- i 1 -- - - a were r DISSEM ABR us DEPARTMENT OWW use om Eff - DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH 89 1 November l2 1969 eclassified T0 The Secretary authority- eases By Through Pam Jahnke Date From INR - Ray S Cline u 27 2a14 1 Subject REPUBLIC OF CHINA GRC Nuclear Weapons Program 'Although the GRC is currently in the process of ratifying the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty it nevertheless appears to be giving some consideration to developing its own nuclear weapons program FollowEhg the first Chinese Communist nuclear explosion President Chiang issued orders which eventually led to the organization of the military research institute now known as the Chung Shan Science Institute CSSI engaged primarily in research in the fields of nuclear energy and missile technology CSSI has recently acquired gig a 40 megawatt MW natural uranium heavy water reactor from Canada is E23 considering the purchase of a heavy water reactor Siemens of West Germany plans to construct a chemical reprocessing plant and has requested foreign FE firms to study the possibility of constructing a heavy water plant on T iwan Egg In line with this expanding interest in advanced nuclear facilities CSSI has also instituted a program to locate radioactive minerals on Taiwan and to - study the conversion of radioactive substances into fisSiOnable materials Capabilities and Limitations In l966 the Intelligence Community estimated that the Republic of China probably had sufficient trained technical manpower to build a nuclear device but would have to import almost all facilities FOREIGN EE LIMITEQ DISSEM 64% CD USE ONLY sm e 3 2315% GROUP- 1 TM um 1 deEmma g mgi ciess'n C3 Changelclassify EREVIEW Excluded from automatic TEE - urn E0 W125955g gawmurrence GEEK i mngrading and Fecmon by Date 3 2' E31a381 oation Ex Hum In ll 6 saw em A Wl idrawalNo 054' 502 67 EE FOREIGN USE ONLY i and materiaTS for Such a program The fac111ties that thel RC has a1ready procured or has under consideration wou1d be sufficient for'a nuc1ear_ weapons development program that if pursued energetica11y cou13 pro3uce one or two 1ow yie1d nuc1ear bombs a year once the Canad1an reactor goes critica1 1973 a 3313A1though the financia1 strain of deve1oping such a program wou1d be great 111 fthe expanding Ta1wanese economy wou1d be ab1e to absorb the expense provided that the dec1s1on were made to accept the costs Because of 1ts dependence upon externa1 sources for reactors and fue1 however the GRC cou1d embark vupon a weapons program on1y if it were prepap d to f1out 1nternationa1 safe guards and find a supp1ier equa11y wi11ing to do so Finding such supp1iers mw# 44534 oaexd seeass13 not 1mpossib1e but it cou1d be both practica11y and po1itica11y extreme1y difficu1t 'The key question is thus whether or not the GRC wi11 be wi11ing to make the po1itica1 decision face the economic costs and take the po1itica1 risks of embarking on a nuc1ear weapon program It is quite obvious that there is a faction within the GRC which with e1ther the acquiescenEe or support of the President favors the deve1opment of a nuc1ear weapons program or at Teast' wishes to maximize Taiwan's abi1ity to exercise the option At the same time there are a1so e1ements who strong1y oppose such a program because of its poTitica1 and eConomic costs kha i Considerations Pro and Con A1though it is difficuTt to envisage any from 1 1 CIA miTitary justification for such a program there are po1it1ca1 and reasons why a sma11 sca1e nuc1ear weapons program wou1d be attractive'to the GRCJanuary 1966 The LikeTihood of Further Nuc1ear ProTiferation DISSEM FOREIGN DISSEM USE ONLY - -- FOREIGN DISSEM USE ONLY -3 h One important element would be that of international prestige With a vested ifgff1nterest in demonstrat1ng that its technical and sc1ent1f1c capabilities are 13 net completely overshadowed by those of the mainland regime the GRC would I 7 expect to have its status greatly enhanced by acining the other four permanent members of the Security Council in possessing this ultimate symbol of a major state It wbuld also give the mainland oriented government and m1litary on Taiwan a tremendous boost Since Communist China exploded its first nuclear device Taiwan has felt more than ever vulnerable to attack and more than ever dependent on US'protection Yet a number of iagtors in recent years have fed about the extent and reliability protection Not the least 1mportant Taipei has seen the growth of substantial sentiment in the US against further involvement in Asian 'wars and a growing American willingness to reach a detente with Peking -The possibility that the US might decide at some future date to remove the nuclear umbrella from Taiwan would add substantially to the attractiveness of an 11 1r1c 1ep1endent nUclear capability in the eyes of advocates on the other hand pursuit of a program to devefop an independent nuclear uweapons system wifl'inevitably lead to strong disagreements within the GRC It could also lead to the contingency most dreaded by many Chinese a serious split between the GRC and its strongest supporter the United States Acquisition of a nuclear capability would also have detrimental effects on the relations with neighboring nations such as Japan especially if this development flouted international safeguards and or the Nuclear Non Proliferation FOREIGN DISSEM USE ONLY U cId 32449313 FOREIGN DIS DISSEM ONLY Taiwan obviously would have to weigh very carefully the advantages of any such program against these major disadvantages Those Chinese who 3 see US support as already diminishing however might feel the price worth Paying In addition to those who would oppose development of a nuclear weapons dljgildiprogram because of its impact en the 3 external relations there certainly aware others who would oppose it for domestic reasons the military there are undoubtedly groups who feel that the enormous cost of an independent nuclear program could be better spent on sophisticated conventional hardware which would be of more direct benefit to the armed forces The leaders in the economic I field could also be expected to oppose a program which will generate little if any direct benefit for the civilian sector on Taiwan and will divert enormous car ru 1 amounts of money from economic development Li it tConclusion 0ver the next five years we can EXpedt the GRC'nuclear program to continue to stress those components that cduld be turned to nuclear weapons production thereby keeping open a nuclear Option During this period those in charge of Taiwan s economic development may strengthen their opposition to a nuclear weapons program and increasingly emphasize its'economic and political tost3 As long a President Chiang remains in power however they will probably not be able to sidetrack efforts to strengthen GRC ability to exercise the nuclear option If Chiang passes from the scene on the other hand Opponents of a nuclear weapons program will probably press their case more strongly and effectively FOREIGN 3 DISSEM use ONLY Milli but 11 1 1 ww# 44534 1 s - 1 i This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu