MEMORANDUM 1 masses WASHINGTON DeGember 26 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ZBIGNIEW BRZESINSKI SUBJECT Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan I will be sending you separately a preposed agenda for the NSC meeting on Friday and it will focus on both Afghanistan and Iran In the meantime you are receiving today's SCC minutes on both subjects This memorandum is meant merely to provide some stimulus to your thinking on this subject he I mentioned to you a week or so ago we are now facing a regional crisis Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil and Pakistan is both unstable internally and extremely appre- hensive externally If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan and 1 the age long dream of Moscow to have direct access 0 the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled Historically the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state we assumed that role in 1945 but the Iranian crisis has led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs Accordingly the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge both internationally and domestic ally While it could become a Soviet Vietnam the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us for the follow- ing domestic and international reasons Domestic A The Soviet interVention is likely to stimulate calls for more immediate 0 3 military action in Iran Soviet decisive ness will be contrasted with our restraint which will no longer be labeled as prudent but increasingly as timid B At the same time regional instability may make a resolution of the Iranian problem more difficult for us and it could bring us into a head to head confrontation with the Soviets - SEQ-HER 47 73 Pm r y Caf scsensgd on in at 56 On ma prcxismrsott 1 355 5 may Erna 533mb Col c1 gr From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE The Galman Libmy 2130 Stmt NW Suite 701 Washington no 10037 URBLESSEHED C SALT is likely to be damaged perhaps irreparably because soviet military aggressiveness will have been so naked D More generally our handling of Soviet affairs will be attacked by both the Right and the Left International as Pakistan unless we somehow mane to ro'eot both confidence and war into the re ion no 1015' B With Iran destabilized there will be no firm bulwark in Southwest Asia against the Soviet drive to the Indian Ocean C The Chinese will certainly note that'Soviet assertiveness in Afghanistan and in Cambodia is not effectively restrained by the United States 1 Compensating Factors There will be to be sure Some compensating factors A World public opinion may be outraged at the Soviet interven- tion Certainly Moslen conntries will be concerned and we might be in a position to exploit this B There are already 300 000 refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan and we will be in a position to indict the Soviets for causing massive human suffering That figure will certainly grow and Sovietusponsored actions in Cambodia have already taken their toll as well c There will be greater awareness among our allies for the need to do more for their own defense a Soviet Vietnam However we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam A The guerrillas are badly organized and poorly led From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE The damn 2130 Street NW Sun 701 Wuhagm no 20037 B They have no sanctuary no organized army and no central government all of which North Vietnam had C They have limited foreign support in contrast to the enormous amonnt of arms that flowed to the Vietnamese from both the Soviet Union and China m n The Soviets-are likely to act decisively unlike the 0 3 which pursued in Vietnam a poricy of inoculating 'the enemy A3 a consequence the Soviets might be able to aSsert themselves effectively and in world politics nothing succeeds like success whatever the moral aspects what is to be Done What follows are some preliminary thoughts which need to be dis- cussed more fully - A It is essential that hfghanistani resistance continues This means more money as well as arms shipments to the rebels and some technical advice 3 To make the above possible we must both reassure Pakistan and encourage it to help the rebels This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan more arantees to it more arms aid and c We should encourage the Chinese to help the rebels also D we should concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign to help the rebels B We should inform the Soviets that their actions are placing SALT in jeoPardy and that will also influence the substance of the Brown visit to China since the Chinese are doubtless going to be most concerned about implications for themselves of such Soviet assertiveness so close to their border Unless we tell the Soviets directly and very clearly that our relations will suffer I fear the Soviets will not take our expressions of concern'I very seriously with the effect that our relations will suffer without the Soviets ever having been confronted with the need to ask the question whether such local adventurism is worth the long-term damage to the U S -Soviet relationship F Finally we should consider taking Soviet actions in Afghan- istan to the UN as a threat to peace From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE The G'clman Library 2130 Street NW Suite 701 Washington DC 20037 411-1 unsafig Sad nut-h Kin 30 3w dil mil vhf-10 cam K I I an United Arab a Emma wigs- - fad BMW 1 lunch I I saw um l h rgbim 533 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu