Septe mber 22 1989 6SCRErf NODIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION ing Bake r-She vardn adze Min ister ial in Jack son Hole Wyom Seco nd Smal l Grou p Meet ing Reg ional Issue s TIME AND PLACE Septe mber 22 1989 3 30 -5 30 p m AMK Ranch Jack son Hole Wyoming Midd le East Camb odia Afgh anist an ST JBJECTS Cent ral Ame rica Afri ca PARTICIPANTS U S Jame s A Bake r III Secr etary of State Robe rt Gate s Depu ty Nati onal Secu rity Adv sor to Pres iden t Robe rt B Zoel lick Coun selor Depa rtmen t of State Raymond G H Seit z Assi stan t Secr etary of State EUR Jack F Matl ock U S Amba ssado r to the USSR Denn is B Ross Dire ctor Polic y Plan ning Staf f S P Marg aret DeB Tutw iler Assi stant Secr etary of Stat e PA Cond oleez za Rice Dire ctor Sovi et Affa irs NSC Staf f Fran cis Fuku yama Depu ty Dire ctor SIP Alex ande r Versh bow D rector EUR SOV note take r Edua rd A Shev ardna dze Mini ster of Fore ign Affa irs Yuri y Dubi nin USSR Amba ssado r to the Unit ed State s Alek sand r Bess mertn ykh Firs t ster Mini ign Fore Depu ty and USA Head hov Alek sey Obuk Cana da Adm inist ratio n MFA Near Head akov Vlad imir Poly MFA nt rtme East Depa ricae 'Ame Latin Head ov Yuri y Pavl _ 'iQ Depa rtme nt MFA Ea le Midd Head seyev Yuri y Alek Depa rtme nt MFA Head ty Depu h otnyk Yuri y Myak MF tries Coun alist Asia n Soci Serg ey Tara senk o Spec ial dze ardna Shev to t Assi stan Head ty Depu dov Mame Geor giy USA Canada Adm inist ratio n MFA Vita liy Chur kin Spec ial Assi stan t to Sfiev ardna dze and spoke sman 2 abou t TASS Afte r exch angin g plea sant ries with Shev ardna dze Secr etar e ativ repo rting on the rumo red U S Open Land s initi nal regio on ents Bake r offe red a number of intro duct ory comm from the Chair men issue s He sugg ested that the Mini sters hear discu ssion of of the work ing grou ps at the begi nnin g of the each topic the U S The secr etary -said that as Shev ardna dze knew issue s The nal attac hed grea t impo rtanc e to prog ress on regio erati on or lack coop worl d woul d jUdg e our relat ions hip by our 6EGRS'i' NODIS DECL OADR DECLASSIFIED PIiR E G 13526 aon- scs ' d5- lJ 13 SDCRB NODIS - 14 - internal settlement They did not want to continue supplying arms as his cost a lot of money and was not a nice thing to do Th s was the rationale for a moratorium The secretary suggested that the best we might be able to do in our joint statement would be to say that the sides discussed efforts that would include a moratorium on arms supplies but also a comprehensive settlement He suggested exploring whether this could be a basis on which to proceed He added that we also had' the interests of our ABEAN friends to consider If we spoke of a moratorium and an internal settlement together it would be consistent with the approach we bad taken in Paris Shevardnadze agreed we should let the experts continue to discussing tnis question He suggested that Afghanistan be the next topic While he and the secretary had discussed this in their private meeting it would be useful to hear the main aspec s of the working group discussions Alekseyev said the working group discussions in Washington and in Wyoming had shown that the sides had a common view about the necessity of a political settlement Both sides' experts believed that Afghanistan should become a neutral and non-aligned state The U s had said it wanted to see a future Afgnanistan that was not hostile t the USSR The discussiohs had covered particularly on the Soviet side the plan of President Najibullah presented in August and reiterated at the non-aligned summit The Soviets had outlined the main points of the plan and answered questions They had emphasized in particular that if one analyzed the plan and how the Afghan leadership visualized a settlement it was obvious that it represented a democratic approach The goal was to have a general election monitored by the international community Alekseyevsaid it had taken great political courage for Najibullah to propose this plan Of course the Afghan leadership wanted to remain in the state and political structure But the plan represented a compromise and showed that the Kabul regime did not insist on a monopoly of power The Soviet side had suggested that the plan be reviewed in detail to see what could be worked out Unfortunately sometimes plans were rejected simply because they were put forth by Najibullah not because of their contents Alekseyev went on to explain two elements of the plan The first aspect concerned how the Kabul leadership envisaged an Afghan settlement - The second element concerned the holding of an international conference on Afghanistan There was a link between the internal and the external aspects An international conference for example would have to guarantee the non- EeRE NODIS SECRE'f NODIS - 15 - aligned neutral and demilitarized status of Afghanistan That status wo ld be further reinforced by a new constitution to be drawn up by the new parliament As for participation here again there was a lot of room for discussion The position of the Afghan government was that all of the country's neighbors should attend the conference Iran Pakistan China Soviet Union along with the United States and pe haps others Alekseyev said that in the working group discussion the U S had emphasized the fact that the opposition did not want to have anything to do with the current Afghan leadership In reply the Soviets had explained the fact that in the current situation quite a few members of the opposition -- such as field commanders -- had held bilateral talks with the Kabul regime Yet whenever resistance leaders got together they put out the line that there could be no cooperation with the current government The question arose as to why such bilateral contacts were all right but higher-level contacts were not One was tempted to draw a conclusion that when the resistance leaders met they could not agree on anything definite and thus stuck to the position of not talking to Kabul as a means of showing their unity Alekseyev concluded that he had asked his U S colleagues for their reaction to the idea of an international conference and had heard that they were cautious toward the idea Nevertheless he had been trying to explain the rationale Speaking for the U S side of the working group Rice said she agreed there had been points of agreement We both affirmed that the Afghan problem could only be resolved by political means We had both restated our commitment to the Geneva Accords We had both expressed a desire to end our involvement and to end the conflict But when we turned to the details there had been considerable divergence From the U S perspective the current composition of the PDPA was a block to a cooperative solution Our understanding was that the resistance simply would not deal with the current government Whatever informal contacts might be taking place when it came to a formal solution of the Afghan problem the current composition of the PDPA remained a problem Thus the situation had to evolve if the parties were to sit down and work with one another Nevertheless we agreed to keep searching for a political formula Rice said we had found it useful to hear the Soviet explanation of the Najibullah plan We had found one of its central features interesting namely the idea of a transitional committee to arrange elections Our understanding was that this committee could take form before an international conference We would like to explore this idea further We also understood IS -SEC 'f' NOD SECRDCf NODIS - 16 - re an arms cutthat tliAJ irans ition al body could begi n work befo outst andi ng some l stil were e ofE bad ne into effe ct Ther sitio nal tran the of on ositi The comp quest lorls ic e adde d could hand that body a it Was comm ittee need ed to be explo red tical skep were we noted Rice nt powe r to an inter im gove rnme nt curre the in e shap that such a comm ittee could take rthel ess we envir onme nt with inten se figh ting goin g on Neve emen t was settl l tica poli A g foun d the discu ssion s inter estin for the not and s selve them e a prob lem for the Afgh ans to solv a that d agree we But guar anto rs of the Geneva Acco rds chap ter ic trag this end to way poli tica l solu tion was the only in our relat ions Kabu l The secr etar said that he unde rstc d that theher the Afgh an whet d aske He s regim e's plan envis aged elec tion elec tions the l unti r powe in in lead ersh ip woul d expe ct to rema had taken plac e neith er the Alek seyev said that noth ing woul d be preju dged s step the just were e comp ositi on nor the resu lts Thes up a set be d woul cil coun envi sage d in the plan A guid ing a t elec to w follo d woul loya jirga and then elec tions form ed What parli amen t fina lly a new gove nment woul d beseyev said this Alek s step woul d be the evol ution of thes e Naji bulla h plan the g entin pres woul d be diff icul t to say In He did tion solu a of on orati was open ing the door to the expl not want a mono poly of powe r The secr etary asked abou t the coun cil func t on of the gove rning tran sitio nal Alek se ev repli ed that it woul d exis t at the h the whic g durin d perio stag e durin g a roug hly six-m onth new a are prep to ns issio tran sitio nal gove rnme nt and comm ing guid The nized orga be d cons titut ion and elec tions woul d woul r rathe but y pa t one coun cil woul d not cons ist of only gue dialo sed form a frame work for a broa d-ba cil woul d have The Secr etary asked whet her the guid ing coun nal natio the d woul or d powe r in the tran sitio nal perio ority gove rnme nt cont inue to have auth d be a Alek seyev repli ed that the guid ing coun cil woul new one a to nt rnme gove ent tran sitio nal stage from the pres woul d be s statu its so gue It woul d be the prod uct of a dialo coun cil ing guid the se cour deter mine d by that dialo gue Of be d woul but ess proc woul d not be the last stage of the follo wed by furth er step s ----- SECGBPU3lf- NOD I S I sseRE 'f NO D I S - 17 - migh t be Shev ardna dze said it appe ared that the ideainter natio nal An look ort hwhi le and could meri t a clos er coun cil rning gove a conf eren ce could discu ss such ques tions as and othe r insti tutio ns the guid ing The Secr etary asked whet her it was corr ect thatwoul d take tions coun cil woul d be crea ted firs t and then elec e erenc conf nal plac e befo re the conv ening of an inter natio rstan ding unde Rice note d that this was indee d the U S h plan it was Alek seyev respo nded that unde r the Naji bulla'plac e As he take d not very defi nite when the conf erenc e woul of the ssion discu unde rstoo d it the prop osal ailow ed for a the that ques tion of timin g The plan also indic atedanist an woul d be dem ilita rizat ion and neut ral statu s' of Afgh nal reinf orce d by the cons titut ion as well as the inter natio conf eren ce in favo r of a Shev ardna dze commented that the Iran ians were ort to the supp ve act conf eren ce and the India ns had also give n ned in favo r butidea He thou ght the Paki stan is were incli tion he did not had not yet decid ed As for the Chin ese posi know shou ld be The Secr etar sugg ested that Naji bulla h's name g He' flyin of ce taken off 1f the plan were to have any chan tanc e resis the with asked whet her the idea had been discu ssed or the AIG Shev ardna dze said no this was a unil ater al prop osal er The Secr etary said it was time to move on togetanoth much as to subj ect but it woul d be usef ul for the U S vers ion deta il on the plan as poss ible He requ ested a writ ten and aske d Shev ardna dze said that this coul d easi ly be done ment state Alek seyev to comp ose langu age for the join t one mind refle cting thos e issue s on whic h w were of inclu de the The Secr etary said the join t state ment could whol e text the see poin ts Rice had made but he woul d like to befo re maki ng a jUdg ment p Shev ardna dze sugg ested that a join t Sovi et Am erica n grou go to Kabu l Tel The Secr etary asked whet her the grou p could also go to Aviv ld do Shev ardna dze jokin gly read ily agree d sayin g we shou this It woul d be of mutu al inte rest -BilCREIf NODIS -- - EQRB NODIS - 18 The'Secretary suggested turning to the next region Central America f And he suggested that Mr Zoellick make a short present iion Zoellick noted that he had not been in the working group discussion of Central America and thought it would be useful to offer a few words on the setting Events had been affected by the recent accord ong the Cent al American leaders at Tela This built on the regional accord at Esquipulas which we believed both our countries supported The key aspects were 1 to create democratic conditions permitting the safe return of the resistance and free and fair elections 2 the voluntary re-integration of the resistance into Nicaragua once conditions for their return had been agreed 3 an end to Nicaraguan support for the FMLN which was required under Esquipulas which included provisions against non-use of territory to support subversion and the involvement of the UN OAS and other institutions to verify the borders and the arrangements for integration 4 Zoellick said we believed the Central American accords could sustain the election process which was the center of our approach A key issue was fair treatment of the opposition In this regard we still had concerns that the election rules put the unified opposit on at a disadvantage Noneth less we were encouraging them to proceed and were encouraging the international community to get involved The latter was important because in order tp assure the world and the United States that the elections were fair there needed to be monitoring of the election process -- beginning now As the Secretary had said we believed the Soviet Union could play an important role in urging the Sandinistas to follow through on their promises regarding the elections Zoellick said another aspect of the Tela agreement was Nicaraguan support for the FMLN The Secretary and the working group had both addressed this issue We had had our conversations in the past regarding military supplies Without repeating the details we saw a distinction between Soviet and Soviet-bloc aid in terms of the role being played by CUba We believed that in our efforts to promote a diplomatic olution based on a political process all countries putting military supplies into the egion had to stop One final point Zoellick wanted to make was that our policy reflected new political thinking There were still many in the United States who questioned whether this policy would payoff 6EeRE NODIS SEOR Sll'- NODI S - 19 - It was's important to our overall relationship that we be able tp pow cooperation in the process of assuring free and fa el_ctions Finally the area because of its proximity and the refugee problems that it produced had a ubstantial potential for affecting the political attitudes of Americans toward CUba and the Soviet Union This made it all the more important that we work in a constructive fashion to'suppor t a democratic process Pavlov said he would not repea the working group discussions although he would note that the group had spent more time on Central America than on any other region His impression was that the discussions had been worthwhile In addition to both sides reaffirming their commitment to a negotiating process and to the agreements reached between the Central American states and in addition to expressing mutual interest in an early ceasefire in El Salvador and promotion of a dialogue in that country the sides had also been able to answer a number of questions posed by the other Pavlov hoped that as a result there was now a greater understanding of the situation regarding military supplies from the Soviet Union and other countries The U S side Pavlov continued had been able to give the Soviets certain explanations about its position on questions relating to the elections and to the demobilization of the Contras The soviets had suggestea that both countries resist the temptation to interfere in Nicaragua's internal affairs by trying to help their friends win the elections no matter how much we might want them to win He was glad to say that the U S had accepted this point Pavlov believed that there was a sufficient degree of convergence in our views and that a number of questions had been identified on which we could cooperate in creating conditions for a settlement of the Central American conflict -- enough to justify a c uple of phrases in our joint statement The secretary said this was fine He noted that the discussion was running well behind schedule and we would need to move on to Human Rights unless there were other regional topics to discuss We had spoken a bit about cooperation in Africa and he did not know if we needed a further discussion here He wanted to note however that the U S was concerned about the situation in Ethiopia and par icularly about the increase in the amount of military equipment going in We were pleased that the parties had chosen to come to Atlanta and begin discussions about a political settlement We believed it was fair to say that we had cooperated successfu ly in Namibia and Angola and that our positions on the situation in Mozambique were about the same He asked Shevardnadze if he or his experts had any comments SElCR I3'f NOD I S --- -- SECIt E'f NODIS - 20 - Shevardnadze suggested that the working group consider more carefullY the situation in Southern Africa They also needed to discuss the situation in the Horn and specifically the overall state of play in that region We also might want to to ch on Cyprus and other questions of that region For the joint statements Shevardnadze suggested we say that there was a discussion of African issues if there were any questions needing the Ministers' attention they could provide guidance later Shevardnadze said he did want to make one point because the secretary for the second time had mentioned Soviet arms supplies to Ethiopia He believed that this criticism was not deserved Ethiopia was a country like any otheL such as Pakistan or Egypt to which weapons were sold The Soviets supplied weapons to some countries and the U s to others Why not Ethiopia The Soviet Union had agreements and obligations o help the Ethiopians not just with weapons but also training How well they were able to fight was a different question Ethiopian officers had studied in Soviet military academies There was a wide range of relations between the countries Therefore Shevardnadze could not accept the Secretary's critical remark Shevardnadze said that given that he and the secretary had had a far-reaching discussion of regional conflicts in their' private meeting that morning he agreed that the session could adjourn now He suggested that the working group ontinue to explore the issues and give the Ministers its suggestions for the joint statement Drafted EUR SOV AvershbowA 9150F Cleared SIP FFukuyama SIP DRoss EUR RGHSeitz C RBZoellick NBC CRice trJ '8i5 C ffi'i' NOD I S This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu