UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No F-2004-03448 Doc No 017993407 Date 08 28 2014 HOUSE NED 11 has 92 23 54 PG 03 PANEL ACTION RELEASED IN PART 31 2sxs Classi cation Extended Class CONFIDENTIAL Reason 1 4 b d 25x6 Declassify on 03-1 1-2022 DECL anon HORTH KOREA COHHITTBE names 12 1992 I AUTHORITY Charles Lahiguera Senior Reviewej 6 'Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable There is no immediate issue for decision nor requirement to change our strategy since North Korea is still on a plausible schedule leading to compliance with its IAEA and bilateral non-proliferation agreements Tabs 1-3 illustrate best and worst case scenarios tor possible DPRK action Upcoming policy questions are how long can we wait betore Embarking on a course of coercive mer ares what measures are both feasible and effective and what are the tactical implications We are in the midst of a testing period for the DPRK High level officials in the ROKG aftirm that the DPRK promised the ROK that it would sign and ratify an IAEA Safeguards Agreement by February 19 and than tailed to fully meet the commitment DPRK representative Kim Young 5un told e s Renter onadanuary 22 that he thought the DPRK would ratity the IAEA safeguards in a muuLh on Lute Pyongyang is also negotiating agreement the establishment of a JNCC to-mcnitor obligations under the North-South non-nuclear agreement by March-19 a deadline both North and South have accepted Talks over the past two weeks have_greatly differences over a JNCC charter The DPRK has announced that the Supreme People s Assembly will meet on April 8 and entry into force of the Safeguards Agreement thus is possible within April The DPRK has hinted that there would be inspections by June although these remarks have not been more officially conrirmed North Korea's intentions remain unclear There are indications of an internal debate that may be slowing decisions the North may perceive some political advantage in delay or it may be playing for time to destroy dismantle or convert sensitive facilities before allowing inspections to take place It may be seeking time to hide its nuclear weapons program or significant quantities of plutonium eningful ins actions _There is no conclusive evidence that the DPRK is increasing activity at Yonghyon or taking steps to-move' materials away Our key regional allies the ROK and Japan agree with to produce and then hide or it may even plan not to accept me B1 25X6 UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 017993407 Date 08 28 2014 agJI-I-I-ll UNCLASSIFIED S Department of State Case No Doc No 017993407 Date 408 28 2014 m1 nwo Winn Ht 235355 -2- us on not moving-towards improved ties with the DPRK until the nuclear issue is resolved The ROK has toughened its posture emphasizing that pregress on the nuclear issue is now a prerequisite for movement in other North South areas Thu ROKG has indefinitely postponed a 3 mmit meeting and it will be likely to postpone the next round of PM talks May 5 8 if the DPRK has not ratified its safeguards agreement If the North moves by mid-April to ratify the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and negotiate a bilateral inspection regime we will have grounds for hope that a satisfactory resolution of the nuclear issue is unfolding However we will still need to watch for the completeness of the declarations to the IAEA DEE Eli aihze Despite the DPRK's failure to move quickly and the concerns expressed at the February IAEA BOG meeting many have been willing to give it the benefit of the doubt Any'longn uterm U s strategy will have to take account of this and recognise that the DPRK continues to have room for plausible delay This will be particularly true with China and Russia A delay scenario is outlined at Tab 1 If the North employs such tactics it may be difficult to mobilize international pressure before this summer unless the South is willing to break off North-south dialogue and China and Russia can be persuaded to support more drastic pressurel This may be unachievahle unless we obtain the sort of clear information on North Korean intentions that we now lack and we can use it to galvanize international pressure to compel the North to fulfill its obligations I I I Our approach for now must he to continue to accept the possibility that the North will meet its obligations and hold open incentives for it to do so Our public statements must walk a fine line between this waiting strategy and maintaining international concern At the same time we should lay a foundation for action over the next few months that can at succeSsive junctures enable us to narrow the freedom of action and tighten international pressure Aggignm ggz m Our challenge is to minimise DPRK wiggle room Pyongyang may try to delay accepting inspections we should seek international support tor a reasonable deadline calling for initial IAEA inspections at all nuclear installations including the suspected reprocessing facility at Yonngon This will help I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 017993407 Date 08 28 2014 US Department of State Case No Doc No C17993407 Date 08 28l2014 I u wnuuln -LEB 92 1 21 66 lay the groundwork for effective international action should it become necessary to coerce Pyongyang A reasonable timetable can be-based on the assumption that North Korea will take the full range of internal DPRK steps action by Pyongyang's Supreme PeOple's Assembly signature by Kim Il-sung etc plus notification to the IAEA in April as the DPRK's IAEA delegate stated they would do after the February BOG meeting If this is accomplished Pyongyang will have until the end of May to -submit its inventory of nuclear material and the IAEA can request a visit effectively an 33 no inspection to all North Korean nuclear facilities at the beginning of Jane A best case IAEA scenario is at Tab 3 Having established this timetable in our own minds we should initiate consultations with key governments anticipating several potential pressure points over Lhe next two months Although the following is heavily IAEA oriented w B1 In tone all of these consultations should 25X6 reflect our hope that the North is soon-going to ratify and we shold avoid any talk that will give Pyongyang grounds for claiming we are pressuring the DPRK who have the most influence in Pyongyang we will stress that North Korean-performance on our timetable is critical and urge Beijing to make it happen The emphasis should be on Beijing's-own national interest the need for further progress toward peace on the peninsula the incentives that exist for Pyongyang and finally our determination to-pursue tough international steps --which we will expect the PRC to join if Pyongyang fails to perform we should begin immediately to build support for a possible special BOG meeting in May We should express our hope that the DPRK-will meet its stated deadline and that the 806 will be able to 'hear_ggod news - B1 - - 25xs -- Though it may be months before we hope to achieve effective UNSC measures to coerce Pyongyang we should-initiate regular discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue among the Perm Three and the Perm Five The purpose should be to exchange views on the degree of progress and to discuss it appropriate Initially the focus would possible courses of UN action but we-should make be on steps to be taken at the I clear that we-see a-role for the UN if the-North does not make good on its April commitment or stalls on the timetable thereafter up should continue to closely coordinate Ya nhb l9h US Department of State Case No Doc No C17993407 Date 08 28 2014 SETBepartment of State Case No F-2004-03448 Doc No 01799340 Date 08 28 2014 -4- with the 603 which plays a critical role in putting-pressure onlthe DPRK to implement both the rash and bilateral inspection regimes -xn ain preoccupied and with its leverage substantially weakened appears to have done little to encourage North Korea to meet its nuclear obliqntionari B1 25X6 on March 17 we should again convey our views specifically and clearly so that Pyongyang can havo no illusions that we will acquiesce to delaying tactics A As these consultations move ahead and we watch yongyang'o behavior hopefully we will have the following additional milestones and possible actions _ The most likely scenario for successfully cooking a special BOG meeting would be if ratification has not occurred L B1 25X6 The next regular meeting of the 806 in scheduled for mid-Juno This will afford a further opportunity for coordinated action as needed Much now depends on precisely how the DPRK behaves in the interim Much will also depend on tho lC's view of events at Yongbyon If we find in June that North Korea is still stalling and a case for a coercive course can be made we will have laid the oundation during our March May consultations and meetings Ideally such measures would be achiavnd through the UN with economic sanctions being the chief instrument pursued Alternatively we could consider a variety of coercive steps either on our own or in concert with like-minded nations SZSBEI UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 01799340 Date 0812812014 UNCLASSIFIED U S Department of State Case No 2004-03448 Doc No C17993407uDate 08 28 2014 m1 ll SEKPOL 3979 ll IIHH 35 136 3 10 92 77 drafted EAPIK NSHasting cleared CKart SAP LDAndetso PM Rope Vi SIP LKeene T STomchik n- I UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No Doc No 017993407 Date 08 28 2014 National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu