o - D lRTMJBT OJ' STAU OnICI OJ' GDHU J JD mS' RUB UJ'AIRS April 25 1949 IOI Oll UllJUl 'OR Subject GSip S A mR o C- Mr halt - r enna - Mr J up - Mr R1c11 er on Mr lUtz Mr lIohlen US CJ'X Progrea on Ger he Secretar r haa r e t d b7 edn a paper on the U S cour e ot action in a po nle CIM rhe attached repre ente the general approach a en'Y18aged bT GJ and 18 not meant to be all inc1uai'Ye deadline et b7 the Secri'-r7 TOur by noon In order to et the CO_eDta are requ eated TUe8 B8lll'7 A l oroa4e Acting eputT 1rector Attachment GA HA Byroade ta DECLASSIFIED AUlhorityN b 31Vtff TOP SE CRE l ----------------- o o -- o ' - DECLASSIFIED Authority Mol b SUBJECT I i'ROGlW FOR A Q 31 ZJHf GEl hANY PROBLEM To consider the poUcy and tactic the US should follow in the event of a CFl on Germ8ll3' FACTS BB ltIl10 ON THE PROBLEMI It follows from the recent meeting of the Foreign iinisters in fashington that the North Allantic Treat1 has a wider signific nce than t hat sit ly of a defense pact and is to be assessed rather in terms of offering the framework for a consolidation of the western world Germany must cons equently be viewed in this light The problem of One of the consequences already has been to make possible an agreement of the three western powers which aims at the inco oration western European system of the major art of Germany itaelf in the By a' closer identification of common interests western Germany figuratively speaking is to be develo 3d as a c1i t1ve me ber of the free community of estern Europe A basic assu ro tion is tha t the process of assimila tion can best be started with the absorp tion of a manageable ortion represented by the three western zones oerta in controls will continue as guar Ulteea of execution but 'ill be gradually liquidated 1n proportion to the pro ess achiev o the long-term implicatione of thie policy call into Question the conception that a reunited GermanT cnn la felT be allol OO to play an independent o or oatensibly neutral role in Euro e ' S lr'F tJ ' o ' J 3 ' iA pf- The facts of the resent situation in in a certain sense cast obsolescence o the hope expressed by Secretary Byrnes in his Stuttgart speech of September 1946 that Germany should b e neither pawn nor artne r of any great owe r combiru tion This does not imply that a reunification of Germany can at no time be tolerated but it does mean that a united Go any must be hold bound by integration in a wider Euro ean free conmunity in t he same degree that i t is intended to absorb western Germany in western Europe The qU S- tions to be resolved are whethor early four-power a6l'eement on Gcr Jan unity can be reached on any other torms than those which would cut o Gerc loose from both the 'estern and eastern systems whether such t er ms I ould promote an extension of the fr ee Euro enn cOlI1Lluni ty or 1ether th y would enable Geroany to play an inde' 'endent role hich would ups et t he or as cnt balance of forces to the detriment of the I'estern nations There is ro ably little doubt that under a system of na tion-wide fr ee elections a crushing anti-communist majority would be the i ' 1r ed iate German r eaction to r ecent Sovi et policy Nevertholess a unifi ed Germany r e-created against the background of present Soviet intentions would a series of elmost insoluble to obvia t e the destructive problems p ow r resent It has been argued that i n order of the veto which the Soviets could employ to orol lote a state of distress conducivA to t he comnunization of Gor e 1Y controls should bo of a oinimal nature virtually to ieavo liertlany the master of its o n policies Politically Gen- any might b e d is oosed to conside r its elf one of the western na tions as long as the latter's prospects oontinued DECLASSIFIED AuthorityNNtJ 31lilf QP SEgEET ' l I t' continued fair' Economically howovor tho East has moro to offor GorT lB l'lY than the Wost and Gomany could devolo'O its natural trado channels in that diroction to strongthon itsolf as well as inovitably tho Sovie t area dogree of Gorcanyl s assoc iation with the Test would always r Llain Tho question- able as long as it wore able to furthor ite own aggrandizoment in bargaining botwoon last and West I'Ihlle Em migllt 80rvo as a tooporary induceoent and chock to keep Germany oriented towards the Vest it is doubtful whether it would prove a sufficiently potent weapon to provont a Germany of uncertain political tempor from oxploiting to tho full a favored position which has boon misused by Gomany in the past to the joopardy of Europoan poaco Nost ioportant is the strain which tho croation of and adjustoen t to a united Gemany would placo upon western Europoan unity lihatovor the logic of tho argument that controls over the now ontity should bo virtually abolished to obtain total exemption froD Soviet interference it is doubtful whether the western nations and in particular Franco could be brought to accept the prospect of a revived Garmany acting as an independent force This now entity would risk subtracting from wostern Europoan solidarity the assured contribution of wostern Garmany under the pr esent program At the best were it to associate itself with westorn Europe it would risk dominating that combination by its sheer nagnitude and increas ed o portunity to strongthen itself as a fro o agont profiting from both tho wostern and eastern political and economic SystoDS At tho worst GerLlany would bo an uncortain factor oither as a strong nationalist state or as a wll lng DECLASSIFIED AUlhority NJJ t 31litf o willing partner of Soviet RUssia in either ovontuality placing an into1erable strain upon the western defen e arrangements Tho above is not intended to mean that the western powers should forevor oKclude German reunification The purpose of the argument is to stress that tho degree and manner of unification must be governed by a safeguarding of the essential interests of the western nations and should not be press ed by the US beyond what it is possible to obtain by COODon agreement with its westorn p8rtners PRQPOSID VBSTEllN PROGRAM The London and Fashington Agroements woro intended to fix B 'ld socuro - tho position of western Ge any within wostorn Europe lt is submitted that a US program for a united Germany should envisage an evolutionary dovolopoent of this principle in -o rder to guaranteo fulfillmont -of the wos t ern nations I requirements in -Gcrnany and to assure thorn by a oajority voting proceduro tho proponderant position they at present dispose of in tho nanagcment of over two-thirds of Gornany the western nations should present at a The substantive prograt which should onbody the principles although not necossarily tho oxact foro of the Washington Agreements adapted in certain details as discussed below FurtherDoro such a progran should adhore to the econooie principles which the westorn nations havo dofonded in previous c Clotings of the eF and have developed to the presont data Agreeuont DECLASSIFIED Authority NIJ 0 '2IZiiSf 9 -5- Aggeement 2g Controls The western German scheme is based on three fundamental documents namely the Occupation Statute the Agreement as to Controls and the Bonn Constitu- tion The first two documents represent in effect a development apolicable to western Germany of the earlier four-power agreement on control machinery as well as certain features of the Potsdam Agreement These four power agreements were explicitly intended to apply to the immediate period fol lowing German surrender The western nations would be able to justify the alternate arrangements for western Germany as being rendered necessary by the impossibility of obtaining four-power agreement to a modification of the earlier provisions which has been long overdue The substitution of a civilian High Commission for the Control Council should be retained in any US preposal in a GEM and would probably be accepted by the Soviets The Washington Agreement on controls was designed to obviate the worst features of a unilateral vote and succeeds in doing this except in two instances The first is the requirement for unanimous approval of amend ments to the German constitution and the other is paragraph 7 which provides for an indefinite suspension of action pending unanimous agreement among the governments in cases where an appeal is made against a majority decision on grounds that such a decision alters or modifies intergovernmental undertakings In all other instances majority decisions take effect after a specified interval of suspension While the Soviets would be able to delay action by a German government under the Washington agreement on controls the latter DECLASSIFIED Authority NH a a latter could nevertheless be Operable with Soviet participation assuming that Soviet agreement could be obtained to the settlement of the basic issues particularly in the economics field To remedy the defects of the present unanimity requirement which would probably prove insuperable in the approval of a German constitution the US should propose the substitution of a uniform majority rule throughout This should be the limit however to which the US should agree in the relaxation of controls over a German government since to go further would risk com mitting the western powers in a CFM to an abandonment of control which they would wish to retain over western Germany in the event that no four-power agreement was reached Occupation Statute The Occupation Statute contains the reserved powers which the western nations would need to retain over the early Operation of an alluGerman government It is not unlikely that the Soviets would also agreo to those powers if indeed they would not wish to add others Soviet obstruction however could be minimized by an adaptation of the Washington control arrangements proposed above The machinery of government and control would doubtless be more cumbersome and difficult but need not prove impracticable if the principle of majority rule is firmly established and if the French -can be persuaded that following the Atlantic Pact it will be to their interest to continue to side with the US and UK on major German issues The DECLASSIFIED Authority NH a 9 Egg German Constitution The constitutional issues and particularly the necessary requirement of free elections throughout Germany under adequate guarantee are likely to prove crucial in a CFM The western powers cannot disregard or abandan the work of the Bonn Parliamentary Council which may take the form of a constitution already approved at the time a CFM meeting is held Accordingly in a GEM the western powers should table the Bonn Constitu- tion as an instrument freely decided by the Germans under the authorization to establish a Federal Government Seviet comments and suggestions could be invited as to how this document could be adapted for use in all of Germany The proposal should be put forward that at the time elections are held for the lower chamber of the Federal Government such elections should be extended under strict international supervision to all of Germany Further- more in order to eliminate the communist-dominated State diets in the Soviet zone the western nations should propose that new elections under inter national supervision be held for State diets throughout Germany Thus delegates from the eastern zone would be included in the new Volkstag and Bundesrat and would have an opportunity to propose suitable amendments to the constitution if such were needed for its application to all of Germany International Supervision It is essential that international supervision be established 1 over 'eleetoral preparations and voting 2 over the German police forces in the various zones and 8 over the activities of the respective occupation forces DECLASSIFIED Authority mm - DEC LASSIF 1 ED Authority Mm forces to the extent necessary to insure that they do not interfere with a free vote It would be desirable that such supervision be carried out by neutral authorities or possibly a UN connission but nixed four pOWer supervision would be acceptable under satisfactory guarantees The latter type of supervision proved effective in the case of the Berlin city elections in October 1946 Dispositions egg Security It would be generally advantageous to the US to propose as part of its program that occupation forces be re-grouped and be concentrated in seaport areas around the periphery of Germany Such a preposal would produce a good effect in Germany and if carried out would obviate day to-day inter ference by occupation forces with the operations of the central and local government It would of course be understood that Germany would be a neutral military area and that forces would be called back into Germany only by decision of the High Commission With resoect to the hilitary security Board set up under the London decisions this could be reorganized on a four power basis to serve as an inapectorate over matters of disarmament and denilitarization It should have authority to submit recommendations to the High Commission by majority vote mm As a gn Egg Egg of agreement the Soviets will doubtless insist upon participation in control over the Ruhr This demand could be handled in two O 9 ways in the following order of preference 1 by allowing the Soviets three votes in the present Ruhr Authority where majority rule prevails or 2 by US withdrawal from the Ruhr Authority in exchange for an understanding that the latter would be an organization of European countries directly concerned in which neither the US nor the Soviet Union would participate Neither alternative is entirely satisfactory since under the first the Soviets would probably side with a German government whereas the latter might leave Germany to the mercy of its chief European competitors The German Eccnonic Pattern and Renaratigng A crucial issue which will run throughout the whole course of the discussions will be Germany's econoxic organization and future While the majority vote procedure would nominally give a preponderant influence to the western nations it is questionable whether the necessary preliminary basic agreements can be reached with the Soviets on such questions as reparations a unified import export program and the requirements for external assistance The western Allies must insist on their conceot of German economic unity maintained in previous CFM meetings as well as upon a structure which will permit Germanyfs association with ERP The obstacle upon which agreement is likely to founder will probably again be Soviet reparations demands In view of the threeapower decision on dismantling and on the requirenonts of BRP the US could agree to no deliveries of reparations to the Soviet Union beyond the latter's share consisting of the plants set aside from among those new scheduled for dismantling Furthernore the question of deliveries falling DECLASSIFIED l a -10 511138 within the terms of the prescribed lists would likewise arise The western nations' economic progran based on their present pattern would fern an essential part of their over- ll plan and would serve at an early stage to test out Soviet intentions and the validity of their own coz pro honsivc progrsn A 92m has mm The US should maintain its previous stand that a peace conference on Ger-ram should not be held until ever-ell four-power agreement had been reached respecting a Gen'an settlement and until a Ger an government had been in existence for a sufficient period to prove its ability to administer Germany in a satisfactory manor The Soviets will doubtless present a progra strongly propagandist in nature Its attractiveness will orobably consist of general oreposals for the immediate establishment of a German government and for the early conclusion of a peace treaty to be followed by troop withdrawal It will also tend to create the i prossion that Ger-new would be neutralized and would be given a high degree ofautonozo' in the management of its own affairs Close analysis would axiom reveal the weakness of this program It could be made apparent that in reality the Soviets will not agree to measures necessary for Gorumry's eoonoznic smvival and are also unwilling to permit the Germans the sale degree of political freedom as the western ulies have done The Soviets are bound to reiterate their negative stand on DECLASSIFIEI Authority W0 lm on a number of issues of great importance to German public Opinion These will be their exorbitant reparations claim their intention to retain the preperty they have amassed since Germany's surrender and their comnitment to the present eastern administrative frontier On these last three questions the Soviets will probably remain highly vulnerable Given the differences in approach toward the German problem it is not likely that agreement can be reached with the Soviets on a unified Germany The best course the US can adept is to propose a program which it believes is in the best interests of western Europe and Germany and which it could honestly accept if the Soviets agreed For tactical reasons such a plan should not be presented as the London and Washington Agreements It should take the form of a comprehensive plan embodying the main principles of the Occupation Statute the Agreement on Controls a political organization represented by the Bonn Constitution and the western requirements for economic unity and Germany's association with ERP These principles should be explained seriatin be submitted to Soviet challenge and be defended against Soviet attack by inquiry concerning the manner in which the Soviets would propose to handle each problem at issue This approach could be so deveIOped as to place the western powers in the favorable position of presenting a constructive program in an initial general discussion with the Soviets It would represent the substance of the western German arrange ments presented against the background of the western Allies' objective to incorporate Mun DEC LASSIF IED Authority Mm incorporate Germany in a EurOpean free community Assuming that a CFM will begin with a general discussion of this kind it should formulate the specific agenda in such a way as to give high priority to reparations foreign property holdings and frontiers as regards which the Soviets have outreached themselves On this basis Soviet real inten tions can be readily revealed and demolished if they remain the same The above deals solely with the presentation of a basic program in a GFM and does not attempt to cover further develoPments which would follow in the event of Soviet non acceptance GA April 21 1949 DECLASSIFIED Authority NH This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu