11 April 1963 FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Special Group 5412 Meeting 11 April 1963 l Eleconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed The Group expressed approval of the CIA program They authorized two ights over Laos and North Vietnam on the as sumption that one of the NEFA ights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit If on the other hand the four India - Communist China border ights were not executed at this time then CIA was authorized to y three ights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired by both Sarit and COMORJ 2 Eitatus of negotiations for India -- Communist China recon- naissance was reported It was agreed that this question should be pursued further by CIA No immediate action was indicated Dr Scoville reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either India or Thailand until about the 20th of April 3 Cuban operations The proposed infiltration-exfiltration operations past and projected were reviewed and approved The proposed program of sabotage and harrassment both the general program and the detailed plan was discussed at length It was reported by Mr Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the direction of higher authority It was not the intention of higher authority to approve and authorize specific actions what he was seeking was de tailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected on a series of operations which were within our capability I took the position which was supported by Alexis Johnson somewhat less vocally however that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program until we had the total policy designed to remove the Soviets from Cuba and also remove Castro I said I was not clear as to how this was to be accomplished nor did I feel that there was any agreed series of actiOns designed to meet this end objective Therefore it appeared to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations none of NAM 1 Raw Eisi isles docket ioiw logos-w lama which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would they seriously impair Castro s economic or military posture and hence serve no useful purpose Furthermore I estimated that under the laws of averages a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U S Government and the CIA Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others more or less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result of the Miro Cardona incident we would have no plausible denial and in fact would find ourselves in a rather difficult position It was agreed this matter should be further studied and reported on next Thursday and possibly dis cussed with higher authority on Friday An important part of this issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future of Castro ACTION I should discuss this subject with General Carter and some of the Senior Staff on Friday morning to prepare an agreed CIA position and also to schedule the completion of the SNIE 4 North Vietnam report was accepted 5 E'he funds for Kong Le were approved However Alexis Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent message that Phouini support Kong Le with money now in which came from the United States However if this appeal failed the support recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time 6 @he coveztgannex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was remanded because the Special Group CI had remanded the basic internal defense plan However there was no objection expressed to the annex but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any Subjects covered in the annex 7 Ehe Colombian plan was not considered 8 @olonel Steakley su titted a report on inadvertent over- ights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961 This report was noted DCI raised the question as to why he-had not been informed Apparently this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group when instances of this type occurred Apparently Alexis Johnson was -2- %a informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression at I was informed However he was on leave and therefore did not know that I had not been informed 9 @ritish Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and placed on the agenda for next week Alexis Johnson reported on Mr Burdette s position substantially parallelling Helms' with the effect that he was disappointed in the British position that he felt time had run in favor of Jagan and they would like an appeal made to Macmillan Bondy took exception McCone stated that CIA felt much ohnson reported and furthermore objected to the in its own political actions which would be attributable both whether they succeeded or failed It was agreed to place subject on agenda for next week 7 ACTION Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu