Joint Concept for Entry Operations 7 April 2014 Distribution Statement A Approved for Public Release INTENTIONALLY BLANK ii FOREWORD The Joint Concept for Entry Operations describes in broad terms my vision for how joint forces will enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions This includes conducting entry in the presence of armed opposition characterized by increasingly advanced area denial systems as well as where the environment and infrastructure may be degraded or austere JCEO describes the broad range of purposes for entry operations that expands this challenging set of military operations beyond the more limited scope that exists in current joint doctrine which is focused on forcible entry Coupled with the challenge of gaining and maintaining access operating in the presence of sophisticated missile cyberspace and potentially WMD armed opponents these operations will stress the future joint force when called upon to deter or defeat aggression on foreign territory Therefore this concept reviews the problem of entry operations and offers key ideas to solving this set of obstacles to effectively projecting force in such situations Each Service has a vital role in ensuring that we can successfully conduct entry This concept was developed with representation from each of the Services and from across the Joint Staff in coordination with the combatant commands multinational partners and other key stakeholders The need for maintaining our ability to enter foreign territory when directed by the national command authority is clear Once access is achieved we must be able to accomplish all assigned missions ashore both in the littoral regions and further inland The Joint Concept for Entry Operations is a critical step in ensuring that the joint force retains the ability to do so ______________________________________ MARTIN E DEMPSEY General U S Army iii INTENTIONALLY BLANK iv JOINT CONCEPT FOR ENTRY OPERATIONS JCEO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Sustaining U S Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense requires the Joint Force to successfully project power despite anti-access area denial A2 AD challenges Guided by the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020 CCJO JF2020 and directly supporting the Joint Operational Access Concept version 1 0 JOAC this concept describes how the Joint Force will conduct entry operations in support of a broader national approach It focuses on operations in hostile and uncertain environments where opposition is possible or expected and where such opponents may possess advanced area denial capabilities In opposed as well as unopposed operations geographic and infrastructure impediments may significantly inhibit the deployment and entry of joint and multinational forces into an operational area As a result most of the required capabilities articulated by this concept can also be used to conduct entry in degraded or austere environments where opposition to entry operations does not exist Finally while overcoming anti-access threats in getting to the theater is required it does not eliminate the need to continue to defend against these threats while overcoming area denial challenges during and after entry Purpose and scope of JCEO JOAC is the Chairman’s vision for overcoming A2 AD threats in the future security environment Gaining and maintaining access to an operational area is described within the JOAC family of concepts Exploiting the advantage of freedom of access to an operational area JCEO focuses on the integration of force capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign territory within an operational area JCEO establishes a common intellectual framework for the challenge of entry in advanced A2 AD environments informs subsequent joint and Service concepts and identifies potential developmental actions to improve the ability of the future Joint Force to project and employ military forces onto foreign territory to accomplish assigned missions New framework for entry operations Joint doctrine JP 3-18 Joint Forcible Entry Operations defines forcible entry as the “seizing and holding of a lodgment in the face of armed opposition ” and lodgment as “a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that when seized and held makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations ” The JOAC and operational experience gained over the past three decades indicate the future Joint Force must enter onto foreign territory for a number of purposes to enable the realization of broader strategic goals A comprehensive list of purposes includes v 1 To defeat threats to the access and use of the global commons 2 To find control defeat disable and or dispose of specific Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD threats 3 To conduct other limited duration missions 4 To assist populations and groups 5 To establish a lodgment Evolving trends This concept is applicable to the future security environment described in CCJO JF2020 and the JOAC In particular three trends set out in the JOAC promise to further complicate the challenge of opposed entry for U S joint forces They include 1 The dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area 2 The changing U S overseas defense posture 3 The emergence of space and cyberspace as increasingly important and contested domains Importance of preconditions The challenge of entry is heavily dependent upon pre-existing conditions and the effectiveness of pre-crisis operations conducted by the Joint Force Consequently success in entry often will depend on efforts to gain access and set entry conditions in advance which in turn requires a coordinated interagency approach The Joint Force will attempt to shape the operational area in advance of conflict through a variety of security and engagement activities as described in the CCJO JF2020 pg 13 such as multinational exercises access and support agreements establishment and improvement of overseas bases prepositioning of supplies and forward deployment of forces However entry opposed by capable and determined adversaries may require advance combat or other operations by the Joint Force to establish certain minimum conditions for the entry force The Military Problem The future Joint Force must be able to enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions in the presence of armed opposition including advanced area denial systems while overcoming geographic challenges and degraded or austere infrastructure Overcoming this challenge requires capabilities from across the entire Joint Force to conduct support and exploit entry operations The Central Idea Full integration of force capabilities across domains To meet that challenge future mission-tailored joint forces will establish appropriate operational conditions and conduct entry by fully integrating force capabilities across multiple domains exploiting gaps in an adversary’s defenses at select entry points to achieve operational objectives The idea is to employ opportunistic unpredictable maneuver in and across multiple domains in conjunction with the ability to attain local superiority at multiple entry points to gain entry and achieve desired objectives This local vi domain superiority may not be permanent more often it will be temporary After landing the entry forces themselves may be able to achieve the operational objectives and then extract thus not requiring the introduction of follow-on forces In other operations entry forces may need to transition the effort to follow-on joint or coalition forces or in some cases non-military partners Conducting joint entry operations requires mission-tailored joint forces that are organized trained and equipped with unique capabilities Missiontailoring begins with a thorough understanding of the purposes for the operational task of entry that can differ in intent and duration as well as the type and quantity of forces required Command and control structures for these operations must allow joint commanders to integrate all forces joint and multinational across combatant command boundaries in order to conduct maneuver through multiple domains to achieve entry even in immature theaters of operations A mission-tailored joint force capable of entry operations is comprised of integrated joint forces and most likely multinational forces made up of four types Support Forces Initial Entry Forces Reinforcing Entry Forces and Follow-on Forces To be globally agile forces capable of entry must be properly postured in order to permit rapid forming of a mission-tailored force sufficiently responsive to emerging crises It is important to note that not all entry operations require all types of forces In the conduct of entry operations mission-tailored joint forces will rely on support from the U S homeland intermediate staging bases mobile joint sea-bases expeditionary airfields and seaports to project power The Joint Force will then envelop infiltrate or penetrate in and across multiple domains at select points of entry to place the enemy at an operational disadvantage Maximizing surprise through deception stealth and ambiguity maneuvering through multiple domains during entry presents many potential threats to an adversary disrupting his decision cycle and exploiting critical vulnerabilities This allows the Joint Force to seize and retain the initiative while minimizing vulnerabilities during force buildup Required capabilities The concept identifies 21 required capabilities the future Joint Force will need to effectively conduct entry in an increasingly contested environment characterized by adversaries equipped with advanced area denial capabilities vii INTENTIONALLY BLANK Table of Contents Foreword iii Executive Summary v 1 Introduction 1 2 Purpose 5 3 Scope 5 4 Key Assumptions 5 5 Entry Operations in the Future Operating Environment 6 6 The Military Problem Entry in an Advanced Area Denial Environment 10 7 A Concept for Joint Entry Operations 10 Establish Appropriate Operational Conditions 11 Form Mission-tailored Joint Forces for Entry Operations 14 Conduct Entry by Integrating Force Capabilities Across Multiple Domains 19 Transition to Achieve Operational Objectives 21 8 Capabilities Required by this Concept 23 9 Risks of Adopting this Concept 33 10 Conclusion 35 Annex A Glossary A-1 Annex B Description of Challenges to Entry Operations B-1 Annex C Entry Operations Flowchart C-1 Annex D Bibliography D-1 List of Figures Figure 1 JCEO Challenges B-4 ix INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1 Introduction Guided by the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Joint Force 2020 CCJO JF2020 and as a supporting concept to the Joint Operational Access Concept Version 1 0 JOAC this concept describes how Joint Forces will conduct entry operations in an environment of advanced area denial systems possessed by a variety of potential enemies and under a variety of conditions as part of unified action Familiarity with the JOAC is essential to understanding the ideas expressed in this concept 1 The concept focuses primarily on operations in hostile and uncertain environments which may contain advanced area denial systems and includes overcoming geographic and infrastructure impediments that may inhibit the execution of joint and multinational entry operations As a result most of the required capabilities articulated by this concept can also be used to conduct entry in degraded or austere environments where opposition to entry operations does not exist This concept is based on a general review of current Joint and Service doctrine and of historical entry operations since the 1918 St George’s Day Raid on the port facilities at Zeebrugge Belgium see vignette on pg 3 as well as an in-depth analysis of the entry operations conducted between 1987 and the present The in-depth effort covered 25 case studies beginning with Operation EARNEST WILL2 in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 through Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR in Pakistan in 20113 Additionally the concept was informed and guided by a thorough review of Joint and Service intelligence estimates the current CJCS Joint Strategy Review and current concepts Joint Multi-Service and Service Joint doctrine defines forcible entry as the “seizing and holding of a lodgment in the face of armed opposition ” and lodgment as “a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that when seized and held makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations ” 4 5 Operations over the last 25 years and predictions of the future operating environment indicate that entry operations will be necessary for a number JOAC’s three foundational future trends apply to JCEO 1 Anti-access and area-denial weapons and technologies are dramatically improving and proliferating 2 U S overseas defense posture is changing and 3 space and cyberspace are becoming increasingly important and contested domains Joint Operational Access Concept Version v1 0 17 Jan 12 pg 14 http www defense gov pubs pdfs JOAC Jan 2012 Signed pdf 2 Overview of Operation EARNEST WILL Wise Harold Lee Inside the Danger Zone The U S Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-1988 Naval Institute Press 2007 Annapolis Maryland pg 55 3 Overview of the entry phase of Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR Bergen Peter L Manhunt The Ten Year Search for Bin Laden from 911 to Abbottabad Broadway Paperbacks 2012 New York pgs 215-216 4 Definition of Forcible Entry DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms http www dtic mil doctrine DOD_dictionary accessed 5 Jun 13 5 Definition of Lodgment DOD Dictionary of and Associated Terms http www dtic mil doctrine DOD_dictionary accessed 5 Jun 13 1 1 of purposes They are Purposes to Conduct Entry Operations  To defeat threats to the access and use  Defeat threats to the access and use of the global commons of the global commons  Find Control defeat disable and or dispose of  To find control defeat disable and or specific WMD threats dispose of specific Weapons of Mass  Conduct other limited duration missions Destruction WMD threats  Assist populations and groups  To conduct other limited duration  Establish a lodgment missions  To assist populations and groups  To establish a lodgment The ideas explained here expand the discussion of entry operations to the projection and immediate employment of military forces from the sea or through the air onto foreign territory to accomplish assigned missions Entry operations enable broader strategic goals such as removing threats to the free flow of commerce interdicting WMD threats demonstrating U S resolve in response to a crisis which includes showing support for international mandates deterring aggression or when necessary defeating enemy forces on foreign territory Unopposed entry operations can deliver critical relief supplies equipment and tailored forces to repair or create the infrastructure required for follow-on  Entry Operations The projection and support of humanitarian and disaster immediate employment of military forces from relief operations the sea or through the air onto foreign territory to accomplish assigned missions As a follow-on effort to the JOAC  Anti-Access Those actions and capabilities this work assumes the Joint Force was usually long-range designed to prevent an successful in gaining and maintaining opposing force from entering an operational access to an operational area with enough area JOAC freedom of action to project and maneuver  Area Denial Those actions and capabilities forces inside it in order to accomplish the usually of shorter range designed not to keep 6 mission Having achieved access the an opposing force out but to limit its freedom entry force will maneuver onto foreign of action within the operational area JOAC territory potentially in the face of armed opposition This does not mean that all anti-access threats are eliminated rather that the primary focus of operations shifts to the generally shorter-range nature of AD threats on foreign territory See the JOAC supporting concept titled Air-Sea Battle ASB Concept v9 0 9 May 2012 which addresses achieving access to an operational area ASB leverages the integration of Service capabilities to gain and maintain the advantage in the air land maritime space and cyberspace domains including the global commons Exploiting this advantage of freedom of access to an operational area JCEO focuses on the integration of force capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign territory within an operational area 6 2 Entry Operations Historical Vignettes  Defeat threats to the access and use of the global commons Operation Z-O St George’s Day Raid 23 April 1918 o Overview Operation Z-O was a direct action raid by the Royal Navy Marines and Air Force intended to disable the enemy ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend in Belgium in the Spring of 1918 during World War I The goal was to disable the port facilities with a Royal Marines ground attack intentional sinking of “block ships” in the narrow shipping channels and the detonation of an explosive laden submarine under a key pier mole to ensure that German submarines and PT boats could not access the English Channel and threaten British use of the high seas This operation while not completely successful set the stage for future successful raids to eliminate threats to the global commons such as the World War II St Nazaire Raid on 28 November 1942 o Reference Prince Stephen The Blocking of Zeebrugge Operation Z-O Osprey Publishing 20 Feb 2012  Find Control defeat disable and or dispose of specific WMD threats Operation GUNNERSIDE Special Operations Executive SOE mission to dispose of Nazi Germany’s Heavy Water Resources in Norway 16 - 28 February 1943 o o Overview A World War II combined special operation whereby a select group of Britishtrained expatriate Norwegian commandos parachuted into occupied Norway on 16 February 1943 These commandos then infiltrated by ski to the German heavy water production facilities at Rjukan Norway and succeeded in destroying the production equipment and all heavy water supplies on the night of 28 February 1943 The Norwegian commandos then successfully extracted by ski some 500 km to Sweden Reference Haukelid Knut Skis Against the Atom North American Heritage Press 1989  Conduct other limited duration missions Operation JUST CAUSE Complex series of entry operations conducted near simultaneously December 1989 o Overview On 20 December 1989 the United States commenced military operations against Panama to combat drug trafficking to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty and to bring General Manuel Noriega to justice On the first day of operations the US force of nearly 13 000 already in Panama augmented by 7 000 personnel conducting multiple entry operations attacked and secured 27 locations distributed across Panama Over the next several days US forces in Panama grew to 27 000 personnel consisting of 22 000 Soldiers 3 400 Airmen 900 Marines and 700 Sailors Forces included mechanized airborne light infantry military police and civil affairs from the Army air mobility attack close air support and information operations from the Air Force light armored infantry from the Marines surface craft and medical assets from the Navy and Special Operations Forces from all Services At the time Operation JUST CAUSE was the largest entry operation since the end of the Vietnam War o Reference Operation Just Cause Panama Joint History Office Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995 3 Entry Operations Historical Vignettes continued  Assist populations and groups Operation RESTORE HOPE Foreign Humanitarian Assistance in Somalia 5 December 1992 – 04 May 1993 o Overview Beginning with Special Reconnaissance missions by U S Navy special warfare units the U S Marines of 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit MEU conducted an unopposed amphibious assault on 9 Dec 1992 at several locations in and around Mogadishu Somalia The operation was a UN-sanctioned effort to ensure humanitarian assistance relief supplies and foodstuffs could be delivered to the starving people of Somalia The complete breakdown of government function and the presence of numerous warring factions in Somalia in the early 1990s prevented delivery of humanitarian aid to the country by normal means Thus multinational military forces led by the U S Armed Forces were necessary in order to establish the conditions required by civilian aid agencies to conduct humanitarian relief in the cities and the countryside Although relief efforts continued to experience significant interference by Somali warlords and criminal elements in many areas of the country overall the operation did provide significant aid and relief to the most needy in the population of Somalia o Reference Mroczkowski Col Dennis P USMCR Retired Restoring Hope In Somalia with the Unified Task Force 1992-1993 USMC History Division Washington D C 2005 and Stewart Dr Richard W The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994 Center of Military History 25 January 2012  Establish a lodgment Operation CHROMITE Amphibious Assault at Inchon 15-19 September 1950 o Overview The daring amphibious assault at Inchon Korea on 15 September 1950 by JTF7 including the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division proved a critical turning point in the Korean War It functioned as a turning movement by establishing a lodgment deep in the operational level rear areas of the north Korean Peoples’ Army nKPA severing their logistical lifeline and reducing the pressure on the UN Forces in the Pusan Perimeter It demonstrated the use of maneuver to achieve surprise and avoid enemy strengths by landing where he was weak It took advantage of the UN Forces’ strengths control of the sea and air to achieve decisive advantage over the enemy’s strengths on land by building forces rapidly in his operational rear and then using those friendly ground forces to encircle and destroy enemy forces Operation CHROMITE’s success relied on an effective initial entry force supported by joint assets and by rapidly inserting reinforcing entry forces to establish a lodgment This lodgment then brought in sufficient follow-on forces and capabilities to re-take Seoul control the ground lines of communications on the Korean Peninsula and to begin the counter-offensive toward the Yalu River o Reference Appleman Roy E South to the Naktong North to the Yalu June to November 1950 Center of Military History 1961 4 2 Purpose The Joint Concept for Entry Operations describes how Joint Force 2020 will integrate force capabilities across multiple domains to project forces onto foreign territory in hostile or uncertain environments Its purpose is to guide force development by      Establishing a common intellectual framework for military professionals DOD policy makers and others interested in the challenge of entry operations Invigorating interest in and study of an operational challenge that a generation of military leaders focused on other missions has not had to consider in recent years Establishing a basis for subsequent joint and Service concepts and doctrine Informing study wargaming and experimentation that will result in recommendations to change doctrine organization training materiel leadership and education personnel facilities and policy DOTMLPF-P Identifying the capabilities required to achieve entry 3 Scope The JOAC is the Chairman’s vision for overcoming A2 AD threats in the future security environment Gaining and maintaining access to an operational area is described within the JOAC family of concepts Exploiting the advantage of freedom of access to an operational area JCEO focuses on the integration of force capabilities across domains in order to secure freedom of maneuver on foreign territory within an operational area Thus JCEO describes how the Joint Force could project and employ military force onto foreign territory in hostile and uncertain environments once operational access has been established It focuses on the actions of military forces in joint and multinational operations at the operational level It applies to combatant commands CCMDs Joint Task Forces JTFs and their subordinate commands Joint and multinational military campaigns beyond the actual conduct of entry operations are outside the scope of this paper This concept does not establish specific programmatic requirements although it does identify the capabilities required to implement the described approach 4 Key Assumptions Key assumptions that are critical to this concept and its recommendations include  The JCEO must align with the operational approaches described in the CCJO JF2020 and the JOAC  The future Joint Force retains the ability to conduct entry operations with both littoral and non-littoral capabilities  Entry operations in the timeframe of this concept out to 2020 will be conducted with existing or programmed airlift aerial refueling and sealift assets 5    Overall a larger percentage of the Joint Force will be homeland-based Entry operations will likely be conducted with or in support of multinational partners The Joint Force is successful in gaining and maintaining sufficient access to an operational area with adequate freedom of action to project forces inside it 5 Entry Operations in the Future Operating Environment During the joint operational planning process for an entry operation commanders should focus on key entry operational characteristics 7 While these operational characteristics apply broadly to all military operations they tend to be more critical during entry and serve as a useful method to analyze requirements for successful execution of these complex operations 8 These operational characteristics include        Purposes for entry operations Geographic and infrastructure challenges Capacity for entry operations Evolving threats Social media cultural factors and commercial capabilities Whole of government approach Multinational and coalition interface and interoperability Purposes for Entry Operations There are five historical purposes for conducting entry operations that will remain valid for the future operating environment Understanding the nature of these purposes allows for a deeper understanding of entry operations in general and will inform the development of future methods of conducting them The five purposes for conducting entry operations are  To defeat threats to the access and use of the global commons Joint forces operating in the land domain may be required to locate and defeat a potentially wide array of land-based threats to commercial activities and or military forces The future security environment articulated in the CCJO JF2020 and the JOAC describes the future operating environment in which entry operations as described in this concept will take place 8 Success in military action is predicated on deliberate persistent efforts to better understand the mission threat environment and whole of government actions Through education immersion and the study of regional responses to our actions the Joint Force must continually seek a more thorough understanding of those cultural geographic and threat challenges throughout the regions which it expects to influence Without understanding there is the potential for significant missteps some of which may be unrecoverable for extended periods With understanding the Joint Force applies force or influence at the point of greatest effect Complete understanding of the operational environment is impossible in a fluid world As such the Joint Force should constantly seek to improve understanding of the adversary and environment to leverage the benefits it provides Additionally the Joint Force must develop and enhance this understanding through whole of government efforts in order to expand its impact on regional efforts 7 6 and capabilities operating in the global commons These threats could be as diverse as piracy or sophisticated A2 AD forces and capabilities  To find control defeat disable and or dispose of specific WMD threats Due to the catastrophic danger posed by WMD their components and precursors it may be necessary to isolate secure or seize9 these assets when a nation loses control or is about to lose control of them Alternatively it may be necessary to act swiftly against those nations or non-state actors with hostile intent in order to defeat disable or dispose of WMD elements before they can be employed or proliferated This will require integrating the unique intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance ISR capabilities handling techniques transportation assets and crews under the control of a dedicated and specifically trained force Given the current level of proliferation of WMD capabilities the risk of this threat may increase in the future along with the need to conduct counter-WMD CWMD missions  To conduct other limited duration missions In entry operations there are other missions where a limited objective is sought and where there is no requirement to establish a lodgment These include missions such as a raid special reconnaissance show of force demonstration feint or personnel recovery They are conducted for a variety of purposes such as performing counterterrorism actions deception destroying key facilities and securing information about the adversary that can only be gained through contact It is important to understand that these operations will include a preplanned withdrawal  To assist populations and groups In this category of operations the primary mission is not to defeat the enemy but to provide assistance These missions range from smaller scale assistance operations for select groups to larger scale noncombatant evacuation operations NEO or relief operations The capabilities required to conduct this type of mission may be significantly more logistics-oriented than the other four purposes for entry It is important to remember that armed opposition may be encountered in such situations These may require an airhead or beachhead to facilitate delivery of supplies and equipment or to evacuate personnel Frequently these operations require cooperation with other governmental and non-governmental agencies  To establish a lodgment This mission is defined in JP 3-18 Joint Forcible Entry Operations Forcible entry and lodgment are linked in joint doctrine where the entry is opposed and the Joint Force secures sufficient maneuver space and key infrastructure in order to establish a lodgment that sets the stage for a Follows the intent of the DRAFT National Defense Strategy for Countering WMD May 2013 pgs 1314 and emerging joint doctrine as prescribed in the DRAFT JP 3-40 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Chapter V 9 7 larger-scale and longer lasting operation that requires the flow of other forces and sustainment The overall purpose could be for any number of reasons defined by the campaign objectives Geographic and Infrastructure Challenges While geographic and infrastructure challenges are universally present due to the nature of entry operations where the theater enablers lines of communications basing logistics ISR communications networks etc tend to be immature they often have even greater impact These physical challenges include      Distance from the homeland and or forward basing to the operational area Distance inland from navigable waters to the initial objective area Nature of the climate and terrain in the operational area Conditions and capacity of the infrastructure in the operational area The density of urbanization in the operational area During much of the Cold War the United States frequently overcame geographic and infrastructure challenges with the use of forward-based forces to establish presence and to ease the deployment burden in response to potential crises A changing defense posture where ground forces are increasingly homeland-based and naval forces may be more forward based may exacerbate geographic and infrastructure challenges even further Capacity for Entry Operations It is important to remain cognizant of the impact of entry force capacity on the ability to execute missions in support of national policy Entry forces capacity not only greatly impacts the conduct of entry operations it also greatly affects the ability of the Joint Force to conduct humanitarian assistance in situations with degraded or austere infrastructure Currently a limited number of U S ground combat formations are trained and equipped for entry scenarios without the requirement for joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration RSO I at an Intermediate Staging Base ISB or secure lodgment 10 Taking into account the limited number of air and sea ports that can accept large capacity aircraft and ships our ability to project power to potential crisis areas could be significantly challenged This places a premium on entry capable forces11 that can arrive using assault lift assets without the requirement for RSO I at a secure lodgment or ISB Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration RSO I A phase of Joint Force projection occurring in the operational area This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel equipment and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms http www dtic mil doctrine DOD_dictionary accessed 5 Jun 13 11 Entry capable forces must be able to deploy rapidly arrive without the requirement for RSO I and employ immediately upon arrival See definitions of Initial and Reinforcing Entry Forces Section 7 pg 16 10 8 Evolving Threats Due to the proliferation of A2 AD capabilities as well as increasing adversary capabilities to exploit or threaten space cyberspace and command control communications computers intelligence surveillance reconnaissance C4ISR assets future entry operations will be more challenging and potentially involve greater risk After overcoming the most significant anti-access threats while getting to the theater the future Joint Force must continue to defend against these threats while overcoming area denial challenges during and after the entry Adversaries may employ an assortment of capabilities in innovative ways to deny freedom of action within an operational area Annex B provides a review of particularly difficult threat systems and likely methods of employment Social Media Commercial Capabilities and Cultural Factors A particularly challenging global trend is an adversary’s use of global and social media technologies that provide an additional ISR capability challenge operational security and exacerbate friendly forces’ mistakes by widely publicizing them in public and international forums Many of these technologies are difficult to counter because of their ubiquitous nature and due to policy limitations Given the expanding broadcast capability of social media and global commercial communications it is also vital that the future Joint Force understands and properly accounts for the growing influence of cultural factors on the conduct of operations Otherwise legitimacy as well as public opinion and international support for the operation could be negatively impacted Whole of Government Approach Cooperative efforts as part of a whole of government approach help set operational conditions They assist in preventing conflict furthering ties with potential allies coordinating for over-flight rights and temporary basing solutions and aiding potential force deployment options 12 Such engagement includes Phase Zero long-term military and interagency efforts that may continue for years before a crisis occurs Additionally the narrative built during engagement operations can have a significant effect on the success of U S Government communication guidance during a crisis response The more trust regional partners and their populations have in U S intentions and capabilities the more likely they are to support joint and multinational operations when necessary Multinational and Coalition Interface and Interoperability Only in rare instances will the United States act alone in future military operations Therefore entry operations must deliberately and continuously account for multinational partnerships Understanding potential multinational partners’ unique capabilities national caveats particularly Rules of Engagement ROE factors and interoperability demands is essential and requires continuous planning and The Whole of Government Approach as described in the 2010 version of the National Security Strategy strengthens national capacity “To succeed we must update balance and integrate all of the tools of American power…” These tools include defense diplomacy economic development homeland security intelligence strategic communications the American people and the private sector National Security Strategy May 2010 pg 14 12 9 preparation on the part of U S forces and partners Additionally military messaging must be consistent with U S and the coalition’s strategic messaging 6 The Military Problem Entry Operations in an Advanced Area Denial Environment Given this future operating environment the future Joint Force must be able to enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions in the presence of armed opposition including advanced area denial systems while overcoming geographic challenges and degraded or austere infrastructure 7 A Concept for Joint Entry Operations To address the military problem above future mission-tailored joint forces will establish appropriate operational conditions and conduct entry by fully integrating force capabilities across multiple domains to exploit gaps in an adversary’s defenses at select entry points to achieve operational objectives 13 The aim is to employ opportunistic and unpredictable maneuver in and across multiple domains establishing local superiority at multiple entry points to gain entry and achieve objectives The unique context of the situation determines the size and composition of the Joint Force form s of maneuver number of entry points level of dispersion or concentration of forces ability to achieve tactical surprise and degree of risk Additionally a Joint Force commander must have access to required enabling capabilities in all domains fully integrated with a command and control structure in order to effectively transition through all phases of the entry operation This approach employing a more interoperable and synchronized joint force is outlined below and explained in further detail through the remainder of Section 7 The phrase “select entry points” is used in the broader context as described in the JOAC “Create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission It is not necessary to achieve domain superiority permanently in a given domain throughout the operational area to accomplish the mission Although Joint Forces in recent decades usually enjoyed such superiority—or even supremacy—future Joint Forces often may not A Joint Force commander who waits for that condition will likely surrender the initiative and miss opportunities ” JOAC pg 23 13 10 Establish Appropriate Operational Conditions Continual Pre-Crisis Unified Action and Theater Engagement Condition setting does not occur only in response to crisis but is a combination of continual pre-crisis unified action in association with theater campaign planning and engagement activities followed by crisis-specific actions Crisis-specific condition setting will normally consist of additional Intelligence Cyberspace and Central Idea Logistics Operational Preparation of Future mission-tailored joint forces will conduct entry the Environment I-OPE C-OPE and by integrating force capabilities across multiple L-OPE respectively Additionally domains exploiting gaps in an adversary’s defenses at deception actions across domains select entry points to achieve operational objectives repositioning of forces employment of joint fires to shape and influence Central Idea Framework enemy decisions and the  Establish Appropriate Operational Conditions neutralization or destruction of  Continual Pre-Crisis Unified Action and Theater enemy forces are vital to achieving a Engagement position whereby forces can disrupt  Crisis Specific Condition Setting or neutralize most enemy area denial  Form Mission-tailored Joint Forces for Entry capabilities To some extent all joint Operations functions require pre-crisis  Command and Control for Entry preparation of the environment to aid  Types of Forces in deployment of forces and the  Force Posture Categories conduct of initial operations to  Conduct Entry by Integrating Force Capabilities support entry Across Multiple Domains  Maneuvering through multiple domains  Envelopment Infiltration and Penetration forms of maneuver  Unpredictability localized capability advantages select multiple entry points  Use of mobile joint sea-bases expeditionary beacheads and airheads  Integration of manned unmanned and autonomous systems The Joint Force and multinational partners will use diplomatic and informational elements of national power coupled with “Phase Zero operations ” such as special operations and security assistance to isolate state and nonstate actors in an attempt to erode their base of support and to isolate  Transition to Achieve Operational Objectives the joint operational area Unified  Entry force achieves all operational objectives and action including diplomatic efforts withdraws will facilitate setting conditions in  Entry force transitions to Follow-on Forces or response to a crisis it will involve non-military partners wide-ranging actions to secure access  Follow-on Forces to necessary basing and sustainment  In-stride transitions and to finalize the terms of reference  Relief-In-Place transitions for multinational partners’ participation Diplomatic and informational actions will precede and may overlap with combat operations to establish entry conditions or the entry operations 11 themselves The Joint Force will set conditions that create gaps in adversary defenses at critical times and locations which can when exploited increase the success of the required entry operation Crisis-specific condition setting This includes operational preparation of the environment surprise and the repositioning of forces and the employment of joint fires Critical to setting the conditions for entry operations is continuous I-OPE throughout the operating area Synchronized ISR along with local and regional understanding will allow the Joint Force to anticipate points of conflict and leverage or counter the use of social and global media or other commercial capabilities From this the Joint Force will develop a thorough understanding of potential belligerents’ critical capabilities requirements and vulnerabilities in order to determine centers of gravity Once identified and understood the Joint Force will be able to determine the best points of entry to gain an advantage over the adversary Detailed analysis of collected intelligence focusing on A2 AD strategies and the adversary’s active and passive assets will drive operational actions and decisions This data will support lethal and non-lethal precision strikes designed to eliminate or suppress A2 AD threats in support of force projection Passive systems such as surface and subsurface explosive devices will be of significant interest for maritime operations threatening all types of shipping and assault landing craft Secondly a thorough understanding of the entry operation’s logistical requirements and limitations as well as deliberate pre-crisis preparatory actions driven by theater engagement activities will better enable uninterrupted sustainment of forces This pre-crisis L-OPE coupled with actions conducted during the emergence of a crisis ensures that the entry forces can be projected without reaching a culmination point Logistical requirements for entry are developed during detailed pre-crisis planning and aid in further identification of the most suitable entry points as well as areas of special logistical concern Thirdly to optimize cyberspace support C-OPE must be clearly integrated and synchronized with operations in other domains This may require long-lead times before the actual entry operation In addition to OPE the Joint Force will maximize surprise through deception stealth and ambiguity to counter adversary terrestrial aerial and space-based ISR and complicate targeting One method the Joint Force may use to confound the enemy is to create either a dearth or overabundance of targets for the enemy to process Social media and other cyber-enabled deception methods may be valuable contributors to gaining surprise Where surprise is not possible due to the nature of the operating area or the duration of the operation the Joint Force will seek to overwhelm the enemy’s targeting capability This could be done for example through a combination of cyberspace efforts and the use of numerous autonomous decoys employed in one or more of the other domains The radar and electromagnetic spectrum EMS signatures of these systems should match that of the system they are simulating to create more targets than the enemy can process or engage Additionally these devices could possess the ability to attack targets autonomously as they present themselves through the use of various electronic counter countermeasures ECCM and seek out critical targets for attack 12 Deception efforts may also result in the adversary exposing previously concealed capabilities opening them up to joint fires engagement Additionally information operations14 including those enabled by cyberspace employed in either a clandestine or overt manner may be able to move populations away from potential points of entry in order to minimize collateral damage concerns Finally crisis-specific condition setting requires the repositioning of forces and the employment of joint fires In a hostile environment fires will be mutually supporting across all domains to develop local superiority by suppressing threats to air and maritime operations For example information operations cyberspace and space operations may be used to help a special operations unit to target track and conduct a direct action strike on an adversary’s anti-ship system permitting naval surface fires to engage enemy air defense assets In turn this engagement would allow global strike assets to eliminate key short range area denial assets that would otherwise impede the entry force In an uncertain environment the Joint Force may face ROE that severely restrict ISR assets and prevent the elimination of threats through preparatory fires and direct action Often uncertain environment ROE does not allow the Joint Force to engage potential threats until the adversary initiates hostile action or clearly demonstrates hostile intent In such scenarios the Joint Force must locate and track as many of the potential adversary’s area denial assets as possible and be prepared to defend against or to destroy them as soon as they pose an active threat 15 In a permissive Foreign Humanitarian Assistance FHA operation the biggest challenges to entry most likely involve infrastructure that is austere or has been severely degraded and coordinating with non-military partners including interagency non-governmental and host nation actors Degraded or austere conditions complicate the delivery of aid and relief to areas where needed In such conditions entry forces are perhaps best suited as “first responders ” They are able to provide the initial response because of their unique ability to enter and operate without dependence on significant infrastructure assets such as rotary wing and tilt rotor aircraft aerial delivery systems and techniques cyber-capable combat communications units and expeditionary sustainment assets are particularly useful in FHA situations Entry forces using complementary multiple domain capabilities can facilitate follow-on efforts to provide life-saving assistance deliver aid supplies and to start repairing damaged infrastructure or overcome geographic challenges impeding FHA operations Likewise command and control C2 capabilities can be From JP 3-12 Joint Cyberspace Operations “While it is possible some military objectives can be achieved by cyberspace operations alone cyberspace operations capabilities should be considered during joint and operational planning integrated into the joint force commander’s plan and synchronized with other operations during execution ” pg vi 15 During NEO and FHA operations joint forces may need political approval before utilizing overwhelming firepower to defeat adversary area-denial threats even after being engaged Mroczkowski pg 98 14 13 leveraged to coordinate with the interagency particularly the Department of State from initial crisis planning through the execution and eventual handoff to civilian or partner military organizations Form Mission-tailored Joint Forces for Entry Operations In order to successfully execute the entry mission16 the Joint Force must be tailorable to the demands of the situation and the mission at hand 17 Tailoring the force begins with understanding the operational objectives the overall purpose for conducting the entry As discussed earlier the purposes for entry are the primary factors that determine the size and composition of the entry force as well as the expected operational duration Additionally due to the potential for an immature theater command structure during entry operations mission-tailored joint forces require an entry-specific set of C2 capabilities to integrate forces and capabilities Finally mission-tailoring the joint force for entry operations requires careful consideration of the types of forces available and how they are globally postured Important aspects of these C2 force type and posture considerations are described below Command and Control C2 for Entry Effective command and control is essential to integrate the assigned attached and supporting forces required to maneuver through multiple domains to achieve entry Effectively integrating and employing forces from all of the Functional Combatant Commands FCCs into and across multiple Geographic Combatant Commands GCCs demands agility and is characteristic of the idea of Globally Integrated Operations GIO as described in the CCJO JF2020 The GIO-C2 structure envisioned to conduct entry operations contains the following  Habitual Relationships While JTFs are purposefully built and are frequently temporary in nature they should rarely be completely ad hoc forming only as a crisis emerges To enable more effective entry command and control some pre-crisis habitual relationships between Joint C2 structures and joint forces is desired These pre-crisis habitual relationships are not standing JTF requirements Rather they are based on common and routine joint planning training exercises and wargames with CCMDs their Service components potential JTF headquarters and their JTF functional components and regionally and mission aligned entry forces These activities should be aligned with existing pre-deployment exercises where possible in order to not interfere with Service-specific training requirements Additionally these habitual Mission The task together with the purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms http www dtic mil doctrine DOD_dictionary accessed 5 Jun 13 17 Tailorable Capable of being adapted to a given purpose or function Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 2001 16 14 relationships should where feasible include regular planning training exercises and wargames with likely interagency and multinational partners The foundation for these habitual relationships is the ability to rapidly establish command relationships joint and multinational based on shared exercise experience conducting entry operations While the relationships themselves may not endure between individuals the exercises help develop understanding of the complexities of entry operations particularly for the GCC and JTF staffs Since entry operations could be conducted on short notice and will frequently be the first significant commitment of forces to an area of operations the ability to form C2 relationships quickly with staffs that understand the intricacies of entry operations is critical and requires flexible commanders and staffs  Authority Sufficient C2 authority to execute the entry operation effectively provides the Joint Force commander the ability to integrate and synchronize joint and multinational forces This authority must extend to all joint functions and include the ability to globally integrate and employ FCC and GCC forces where and when needed during the entry operation 18  Interoperability A Joint Force that uses an enterprise approach to standardize DOD C2 protocols and systems will enable better interoperability This interoperability of Service and allied C2 systems allows rapid expansion and synchronization of joint and combined forces’ C2 for specific mission requirements This flexible redundant and expandable cyberspace architecture creates command and control network agility An agile network can expand and contract when needed as well as mitigate the loss of nodes or commanders within the network  Mission Command It is expected that the electromagnetic spectrum will be contested during entry operations in the future operating environment This will significantly challenge command and control during the entry operation Because of this the utilization of mission-type orders which can better support decentralized execution may well be imperative for mission success Commanders must prepare to operate in a communications-denied or intelligence-denied environment Types of Forces The task of conducting an entry operation involves the introduction of combinations of four types of joint forces Each of the four types will be individually tailored based on the operational requirements The characteristics of each of the four types are unique and carry with them specific implications to the Services’ manning training and equipping decisions The four types of forces are Support Forces Initial Entry Forces Reinforcing Entry Forces and Follow-on Forces See Annex C Not all entry operations require Reinforcing Entry Forces or Follow-on 18 Unified Command Plan 6 April 2011 The White House pgs 6-33 CCMD responsibilities 15 Forces In some cases entry forces Initial Entry Forces alone or supported by Reinforcing Entry Forces will with the aid of Support Forces achieve the major operational objectives without Follow-on Forces Given the limited capacity of entry forces Follow-on Forces are more likely to be needed as the size of the overall operation increases  Support Forces Potentially operating across all domains these forces provide capabilities to set the conditions and support the conduct of entry operations These capabilities include but are not limited to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets aerial refueling strategic airlift and sealift maritime mine clearance capabilities global strike air and missile defenses air interdiction and close air support space and cyberspace capabilities offensive and defensive as well as special operations forces 19 A critical element in future entry operations is achieving some level of surprise through deception by entering where least expected or by entering where the enemy is unable to detect the entry force an increasingly difficult task given modern ISR capabilities Support Forces are critical to the conduct of deception establishing conditions that confuse the enemy’s intelligence and decision making capabilities and blinding the enemy’s ability to detect where and when the entry will take place in the critical opening phases of that entry operation  Initial Entry Forces These are the first forces to enter onto foreign territory They include both Conventional Forces CF and Special Operations Forces SOF Their defining characteristic is their ability to insert offset from infrastructure such as airfields and seaports by air surface or subsurface assault or infiltration means as tactically coherent units and formations that are able to operate immediately upon arrival Currently the means of assault insertion included air assault amphibious operations airborne assault and airland operations Initial Entry Forces are able to operate for predetermined periods of time without a need for external sustainment The concept of Initial Entry Forces and Reinforcing Entry Forces is scalable and applies to small entry operations as well as to larger entry operations  Reinforcing Entry Forces These forces reinforce Initial Entry Forces shortly after the initial entry Reinforcing Entry Forces which may be either CF SOF or a combination thereof are more heavily equipped than Initial Entry Forces in order to increase the firepower protection mobility or other required capabilities to support initial operations They do not require RSO I upon arrival20 and can operate immediately or shortly after landing However Special operations forces or reconnaissance forces may conduct actions in support of a larger entry operation or may conduct the entry operation themselves 20 JP 1-02 defines Reception Staging Onward-movement and Integration RSOI as “A phase of Joint Force projection occurring in the operational area This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel equipment and materiel into forces capable of meeting 19 16 Reinforcing Entry Forces must follow the Initial Entry Forces into the area of operations due to offload security requirements that must be met prior to their introduction Closing the Reinforcing Entry Force on the initial objectives quickly is critical to ensuring the survival of the Initial Entry Force during opposed entry operations Depending on the specific mission of the Reinforcing Entry Force existing infrastructure may be needed to support offload or the Reinforcing Entry Force may be the force creating the expeditionary infrastructure such as expeditionary airfields needed to support receipt of Follow-on Forces and replenishment of logistics for the Initial Entry Force Some limited duration missions may only employ an Initial Entry Force and not require the capabilities of Reinforcing Entry Forces For entry missions limited in scope and duration a planned withdrawal with little to no use of Follow-on Forces is normally expected  Follow-on Forces In some circumstances entry operations will be conducted to support Follow-on Forces These forces will deploy to a lodgment already secured by Initial Entry Forces and Reinforcing Entry Forces and will be aided by support from the larger joint force By incorporating the capabilities of entry forces Follow-on Forces are able to conduct a range of missions in pursuit of a military campaign that is beyond the purpose of the entry operation itself In general Follow-on Forces require some form of RSO I activities before they are able to conduct operations and must arrive using existing airfields and seaports or expeditionary airfields and seaports 21 If sufficient infrastructure does not exist Follow-on Forces may need to aid the Reinforcing Entry Force in improving and expanding it Not all entry operations will require the deployment and support of Follow-on Forces just as the purpose of entry is not always in support of establishing a lodgment and a larger military campaign Force Posture Categories An additional characteristic of Globally Integrated Operations is flexibility in establishing and employing joint forces for entry operations in short order Across the Joint Force it is vital to properly posture forces for timely and correct responses to emerging crises This requires ready access to a range of force postures in order to build effective entry capabilities During deliberate and crisis action planning at all levels of command this requires thorough understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of each category of force posture Over time the allocation of joint forces to these posture options can and should change to best meet national strategy and combatant commander needs Additionally it is possible for a force to exist in more than one of these categories at a time For example some operational requirements ” This definition is not characteristic of entry forces which are expected to fight immediately upon arrival and logically then should not require any RSOI activities However in most cases Follow-on Forces do require RSOI activities before being able to conduct combat operations 21 Typically expeditionary seaports require the use of Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore JLOTS capabilities 17 U S Army Special Forces Groups have two battalions that are homeland-based and regionally-aligned and one battalion that is forward-based Each of these battalions is comprised of teams that are mission aligned with special training equipment and organizational structure  Forward-based Forces Those forces permanently based in a forward-deployed GCC Area of Responsibility AOR 22 Forward-based Forces provide commanders situational awareness and forces closer to a given operational area than other types of forces easing deployment and strategic lift demands These forces may be more expensive to maintain and will have limitations placed on them by the host nation and the U S Government However they are well suited to rapid response theater engagement to shape and set conditions and perform key missions like Special Reconnaissance in support of entry operations  Rotationally Forward-deployed Forces These forces provide great flexibility to a Combatant Commander to surge for crisis response engagement deterrence and entry operations There are some considerations with force availability concerning Rotationally Forward-deployed Forces based on the ability to maintain them on-station in forward areas whether that be on land at sea or in the air These include the regular rotation of forces the availability of strategic lift and access to temporary basing These forces include capabilities like the Marine Expeditionary Unit MEU and its associated Amphibious Readiness Group ARG Carrier Strike Groups CSGs Maritime Patrol Aircraft and submarines as well as periodic rotation to forward basing areas of other Joint Force capabilities such as Patriot missile batteries to provide temporary air and missile defense capabilities 23  Homeland-based Regionally-aligned Forces Allows Geographic Combatant Commanders to have a regionally-specific trained and focused list of forces available in the homeland tailored to regional plans and problem sets Particularly well suited for theater shaping and engagement missions and response to a “no plan” scenario in a given GCC AOR  Homeland-based Mission-aligned Forces Allows some homeland-based forces to be specifically organized trained and equipped for particularly demanding missions that require specialized training and equipment high standards of mission competency and readiness to deploy e g forces set aside to focus on entry missions such as those delineated in the Global Response Force Execution Order GRF EXORD However these forces must retain the ability While USNORTHCOM has an AOR that includes much of the Homeland most of the forces therein are Service-Retained Forces or belong to one of the Functional Combatant Commands 23 Normally it requires at least three like units to maintain one rotational forward deployed This includes one unit forward deployed one unit in training and preparation for deployment and one unit in recovery from deployment 22 18 to perform other missions outside of their specific mission focus in order to be useful for general purpose requirements  Unassigned or Service Retained Forces General Purpose Capabilities Those forces and capabilities that remain truly general purpose in order to support a wide range of missions in any region In summary mission-tailored joint forces are organized trained and equipped with unique capabilities to perform entry operations Mission-tailoring begins with a thorough understanding of the purposes for entry purposes that can differ in operational duration and the type and quantity of forces required Mission-tailoring continues with the selection of the optimum mix of joint forces from all global force posture categories and is completed with effective entry-capable command and control structures to allow joint commanders to integrate selected joint and multinational forces How specific Joint Force capabilities are employed to achieve entry is described in the next section Conduct Entry by Integrating Force Capabilities Across Multiple Domains Entry forces will envelop infiltrate and penetrate in and or across multiple domains at select points of entry to place the enemy at an operational disadvantage Maneuver capabilities in multiple domains present many potential threats to the adversary overloading his decision cycle and allowing the Joint Force to seize and retain the initiative In response to a review of Joint Force strengths and weaknesses an adversary will be compelled to consider which investments in technology and time afford it the best opportunity for success It may prepare for all possible forms of entry or it may focus on just one Either way the adversary can be made vulnerable by exposing weakened defenses in one or more domains allowing the Joint Force to achieve local domain superiority at one or more points of our choosing For example if the enemy focuses on the periphery the Joint Force will attack in-depth If the enemy defends in-depth the Joint Force will concentrate at critical points When the enemy focuses in any domain the Joint Force will capitalize on defeating him in another where he is weaker When an adversary has fortified a beach the Joint Force may use the vertical maneuver to envelop the adversary from the rear Alternatively when the adversary has greater strength in air defenses the Joint Force can approach via the sea for a surface or subsurface entry For this and other reasons the Joint Force will improve the ability to maneuver via the sea and air domains This will include the improvement of not only surface and vertical maneuver capabilities but also the expansion of subsurface maneuver By exploiting the sea and the air as maneuver spaces the Joint Force will be able to threaten a greater number of the adversary’s critical assets as well as increase the unpredictability of the force Maneuvering through multiple domains to multiple and potentially unexpected entry points can allow the Joint Force to minimize the likelihood of fighting into the teeth of the enemy’s defenses While it is expected that Joint Force commanders will consider all 19 forms of offensive maneuver it is central to this concept that integration of force capabilities during entry operations is best suited to the use of envelopment infiltration and penetration Additionally these forms of maneuver could apply conceptually to all domains during entry operations and not merely to maneuver in the land domain  Envelopment This allows the Joint Force to utilize its advantages in mobility in each physical domain air land and maritime to maneuver entry forces into the adversary’s undefended areas From here the Joint Force is able to strike where the adversary is weakest to gain physical and cognitive advantage and exploit critical enemy vulnerabilities  Infiltration This may be the preferred method to insert an entry force for the purpose of affecting the adversary’s rear areas disrupt his cohesion and to avoid or defeat area denial threats Typically this form of maneuver is best suited to smaller scale entry operations  Penetration In some situations it may be preferable to utilize penetrations to enter hostile territory A penetration allows for the concentration of Joint Force capabilities to at least temporarily overwhelm an enemy’s defenses Regardless of the type of maneuver mobility and flexibility are critical and enhanced when fully integrated with cyberspace and space capabilities Entry operations require the ability to build up capabilities as quickly as possible Forces must be able to disperse to seize key terrain or for self-preservation and to concentrate rapidly to exploit opportunity The use of maneuver through multiple domains in concert with missiontailored forces will allow the Joint Force to minimize vulnerabilities during force buildup Potential adversaries are aware of our reliance on infrastructure to unload the heavy equipment that the United States typically uses to achieve overwhelming force and these enemies will seek to deny the use of such critical infrastructure They will likely attempt to destroy facilities in order to disrupt our ability to close joint forces on the objective By becoming unpredictable while affecting and acting upon localized capability advantages in all domains the Joint Force will maneuver to select entry point s that exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities while simultaneously reducing the risk to his own entry forces through surprise When necessary the Joint Force will conduct maneuver to seize expeditionary lodgments to allow for greater options to maneuver and close Follow-on Forces This includes the use of sea-based forces and capabilities Where available forward land bases are used to launch and support joint entry operations Sea-basing can complement land bases or serve as the sole means to launch and support operations Both approaches can aggregate a variety of capabilities relevant across the range of military operations When forward land bases are not available sea-basing provides forward staging for entry or Follow-on 20 Forces logistics support offensive and defensive fires ISR and C2 Entry operations should make use of the available basing option s that produce s the greatest advantage for the Joint Force in terms of position throughput protection and surprise As required lodgments will be rapidly established and exploited by Reinforcing Entry Forces to ensure rapid force closure with in-stream offload so that the Initial Entry Force can be quickly augmented in the initial assault objectives These expeditionary facilities will also be rapidly disestablished and relocated as required to minimize vulnerability and increase force closure efficiencies on critical objectives Finally unmanned and autonomous systems can be utilized to expand mobility provide ISR and precision strike for entry forces A variety of unmanned options can be used to deceive or operate in the portion of the operational area that presents the most risk in order to saturate enemy defenses Unmanned decoys can aid in drawing adversary fire away from critical manned assets or in deceiving the adversary as to the critical point of attack Unmanned systems working in concert with manned systems can be critical in overwhelming enemy defensive sensors Unmanned ground and subsurface systems can be used to breach critical points where exposure of the entry force may be too risky Additionally continued development of manned unmanned teaming and unmanned ground enablers provide ISR mobile firepower and precision fires to entry forces that can be used to clear critical areas without exposing the Joint Force Unmanned sustainment capabilities able to penetrate area denial envelopes will be instrumental in sustaining an Initial Entry Force when there is no requirement for Follow-on Forces Transition to Achieve Operational Objectives Achieving operational objectives will dictate the duration of an entry operation Two types of entry transitions exist 1 withdrawal of the entry force upon completion of operational objectives or 2 transition to follow-on joint and multinational forces or to non-military partners and missions Transitions must be planned in detail during campaign planning The first type of transition occurs with a significant number of entry operations where operations conclude with the entry force completing all objectives without any Follow-on Forces at a given location In these operations the entry force in concert with support forces will accomplish a preplanned extraction from the operational area Examples include special operations or amphibious force raids to eliminate impediments to access or evacuation and personnel recovery missions During these operations the withdrawal may be as or more challenging than the entry While the entry may have the advantage of surprise retaining it during withdrawal is much less likely potentially requiring the entry force to fight its way out Additionally depending on the method of entry alternate means of withdrawal may be required In 21 particular airborne forces utilized for this type of mission will require alternate extraction means which may require indigenous interagency or joint support24 Also included within this transition category are times when entry forces will be used independently in support of a broader operation and not receive reinforcement or be withdrawn for an extended period of time Missions such as Operations GROUSE and GUNNERSIDE25 in Norway and Operation DINGSON 35A26 in Brittany during World War II fall into this category Extended independent operations like these require extensive sustainment planning and training to forage and survive in the environment Such missions will eventually involve detailed extraction or relief by heavier forces They may also utilize maneuver to develop asymmetrical advantages for entry sustainment and extraction The second type of transition consists of progressing to follow-on operations to serve the objectives of a large campaign These can include transitions from the entry forces to U S Follow-on Forces multinational forces or to interagency and nonmilitary missions that could require assistance from entry forces to achieve operational objectives In the latter case the partnered agency does not have the ability to conduct an entry and relies upon joint or multinational entry forces to get into the operational area An example may be a humanitarian mission such as Operation SEA ANGEL II27 in Bangladesh during 2007-8 or a multinational peace enforcement mission During these missions the entry force will establish the initial beach or airhead that allows the agency to conduct its mission and then turn over responsibility to the agency or nation prior to a preplanned time-driven withdrawal Follow-on Forces are employed when a transition to one or more follow-on missions is required These follow-on missions are of two basic forms in-stride transition and relief-in-place During in-stride transitions the entry force is Extraction may be by amphibious shipping small boats submarines fixed and rotary wing aircraft in order to retrograde to intermediate staging bases new operating locations or home station 25 British Special Operations Executive operations to destroy the German heavy water facility at Vemork Norway Operation GROUSE inserted a four man Norwegian reconnaissance team on 18 October 1942 near the facility They conducted surveillance of the facility for four months supporting Operation FRESHMAN and later Operation GUNNERSIDE During Operation GUNNERSIDE nine more Norwegian commandos infiltrated into Norway to link up with the commandos from Operation GROUSE and destroyed the German heavy water facility at Vemork Norway After completing the mission half of the combined team extracted to Sweden while the other half remained in hiding in Norway for the duration of the war and continued to pass intelligence to the Allies Haukelid Knut Skis Against the Atom North American Heritage Press 1989 26 Operations by the Free French 4th Special Air Service to reinforce French Resistance fighters in Brittany and prevent German forces there from reinforcing the Normandy beaches during Operation OVERLORD SAS forces remained in place until killed or eventually relieved by Allied forces in September and October 1944 Beavan Colvin Operation Jedburgh D-Day and America's First Shadow War The Viking Press 2006 pg 147 27 “U S Response to Cyclone Sidr Operation Sea Angel II ” Press Release U S Embassy Dhaka Bangladesh 23 November 2007 http dhaka usembassy gov cyclone_sidr html 24 22 integrated into the continuing operation such as Operation ICEBERG28 on the island of Okinawa during World War II During relief-in-place transitions the entry force will hand over all responsibilities within the operational area to the follow-on force and extract or reconstitute for follow-on entry operations such as the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment did during Operation CARTWHEEL in New Guinea during World War II 29 8 Capabilities Required by this Concept The operational approach advocated in this concept entails potentially significant required capabilities for force development After analyzing inputs from across the community of interest the following capabilities emerged as essential to implementation of this concept They constitute an initial proposal not an exhaustive or authoritative listing of required capabilities that need additional thought and development Although grouped by joint function for ease of understanding many of these required capabilities apply across multiple joint functions Furthermore the required capabilities have implications for DOTMLPF-P as well as for integration with interagency and multinational partners A list of initial implications follows each required capability Following concept approval subsequent analysis of these proposed capability requirements within JCIDS will provide the basis for developing capability solutions that will close the operational gap the concept addresses Command and Control Required Capability 1 The ability for a joint and multinational force headquarters to integrate the full range of FCC USSTRATCOM USSOCOM USTRANSCOM capabilities GCC and multinational partner capabilities in all threat environments while coordinating with whole of government and operating across multiple Areas of Responsibility during the execution of a range of real-world entry operations a Improve the ability to rapidly stand up a JTF for entry operations focusing on pre-crisis deliberate planning crisis action planning and unity of command requirements This could include further development and implementation of joint force aggregation protocols as recently noted in Service Title 10 wargames e g EXPEDITIONARY WARRIOR 2013 b Consider developing detailed Joint Manning Documents JMDs placed “on the shelf” to aid in entry operation crisis-action planning and JTF formation for warfighting joint force headquarters These JMDs should document requisite liaison coordination and planning team exchanges required by the entry Roy E Appleman James M Burns Russell A Gugeler and John Stevens Okinawa The Last Battle Washington D C Center of Military History 1948 pgs 68-79 29 Miller John Jr Cartwheel The Reduction of Rabaul Center of Military History 1959 pgs 189-217 28 23 c d e f g operations warfighting headquarters e g JTF both from and to the GCC and FCC headquarters concerned Ensure the interoperability of all critical C2 systems using Joint Information Enterprise protocols communications equipment data processing Friendly Force Tracking FTT and Common Operational Picture COP systems to enable rapid C2 and force aggregation during entry operations Consider preapproved for theater introduction sets of standard joint and coalition systems tailored to missions to assure timely network connection approval and operation Consider modification of deliberate and crisis action planning documents to account for the command and control requirements and challenges associated with entry operations For example ensure that the Global Response Force Execute Order GRF EXORD has fully identified and incorporated the role of FCC capabilities GCC capabilities as well as reserve component RC forces into its intent and tasking sections Improve the ability to manage and coordinate significantly increased quantities of unmanned and autonomous systems throughout the operational area in support of entry operations Improve the capabilities of Joint Multinational En Route Planning and Visualization tools for Entry Forces The ability to access the global information grid at any location on the globe Required Capability 2 The ability for the Joint Staff and CCMDs to prepare selected joint and service headquarters to participate in a joint and multinational entry operation by executing a comprehensive joint training and exercise program This ability must include those JTF-level headquarters and potential JTF components for entry operations a Consider training opportunities to prepare designated headquarters to assume the Global Response Force GRF joint force headquarters role b Consider a series of training events that annually exercises entry operations Focus on Joint C2 GCC and FCC liaison teams force aggregation interagency coordination selected multinational partners and tactical units and assets participation This exercise event should include a significant “live exercise” component with detailed examination of all Support Forces including FCC enablers intermediate staging bases joint sea-bases and lift assets required to realistically execute the operational scenario concerned c Conduct annual Time-Phased Force Deployment Data TPFDD validation events for high priority Operations Plans OPLANs and Contingency Plans CONPLANs that are likely to require an entry operation d Consider establishing an educational agenda in joint and service professional military education through courses that study historical examples of entry operations and further the study of future entry operations challenges This educational agenda should also include a thorough review of the risks associated with the conduct of entry operations 24 e Develop a range of online training and education modules concerning entry operations for the joint force f Expand multinational partner-U S forces entry operations training opportunities Required Capability 3 The ability to command and control forces in austere or degraded environments including communications intelligence cyberspace and space force enhancement degraded environments a Expand Service and Joint training opportunities concerned with operations in and recovering from Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear CBRN effects in degraded hostile environments b Develop procedures for operating without some or all Space Force Enhancement capabilities combat support operations and force multiplying capabilities delivered from space or with degraded capabilities for extended periods Space Force Enhancement capabilities may include ISR launch detection missile tracking environmental monitoring satellite communications SATCOM and position-navigation-timing capabilities PNT c The ability to maintain operational access to key portions of the electromagnetic spectrum during entry operations d Develop procedures for rapidly identifying operating during and recovering from significant cyberspace attacks Effects of some attacks such as denial of service may be more obvious than others 30 e The ability to conduct training and exercises that place commanders’ decision support mechanisms under stress where there is an uncomfortable level of imperfect knowledge including missing or degraded information intelligence and communications capabilities f The ability to provide operationally responsive space capabilities to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities Required Capability 4 The ability to execute effective and complementary Special Operations Forces SOF and Conventional Forces CF integration where SOF or CF can be the supported force depending on the nature of the entry operation a Routinely conduct joint training exercises between SOF and CF units focused on the highest priority missions as described in the Guidance for Employment of the Force GEF and the Global Response Force Execute Order GRF EXORD Also prioritize this expanded integration effort by Geographic Combatant Command b Consider providing liaison teams from select Service JTF-capable headquarters to Theater Special Operations Commands on a permanent basis JP 3-12 Joint Cyberspace Operations Appendix A defines cyberspace attack as “Cyberspace actions that create various direct denial effects in cyberspace i e degradation disruption or destruction and manipulation that lead to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains ” 30 25 c Consider providing SOF plans and operations cells to select Service JTFcapable headquarters on a permanent basis d The ability to establish and maintain relationships with non-military partners for both CF and SOF units e Consider expanding the integration and synchronization of space cyberspace and electronic warfare capabilities that CF and SOF units can leverage across the spectrum of operations f The ability to provide operational Military Information Support Operations MISO capabilities in a degraded environment Required Capability 5 The ability to maintain sufficient C2 and liaison capability to account for interagency and multinational interoperability and interface demands including the exchange of liaison personnel the sharing of C2 equipment and procedures and the ability to readily exchange information a Ensure the ability to fully implement the procedures for common C2 and security classification initiatives for joint and multinational operations as described in the Joint Information Environment JIE multinational treaties and specific operational terms of reference 31 Additionally the JIE and Mission Partner Environment MPE protocols must evolve to meet the needs of entry operations b Establish baseline C2 equipment exchanges required for the range of potential multinational partners that will not be able to fully implement C2 agreements and specific operational terms of reference for information sharing When producing Basis of Issue Plans BOIPs and procurement objectives for C2 equipment these factors should be considered c During pre-crisis planning and preparation develop operations security OPSEC and information security INFOSEC procedures for all potential partners Include the ability to operate multi-level security networks that enable rapid information sharing with all partners multinational interagency non-governmental d When developing JMDs and joint headquarters designs for warfighting headquarters’ staffs CCMDs JTFs functional components include requirements for potential multinational and interagency partners This includes accounting for partner liaison teams and translators especially for Level 1 cleared translators and includes their office and billeting requirements Currently being developed and implemented the JIE a DOD-wide initiative and the Mission Partner Environment MPE—a multi-CCMD initiative protocols will provide the means for commanders to effectively share their intent communicate mission orders and empower decentralized execution when operating with a range of mission partners MPE formerly known as Future Mission Network FMN is a federation of existing information technology systems into a single operating environment in which partners plan prepare and execute operations on a single security classification level with a common language MPE enables Joint and combined force commanders to execute mission partnered operations through the connection of multiple networks and national systems with applications and tools to enable mission partner information-sharing 31 26 Intelligence Required Capability 6 The ability to provide intelligence support and manage “Tasking and Collection” intelligence capabilities sufficient to meet the needs of the Initial and Reinforcing Entry Forces before and during the initial entry phase 32 a Maintain the ability to access reachback architectures in order to task and access all-source intelligence and prioritize requirements including timesensitive capabilities both en route to and during the initial entry phase of operations b Develop manned and unmanned systems support or alternative nontraditional ISR techniques that can deploy and operate simultaneously with rapidly deploying entry forces c Develop capabilities to detect and identify as friend or foe all systems including small Unmanned Systems operated by the Joint Force adversaries and third parties in all domains d Develop tactics techniques and procedures TTP to enable non-traditional ISR in high threat environments denied or highly contested airspace where traditional ISR could not be utilized without significant risk of asset loss e Ensure sufficient translation capability in order to support SIGINT and HUMINT activities during entry operations Required Capability 7 The ability to provide Processing Exploitation and Dissemination PED intelligence capabilities in degraded or austere environments during entry operations a Space-enhancement based and reachback PED capabilities must be able to support or be augmented in order to sufficiently meet entry operations’ intelligence requirements en route during initial entry and even under degraded or austere conditions b When space-based and reachback support is interdicted entry forces must be able to carry with themselves tailored PED capabilities sufficient to support intelligence requirements in such communications denied environments c Ensure all data dissemination methods and voice communications required by PED activities are sufficiently interoperable between Services and allocated with sufficient redundancies to ensure continuation of data dissemination in contested environments including loss of space-enhancement or reduced access to the electromagnetic spectrum d Improve the ability to process multi-intelligence data including that from nontraditional sources such as social media blogs Internet and periodical media Much of the organic and Joint ISR developed during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM OIF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM OEF is not rapidly deployable without access to intermediate staging bases prior to operations 32 27 Required Capability 8 The ability to rapidly share information and intelligence data and products with all relevant joint multinational and interagency partners during entry operations a During deliberate and crisis action planning and preparation identify all types of intelligence data and products that will need to be shared during entry operations and develop appropriate policies and dissemination methods b Develop multi-level security protocols and technology solutions to support rapid security downgrade requirements and intelligence sharing c During pre-crisis planning determine all intelligence sharing requirements that require liaison team exchanges and associated data and communication equipment exchanges to ensure proper and timely intelligence sharing can occur during entry operations Fires Required Capability 9 The ability at the lowest tactical echelon potentially the platoon to access joint fires in a timely manner in support of independent schemes of maneuver 33 a Ensure entry forces have sufficient precision target location equipment Joint Terminal Attack Controllers JTAC easily understood Rules of Engagement ROE and data transfer links to enable joint fire support especially precision to all independent units or teams operating during initial entry operations and locations b Improve ability to integrate manned and unmanned systems of varying levels of autonomy into entry and support forces in order to provide joint fires to entry operations c Improve the ability of precision fires to generate rapid area effects Required Capability 10 The ability to continue to operate against A2 AD threats such as increasingly capable enemy subsurface and surface maritime threats surface-to-air missiles SAMs and integrated air defense systems IADS capabilities precision guided ballistic missiles anti-ship cruise missiles small boat swarms landmines and maritime mines complex obstacles WMD and related CBRN materials and enemy aerial systems a Ensure that Air-Sea Battle implementation plans account for the ideas and the required capabilities described in the JCEO as required As discussed earlier in this concept the total size of the Initial Entry Forces conducting entry can typically for conventional forces range from as small as a company to as large as a brigade minus Given this and the wide variety of scenarios in which entry operations may be conducted for conventional forces the lowest tactical echelon requesting fires could be a squad a platoon or a company 33 28 b Ensure that “effects-chains analysis” and “networked integrated attack-indepth to disrupt destroy and defeat NIA-D3 ” is a part of deliberate and crisis action planning and targeting for entry operations c The ability to deny an enemy’s access to space d The ability to create denial effects within an enemy’s networks e The ability to fully integrate offensive reactive and defensive cyberspace capabilities to protect and project force in support of entry operations f Ensure the joint force has the mechanism to employ appropriately delegated authority to use all non-kinetic fires assets to include cyberspace capabilities g The ability to detect identify and engage if required all systems including small unmanned systems at a rate sufficient to keep pace with the proliferation and potential simultaneous operation of unmanned systems operated by the Joint Force adversary and third parties potentially employed in all domains h The ability to find control defeat disable or dispose of WMD and related CBRN materials Required Capability 11 The ability to plan for and integrate information related capabilities IRC with information operations IO in order to inform and influence audiences a Improve the ability to execute MISO in support of future joint and multinational entry operations b The ability of entry forces to fully coordinate themes and messages with a whole of government and expanded multinational partner approach to ensure unity of effort and consistency c Update IO and MISO capabilities to recognize all existing and emerging media types multinational governmental social and commercial d Pursue biometric masking capabilities development This capability may aid in clandestine actions that support entry operations e Ensure there are sufficient qualified translators and personnel who are familiar with the local culture Movement and Maneuver Required Capability 12 The ability of Initial Entry Forces IEF to conduct the initial entry into an operational area Generally initial entry forces will value strategic operational and tactical mobility and require specialized training organization and equipment The following lists specific required capabilities for the IEF a The ability to maintain an enhanced readiness status in order to deploy in accordance with the demands of the GRF operations orders and rapidly developing crisis situations b The ability to maintain a combat vehicle and equipment complement that can be lifted or moved by existing and programmed aerial and surface assault lift assets This includes strategic lift assets when they are used to conduct entry operations 29 c The ability to insert low-signature capabilities to form or support the initial entry force d The ability to land offset from enemy force concentrations and infrastructure using existing and planned assault lift assets e The ability to identify and clear mines and obstacles in littoral and riverine approaches sufficient to support amphibious operations f The ability to properly marshal forces and assets such as aircraft Required Capability 13 The ability of Reinforcing Entry Forces REF to quickly deploy and maneuver onto the initial assault objectives in order to provide additional firepower protection mobility and required capabilities to ensure the survival of the initial entry force and the ability to achieve entry objectives necessary for mission accomplishment or transition to Follow-on Forces The following lists specific required capabilities for the REF a The ability to land via aerial and or surface means in a timely manner in order to support the Initial Entry Force b The ability to provide enhanced lethality and force protection during entry operations without creating a force that becomes too heavy to move rapidly or that requires RSO I activities c The ability to tailor the REF for operations by expanding the use of small units of currently available medium and heavy forces trained to deploy rapidly on strategic lift as a REF asset and not just as a Follow-on Force d The ability to employ low-signature capabilities to insert and support the REF e The ability to employ a range of CWMD capabilities integrated into REF packages to aid in the execution of the CWMD mission Protection Required Capability 14 The ability to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards to personnel equipment and facilities while maintaining initial entry operations a Ensure displaced personnel and captured enemy combatants are cleared and routed from the initial entry operations’ locations b Ensure policing and corrections capabilities promote the rule of law protect the force and supports civil authorities to save lives minimize suffering and to protect critical infrastructure Required Capability 15 The ability of Reinforcing Entry Forces REF and or Support Forces to counter enemy efforts to limit entry forces’ freedom of action includes counterair and counter-GRAMM Guided Rockets Artillery Missiles and Mortars operations a Using available strategic lift assets ensure that mobile and transportable Counter-GRAMM capabilities can protect mission critical vulnerable areas 30 b Using available strategic lift assets ensure that land and sea-based IAMD capabilities are able to protect mission critical vulnerable areas against all air ballistic missile cruise missile and maritime mine threats c Ensure the ability to deploy and integrate long-range counter-fire capability in support of entry operations Required Capability 16 The ability to provide sufficient air and maritime advantage necessary to insert entry forces and sustain littoral and vertical maneuver during entry operations a Ensure that sufficient counter-mine capacity exists to clear areas and lanes in coastal areas in support of littoral maneuver during entry operations b Ensure that counter-mine capabilities are able to deploy in support of initial and reinforcing entry forces based on required readiness and lift factors c Ensure sufficient counterair electronic warfare anti-submarine warfare and air defense capability and capacity can be deployed along key routes and entry locations during critical entry times d Ensure the ability to employ decoys across all domains to aid in the successful insertion of the initial and reinforcing entry forces e Ensure the ability to shut down Internet and cell phone connectivity in the entry operation area as required Required Capability 17 The ability for initial and reinforcing entry forces to operate in areas degraded by CBRN attacks and events a Update Service capabilities associated with operating in and across CBRN contaminated areas b Update Service capabilities associated with CBRN reconnaissance and agent identification to account for current and evolving CBRN threats c Update Service capabilities associated with CBRN hasty decontamination casualty evacuation and treatment to account for current and evolving CBRN threats d Expand joint training opportunities for initial and reinforcing entry forces that will potentially operate in CBRN including High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse HEMP degraded or hostile environments Sustainment Required Capability 18 The ability to quickly access properly configured prepositioned equipment sets and relief supplies in support of entry operations a The ability to rapidly access classes of supply supporting entry operations FHA port opening and theater opening operations Improving selective offload capabilities for relief supplies and port theater opening support equipment would better prepare the operational area for theater access The ability to rapidly access and re-distribute prepositioned assets in the theater is key 31 b The ability to provide a multi-mission logistics prepositioning sea-based storing capability that is readily available for relief supplies and tailored port and theater opening equipment to enhance rapidly opening the initial distribution or logistics system c Develop an effective afloat capability that allows the future Joint Force to build up combat power in and support operations ashore from the sea-base d Improve the ability of the Joint Force to conduct selective offload of forces equipment and all classes of supply from sea-based assets Required Capability 19 The ability to assess plan prioritize sequence and disperse sustainment requirements needed by the Reinforcing Entry Forces and Follow-on Forces JLOTS addressed in Required Capability 20 in order to present a less inviting target for enemy maneuver and fires assets increasing the overall entry forces’ survivability a The ability to provide sustainment directly to the point of need even in denied environments and to deep inland entry locations b The ability to prioritize and sequence sustainment into multiple disparate logistic nodes c The ability to match strategic movement of forces with theater capabilities to receive them d The ability to prioritize synchronize and protect logistics operations in a degraded or degraded-communications environment e The ability to ensure cargo rapidly transits all ports of debarkation en route to the end user with minimum staging and or cross-decking f The ability to conduct long-range casualty and medical evacuation along with forward resuscitative care at multiple entry locations in the littoral and deep inland g Maintain the ability to escort and protect key sustainment assets in advanced area denial environments h Ensure the ability to access a database listing multinational partners’ logistics and classes of supply capabilities and resources i Ensure the ability to rapidly repair or replace battle-damaged equipment j Ensure sufficient material handling capability is available to support the entry force Required Capability 20 The ability to build open assess repair and improve expeditionary airfields seaports or JLOTS capabilities to support entry operations once an entry area is secured a Develop and maintain the ability to deploy early joint assessment teams in support of entry operations’ expeditionary airfields seaports or bare beach and riverine locations for JLOTS and assault landing locations Include the ability to fully assess austere as well as degraded conditions such as after a CBRN attack b The ability to construct expeditionary airfields or employ JLOTS capabilities as required to support entry operations 32 c The ability to equip the Joint Force with a capability that can deploy rapidly to provide early air and sea port damage repair Required Capability 21 The ability to provide a scalable and early entry bulk fuel liquid delivery system at multiple points sufficient to meet the needs of entry locations in at least two separate but simultaneous operations in both the littoral environment as well as deep inland a The ability to access commercially developed bulk fuel liquid delivery systems in support of entry operations b The ability to fully test and access local bulk fuel liquid resources in order to reduce the transportation burden during entry operations 9 Risks of Adopting this Concept Operations to disrupt destroy and or defeat advanced area denial systems and entering onto foreign territory and immediately employing capabilities in the presence of armed opposition is not without risks  Joint and multinational forces may not be able to achieve the necessary command and control resiliency required to effectively integrate force capabilities across domains The application of combat power in multiple domains relies on the ability to integrate as well as coordinate between domains which may be difficult in a degraded command and control environment The mitigation to this risk is to develop alternative procedural and technical C2 methods maintain the ability to fall back on mission command Service-specific capabilities and develop training and exercise programs that focus on operating in C2-degraded environments  Maneuver capabilities in multiple domains could be misread by resource allocators to suggest significantly less need for organic self-sufficiency Such an outcome would be dangerous if degraded command and control prevents integration across domains leaving elements to their organic capabilities Mitigating this risk requires maintaining a sensible balance between organic capabilities and those accessible only through external support together with robust and redundant means for requesting and coordinating that support  Integrating simultaneous actions across multiple domains on multiple lines of operations could lead to joint entry operations of debilitating complexity The friction of military conflict urges simplicity and punishes unnecessary complexity but entry operations are inherently complex On a large scale they may be the most complex operations the Joint Force conducts Commanders must be alert to the tension between complexity and simplicity and continuously strive for the proper balance 33  Crisis-specific shaping including deep precision strikes to neutralize adversary anti-access and area denial weapons particularly with respect to protecting airlift and sealift may be unrealistic in the time frame of the concept Locating targeting and defeating such systems effectively from a distance remains a very difficult challenge from the perspectives of both target intelligence and weaponeering If opposing systems cannot be rapidly neutralized in key locations and for key times the successful execution of the concept could be at risk Mitigating this problem may require that the Joint Force adopt a sequential campaign strategy based on first defeating or neutralizing adversary area denial capabilities almost entirely before projecting forces ashore  Failure to isolate the area concerned during an entry operation may preclude fully implementing the ideas proposed in this concept This concept assumes access to an operational area has been achieved and that the surrounding areas have been sufficiently isolated from interfering as to enable force projection ashore If the conflict widens militarily and political authorization for actions to maintain isolation of the area is not forthcoming then the Joint Force may not be able to achieve the entry according to the ideas presented in this concept The mitigation is to work with policy makers to ensure that all potential operational requirements are clearly understood and accounted for particularly when there is a possibility for the conflict to widen in scope and scale  Conducting entry operations against adversaries with advanced area denial capabilities without proper protection of sustainment forces may reduce operational tempo to unacceptable levels The future area denial environment will demand accepting higher levels of military risk However sustainment forces will likely be particularly vulnerable in advanced area denial environments given their lack of self-protection capabilities and the trend toward augmentation by commercial capabilities with sustainment C2 systems that are often less well protected against cyberspace attacks and signals intelligence collection Mitigating this requires continuous risk evaluation and when necessary the diversion of combat forces and protection capabilities to ensure sustainment forces can survive to support the entry operation While this may reduce operational momentum depending on the area denial threat it may become an absolute necessity  Reliance on ISR for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment in support of entry operations incurs certain risks depending on the location of the environment Entry operations will be inherently more dangerous if intelligence products do not already exist for the entry location In such a case time will be needed to acquire proper intelligence products for planning and targeting Without these products much greater risk may be incurred or cause the entry operation to be delayed In austere locations ISR may be impacted if communications architecture is not adequate to sustain the significant bandwidth requirements 34 10 Conclusion Joint forces must be able to disrupt destroy and defeat enemy area denial capabilities and enter onto foreign territory and immediately employ capabilities to accomplish assigned missions This is not new but it becomes uniquely challenging when facing advanced enemy systems that can directly threaten our capital investments in strategic lift power projection platforms and low-density high demand assets Operationalizing this concept will require the future Joint Force to refine existing capabilities develop new ones determine proper capacities of these capabilities and examine further implications across the joint functions 35 ANNEX A GLOSSARY Unless otherwise stated all definitions are from the JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms http www dtic mil doctrine DOD_dictionary anti-access Those actions and capabilities usually long-range designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area JOAC area denial Those capabilities usually of shorter range designed not to keep the enemy out but to limit his freedom of action within the operational area JOAC assured access The unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory waters airspace and cyberspace achieved by projecting all the elements of national power JOAC combined arms More than one tactical branch arm or specialty of a single Service employed together in operations Adapted from AR 310-25 Dictionary of U S Army Terms command and control The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission cross-domain synergy The complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others JOAC cyberspace 1 A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data including the Internet telecommunications networks computer systems and embedded processors and controllers JP 3-12 2 Domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store modify and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures From ―Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations VCJCS memo for the Service chiefs combatant commanders and directors of Joint Staff directorates undated domain superiority That degree of dominance of one force over another in a domain that permits the conduct of operations by the former at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the latter JOAC entry operations The projection and immediate employment of military forces from the sea or through the air onto foreign territory to accomplish assigned missions JCEO Working Definition A-1 forcible entry Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition JP 3-18 global commons Areas of air sea and space that belong to no one state Access to the global commons is vital to U S national interests both as an end in itself and as a means to projecting military force into hostile territory JOAC landing area 1 That part of the operational area within which are conducted the landing operations of an amphibious force It includes the beach the approaches to the beach the transport areas the fire support areas the airspace above it and the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective 2 Airborne The general area used for landing troops and materiel either by airdrop or air landing This area includes one or more drop zones or landing strips 3 Any specially prepared or selected surface of land water or deck designated or used for takeoff and landing of aircraft This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 landing force A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations The landing force together with the amphibious task force and other forces constitute the amphibious force Also called LF line of communications A route either land water and or air that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move mission command The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders JP 1-02 where mission-type orders are defined as 1 An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters JP 3-31 2 An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished JP 3-31 movement and maneuver This joint function encompasses disposing joint forces to conduct campaigns major operations and other contingencies by securing positional advantages before combat operations commence and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives This function includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces objective area A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces This area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control A-2 operational access The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission operational area An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted Operational areas include but are not limited to such descriptors as area of responsibility theater of war theater of operations joint operations area amphibious objective area joint special operations area and area of operations power projection The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political economic informational or military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises to contribute to deterrence and to enhance regional stability protection The preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission related military and nonmilitary personnel equipment facilities information and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area reachback The process of obtaining products services and applications or forces or equipment or materiel from organizations that are not forward deployed seabasing The deployment assembly command projection reconstitution and re-employment of joint power from the sea without reliance on land bases within the operational area space A medium like the land sea and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve U S national security objectives tailorable Capable of being adapted to a given purpose or function Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 2001 unmanned aircraft An aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming Note Includes remotely piloted aircraft remotely piloted vehicles unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems weapons of mass destruction Chemical biological radiological or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon Also called WMD 1 A-3 ANNEX B Description of Challenges to Entry Operations Challenges to entry operations include geographic and infrastructure challenges as well as adversary threat capabilities specific systems and their methods of employment Entry Lift Challenges During the last century the United States maintained varying amounts of lift capacity depending on our national strategy In a general sense the United States has utilized either force projection or forward basing to accomplish national goals The quantity of forces capable of conducting entry in the absence of infrastructure both numerically and as a percentage of ground forces has varied depending on the strategy adopted 34 35 Entry forces do not require deep water ports or large airfields to receive and debark the force they arrive in theater equipped and organized to fight without Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration RSO I  During World War II the combination of amphibious shipping and airborne lift allowed nearly one-fifth of U S Army and Marine Corps divisions to conduct entry operations at strategic distance at any given time 36  During the Cold War the combination of forward based forces as well as land and sea based prepositioned equipment allowed over a third of the U S divisions to be brought into action quickly against primary foes due to assured access in Europe and Asia 37 Forward basing reduced the focus on entry force capabilities causing a reduction in entry force lift capacity to barely six percent of the total U S divisions 38  The United States is now reducing the quantity of forward basing throughout the world due to the changing nature of the threats and fiscal constraints This puts a premium on the capacity of entry-capable forces Reductions in sealift and airlift have left the U S capacity to insert entry forces at less than four percent of all combat brigades 39 In terms of conducting the entry this is the combination of forces manned trained and equipped to conduct entry paired with the sealift or airlift assets designed to insert the force over strategic distance 35 Includes airports seaports and suitable beach landing areas 36 Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations N8 April 2012 30 Year Ship Building Plan 37 Assured access The unhindered national use of the global commons and select sovereign territory waters airspace and cyberspace achieved by projecting all the elements of national power JOAC v1 0 17 Jan 2012 38 Work Robert O “On Sea Basing ” The Newport Papers Vol 26 Feb 2006 39 Hammond James W “A Fleet Out of Balance ” Proceedings Magazine Vol 139 Feb 2013 With respect to the USMC it is understood that while any unit can conduct amphibious entry operations the limitation is on the sealift to transport them Once the amphibious lift has been loaded it must sail to the objective area to land its forces and then return over strategic distance to load additional forces This limits force buildup With respect to the U S Army 34 B-1 Army air assault forces are not counted in the equation because they require the establishment of an intermediate staging base within the area denial envelope Adversary Threat Capabilities In terms of specific capabilities future adversaries may possess highly adaptive combinations of anti-access and area denial systems including space cyberspace and potentially WMD capabilities that can challenge entry operations to a much greater degree than in the past These capabilities comprise specific systems and the innovative ways in which they may be employed to counter joint force entry operations Adversary Threat Systems Potential adversary systems include  Anti-access A2 Widespread proliferation of very capable and long range ISR systems surface-launched air-launched and submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missile capabilities submarines long-range strike and bomber aircraft SOF and terrorist assets that can threaten entry forces during strategic movement and while transiting or operating intermediate staging bases and sustainment sites U S Joint Force dependence on space support for navigation communications timing targeting and ISR is vulnerable to the expanding space control and antisatellite capabilities of potential adversaries  Area denial AD Enemy area denial capabilities have increased in number and proliferated in scope over the last 10 years with regular and many irregular forces possessing advanced AD capabilities as well as less sophisticated but difficult to counter AD assets such as sea mines improvised explosive devices mobile threats to airlift and sealift and a variety of guided rockets artillery mortars and missiles GRAMM  Enemy Space Assets and Use of Commercial C4ISR Both regular and irregular opponents will increasingly have access to space-based capabilities both military and commercially-based capabilities These developments mean that the Joint Force will have difficulty in conducting deception achieving surprise masking intent and protecting sensitive information Enemy offensive space assets could threaten the Joint Force’s space force enhancement assets and cause operations to be conducted in a degraded environment  Cyberspace Activities Growth of opponent cyberspace capabilities is explosive with state non-state and individual or small group actors able to conduct offensive and defensive cyberspace actions that potentially the same is true for airborne forces and associated airlift requirements The Gain and Maintain Access GAMA Multi-Service Concept was approved for release by the U S Army and U S Marine Corps March 2012 B-2 threaten military operations in general and the confidentiality integrity and availability of key data information and communications Adversary Employment of Threat Systems An adversary’s tactics within broad approaches may vary Some of the more prominent tactics are  Prevent Whether or not the adversary has any advanced anti-access capability they may still choose to prevent joint forces from successfully landing on their territory It can be expected the adversary may use antiair and anti-ship area denial capabilities to disrupt deny or defeat joint and multinational force access to the objective area Thanks to modern systems it will be unlikely that this would take on the visual manifestation of the Normandy beaches with heavy guns and machine gun bunkers on the beach More likely it will comprise distributed concealable air and surface area denial systems that favor attacking vulnerable delivery assets This includes use of sea and land mines to similarly prevent access to their territory Additional methods of prevention include conducting computer-network attack on defense and civilian infrastructure within the United States or our allies This may shift priorities or even send the entry force or sustainment forces to the wrong location making them easier to engage  Isolate Adversaries may choose instead to allow the entry force to cross into their territory with minimal or no opposition in order to then cut them off Once inserted the adversary could use area denial assets to isolate the entry force by destroying the amphibious shipping intermediate support bases or air delivery assets Once a force is isolated the adversary could target them without concern for reinforcements  Overwhelm Adversaries may choose to allow the entry force to enter unhindered and then while landing apply overwhelming area denial firepower to the landing area to destroy them as quickly as possible This is simplified when the Joint Force approach is tied to existing infrastructure making it more predictable and thus easier to target  Undermine Less capable adversaries may choose to undermine the Joint Force using public protests at the entry site coordinated via social media This can become a delaying tactic by slowing the Joint Force’s advance or something more potent if the adversary is willing to kill protestors to discredit joint and coalition efforts An adversary can also undermine the Joint Force by placing likely targets in sites protected by the rules of engagement where the collateral damage resulting from the destruction of them would cause an international outcry Finally an adversary may also resort to more traditional means such as economic or political blackmail to undermine entry efforts B-3  Conceal or disable In some circumstances the adversary may attempt to conceal the location of some or even all of his area denial systems from Joint Force surveillance It may also attempt to render established ports and airfields unusable for a period Figure 1 JCEO Challenges B-4 ANNEX ENTRY OPERATIONS FLOWCHART Tailored SFor 8 IEF Tailored SFor 8 IEF REF Tailor Joint and Multinational Forces to Execute Entry Onto ForeignTem tory Joint and Multinatioml Forces Execute and Achieve Entry After entering can the IEF achieve the purpose for entry ls the purpmeof establish a Iodgment ls Iodgment infrastructure available at entry location 8 REF seize orsecurelodg'nent Purpose To illustrate the relationships between the entry operation the purpose for entry and the types of forces in order to inform planning and decision making Support Forces Initial Entry Forces Reinforcing Entry Forces Follow-on Forces SFor REF SFor 8 IEF Ach'eve SFor Extracts IEF Purposefor Entry SFor IEF 8 REF Achieve Pu rpose for SForExtractleF andREF I Entry Yes ls Iodgment available at a separae location SFor IEF 8 REF maneuverto seize or secure existing suitable Iodgment 8 REF maneuverto seizeor secure location and owin expeditionary lodgnent infrastructure for flow Lodgmentis established Will the IEF and REF transition becomepartof No SFor Extracts IEF and REF the Yes I IEF andREF becomepartofFoF I C l ANNEX D 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