A I access Rm 3 William W Thomas Jr Esquire Counselor for Political Affairs - American Embassy Taipei CIA 1 - CIA Dear Bill 5 Thank you for your letter on the GRC's nuclear research program Over the I have seen a steady stream ofl ion the subject but have never really understood what it was all about It was useful to have Bruce Billings' insights into what the actual poten ' tial of the Chung Shan Science Institute is As you commented we can all take comfort in the GRCs inefficiency in this direction It is a bit discouraging though to contemplate the waste of talent and resources involved in the program Sincerely Declassified Rutho rity 2 68 4 Thomas - Shoesmth By Theresa COuntry Director Ackerman Date TPS bds COPY SENSITIVE DELETED DocIdz447594 Taipei Taiwan March 11 1971 OFFEIAL-QFORMAL Thomas P Shoesmith Esquire Country Director 4 Department of State Washington D C 20520 Dear Tom This report is really a Bruce Billiggs repo as told to me Bruce and I discussed the C's clear research program for a couple of hours one afternoon and this is the gist of what Bruce has to say He unquestionably knows a great deal more and you and others in Washington may wish to use this paper as a basis fOr discussions if you can pin him down Given the intent they have Bruce is sure we can all take comfort in the inefficiency of the program Sincerely 3 William W Thomas Jr Counselor of Embassy for ll Political Affairs 47 Enclosure as stated DocIdz447594 SUBJECT GRC's Atomic Weapons Program In summary the GRC an atcmic weapons program but at the earliest could not possibly obtain any nuclear weapons capability for five years In all probability the time required would be much longer At the present time the GRC has no active intent to construct a nuclear weapon but does intend to attain the capability to manufacture such a device It has concentrated the staff equipment and_research in its Chung Shan Research Institute near Hsinchu STAFF The staff of the Chung Shan Research Institute is headed by General Tang Chun-po who has headed the Chung Shan Research Institute since its founding Tang was trained as a mechanical engineer at Cambridge prior to World War II Tang's scientific education is badly out of date but he has hired a staff of new PhD's trained in the United States who are perfectly capabb of the research and technology necessary to produce nuclear weapons One shortcoming of the staff of the Chung Shan Research Institute is in its administration it is probably incapable of an efficient research effort UIPMENT The equipment Chung Shan Research Institute is generalized up to date and adequate to produce atomic device if preperly used Like many other laboratories in Taiwan the Chung Shan Research Institute's laboratories have much more equipment than is needed for current research projects and their equip- ment very often duplicates equipment available in other nearby laboratories The Chung Shan Research Institute laboratory shows clearly that as far as its research is concerned money has never been an important obstacle The Chung Shan Research Institute has long wanted a research reactor of its own and priog to 1969 intended to buy a 50 megawatt heavy water reactor DocIdz447594 2 from the Siemens Company in Germany The Siemens reactor was one whose salient characteristic was an unusually high production of plutonium and was Opposed by the GRC's scientific and economic community as an unnecessary and inefficient expenditure whose usefulness would be limited Only two persons in the GRC General Tang and Chiang Ching-kuo favored this reactor The leader of the opposition was President Chiang's Science Adviser Dr we Ta yu who led a Spirited and successful campaign against the Siemens reactor in 1969 The GRC now is purchasing a 40 megawatt boiling water reactor from Canada that should be more generally useful than the Siemens reactor Work on the site of this reactor is well under way and a large and capable staff is being trained in Canada to operate it It is interesting to note that both the Canadian and Chinese Governments made it very clear that Canada's recognition of Peking would have no effect on the sale of this reactor Canada may have been as interested in the $40 million to be paid for it as the GRC was in acquiring the reactor RESEARCH Research as carried on at the Chung Shan Research Institute at present is not directed toward the production of a nuclear weapon as far as we can tell it has no direction at all Most research is now on topics which were throoughly explored as much as 20 years ago This is partly due to the fact that General Tang's own education in physics is badly out of date and partly to inefficient research direction It is clear however that no decision has been made on research toward any sort of nuclear weapon TIMING If the Canadian reactor goes critical in 1973- the earliest possible date the GRC could by dumpig the core of the reactor have adequate fissionable material for a nuclear weapon It has the capability staff and equipment for pro ducing such a weapon It does not however have a research DocIdz447594 3 program well enough organized to carry out the necessary research and apply the technology necessary to build a bomb The best estimate of the minimum time necessary for production of a nuclear weapon in the Republic of China is that it would require at least five years With the present research program it is likely that the time required would be substantially in excess of five years DocId 447594 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu