9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware TLP WHITE Alert TA17-132A Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware Original release date May 12 2017 Last revised June 07 2018 Systems Affected Microsoft Windows operating systems Overview This Alert has been updated to reflect the U S Government's public attribution of the WannaCry ransomware variant to the North Korean government Additional information on the attribution may be found in a press briefing from the White House For more information related to WannaCry activity go to https www us-cert gov hiddencobra According to numerous open-source reports a widespread ransomware campaign is affecting various organizations with reports of tens of thousands of infections in over 150 countries including the United States United Kingdom Spain Russia Taiwan France and Japan The software can run in as many as 27 different languages The latest version of this ransomware variant known as WannaCry WCry or Wanna Decryptor was discovered the morning of May 12 2017 by an independent security researcher and has spread rapidly over several hours with initial reports beginning around 4 00 AM EDT May 12 2017 Open-source reporting indicates a requested ransom of 1781 bitcoins roughly $300 U S This Alert is the result of efforts between the Department of Homeland Security DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center NCCIC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI to highlight known cyber threats DHS and the FBI continue to pursue related information of threats to federal state and local government systems and as such further releases of technical information may be forthcoming Description Initial reports indicate the hacker or hacking group behind the WannaCry campaign is gaining access to enterprise servers through the exploitation of a critical Windows SMB vulnerability Microsoft released a security update for the MS17-010 vulnerability on March 14 2017 Additionally Microsoft released patches for Windows XP Windows 8 and Windows Server 2003 operating systems on May 13 2017 According to open sources one possible infection vector may be through phishing Technical Details Indicators of Compromise IOC TLP WHITE https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A 1 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware See TA17-132A_WannaCry xlsx and TA17-132A_WannaCry_stix xml for IOCs developed immediately after WannaCry ransomware appeared These links contain identical content in two different formats TLP WHITE See TA17-132A_stix xml for IOCs developed after further analysis of the WannaCry malware Analysis Three files were submitted to US-CERT for analysis All files are confirmed as components of a ransomware campaign identified as WannaCry a k a WannaCrypt or wnCry The first file is a dropper which contains and runs the ransomware propagating via the MS17010 EternalBlue SMBv1 0 exploit The remaining two files are ransomware components containing encrypted plug-ins responsible for encrypting the victim users files For a list of IOCs found during analysis see the STIX file Displayed below are YARA signatures that can be used to detect the ransomware Yara Signatures rule Wanna_Cry_Ransomware_Generic meta description Detects WannaCry Ransomware on Dis k and in Virtual Page author US-CERT Code Analysis Team reference not se t date 2017 05 12 hash0 4DA1F312A214C07143ABEEAFB695D904 strings $s0 410044004D0049004E0024 $s1 WannaDecryptor $s2 WANNACRY $s3 Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptograph ic $s4 PKS $s5 StartTask $s6 wcry@123 $s7 2F6600002F72 $s8 unzip 0 15 Copyrigh $s9 Global WINDOWS_TASKOSHT_MUTEX $s10 Global WINDOWS_TASKCST_MUTEX TLP WHITE https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A 2 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware $s11 7461736B736368652E657865000000005461736B53 74617274000000742E776E7279000069636163 TLP WHITE $s12 6C73202E202F6772616E742045766572796F6E653A 46202F54202F43202F5100617474726962202B68 $s13 WNcry@2ol7 $s14 wcry@123 $s15 Global MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA condition $s0 and $s1 and $s2 and $s3 or $s4 and $s5 and $s 6 and $s7 or $s8 and $s9 and $s10 or $s11 and $s12 or $s13 or $s14 or $s15 The following Yara ruleset is under the GNU-GPLv2 license ht tp www gnu org licenses gpl-2 0 html and open to any user or organization as long as you use it under this license rule MS17_010_WanaCry_worm meta description Worm exploiting MS17-010 and dropp ing WannaCry Ransomware author Felipe Molina @felmoltor reference https www exploit-db com exploits 41987 date 2017 05 12 strings $ms17010_str1 PC NETWORK PROGRAM 1 0 $ms17010_str2 LANMAN1 0 $ms17010_str3 Windows for Workgroups 3 1a $ms17010_str4 __TREEID__PLACEHOLDER__ $ms17010_str5 __USERID__PLACEHOLDER__ $wannacry_payload_substr1 h6agLCqPqVyXi2VSQ8O6 Yb9ijBX54j $wannacry_payload_substr2 h54WfF9cGigWFEx92bzm Od0UOaZlM $wannacry_payload_substr3 tpGFEoLOU6 5I78Toh n Hs RAP condition https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A TLP WHITE 3 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware all of them TLP WHITE Dropper This artifact 5bef35496fcbdbe841c82f4d1ab8b7c2 is a malicious PE32 executable that has been identified as a WannaCry ransomware dropper Upon execution the dropper attempts to connect to the following hard-coded URI http www iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea com Displayed below is a sample request observed --Begin request— GET HTTP 1 1 Host www iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea com Cache-Control no-cache --End request-If a connection is established the dropper will terminate execution If the connection fails the dropper will infect the system with ransomware When executed the malware is designed to run as a service with the parameters “-m security” During runtime the malware determines the number of arguments passed during execution If the arguments passed are less than two the dropper proceeds to install itself as the following service --Begin service-ServiceName mssecsvc2 0 DisplayName Microsoft Security Center 2 0 Service StartType SERVICE_AUTO_START BinaryPathName %current directory%5bef35496fcbdbe841c82f4d1ab8b7c2 exe -m security --End service-Once the malware starts as a service named mssecsvc2 0 the dropper attempts to create and scan a list of IP ranges on the local network and attempts to connect using UDP ports 137 138 and TCP ports 139 445 If a connection to port 445 is successful it creates an additional thread to propagate by exploiting the SMBv1 vulnerability documented by Microsoft Security bulliten MS17-010 The malware then extracts installs a PE32 binary from it's resource section named R This binary has been identified as the ransomware component of WannaCrypt The dropper installs this binary into C WINDOWS tasksche exe The dropper executes tasksche exe with the following command --Begin command- C WINDOWS tasksche exe i --End command— TLP WHITE https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A 4 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware Note When this sample was initially discovered the domain iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea com was not registered allowing the malware to run and propagate freely However within a few days researchers learned that by registering the domain and allowing the malware to connect it's ability to spread was greatly reduced At this time all traffic to iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea com is re-directed to a monitored non-malicious server causing the malware to terminate if it is allowed to connect For this reason we recommend that administrators and network security personnel not block traffic to this domain TLP WHITE Impact Ransomware not only targets home users businesses can also become infected with ransomware leading to negative consequences including temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information disruption to regular operations financial losses incurred to restore systems and files and potential harm to an organization’s reputation Paying the ransom does not guarantee the encrypted files will be released it only guarantees that the malicious actors receive the victim’s money and in some cases their banking information In addition decrypting files does not mean the malware infection itself has been removed Solution Recommended Steps for Prevention Apply the Microsoft patch for the MS17-010 SMB vulnerability dated March 14 2017 Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching the end users and authenticate in-bound email using technologies like Sender Policy Framework SPF Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance DMARC and DomainKeys Identified Mail DKIM to prevent email spoofing Scan all incoming and outgoing emails to detect threats and filter executable files from reaching the end users Ensure anti-virus and anti-malware solutions are set to automatically conduct regular scans Manage the use of privileged accounts Implement the principle of least privilege No users should be assigned administrative access unless absolutely needed Those with a need for administrator accounts should only use them when necessary Configure access controls including file directory and network share permissions with least privilege in mind If a user only needs to read specific files they should not have write access to those files directories or shares Disable macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via email Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Office suite applications Develop institute and practice employee education programs for identifying scams malicious links and attempted social engineering Run regular penetration tests against the network no less than once a year Ideally run these as often as possible and practical https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A TLP WHITE 5 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware Test your backups to ensure they work correctly upon use TLP WHITE Recommendations for Network Protection Apply the patch MS17-010 If the patch cannot be applied consider Disabling SMBv1 and blocking all versions of SMB at the network boundary by blocking TCP port 445 with related protocols on UDP ports 137-138 and TCP port 139 for all boundary devices Note disabling or blocking SMB may create problems by obstructing access to shared files data or devices The benefits of mitigation should be weighed against potential disruptions to users Review US-CERT’s Alert on The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations and consider implementing the following best practices 1 Segregate networks and functions 2 Limit unnecessary lateral communications 3 Harden network devices 4 Secure access to infrastructure devices 5 Perform out-of-band network management 6 Validate integrity of hardware and software Recommended Steps for Remediation Contact law enforcement We strongly encourage you to contact a local FBI field office upon discovery to report an intrusion and request assistance Maintain and provide relevant logs Implement your security incident response and business continuity plan Ideally organizations should ensure they have appropriate backups so their response is simply to restore the data from a known clean backup Defending Against Ransomware Generally Precautionary measures to mitigate ransomware threats include Ensure anti-virus software is up-to-date Implement a data back-up and recovery plan to maintain copies of sensitive or proprietary data in a separate and secure location Backup copies of sensitive data should not be readily accessible from local networks Scrutinize links contained in emails and do not open attachments included in unsolicited emails Only download software—especially free software—from sites you know and trust Enable automated patches for your operating system and Web browser Report Notice DHS and FBI encourages recipients who identify the use of tool s or techniques discussed in this document to report information to DHS or law enforcement immediately We encourage you to contact DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center NCCIC NCCICcustomerservice@hq dhs gov or 888-282-0870 or the FBI through a local field office or the FBI’s Cyber Division CyWatch@ic fbi gov or 855-292-3937 to report an intrusion and to request incident response resources or technical assistance References https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A TLP WHITE 6 7 9 5 2018 Indicators Associated With WannaCry Ransomware Malwarebytes LABS WanaCrypt0r ransomware hits it big just before the weekend TLP WHITE Malwarebytes LABS The worm that spreads WanaCrypt0r Microsoft Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010 Forbes An NSA Cyber Weapon Might Be Behind A Massive Global Ransomware Outbreak Reuters Factbox Don't click - What is the 'ransomware' WannaCry worm GitHubGist WannaCry WannaDecrypt0r NSA-Cyberweapon-Powered Ransomware Worm Microsoft Microsoft Update Catalog Patches for Windows XP Windows 8 and Windows Server 2003 KB4012598 Cisco Player 3 Has Entered the Game Say Hello to 'WannaCry' Washington Post More than 150 countries affected by massive cyberattack Europol says Revisions May 12 2017 Initial post May 14 2017 Corrected Syntax in the second Yara Rule May 14 2017 Added Microsoft link to patches for Windows XP Windows 8 and Windows Server 2003 May 14 2017 Corrected Syntax in the first Yara Rule May 16 2017 Provided further analysis and new IOCs in STIX format May 18 2017 Provided initial IOCs in a STIX format June 7 2018 Added attribution of the WannaCry malware variant to the North Korean government and link to White House press briefing This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy Use policy TLP WHITE https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A 7 7
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