T l- SEC RE'I v L' l- i-' - _ Cl- l 'CT - MEJ 10RA l iDUM OF AGJl_l' -GORBACHE 7 C01 VEF SATION EETINGS J -7 GENEVA November 1985 Second Plenarv Meetina DATE November 19 1985 TIME 2 30 - 3 40 P M PLACE Maison Fleur d'Eau Geneva Switzerland PARTICIPANTS United States President Ronalo Reagan Georae Shultz Secretary of State Donald T Reaan Chief of Staff White House Robert C Mcf r ane Assistant to the President for National Security Affair Arthur Hartman l JI bassador to the USSR Paul Nitze Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Jack F atlock Jr Special Assistant to the President for k tional Security Affairs Robert E Linhsrt Senior Director National Security Council Sta E WiJliam Krimer Interpreter Union of Soviet Socialist Republics General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev Eduard Shevardnadze Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy M orniyenko First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anatoly F Dobrynin Ambassador to the United States Aleksandr Yakovlev Chief Propaganda Department Central Committee CPSU Leonid M Zamyatin Chief International Information Department -- - -cerJ tral Committee CPSU Andrey M Alekspndrov-Agentov AssiEtant to General Secretary Gorbachev Sergey P Tarasenko Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs Sov iet Interpreter SECRET SENSIHVE P t P r 1- 1 cl1 b - ltu r c- - --- - -- - o _ o o # o o - -- -- - - - The r rF -iCi e t offe r-ec Gc r i e chev the J o0r to c-omrr erJt on the presePte tic during the morning session Presi ent's Gorbo chev said that they both hc c discussed hov ' to conduct their meeting ana during the prepe rations had discussed V 'hether to focus on the causes o tensions or on solutions Both sides hac said a lot ab0ut causes He is convinced that if they start making up e list of objections they will not get far toward norn lization more trust and more respect -- and most importarrtly toward giving sGrr e impulse to the Geneva process which is at a crucial stage no He will be reasonable in what he proposes He does not plan an extensive debate over what President said But as he said during the private meeting this morning the Soviets reject a primitive approach toward the world around us -- that is that everything can be traced to some Soviet plan for supremacy or world domination We have discussed this many times and when it raises regional issues the U S frequently charges the Soviet Union with expansionism -- in Afghanistan Angola even South Yemen Hotbeds of international conflict do sour international relations Gorbachev continued but the Soviets cannot share U S views of the causes of regional conflict You say that the Soviet Union and Soviet expansionism is responsible But that is either a mistake or a deliberate distortion If U S policies are based on this nistaken view it is difficult to see the way out oGBP these problems An assessment of Soviet policy in the Third world on the basis of such a misconception can lead onlv to underrr ining international security Let me give you our view Gorbachev said We take a principled approach to the developing countries and their problems First we have no monopolies in these countries which exploit their rr anpower and reEources We seek no cornmercial concessions but rely on our owr resources one hundrec percent Therefore we have no selfish interests or expansionist aims and desire no nilitary bases Second if you look at the developing world in an unbiased way you will see that there is a long-term objective process which began after World War II It is a natural one of thirdworld countries first pressing for political independence and then striving to gain control over their own resources and labor This is the root cause of what is happening You overestimate the power of the Soviet Union Gorbachev observed The U S attributes to USSR the power and capability to upset the whole world but 1 EUR are realistic pragmatists who categorically oppose attempts to dominate other countries from SECRET GBPENSITTVE - - ----th outside KP 6o oppcse tt export of counterrevolution A - tempts-have been mad to crush revolution in the past This 1- appened t h the AmE r ican revolution ri tt the French Revolution an with the October Revolution But the idea that that small numbers of people from outside a country can turn it to revolution is not realistic India Indone8ia Kor a -- these are ell countries with ffiillions of people The U S speaks of Afghanistar and Ethiopia as if it were the fovjet Union that stirred the pot there But we first heard of revolutions there on the raa1o We had good relations with Haile Selassie and were not the cause of the revolution there It is wrong to think we are plotting this is just not right But people want freedom and we do support progressive movements We make no secret of this and it is in the Party program But we have no secret plans for world domination The U S has its values and the Soviet Union has its own R gional problems are caused by a social struggle evolving over many stages Sometimes you support one faction and we another but both of us can play a role together to solve problems and in some areas we already do so In Afghanistan the Soviet Union supports a regularizing process around that country a political settlement under the United Nations and you could help The U S however does not help You say the USSR should withdraw its troops but actually you want them there and the longer the better Gorbachev continued saying that the Soviets are ready to promote a package solution iP 'C-1 ving a non-aligned Afghanistan Soviet troop withdrawal 1 the return of refuoees and international guarantees of no out side interference There are possibilitie for a political reco ciliation he added and said that Afghanistan is already ready to cooperate but requires the cooperation of all groups He then asserted that the Soviet Union has no plan for using Afghanistan to gain access to a warm water port to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf or to impinge on U S interests in any way It is a situation which could be used to improve our overall relationship by fostering cooperation by the conflicting sides and abstaining from interference It is an area we should explore he concluded Gorbachev _th n stated th2t these are just examples to illustrate the Soviet policy toward the Third World B2Eically the issues are internal problems for the states involved We can continue to work on these issues with our discussions by specialists on regional matters SECRET SENSITIVE o G0rbachev th r ctec th the President had charged that it s the Soviet l nior v ot i ci had been buil6 i 1c_ up it ' arms -v hile t hf' r s acted ith restr nt This is a major gues ion Much decend 0r the character of the Present strateaic situation and how it will develop i n the future - It is the certral question of our relations Go1 bachev continued by saying that t 'P nty years ago there was no str2tegic balance U S had four times as many strategic delivery s 'stems than the USSR and a sc fon 'c rd-ba sed systems He then asked rhetorically what the U S would have done if the Soviet Union had possessed four times as much The U S would have had to take steps just as the Soviet Union did to establish parity In fact Gorbachev asserted the u s has tripled the number of its nuclear weapons and has more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union Negotiations began as we approached parity and the Soviets have not violated the nuclear balance and are not trying to surpass the U S since superiority cannot be the basis for normal relations All institutes which study the problem including the ISS in I ondon conclude that there is strategic parity Force structures are different but they support different stratec ies The Soviet Union wants parity at a lower level he continued We are for equal security and agreed to embark upon the negotiations in Geneva Ke must meet each other half way if we are to find a way to reduce strctegic weapons The time has come for us both to muster the political will anc realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun the other side Even now due to computer technology one side could get ahead in space But we can roatct any challenge though you might not think sc We know that the U S can meet anv challenge frorr us and we can meet any challenc _re from you But why not make a step which woulc permit lowering the ar s level Gorbachev then said that they the Soviets think SDI can lead to an arms race in space and not just a defensive arms race but an offensive arms race with space weapons Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicionE and mistrust Scientists say any shield can be pierced so SDI cannot save us So why create it It only makes sense if it is to defend against a retaliatory strike What would the West think if the Soviet Union was developing these weapons You would react with horror Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first it would be bo a- --rf v1e oo first vou feel it would be bad for the world feeding mistrust We cai not accept the rationale vlhich says it is good if you do it and bad if we do it 6ECRB'f' S C NSITIVE Gorbachev then said that he knows President s attache t0 the program and for that reason the Soviets have analyzed it seriously The Soviet conclusion is that if the U S implements its plan the Soviet Union will not cooperate in an effort to gain superiority over it We will have to frustrate this plan and we will build up in order to smash your shield You say the Soviet Union is doing the same he continued but asserted that this is not the case Both of us do research in space of course but Soviet research is for peaceful purposes The U S in contrast has military aims and that is an important difference The U S goal violates the ABM Treaty which is of fundamental importance Testing is also inconsistent with the Treaty and can only exacerbate mistrust If the U S embarks on SDI the following will happen 1 no reduction o f offensive weapons and 2 Soviet Union will respond This response will not be a mirror image of your program but a simpler more effective system What will happen if you put in youn seven layers of defense in space and we put in ours It will just destabilize the situation generate mistrust and waste resources It will require automatization which will place important decisions in the hands of computers and political leaders will just be in bunkers with computers making the decisions This could unleash an uncontrollable process You haven't thought this through it will be a waste of money and also will cause more distrust and more weapons Gorbachev then referred to the President's remarks reoardinq the need for a defense against some madrr an in the future who might get his hands on nuclear weapons He observec that they should remember t hat they JPY 7 ill have sufficient retaliatory force for a long time to deter such use Gorbachev then concluded bv sayinq that verification will not be a problerr if the basic question is solved The Soviets are prepared for full verification of a ban on space weapons If such a ban is agreed upon then the two countries could negotiate on their respective proposals GBPor offensive weapons reduction The Soviets are ready to compromise If space weapons are banned the situation would be completely different it would create a new attitu-de on the Soviet side The process would be different however if they leave Geneva without any agreements If agreement on this point is not possible they the Soviets would have to rethink the current situation The President then made the following points o'SECRET SEN S ITIVE - t Gorbachev's oresentatio illustrates the lack o trust between us It is dif icult for us to understand the level of suspicion which the Soviet Union clds Ever v hen we -v rere allies in Kcl-ld c r we encountered inexplicable Soviet suspicion For example permission WRE not giver for U S bombers to land on Soviet territory in order tc reduce the dangers of bombing our com rr on enemy We cannot understand this kind of suspicion Gorbachev spoke of parity but there is none today True that u s once had nuclear superiority but in June 'l946 offered to place all nuclear weapons under international control It has also made numerous other offers and the President listed twelve such between 1953 and 1969 Since SALT-I was signed the Soviet Union has added 6 000 nuclear warheads Since SALT-II 3 850 have been added Meanwhile the u s removed 2400 warheads from Europe while the Soviet_Union threatened Europe with its SS-20's Our Allies requested protection and it fell to President to implement their request when Soviets refused to conclude an agreement to remove the threat Now we are locked in a Mutual Assured Destruction policy The U S does not have as many ICBM's as Soviet Union but has enough to retaliate But there is something uncivilized about this Laws of war were developed over the centuries to protect civilians but civilians are the targets of our vast arsenals today The Strategic Defense Initiative is the President's idea History teaches that a defense is foun6 for every offensive weapon We don't know i strategic defensive weapons will be possible but if they are they should not be coupled with an offensive force Latter must be reduced so it will not be a threat J nd if strategic defenses prove possible we v rou1d prefer to sit down and get rid of nuclear weapons and with them the threat of war Regarding Afghanistan Their leader was supplied by the Soviet Union Actually he was their second choice since the first one did not ork ou as they wished The Soviet invasion has cr ated three milliion refugees He made suggestion for solution at TJN- - -Spe- d fically ho Y r about bringing about the mutual withdrawal of 11 outside forces then forming a coalition of Islamic states to supervise the installation of a government chosen by the people of Afghanistan nam Regarding Cambodia We signed an agreement with North VietIt was violated and the North Vietnamese took over South ITIVE -m r - - _ N - Vietnam and also Laos and Cambodi It now rules Cambodia Ke should put ar end to this an6 to ether supervise establishment of s government chosen by the Cambodian people Regarding Nicaragua The Soviets have advisers there The have built a tremendous military machine far more than they need for defense They have declared an aim of spreadins revolution elsewhere The President then reviewed the history Somoza's removal --the appeal to the OAS and the Sandinista promise of free elections and a free press But then when Somozc as removed the Sandinistas forced other groups out of the coalition and are trying to establish totalitarian control The Contras are only trying to reinstate the goals of the original revolution Sandinis as a Such things as those noted are behind our suspicion and mistrust Every military judgment has it that Soviet forces are designed for offensive operations The U S willing to work on an agreement to move away from mutual threats SDI would never be used by U S to improve its offensive capability or to launch a first strike SDI should not lead to an arms race we can both decide to reduce and eliminate offensive weapons These are things we could do to remove mistrust Our goal is not an annE race We car return to parity in one of two ways either we both reduce offensive weapons or we can build them up and use defensive svstems to offset them The U S does not seek superiority but will do what is necessarv to protect its freedoms Gorbache then asked what thev should tell their negotiators in Geneva The President replied that they could be given guidelines to reduce nuclear weapons say by 50% We could negotiate on the structure of forces since we know the structure of our forces is different Gorbachev asked about the U S goal of SDI and how this relates to our January agreement to prevent an arms race in space The President said that he did not see a defensive shield as an arms race in space He then recounted a conversation between a Chinese of icial and Ambassador Walters in which Walters was asked what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate anything meets a man with a shield that is impenetrable Walters responded that he did not know but that he did know what happens S-BEURRB9 i SENS1TIVE ------ -- - - - - -'hen a m u - 1 nc hielc meetE U- 2-- c me opponent v rho haE thE spear Keithe of us wants to be in the po ition of having n0 shield Gorbachev then asked whether the President considered developing SDI weapons as the militarization of space The Fresident replied that he did not If the technology was developed it should be shared Neither side should deploy until the other did It should be done in combination with lowering offensive weapons so that neither could gain a first-strike advantage The President then invited Gorbachev to take a walk for another private conversation and the two departed at 3 40 p m Prepared by Jack F Matlock SECr E1' SENSlT'1VE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu