- UNCLASSIFIED 13 October 1961 MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE A RMY SUBJEC'J j Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War ' o M- 'i I 1 One of the two tasks which constituted the basis for my temporary detail to your office was an examination of the Arrny's performance in the field of Sublimited War Behind the assignment of this task lay your conviction shared I understa nd by the Chief of Staff that the Army's potential capability far exceeded currently programmed or planned utilization My survey had therefore a dual purpose first isola tion of the basic reasons for the gap between the feasible and the actual level of activity and second suggestions as to how the Army's contribution might be materially increased H 2 The activities of the U S Army in Sublimited War - or the equivalent Cold War - are legion Its strength combat sta nce rnobility capacity for expansion staying power assistance to and compatibility with Allied grocmd forces - to name but a few - are all assets in the power conflict and any measurable change in these categories either advances or slows the attaimnent of national r policy objectives Consequently to reduce the scope to manageable j Q proportions I ha ve arbitrarily limited my inquiry to the significant but la rgely unexploited functions enuncia ted by Genera l Decker in his 00 ' brilliant address at the Army War College on 8 June 1961 The Chief Awe of Staff raised the sights of military assistance by outlining imaginative ' ' 1m' and Imminently practical ways of improving capability of local armed V l-' forces Allied and neutral alike to insure internal defense and deter 1-' external aggression It is significant that the President himself has 't' repeatedly shown marked interest in this subject 3 In essence General Decker envisaged the employment of selected military personnel and units as a If transmission belt - communica ting at the grass roots Army know-how and community of aims Three major purposes to be served by U S military crt t _D t 3 YEAJ - - - flOD llill - '-'- '- -- E- rE1 tiiS '-- u - - i- H' 52 DJD '1 I- y ' y L' ' - 'f- 1-- b' Jd U - o I 0' l-' UNCLASSIFIED counterparts elem ents working alongs were a To give im petus to the employment of m ilitary talent and resources in ways contributing to the political stability - econom ic betterm ent and social progress of the country concerned - subject to the proviso that capability to perform assigned com bat m issions not be degraded The public works of Bolivian engineer units are representative of this category b To heighten the effectiveness of indigenous m ilitary and param ilitary forces in insuring against the developm ent of dissident factions or in dealing with arm ed insurgency should it erupt Program s undertaken in Laos and proposed in South Vietnam are examples c As the com plement to the foregoing to accelerate the developm ent of indigenous military and param ilitary capabilities to include support m echanisms for conducting subversion or guerrilla activities in contiguous Communist territory We have already developed such units in Taiwan and South Korea 4 I have spent the better part of the past three weeks acquaint- ing m yself with what is underway and what is projected in these areas both within and without the Departm ent of Defense but primarily the Departrn ent of the Army Even as delim ited the field is both wide and com plex the initiatives are numerous occur at m any levels and are overlapping I do not pretend to have explored the subject in full More- over I have been aware throughout that there are m any officers in the Pentagon whose competence l n these fields and whose knowledge of current developments therein outstrip m y own It is therefore possible that facts not unearthed and others m isinterpreted could invalidate certain conclusions emerging from thi'S imperfect survey 5 Two major prem ises have conditioned the findings a The fir st is that the activities under survey the unconventional unorthodox paramilitary military assistance by another name or whatever are simply auxiliary weapons within the total array of U S power resources and that they are effective only when applied in coordination with those other resources The articulate 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED proponents thereof notwithstanding they represent a complementary rather than an alternative means Moreover as is the case with all other power resources they can be properly applied only in the wake of a prior enunciation of clear and constant objectives sought vis-a-vis any area or country b The second is that it is the operative policy of the Executive Branch to exploit fully the potential of the U S Army to improve the overall capability of indigenous armed forces to deal with problems of internal defense This premise is consistent with the demonstrable indeed urgent needs of the world situation today it is likewise consistent with the statements of our Chief Executive If the premise is erroneous then the proposals for gearing for a substantially higher level of activity are meaningless the difficulties which have been attributed to growing pains may in fact be deliberate roadblocks and the shortcomings noted within the Army are of no significance c The corollary to the second premise is that the Army can divert appreciable numbers of its best personnel to these activities without derogation of its other missions and functions Only individuals of exceptional skill motivation and leadership ability can properly perform the training guidance and related tasks involved - in ali a lien environment and remote from supervision Our rolls of course include such personnel aplenty but they are filling key positions elsewhere My unsupported estimate is that they can be released from current assignment as required and that our training system can spawn a dequate replacements 4 From the outset I have been assisted by three extremely capable officE rs Lt Colonels Ralph Kinnes Special Warfare Pivision and John L Mohl War Plans Division were kindly made available by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Lt Colonel Jesse G Ugalde has been on temporary duty from Headquarters Fort Carsono All three have displayed high professional competence complete cooperation and amazing industry They have helped immeasurably 3 UNCLASSIFIED d UNCLASSIFIED This is not however a team product The findings and recommendations are unilaterally mine 80 also is the responsibility for the defense thereof 5 The original of my report is attached hereto and per your instructions a copy has been transmitted to the Chief of Staff I J ' ' - '-j-- 'j-'- 1 - cf RICHARD G STILWELL Brigadier General USA Incl Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War CC Chief of Staff USA 4 UNCLASSIFIED l m UNCLASSIFIED ARMY ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS SHORT OF DECLARED WAR REPORT BY Brigadier General Richard G Stilwell f Lt Colonel Ralph Kinnes Lt Colonel John L Mohl Lt Colonel Jesse G Ugalde 13 October 1961 II f E -- - UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PURPOSE AND SCOPE On 11 September the Secretary of the Army assigned me two concurrent tasks a One was to evaluate and make recommendations with respect to the Counter-Insurgency Operations Courses presented by the Army's Special Warfare Center and by instrumentalities of three Unified Commands as well as matters pertinent thereto report in the premises was filed on' 6 October b The second was to make an independent survey of how the Army was discharging a series of generally related tasks targeted on the less developed nations of the Free World and with the common objective of strengthening the capability of national military and paramilitary contingents to insure the internal defense of their respective countries Should the survey disclose areas where performance could be improved appropriate recommendations were to be formulated Time constraints required that the survey focus on activities of major import only Consequently examination concentrated on the three areas enumerated by the Chief of Staff in his major policy address at the Army War College on 8 June 1961 and specifically i UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED '1 a The employment of selected Army personnel or units in underdeveloped countries and in direct working contact with national military contingents to further the latter's effective- ness as the guarantor of internal security and as an instrurnent of econon ic and social progress On 5 September the Secretary of Defense underlined the irnportance of this functional area and charged the Department of the rmy with Executive Agent responsibilities therefor b As a variant of the above in high intensity situations actions to improve the capability of indigenous military and paramilitary contingents to deal with dissident factions below or above the level of arrrred insurrection externally suppol'ted or not The Army's Gounter-Insurgency concept and program approved by the President on 28 March provides the framework for actions under a and b c Finally the encouragernent guidance and support of indigenous capabilities GBP01 the conduct of covel t and cross- border operations into contiguous Communist tel'ritol'Y with the minimmn objective of strengthening internal defense and the larger objective of eroding the stability of the Sino-Soviet orbit The pro- visions of National Security Action Memoranda NSAM 56 and 57 are directly applicable ii UNCLASSIFIED EXaIninatiofi qf the foregoing necessarily involved some exploration of a Extent and adequacy of policy guidance b Status of plans and actions within the Army staff the Joint staff Office of the Secretary of Defense and as feasible and appropriate within State and CIA c Cognizant staff elements and machinery for intra-Defense and interdepartmental planning and coordination d Terms of reference and functioning of Army staff elements e Status of Army operational assets f Roles and activities of Unified Commanders of U S country teams and MAAGs Missions The report is not a complete record ot the survey work Given the fact that circulation will be limited to those already knowledgeable of what has transpired and is transpiring it is essentially a compila- tion of findings with minimum background to provide a frame of reference o ' iii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ARMY ACTIVITIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS SHOR T OF DECLARED WAR T ABLE OF CONTENTS RECOMMENDATIONS vi The Framework Broad Conclusions vi As to Basic Approach ' ' ' ix As to Army Mechanisms for Planning and Coordination xii xiv A s to Strengthening the Assets ' '0' o o_ t Special Warfare Center - xiv A rmy Aviation Support xvi Non-Materiel Research xvii U S Personnel xvii Role of MAAGs xviii f I ooooooo II oooo o o to' o PRESENT PATTERNS AND TRENDS oooo o oooooo ooo o oo oo o 1 The Low Intensity A rea The High Intensity A 1 ea Covert Denied A reas t' o o o o o o o ORGANIZATIONAL ADEQUACY PLANNING COORDINATION SUPPOR T I ooooo ooooooo o National Level '' o _ Defense Level _ Office of the Secretary of the Army Army Staif _ 1 t o _ o _ _ iv UNCLASSIFIED 1 _ ' _ ooo - 1 7 13 18 18 24 26 27 0 UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTAIN MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ASSETS o 32 Special Warfare Center ' ' ' Center Army Staff Relationship o o o o o o o o o o o o o oo Psychological Operations Army Aviation Support Non-Materiel Research Personnel O'O' o oo o o o 32 34 36 38 40 41 OTHER ROUTES OF ADVANCE o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 45 'f ooooooooooooooooooooooo 0' of O'O' oo O' ooo Communications o Education MA P Tie-I o o o o o o o o o o o Africa South of the Sahara ANNEX A oo oo oo o Terms of Reference for the Paramilitary Psychological Warfare Directorate o o o o o o o o o Proposed Organization Chart for Paramilitary Psychological Wa rfare Directorate o v UNCLASSlHEU 45 47 49 51 1 1 3 -- ----- UNCLASSIFIED RECOMMENDATIONS The Framework Broad Conclusions 1 The U S Army - by virtue of tradition experience adaptability to any land environment and range and diversity of tactical and technical skills - can make signal contri butions to the internal defense of the underdeveloped areas of the Free World and primarily through improving the effectiveness of the indigenous Armed Forces in the several roles of protector of exposed frontiers guarantor of internal security and instrument of economic and social progress 2 The capabilities which the Army can quickly harness for this effort without derogation of its other missions far exceed the level of utilization which has thus far been approved for pro- gramming or planning within or without the Department of the Army 3 The very considerable gap between feasible and currently planned level of activity is attributable to a variety of shortcoming s a On the one hand there is much that the Army can do unilaterally to insure greater and more effective exploitation of its vast assets Subsequent recommendations deal mainly with vi UNCLASSIFIED JV remedial action in this category b In another category are shortcomings with interdepartmental implications These include not only specific deficiencies but matters of approach and philosophy as well Clearly these problems can only be attacked and surmounted by collective action equally clearly however the Army influence can be material 4 The principal shortcomings in the second category are these a Lack of appreciation and acceptance through out the Executive Branch generally of the extent and diversification of Army assets of the propriety of employing these assets in non- ---'- - ---- 1 combat environments and to a lesser extent of their applicability to the problems at hand To an indeterminable degree the Army bears a responsibility for this state of affairs by failure to evolve sim l --- and dytla lic c rlne by failure to stress that its proposals are a new and essential dimension of military assistance and are designed exclusively for implementation through indigenous Armed Forcesj and by failure to convince the Executive pepartments and Agencies oithe efficacy of both doctrine and programs vii UNCLASSIFIED 3 UNCLASSIFIED b Lack of agreed requirements developed at the U S Country Team levei and successively refined by higher echelons as the condition precedent for packaging and projecting Army assets It is indisputable that requirements have more authenticity and are likely to rally more support when generated in the field and when sponsored by both the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG Mission But such action presupposes a knowledge of the potential contribution of Army assets and of the availability of those assets The educationa1 process has yet to be undertaken c Lack of adequate interdepartmental machinery for coming to grips with the vital task of anticipatory planning for the internal defense needs of those countries where the insurgent threat is still latent Internal defense being a national problem effective planning must provide for coordinating and coalescing the total array of indigenous power resources and all categories oGBP U S aid on the multiple objectives of political stability economic better- ment social advance control of subversion national dignity and international cooperation The Department of the Army bears no responsibility viii UNCLASSIFIED v for the lack of such machinery likewise its organizational position renderl3 inappropriate any initiatives in the premises On the other hand the cognizant Army staff element is not now geared to participate effectively in coordinated interdepartmental planning should the machinery therefor be established 5 The foregoing conclusions serve as a frame of reference for the several loosely connected recommendations which follow In areas where gearing up is a function of education rearrangement of priorities or complementary actions by several Departments no specific recommendations are advanced the body of the survey may however have some relevance in suggesting the tack to take Conversely the list of recommendations is extended by several extracted from the companion report and starred for identification They have been restated because of their pertinence to this paper It is recommended As to Basic Approach 6 That the Department of the Army take additional steps both through informational educational channels and its school systems to intensify the indoctrination of all ranks with the tremendous potential of the U S Army to further foreign policy objectives short of declared ix UNCLASSIFIED - - - _ and primarily by increasing the effectiveness of indigenous military forces of the underdeveloped nations in the discharge of their several roles and that these steps include as a minimum a Elaboration of the theme that in this kind of war the Army has the key military role the Army are unlimited and the initiatives open to we possess the requisite skills to meet any requirements b Widest possible dissemination of the relevant portions of the Chief of Staff's address of 8 June as the do l I basiB for the Army position c Refinement expansion and approval of the Command and General Staff College's draft manual Army Activities in the Cold War J paralleled by action to insure that the full flavor of its contents is reflected in appropriate del'ivative training literatUre 7 That the Department 0 GBP the Army give serious consideraM tion to suppressing the tel rnS Heivie actions and HUt S FLA Gll given the ever present posaiblllty that these terms and the initiatives planned thereunder will be misconstruedj and instead stress be placed on the relationships of auch programs to the MAP as consistent with and in extension of long accepted conceptSoGBP military assistance 8 That as a matter of priority the Army staff assemble x 1 Jh UNCLASSIFIED - --- --' __ ' __ ___ _ _ _ _ _ u - _ __ t- _ - ' ' _ _ __' clo n o__ __ o _ I groom and dispatch highly competent senior level teams to Asia the Middle East Latin America and Africa under the joint auspices of ISA and JCS for the purposes of expounding Army capabilities experience plans and preparations to U S Country Teams and the command and staff of the Unified Commands concerned and of stimulating field requirements f or Army teams tailored to any task 9 That the Army staff elements concerned with the fields of activity unde'r study strengthen their informal channels of contact with the pertinent offices and officers of QSD State CIA ICA AID and USIA for the several purposes of a Establishing professional and personal rapport with opposite numbers dealing with counter insurgency psychological covert and related operations p llob1errrll b Educating these individuals on the _- extent variety -- - -- and flexibility of the Army's capabilities to strengthen the internal ---- --- ---- -------- ----- ----- --- ---- -'-- ---- defense of the underdeveloped nations in both low and high intensity situations c Stressing the overall need GBP0 t l l t l cJpa toi'y planning on a coordinated interdepartmental basis 10 Because the less than comprehensive and reactive xi 17 approach of the Goverrvnent has beeh inadequate to past challenges and auge l-s to be no more effective in the future that whenever and __ -r-' -- wherever possible the Secretary of the Army and the senior members of the Army staff support vis a-vis the policy making 'elements of the Executive Departn'lents and Agencies all reasonable initiatives directed toward the establishment of interdepartmental machinery for stimulating coordinated forward national planning for the defense and strengthening of the Free Wodd As to Anny Mechanisms for Planning and Coordination 11 That the Secretary of the Army establish the position of Special A Bsistant for Paramilitary and Psychological Operations and relieve the Deputy Under Secretary of the related responsibilities with which the latter heretofore has been charged that a qualified staff officer of approprlate gl'ade be detailed to the Special Assistant within his area of competence the Special Assistant monitor the Army' B actions maintain liaison with pertinent elements of OSD and other Executive Depal'tments and Agencies provide timely information and advice to the Secretary and Under Secretary and carry out such related duties as the Secretary may direct lZ That the cognizant element of the Army General Staff be given stature and personnel resources commensurate with its xii UNCLASSIFIED '1 ever increasing responsibilities more specifically that a The Special Warfare Division currently part of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate be made a separate Directorate within DCSOPS b The title of the Directorate reflect its responsi- bilities for both paramilitary counter-insurgency denied area covert support unconventional warfare and psychological operations c manning level of The functions internal organization and th Directorate conform generally to the proposals at Annex A 13 That the new Directorate be charged with and expected to undertake - without derogation of present activities - immediate and concentrated work in the following major fields assigned by Presidential or Secretary of Defense directive but currently unattended a Planning envisaged in National Security Action Memorandum No 56 and involving on a country bycountry basis analysis of existing indigenous paramilitary assets determination of levels of strength and effectiveness to which those or other paramilitary assets should be raised development of plans and programs for meeting requirements and participation at the expert level in joint DOD-State_CIA planning in relatinn thereto xiii '-- ' b - Detailed planning and collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency envisaged by National Security Action Memorandum No 57 and involving at both Washington and field levels development of flexible arrangements for reciprocal operational and logistic support cross-training exchange of personnel and change- rver policie s portions of c Development of Army positions on military d Development of master plans and programs nati nallevel country counter-insurgency plans world wide on a five year projection for Africa south of the Sahara under the aegis of the MAP Gl nd exploiting the Army Staff's role as a Unified Command therefor Such programs should have as their central objectives the development of effective native military leadership and maximum utilization of military and paramilitary resources on nation building projects both stimulated and guided by highly qualified U S Army personnel As to Strengthening the Assets Special Warfare Center 14 Given the specialized nature 9GBP the Special Warfare xiv Center's activities and support requirements paralleling those of the Army Intelligence Center as well as its relationship with the Regional Counter-Insurgency Schools that the Special Warfare Center be designated as a Class II activity for specified functions of which the following are representative operational direction academic guidance and support research and development funding and personnel 15 To insure that the Command Staff and Faculty have maximum scope to concentrate their talents and efforts on those tasks central to the role of a Center that the Commanding General's operational involvements be reduced either by establishment of alternate command arrangements at Fort Bragg by unit deployments to Unified Command areas as for example the 7th Special Forces Group or both 16 ' That arrangements be made to provide the Center a direct liaison and informational link with the Combat Developme'nts Test Center operative in South Viet Nam with the field research office planned for Thailand under the auspices of DDRE and with other 'such installations as may subsequently be established to investigate the counter -insurgency field 17 That the Commanding General Special Warfare Genter xv be directed to develop a plan for a special classified counter- insurgency course of three-four weeks duration to be attended by representatives of all Executive Departments and Agencies normally represented on U S Country Teams and that concurrently Department of Defense be requested to seek faculty and other support for this course from State CIA ICA AID and USIA 18 That the Commanding General Special Warfare Center be directed to design a new course of instruction for specially talented foreign nationals and covering both the offensive and defensive aspects of insurgency blending the three courses Special Forces Psychological Operations and Counter-Insurgency Operations now offered at the Center Army Aviation Support 19 To accelerate and intensify the collaboration now developing between the Army Aviation and Special Wa rfare Centers and to speed field testing he CG CONARC be directed to determine as a matter of priority the role and responsibilities of Army aviation in support of paramilitary and psychological operations offensive and defensive in war and short thereof 20 Further that a senior Army aviator be assigned to xvi the Center to among other duties assist in determining the capabilities and limitations of Army aviation in support of subject operations Non-Materiel Research 21 As a first step toward strengthening the non-materiel research support of paramilitary psychological and related operations that the work program and organ zation of the Special Operations Research Office SORa be reviewed against current and predictable research requirements to determine whether that Office has the capability not now evident to provide effective and balanced service to the Army staff and the Special Warfare Center j and should the review disclose significant shortfalls alternative or additive contractual trrangements be sought to include the possibility of SORa's absorption by larger Defense research organizations ' U S Personnel 22 To insure that the present and programmed ma nning requirements of Special Forces and Psychological Operations are filled expeditiously and with personnel of specified quality the Department of the Army detail outstanding officers and noncommissioned officers to these duties to the full extent required xvii - ' - c if I I I 2 3 Given the magnitude of contingent demands world Z3 wide for counter insurgency counter guerrilla training and operational assistance the Special Forces now be considered an ancillary rather than primary source for meeting such requirements henceforth the Army as a whole in which individuals with the requisite skills and leadership abound be considered the main reservoir and that detailed planning initiate now as regards the modalities of selection organization into and training as teams equipping and readying for deployment Role of MAAGs Z4 To gear fully for the Bcale of Sublimited War effort likely to be demanded in the immediate future advisory tactical training and operational aid to indigenous foreign military and paramilitary contingents be viewed as a major continuing function of the Military Assistance Program a and The mission statement of MAAGs Missions be expanded in all cases appropriate to include advice and operational as sistance to host countries on counter -insurgency and other paramilitary as well as psychological operations b Chiefs of MAAGs Miesions as well as principal xviii staif members be thoroughly i ndoctrinated and briefed on U S concepts and capabilities in order to' insure effective discharge of their responsibilities both in relation to their indigenous military counterparts and as key members of the U S Country Team c That the Tables of Distribution of MAAGs Missions i n those countries where insurgency is an actual or potential threat be examined by the Army staff to determine minimum require- ments for counter-insurgency instruction at either the Special Warfare Center or a Regional School and that for individuals so specified attendance he mandatory 25 That the currently effective criteria for selection of foreign military personnel to attend cour sea of instruction in the U S be modified to downgrade the importance of English language proficiency and to establish as primary conlliderations military experience intelligence and motivation growth potential xix PRESENT pATTERNS AND TRENDS The Low Intensity Area 1 As indicated in the scope the first functional area examined is related generally to the employment of tailored po r packages of U S Army leaders specialists and occasionally units alongside the indigenous military forces in underdeveloped countries with the object of increasing the latter's effectiveness and contributions in both combat and noncombat roles What is envisaged is the utilization of indigenous military resources to improve the economic and social fabric of the nation in ways acceptable to the governing authorities and the people and compatible with continued readiness for the assured performance of emergency combat tasks The role of the U S elements is stimulus training and guidance The possibilities inherent in such programs have been stressed in important studies over the past few years for example one complete annex and the major portion of a second of the report of the Draper Committee 1959 were devoted to this subject Prior to 1961 the Army developed and launched several individual projects particularly in Latin America The gener al concept was enunciated and included as an integral part of the Army's basic Counter1 ' ' ' Insurgency program approved for implementation by the President in his budget message to Congress on 28 March 1961 This category of activity looms large in the U S FLAG proposals developed in the wake of General Decker's address Recently the concept was given further impetus by a directive of the Secretary of DeGBPens e o __ under dat- of pte 1l er designating the Department of the Army as Executive Agent for programs of this genre and pointing to COlombia - Thailand Nicaragua Pakistan and Iran as logical starting points Z of high level support However the impressive evidence notwithstanding implementing action has been minimal The original U S FLAG study met difficult going in the Army staff and the head quarters elements contemplated for activation in FY 1963 a year later than originally proposed by the planners were deleted from the Army program by the Secretary of Defense Only the specially tailored group for the Colombia laboratory is under active consideration 1 ' h 1 1 j lilil 'j I i' I above the Department of Army level tt1 1 iI U p tl v o t A n f J fi 4 t I ' 3 _ o - I r r I ' Jr J IA A' del ' The reasons for this dismal record appear to be several One is lack of understanding or acceptance of the legitim acy or propriety of this role ---- --- --- As General Taylor recently remarked thec _ odimensions _ _ o _ - -' -- of_ potential ilital 'Y c apa1Jm1 yGBPo_ t llEEo GBP la i _I1 lpolicy ill an _ _ - ---- _---- _ - - 2 t' '1 L t 'Ill A 'l ' l essentially noncombat environment is not broadly appreciated - - -- - - - - -- --- - - --- inside the Pentagon or without -- - ------- --- -'-- Personnel in other Executive Departments tend to view the prospects with considerable suspicion and some alarm perhaps rooted in our own tradition of the non- involvement of the military in dome stic political affairs Nor is the average military man accustomed to thinking within the conceptual framewor1 outlined by the Army Chief of Staff A vigorous educational program both inside and out of the Executive Branch is a must and - the basic text for such program could well b _the Chief of Staff's speech 4 In retrospect it might have been better as the first step to have stumped for acceptance of the concept outside the Department of the Army rather than concentrate on development of a large specialiy organized and theoretically balanced task force Significantly General Decker's broad philosophy was obs cured within the Army staff itself in the detailed planning of a prototype organization As indi- cations of the narrowed view one can cite the fie rce intrastaGBPf arguments which developed and still remain extant over the size and composition of the various bloc1 s on the organizational chart The Civil Affairs staff questions the overall orientation the Ertgineer 3 UNCLIl SS F ED feel that construction capabilities should predominate and others argue that it should be composed primarily of Special Forces personnel All this has dampened what should have been strong and universal enthusiasm swelling up from the Army staff and --r overwhelming the rest of the Pentagon The real point should have ' been - and should be now - that the U S Army has such extensive rtf ' and diverse capabilities that it can tailor and Held task elements t meet any conceivable requirement This should be the precept of the educational process 5 In my opinion progress will be directly proportional to the formulation of denlOnstrable requirements against which capabilities can be matched If the Colombian task force moves ahead - and there is reason to believe that it will _ it will be because there is a concrete thrice-enunciated requirement which the task force has been designed to meet Conversely one can speculate that the four bOO- man headquarters have net been approved because they can not be equated with a specific requirement In any case these headquarters are not an absolutely essential planning element that function could be assumed by Theater Army Headquarters Once indoctrinated 6 ' The key task is to as Biat and accelerate the development of requirements Such requirements mU at be reflected in MAp and 4 hence must be generated at the country team level and endorsed by the Unified Commanders Overriding importance therefore attaches to project s designed to brief the field headquarters to sell the basic concept plus the ability of the U S Army to translate that concept into vital action programs and to insure understanding that what is involved is merely the next logical phase of military assistance This would rep resent at long last the first Washington initiative promised the country teams in the joint State DOD-lCA circular message numbered 976975 and dated 10 May 1960 7 Several other circumstances have been contributory to the lack of forward progress a The term ciVic action has long been used as a kind of shorthand to describe l'rograms of this nature Unfortunately it can be misinterpreted o And it haa been mial nte rpreted unintention- ally or otherwise Henceforward it is probably better to forego brevity in favor of a more definitive title which spells out clearly that th 1 concept relates to vvY eompl ttary tasks for military units which exist in any case I to IulGBPill a primary role in combat that the transmissions are exclusively militat y to miHtA ryi th t 1 n most underdeveloped countries the military tepresentthe strongest most talented and most consel'va- tive power element and that their- dual function as a protectoroGBP thEl UNCLASSIFIED 5 populace and conscience of the govermnent is unique b In extension of above the Arluy state ent of certain functions which could be perforlTIed by U S FLAG elements have been poorly worded in that they have not stressed that such advice and proposals would be channeled solely through indigenous military counterparts One can read into these statements the possibility of psychological and political actions targeted directly on the local civilian populace c This is of course not intended The average Foreign Service Officer thinks in sophisticated and qualitative rather than quantitative terms in selective individual rather than group operations Because he is conscious of the importance of language and of adequate knowledge of native culture mores and prevailing political strata he can be expected to be reserved and questioning when confronted with proposals for a massive organization targeted on an entire region and presumably poised to meet the special needs of any and all countries therein The business of the qualitative approach has merit Asingle highly competent dedicated AlTIericanwith the right sort of empathy Can exert phenomenal influence over a widening the record will bear witness circ1e as Conversely a group containing 6 UNCLASSIFIED within its ranks one poor specimen may have onl zere er a nn loss to show for its efforts The answer of COl n is to have the flexible capability to dispatch a quality operator where special require- menta dictate and adequate numbers where the task is big but straightforward The High Intensity Area 8 The difference in U S and foreign military actions in high as opposed to low intensity areas is in rela tive emphasis only A single c cept embraceS' both optimizing the overall potential of indigenous military and pa 'a military forces to insul'c the internal defense throughout the spectrum ofSLlblimited War aituationll Counter- insurgency operations are integral to both areas -so is the nation building role o which may weH predominate ill low intensity situations What moves' an area from low to high intensity if the eruption of guerrilla activities as for example in ColombIa and Vietnam or open combat between regular military establishments as may happen again in Laos The main focus of military effort is adjusted accordingly 9 Prior to 1961 the Army took a number of initiatives- in the counter-inlfUrgency areas to include deployment of Special Forces personnel in quantity as unit advisors at the low tactica1 7 level to the Royal Laotian Army dispatch of indo d J n e r small groups of Special Forceg personnel to cth c r ' ' l t t d ilO t S of elite units and intensive preparations for the Counter-Insurgency Operations Course which opened this Spring at Fort Bragg under Special Warfare Center auspices 10 The major surge forward followed President Kennedy's approval of the 3 000 man increase in the Arrny' B counter-insurgency forces in FY 1962 and the relevant budget messa ge which stressed the need for a greater ability to deal with the threat to the Free 'World posed by Communist inspired or directed subversion insurrection and guerrilla forces In the past few months major activity has centered on the buildup of the Special Warfare Center and of the three reduced strength Special Forces Groups on the activa tion of a fourth Group 5th SF on the development of Civil Mfairs Mi1ita ry Intelligence Army Security Agency Engineer Signal a nd MedIcal teams provided for in the strength increase and on the improvement of the Counter- InsurgencyOperations Courses in being and the launching of others Additional requirements for Special Forces advisors to train loca l forces in counter guerrilla operations have grown out of the deteri orating situation in Laos and South Vietnam these requirements have been met or are in the process of being fulfilled 8 - --- -- 11 ------ -------- It is important to note that the authorization for c br tantial increase in Special Forces' strength is not easily or quickly translated into augmented operational capability The austere manning level imposed upon Special Forces over the past several years has caused the pool of trained personnel to atrophy Strength of the pool is roughly equal to present requirements and many of those in the pool have lost much of their former lustre Volunteers without prior Special Forces background must undergo a rigorous seven months program before being pronounced operationally ready for team deploy- ment Meanwhile essential shifts in the contingent war-time mission of the First and Seventh Special Forces Groups have resulted in waste of the previously acquired area capabilities of 80me operational detach- ments' and have generated proportionally great new training requirements 12 The problem then is not that Special Forces have today a large unused reservoir of operational assets The point is that thanks to inspiril1g leadership and the dedicated efforts of all key personnel a sizable reservoir will soon he developed At the present rate of 'progress this will occur long befoTe requirements for the employment thereof wil1 have been foreseen developed coordinated and approved Attention aplenty is focused - at the Washington Unified Command arid country 9 UNCLASSIFIED team level - on the areas of extreme criticality notably Southeast Asia But there is no evidence of detailed forward planning tilose 10 ' countries where the threat of insurgency is latent but already very real The Special Warfare Division in DCSOPS is undermanned to the point where it can scarely stay atop current actions let alone make any measurable progress towards the development of Army contributions to country counter-insurgency plans At the higher levels there is no active mechanism to spur planning interdepartmentally the only sound basis for development of programs which must coalesce the total resources of the host country and all forms of U S aid - - a comprehensive forward looking paper 3 March the JCS recom- mended that the Setretary of Defe1 -se attempt to secure interdepartID ental agreement for coordinated country counter-insurgency planning and clarify the responsibilities of the various departments and agencies in advising and assisting foreign governments with respect to counter- insurgency programs and operations The Secretary of Defense has taken no action thereon Actually it is within State's province to invoke such planning there are stirrings in the Policy Planning Staff - in this direction but no indications of early action 13 Meanwhile National Security Action Memorandum NSAM No 56 dated 28 June 1961 imposes new planning and preparatory 10 UNCLASS FlED responsibilities in this general area In this memorandmTI the President requested that the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency make a survey of the paramilitary assets in the U S Armed l orces Con- sider areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous' paramilitary forces and thus arrive at a determina- tion of the goals which we should set in this field Having determined the assets and possIble requirements it would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit 'As a first step the JCS have completed a 'Wodd wide consolidation of existing indigenous paramilitary forces for use by the Secretary of Defemre in discussions with the Secretary of State and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency The latter having long since tabled his inventory The report forwards without comment or analysis recommendations by the Unified and Specified Commanders fOr support by way of qualitative improvement or expansion of indigenous paramilitary forces in their respective areas 14 In its present form the JCS submission does not provide i an adequate basis for the second step determination of requirements ' let alone the third deficit p1a' lling The Joint Staff has no in-house capability for either step Thus far by reason of preoccupation 11 UNCLASSIfiED 30 with other duties the cognizant staff elelllent Special Warfare Division in the Army has done no planning in this regard although our interest is primary There is a clear requirement for the Army staff to analyze the report including field commanders' recommendations in detail to develop ' country by country support requirements in terms of equipment financing U S advisorypersonnel and the like evolve programs for meeting these requirements and participate at the expert level in coordinating planning with State and CIA The task is immense and immensely important The indigenous paramilitary assetlf in question are in the main utilizable oIlly within the framework of counter-insurgency programs Some however will have a latent offensive capability as well and prudence may dictate the husbanding of a select few as denied area relfources exclusively In the past CIA had exclusive jurilfdiction over any offensive operationlf involving the last two categories Henceforward by the terms of NSAM No 57 that interest will be Ifhared with DOD - as' will be elaborated in a following section 15 It is reasonable to as'Sume that General Taylor will chair the 'top level interdepartmental meetinglfexplicit in this planning requirement The workiIlg level meetings allfo interdepartmental 12 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSlrlEIJ can be expected to extend over considerable time to exanline countries individually in some depth and in order of criticality Since strength or weakness of paramilitary forces can only be assessed within the overall framework of the dissident threat and the total power resources of the friendly country concerned it is obvious that the basis for coordinated counter-insurgency planning may be at hand It could be the breakthrough for efforts to establish machinery for coalescing the efIorts of the several Executive Departments and Agencies on forward country planning and may explain General Taylor's extremely _ - -_----- keen interest in this project its substantive merits aside Covert Denied Areas 16 From 1948 when an empowering NSC directive was is sued through the ill-fated Cuban invasion the control and direction of covert operations' within the geographical expanse of the Soviet orbit were exclusively the jurisdiction of the CIA The sole condition under which DOD agencies were authorized to participate in such 'operationS' unless invited in on CIA initiative was when circumstances dictated the activation of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force JUWTF directly subordinate to the Unified Commander concerned No JUWTF haS' ever been activated although such action was contemplated by CINCPAC on several occasions o 13 UNCLASSIFlEO UNCL S c t 17 'c As an outgrowth of the work of the Presidential Committee which reviewed in detail the planning er and Gup rt of the Cuban operation the President issued NSAM No 57 28 June 1961 which in effect tempered the exclusivity of the original CIA mandate The operative sentences of NSAM No 57 stated in substance a Proposals for paramilitary operations will be presented to the 5412 Committee the group chaired by General Taylor for consideration and Presidential approval b The Committee will as sign primary re sponsibility to- the Executive Branch element beat qualified to handle the operation c Overt operations will normally be assigned to the DOD covert to CIA if within itS' in-house capabilities_ d Large operations covert in part or full beyond CIA reS'ources in qualified personnel equipment Or experience will be the primary responsibility of DOD with CIA in support L essence I this directive established a threshold beyond which the responsibilities heretofore carried by CIA would pass to the DOD 18 From the wording of the directive it is evident that there can -be no prior detel'mination of the threshold and that each caS'e wilt be assessed on its individual merits NonethelesS'i horizons 14 UNCLASSIFIED have opened which have in the past been beyond thee ken 01 Defense agencies Curiously there have been no CT' ' _ ' _- i 'ul_ Jst -1 ntive conversa- tions to develop the full implications of the dire cHve or its impact on both parties and since paramilitary operations a re always conducted in a ground environment the inlplications fo-p the Army pronounced re most It is one thing to be authorized Or directed to assurne responsibility it is quite another matter to be adequa tely prepared to discharge that responsibility without disruption of the tempo or continuity of operations 19 I have discussed NSAM No 57 and its import with Mr Richard Bissell the Deputy Director of CIA seized with' these matters He agrees that the directive permits a new order of inter- agency collaboration flexibility and mutual Bupport he agrees likewise that much work needs to be done in order to ea n theBe divi dends I believe that he may initiate discussions through app opriate channels with the Army staff I am confident tha t he win be highly receptive to Army overtures Among -the areas which should be explored with a view to implementing action are the following a The introduction of selected Army personnel into the operational chain of those current CIA paramilitary operations I 'I which conceivably could pas a I at Bome stage to DOD o 15 By this meana o U I CLASSIFIE the Army would build a reservoir of personnel sufficiently well acquainted with subject operations to be able to step in and perform competently when and if required The support rendered to the operation during the officers' tour of duty therewith would in turn be a measurable gain to CIA b Along the same Hnes but for a differing primary purpose the release to CIA of specially qualified individuals normally Special Forces should be authorized to plug a CIA hole CIA has had only limited success in stockpiling highly qualified paramilitary penonnel against contingent needs It is patently uneconomical to do so we should be prepared to help in crise s c There are a number of MAP controlled paramilitary organizations abroad as for example in Pakistan Korea Taiwan and Greece which contain select elements qualified for the conduct of covert operations In the national intere st our working relationships with CIA should be of such nature as to permit CIA exploitation of these capabilities d The reverse is equally true o It is important that there be early agreement by the military on one fundamental premise i e that the modus Qperandi -when control of operations passes will in effect involve the superimposition 'of Defense resources on CIA control and support 16 UNCLASSIfiED mechanis ms and not the ejection of the latter In most instances the rapport between CIA case officer and principal agent is developed and ce mented over a period of years Such inti macy is unattainable under the rotation procedures characteristic of our own Ar med Forces It would be folly to disrupt that kind of operational continuity 20 Some ti me ago the JCS reco m mended that control direction and support of the Meo tribes men in the denied areas of Laos and North Vietna m should i m mediately pass to CINCPAC The Secretary of Defense has not sub mitted this recorn mendation to the 5412 Co m mittee for there are countervailing considerations First I--- CINCPAC is content with present arrange ments which suffice for the leve1 of activity authorized by the President CINCPAC is incidentally influenced and properly so by the inti mate cooperation existing between the Special Forces personnel and CIA operatives as well as the responsiveness of the CIA logistic mechanis m CAT Second CIA- DOD agree ment has been reached on the basis for turnover of responsi- bility this is geared to international political develop ments and see ms V e minently sound The Army would be incapable of cont nuing control if provisioneof a Laotian political settle ment invited the MAAG out moreover the scale of Meo guerrilla activities will be necessarily proportional to the military stance of the Royal Laotian Army 17 UNCLASSIFIED - --- Z1 Pertinent to this section are the possibilities arising from the planning due to take place under the previously discussed provisions of NSAM No 56 This again should further collaboration as between CIA and the Army both at the Washington and field levels Noteworthy among the offensive capable par8 military organizations are the South Korean and Chinese Nationalist Special Forces units trained by our own personnel How well we do in the field of joint planning and mutual reinGBPorcen ent vis-a-vis CIA is in large measure a function of the qualified people who can be harrtessed to thiS' task Such individuals are not now on hand ORGANIZATIONAL ADEQUACY Pl ANNING COORDINATION SUPPORT o National Level ZZ The Pl'e sent administration abolished the Operations Coordinating Board substituted an informal luncheon group for the NSC Planning Board J and convenes the full membership 0GBP the NSC but rarely These actions reflect dissatisfaction with the ing of mechanisms which loomed large in the Eisenhower 18 UNCLASSIFIED function Administration For these have been substituted the dynamism of a vigorous President who prefers to plan direct with his principal Cabinet members who is ready to make the hard decision and who empowers his Secretary of State with pre -eminent authority in foreign policy 23 So far as the direct influence of the President can penetrate these arrangements are quite satisfactory however limitations which no human can surmount There are The President is taxed beyond belief with current problems of global significance requiring immediate decision and with the establishment of guidelines for short range operational policy and plans Reflective of this concept of the exercise of command operational planning vis-a-vis the areas of highest criticality is exercised at the national level through the medium of several Department of State chaired Task Forces At times of peak pressure these Task Forces direct the implementation of coordinated interdepartmental plans with reasonable succe as 24 Major deGBPl ciencie s lie elsewhere The planning gap exists in all time frames except that of the short term future And the latter marks the limit of direct Presidential influence even the President's strong words on the subject - - 19 UNCLASS FlED of improving counter-insurgency capabilities has not led to coordinated planning for low intensity areas _ __ _ - _ - - - - The reality of this planning void has -- been affirmed with near unanimity by senior level career civil servants and military planners They point to the fact that the concept of the NSC Planning Board and the OCB was absolutely sound and their existence essential Most are emphatic that the real fault of these mechanisms and in particular of the OCB were the terms of reference and that even when the planning product was ineffectual they still constituted a permanent forum for interdepartmental contact and exchange of views 'In their absence no machinery exists for coming to grips with the vital task of anticipatory forward planning 25 Parenthetically attempts to gene rate positive coordinated forward plans may continue to flounder as they have in the past by reason of running counter to the Anlerican charactel' As a nation we are adept at dealing with specific concrete one-time issues we have the greatest of difficulty gearing ourselves to problems which are open-ended as to time obs'cure as to issue and substantively of les6 than critical importance Coupled with this is a general1ack of appreciation of the implications of the Communist operational doctrine I and thus a failure to recognize the Cold War for what it really is 20 llNCLf ' SSIFIED We can I lNCLAS SIFIED only hope that we shall learn that the Cold War must be fought with the same coordination precision and ruthlessness that characterize military operationS that the aim is to secure a decisive advantage over the opponent and that this entails being at least one campaign ahead in plans and preparations 26 Yet the void mns t be filled It must be filled to establish contact among interdepartmental planners on the kind of regular basis which promote 8 reciprocal unde l'standing to malterepre sentative 8 defend their views away from the paroc hial atmosphere of parent organiz ation or temper position On the basis of hard critique and moat important to a look ahead The little things can be implemented by individual clearanctl but a large program pointed to the GBPutuJ e will not gct by unless backed by an overall plan approved at the highest level Z7 There are straws in the wind recommended with an increasing note The JGS has several times of urgency the creation of interdepartmental machinery thus far the proposals have gone unhe ded Voices in the Policy Planning Staff of State argue persistently that that Department must invoke its ma ndate to rally others to the task of forward planning gIven the vital importance of preventive zi UNCLASSIFIED action in areas where the potential insurgent threat is significant Meanwhile there is some hope of such machinery albeit truncated growing out of the NSAM No 56 planning exercise discussed above or possibly the Executive Branch regional institutes proposed in the companion report The precise form of the machinery is not critical what count are the terms of reference and the handling on its output 28 Experience indica tes that the terms of reference and modus operandi of interdepa rtmental planning machinery capable of formulating dynamic policy and plans should meet several tests Its members should be empowered to speak for their parent organizations They should be under no compulsion to reach agreed solutions but rather should be instructed to serve up opposing points of view to the highest authority lor decision By the same token no individual member should be able to veto an unpalatable solution Departments with only tangential interest in any given planning problem shoul'cl be denied the right of participation as well as vote Ruthless action should be taken to insure that the number of conferees is minimal The group should approach its tasks sequentially in order of iinportance and criticalityo 29 A theoretically ideal Sublimited War Planning Group woul d operate on the basis of the foregoing ground rules would draw UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED J 1 support from the permanent secretariat of the NSC and would be chaired by a nationally respected official answering directly to the President The group's primary function would be advance planning the projection of tough forward strategy concepts priorities and order of magnitude costs These would not be mere statements but would be developed in requisite detail to serve once debated and approved by the President as the reference points for effective central guidance and coordination of the overall effort Execut ve The group and supporting staff drawn from those Departments and Agencies with major foreign operations would be kept to minimum size However there would have to be built-in capability to analyze supporting plans to assure harmony with the national guidelines established and to spawn task forces to develop master country plans I on a priority basis I from which would derive a series of specific country programs staffed at lower echelons The 'group would not have opera tional authority Direction of the nation l effort must vest in the President and be implemented through established lines of authority If supported by the President and by a vigorous national climate I the mechanism would assure the development and i i approval of forward looking national plans programs so aadlylacking now 23 UNCLASSIFIED i ' 5 -j---- and the timely evolution of coordinated supporting plans Moreover it would be uniquely positioned to secure decisions on divergencies to recommend measures to promote flexibility and to monitor progress of implementing programs It could lead to the development of a new order of cooperation and collaboration at all levels of the Executive Branch Defense Level 30 The cognizant elements of the Joint staff principally the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division of J -5 plus portions of J-3 for contingency planning maintain close and harmonious working relations with the Special Warfare Division of the Army staff JCS papers in the counter guerrilla and l'elated fields have been consistent with Army positions and had the recommendations been implemented would have gi ven impetus to interdepartmental planning and program action 31 The Joint staff utilizes as necessary Service planners to supplement in-house resources levels is not easily assessed necked Army actions Therefore the adequacy of manning To date the Joint staff has not bottle- On the other hand failure to initiate concentrated work on NSAM No 57 and to m rve beyond the compilation aspect of NSAM No 56 suggests either personnel shortage or inattention to the implications of those documents 24 UNCLASSIFIED 32 An Assistant to the Secretary of Defense has cognizance of the entire field under survey and is the principal CIA contact for policy and support Illatters as well By virtue of the Secretary's close personal control of Defense plans and operations coupled with the confidence that both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary repose in hiIll the As Bistant is an extreIllely iIllportant cog in the policy and prograIll approval IllechanisIll He is an action type with firIll belief in the iIllportance and efficacy of operations of this category Conse- quently close working relationships with the Assistant are Illost desirable Such rapport does not exist between his Office on the one hand and the Joint and ArIlly staffs on the other the reasons for this are chargeable to both Personal contact and follow-up between these Offices are well nigh non-existent - a circuIllstance which has led to Illisunderstandings and perceptible retardation of the pace of events ReIlledial action is a Illust In Illy estiIllate the ArIlly has Illuch to gain by repairing the breach 33 Given the MAP implications of the major areas discussed the Office of International Security Affairs also looms important working contact therewith should be assiduously cultivated Close FOr example there should have been a comprehensive briefing of the pertinent 25 UNCLASSIFIED elements of that Office on the background and import of the Colombia project before or immediately after ISA assumed action responsibility therefor Office of the Secretary of the Army 34 No staff officer reports to the Secretary on Army programs actions and responsibilities in the paramilitary and psychological operations or related fields of Sublimited War activities The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs acts for the Under Secretary of the Army On all matters relating to Special Warfare The function is further delegated to his Deputy Office Chief a Colonel who is responsible for intelligence I counterintelligence and internal security matters of higher priority Consequently he has had difficulty staying abreast of the fast-moving and expanding activities of the past several months Certainly I he has been unable to exercise any positive influence at the DOD level or with other governmental agencies 35 Close study of operative channels and the decision process has convinced me that there is a demonstrable need for a Special Assistant' to the Secretary of the Army I preferably civilian I to monitor the discharge of the Army's responsibilities in Sublimited War This individual should be adElquately versed in paramilitary and psychological UNCLASSIFIED activities and the working organization of the Department of Defense He must in the first instance know the personnel of the Army staff element and the details of their work to this end two way contact should be close continuous and importantly informal He should develop excellent rapport wiL the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense key officials in ISA Planning Staff Regions and MAP and pertinent offices in State CIA and USIA While essentially a monitor he should be prepared to step in when trouble spots surface above the Department of the Army level in this sense he would act as the cbmmunications link -- to explain promote negotiate or follow-up as appropriate -- between the Army staff and policy elements He should have direct access to both the Secretary and the Under Secretary and keep them GBPull y informed He should have no other duties nor should the officer assistant who needs be provided Army Staff 36 In June 1958 the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare was abolished and reorganized as a directorate in DCSOPS The reorganization order contained the following statement The importance of special warfare its present state of development and the necessity to retain emphasis in these matters make it desirable that 27 UNCLASSIFIED L T your office continue as a separate agency Three months late r the Directorate was downgraded to a Division in the Plans Directorate of DCSOPS and part of its personnel assets transferred In this connection it was decided that other concerned Directors in DCSOPS would assume the special warfare functions falling within their province Such has never really been'the case It is pertinent that in 1958 the Special Warfare Staff was almost exclusively hot war oriented Except for certain psychological operations its involvement in plans and programs for activities short of declared war was minute 37 The Special Warfare Division continues to exist today in the same organizational framework except that a Deputy Director is positioned in the Office of the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy Th'e basic Division mission remai ns Over-all staff supervision and coordina tion of plans and policy functions of the Army relating to psychological operations and unconventional warfare Additionally the Special Warfare Division is the designated office for coordination with the Joint Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to Army sl1Pport of CIA operations in peacetime Thirteen officers are authorized and manning level has usually been eleven 28 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFiED 38 During the past year its responsibilities have multiplied several times ' As a result of increased emphasis on pararnilitary operations throughout the underdeveloped areas the Special Warfare Division has become the focal point and action agency in the Army staff for all matters relating to counter-insurgency counter guerrilla operations covert operations and civic actions and has performed staff actions in the functional areas of concepts plans policy training organization and operations Under the leadership of Colonel W H Kinard Jr the Deputy Director for Special Warfare and Colonel W M Higgins Jr the Chief of Special Warfare Division it developed the Army's counter-insurgency concept and staffed the 3 000 man increase which followed approval thereof prepared the original US FLAG concept and implementing plan and developed the operational plans for the employment of Special Forces and associated personnel in Laos Vietnam and Colombia It has also discharged primary Army Staff responsibility for the support of the rapid build-up of the Special Warfare Center and its units to include the multitudinous accompanying problems 39 The Division has tackled its ever widening scope of current actions without any augmentation of strength Thanks to the high professi onal competence and dedication of the officers concerned it has 29 UNCLASSifiED - - c - JtlC - SS FIED managed to keep abreast of immediate requirements and has clone a very creditable job in most areas are uncovered But others for want of people Foremost among these latter is the field of planning to which almost no attention can now be given' There 100m the mas sive tasks associated with NSAi'v1's 56 and 57 there is the contingent require- ment for the military portions of country counter-insurgency plans on which anticipatory work should have begun there is the requirement for reorientation of the Special Operations Research Office SORO planning of its new programs and close monitoring of its future work There is the entire field underscored by the Secretary of Defense's directive of 5 September on the employment of indigenous forces in nation building and related roles There are numerous new planning responsibilities explicit in the increased deployments of psychological operations personnel and an urgent requirement for re-establishment of liaison with USIA In the field of support work load JNill grow apace with increase in the Special Warfare Center's leyel of activity 40 Aggravating the personnel shortage of the Division is the reluctance of other staff sections to perform duties which a e properly theirs One reason is that some action officers have little understanding or knowledge of operations of this type and consequently 30 UNCLASSIFIED --' --- - - t f ' ' lI1CLASS F ED need considerable guidance by way of explanation of requirements and the like A second is preoccupation with more normal Army functions In any case designation of the Division as holding primary responsibility for the Special Warfare Center funnels off much effort on follow-up For example one officer spends the bulk of his time on personnel mat ters Doctrine responsibility is assigned to ODCSOPS CD in name only the expertness is in the Special Warfare Division 41 In my opinion the premise that led to the abolition of the Directorate in 1958 has proved to be invalid the more so in 'light of the tremendous augmentation of scope and weight 'of activity Aside from being undermanned the Division Chief is at too Iowa level for the re- sponsibilities formally and informally assigned him particularly in a Directorate of necessity predominantly attuned to Joint as opposed to Army matters If the total programs are to be effectively and expeditiously handled if adequate preparations are to be made for the likely upward surge of activities certain measures seem indicated the strength of the staffj another is t One is to double give it Directorate status and assign thereto the new tasks it now handles anyway and still another is to attach to the Directorate ad interim qualified members of other General and Special Staff Sections to expedite planning and coordination while developing the know-how which can be carried back to the Sections concerned 31 UNCLASSIFIED 42 Continued use of the term Special Warfare to describe the staff element charged with the array of functions discussed above is inappropriate The term Paramilitary is more descriptive for as used today it encompas 6e s activitie 6 in combat and noncombat environments defensive and offensive operations in Cold War and Hot Moreover it should be recognized that military psychological operations are on the increase and that in time of war the cognizant Army staff element would grow to tremendous proportions probably attaining independent status The resultant Paramilitary Psychological seems a fitting alternative to Special Warfare It does not follow that the names of either the Center or the Groups should be changed the Army staff element has wider functions than either CERTAIN MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ASSETS Special Warfare Center 43 The c mpanion report included a series of recommenda- -- ------- tions for improving the quality and impact of the Counter Insurgency Course presented by the Special Warfare School and for heightening ---' the stature and professionalism of the Special Warfare Center as the main reposito ry of skills and knowledge in the field of military action 32 CLl SS nED ul' - ' r -' 3 7 -- against insurgency These recommendations and the analyses from which they were distilled are incorporated by reference 44 The Center is suffering some growing pains as the natural consequence of the sudden and extensive increases in mission the stringent time schedules which have had to bernet the rapid turnover of key personnel by reason of new unit activiations arid urgent operational commitments and the very business of being subjected to close scruitny however sympathetic by an unending succession of highly placed visitors Fortunately the Center is in the hands of a remarkable soldier the briliiant and imaginative -- Brigadier General WilHam P Yarborough With any reasonable amount of assistance he will insure that the Center reaches the standards desired and dischargSl effectively the several roles emrisaged His needs are straight forward achievement of a reasonable degree of stability so that main attention can be focused On the most important mattelflrather than those most immediately critical personnel of the highest q a1ity obtainable and full understanding and support from above 45 Even for a man of Yarborough's caliber the span of control is excessive asa result of recent assignments and activations - 'the problem w i ll be further aggravated if 33 he is to command the first UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED US FLAG as now contemplated The key concern is that the several subordinate units have widely differing orientations the school complex has one the Groups another the FLAG components still a third and so on Heavy involvement with operational problems cannot but dilute the effort which the command group and key staff personnel should place on primary tasks of advancing and perfecting doc'trine concepts policies and techniques of becoming in fact the fount Consideration should therefore be given to reducing the number 6f units assigned the Center The Latin American FLAG elements might be brigaded with the 7th Special Forces Group also targeted on Latin America and both assigned to Crn-CARIB with station in Panama or 'as close thereto as feasible Center Army Staff Relationship 46 At the moment there are only two focii of expert knowledge of paramilitary and psychological operations within the Continental U S the Special Warfare Division of the Army staff and the Special Warfare Center itself Moreover the high level 'attention which has been and will continue to be riveted on counter-' insurgency actions of very modest scale but of conaiderable operational significance as for exa mpte deployments to Southeast Asia leads 34 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIfiED to unusually detailed planning by the Army staff and requires quick reaction by the Center Many problems whichthe Center continues to confront in meeting commitments world wide must be resolved ultimately by direct communication v i th the Department of the Army 'Because of other agency interests minute decisions should Special Forcea personnel take boots on initial entry into Laos have to be passed to the Washington Level Given the specialized nature of operations and the lack of a broad base of competence the inter mediate headquarters for the most part merely act as relays on substantive matters 47 For the foregoing reasons there appear to be considerable advantages to establishing the Center as a Class II activity for specified functions Such functions would logically include operational direction doctrinal guidance and other academic support research and develop- ment to include nonmaterial personnel and special funding The Center should of course remain satellited on Fort Bragg for common support functions Such an arrangement would provide a direct command line from the Army staff to the Special Warfare Center reducing' reaction 'time and eliminating a considerable staff effort now imposed 35 UNCLASSIFIED ---- - _ _--- '- -- -- --- on the Continental Army Command 3d Army and Headquarters Fort Bragg It would also increase the work of what is now Special Warfare Division as the staff element with primary responsibility but not to an inordinate degree The work load would be quite manageable if the Army Special Warfare staff were given the Directorate status' and strength proposed and if the other staff sections would do- their fair share P sychological Operat 48 Though not as well publicized as Special Force s activities ' the scope and effectiveneSs of U S psychological operations Psy Ops abroad have been significant For example since 1955 in the Pacific Command alone more than 100 mobile training teams have i auSisted in developing indigenous Pay Ops capabilities in seven countries These efforts have been undertaken with the concurrence and under supervision of the Country Teams and in close coordi ation with the local representatives of USIA CIA and State United States Psy Ops teams have supported Counter-Insurgency and consolidation efforts primarily throu ghtheir indigenous military counterpart units 49 The augmentation of personnel for Counter-Insurgency fcn ces authorized by the President led toa much needed improvement 36 UNCLASSIFIED -- _ -- - - --- - -------- ----- _---- -Trn-- ------ ---- - U CLASS f ED of capabilities in the Psy Ops field Moreover three ready reserve units have been or are being called to active duty to bolster the existing two psychological warfare battalions 50 In the future the Army with limited Psy Ops resources can expect to be called upon to conduct Pay Ops simultaneously in many and diverse areas of the world Cultural and language barriers political implications remoteness from U S support resources and personnel economy will dictate primary attention to the develop- ment and use of indigenous Psy Ops assets these assets is dependent on e tensive Effective utilization of preparatory and supervisory efforts on the part of U S Pay Ops specialists 51 To meet future demands Army Psy Ops organization must keep abreast of changes and advances in specialized operational technique s personnel proficiency material development and 'V technological advances The Army is adopting a cellular-type organization which should prove to have the required responsiveness flexibility and mobility to discharge its supporting role United States Pey Ops suffer the same problems as do Special Forces with regard to the selection and retention of qualitatively superior- personnel e ape cially office r 8 o 37 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 52 To insure that Psy Ops are planned and executed to support fully the overall Army efforts in Sublimited War certain requirements must be met One is a major equipment modernization program a second is the location and assignment of highly qualified persolu'l el on a detail basis if necessary and a third is the activation of a fourth Pay War battalion to provide a truly world wide capability Likewise close liaison and coordination should be maintained with other government agencies concerned with Pay Ops Army Aviation Support 53 The concept for employment of USAF aircraft in support of wartime Unconventional and Psychological Operations is sound for deep penetrations are the planning norm However the world situation has led to operations short of war - primarily counter-insurgency but also including penetrations of denied areas This has generated a requirement for air support for relatively shallow operations The what where and how of the Army aviation role in such operations has not been explored though capabilities ' are manifest Certainly tests should be conducted to ascertain the possibilities for mutual support as between Army aviation and para- military forces This requires a practical marrying up of the low 38 UNCLASSIFIED -- -----'---- -- -- ' ' ii UNCLASSIF ED o ' and slow Army aircraft with Special Forces personnel at Ft Bragg or elsewhere to develop doctrine tactics techniques and procedures Field testing would be expedited if CO CONARC would define the specific responsibilities of the Army Aviation Center vis-a-vis the Special Warfare Center on the matter of Army aviation support for special warfare and Counter-Insurgency operations 54 The Special Warfare Center does not have Army aviation support responsive to its needsi nor does it have personnel prepared to advise and assist on Army aviation matters remedied This should be Assignment of a senior Special Forces qualified aviator who could command either an aviation or Special Forces unit would be a step in the right direction In this general connection CO CONARC is under- stood to have recommended the assignment of a Sky Cavalry Troop to the Special Warfare Center 55 Obvious merit attaches thereto The close collaboration envisaged between the Army Aviation and Special Warfare Centers by no means precludes a similar cooperation with the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Eglin AFB The latter nickname Jungle Jimlt represents Air Force sho rt range capabilities which are being developed for use in guerrilla 39 UNCLASSIFIED _ _ _ _c _ - ' ' H UNCLASSIfiED' counter 'guerrilla counter-insurgency and related fields Working level contact and liaison with the 4400th ccT should be established and maintained for exchange of information on operational techniques and procedures which should prove to be of mutual benefit Special Operations Research Office SORa 56 SORa is a non-governmental agency ope rating under contract between the Department of the Army an erican Unive s r ' -- - ---- --- ------ -- - -- --' It is responsible for the conduct of such nonmateriel research as will support the Special Warfal'e Staff's mission to develop psychological and unconventional warfare plans for the Department of the Army 57 entitled SORa has prepared excellent country studies 'j' spe fare Area Handb e eagerl sought ---- --- --_ -_ - -- - - - - - - --- ' ' -- - -- ''' - by USIA IcA AID an d others Thus there is the anomaly of a small research organization with a very special orientation using its funds to develop a product applicable throughout the U S ' government community ' Moreover the work involved can not properly be classified as research It can be argued that the final compilation of the materials required for Special Forces operational detachments should be accomplished under the direct supervision of the SpeeialWarfare Center 40 UNCLASSIFIED' --------_ UNCLASSIfIED 6 SORO is also engaged in studies of such transcendent magnitude as to require a massive national effort to insure successful results One such study is entitled lIExploit-USSRlI with the stated objective of researching methods of exploiting Soviet vulnerabilities It is apparent that SORO has assumed tasks beyond its capabilities 58 It is my belief that the SORO program of work and the priorities attached thereto are not meshed with the current missions of the Special Warfare Division and Special Forces units the weight of effort is now in support of psychological operations whereas the reverse should be true In addition there is some doubt that SORO as presently staffed can shift gears rapidly and effectively The advantages of SORO's absorption by large research organizations are worth investigation Personnel 59 The basic Army power package for denied areas opera- tions is a highly skilled Sp-ecial Forces detachment of 2 officers and 10 sergeants trained and equipped to organize guide control and supply upto 1 500 indigenous personnel and to conduct guerrilla war- fare in denied areas o This detach ment contains specialists in light and heavy weapons demolitions basic surgery and communications 41 UNCLASSIFIED ----_ _-------- I All personnel in the detachment are and language qualified cross trained in specialties They are without question elite troops It was quite appropriate from 1959 forward to look to these war reserves to train adapt and guide foreign military contingents in operations against insurgent forces The teams moved into the field provided their own communications did what they were trained to do and moved out when ordered Because it was akin to their contingent war missions the experience was professionally profitable and sharpened their edge 60 The demands for Special Forces personnel to assist in high intensity counter insurgency situations continue to grow Laos alone the overall figure is set at 512 some 400 have been requested for South Vietnam in a year that will consume over 1800 in just two countries- out of many possible claimants while there are conflicting requirements Mean While there is merit in keeping substantial numbers of Special Forces personnel deployed for such operations the Group have contingent wartime tasks for the execution of which constant preparation is required Further- more collaborative arrangements with CIA under the provisionS of NSAM No 57 may require considerable numbers of fully trained Special Forces personnel and detachments 42 UNCLASSIFIED In 67 61 ' That there are finite limits On the numbers of Special Forces personnel who can be deployed on Counter-Insurgency tasks in underdeveloped areas is not in itself significant Given their characteristics they are admirably effective in this role can do the job But others Well-trained and motivated Infantry officers and non- commissioned officers - or comparable ranks from other combat branches who have had Ranger training - can acquire a smattering of the native language be provided with good communications develop conceivable requirement large quantities The omens are that we will need them in v' Planning and preparation should begin now on the ways and means of selection tfaining organization equipment and readying for operational deployment 62 The foregoing gives emphasis to a theorem postulated earlier in this report in the context of whether the specially designed FLAG organizations were ess'ential or merely administratively convenient The requirements which counter-insurgency situations generate for U S trainors to live and work with the indigenous military 43 UNCLASSIfiED forces have been considered special But they are special only to the extent that they differ from the terms of reference and modus operandi of the average MAAG officer today Stated otherwise the Army's counter-insurgency concept envisages transformation in whole or in part of the functions of the MAAGs and establishment of new criteria for MAAG personnel In one sense it is a return to the Van Fleet mission in Greece in the late Forties or KMAG in the early Fifties It is a significant change it is also a very healthy one The concept of Americans rolling up their sleeves sharing the same privations and working as equals alongside their Allies can not but h lp to develop new understanding and identity of interests This is a long cry from the pure advisor but that word and the concept behind it appear to have outlived their usefulness 63 One of the criteria of Special Forces operational types is that they be volunteers Unfortunately application of this c riterion is not helping the rapid build-up to newly authorized strength The number of volunteers has recently been jll stadequate to meet incre- mental requirements thefr cross section is below desirable standards therefore the Center has'no flexibility in selection and large numbers have to be eliminated during the early training phases ' There are of course many outstanding young officel S and NCO's ' 44 UNCLASSIFIED o UNCLASSIfiED o who would be real assets to the operational detachments These individuals are for the most part both airborne and ranger qualified and have the motivation and resourcefulness demanded They would require minimal additional training Since the real goal is to maintain the high caliber of Special Forces personnel across the board there is every reason to supplement the volunteer program with a policy of detailing personnel to Special Forces One goes and does as one's country dictates OTHER ROUTES OF AnVANCE What follows has been touched upon in several places during the report Because of the value I attach thereto the points are re-emphasized Communication 64 During the course of the survey note was taken early of limitations on working level contact with opposite numbers in other De- partments or Agencies Some years back extensive and effective liaison was a characteristic of the Army staff For reason of pressure of duties strict adherence to formal liaison channels stated policy animosity or whatever informal airing of views coordination and follow' up is conspic- f uously rare today - except with the Joint Staff and as appropriate with the 45 UNCLASSIFIED I UNCLASSIFIED other two Services Although I saw more of the Army staff than the other three military elements I gather the identical situation obtains At the same time there is s'ome tendency to assess without qualifica- tion total responsibility for failure or inaction or rebuff to this agency or that to apply a single evaluation to the entire personnel of a Depart- ment or major office to assume the worst reply wi thout checking how a project is going One can hear the same things in the halls of State and CIA even the moat contradictory word pre serve 6 contact it is silence which isolates A failure in communications can be at the root of many problems 65 It would be presumptuous to suggest the transcendent importance of personal contact at the working level This is how busineas gets done how the misinterpretation of the written phrase is corrected how staff actions are accelerated Most significantly it is how One learnS' that the human cross sectioJ l eisewhere in government has essentially the same thought processes same sense of dedication same foibles and same desire to' whip the Communists 66 Predaely because we are the senior Service we can afford to meet the others halfway We are certainly more intent that 46 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED the job get done than in who gets the byline If we believe in our product - and it won't sell itse lf in a competitive market - we should be prepared to go to great lengths to see that it is sold If action on a proposal is overlong in coming we should assuredly find out why 67 The informal channels of contact with the pertinent elements of OSD State CIA and USIA should be strengthened as one means of speeding the march forward The Army's interest in effective counter-insurgency operations is vast so is State's and therefore a firm basis for contact exists NSAM No 57 opens new paths for CIA-Army collaboration The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is interested in the maximum of action programs he can help the Army in many ways he should be cultivated Education 68 Referring to his initial Pentagon briefings on military activities in the Cold War General Taylor remarked that only one ------ -- - - - - ' - - -- ----- --- - -- presentor had ia sparkle in his eye The point was apt for large segments of the Army assess military participation in the Cold War in purely negative terms how much is detracted from optimum readiness' I for limited or general war The fact thatwe could be bested without fighting either kind of war i6 not generally appreciated There is a marked lack of understanding' of and enthusiasm for the several Army initiatives of the current year or their potential for stabilizing the 47 UNCLASSIFIED Free World periphery Perhaps one of the reasons is that since the price in men and money is insignificant the results must be similarly circumscribed The fact that this is not true is unimportant what is significant is that many believe it to be so 69 The need for a comprehensive informational educational program throughout the Army is evident and it might well start by the Army staff studyirig General Decker's speech and the doctrinal guidance contained therein that this is war that in this kind of war the Army by vil'tue of tradition and capabilitie s has a key role that in lieu of standing idly by the initiatives outline l permit Army elements to come to physical grips with the enemy to cope with Cbmmunist inspired insurgency and to extend the fight into the enemy's homeland there to use against him hiS' own resources that this is attack not defense 70 produced on The Command and General Staff College has recently its own initiative a draft manual Army Activities in the Cold War II An excellent text and consistent with the Chief of Staff's speech its refinement and approval should be expedited so that it may serve as the basis for the derivative training literature required to develop a responsive Army attitude toward Sublimited War The hope is that the Armyls role and contribution can be vividly and 48 UNCLASSIFIED -'- -- ' ' - o o o -_- '-c ' ' ' ' ' ' - - ' ' dynamically portrayed and that one can drive horne the linkage between the Special Force detachment with the Meo tribesmen the moveITlent of the 18th Infantry to Berlin and the Psy Ops specialist in Guatemala The MAP Tie -In 71 In examining Counter-Insurgency programs and FLAG concepts the relation thereof with the current MAP vas a recurring question The former were projected a s military to military they did involve advisors some degree of MAP financing was implicit a key objective as with the MAP was to stabilize and strengthen the internal security of the indigenous countries concerned Yet the relevant papers the briefings and indeed the approval channels muted or omitted reference to the long established maasive and unilateral vehicle for military assistance to the non-Communist nations of the Free World 7Z Conceptually these new Army programs are alien to the MAP as it exists today The average MAAG unit centera in the capital city the administrative and logi stic aspects of the aid program predominate liaison is principally at the m l nisterial and senior officer tevel and the scale of living accords with that of the diplomatic i I community GraS'S roots con tact is minimal or non-existent 49 UNCLASS FlED The r MAAG observes but stands aside from the local military problems 73 The counter -insurgency concept as discus sed earlier is that the advisor or trainor will be operationally oriented will live where his counterpart lives will shunprotocol will be directly involved in the problems the unit faces norm Grass roots contact is the In a word the new programs have the coloration of the country MAAG but operate in the area that MAAGs do not penetrate --- ''-- 74 ----- --- Programmatically the two are essentially identical The MAP finances the attendance of foreign military at the CounterInsurgency Courses The expenses of special Forces personnel in Laos are defrayed by the MAP Exceptwhere contingency funds are used as in Southeast Asia the Counter-Insurgency operational requirements must be proposed by the country MAAG accepted for programming and funding The dependence of deployments upon needs I generated by the field is clear 75 Concentration On the operational aspects of the Counter- Insurgency and related programs which are laudably new approache s has obscured the importance of attention to arrangements to insure that capabilities and utilized could be fielded Planning actions have been limited to Armi d annels neitlier Unified Commanders nor country -- ---- -- - ----- ---- 50 UNGLi SSIFlED o temTls have been made officially aware of- the concepts the evolving _ _--- - -- capabilities nor the scheme of operations 76 The need to close a circuit is evident but implementing actions have yet to be taken The operational plan for the Colombi an task force was processed to the Secretary of Defense without any concurrent action to signal the field for support or comment yet the first move of DOD was to secure the views of CINCARIB and the country team as a condition precedent to further action 77 This sequence points up the essentiality of informing the Chiefs of MAAG Missions the Ambassadors and the Unified Commanders concerned together with their respective staffs of the contribution that Army assets can make to the internal defense of the underdeveloped areas of the arrangements in train to harness these assets and of their availability This is a task for the most competent senior-level briefing team that can be mustered If the team is convincing the long awaited requirements may begin to emerge from country teams Africa South of the Sahara 78 The Secretary of the Army has been made responsible for the MAP in Africa south of the Sahara Two MAAGs are now operative with four more likely to be positioned thisyeari a total of 51 UNCLASSIFIED $25 million has been progra mmed for FY 1962 and the estimate for next year approaches $100 million In the absence of other command arrangements the Army staff will in fact be the Unified Co mmander for MAP functions commanding the MAAGs controlling allocation of funds as among countries and exercising major influence over country programs 79 The Army is thus presented a magnificent opportunity to project its resources and to make a major contribution to U S o ------ security interests in a vital long neglected area and under - ------- ------ conditions which as'a'ure maximum controla __ lexibility - ----'- of planning and'programming for the area as a whole The long sought basis for coordinated GBPorwar d country planning for low intensity areas has been provided the Army's Challenge is to exploit it fully 52 - UNCLASSIFIED I I I ---------- 77 ANNEXA Terms of Reference for the Paramilitary Psychological Warfare Directorate The term para military operations as used herein refers to the employment of Army resources to stimulate train advise and support indigenous forces in counter insurgency operations and other activities contributing to internal defense as well as in covert denied area operations and to wartime unconventional warfare activities for which the Army has primary responsibility The Director of the Paramilitary Psychological Warfare Directorate discharges DCSOPS responsibility for the overall staff supervision and coordination of the functions of the' Army relating to Paramilitary Operations as defined above and Psychological Operations More specifically he a For mulates concepts and policies for paramilitary and psychological operations b Deyelops plans requirements and programs for Army paramilitary and psychological operations i c Develops the military portion of country counter- insurgency plans d Provides staff coordination and supervision of 1 UNCLi SSIFIED - ---- ---- - - - - - - - - Army paramilitary and psychological operations e Prepares the Army position on JCS Unified and S pecHied Commander s' plans relating to paramilitary and psychological operations f Develops requirements for and supervises materiel and non-materiel research and development relating to paramilitary and psychological operations g Maintains laison with governmental and non- governmental departments and agencies having related interest in the fields of paramilitary and psychological operations h Maintains liaison with the U S Army Special Warfare Center and discharges primary Department of the Army _responsibility for matters affecting the Special Warfare Center i i 'I I I I II I I Insures -that approved concepts plans and programs relating to Army paramilitary and psychological operations are forwarded to Army Component Commanders CG CONARC and to Chiefs of U S Army MAAGs Missions in order to insure a coordinated Army effort UNCLASSIfiED PROPOSED ORGANIZATION CHART PARAMILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIRECTORATE r- Unconventional War Div Psychological War Div Plans Operations Br Support Br Plans Br Units Activities Br SWC Support Br Covert Denied Areas Div Counter-Insurgency Plans Div Plans Br Operations Br CIA Liaison Support Br Country Plans SE Asia Country Plans L America Gountry Plans Africa ME STAFFING REQUIREMENTS Officers Action Civilians AdminisM trative I i New Directorate 28 5 12- t oo Special Warfare Division 13 3 6 15 2 6 - I I I Requirement 3 UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu