31 January 1994 Special Report China Potential Reaponse to Korean Contingencies is likely to circumvent UN economic embargoes imposed on Pyongy ang China however probably would not intervene aggressively in a Korean war because of the risks such intervention would pose to its nationaiI security strategy The North Korean nuclear issue creates Special - problems for the Chinese They must recoocile their interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula and long- standing ties to Pyongyang with their interests in a - Nation MFN trade status in Washington or the need to regain MFN status if it is revoked in June Nonethe- less Beijing is likely- to circumvent any economic embargo by providing medical supplies foodsruffs denuclearized peninsula in avoiding isolation among UN Security Council SC members and in maintain ing stable relations with the US Japan and South Korea In this context Beijing is likely to take a num- ber of actions if the UN and the US apply punitive - and oil to North Korea by allowing other natiOtis to 'do '50 across the Sine-North Korean border or along coastal waters and by refusing to cooperate with an extremely harsh enforcement of sanctions China s primary objective would be to prevent a political crisis measures in pressuring North Korea that might result from the economic collapse of the North UN Eeonornic anctione - - I A North Korean Attack WChina probably would try to avoid a tradeoff between its competing interests by abstaining if the UNSC tables a resolution calling for economic sanc- tions against North Korea - Key constraints on Chinese behavior would be the need to maintain Most-Favored 48933 If North Korea iaunched'a military attack againsr South Korea in response to 'puuitivc measures CDNFIDEWL Weenieswda weaken-re UNCIASSIFED some Harp Treaty oi Friendship Cooperation and sea predict ii bellowed the over the No hukorean nuclear into iHowe ital two other examples from history may provide better insl hr Bo li-fg' 5 reaction to 9 1 potmtlat orean contingencies I dig December gut-1 M1971 ii hma limited its espouse toynoia' 33 intervhrition in EestPakfstaq to Chinese forces on India' eastern border-I 'zf-Bewn'g 66k this astrologer measo'Ire 31 its longtime af rm to Fair Ii'an ari its Visceral dt'sl'rus gogovex duri # war p ta 5 11 North ergai c g rawdt' lair andgg f st 00115555 I deep e gijing '5 72 21 Jew mapgs- inooft IIem Eht in t wgr analog 33 3 at gr Parry shat tiger hither ahd other assistance by me other Contracting rty ti igf l any notion orfft asuro Military intelligence Digest n55 nnu - 31 January 1994 or on its own initiative the Chinese would avoid extending military support to Pyongyang and call for a 1 Beijmg 13 not required by treaty to pro- vide military' aid to an aggressive Pyongyang and probably would not provide Substantial logistics aims intelligence and electronic warfare support to the North If a North Korean advance was halted and US and South Korean forces initiated a counteroffensive Chinese hardliners would pressure senior leaders to intervene with the goal of preventing a potentially hosrile force from gaining completecontrol of the Korean Peninsula If such a development appears imminent or likely Beijing may try to accommodaite hard-line impulses and signal its resolve by crossing the Yale River and establishing a forward defensive Su ofJapm DWCIWURI - - or Large Ethnic Korun Population Yellow Sea perimeter some limited distance inside North Koren Chinese doctrine explicitly justi es preemptive mili- tary operations along'or beyond its geographic borders to defend China s strategic bOundary A Preemptive Strike China probably would net respond with aggressive military nation to any preemptive UN or US military strike against Nonh Korean facilities Beijing would base this decision on its overriding interest in a denuclearized peninsula in preventing a regional arms mega d in stalling a broader 'coniliet uch a now would be intended to bol China's border defense and to prepare for civil unrest among the 2 million ethnic Koreans on the Chi- nese side of the border - -S-191l-B-lf Pyongyang fails to take immediate military action in response to such a strike Beijing would try to reduce the North 5 sense of isolation by providing 11 with economic and military support bi UNCLASSIFIED 651110th Korean President song and Chinese President Jiang Zemin Chinese and North Korean interests 11111111111155 will diverge during any crisis over the North Korean nuclear 1ssue despite their formal solidarity Digest 1' i '21 - 31 January 1994 might etch promise to intervene if the US launched a full-scale conventional attack agains North Korea WDiplomatically China orobably would try to obtain UN censure of the US call for Washington to - compensate Pyongyang for any damages and increase pressure on the US to alter its nuclear arms control - policies in several multilateral forums On a bilateral level Beijing couid be expected to expel the US Ambassador from China temporarily withdraw its Ambassador from the US and slow-cooperative- efforts on trade human rights and proliferation issues - The Strategic Context WChina s standing in the UNSC and its relation- ships with Washington Tokyo and Seoul wouId have to deteriorate substantially for Beijing to risk the long- term costs to its foreign policy economic deve10p- meat -and military modernization objectives that would accompany aggressive intervention in a war on the Korean Peninsula Nonetheless a Korean con ict would heighten Chinese concerns about the post-Cold War security environment and Military Intelligence Digest This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu