Assistant to the Vice President 20911 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON becamber 13 enqr r 3 J - 43 4 I FDR I m KARL D JACKSON MS PROVOST MCNEIL Executive Secretory Central Intelligence hgenoy COL GEORGE SUMRALL JR Secretary Joint Chiefs of Staff MS 3mm swim Executive Secretary Axms Control and Disarmament Agency for National Security Affairs MR w RDEERE PEARSON Executive Secretary Department or State 136 JOHN a DUBIA Executive Secretary Department of Defense ll SUBJECT Meeting on Korea Nuclear Program 1 33 The national Council Deputies Committee will meet on a December 17 at p m in the White ouse Situation Room to discuss next steps in confronting the North Korea nuclear program The agenda is at Tab A The background paper will he provided shortly Attendance should be limited tq_principals plus one Please call your attai ifce to the ExchEIVe Secretary s office 456-2224 vi DECLASSIFIED F sittmann Executive Secretary Attachment Tab A Agenda cc Andrew Card 5 5th SmudCom-Nemx u 5 5 I $555507 STAVE EQUITIES 513 guowm 253$ REE-RUTHES i- AGENM scam mam A - mmam mm MR mum-3 m GAMEPLAN PAPER STATE TALKHPEQF WEEK 5 Isatmm MEMO 6N RON mama mm- 13 s va cam 11% mos JOINT Butamm'mma gamma 5mm 5ng WITH m-s AMEEMEM 55 DECLASSIHED ts-natal nap-J mash a 20911 Tuesday December 1991 iwt u 4ha I am 2 13 1130 Agenda II II Debrief on Recent ACDA Mission Ronald Lehman Discussion of Next Steps junold Renter IV Draft Talking Points for Kanter DECLASSIFIED Wang I SEQ-BET naeumw m i COMMITTEE MEETING ON NORTH KOREA DECEMBER 17 991 The objective of this meeting is to consider approval of a game plan to bring North Korea's nucleacuweapuns pregzam under control as outlined in the attached papex In addiaicn this meeting should consider approval of the following specific steps w1th North Korea in ew York to be dquble tracked by means of an by Ambassadqr Roy 1n Beijing inviting the North Koreans to sand 5 high lavel uEfScial - preferably Party Secretary for Internatioral Affairs Kim Sowng Sun to meet with a USG counterpart in New fork prior to President Bush s arrival in Seoul on January 5 in Neerork -with the 3 5 represented by Assistadt Secretary or other appropriate official The meeting should be held before President Bush arrives in and ROK in order to underscore his public statements there regarding the North Korean nucleat issue and out support ot ROK positions pointg fbr the preliminary nd high and a cable 0 Beijing wr n instructions for double tracking the contact - - to thbse countries having relations or potential influence with the orth alerting them to our concerns about tha North Korean nuclear probldh 1 DECLASSIFIED mar- e a SEKPOL 3531 12f12 9l x7 7i7 drafted NSHastings cleared BAP LDAnderson Acting - CFKartman I '3 OFFICE OF THE ASSWRETARV OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON D C 20301-2400 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM FOR THRU ACTING DIRECTOR SUBJECT DC Meeting on North Korea Nuclear Program U Gib Tomorrow at 1430 there will be a Deputies Committee DC meeting on the North Korea Nuclear Program at the White House to be chaired by new Deputy National Security Advisor_ Admiral Jonathan Howe The purpose of the meeting is two foldz to discuss the gameplan on the strategy to deal with the North Korean nuclear program and to approve a one time high level 0 8 meeting with the DPRK on the nuclear issue The gameplan TAB B lays out the steps which the U S will take in the next two months with the next decision point being the late February IAEA Board of Governors meeting The plan calls for Continued international effort working with Japan the Soviet Union China and other key friends and allies such as the UK and Australia to pressure DPRK 2 Ensuring that the ROKs press the North at North South talks on this issue During Ron Lehman s trip recently we provided more ammunition for the South by agreeing to the concept of a North South inspection regime Frankly we are concerned that the South seems to have rushed ahead with a non aggression agreement while placing the nuclear issue off to the side we will know more after the North South nuclear talks this weekend 3 The need to clearly enunciate our position on a peninsula ban on reprocessing and enrichment to the world and especially to DPRK directly via a high-level oneetime meeting A core demarche cable to friends and allies is necessary to do the former but that cable has been stalled at State on desk we expect the discussion at the DC on the gemeplan to be generally non-contentious but some points needed to be emphasized by you can he found in Th3 A measure progress signing IAEA safeguards is not enough but the North should reciprocate Roh Tee Woo's November 8 policy of foreswearing the development- including reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear weapons There is no dispute within or with the ROK that such a meetingh if approved by the DC will take place before the President's visit to Korea However how forwardmleaning should the U S be is in dispu e - The attached talking points C for the onewtime meeting is in our-view much too forward 1eaning we believe that the fact this meeting is taking place at possibly USP's level is a carrot The promiss of a second meeting which clearly connotes dialogue towards better relations is another carrot It is far too early to use the word normalization in this first meeting especially since thus far the North's strategy is to stall and impose additional conditions while refusing to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement We want to see the North sign and implement safeguards agree to a reciprocal non nuclear policy with the South and agree to at least trial inspections before we hold a second meeting The second meeting should not be characterized as the beginning of normalization dialOgue The points drafted by State reflect the views held by AS Solomon and they are not satisfactory to Don This View is shared strongly by the JCS Talking points on this issue for your use are in TAB A en s chex related issues which may arise dosing the DC meeting re-Team-Spirib 92 polioy The ROKs-are divided over whether to hold Team Spirit 92 with the Blue House leaning toward postponement and MND wanting a bigger and better one to show nesolve Our position is that we defer to a decision by the ROKs wwhioh we predict to be a decision to postpone USER has indicated that Januaxy 1 is the last date for a decision to postpone As for NCND a Bob working group der the digestion of 9213 lookin ii hi Attachments EAR Talking Points for Use TAB Gameplan Paper TAB State Proposed Draft Talking Points with DPRK ass sh 9 WW sees f' Hugo-559 o'a I TALKING 1 0st FOR MR LILLEY enunaannam r If the ROKs are only halfuhearted on the nuclear issue we will have a-great deal of difficulty gathering international pressure on the North especially if the North signs an IAEA safeguards agreement by February but does nothing else To keep the pressure on and to clearly state our position that the North must reciprocate Roh's policy -to include foreswearing of reprocessing-rwe need to send the core demarche cable out to friends and allies 0cm 2 5 95 ago 9 Andean MEETING 9 It w Draft talking points reflect the position that normaliza tion should be presented as the carrot to entice the North to stop its nuclear program However DPRK track record has been very poor We have seen no movement but only a series of additional demands Putting normalization forward could lead the North to believe that its program is paying off and weakening our resolve It could also alarm the South 7 5 0299 03 Don only agreed to a one time meeting to Specifically and clearly explain our position on the nuclear issue to the Nerth The current draft is unfocused and goes beyond what is wise we need to say up front what our concern about the nuclear program is and what DPRK must do 1 Sign and implement safeguards 2 Agree with Ron's non nuclear principles and sign up to South s Joint Declaration and Initiate trial inspections ASAP to include Yongbyon WW I n The carrot would be ano her meeting obviously leading to better relations and potential normalization if the North does the above first There is no need to be so forward leaning a I - nm mm H IlI-iilEl-n H - I ll- 1' 1 I 7115 aper puts atwatd a p an that seeks to parsua e North are to giye up its pursuat o nuclear'waapcns by diplcmatic politxcal and econcmic measures we are making pr axess in mahilizing ntexnational pressure on the DPRK to abandun its nuclear weapons grogram Our nuclea weapons decisions 5eau1 s subSequent preposal Eu 6 non nuclear Korea a Secretaries Cheney and Baker and the recent mogzh SOuth Prime Ministerial talks have focused global and regional attention on Japanese terms Ea DPRK normalization have the issue toughened Bezjing may press the aorta harder and may be willing to wank quietly with us ta 956 the probl m under control Du deferral of traap raducti n has strengthened Seoul'g and Japan's can idence in our reliability and remanded that satanic of nuclear weapons is not cost-free We must new build on this momentum y to these inc ssuad a Face on woula teasing gregsures Pfangyang n-s t stateman Raspundi 25 i Elements of the statement were encouragan but 1 conhamne 'in nge of IAEA inspectio of North Korean nuclear activities t6 North Korean inspectiaas o 8 5 bases in she RGK and alleda 2x dirBCt negatiaticns with the U S on simultaneous nuclgar weapons I in the and of wh n use As wezl there is a well established history accEgtable to us i sinq that 1t wi$l stem only tc of Pyongyang tax I last mznute additional canvass Seoul's back off at the recent unof icial acknowledgment that there are a nuclear weapons in the ROK has not elicited any further resp nse rom - 3 We have to recogniae that the odds may be agaxnst us in pursuing th s glen to get the North Korean Fragram under control- Intelligence analysis indicates that we may not knew when the Yongbyon repzocessinq plant goes not and ha we 60 not know whether North Korea may have egrscassed some material already Given the pat ecr stailing on the safeguards issue it is possible Pyongyang has no intention of changing csurse IE its a m will be 0 a v D939 NH 5 out 552nm ED- 352 0 53 U4 G9 rh- u u 1 5 delay diffuse igtexnagibnal pressure and use any appoxcunity to seem Earthcamzng Without making maanianul concessions There are early indications moreover that the North may attempt to move and hide its reprocessing facilities than agtee to inspection Or Lhe North may sign but not implement IAEA safeguards at the eleventh hour hoping to short circuit international pressure our plan for the next Eew months Eambines escalating international p essure with concrete inducements Eo Pyangyang In addition to gaining DPRK aacaptance of IAEA safeguards our short-term objective is a Verifiable freeze on orth Korea's reprocessing elfort Du long-team objective is for North Korea to Sign on to the same non-nucl hr rinciples that the ROK has adopted by means of a credibly North-South agreement As we have forasnadowcd in Seoul Beijing and unacaw the plan includes a meeting to present our positions to tha North Koreans but not to negotiate with them Between now and the late February IAEA Bdazd of Governors BOG meeting our plan focuses diplomatic persuasion ana laying out thu pasitiva benefits-Ear Pyongyanq of cooperatipn with us on problem After that we would seek to maximize international pressure and fast DPRK economically and diplomatically with ng_13gg1n We would send a core dematche to those countries that-have rekationsg'or potential influence with North Korea It would'seek to widen the range of bilateral pressures on the ou own message and build a diplomatic record thag would enable us to gain support for possible later aversive di iomatic As we launch and follow up this we should measures stress the urgency G5 the problem but eschew rhetoric that would qain the DPRK sym achy or appear to back lt into a corner This camgaign should make clear to the chat the casts of continuing its nuclear efforts include further diylomatic isolation The President's January grip can rein orCE this message as he voices our concerns in Austrazla Ringapere Korea and Japan We need to stay in close ranch with Ia xgl which has now linked normalization not only to this safeguaxds but to an end to reprocESsing We Want-the Japanese to to dangle the carrot of normalizaczon and 1 5 5 but if the March continues to stall 4% want the benefit 0 ccnside tougher measures in Coordination ocherz vis-a-vis the DPRK after February DECLASSIFIED - a similar apgroamh should be taken with china trying to the DEER We can engage the press Beijing to bear down on Chinese in New Ybrk Beijing and Vienna hoping they will convey ta Pyongyang that they cannot hold back international pressure for lbnq We should make clean that stepped up pressure in the IAEA and the UN must be pursued if North Korea hasn t come around by lace February We may alga wish'to discuss with the Chinese our need for more reliable information regarding north Ketean nuclear efforts We cannot be absolutely certain of PRC motives howevee and it is unlmkely they would be prepared to take any measures they perce ved as putting the survival of the Pyongyang regime in guestion is seized of this assue and has raised_it with us several times in the past few weeks most neta ly in a letter from RM Shevardnadze to Secretary Baker we have prepared a rapt and talking points for Seexatary Baker to gee with trong ef ort to bring Pyongyang Shevardnadze 0 encourage a 3 around to in 1ude Deputy Foreign Ministe Rogaghgv's visit there in late December We would let Moscow know of our illingness to meat with the North to seek imprevement of elations in-exchange for reagonsihle behavior but we would' itreae the need-fer etconger measures if nothin92comes of this 3 late February As with China we may wish tc discuss the exchanges on North Korean eucleax need for in ormetio efforts With Republic o icials we wauld use many oi the same themes 3 To improve chances success- eu allies would not seek digest action against Pyongyang at the December BOG meeting Instead we 5 would lay dawn markers seeking support for a yetuible _resolution by the late February BOG meeting Such a resolut on would notify the aeeuzity Caupcil of the ailuxe tc honor obligations terminate IAEA technicar'assistance t er states to do likewise This orth Korea and call on memh I would have wide support though we well have t6 work hard on the Chinese It would be harder to impose sanctions immediately i the DPRK were to sign a safeguards accord as the retification process and implementation would provide the DPRK ample excuses for further delay Once the IAEA sent a resolution to the UNSC the Council usgent basis to fulfill iLs NPT obligaticns There may be substantial problems with his course however There may '4 chance that the Security Cnunczl wnuld be will adage sanctions or other coercive measures an_nxe_le aeez in the we and Him Thus while moving ahEad in the IAEA and discussing'v options with governments sucn as China offers maintaining international we will need to weigh carefully whether and how we engage this is security Council We should keep in mind however that other nterested governments e g Australia and Japan may press for eterral to the UNSC in any ease and that the threat of resort so UN action is ar important element of our own strategy t9 move the 092K whether or not we ultimately press a vote Ultimately should we find we cannot assure UNSC to coercive measures aside-the um umbrella In this countries to pursue sanctions on instance as at the UN Chinese Particzpae1on would be critical to success Yet Beijing's Pasition is likely to be problematic Ministerial talks have shown the As the recent Prime- Horth South channel is crgg al to any solution of the nuclear issue and annex Korean problems At the December 10-13 prime talks Seoul Eollowed up Rah s recent announcement Ministerial a with a concrete proposal to dzscuas a HQK-DPRK non nuclear agreement including Cheney had told the RGK that we could consider 1 bases under the right circumstances Inspections should he reciprocal simultaneous and involve both civil and military facilities They shauld also follow public meat of both Kcreas he a non-nuclear policy reciprocal inspections could not the same Eunctien as IAEA Secretar inspections af v 5 replace and would not serve sateguasda This poeitaoa was conveyed by the Lehman team in greater detail to Seoui which incorporated it into 1 5 proposals for a bilateral inspection regime and trial insuec i ns DECLASSIFIED us- The results of the recent Primeuministerial talks while positive point to a potential danger of divergence between ourselves and the R036 So far the RDKG has avoided euphoria and kept the focus on the need for pragrees on the nuclear issue However even the appearance of si Nosth 5outh dialogue will have political resonance in Seoul with elections scheduled later in 1992 the R086 may be reluctant to move from dialogue with the North-to tougher measures including cutting of north South trade which would be important to any embargo As we did with the Lehman visit we will need to coordinate closoly with the ROK at every step to assure that the-nuclear issue'is pursued vigorously and to coordinate on the man polioy and technical issues which Pyongyang spring's Team Sp rit exercise regularly tees as an excuse to break off dialogue will be a or our two governments need to consider carefully as we pursue the overall problem Many key figures in the HOK are now considering a postponement of Term spirit This ie ot unprecedented last year we consulted closely with the 30x over the potential of Team Spirit to disrupt the North South the ROK decided it wished he proceed dialogue In the end i with the exeroiSe although this is by no means certain this year in January will afford an opportunity The President's visit to coordinate-policy at the most authorirative level problem we need to bring the Because of the urgency of th bilateral track into glay rapidly to tell the worth Koreans what we expect of them to reinforce the Rox in its dialogue with hem and to lay down clearly the incentives we can provide if they put their nuclear program under acceptable controls To In this We Mould hold a high level US-DPRK meeting as SOOI as possible to support the Rox's proposals but a before the Hre idenh's early January visit to Asia and Seoul so that his vi 1t can be used to highlight our policy and strengthen interhational support for our 0 would be necessary to implemen Some MW oval meetlng We would pass a the dec1sion to hold a high 1 message to the DPRK in New York and double tr-ck it in order to keep the PRH engaged and o tze Chinese government a sure delivery to the hlohest levels 2n Pyongfang 5 our are ready for a level I - nessage we would state that concerns on the nuclear ISSUE explenn waeting to discuss on ally our requirements for 315 c early and unequivoc arm DECLASSIFIED concerns and outline a concept for potential US-DPRK normalization we would also state that we were proceeding on the assumption that there will be continued pcoqress in NorthuSDuth dialogue Finally we would lay down one czitical roe at each succeeding stage marker one that we would reinfo nnzoaiizaiiano Through the lathe proviso we would seek to achieve a g ggjg Ereese on reprocossing while any vs opax taiks procee If we were successEuJ in maintaining this as a condition Eon further progress we would have achieved at least a temporary albeit not fully verifiable solution to the reprocessing problem we would indicate a willingness m the ormallzatuon under the right to move step by step towa'd conditions We would ev ew our nuclear proliferation concerns -reseo it the DPRK refuses to implement we would and the consequences we 5 safeguards Emily and promgusy abandon reprocessang emphasize the primacy of who North-South channel and strongly support Ron's proposals Eo a summit and for a North-South eprocesaing and the development of nuclear agreement to forego 1 weapons To make our package attractive we would lay out a gameplan of clearly defined incentives for moving to a better relationship with the North in which improving US-DPRK ra1atiousoncontingenb upon resolution of the nuclear issue and continued progress in Hort Sout ue wou1d facilitate - of its political and economic The incentives and steps we envisoge are as follows Once the DFRK brings into force a safeguards egreemenn prov ding for inSPECtions of all DPRK nuclear metezial to 1 include visits to all suspect facilities we would gh level nonmalization dialogue establish a ' ormal 111 A ter full implementation of IAEA sareguarus and conclusion of a North-South agreement banning 905533519 95 nucl ar and production nuclear matecgal with apptuptiete inSpecticn_provisions we u uid be prepared to make a positive intexzm move toward narralzzation This could be an the form of offices escabLished in capitals trade lxaison er interes sootions as in Havana L'l iif'f' Iran nu wa DECLASSIFIED Thereafter we would intensigy our normalization eonrt and move toward full normalizatlon as progross was achieved North-South dialogue missile in other areas we g proliferation and terrorism This cauld include sugport for North Korean access to IFIS it Pyongyang ma nocmal conditions and Ear diplomatic relations with others This approach would g ve the DHRK a serious positive proposal up fcapt It wanid take the face argument from the DPRK by an off that would be hard to re use As our multilateral position would be others Learned of it strengthened The Presioenu oould make this approach pub1 c during his January visit to Seoul 5335 cans-91v 5 9 4 RES Still stalling we will have to y February if the is move to the IAEA and if Eaasihla to he UN to yursuo a coercive diylomatio course If we are to have multilateral support for sanctions we till have to build support for our approach over the next few months and demonstrate that a policy of offering positive incentives to the North has failed to elicit Pyongyang's It is just possible that in the face of a deteriorating economy and even greater isolation the eoime would resound to our incentives although 1d on to their nuclear program at all Costa -m111tary measures since S t dis $ ion initial diplomatic strategy they may try to ho Secretary Cheney told ROK and Japanese leaders that we hould not consider could jeopasdize ou Wu - DECLASSIFIED lmr Hog DECLASSIFIED 21mm i I - Demarche in many capitals to keep pressure on DPRK and continue to build international consensus Letter to PM Shevardnadze Continue to seek informal talks among v Coordinate with Seoul on December 10-13 North South talks especially re ROKG proposal on nuclear and related issues I - IAEA Board of Governors meets in Vienna DPRK's failure to sign safeguards agreement to he discussed wonthaSoqth te1ks in Seou1 R05 tabies non nuc1e r proposals based on Rohts November 8 announcement on i g egemheg Preliminary approach through New York Bei3ing to set no highmlevel meeting in New York Set out precondition re reprocessing mention possibility of normalization dialogue if DRRK signs and implemehts'IAEA safeguards regime Maize-evens sea 0 5- High level meeting in New Yerk Support ROE proposal by dangling normalization a Rogaohev trip to Pyongyang Soviets to gross North Korea - Pnesident s trip to Asia National Assembly speech in Korea reflects state of play with North Korea reaffirms security commitment to ROE '5 022521 men 255 79a 9 Hmoeoo GDqu as ozssr '0 a goose Possible AIS Solomon follow-up discussions in Seoul Beijing and Tokyo 0 Ja a North 50uth talks in Pyongyang Possible Rob-Kim 11 Sung summits a 2r 2 IAEA scars of Goirernors meeting If the North has not implemented the agreement the board could neport to the UNSC Mama Possible UNSC consideration of sanctions Let Team Spirit exercise Conventional military enhancements e g Patriots Stealth fighters play a prominent role as promised during SCM QHGEEHIEESEIB arm 4-- hue-4 9 Mir- x l - bs t3 ELI-U- mm 1 03 TALKIHG POINTS MIHIHARSE WITH DPRK You have re direCt y and indirectly that higher level discusSion between our two governments could help to remove the sources of concern that prevent lotions from improvin bilateral re we are satisfied un er current circume ances with the established channel between our polltical counselors in Beijing During Secretary Baker's vzoit to Beijing however his hosts insisted that a higher level dischesion woule be pxoduetlveae_#kc h m ud gale a you hot he ere williog- o ed to i form on in New york as soon as practical hold such a dieeusei -orrangomonte cea'be mede if your-governmeng wishee to sen an authoritative representative from Pyongyang we propose a meeting on pecemher 27'0 28_in New York policy level of our be chosen from the re could attend as hosts peatedly suggested I have been authoriz The 0 8 side would gavernment on ambassado scent- cd etlny we will be prepared to discuee the - this me i kaki L between the DPRK and the 0 following eo' deep concerns neighboring countri Koreqp peninsula regarding the nuclear issue on the concorns ahgyt you nuclear Potential methods to resolve program and security-in northeast Asia Conditions for a potential normalizatioq agalogue will continue us and reiterates that'h 1n the North 8 North-South dialoouo is an essential condition The creation and continuation of a 3 5- 53 on nuclear es-es n North 30ut depends on progre channels we hope tha in the upcoming meeting in Panmunjom the DPRK responds yoeitively to the proposal tabled by the ROK at the laot denuclearizetlon I round of Prime Minister talks 139' r- 53% maiuifh-QS I 0 promote progress Lo eK diaio e all DECLASSIFIED 1 -3- - 0 Finally I mum caution you on a critically important point ShOJld we at any time learn that the DPRK is producing eayona grade useable nuclear material or eveloping nuclear weapons we would be unable to proceed AQk -q further in the airection of dialogue md normalizatio mx 'n SEKPOL 3 4 6 DECLASSIFIED a a people decade quil- 0 Recent events make hear from us direct issues of special but especially your nuclear pr We also wash to make 619 presented to North Korea by changing especially the ophoxtun leading tn peeoe Korean peninoLla a The and of the Cold War has been a effort by the U Union to xeduoom h wyi5k of nuclear war of nuclear policy was a At he sam political changes transformation in In the space 05 one 9 into the moot fa 1d1y have enjoyed tremendous economic growth We believe that all nations of 5 share this growth and prosperity effect of th oous on reducing weapons and especially destruction includin apons and the techno ogy of weapons of proliferation of we mass destruction and easing regiOnal tensions The v 5 and the Soviet Union reductiOns in nuclear weapons and cooperatinggto ensure - that nuclear proliferatio reorganization-0E the Soviet Union china has indicated that it will soon join the NET 2mm v5 duo-5 Baum-u m' u p - 1 this meeting essential'ao that you can ly and authoritatively our positions 0 oncern to the 8 5 govornment and ogram ar our View of the o Bortunities world realities ity to participate in a process securityi'and economic davelopmont on tho ad in Northeaot Asia by an historic _and the Soviet President Bush's September 27 announcement' major step in this direction A significant social ea in the world have been m05t of the nations of onerotion Asia has developing region region should and of the gold'War is a new woogono of maos 9 nuoleax weapons op are makingm ajor 5'not an outcome of the 3- in long-standing regional There have been breakthrou disputes such as Cambodia and some progress in the Middle Boot talks Eon admission to the UN ialogue with the Republi contributed to this posit tensions Lwn t s 5 XOut- hu ckea 'Tk u 33' ue- Ht 1 ij 6 Ha wag-k 4m wk and welcome progress in your of Korea have also ive trend toward reducing on $1 4 44 jam 15 be wtt woy K-t wok Elsa-Ar PM a our dke 3h1 55555 - a i We are Eully committed to doing everything in our power to encourage these trends an buttre s movement oward a worl in which all nations will be secure peaceful prosperous and stable It should be clear rom thiamine we believe north Korea should also benefit from these positive trends we supported your admission into the UN - In our View north Korea is at a crosoroads i3 its 5 relations not only with the United stages but also with the rest of the world Yoc can through your actions and policy decisions make progress toward improved relations with you neighbors and with the United States and get on the roao to dyoamic economic growth - In deciding to enter the UN earlier this year yoor -government ghve an indication that it mighh be ppepared to move in these new directions inoluding hy'Eoz illing its international obligations as called for by thc'U Charter We welcomed an supported this effort by co sponsoring the entry of both Koreas into the UN without prejudice to eventual reunification on terms acceptable to all Koreans Our strong preference is to sustain areas wieh the ultimate goal of paving the way Eoward normal relations And we are pfeparea to take steps to reciprocate poo hive actions in ways which will be of considerable benefit to you and your people The actions we look to you to tone are welgiknow to you thxough our contacts in the Beiging channel and which we have restated consistently since 1988 But first and foremost among cur concerns feethe nuclear iasue who elimination of international concerngand suspicions about your nuclear program is a matter of - fun amental importance and urgency It is the issue which will most significantly affect whether our'contacts can go forward or whether our relations will be set back engendoring serious _m We are firmly opposed to nuclear weapons proliferation by any country yours included There is bruad support for this position among countries in the region and the international community and a shared determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons Ln this very sensitive part of the world as there was Ln rye Gulf A nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsuga Would constitute a threat to international soou itx and would be unacceptable to the rest of the world - Indeed eVen the current you are dovsloping nuclear woopons inhibits North Korea's relations other countriesr It is also very destabilizing as t coula to ensure their security 3 a It is possible that you are seeking a nuclear capability under the misapprehension that this addi ional military capacity would enhance your security weapons or their own we look to you to meet your unconditional international obligatiops as a signatory to the by signing-and This is the only way to epsure that there is no nuclear arms race on the Korean peninsula The u s ank the initiative in improving bilateral relations 45th your country in 1988 with moosuros that faciltotea contact between our countries 5 '4 At that time we indicatcd that relations could improve on a reciprocal basis and we noted a number of specific areas where we looked for improvement we have welcomed the beginning of progress in the areas of North-South dialogue the return of a very limited numb3t_of Korean war and academic orchanges and family reunions We look to continuing progress in these and other areas for our relations to Advance President Bush also took a major initiative in his September 27 declaration on nuclear policy - - in 'h The objective of this global initiative is to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation and war and to enhance the security of all nations As we have declared frequently the v 5 poses no threat to north Korea nor are we seeking to interfere in your internal affairs The v 5 affirms its obligation and commitment to refrain from the throat or use of force except in accoraanoe with the UR Charter agaimst the territorial integrity or political independence of any country including the FPRK None of its weaponsawill ever be used except in self ce ense or otherwise in accordance with the UN Charter T112 is an internationa1 y legally binding commitment we have undertaken and honor In addition ROK President Ron announced on ovemher 8 a comprehensive polio which stressed the RDK's weapons grade material 20 to reprocess or enrich nuclear material We welcomed and fully supportea that statement as a comprehensive and hold initiative which made a significant contribution to peace and atahilitx on the Korean peninsuga We also supported the orncept of a joint deciEration of nonunuolesr policy by Koreas as propose by the ROKG in Seoul a few days ago 1 Taken together the two initiatives go far toward achieving an objective you have state that you share with no and the' 036 a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear waitens or the capacity to develop them However in orde _for this objectiVB to be fully attained your government must accept the same degree of inepection and verification as the ROK - has already accepted or is now groyoaing to deal with the reprocessing issue Thus we now look to the DPRK to reciprocate the reboot v 5 and Ron poliqy initiatives by -- Fulfilling its NPT obligations unconditionally by accepting and implementing by an early date the IAEA agreement on fu11 soope safeguards of allwuuolearu-um- materials ana facilities I I $293 3 If the DPRK responds gositively to the opportunities in the present situation ano and its nuclear weapons program we are prepared toEnove toward normalization of our uauksan tex relations We heliovs other countries would respond kn similarly and we would urge them to do 50 4 - ous- 13 Once you have signed and ratified the IAEA safeguards anonva agreement providing for inspections of all your nuolear h iwg activities and the inspection process hao begun inoludin physical inspection of all suopect reprocessing - facilities we are prepared to regulaggze these oblitical level contacts in New York to include of the foil range of relevant issues of concern including the possibility of the normalization of relations When IKEA inspections have been fully implemonted and when the DPRK and ROE have mutually agreed to abandon all reprocessing and enrichment activities on a notifiable basis we are prepared toEbpon formal discussions on full normalization or U DPRK relations Waugh quln wok How-twa- L As progress is sustained in the nuclear area at we 1 as in other esenbial aroas moot importantty the NO tn South dialogue but including matters at missile proliferation limitations on chemical and biological weaponsw accounting anitetroriomn we uill take additiona1 atogs toward normalization of our relations including 2 development of economic and diplomatic ragationa -E-' This process of normalizing our relations could include urging our friends to move more expeditiouslg toward normalization with you and nogotiations on apoaoprgate economic benefits I For our part otter our concerns on nuclear proliferation issues have been fully met we are prepare 10 take steps to contribute to other confidence building an rnrma control measures in Korea The beginning at this process of normalizing our bilaterab relations should provide you with the means of planning for a better economic future for your people the expansion of your international standing and a more secure future we must stress from the outset that esolution of the problems of the Korean peninsula is fundamentally a matter for the Korean people we will support and acilitate internationallyvaooeptable agreements reached between North and South Korea ragga so DECLASSIFIED Mom We continua to support the efforts of the Korean people to achieve pe ce u1 reunifccation and believe the North South dialogue is the best means to achieve that objective In that regard we believe the time has come for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two Korean sides as proposed by President Ron This would build on the progress already made at the last round of talks and Lhe talks at Panmunjom on nuclear issues If you do not respond tr the positive steps we and the ROKG propose which wv preter to be tge path follow and if you do not'forego your nuclear weapons development there will be a steady expansion of international opposition to your nuclear-activities As a final point I would reiterate that our3w1111ngne55 to pursue this positive course toward normalizatio jwill and if we gain information hat you are engaged in producing weapons grade useable nuclear material or developing nuclear weapons 3 IF ASKED FOR FURTHER LEVEL MEETINGS I believe that I have fully and definitively explained oux position However if there are any elements on which you desire clarification you can communicate with us thgough the existing channel in Beijing To reiterate we are prepared to regulariee this higher level channel if you sign and implement a IAEA safeguards agreement And when you and the South have agreed on a verifiable ban on reprocessing and enrichment we are prepare to initiate a formal normalization ie ogue a a 9 I DECLASSIFIED In reply refer to 1 91 09269 MEMORANDUM FOR USDP THROUGH ISA SUBJECT ACDA Director Lehman Visit to Korea on Nuclear Issue U noon Director Ron Lehman led a small interagency team to the Republic of Korea Rom last weekend for the purpose of discussing with the South Koreans how they should handle the North Kerean nuclear issue with the North Koreans at this week s North- South ministerials The team was composed of representatives from RCDA State JCS and 0813 During the visit nirector Lehman impressed upon the South Koreans that the North Korean nuclear issue shot-1d front and center in the ministe The remainder of the short visit was devoted to revising a draft joint declaration which the South plans to propose to the North at this week s minister-isle There were some serious deficiencies in the ROK proposal which raised Ls concerns the three major ones were 1 The ROKs placed in the middle of this declaration a joint agreement to observe IAEA safeguards Our View is that this is an international obligation of Nerth Korea and should not be part of a North and South agreement 2 The ROKs wanted to limit the inspection regime described in the declaration to only military facilities of both sides leaving the civil sites to be inspected by the 1293A cur position is that IAEA inspections have proven to be inadequate to detect a covert weapons program and may not cover the suspected reprocessing facility so we must be able to have the ROKs probably with 0 5 participation- examine Yonghyon and other suspected civil sites 3 The ROK wanted to state the purpose of these inspections as to check on presence of nuclear weapons Our position is that this comes too close to sounding like checking for 0 3 weapons Besides the North has no nuclear weapons for us to checks rather we want the inspection regime to verify that both North and South are hiding by the joint declaration I DECLASSIFIED i 2 The ROKs balked at our changes initially claiming that this ma es the declaration too tough for the North Koreans to accept and more disturbingly clain ng that it is difficult to pressure the North on inspecting reprocessing facilities since reprocessing is legal This latter position is a reversion to old ROE thinking which we frankly thought disappeared with President Roh Tas woo's November 8 nonmnuclear policy announcement The ROKs exhibited a lack of confidence in or perhaps understanding of-wthe strength of Ron's policy and were hesitant to press the North to reciprocate this policy we spent the better part of the visit explaining the inadequacies of IAEA inepections the need to press the North to stop reprocessing the powerfulneSS of Ron's November 8 pronouncement and the costs which are mounting far the North At the end of the visit our changes were accepted by the ROKs Specifically in the final draft of the joint declaration reference to EAEA was moved to the preamble civil sites were included in the proposed inspections and the purpose of these inspections is to confirm that the North Koreans adhere to a non nuclear policy similar to Ron's See TAB A As for trial inspections the BOKs will propose that separately in a Prime Minister speech in the ministerials ail The ROKs are very concerned that once the North signs the IAEA safeguards agreement- which may take place at the late February InEh board meeting -international pressure will dissipate we explained-that Japan is hardening its position and we are working with friends and allies on pressuring the North to not just sign a safeguards agreement but actually to reciprocate Ron's non-nuclear policy We do not know if we succeeded in diapelling all of the concerns but it is clear that we have to do some more work to convince the ROKs For the next two months the ROKs appear to accept our carrot and stick approach It is important that we send out the so-called core demarche cable to friends and allies This cable states definitively our goal of getting the North to reciprocate Roh's non-nuclear policy and stop reprocessing It would clearly state that signing of IBEA safeguards is insufficient to allay the world's concerns The sooner we get this cable out thegeaSier it is to avoid the accusation that we are moving the goalposts on our demands 'This would have the added benefit of showing the ROKS that there is international support for seeking a stop to DPRK reprocessing This same message would be given to the North Koreans at the highmlevel bilateral which is being proposed for late December The second thing is to engage the Chinese in more depth on the issue The ROKS told Director Lehman that they thought China s role was very important especially if the UN Would be involved later and they pleaded for the v 5 to lobby the Chinese more on this issue The RDKs believe that China although it works always in indirect ways has more influence with the North than any other country The current gameplan of including this issue as talking points in wide ranging talks with the Chinese - foreign minister is not focussed or quick enough A high-level trip Specifically to discuss this issue seems in order State PM has just sent a memorandum to USP Kanter about this suggestion 73 Finally it was clear from this visit that the ROKs are divided on what to do with 1992 s Team Spirit exercise Minister of Defense Lee explained in strong terms to Director Lehman his desire to see a bigger and more visible Team Spirit to demonstrate resolve to the North However the Blue House seems to lean towards a postponement fearing that an exercise announcement would jeopardize progress in North-South relations We were told by USFK that any cancellation decision must be made by January 1 due to the extensive preparations required State and ACDA will be inquiring with DOD soon whether this January 1 date is firm and whether planning can go forward without any public announcement They believe that if the North by February is still dragging its feet then an announcement at that time to conduct Team Spirit as a stick measure would be extremely effective Hence this is an issue which will he discussed in the interagency arena for the next two weeks This was a very useful visit for explaining 0 8 positions to the ROKs and also persuading them on the strategy to deal with the North on the nuclear issue Nevertheless with the rapid development of a reprocessing capability by the North we must continue on a fast track with follow up actions as proposed in this memorandum A DC meeting has been tentatively set for_ Monday December 16 where the many of the above issuesh will be addressed Eden Y Ween Col USAF Attachment a s DECLASSIFIED h g t l- Phgf ga DF 95 13015 93 OF 2 3909492 013113 323913 NOD335 ACTION 003-99 mro Lac-m1 Ans Ha 1mm DEC 9 1991 3459 3919942 m 33 1-5 4 0 5999512 91 q fqo mmanssv 3mm W s I TO SECSTATE WASHDB IMMEDIATE 8485 Qme t Mswm 13m $50 - Jliyg ALSO PASS cinema NA FOR eases mm AGS PREL mum MNUC as umch LEHMAN v13 ROKG rnopom mm A BECLARATIOR REF STATE 397594 1 ENlei TEXT 2 DISCUSSIDNS DURING ACDA DIREBTRR 6 9 'vaszr CENTERED nu none ran wiru NUCLEAR h ISSUES AT THIS uonra souru PRIME MINISTERIAL as napanwusnr l3 AWARE BHRING THE PM Intus THE one WILL IEBLE A JOINT u s DECLARATION novsmn n a uou uuctenn THIS ka ro t'ems i an BRAFT roan AFTER A senses of ten INTER-MINISTERIAL MEETINGS DECEMBER 4-5 PRIOR ID nr usuiruoucars courAIusn an Errati 3 HIE R08 BASIC DRAFT TRACKED Ml GENERAL WITH LS SERIOUS M10 WERE ADDRESSED BY DIRECTOR LEHMAN WITH THE KOREAHS DISCUSSIONS CENTERED 0N THE ISTINCTION BEIHEEH IAEA w- - 5 3t v J' - - - myv - 133wre fgg5-way - f' Wk HF HS SEOUI 13935 93 9F HZ 9993591 523919 00386 INSPECTIHHS AND ANY BILATERAL INSPECTION AGREEMENT THE NEED TO CIVIL SITES IN ANY BILATEHAI INSPECTIHN AGREEMENT THE UNACCEPTABILITT 0F HAVING H5 THE 0F HILRIENHL INSPECTIONS TO CHECK FOR THE PRESENCE OF WEAPONS EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT WOULD BE INST THAT HNH TRIAL INSPECTIONS 4 IN THE END THE ROHG SIHE AGREED WITH FIXES AND WILL FROVIDE THE MODIFIED JHINT DECLARATION SEE PARA GI TO THE NORTH DURING THE DECEMBER 15-13 PM TALKS THEY WILL A150 PROPHSE TRIAL INSPECTIBNS AS SUGGESTED BY US IN THE PRIME MAIN SPEECH ONCE AGAIN THE ROHG IMPRESSEB THE 0 3 TEAM HITH HHRH DONE REGARDING STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE NORTH H56 HDNCERHS ONCE SURFACED HERE TAKEN SERIDHSIT BY OHR 5 THE ROKG AGREED WITH THAT THE HHBIEAH ISSUE HILL BE AND AT THE UPCOMING TEENS THE JOINT HECLARATION WILL BE HSED BY THE RBHG T0 THE FGHR POINTS OF NHVEMBER 25 THE STRATEGY T0 EEAH T0 A MHIOR CONFRONTATIHH ON THE NUCLEAR ISSHE AHB T0 PM AHVISER IEE DONG HDK THEY ARE- HETERMINEB TO COME OUT OF THE FIGHT HHRIHB THIS ROHNB AS 088 5 BEGIN TEXT OF IGINT DECIARATION THE AND THE SOUTH NIEL STRIVE T0 GREATE AN ENVIRONMENT FAVORABLE TO THE PEACEFHE REHNIFICHTION 0F DIVIBED AND TO T0 PEACE IN ASIA AND THE BY SECHRING A NHCEEAR KOREAN PENINSHLA AND EEIMINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAE WEAPONS FRHM GER LAND THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH BY THE NON-PRGLIFERATIOH TREATY A NUCLEAR SAFEGHARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HND - - w t u pA' 3 5 n v 2355 5232 - 'w jc - w - 923918 'Iumof PACE HA OF 95 SEOUL IBOTR OH Of OZ 6999491 ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OR ALL HOCLEAR-RELATED PACILITIES AND MATERIALS OR THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES 08386 AOOITIOH TO BISCHARCIHG THEIR EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS THE SOHTH AND THE HORTH HAVE AOREEO AS FOLLOWS ARTICLE 1 THE SOUTH AHO THE NORTH WILL HSE NUCLEAR ENERGY SOLELI FOR FEACEEOL PURPOSES ANO 00 HOT MANUFACTURE POSSESS STORE DEPLOT OR USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARTICLE 2 THE SOHTH AND THE NORTH WILL NOT P033533 HHCLEAR REPROCESSIHG AHO HRAHIOM EHRICHMEHT FACILITIES ARTICLE 3 THE SOUTH AHO THE RORTH WILL ACTITELT ARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS EOR TOTAL ELIMINATION- CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ARI ABIBE BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN THIS AREA ARTICLE 4 IN ADDITION TO IAEA INSPECTION OF THEIR HHCLEAR EACILITIES AND MATERIALS THE SOUTH AND THE NORTH HILL AGREEO INSPECTIONS ON ANY MILITARY AHO AHY CIVIL FACILITIES MATERIALS AND SITES IN THE HORTH AHO THE SOUTH IR A MAHHER TO BE AOREEO OPOH BY BOTH SIOES ORDER TO CONFIRM COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABOVE ARTICLES 0 THESE FACILITIES AND SITES WILL BE SELECTEO RT THE IHSPECTIRO SIDE ARTICLE 5 THE SOUTH AHO THE NORTH HILL OISCHOS AHO DECIDE 0H DETAILS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OT PROCEOHRES TO BE ESTAOLISHEO DECEMBER 199 PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CHUNG WON SHIH DECLASSIFIED - 53 - 3'35 3 hum-O'D- PAGE 95 0F 85 3875 0F 92 9909432 619116 323913 NGDEIBE PRIME MINISTER or was ptopLEjs REPUBLIC 0F KOREA vsou uvuus mun sunsunanr WL DECLASSIFIED calm smut CEIITEF mm 2va aumumsz mm ougsnm er mr aim- 37 on u - Karim Paulrm i 'mra mme m msuaassv sum um comm a we Durante 43315755 3 3 am- may macaw E iwr mam 5mm - 38 3 numb-555v mm was mm m ms nu 515 5 amen mu m mm mm 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TRAUILATIOR DRIER THE ROI AOREEHEUI HAS THI FIRST OFFICIAL NUTRIENT AGREED RT OF IUFORPATIOU HAOE OF THE FINAL ADREEUERT OF BOTH SIDES HDULD GDUERU DRSIO - - ER-KORERU UNLIRI THE JULY 4 19 JOINT WHEREAS 1U KEEPING RITU THE TEARRIUO OF THE IOUE ULTIOU DULY DEDLT 31TH THIS IS EUTIRE PEOPLE FOR THE PEACEFUL URIFICATIOR OF THE DIVIDED IRTEUDEO TO BIRD BORE SIDES ARR REQUIRES OOIH SIDES TO LAT-TI THE STRUU ILRD THE RDRTU RLAFFIRH THE UUIFIEATIDU SIBRIT IT TO THEIR RESPECT IUE RATIFIEATIGI PROCESSES AS PRINCIPLES JR TUE JULY 4 1912 SUCH IT IS RUST NORTH-SOUTH RDREEHEUT JOIUI THE HE ALSO CALLED IT RAIOR HITCH COULD BRIRO ABOUT A UAJDR BURROS ROTH PARTIES ART OETERUIRED T0 RESOLVI THIS RRD DURL EUTRY POLITIEAL ADD COIIFREIRTATIDU ADD ACHIEVE UATIOUAL U R SAID LAY A FIRE FOLRIOATIOU FOR THE FUTURE RECOIISILIRTIOU OT UUEREAS BOTH DESIRE TO Wanner US OF DE SEOUL 13332 EXDUAHOLS ARD COOPERATION TO RDUAUCE CWT NATIONAL INTERESTS ARI PROSPERTTI RUERERS BOTH RECOGNIZF THAT THEIR REIDTIOIIS CORSTITUTE A SPECIAL PROYISIOUAL RELATIOUSUIP GEAREO TO FOR PA TADS PEEL RUDE RS AU US DECLASSIFIED 7 SUBJECT PRIHE MINISTERS SIOR JOIDT AGREEMENT HOST EITHER ROKG OFFICIALS HAVE LEE NOTED TUE WSECTIOU Of 05 SEOUL 13322 KOREAN STANCE UT DPIUED THAT TRT HAY REED TARGIDLT PROOF OF PROGRESS IN THE CIREPAC FOR FPA DIALOGUE AS A STEP TO BETTER RELATIORS HITII OTHER WRIES ADO R3 A READS DE ENDING ITS DIFFICULTIES AND ITS IRTERURTILTIAL ISOLATION -LEE SAID TAGS PREL PARK RUDE KS EU US IIDRTD ORERR HEPRESEFIMIHES SUGGESTED THAT SUBJECT PRIHE HIRISTERS STUD JOINT AOREEREUT DR ROUTINE IMPERATICU SHOULD IRREDIATELY AFTER MID INTO FORCE OF THE DOREEHEUT LADDERS PLEDGE TD EXERT JOIUT EFFORTS TO II AT THE DOROLUSIDII OF HIS PRESERTATIDR LEE FIELDEO A ROULETTE PEACEFUL UUIFICATIDR HIDE OF WESTIORS WITH UARUIUD OEDREES OF RSSURADEE ID R13 RESPONSES LEE THEREFORE THL PARTIES HERETO AGREE AS FDLLORS HAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE SIORIUB THE RRTICLE 1 TUE SOUTH ADD THE HDRIH SUALL JOINT AOREEHERT OR OTHER RORHALIIATIOU EFFORTS RESPECT EACH POLITIOAL RAID SOCIAL SISTER TOWARD THE NORTH UE SAID THAT THE SIGNING REPRESENTED THE DIALOGUE ADD SORT OF ARTICLE 2 BOTH PARTIES SHALL ROI IUIERFERE BUT IT HOULO DE NECESSARY TO GAUGE EACH IUTERHAL AFFAIRS ALSO 1T ROULD DE NECESSARY TO THI IMOIATF PERFOHRAIICE OR THE VERY ARTICLE 3 BOTH PARTIES SUALL ROI SLAROED ARD EACH OTHER RUCLERR ISSUI TORUQ1347109492 1309482 DEC at cc -r tut- 1 ARTICLE 4 PARTIES WALL NOT 15 MARIE TD SAITOTAGL ANC- THE OTHER ARTICLE 5 ROTH PARTIES SHALL EADTAUOTE TOAETHEE TO THE PRESENT ARNISTICT REGIME INTO STATE 0 PLACE THE SOUTH ANT TNT NORTH ANT SHALL ABIDT THE PRESENT HILTTAR- ARRISTTCE TR DAT 1L SUCH TIME SUCH A STATE E-T PEACE TAKET HOLD ATT ARTICLE 6' BOTH PARTILT- SHALL BEAST ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE ARI SHALL COOPERATE AIR TO INTERESTS ANT ESTER ARTICLE TL- ENSURE CLOSE LIAIADH BURIED PARTIES A SOUTH-NORTH LIAISON OFFICE ARALL DE ESTABLISHED AT RITHIN THREE THIRTY-21 OT TILE EFFECTIVE DATE 0 AGREERENT 6- ARTICLI A SOUTH-NORTH POLITTEAE SHOCWNITTET SHALL BE ESTAELJSHEET THE ERAREHJR THE INTER-KOREAN HIGH-LEVEL TALES HITHIN ONE NORTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE Oi AGREERENT 1 DIET TO CONCRETE HETAURES TO ENSURE THE IRPLENENTATIDN AND ODSERUANCE THE ACCORDS DU SOUTH-NORTH RECONCILIATION- ARTICLE BOTH PARTIES SHALL NOT USE ARMED PORCI OTNEI ARR SHALL NOT HATE ARNED ADDRESSION AGAINST EACH OTHER ARTICLE IN DIFFERENCES OPINION AND ARISING DETHEEN THE THO PARTIES SHALL BE THROUGH DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS ARTICLE 31 THE DEHARCATION LINE AND AREAS ERR NONAGBRESSIOR SHALL BE IDENTICAL NTTH THE HILITART DEHRRCATIDN LINE SPECIFIED IN THE ARHISTICE ADREENENT OF JULIET 1953 AND THE AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN THE JURISDICTION OE THERE UNDER HAITI THE PRESENT ARTICLE 13 RE AND OURRANTEE TDD PARTIES SHALL CREATE SOUTH-NORTH JOINT MILITARY LITERATURE THREE OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT THE SAID SHALL DISCUSS AND CARRY OUT STEPS TO BUILD HILITARY CONFIDENCE AND REALIZE REDUCTIONS INCLUDING THE RUTUAL NOTIFICATION AND CONT RDL OF MAJOR RONENENTS OF MILITARY UNITS AND MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES THE PEACEFUL UTILITRTIDN DE THE OEHILITARIZEO ZONE EXCHANGES Of PERSONNEL AND INFORHATIDN PHASED IN AWAKENTS IHELLRTINB THE ELIMINATION OF NEAPDND OF RATS DESTRUCTIUI AND SURPRISE ATTACK CAPABILITIES AND NERIFICATIDHS THEREOF ARTICLE-13 A TELEPHONE HOTLIRE SHALL BE INSTALLED BETHEEN THE HILTTART- AUTHORITIES OF BOTH SIDES BI WI AECTION OE OF DE SEOUL 13322 CIRCPAC FOP EPA TADS PREL FARM HNUC AS IN US SUBJECT PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGRLEHENT ON TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL ARHED CLASHLS AND AVOID THEIR ESCALATION ARTICLE 14 A SOUTH-NORTH MILITARY SHALL BE ESTABLISHED HITHIN THE TRAHENORE OE THE INTER-ROMAN HIGH-LEVEL TALKS HLTHIN ONE NORTH OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OT THIS AEREENENT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS CONCRETE NEASURES TO ENSURE THE IHPLEHENTATIOR AND DBSERNANCES OF THE RECORDS ON NDNAGGRESSION AND TO RESOLNE 5011 2 70243134 7 09492 TAP 5' HI COHERDNEATILI IE If INTEGRATED ANT BALANCED DEVELOPMENT 9 THE NATIONAL ANL- TE HELFRRE D THE ENTIRE PTOPLE EDTN PARTIES SHALL ECOTRAITC TXENANGEE CODEENATILT INLLUDINA THE JOINT OE RESOHRCE TRADI me - A LINE f5 EMT-TENTS ATN- 3L1 TH PROJECTS ARTICLE SRALT CARR LAEHAITLES EMPENATITH- TI DIVERS IHIAHDNT SCIENCE EONCATIOA LITERATURE IN HEALTH REBATE AND PDDLISHIIH- ARE JULIAN-LIED INCLUDING RADIO AIR PUBLICATIONS IN NERERA ARTICLE 13 ROTH PARTIES SHALL GLIARANTEI RES HEATS OE AREAS FREE INTER-LORETTA TRAVEL ANT ARTIELE ROTH PARTTEA SHAL PIRATE CORRESPONDENCE AHD BETDEEN EARTH ANT OTHER DISPERSEL SOUTH AND NORTH SHALL REMOTE THE REEDNSTITOTIDR GT EARTLTES THEN ORR SHALL TREE HEASTIRES TO OTHER WTITARIAR ISSILS ARTICLE DDTU AIDE SHALL RAILTAJADE ATE THAT HAVE DEER AND SHALL OPEL LAND SEA AND AIR TRANSPORT ROUTES ARTICLE 20 PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH ANT- LINT FACILITIES NEEDED FOR SOUTH-NORTH POSTAL AND TELECOTDTUNIEATIDNS SERVICES AND SHALL GUARANTEE THE OE NAIL AND ARTICLE 21 ROTH PARTIES SHALL CMPERATE ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE IN THE CULTURAL AND VARIOUS 03% FIELDS AND CARRY OUT JOINT BUSINESS A TO ARTICLE 22 10 RECORDS ON EXERANSES AND EMPEAATTON IN THE ECONOMIC CULTURAL AND NARIONS OTHER FIELDS ROTH PARTIES SHALL ESTABLISH JOINT COHNITTEES FOR SPECIFIC INCLUDING A EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION CDPHITTEII NITHIN THREE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 1 3 A SOUTH-NORTH EXCHANGES AND CDOPERATTGT SHRED-INTENT SHALL BE ESTABLISHED HITRIH TUE FRAHEHDRR 07 THE INTER-LOREAN HIGH-LENEL TALKS NITHTN ONE L1 m N- TNT EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ADREEHENT INTO A TIER T0 WHERETE HEASURES TO ENSURE THE TNPLENENTATIDN DBSERNANCE OE THE RECORDS ON ENTER-NORTH EXCHANGES AND COOPERATION ARTICLE 24 THIS ARREEHEHT HAY BE AHENDED OR SUPPLEMENTED BY CONCHREHCE BETHEEN ROTH PARTIES ARTICLE 25 THIS AEREEHEHT SHALL ENTER INTO TORCE AS OF THE DATE ROTH PARTIES EXCHANGE OF THE CUIPLETIDN OF THEIR RESPECTIVE PROCEDURES TOR RRINDIRG IT INTO EFFECT er - an a an saw 13322 cmcpar FOR ms 9m max anus IS an us SUBJECT PRIME MINISTERS SIGN JOINT AGREEMENT ON DATE DECEMBER 13 1991 Eun TEXT as 3 a 4 1309432 nec 91 05 55c M35 National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu