cl NARA JFK esta aim of MW slats lasts-latte lose 2 9 March 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting 12 30 p 111 - 29 March 1963 IN ATTENDANCE All present - plus Cottrell Kaysen Dungan and othe rs The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit -and- -run raids and asked my views I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships etc On a minimum we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids Dillon stated that We could not stop them because of the number of ports small ships inadequate coast guard facilities etc McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally should disassociate ourselves from responsibility The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through hnmigration procedures Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship Practically all in attendance thought that we should try- and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand or stopping them on the other He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids 51 st 1 311 1 t3 BEE-ES $11313 BF THE3 BBCUMENT RS Mist-3298 W145 UVUVU I I if if I 29 March 196-3 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT Unauthorized Cuban Raids 1 Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey Alpha 66 and Lamba 66 are well known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico Their plans are discussed openly are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins 2 There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico The boats outbdard motors guns ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources of which there are many We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U S ' areas 3 The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvibus courage and dedication Apparently the organizations are building up and We can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future 4 Obviously raids of this type'will exascerbate problems with Cas'tro and more particularly the Soviet Union and from that standpoint arehdesirable However successful harrassment will Create very considerable annoyance will stimulate internal dis sension will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting' Castrois-m in Latin America Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question theistrength of his position and therefore reapprais'e their own position in Cuba It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba on the other to reinforce it and finally might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United'States 5 Finally although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community itis my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to stand down these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control 5 K i 1 JOHN A MCCONE M334 he 3 Ed kg Elam Director aloe oi lee- - inseam longs i anti-@139 #11645 0553441 i a l n att g as Mm 9am taste i'ottwio oe lama 1611 SEEM The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters 1 We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively whether we can stand down the operations 2 A policyr statement which State is undertaking 3 The question of prosecution which the AG wOuld undertake 4 Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas - 5 The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union At the meeting attended by AG McNamara McCone Coltrell Douglas Dillon it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA Immigrat We officials Coast Guard etc Principal purposes would be to 1 Find out all we know about the groups who they are where a they are and what can be dene about them Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami Apparaitlyf there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami 3 Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guardio'r some of this 4 Warning the unauthorized groups in advanced actions we intend to take against them Also warning the euppliers of explosives - arms etc 5 FCC shut down illicit radio stations provide a truck equipped with DFuequipment to locate the stations 6 Explore what could be done to in uence the groups away from Soviet targets In this connection the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu