Views Preparing for Multidomain Warfare Lessons from Space Cyber Operations Maj Albert “AC” Harris III USAF Disclaimer The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con­ strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense Air Force Air Education and Training Command Air University or other agencies or departments of the US government This article may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission If it is reproduced the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line A merica is under attack The enemy has jammed signals from the Global Posi­ tioning System GPS limiting unmanned aerial vehicle support and preci­ sion air strikes Satellites are blinded by ground-based lasers preventing ac­ tionable intelligence on enemy maneuvers within denied areas and degrading threat warning capabilities At home cyber intrusion threatens America’s critical infra­ structure that supports satellite command and control C2 and cripples in-theater satellite communications putting deployed naval strike groups at risk To compli­ cate matters further news outlets report on the attacks with information that de­ fense officials know not to be true Yet this misinformation sparks outrage from the American public and encourages hasty decisions by lawmakers America is under attack and all this happens without a single kinetic strike These events describe a potential scenario in the next Great War How could America get to this point For years we have achieved national objectives through military operations other than war Such activities were focused on nonstate actors like Al-Qaeda Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIS and Al-Shabaab Yet as war fighters integrate joint capabilities to defeat extremists nation-states are learning from the success and failures not only of our military activities but also those ac­ tions performed by our enemies This makes them more capable in challenging American interests and curtailing our war-fighting advantage How do we prepare our military to meet the challenges of this evolved adver­ sary In a 2017 letter to Airmen General Goldfein stated that to counter this adver­ sary we must enhance multidomain C2 1 He tasked Brig Gen B Chance Saltzman a space weapons officer to lead Air Force efforts toward multidomain solutions Since then much progress was made yet even with progress it is going to take time be­ fore we see significant change across the Air Force To help speed the enhancement of multidomain C2 tactical leaders such as those at or below squadron levels should cultivate multidomain thinking in their units Leaders at the tactical level should consider employing the following steps in shaping their environment for multidomain C2 1 Know your domain and know it well 2 Identify and collaborate with tactical mission partners in other domains Fall 2018 45 3 Train and exercise multidomain approaches 4 Document lessons learned 5 Apply multidomain lessons in agreements plans and tactics These transferable steps have helped enhance multidomain C2 at the tactical level But before this discussion dives right into the five steps I want to add context to their usefulness and review why multidomain C2 is the solution for preparing our nation for the next Great War Courtesy of Wayne Clark Gen David L Goldfein USAF chief of staff speaks at the February 2018 Air Warfare Symposium A Smarter Adversary Requires an Improved War-fighting Approach President Donald J Trump’s first National Security Strategy reminds us that Amer­ ica “faces an extraordinarily dangerous world filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in recent years ”2 Whether a nation-state an extremist group or even a lone wolf the enemy of today is smarter than ever before As American national power evolves our adversaries continue to challenge us in each of the dip­ lomatic informational military and economic sources For example on the eco­ nomic front extremists have learned that sustained threats against a nation can de­ ter investors and disrupt productivity 3 On the diplomatic and information fronts noticeably absent from accords on cybersecurity and intellectual property rights are those countries that are active in cybercrime and cyber espionage against the US 4 On the military front years of budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty have compli­ 46 Air Space Power Journal Views cated and impeded military solutions to these evolved threats 5 Russia is using false information to influence elections around the world hacking into American infor­ mation systems and violent extremists are using social media to promote their causes 6 If we want to be successful in keeping the peace and be ready for the next Great War our operational art must confront this smarter adversary using multido­ main approaches Courtesy Scott Ash Gen John W Raymond Air Force Space Command AFSPC commander testifies with the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on 17 May 2017 Multidomain approaches at the tactical level involves the lowest warfighting ech­ elon taking advantage of secondary domains—land sea air space or cyber—to de­ liver effects more effectively across their primary domain At the operational level of warfare they will help provide a greater level of synergy bolstering solutions to complex matters such as antiaccess and area-denial problems presented by Russian and Chinese military capabilities 7 The Army called warfare that uses this approach “multi-domain battle ” and suggests it enables the projection of “combat power from land and into other domains to enable joint force freedom of action ”8 The Marine Corps also highlights the necessity of exploiting all domains as doing so increases maneuvering capabilities and combat effects 9 In concert the Navy is exploring inno­ Fall 2018 47 vative ways for employing land forces from other military branches to secure access to shared domains—particularly those within the Pacific area of responsibility 10 For Airmen multidomain operations are by no means new to Air Force culture Our service was born from airpower’s promise of combat effects that could enable more effective maneuvers on battlefields ashore and combat areas at sea Over the years Airmen have studied ways to employ airpower in ways that it drives desired effects in other domains Before World War II Airmen at the Air Corps Tactical School developed theories for employing airpower that were key to defeating Hit­ ler 11 A little more than 40 years after we became an independent combat force the Air Force developed an evolved operational strategy drawn from years of airpower experience and employed a new strategic attack strategy during the first Gulf War 12 Much of that strategy was a result of the theories offered by Col John Warden who advocated an approach that visualized the enemy as a system where simultaneous offensive fires by combined arms on various components delivered synergistic ef­ fects across the entire social and military system Courtesy of USAF Air Force fighter aircraft fly over oil fields during Operation Desert Storm With this new strategy the Gulf War became a watershed moment for airpower advocates Not only did the air campaign validate the efficacy of modernized strate­ gic attack it is considered the first major conflict in which space played a vital role 13 Under the leadership of Lt Gen Thomas S Moorman Jr AFSPC commander 48 Air Space Power Journal Views at the time space war fighters around the world proved that they knew their do­ main and delivered effects from space that made the success of strategic attack pos­ sible During a 1991 presentation at an Air Force Association chapter in Minnesota General Moorman proudly acknowledged that in Desert Storm “space owned the battlefield We had a robust on-orbit constellation and the inherent spacecraft flex­ ibility to alter our operations to support specific needs of the terrestrial warf­ ighter ”14 Although we demonstrated how multidomain employment of airpower can achieve strategic objectives in the first Gulf War the Air Force continued to im­ prove its ability to operate using multidomain approaches driving even more op­ erational successes as seen later in Operation Inherent Resolve 15 As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved America’s grand strategy piv­ oted toward Asia Russia China North Korea and others were keen observers of US military engagement in the Middle East and did not want to suffer the same fate Their efforts to counter American military effectiveness seemed deceptively sim­ ple deny America’s ability to project power to the battlefield However we did not sit idly by and allow the adversary to prevail with such antiaccess area denial strat­ egies When the Air Force and Navy experimented with air-sea battle it improved our ability to employ airpower using multidomain approaches Yet its inherent weakness was in the fact that the concept focused primarily on combat operations across the air and sea domains rather than across air space cyber land and sea domains 16 Nevertheless experimenting with air-sea battle helped the services re­ learn the value of joint force integration resulting in a “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuvering in the Global Common ”17 As a service with significant responsibilities in three war-fighting domains air space and cyber Airmen play a vital role in this joint concept However we should not consider such concepts at just the operational and strategic levels we must also consider them at tactical levels To evolve airpower thinking toward mul­ tidomain solutions more effectively Airmen should observe the lessons from natu­ ral multidomain packages like those found in the space and cyber mission areas After all America’s increasingly integrated joint fighting force relies heavily on the decision advantages and deep reach provided by the multidomain effects delivered through space and cyber capabilities Almost 20 years ago Colonel Warden pre­ dicted “Information will become a prominent if not predominant part of war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve around seizing or manipulating the en­ emy’s datasphere ”18 As a key architect for the airpower strategy in the Gulf War he also predicted that although information was not a prominent part of warfare at that time it would be He was right Today space and cyber capabilities support every US military operation provid­ ing significant combat and combat support effects that secure American interests around the world Space and cyberspace capabilities are so integrated that they function as a multidomain package unseen and unappreciated by many until some­ thing interrupts the advantages they provide The next Great War will likely involve extensive cyber campaigns and will likely extend into or even start in space To be prepared we should learn from space and cyber operations and use those lessons to shape the environment for multidomain C2 Fall 2018 49 Observations and Lessons from Space Cyber Operations General Goldfein receives a GPS mission brief from the 2nd Space Operations Squadron Tactical space operators enable multidomain solutions and help to assure joint operations worldwide Tactical space operators located around the world com­ mand and control their assets in a way that enables the free flow of effects from their space systems During Operation Iraqi Freedom effects from communication satellites such as the Mobile User Objective System the Wideband Global Satellite Communications System and the Military Strategic and Tactical Relay were essen­ tial for effective military maneuvers on land at sea in the air and provided the se­ cure communications needed to coordinate synchronized tactical multidomain fires Missile warning satellites such as the Defense Support Program and the Space-Based Infrared System offered a unique awareness of key areas This af­ forded more time and space for decisions by commanders at all levels and helped to counter Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s ability to conduct surprise movements Even today GPS helps guide American ships aircraft and troops to their objectives and put the “smart” in smart munitions enabling them to hit targets requiring high levels of precision Data from signals intelligence and imagery satellites have the reach to fill critical intelligence gaps in denied areas that other air sea and land as­ sets cannot observe without significant risk of interdiction or destruction 50 Air Space Power Journal Views Modern warfare has shown that a space capability such as a satellite communi­ cations asset can support tactical air control parties provide links for armed un­ manned aerial systems facilitate in-flight retargeting of cruise missiles enable res­ cue forces to talk to isolated personnel and transmit sustainment instructions back to the US—all at the same time 19 In short a small crew of space operators on watch commanding and controlling a single space capability have simultaneously brought both combat and noncombat support effects to a range of military operations around the world These war fighters have proven their operational prowess again and again From delivering space effects against enemies during the first Gulf War to using space in the fight against the Islamic State Airmen operating space assets continue to drive operational success in all war-fighting domains As such any en­ emy that wishes to defeat American’s military might would likely target space capa­ bilities Adversaries are aggressively seeking counterspace capabilities to limit US war-fighting advantage America’s adversaries see space as a key enabler of com­ bat action and thus have invested in counterspace weapons to seize the initiative seemingly at an increasingly faster pace 20 One does not have to look far for exam­ ples of this China is expanding its intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities while concurrently developing systems that could be employed to curb such advantages 21 In early 2017 a Chinese researcher was reportedly awarded a na­ tional prize for his work in high-power microwave technology which could poten­ tially be employed toward a wide range of enemy multidomain fires 22 Russia’s de­ velopment of laser weapons and kinetic kill capabilities is also threatening as such weapons may possibly be used to blind imagery satellites or destroy them alto­ gether 23 As long as space remains a key enabler for combat effects across multiple domains our adversaries will continue to look for ways to counter our space capa­ bilities In the next Great War one could assume that the enemy will attempt to dis­ rupt America’s war-fighting advantage through offensive cyberspace campaigns on systems that enable space operations Like tactical space operators tactical cyberspace operators provide and en­ able vital effects that shape the nature of military activities in all domains Tac­ tical cyberspace operators deliver combat and combat support effects by leveraging physical or logical computer networks or by leveraging cyber personas In physical networks cyber operators can target information technology IT components that make up the network IT hardware stored on aircraft ships satellites and data pro­ cessing centers or in the palm of a Soldier’s hand can be key physical network tar­ gets that can be exploited through various technical means 24 Within logical net­ works such as websites SharePoint or the “Cloud ” cyber operators can maneuver across domains to deliver fires on selected targets Offensive actions conducted in the logical network could render systems inaccessible denying war planners and operators access to essential mission data and communications Access points in the logical network can also be leveraged to target physical network systems bring­ ing down IT hardware and leaving a technology-dependent unit nonmission capa­ ble Virtual identities or cyber personas can be targeted to gain access to the physi­ cal or logical IT layers A stolen virtual identity can give an adversary access to Fall 2018 51 personal computer systems and personal information or even to the target’s physi­ cal work spaces With enemies poised to use cyberspace as the means to attack America or chal­ lenge American interests tactical cyber operators remain combat-ready Although rarely discussed in the open these war fighters have employed options to achieve national security objectives They have monitored the cyber environment as Russia asserted aggression against Ukraine and are working with other US government en­ tities to defend the US homeland against cyber attacks from Russia China and other entities capable of malicious cyberspace behavior 25 Source Defense Visual Information Distribution Service Cyber Airmen in the 175th Cyberspace Operations Group Adversaries see cyberspace as an effective means to challenge American inter­ ests As cyber attacks on America become more frequent one could wonder if the enemy is actually conducting live fire training events in preparation for attacks on more sensitive targets For instance when North Korea executed offensive cyber campaigns against Sony in 2014 it compromised more than 3 000 computers 800 servers and a huge amount of data including the personal information of employ­ ees 26 In another attack in May of 2017 the ransomware known as WannaCry in­ fected hundreds of thousands of Microsoft Windows operating systems in more than 150 countries 27 This particular attack targeted files encrypted them and held them hostage for money In essence this was a cyber equivalent of a worldwide 52 Air Space Power Journal Views hostage crisis Imagine if these attacks were on military capabilities or on the criti­ cal infrastructure of allied nations engaged as a coalition in armed conflict Each offensive action reveals not just the civilian but also the military threat underscor­ ing vulnerabilities of an IT-dependent interconnected society The nature in which cyber assures the space mission helps to highlight the ef­ ficacy of multidomain operations In a February 2018 statement to the Senate In­ telligence Committee the director of national intelligence Daniel Coats confirmed that Russia and China are reforming military capabilities in a way to enable multidomain fires against US space systems 28 With this one could infer that Russia and China are considering offensive cyber tactics to disrupt space capabilities This is a serious threat because although cyber attacks can threaten operations in all do­ mains and in practically all aspects of society the space domain is uniquely vulner­ able to adverse effects on its cyber dependencies 29 For instance Soldiers Sailors Marines and Airmen once employed have engaged in combat without the use of cyber capabilities However space operators have always leveraged cyber effects to deliver military success in through and from space Satellites are useless without the cyberspace link that allows for the flow of data to and from them or the proces­ sors that transform that data into meaningful information Attacks on cyber systems could easily exploit the vulnerabilities of space activities and could cause cascading events that limit the delivery of space effects and reduce America’s ability to meet its national security objectives We have seen evidence of this already Between 2007–08 government officials suspected Chinese actors in hacking and taking control of two imagery satellites National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Landsat-7 and Terra AM-1 Dur­ ing a congressional testimony Dean Cheng stated that this incident among others suggests that the Chinese “are actively exploring vulnerabilities in space informa­ tion systems ”30 Chinese actors are also suspected in hacking the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s weather satellite in September 2014 31 These are just a few of many incidents and space and cyber Airmen are working hard to miti­ gate the apparent threat to defense systems Together space and cyber operators provide vital advantages toward national se­ curity objectives They make up an advantageous multidomain package and the en­ emy knows it Actions by our adversaries suggest attempts to curb this advantage by challenging not only our space superiority but our cyberspace superiority as well The 2018 National Defense Strategy says it best “today every domain is contested—air land sea space and cyberspace ”32 As the enemy vigorously develops new capabili­ ties to challenge US interests their perceived emphases on being able to deliver mul­ tidomain fires illustrate America’s need for strengthening multidomain C2 Shaping the Environment for Multidomain Command and Control Enhancing multidomain C2 requires deliberate action at the tactical level At this level planners and operators of one domain must have not only the skills to per­ form their own missions but they must also understand how planners and opera­ tors of other domains assure or even challenge their mission accomplishment Fall 2018 53 Building this knowledge at the lower levels can help enhance multidomain C2 at operational and strategic levels Leaders at the tactical level should consider the fol­ lowing steps when shaping their environment for multidomain C2 1 Know your domain and know it well To shape tactical environments for multidomain C2 we have to first know our domain and know it well In any case before one can consider synchronized tactical actions from multiple domains we must first be experts in our primary domain But this knowledge goes far beyond just job acumen We have to recognize how our piece of the mission fits into the bigger fight At the tactical level we must understand how our actions enable op­ erational objectives and leaders must effectively communicate this understanding to those they lead This helps Airmen be mentally ready to support units that oper­ ate in other domains Maj Hanif Flood talks with Air University AU about his experience in integrating space and cyber at the Space Symposium in Colorado Springs Colorado 18 April 2018 For tactical space and cyber operators they master their domain not only through local opportunities but also through advanced education and training op­ portunities offered by the DOD intelligence community and various commercial vendors For instance within both the Advanced Space Operations School and the National Security Space Institute at Peterson AFB Colorado space operators learn how to better operate in their domain 33 They also explore challenges and ap­ proaches toward space integration into joint operations at not just the tactical but also at the operational and strategic levels Within the Center for Cyberspace Re­ search cyber Airmen enhance their ability to among other things “plan direct and execute offensive and defensive cyberspace operations ”34 At AU an increased focus on space cyber and multidomain C2 provides valuable training that is avail­ able to all Airmen bolstering cross domain learning and inquiry 35 54 Air Space Power Journal Views 2 Identify and collaborate with tactical mission partners in other do­ mains Tactical leaders should identify units with missions in opposite domains and then collaborate to ascertain possible cross-domain synergies that may contrib­ ute toward multidomain mission success At times this may be evident as the mis­ sion of some tactical units is to provide support to another However when evaluat­ ing cross-domain synergies leaders should meticulously understand how actions in one domain have the potential to impact the mission of a unit operating in another positively or negatively Then those leaders should develop mission assurance tac­ tics that improve the probability of operational success With these tactics in place leaders will help underpin the building blocks for multidomain C2 extending op­ tions available to the operational or strategic-level commander’s battle management responsibilities Tactical space and cyber units continue to evolve with many now presented to combatant commanders in a way that better enables collaborative partnerships with tactical mission partners from other domains Some partnerships have been improved in part due to the establishment of the Space and Cyber Mission Force The 2012 establishment of the Cyber Mission Force CMF by United States Cyber Command USCYBERCOM was designed to improve the organization of cyber forces and better address cyber threats to US interests 36 Air Force efforts such as the Cyber Squadron Initiative complements CMF concepts building tactical cyber mission defense teams to better protect and defend the delivery of air and space power 37 On the one hand the Space Mission Force SMF introduced by AFSPC in 2016 focuses on advanced training that better prepares space operators to execute space war-fighting missions 38 The SMF also adjusts the presentation of space forces to combatant commanders enabling improved integration of tactical space capabili­ ties into joint war-fighting campaigns 39 Efforts within Joint Task Force Ares a USCYBERCOM operation against the ISIS can serve as excellent examples for how tactical units within the CMF use multido­ main partnerships to enhance solutions at operational and strategic levels 40 Like fires from other domains cyber fires must be coordinated with not just stakehold­ ers at the strategic and operational levels but with tactical mission partners as well 41 After all we do not want to conduct offensive cyber operations on enemy networks if friendly forces are using those networks to achieve desired effects Multidomain partnerships leveraged by tactical space forces have also enhanced solutions at operational and strategic levels At Schriever AFB Colorado unique partnerships between space cyber and ground support units have improved space mission assurance directly contributing toward combat and noncombat support effects in theater 42 These partnerships ensure that when deployed war planners reach back to the SMF they receive tactical support from space experts ready to de­ liver space capabilities For example while US Central Command was planning air strikes against Syria after Bashar al-Assad once again deployed chemical weapons against his own citizens war planners leveraged data provided by the SMF to de­ velop space effects specifically designed to support the 14 April 2018 air strikes 43 This example along with efforts within the CMF highlight the value of tactical multidomain collaboration and their impact on contributing toward strategic and operational successes Fall 2018 55 3 Train and exercise multidomain approaches Tactical leaders should con­ duct joint training and exercises to strengthen multidomain options When conduct­ ing such activities leaders must be careful not to focus solely on refining tactics that work Some of the best lessons can be learned when we stress our ability to op­ erate when the probability of mission failure is high or even certain Quality exer­ cises evaluate the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action that can complicate efforts to achieve the objective In other words tactical leaders must ex­ ercise their ability to fight through the adversary’s multidomain fires and win Training and exercising multidomain approaches can be challenging A notional enemy during an exercise can declare victory early in the scenario if it successfully conducts offensive cyberspace operations or offensive space control against key blue force capabilities Imagine an air campaign without the precision navigation or timing from GPS satellites the vital intelligence delivered by space capabilities or without capabilities we take for granted like our desktop computers phones and yes even the lights Yet those are the type of scenarios we need in our exer­ cises Fortunately we are making progress with exercising multidomain ap­ proaches For instance space and cyber incorporation into Red Flag marking a sig­ nificant milestone in 2016 when then Col DeAnna Burt was the first nonrated wing commander 50th Space Wing to be deployed for the exercise 44 Courtesy David Salanitri An Airman attempts to troubleshoot space systems on his F-16 Fighting Falcon during an exercise 56 Air Space Power Journal Views 4 Document lessons learned Building multidomain solutions to national se­ curity challenges takes careful observation analysis and then documentation of lessons learned Yet documenting lessons from training and exercises are not enough planners and operators must also learn from anomalies that drive mainte­ nance actions or even maintenance actions that unfortunately drive anomalies Sometimes the effects from those anomalies can mirror effects derived from adver­ sary fires Anomalies like this during peacetime operations can produce significant lessons that planners and operators can leverage for multidomain approaches dur­ ing war Space and cyber units today are collaborating to better conduct multidomain op­ erations During my six years assigned at the National Reconnaissance Office NRO I witnessed the evolution of tactical space cyber integration and had the honor of helping our airmen become better multidomain warriors In a speech at the 34th Space Symposium NRO Director Ms Betty Sapp highlighted how partner­ ships with the Air Force allow touch points and opportunities like never before 45 She echoed comments by General Goldfein and General Raymond by mentioning that our adversary is evolving and we have to move fast and learn fast 46 The in­ creased focus on partnerships between tactical space and cyber units at the NRO and across AFSPC have produced valuable lessons that allow better employment of air and space power 47 5 Apply multidomain lessons in agreements plans and tactics Leaders at the tactical level should apply multidomain lessons by codifying them into their lo­ cal agreements plans and tactics This is probably the most challenging step as current operational needs tend to out-prioritize administrative functions and typi­ cally the momentum for change has a short lifespan However if we do not apply these lessons we may jeopardize progress toward better tactical multidomain op­ erations We have to overcome the tendency to underprioritize this step as applica­ tion of such lessons can drive immediate improvements in multidomain efforts while the unit drives toward their mission Due in part to the fruitful collaboration between tactical space and cyber units across the NRO and AFSPC these two space organizations have codified a series of strategic-level concepts of operations to better deliver on their respective missions in the national security space enterprise 48 Those concepts born from multidomain partnerships exercises wargames and experiments involving tactical units help shape environments for multidomain C2 With the Air Force driving toward multidomain concepts Airmen like those in AFSPC and those assigned to the NRO have stepped up to validate the efficacy of multidomain operations contributing exten­ sively toward the projection of multidomain airpower For years effects from both space and cyber have been recognized as force multi­ pliers now they are considered war-fighting domains on their own The enemy un­ derstands that America’s military success depend on both space and cyber capabili­ ties and have taken steps to curb the advantages those capabilities provide With these five steps tactical leaders closest to the fight can cultivate a multidomain mindset within their unit and help speed the enhancement of multidomain C2 Fall 2018 57 Concluding Thoughts and Recommendations Multidomain operations are the solution to maintaining America’s war-fighting advantage and enhancing the multidomain approach at the tactical level will help prepare military forces for the next Great War The space cyber package is a natural multidomain option but to offset the enemy’s attempts to curb America’s military advantage Airmen at the tactical level must cultivate multidomain C2 in their own environment Yet effective multidomain C2 goes far beyond just delivering effects across the military domains It includes exploiting the capabilities of all govern­ ment commercial and foreign entities willing to support America’s national secu­ rity objectives Although enhancing multidomain C2 starts at the tactical level we still need to innovate and look for ways to improve multidomain thinking and application at the operational and strategic levels If we want our Airmen to be successful in conduct­ ing multidomain operations then we also need to develop multidomain capability areas that better organize train and equip tactical leaders for a multidomain con­ flict For example within AFSPC space warriors are advancing toward a Space En­ terprise Vision which seeks to exploit such capabilities to succeed in multidomain warfare As key enablers cyber warriors are contributing to that vision AFSPC is certainly contributing toward developing multidomain Airmen and according to their vision we can only expect that contribution to increase However we can al­ ways benefit from additional efforts that contribute toward the multidomain vision of future air and space power Tactical leaders at or below the squadron level are key to making that happen Lastly although there is an increased focus by senior leaders on space and cyber­ space superiority including breaking off space into a separate service and the evo­ lution of cyber squadrons we cannot lose focus on challenges that may threaten progress toward enhancing multidomain C2 Shortages in the pilot space cyber and other key communities are concerning as this doesn’t just mean there are less Airmen to sustain their career field but it also limits opportunities to evolve into a multidomain war-fighting force After all Airmen will continue to play a vital role in the CMF and if directed could also help shape a new military service for the space mission 49 Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and General Goldfein are certainly the Airman’s champions for these difficult issues as evident in their many presentations to Congress 50 However we need our national leaders to act on their call and provide the vital resources air space and cyber forces will need to be a dominant multidomain war-fighting package While the adversary explores ways to conduct multidomain fires to undercut our war-fighting advantage we must explore ways to enhance multidomain capabilities Without this America will be at risk of strategic paralysis when confronted with widespread conflict The five steps indicated above can help tactical leaders build a multidomain mindset to bolster multidomain C2 and help ensure America is pre­ pared for the next Great War  58 Air Space Power Journal Views Notes 1 Gen Dave L Goldfein “CSAF Focus Area Enhancing Multi-Domain Command and Control Ty­ ing it All Together ” March 2017 http www af mil Portals 1 documents csaf letter3 CSAF_Focus_ Area _CoverPage pdf 2 White House National Security Strategy of the United States of America 18 December 2017 https www whitehouse gov wp-content uploads 2017 12 NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905 pdf 3 Subhayu Bandyopadhyay Todd Sandler and Javed Younas “The Toll of Terrorism ” Finance Development 52 no 2 June 2015 26–28 http www imf org external pubs ft fandd 2015 06 bandyopa htm 4 G7 2017 Italia “G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace ” accessed 29 April 2018 http www esteri it mae resource doc 2017 04 declaration_on_cyberspace pdf 5 Frederico Bartels “Continuing Resolutions Invariably Harm National Defense ” The Heritage Foundation 21 February 2018 https www heritage org defense report continuing-resolutions-in variably-harm-national-defense 6 Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation “GRIZZLY STEPPE— Russian Malicious Cyber Activity ” 29 December 2016 https www us-cert gov sites default files publications JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY STEPPE-2016-1229 pdf and Jarred Prier “Commanding the Trend Social Media as Information Warfare ” Strategic Studies Quarterly 11 no 4 2017 7 Jeffrey M Reilly “Multidomain Operations ” Air Space Power Journal ASPJ 30 no 1 Spring 2016 61–73 http www airuniversity af mil Portals 10 ASPJ journals Volume-30_Issue-1 V-Reilly pdf 8 Gen David G Perkins USA Multi-domain Battle Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st Century Department of the Army 14 November 2016 https www ausa org articles multi-domain-battle-joint -combined-arms 9 Department of the Navy The Marine Corps Operating Concept How an Expeditionary Force Oper­ ates in the 21st Century Washington DC Headquarters US Marine Corps September 2016 http www mcwl marines mil Portals 34 Images MarineCorpsOperatingConceptSept2016 pdf ver 2016 -12-02-073359-207 10 Adm Harry Harris “Role of Land Forces in Ensuring Access to Shared Domains” speech Asso­ ciation of the US Army Land Forces of the Pacific Symposium Sheraton Waikiki Honolulu HI 25 May 2016 http www pacom mil Media Speeches-Testimony Article 781889 lanpac-symposium -2016-role-of-land-forces-in-ensuring-access-to-shared-domains 11 ASPJ staff “Air War Plans Division 1 The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler ” ASPJ 17 no 1 Spring 2003 http www airuniversity af mil Portals 10 ASPJ journals Volume-17_Issue-1-4 spr03 pdf 12 Department of the Air Force Air Force Doctrine 3 Annex 3-70 Strategic Attack 25 May 2017 http www doctrine af mil Doctrine-Annexes Annex-3-70-Strategic-Attack 13 Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings “The First Space War The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War ” The RUSI Journal 136 no 4 December 1991 doi 10 1080 03071849108445553 14 As cited by David Spires Beyond Horizons a Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership Maxwell AFB AL Air University Press 2002 260 15 Joe Pappalardo “How a Syrian Airstrike Got Help from Space ” Popular Mechanics 24 April 2018 https www popularmechanics com military weapons a19980968 syrian-airstrike-from-space 16 Department of Defense DOD Air-Sea Battle Office Air Sea Battle Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges Washington DC DOD May 2013 http navylive dodlive mil files 2013 06 ASB-26-June-2013 pdf 17 Michael E Hutchens William D Dries Jason C Perdew Vincent D Bryant and Kerry E Moores “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons A New Joint Operational Concept ” Joint Force Quarterly 84 January 2017 134–39 http ndupress ndu edu Portals 68 Documents jfq jfq -84 jfq-84_134-139_Hutchens-et-al pdf ver 2017-01-27-091816-550 18 Barry R Schneider and Lawrence E Grinter Battlefield of the Future 21st Century Warfare Issues Honolulu HI University Press of the Pacific 2002 104 19 “Raytheon Tomahawk Cruise Missile ” Raytheon Customer Success Is Our Mission ” accessed 14 March 2018 https www raytheon com capabilities products tomahawk Fall 2018 59 20 Daniel Coats Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community testimony US Sen­ ate Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Congr Washington DC 11 May 2017 https www dni gov files documents Newsroom Testimonies SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final pdf 21 Kevin Pollpeter “The US-China Reconnaissance-Strike Competition Anti-Ship Missiles Space and Counterspace ” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation University of California–San Diego 28 February 2017 http escholarship org uc item 4s99s9rs 22 Elsa Kania “The PLA’s Potential Breakthrough in High-Power Microwave Weapons ” The Diplomat 11 March 2017 http thediplomat com 2017 03 the-plas-potential-breakthrough-in-high-power-micro wave-weapons 23 Cheryl Pellerin “Hyten Deterrence in Space Means No War Will be Fought There ” DOD 26 January 2017 https www defense gov News Article Article 1061833 hyten-deterrence-in-space -means-no-war-will-be-fought-there 24 Joint Publication 3-12 R Cyberspace Operations 5 February 2013 http www jcs mil Portals 36 Documents Doctrine pubs jp3_12R pdf 25 Adm Michael S Rogers Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services statement 115th Cong Washington DC 27 February 2018 https www armed-services senate gov imo media doc Rogers_02-27-18 pdf 26 Steve Kroft “The Attack on Sony ” CBS News 12 April 2015 http www cbsnews com amp news north-korean-cyberattack-on-sony-60-minutes 27 “Alert TA17–132A Indicators Associated with WannaCry Ransomware ” US Computer Emer­ gency Readiness Team 19 May 2017 https www us-cert gov ncas alerts TA17-132A 28 Daniel Coats Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community testimony US Sen­ ate Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Cong Washington DC 13 February 2018 https www dni gov files documents Newsroom Testimonies 2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI pdf 29 Chris Babcock “Preparing for the Cyber Battleground of the Future ” ASPJ 29 no 6 Winter 2015 61–74 http www airuniversity af mil ASPJ Display Article 1152264 volume-29-issue-6-nov-dec-2015 30 Information Dominance The Importance of Information and Outer Space in Chinese Thinking testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 115th Cong 3 January 2017 statement of Dean Cheng http docs house gov meetings FA FA05 20170426 105885 HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-ChengD-20170426 pdf 31 Mary Flaherty Jason Samenow and Lisa Rein “Chinese Hack U S Weather Systems Satellite Network ” Washington Post 12 November 2014 https www washingtonpost com local chinese-hack-us -weather-systems-satellite-network 2014 11 12 bef1206a-68e9-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story html utm _term 16f8a19c9b62 32 DOD Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge Washington DC DOD 2018 https www defense gov Portals 1 Documents pubs 2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary pdf and “Report to the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization ” Defense Technical Infor­ mation Center 11 January 2001 http www dtic mil docs citations ADA404328 33 National Security Space Institute “Educating and Inspiring Visionary Space Leaders of Today and Tomorrow ” accessed 27 April 2018 https www2 peterson af mil nssi public 34 Air Force Institute of Technology School of Strategic Force Studies “Cyberspace 200 Fact Sheet ” 19 July 2016 http www afit edu images pics file Cyberspace%20200%20Fact%20Sheet%20new doc 35 Gen David L Goldfein speech 34th Space Symposium The Broadmoor Colorado Springs CO 17 April 2018 36 DOD The DOD Cyber Strategy Washington DC DOD April 2015 https www defense gov Portals 1 features 2015 0415_cyber-strategy Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web pdf 37 DOD “Cyber Squadron Enabling Concept ” 15 March 2018 38 “Details of Space Mission Force Now Available from AF Space Command ” Air Force Space Com­ mand 15 July 2016 http www afspc af mil News Article-Display Article 841797 details-of-space-mis sion-force-now-available-from-af-space-command 39 Ibid 40 “FOIA 17-023 17-033 17-064—USCYBERCOM Joint Task Force ” US Strategic Command 19 April 2017 http www stratcom mil Portals 8 Documents FOIA FOIA%2017-023 %2017-033 %20 17-064%20-%20USCYBERCOM%20Joint%20Task%20Force%20Areas pdf ver 2017-04-19-111941-797 60 Air Space Power Journal Views 41 Mark Pomerleau “How Can Cyber Contribute to Multi-Domain Battle ” Fifth Domain 22 August 2017 https www fifthdomain com home 2016 12 15 how-can-cyber-contribute-to-multi-domain -battle 42 2nd Lt Scarlett Rodriguez “Wing CC Praises Execution of First-Ever Ops ” Schriever AFB CO 5 March 2018 http www schriever af mil News Article-Display Article 1458091 wing-cc-praises-exe cution-of-first-ever-ops 43 Pappalardo “How a Syrian Airstrike ” Popular Mechanics 44 Brick Eisel “Space Cyber at Red Flag ” Air Force Magazine September 2017 http www air forcemag com MagazineArchive Pages 2017 September 2017 Space--Cyber-at-Red-Flag aspx 45 Betty Sapp speech 34th Space Symposium The Broadmoor Colorado Springs CO 17 April 2018 46 Ibid 47 Gen Dave L Goldfein Gen John Raymond and Betty Sapp speeches 34th Space Symposium The Broadmoor Colorado Springs CO 17 April 2018 48 Gen John Raymond and Betty Sapp speeches 34th Space Symposium The Broadmoor Colo­ rado Springs CO 17 April 2018 and Gen Raymond speech Air Force Association Multi-Domain Command and Control Conference Colorado Springs CO 14 August 2017 49 President Donald J Trump “Remarks by President Trump at a Meeting with the National Space Council and Signing of Space Policy Directive-3 ” statement White House 18 June 2018 https www whitehouse gov briefings-statements remarks-president-trump-meeting-national-space-council -signing-space-policy directive-3 50 Dr Heather Wilson and Gen David L Goldfein “USAF Posture Statement Fiscal Year 2019 ” presentation Committees and Subcommittees of the US Senate and the House of Representatives Washington DC 14 March 2018 http www af mil Portals 1 documents 1 FY19_AF_POSTURE _STATEMENT_HIGH_RES PDF Dr Wilson Gen Goldfein Gen John Raymond and Lt Gen Samuel Greaves “Military Space Policy” presentation Subcommittee on Strategic Forces US Senate Washington DC 17 May 2017 https www armed-services senate gov imo media doc Wilson-Goldfein-Raymond -Greaves_05-17-17 pdf Maj Albert “AC” Harris III USAF Major Harris BA University of Kentucky MSIR Troy University DPA Capella Uni­ versity is an action officer at Headquarters Air Force Space Command Peterson AFB Colorado Before his current assignment he was the operations officer for the Communications Operations Squadron—East delivering cyber mission assurance in support of satellite intelligence missions Commissioned in 2004 Major Harris is a multidomain leader who focuses his efforts on integrating space cyber and intel­ ligence capabilities to meet national security objectives His previous assignments include intercontinental ballistic missiles joint space operations and joint planning and exercises Distribution A Approved for public release distribution unlimited http www airuniversity af mil ASPJ Fall 2018 61