' mreus IDRAFT VERSIONS 5 21199 3pm -BENIEf IN FULL -Bl 1 4 B B5 SCRIPT OF TALKING POINTS for WILLIAM J PERRY o P o r '1 s c l ' 11-q a L fl ph I IS o As l - n ' 1f1 1 1o t OPENING 'rt-Gi GW' GRACE NOTES AND THEMES o p l -- l J ' ' c j- k J c J ' ' t ' b t orr 1 J 'l_ J it- J -O c c # IH r 'ik p ofk a J io ct da -kc r e vt A L _ We sl iJ d cw -t l 1 - o o -t e f f - c f C c v-f -k i wr L b u14 - President Clinton was very pleased as am I that I have the opportunity to come to 'NwthK Eet --fk J PRK 1 - h'IJ 4 -4oo 8 I hope and believe at in years to come the US an the DPRK will view this visit of an American presidential envoy to your country as l istoiic and as the tart of a process of adagtion by both sides to the quickening pace of change in the modern world '0 _ - f-it 9d' t4GBP1 4 tlh ' tk A _ J o -o Our welcome has been varm and I extend my thanks to Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan and his staff for their consideration and hard work in making our arrangements F 3 E- o r l ffiSTORY o e i etween I have not come for a discussion ofwhere the relations our two countries have been or of opportunities missed by either sid e As a prnctieai matleo I understand that z we cannot escape history nor should we seek to avoid the responsibilities history has g5 placed on us S SS F o My experience has taught_that history is not an unseen uncontrollable force but cL 1 b r 44 tt 61 f L- 1 h 'j f_ kz h -'C o o z S S instead that our own choices and actions can change history Now we are faced with tg S S newchoicesaad eieiens Wl Jcl c4 tL w vs t c l sht Jz i r 5 u r l - Whl e in you -and dluing Our conVersations I do not intend to dodge l istory nor GBP to lay blame'h we can learn from history and avoid past mistakes I am prepared to listen carerully and respond frankly to your views in accordance to my understanding of events especially those in which I was involved directly Po DPRKli- I am not here to for any actions by the United States I seek no apologies from the do expect that over time a full and frank exchange of views between our two peopl on past events will help heal the wounds that to this day UNITED STATE mJXJPrNii N PW f fff- REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN CLASSIFICATION SECRET REASON 2 - -- 2_ DECLASSIFY AFTER 22 MAY 2024 __ C C DATE CASE ID 19 OCT 2006 2006012 - r UNClASSifiED DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT VERSION 5 5 21 99 3 pm INTRODUCTION TO VJP AND TIIE NKPR o s yeu ma y k I stepped down as Secretary of Defense in 1951'7 after four years of service to President Clinton and leadership of the Pentagon I o o By training I am not a diplomat I began my career as a mathematician and technologist developing weapons and teclmology during the Cold War I served as chief of the Pentagon's technology_ and weapons development office for-Presiden Jimmy Carter from 1977-1981 any advanced technical programs designed o 1 J to deal with the challenges ofth Cold War 7 - - 1 p 1-Y ' lteH- President Clinton asked me to return to the Pentagon in 1993 the Cold Wif had ended and I found myself dealing with an entirely different sets of challenges and responsibilities namely inaugurating new and peaceful relationshilwith countries that had ong been advers ries and frankly were potential targets of weapons I had prevxously helped design the o In particular I began working with these former enemies to inaugurate new security relationships and to eliminate nuclear missile and other weapons of the Cold War Thus as Secretary ofDefense i became something of a diplomat after all-the changed world required -a changed role o When I left Washington in 1997 to return to California sa Professor at Stanford University I looked forward to spending time writing about what I had learned and teaching a new generation about the new era's opportunities for peace and security I also looked forward to r spending more time with my family o Thus it came as a surprise to me when last Qctober President Clinton asked me to undertake a thorough review of US policy towards North Korea o I told the President that I was honored to be asked but I wanted to think about it before accepting I reeognized it was a complex and difficult task o As I made my decisioii I thought back to 1994 when the US and DPRK came perilously close to a serious crisis Indeed I spent much of the spring of 1994 in the Pentagon thinking about how we could avoid a destructive war on the Korean Peninsula At that time while I was confident that our t1bility to deter and thus prevent war was exceedirtgly strong I believed that a war resulting from miscalculation would be a disaster for all concerned o Fortunately through decisions taken by leaders on both sides crisis was averted and the Agreed Framework negotiated 1 ' 1 I ' A t7 J 1 -1' _ J ' Slfl ' UnClAS ' cro cfr-- o The Agreed Framework was an achievement for all Despite some critics in the US and problems in implementation the Agreed Framework has been overall a success Our team's visit to Kumchang-ri showed that both sides remain committed to the 2 J I ' --t' 'Lh' _ - - '- 1 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT VERSIONS 5 21 99 3 pm Agreed Framework and can be flexible in seeking solutions that arise in the course of its implementation n _ J l b JG cL 1 kJnJ-_ r _ j J 'fk MC'- f VI -' VI u - GBP' Agreed Framework Wii U l p avert a crisis eut to open a door as well-a door into an era of decisive y improved relations between the US and the I DPRK t ' 8 Btfhe Jr - pprr ' 'o '-' GBPGBP o o Lthi t is fair M to Say that the two sides have not passed through doer It seem 1 to me that the work begun between our two countries in 1994 was not yet finished c - _Lbt or e I believed more generally that the is ved waz ntral to the safety and security ofthe United States now and for the EMS I felt that the United States has a role to play and a responsibility to help shape an equitable and enduring resolution to the Korean issue v -J o GBP j Fin lly I believed that some of my experience as Secretary _of Defense building new security relationships with former enemies might be useful in approaching the Korean o 3 I therefore knew I could not refuse President Iintorb' ve-s h PURPOSE OF THIS 'VISIT o 4 'r 'Co- My review of' S -policy toward your country has lasted six months so far 1-f k r o I o JPYe have reexamined every assumption that has underpinned our policy for decades and studied a variety of paths into the future o o o I have consulted with all Cabinet Departments and agencies fthe USG and met frequently with President Clinton Secretaries Albright and Cohen National Security Advisor Berger and senior members of our military I have consulted with leading members ofourCongress from both parties and have GBP- i their support ty a I have met with scholars and experts on Kore with representatives of non- governmental groups that have worked with your country and with people who have have visited il t4b Emwrand know it people y NY' CQC oll fv-t 'j' '-'Y o I have also consulted closely with U S allies in Asia and elsewhere especially with -fk Ro K_ S 1U t 'iu and Japan o And I have consulted with the governments of China and Russia and with the European Union UNCUSSlfiEO 3 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT VERSIONS 5121199 3 pm r t l 'i After mil thought and reflection I have told President Clinton I believe that B the ySjihould make a dam ental change in its policy toward the DPRK and I have come here today to convey the outlines of this policy o I also told the President that consistent with the goals and central security requirements of the United States of Ameri we shou d take this path with our allies and in full cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of korea G However before completing my Review and making my final recommendations I advised the President that it was crucial that I seek an invitation to visit the DPRK on his behalGBP and to have an exchange of perspectives with its highest lead erL A thorough and fundamental policy review would be impossible without hearing andlearning firsthand e views and perspectives of Your country ef o ---l t tl t s I therefore come at the instruction 9fPresident Clinton to describe the circumstances in which the United States of America would be prepared to move decisively and unambiguously to an entirely new and improved relationship with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to exchange views aboutthat hist ric possibility 1f -j 1 fj_ IJI bt __ aw h - E - 1 n - 're i t US STRATEGIC VIEW o The review and my recommendatiop s are anchored in long understoo carefully examined and historically tested US views about its true interests in Asia These ideas reflect the views of both political parties in my countiJ ' j hey represent the distillation of experience some ofit costly some of it bitter o I believe it is important that during my visit I discuss with you this M'5 strategic view of Mrole in Asia and to hear your views Jy r c J Q o The US is a Pacific power with legitimate security interests in Asia History has demonstrated to us and erience continues to show that the political economic and military interests of the United States are intimately bound up in developments in Asia Over a hundred years ago events occurred and decisiotsFfade in capitals in Asia that decisively and tragically influenced the course of the 20tli eentury It is important that decisions made now not repeat the same mistakes or doom the peoples of Asia and the Pacific to similar tragedies for the next I 00 years o A o r r A lh- Since the end ofWorld War IT - policy in Asia-- r d in our military presence in the region- has been to prevent a repetition ofwha7 before 1945- when one power or another sought to take control of the region Jt-- o ls l s- o J ttO i t w F Our role and our military presence is riot directed any mklpower nor likl' any territorial or other claims in the area 4 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT VERSIONS 5 21 99 3 pm o ' 'p vio ' il' iEB is -fl o not in the nature ofthe American people ence But we are a global power with global interests o and responsibilities Our Asian policy reflects this underlying belief That peace and stability are most secure when countries are free to oevelop as they see fit ana none feels threatened by its neighbors o After World War II a key part of our Asian policy was to defend ourselves and our allies from the threat of attack by the Soviet Union or its allies We took the defense commitments we made to our allies under tlf circumstances @hose ye seriously In retrospect there is no doubt in my mind that these US commitments were a key to_ preserving peace in the region for evet'three decades Many others eve former adversaries have acknowledged t 1 point o Since the fall of the Soviet Union we have worked with our allies to keep our security relations strong These alliance relationships are no longer fundamentally pointed at any single threat or specific country They are intended to enhance our own security the security of our ty pJPYtners and the overall security of Asia These alliances afe im ortt- to us ant e will preserve them r 11--e 'l f'l- E r tl li' w o h I ess1 we realize that there have been great changes in the world especially irt Asia The structures and patterns of diplomacy that emerged in the aftermath ofWodd War II and evolved in the Cold War are no longer completely suited to the current si ation and will become increasingly less suitable as the years pass N hist rical ties to the tj- -A For example although we have deep th5 se ties t preclude creatin theDPRK J A- tJj f ctive and sustained ties with - o The Unit elieves that peace and stability in North Asia can be sustained through a stable pattern of normal equal relations among the countries involved as well as through continued economic growth shared in by all ofthose in the region o hr t'lthere 1s o ' o roIe LOr th e RK In_ preservmg o stabolo We be1Ioeve active 1 1ty o m own benefit and for the'benefit of the entire region o The DPRK as does every country has its own s gx erspectives and legitimate defense concerns We are fully prepared to constder those o In tum we expect that the DPRK will consider the defense concerns of other countries o including the United States __ This process in short wi t- e reciprocal D P - #2 - p -5 1 A no ta fcor otts f1jt1 H-- h- J 5 I i DRAFTIDRAFI' DRAFT VERSIONS 5 21 99 3 pm o m I believe as wel that after e have had a chance to discuss these matters more fully you will agree that the U strategic view is not incompatible with DPRK interests L Fttt 4 i '' -GBP GBPf k p svl J C -i' In fact paaition Wlll be enhanced by strong const ctive relations with a nonAsian power Surrounded b stron states o rbord rs can benefit from co - _ f fiiendship with t e U S whose interests Are m a prosperous In epen ent o' v On the question of reu'nifzcation I think you already understand the IT S _gosition quite well We believe reunification is a'necessary element oflonger te r' uA -hn h peace d st ilitti Nort eas_t i We a so be ieve 1s n histone mevltapility11- IS one na'tion aild irs vtston ts a tragtc acctdent o history We lso strongly believe in this cast that the means of achieving reunification are as importjUlt as the ends For that reason we have opposed and will continue to oppose any efforts at forceful reunification GJ o As for the specific proposals we J2 J L I on the means for peaceful and gradual reunification that question is not part of my recommendations to the President because U S policy cannot decide- nor should it- something that ultimately must be left to the people themselves JPYJ i o We support an liave supported-- through deeds as well as words-- the peaceful - sustained and dynamic interaction of the o governments and two systems on the peninsula encouraging gradual reintegration of the economies and systems while preserving stability and the security interests of each party o understand th @ though the issue of reunification is ultimately one for the Korean people other countries have their own roles to play as welL I l t 2 o The U S role is to help create the environm nt in which the two K6reas cant practical steps to lessen tensions and increase opportunity for reconciliatio nonaggression exchanges and cooperation Nonnal wide-ranging US-DPRK relations are necessary for such an environment We wish to establish normal relations with the DPRK not merely out ofU S security interests but also because of its positive influence on Ka n ties JJMI--S4 o 1 fL x J Sn af'b ef Clearly there is a relati9nship between US policies towan the Just as clearly there is a relationship betwee ortl1 olicies toward the US and toward the So es olicies are inextricably linked There is no sense in ignoring thctse links o l _e ID 'e g around them I believe all parties equally should recognize the links and fashi policies to take-them into account 7 f P PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND MUTUAL THREAT REDUCTION o 1 J- - l' f' vlvvr T- J z - - jC - Just bnement ag I saia t-Im if the region is secure all cdGntries can develop as they see fit according to their own unique beliefs traditions and systems 1 i _ DRAFT DRAFf DRAFT VERSIONS 5 21 99 3 pm o This is such an important principle that I wanted to repeat it o 8 o 8 Indeed it is a principle that underlies my Review and the recommendations I am considering making to the P esident After a long period in whi h-they were alinost completely cut off from each other our two peoples have begun to have contact When we look at the DPRK we see a system very different from that of the U S But different systems need not stand in the way of better relations nor shodd close ties with the ROK or the unresolved issue of reunification prevent the U S and the DPRK from improving relations The huge concentration of conventional forces on the DMZ is U Satisfactory and dangerous War would be a tragedy for all and all sides realizc -jt Therefore we- 1 s h J etl to initiate the Four Party Talks to tQMr' 1 ppi aef P l'ld-replace the armistice with a more stable peace structure R o t v t lUt l-- vc cw v d a h t s--Qbk 'Pence 1 Je I U-1-t r J IC k n - V l I S'Il We h -fo k pea i ful C J'iJdste o ce ilpessi vJ must reduce and remove any threats r t u l that by their very natu @ could lead us away from better relations lloc o srJ g o I intend to recommend strongly to the President that he seek negotiations with the DPRK to reduce those threats that stand in the way ofbetter relations o If successful these negotiations would result in agreed steps that would be reciprocal and nearly simultaneous with the result of mutual threat reduction and greatlyimproved relations in all dimensions o With the threat reduced greatly i s should oe possibl nited States of America and the Democratic People's Republic ofKoreaJ F'- - u ft r -b-y-tk- F t f a t' ' ' r e1 No A I am firmly conyinced s that a withdrawal of US forces would not contribute to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region 9uite the contraryf- a c-J E c l of- ' eO e c-c 4 P er J -1 L 4- wJft l nw U Scj1Jl QI vt'a o Nor do I believ esuch a change would enhance the security of the DPRK given the geopolitics ofthi region V_ - L A' o L 1 - r f''i' 7q Y C o 1- _ hr Jl l 1-- J - _ _ o A I believe that surrounded by larger states can benefit from a positive relationship with a power across the Pacific that has a keen interest in its independence and no interest in its tenitory or its subjugation c k 7 DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT VERSIONS 5 21 99 3 pm STATUS QUO UNSTABLE U S OBJECTIVES-FOR TALKS o -diJ 't A E Despite the possibilities for greatly improved relations through talks aimed at reducing mutual threat I will also tell the President that the current ffairs is in my judgment unstable 7 - _ 1 - I evelopment by the D In my view t uclear yteapons and the _ i' 1 FReaHs to-deli resents a clear and sent dan er and should_nots- -' - v bJ s threat to the US and its allies and interest be eliminated vJ ' 4 - qf -1 1 - w i o h EUR5SEUR I'ofi -f b - fir ' fr-- Vro l ow '1tf Co _ il 1 lN 7t-tkA peo qfil ' My review of the facts and my dtscussions_wtth a lies have convince e thcit the current situation could deteriorate rapidly if our two sides do not work tog ther tg remedy it Thus we have a situation where there is a real prospect of either dramatic f f improvement or dramatic deterioration in our relations a deJo -p-h - c e II o Jl ts ke o s -- u o - t f 0 '- 101 w -sf e p-r r f- s t' ' l f r w a e o I will tell the President that we need to be ready for both possibilities but that we need --r c to work urgently toward mutual threat reduction J _ z 'Jr -' ' f- I ' J j-v _ 1- L r-t _ t _ _ Specifically J Pf K nuclear w pon incompatible with these g als Galffi'e so p J J o On the Korean perunsula ight lead to a we ening or deterrence of war 1- 1'_ In the region other powers would likely react causing an Aarms race Bh n J If o o lj A Around the world the cause of nonproliferation would be damaged affecting other interests yg J 1'-u' t C 1 1 o _ With the Agreed Framework the DPRK made an important statement to the world and to the US The AF froze the nuclear activities at Yongbyon and began a process of eliminating them and bringing the DPRK back into full compliance with the NPT This has been a su ccess and something that we can build upon Bl __-_-_-___ ___j_ n et a --- 8 _ Pages 9-17 are withheld in full pursuant to Exemption 1 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu