o E _ C GBP A n GBP T w T je o n r r OFFICE o r THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON U t M S SENSffWE 16 M a rch 962 MEMORANDUM TOR THE RECORD By B rig Gen Lansdale Subject Meeting with President 16 M arch 1962 Present Th President G eneral Taylor the Attorney Q sneral ' M cG eorge Bundy M r G ilpatric G eneral JLemniUer Mr M Cone Aleada Johnnon m yself At the White House 1600 houra 16 1larch 1962 P rio r to the President'll a rriv a l the group m et in the Ov l room General I k y lo r handed out hie G uidelines fo r Operation Mqag oae 11 M arch X asked McCone about having H elm s and Hary ty i o w ere waiting out aide Join us M cCone asked i f 1 had any difference of opinion with them X said that we w ere In agreem ent oh opej 'atioa l procedu res as fa r a the guidelines would p erm it operation McCone then said Hftlm i and Harvey should atay outside which he told he President la ter also McCone then asked me if 1 w ere in agreem ent with the concept contained in the Guidelines 11 1 com m ented that they didn't fit the conditions inside Cubfe that were becoming m ore apparent to th opera tional people including A o p era tors lo r whom 1 had respect the chance of fracturing the regim e and creating a valid revolution is becoming m ore feasible 1 felt that we needed much m ore fee tom to work on the revolutionary p ossibilities than is possible unde the guidelines The P resident t h e n came in i i i General T y lor gave a brief r p o r t on development in ca 0 0 Novem- ber M id th Special Croup felt that hard intelligence wae n o4 d before going ahead and handed th P resid en t a copy o f th revieed r -- j EXCUJWW % %GBP 10 HEGRADK C tt ' J r r r iim ftfr i B - s e t 1 8 jpi es- s O u l W I I I J L- IPFijWittn cop II r m i o m m m i m m m IN S eeldwrt gtancsd at th i a o m n t t t U y and t it d m o him th G u ld im t h evoicm Tke P r aidant then turned to mm and asked n what was ' I p v t U m a quick summary o f th intoUlgaace-eoUact through July tolling him that this was the Spoci l Group describing the work so f a r o f C U and I told Mm finally wore starting to get a really good team together fo r fee opera tion after much effort to get the U S pointed in the right dj rection I noted that agents were to be trained or eaqperieneed in guei rilla w ar fa re that we needed U S m ilitar y participation for support including a ir r e s u p p ly and maritime actions He asked fo r details Both General I emnitaer and I told him about eheep-dippingn U military personnel sanitising equipment and nee o f U S baaes Z pointed oat that P T boat silhouettes required a Navy base as c o v e r even if w called it RfcE f that a ir re supply would be done at night from about 800-feet which entailed som e riak which the A ir F oro was now assessing Be asked about maritime runs of the P T -b o its l -'explained our problems of mother11 ships the LSD e' 38 300 man crews which we are trying to lick I 1 remarked that the thesis of creating revolution ins looked Just as valid aa ever# and that CIA professionals we agreeing m ore and m ore that both resistance and the pos fra cturing the regime pointed to some real opportunities X that we were checking out a number of leads including r Fidel Caatroi to assess the practical opportunities lor split some of the regime If we could get iom e of the top Qiban and some units of the Cuban security forces to take to the would have conditions which would need quick exploitation o would have to be ready for this I noted that we would have arm s and equipment it is possible that this could be done m ilitary intervention but we must be ready to intervene forces# if necessary Th Preaident asked U U S military intervention w a Anissue which th Special Group was posing to him now Taylor an Sp cisl Group promptly said no jency General JUmnita r cosuntaw d that th plausible plan ior U S intervention A lso it had plan Qa S aixp retexts to use force with the pr texte i r y stellate craft or a Cubsn action in Latin A m s r ic a fo r which wa S ' w seess a e O R C T s E H S ffW E 1% 'o f V GBP rc W r i ctt aJag 1 0 1 might U rlla op eiaawhere that 1m co u W t u o thT So M can t eay tL t to make decision oo the uae of O S military force o'I I dM ione ia Cuba be c a eat a that be hoped something ootid dosie about the prftn That the M w ip ip a n would sta rt eou r t f y 1961' 1 id that coo on a ll the tim e that any aolid-lookiag report a n i 4 reaI tt e in g because aa talk increaaea that t l U S m the intention som ehow to help the people o f f h x P cPl# would get Bome hope T L i spiritu al fa cto r of having hope o f something better what tGBP y a re now saddled with is v ita lly important at this tim e Hhe P resid ent then asked about Im m igration W ouldn't it 1 e b etter to shut our doors to the people trying to get out so that ih ey Z01 BtaY an Jtate actlon vgainst he reg im e poisstod out that we still w ore giving them only two ch oices eUner to escape to the U S and freedom or to stay and be sla v e s tftne we a re com m itted to helping them stage a revolt prjovide a rm s and a re w illing to go all the way in being sure that they win then wl i m ight consider closing our doors - - because we then w ill be het ping them gain their freedom at h om e Now with 2 000 people H a dug every week we would be fo o lish to rem ove this sym bol of ou r y m pathy and cut off tha source of intelligence information end reel uits We m ust give the Cubans the chance and the help to free themsi vea The Attorney General then mentioned Mary Hemingway com m ent ing on reports that Cestro w as drinking heavily in disgruntlem at over the way things were going and the opportunities offered b r the s h r in e to Hemingway 1 com m ented that this was a eonvere Aon S d M orrow had had with M ary Hemingway that we had sixzdla reports fram other source and that this worth assessing firmly IQ pursuing vigorously If there are grounds tor f tion CIA ha n w S e a s s e t s which might well be committed for such - ort McCon asked if his operational people were o ' 2 worth him that we had discussed this that they agreed the o R c t t 'r vigorous development and that we were in agreement thatthe aa wfs so delieate and sensitive that it shouldn't be surfaced to th Special Group until we were ready to go and then not in d taU 1 QFPifPfTti tv v u k h I V u Pertained to fractiaaing the rogttn If ' cou d develop Xike a brnsh flr much as la Jhxngary we muit be prepared to help it win our goal of Cuba fre rf a uommunist government ' Lemniteer mentioned the beach reconnaissance by the U S Navy which was evaluated by the JCS as having little ilsk uDT teams would do this at nighto and would not need to lu ib ee Mr# MeCone mentioned that we were including sabotage in early actions 1 commented that we had a number of such action listed but were only planning on a few moat necessary onea One iutample was the Soviet patrol craft for which both Navy and CIA we t tasked to plan sabotage Hie President asked how this might be dqie I replied that fuel lubricants crews and the patrol craft w re all potential targets -- that for example a boat laid-up for repair was a boat that wasn't out on patrol at a critical period Mr Gilpatric mentioned that Mr McNamara was intern ely interested in creating a Defense pool of resources for coveif actions for Colombia for example so that we wouldn't be ffc-eed with the problem oi only having 4 PT boats as we do for Cub l The meeting then broke up with the President saying S ' ahead on the Guidelines General Taylor asked for his copies of d ie to Guidelines hack 1 said 1 needed a copy for my guidance o it show the operators such as Harv y and Craig The Presid expressed his appreciation for wha t had been done so far lien Taylor didn't persist at getting hi copy back so 1 retained it v i jGBP L o1 3k -o oi % - V c v a s ju 4 'i ' 1s i% i o V ' w i l l F s GBPo-i vr - i - M i e r I f t- 4 M - III 'Wc C Su 4rok 'J f -% ' -''r ' ' o-'- a r o - ''JPY i SCr v R r''-' ro b'i'r U o ' H ' GBP r GBP -i 'f - - JPY o V y 1 IT p v HI i t I 4 i - v a o - v o f J GBP 5 I f i o t o4 j i 5 ' 4 r S1 i S It % j fc- 4 S a V v r t--V-# i GBP tr 4 M r 4 - r r ' I A h i - s R V' 'r y o 1 f u --i V ' v n '1 S' v# r' This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu