lJ' L JU ' l NU l'UKJ LCN U l SI' M i 7iru llirj u s DEPARTMENT OF STATE UIIe-JJIO a1'UltfIJI DIRECTOR OF INTElLIGENCE AND RESEARCH REU-34 August 13 1965 322 To Through From sis Subject The Significance of NATO -- Present and Future The Secretary INR - Thomas L Hughes L Before long some of the basic assumptions underlying the North Atlantic Treaty Organization indeed its very existence in its present form may face a challenge from France The following Research Memorandum puts forward in hroad outline some ideas as to the nature of NATO as the principal framework for U S -West European relations It discusses the significance and especially the non-military significance of NATO to its uropean members And it attempts to show what the possibi l i ties are for adaptation of NATO into a more useful instrument of U S policy in the world as it has changed since the Alliance's birth ABSTRACT The main arguments of this Research Memorandum are as follows 1 NATO has become the generally accepted vehicle for a dominant U S presence politically and militarily in West Europe 2 lfuen West Europe was toeak 10 to 15 years ago NATO's main function and orientation was military 3 Now Vest Europe is not only economically and politically strong but considers that the threat of Soviet attack has been replaced by a U S -- USSR nuclear stalemate NATO has therefore become to a considerable degree in fact though not in form and bureaucratic outlook an instrumentality for regulating political issues within the West 4 All NATO members except for France with its special Gaullist out- look want NATO to go on and want the U S to stay in West Europe not only for continued security but also in order not to jeopardize the political equilibrium which NATO ensures in the whole region especially including West SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority 7 'l 2 aJIIOIJP S d at 12 P ilO-C will 1 a r automat1cally declassifle4 L I f n v V lu I UI1 U l o 1l t ' - ii - Germany which might other wise be a highly disturbing factor 5 As long as the U S remains committed to West Europe's defense and is militarily present there the USSR can almost certainly be deterred from aggression on the continent even if NATO itself does not continue in existence 6 Yet NATO remains essential to the U S as a well established an 1 easily available instrument for exercising American political influence in Europe and it is important for U S objectives that France not be seen to be winning out over the U S on such a critical issue as NATO's continuance 7 If it is also to serve still broader U S purposes NATO should probably try to do more to harmonize the many divergent U S and West European political and economic interests both in Europe and on a worldwide basis 8 The key factors that will determine whether NATO can evolve in this direction are to be found least in the nuclear field -- the one area where U S supremacy is unchallenged by the West Europeans and can scarcely be altered -but may be substantial in the political field SIlCRBT NO fOUIGli DISSEH DECLASSIPIt D- Authority - l 1o 7 A series of clearly articulated warnings about French dislike for NATO and French determination either to change the North Atlantic Alliance drastically or to detach France from the Alliance make it probable that sometime before 1969 the Organization wi 11 face a dras tic challenge to its continued exis tence at leas t in its present form In considering how to confront this issue the United States must first be sure that it has clearly in mind 1 what NATO now represents 2 what functions it performs on the European scene and 3 wh a t objectives it fulfils for the United States With these data in hand it should be somewhat easier to assess the significance of French presence in or absence from NATO as well as the feasibility of achieving U S aims through some instrumentality other than NATO NATO is the expression of the need which West Europe has felt since 1945 for outside military support to counterbalance nearby Soviet power It provides the framework which institutionalizes and legitimates America's role as the dominant pm er in Jest Europe It has allowed the countries of Jest Europe behind the shield of American strength to concentrate on economic recovery and grmlth and to devote a smaller share of their resources to defense than either the U S or the USSR The existence of the Alliance has also meant that the U S has at least generally consulted these states on matters outside Europe on which without it many of them would have had no opportunity either to be informed or to express opinions On the other hand these states have played an e oo entially subordinate role to the u S The Inte rated mi litary structure of NATO is dominated by U S officers in top command posts while through the political machinery the U S seeks to line up maximum understanding and occasionally backing for its foreign policies on a global basis generally and within the European-North American region in particular The root cause for this state of affairs was the weakness of West Europe after World War II economically politically and militarily combined with the existence of a mighty Soviet military machine that was perceived to have hostile and perhaps aggressive intentions This does not accurate ly describe the situation which now prevails True the Soviet military machine is still powerful and more than a match even for any combination of West European nations by themselves However in the general evaluation of West European leaders and public alike the threat of direct aggression has now considerably receded The Vest Germans attributed this almost entirely to NATO's strength and are inclined to think or at least to argue that there is a real danger that the USSR may return to more menacing policies Most other Europeans while not denying the importance of NATO's i e America's strength for purpose of deterrence and of counterbalancing Soviet political weight prefer to believe that in addition the nature of the Soviet problem has changed to a major degree They ascribe this to the Sino-Soviet dispute to East European de-satellization to a U S -Soviet nuclear stalemate to internal changes within the Soviet Union to enhanced Soviet interest in developments on other continents to the general decline of Communist Party strength and action potential in West Europe and to general Soviet satisfaction with the European status guo They do not deny that the USSR could revert to direct threats against t est Europe but they think this unlikely even i f they allow for ups and downs in the level of East-West detente SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLAsSIFIED AuthoritY Z 7 St CIU- 'l' NU 'UKl' l N 1J1S t M - 2 - Not only is the ori inal military rationale for NATO's existence thus s omewhat unde rcut in l cst European eye s but there has also been a drastic change in the othe r crucial causal factor West Europe's weakness In spite of the loss o f coloni es and empires the West European stat es have new worldwide political presti ge as stable and developed countries Moreover they have made unprecedented economic progress and far from heing economdcal1y dependent on the United States they are equals in a tremendous variety of commercial financial and economic links They bargain actively and fearlessly on these que stions with America and Washington must take their views and proposals into account From their newly-won positions of strength vis-a-vis the United States and in the current absence of any serious fear of Soviet aggression the West European nations are able to re-examine their relationship with the United State s against which they have a number of cumulative grievances big or little real or imagined There is envy of U S wealth and power particularly by countries that were themselves formerly world powers There is noticeable unhappiness about the fairly consistent American failure to consult with and take advice from its NATO allies before undertaking major new policy departures even though they must often share the consequences There is resistance against American attempts to enroll its allies into supporting U S policies elsewhere in the world which are of little or no concern to lIest Europeans or which may not accord with specifically lIest European interests There is often a dislike for the style and tone in hid U S foreign policy is conducted There are residual resentments over s uch incidents as Suez There is concern especially among the smaller powers and in Socialist circles about Washington's supposed tendency to support reactionary regimes and causes While these fee lings exist fairly broadly under the surface they are outwei ghed in most 1 'est European countries by other factors which continue to make the U S presence and even its political and military pre-eminence not only tole rable but positively desirable Indeed only the French Government has come to an opposite conclusion and in consequence launched an active campaign to undo NATO and the American role y this divergence of outlook between France and the other 13 NATO members has come about and what it implies for NATO's future is well worth examining Relatively little need be said here about France's current posture Essentially de Gaulle has decided that his overriding purpose will be to restore France to a leading position in world affairs from which it Can act independently in regard to political and military proble llS Not only does American involvement in Europe inhibit such a French role and make it seem of only secondary importance but in de Gaulle's view U S hegemony also prevents certain desirable regional policies from being realized These thwarted policies would include a West European rapprochement with Eastern Europe and the USSR and the emergence of first West European states and eventually all European states acting in concert perhaps in confederation as an independent power base with its own global interests to pursue and protect o The only solution therefore is for France to work to undermine the NATO structure which it sees as a key instrumentality for preserving the present American position in Europe DECLASSIFIED Authority l'7't2 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM SEC R T I NO I'ORlC1r N IHSS M - ' - The o th e r est Europ eans and Can a da sh a r e to a de g ree some of de Gaulle's ge neral as pirations for e nh a ncing Europ e 's stature but they strong ly disagree with the means which he seeks to e mploy to attain his ends They believe that I'est Europe is not ready f o r a r e turn to its old pre ar habits of powe r poli tics which could ar ai n propel t he nations of the continent into rival power g roupings promote nation a lism and disturb indispensable cooperative ventures in economic and other fi e lds They are most especially anxious not to turn West Germany loose into such an environment be cause they cannot see where that country would lead them amidst the uncertainties of the unyielding problems of Germany and Central Europe Th ey are much less certain than de Gaull e of the feasibility of taming the USSR and freeing the Soviet satellites in a new framework of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals As a consequence of these various factors the y feel a g enuine need for the U S presence in this situation and they value NATO as the established mod a lity through which America can easily and almost painlessly make its power operative in preserving West European s tability For 1 lest Europ ean s therefore NATO is now a framework within which the y Ilave achieved and can maint a in cert in satisfactory political equilibrium among the mselves JATO integ rates 'est Germany into their re gion without upsettin r the balance because even Germany is greatly overshadowed by the U S NATO sharply reduces the s c oP for traditional power politics among the Hest Europeans indeed it also provides an umbrella bene a th which th e mbryonic instituti ons of 1 lest Europe a n economic and political unity can grow NATO encourages habits of joint international planning and stabilizes the foreign and domestic policies of its members It also permits the West Europeans the luxury of not spendi ng as much on defense as they would probably have to do in its absence because of the U S commitment and it gives military assurance about such orries as they still entertain concerning Soviet military capabilities and intentions By and large the foregoing catalogue also covers current American inte r es ts in Hest Europe Fundamentally the U S wants a stable and prosperous North Atlantic area which is growing internally towards greater unit y of purpose and to 1ards g reater understanding of its long-range similarity of interest with the United States vis-a-vis both the USSR and the rest of the world Ilashington opposes a ny tendencies to a revival of internal dissensions within Wes t Europe or to any resurgence of hostility between East and lIest Europe whether because of Germany or any other serious problem To ensure against such contingenci es as w ll as to safeguard its own commercial and political interests in 'e s t Europe the U S wants to safeguard its position of great influence in the area No means of accomplishing these objectives is likely to appear which will be as efficacious as NATO See RH REV-3 Western Europe Looks at Germany August 4 1965 Confidential No Foreign Dissern Controlled Dissern SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM I D AdIIariIy 7'1 I SECRET NO FOREIGN DI SSEM - - 4 - That thes e vital polit ica l arrangements have to be rationalized in the cont ex t of a military alliance imposes ce rtain problems There is inevitable pressure for this alliance to justify itself by references to a Soviet menace ev n though this menace is l e ss actively felt than i t was The orientation of NATO's military and civilian bureaucracies is quite naturally toward military problems a nd solutions and there is the danger that this can lead to an overly expensive emphasis on confrontation with the USSR and to an immobility when it comes to exploiting opportunities to decrease East-West tension Nevertheless this is a problem that alert political leadership should be able to minimize and in any event it does not appear to pose so serious an issue that the other many manifest advantages of NATO for the United States should be surrendered In fact from a strictly military point of view NATO in its existing form is probably not now indispensable to American purposes nor will it be over the next five years or so The protection which the U S now extends to the West European countries could presumably be managed by a series of bilateral or other agreements The e agreements perhaps supplemented by arrangements for loose staff and plannin coordination amon Alliance countries a concept often associated with de Gaulle while less dependable and effective than the NATO system would still probably suffice to avert an active and credible Soviet military threat to Western Europe Indeed as long as the U S remains militarily committed to and present in the area and as long as the general U S Soviet strategic nuclear halance stays unimpaired it is unlikely that Soviet military stren th will be able to disturb West Europe psychologically whatever the framework for military alignment among the North Atlantic countries In other words the resulting situation might be less satisfactory for preparing for a war or for fighting one if worse came to worst but it would probably be sufficient to deter one This however is no justification for complacency about NATO It is important for the protection of American interests in Europe and for American influence there that France not be seen to be winning its battle against the U S presence It is important that West Germany not be cast adrift politically and not be forced down a road which would require it to create a high command structure that does not now even exist because all Bundeswehr forces are committed to SACEUR It is important that countries such as Denmark with anti-military traditions have an acceptable way such as via NATO to 1 ustify a military establishment It is important to have a forum where the many political issues of common concern to NATO member countries or even of individual concern to a few of them can be aired and discussed Oespite these values of NATO however France's European fellow members of the Alliance do not want to make the issue of NATO's continued existence SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEH DECLASSIFIED Authority 2 7 J I A ft l 1 1IIV r u r r H I' I U 1 'P' M - 5 th e occasion for 3 final shnw-down between France and its allies France is invnlved in a hMt of regional relationships with other European countries outside of NATO to which reat importance is attached This is especially true of the Benelux nations Germany and Italy which with France make up the tt l ree European Communi ties As much as these states regret Paris t attitude toward NATO they strongly hope to avoid active conflict with France on that subject If France insists on leavin NATO they cannot stop it but they seek to avoid iving Paris any pretext for such a move and they would prefer that the partin take place with minimal fuss and minimal repercussions in other fields In fact if France eventually left NATO they would hope to work out a modus vivendi even on military matters and to effect a restoration of French participation in NATO affairs after de Gaulle's departure from active rule This situation points to the eneral desirability of maintaining as much o f the NATO organization as is possible even if France withdraws This is not to pretend that quite apart from the serious military logistic and strategic problems raised by French departure there would not be grave political consequences for Western Europe A est European or anizatlon without France would be something less than a healthy and normal political animal Yet all problems would only be heightened by abandoning the field to France Indeed the most likely way of inducing Paris to reverse field -- after de Gaulle and assuming that de Gaulle will before his demise have pulled France out of NATO -- would be to demonstrate that the resolve of the other 14 NATO states to remain united is firm and that France has only harmed itself rather than profited from its unpopular actions Besides the clearly evident determination of the 14 to stick with NATO might even induce modifications in de Gaulle's tactics and short-run goals durin any ne otiations that France might initiate with its allies from 1966 on regarding modifications of NATO There does not then appear to be any serious reason why NATO should not be able to carry on with adjustments and with a willingness to allocate new funds for vital alternate infrastructure facilities in spite of French disruptive tactics However this is by no means the same as saying that the other member states are entirely enamored with conditions in the Alliance as they are Even when the position of France is set aside it cannot any longer be thought that NATO's European members are prepared to accept without question either the total identity of their interests with those of the United States or the judgment of the United States as to what policies and actions in their interests They well understand that the United States as a superpower confronts problems and bear responsibilities entirely commensurate with their own Yet their membership of NATO involves or potentially involves For a discussion of de Gaulle's policy toward the Alliance and the circumstances in which he may decide to leave it or remain in it see RH REO-17 De Gaulle and the North Atlantic Alliance May 4 1965 Secret No Foreign Dissem Controlled Dissem S RET RO l ORJI IGN DISSEM DECLAsSIFIED - Aulbority m 0 7 SECRET NO FOREI GN DISSEM - 6 - them i n the consequences of Ameri can actions in many parts of the world Thus while they do not overestimate the extent to which their views and wishes can be taken into ac count by the United States in the conduct of American foreign pol icy on a global basis they understandably want a chance to make the se views known beforehand In cases where they have immediate interests they want these to be given due weight As a minimum they want to be able to cover their political flanks domestically in adva ce of U S action instead of being caught short by faits accomplis They argue that they will be able to support the U S more effectively at home if they are prepared for U S actions rather than surprised by them Unless possibly divergent U S and West European interests on many problems can be aired ahead of time and unless the U S can give the appearance -- and occasionally the substance -- of taking its allies' views carefully into account before finally adopting positions and baSic poliCies the existing strains in the NATO fabric will continue though this is not to say that they will by themselves rend NATO assunder To be sure no one in West Europe expects the U S t o withhold action in any urgent crisis sucb as in 1962 over Soviet missiles in -Cuba until it has first consulted its allies And also it is true that there are already many subjects on which there is advance discussion in the North Atlantic Council -- Germany Berlin certain moves vis-a-vis the USSR some disarmament matters export controls etc Yet there are many other matters which NAC learns about ex post facto or else only bilaterally or t ough the press Washington's past diagnoses of NATO's problems have not been concentrated in this political area but rather in the military field Indeed since 1959 there have been a number of American efforts to give the appearance of a multilateralization of influence and to a lesser degree of control in the nuclear field The Athens Guidelines of 1962 the establishment of a NATC Nuclear Committee and Secretary McNamara's recent plan for a NATO Select Committee are examples of the ingenuity of the United States and the MLF ANF project thougb it aims to promote a number of broad objectives also concerns itself with rruclear-military arrangeraente Nevertheless it is well to reiterate that the nuclear field is precisely the one area where the U S role is not only the most recognised and accepted by almost all other NATO members but also the one where the least can be done substantially to change the existing state of affairs The West Eurnpeans are aware that the hard facta of nuclear arms and missile research and production the long U S head start over any West European country the strong American impulse against nuclear proliferation and Washington's unreadiness to surrender ultimate decisionmaking power over the use of U S rruclear weapons all pose sharp limits to lUlclear sharing plans under American auspices Tbis of course does not mean that they would deprecate whatever moves can be made in thia field in practical ways to devise palliative measures which can soothe whatever Allied sensitivities may exist over the conspicuousness of U S nuclear predominance SEX RET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECL AUIbority 2 l SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM - 7 BYen if nuclear problem have been allowed t o become one of NATO' s most promine nt preoccupations a more significant question may still be the exte nt to which NATO can and should be used as a forum for the discussion and formulation of broad policie s on such issues as move in the United Nations basic disarmament proposals actions in regard to Communist China tactics in the Middle East plans for coping with potential crisis points before the crises happen and so forth The choice for the United States seemS to lie between on the one hand routinely submitting important foreign policy decisions to the advance scrutiny comment and IBrhaps even modification of its NATO allies and thus surrendering if only to a limited extent its uninhibited freedom of action and on the other hand a continuation or even an intensification of the lack of political cohesiveness in the Alliance It is not suggested that this lack of cohesiveness is fatal to the Alliance but only that NATO is not likely to evolve as a more tightly knit political alliance if this is what Washington believes to be desirable unless the U S can and does incorporate the interests of its allies as expressed by them into its own decision-making process Merely to put the question in this way may expose so many difficulties as to make the answer obvious that greater inter-Allied political consensus is a will-othe-wisp hardly attainable on a lobal hasis Even in regard to the future shape of Western and Eastern Europe there are some major differences of objective among major NATO members such as Great Britain France and Germany In respect to the rest of the world divergencies are still more evident Many NATO countries would be content to adopt fairly neutral positions on the conflicts and tensions of Asia Africa and Latin America they are less than enthusiastic over U S involvement Others have their own special interests such as Portugal's in Africa or Britain's in the Far East which will not get broad NATO 8upport It may therefore well be pondered whether such broad-ranging U S consultation -- assuming that the security difficulty of possible leaks in NAC could be ovorcome -- would improve inter-Allied relationships unless they actually helped to achieve a meeting of the minds at least in some instances Yet as noted there is a serious question whether a meeting of minds on important issues except perhaps European issues can often be achieved when the 15 nations involved have so many dissimilarities in their respective views of proper policies for given problems and crises This memorandum does not suggest that there is an easy answer to this query but only that it should be recognized that it is here that the problem of NATO's future evolution lies rather t n in NATO's military or organizational aspects SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM DECLASSIFIED Authority m tl t This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu