fewvcni June 30 1 SI M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E PRESIDEN T SU B JE C T CIA Reorganisation t submit the following vlrw a ono who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since I On balance C IA fs record has probably been very good In the nature of clandestine operations the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown all the public hears about or should hear about are Its errors But# again in the nature of the case an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors The important thing to recognise today In my judgment Is that the CIA as at present named and constituted has about used up its quota Its margin for future error is practically non-existent One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably In US policy at horns as well as abroad And until CIA Is visibly reorganised It will as In the Algerian Instance be widely blamed for developmonte of which It Is wholly Innocent Tho argument of this memorandum Is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate and that this autonomy to due to three main causes 1 an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations 2 an Inadequate conception cGBP the relationship between operations end policy 3 an inadequate Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been Its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favourable publicity The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of oclf-cougratulaiory publicity which followed thsm q g $h 3 ariideo te j Richard and Gladyo Harkaess The ly y is r io u ia I X 1954% Date o f C I V M S a tu r d a y E v e n in g Foot D t 30 N N 6 ceocepttco of tb rdatioiu lp U t w a op r tioa And le u W a tn e T f merooraodom also ugg U w y In widen 00 U m 9 c a p erha b U vi t 4 L M v 9 CIA Autonomy intellU CIA conduct three mala GBPortnt ct secret work genea collection covert political operations and paramilitary tiviticf carriea o a theae function with relative autonomy The m m i for the autonomy art historical hen CIA bsgaa the Slat Department still thinking too much in tonal of tti traditional mleeions in foreign affairs looked on thia new venture with suspicion and renounced tha opportunity to seise Arm coctroi of CIA operations tt did not for example try to establish any effective eyetom of clearance for CZA activities and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA wee up to in their countriee After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brother further confirmed CIAfe Independence from eupervieioa by State Department deeke In the meantime CZA grew in else and power During the fiftlei it began in eoma areaa to outstrip the State Department in the uality of ito pereonnel Partly becauae CIA paid higher ealariee and even more jperhape because Allen Dullee gave hie people courageous protection Againet McCarthyite attacked CIA wae able to attract and hold a largo number of able and independent-minded men The more it added brilliant activist to its staff the more momentum ita operation developed and the greater jrola it played in the Initiation of policy By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the probleme created by an active and autonomous CIA it had long ince missed the ebance to establish ita own ultimata authority hile State re ained a nominal supervision over covert political operation thia was to some degree offoet by CIA tendency to present a propoeed cperaUon almost ae a fait accomgUt State never had'title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection and it had loot ground in euch areas as ovo i political reporting and oven in the maintenance ef ovsri diplomatic contact# -- tumru 1 For tts part CIA had developed a whole Hrtti rffunctions parallellnj already editing function of the Stat Department aadcf the Defense Department s well Today It has Its own political desks and military staffii it has la effeet its own foreign serricej it ha or ha had it own combat force it vea has its own air force Its annual budget It abouttimes that of the State Departmeat The contemporary CIA possesses many ct ths characteristics of a state within a et ts IL Doctrine Though CIA1 autonomy developed for historical reasons it haa been able to endure because there i$ no doctrine governing our Conduct of clandestine operations# The problem of doctrine for CIA ie the extent to which ite various clandestine mission are compatible with a free and open society tt is idle to argue that because the Communists can do such-and-such we are free to do it too Communism ie a creed nurtured in con spiracy and the whole point of Communist social and political organic aation is to make conspiracy effective Zf 'fighting fire with fire1 means contracting the freedom# traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA no one seriously wishes to do that Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity Until this Is done CIA'a role will not be clearly defined and under stood The problem which must be faced Us what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order We must begin I believe by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to bo a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches reporters will dig out stories newspapers will pub- iish editorials individuals driven by promptings of conscience will blurt out things harmful to the stato and so on We do not wish to change then things and could not do so without violating the essenco of our eccistye These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate In abort they constitute the problem and ae General Marshall used to oay MThere's no point in Sighting the problem n Thex follow from tMa I would think tha that a cr t actWMaa a i parm l lU ion M they 4o oot can TM vT------principle aad practtca w aocUtr atki that th v pwrnlaatbla when thaly effttct U to e o trxa t them pXnrtpt -- o -pradless Each form of IKrtt activity pressni its own problem Clandestine intelligence collection has beta a traditional function of ths r fit state Bt rules and usages ere fairly trail established Zn Os main espionage if conducted with discretion# Should prssent no great problem Itowtvti when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandats even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity In an open society X consider later for ' example the question of the Controlled American Source CAS and whethsr the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities oof the government Covert political operations present a trickier problem Occasions arise when it ie necessary to subsidise nswspepers9 politicians and organ aations in other countries GBPut corruption of the political'life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed 1 wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem if only because tha problems of concealment are SO much mors difficult In general 1 would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependant on the suppression of newd on lying to Congressmen and Journalists and on tho deception of the electorate should be tmdertaksm only when the crisis is so considerable that tha gains really sssm to - eutwoigh the disadvantages This suggests that the else of ths pro posed operation may bo of crucial importance Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption The greater the visibility of the operation thd more its success depends on thwarting ths impulses and denying the values cf an open society the riskier it becomes and the more urgenS It is ghat an oyerwhelming case be made for its necessity GBPn short when confronted with a proposed operation we must not only whether tha operation io technically fte sribl C in its wn terms aait whether Us C oec$fe 0 requires C ur open aoeiety to in # C rloTiS vts7 falos i'X# $rwsi aciplo% UL Operations and Policy Clandestine ectivtties should U u ie iiid not only to the context ol their relationship to n open society t t lso la the context of their relationship to United SttUl foreign policy CIA operations have net b a held effectively fubordlnats to U 8 foreign policy 1 Clandestine intelligence collection is by charter free from State Department control Thia fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA la discovered recruiting agente or developing sources in a friendly country The recent Singapore caee# when CIA without notice to the Consul General tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example After complications of ludicrous complexity including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test# it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his euperlore of the CIA approach and was leading CIA Into a trap which when sprung produced considerable embarrass men to relation between the US and the Singapore government There have been trcublee of a comparable sort In Pakistan and in Japan where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work In a CIA-NSA operation CZA has said that# in such cases neither the Embassy nor the Depart ment in Washington is normally informed cf this type of operation In short no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at thio moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation erg the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police out weighs the risk e g exasperating the local government and shaking Us confidence both in our purposes and in our sense Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Depart ment of State and save for exceptional Instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State with the loesi U S Ambassador iJCtrfVfclJ--___ I Covert political oW lH o n i technically require State Department clttxw d In practice however CIA has often b n able to seise tha initiative fa ways which reduce S u u 't role W to that of a rubber stamp o np i TM s Hu fetftapartly the consequence of the Superior drive and activism ot CIA portonnalt especially as compared with the diffidence of Stat Department personnel For example when men coma to CIA with th assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organising coup or preparing for paramilitary warfare these men naturally fall to work with Ingenuity and seal they probably faal that they are not earning their pay unleset say they organise ae many coup ae possible The concept of Contingency planning9 baa legitimatized the concrete preparation of operationa etill presumably In a hypothetical stage peopl did not at firet notice that9contingency planning f when carried to the etage of recruitment tod training of personnel createi a vested interest which often transforms contin genciet into'apparent necessities Thus# if a group ia assembled and revved vpoaa contingency basis then the failure to carry the project through it if argued will invite the disappointment and alienation of the gTOupj so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started ae a pure speculation This was a central factor of course in the Cuban decision the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala Just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands# CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must there after do pretty much what they want o or else they will blow security Or even go over to the Communists This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents $Wd become prisoner cf C ur agents in another sense too The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and suit necessarily in political or eren moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation Such actions as locking up tha Revolutionary Council such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in method R cf torture such episodes as tho detention aacl SM d 123 50 sapjjrtsdly dministored to Tte Re olia Nodal Tarafa end s $h r oilemoeratis Cubans this February ooo 21 thaaa suggest that thing3 33 tawito CXA 'sriiii -which CIA si 'Washington C ly disaiy -5 n gh nmmemWWM mw mdd agenda only in ll hut oath lo undo no um worse the worm elmdy Ward the tissue an consequence awaiting evozo twen mambo Tom 1 n1 we never have noted inmate thie operation but men Moreover a time when here 10 meadow premium on state when 3 questions CIA operations a momma oi Bull in a pussy deny gnaw role The e vocalo clandestine utivi eo seems 'eoqgh' and realistic an opponent has to Invoke mmug no the patella o the United states world public Opinion m -do we say in the United Notions etc and owns hopcloul Weds legallatlo end 'odt The result o GIN Initiative in cover political ha been to one motion have woodpollcy on the State Dope-mean Thieves ablaze A AllenDunoewrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Bone Armed Services Co amime The Central Mme Agency should have nothing to do with policy Yet In the ymo etnoo CIA has ln effect 'mede' policy in my partedtheworld 'Anumberoigovenmonu 111121er tho they have oven been argue 0 CIA attempt a mulls-ow - not a nose a mind calculmd to stimulate friendly collage toward the United Smog 5 321 93 - coin is aprlme example This met-loam suggests that the prevent system by which CIA moo State cd 9 projected covert cpora mle inadequate to protect Us interests There must be some means State can be blamed 31 such cporations a an early enough 5 330 3o meet the conception and preliminary planning 0 the'oporodm Othorvlu CIA will con- tinue to confront State with propoel mm having potomlal impact on foreign policy but at too late a polo to onbjoct the We to xenon able entrai- A 4 Paramilitary rarfare I gafiier li regarded la tomo quarter as a purely technical matter easily detachable from policy and there fora a proper function of the Department of Defense Tot there ie almoat no CIA function i ore peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary varfaro# Tbera are several reaacca for thla For one thing a paramilitary operation i R In Hs nature a large and attributable operation and thereby as euggested above ela bee with the preeuppoaiUone of our open society Tbeae cona Ida ratione need not apply bovovqr to the training of aay the South Vietnamese in gu rrllla tactics or to the ocpport d already existing guerrilla activities For another the moral and political pries of direct paramilitary failur i acute for rj Com m unist rrh fa they stimulate paramilitary activity are dokQ tha v ro rid aspects from thorn rhon wfc do it we appear to betray otrr oim profesaed principles and tborefo e cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeats Moreover as tha recent Algerian opiaoda aboweds cnce vre convince the world that ws are committed to a paramilitary endeavor w urill bo blamed i o i aU Oorta of things And as the recent GBPractar0 -GBPar psriasiieT8 apiaod ohcrKred vrhvn we do eead m n to possible death we cannctf UgMly write them aGBPf and cloee the bock C The Cammunidta ca the other bandy have no acruple about liquidating a loeinj eborr 10 Moreover guerrilla warfare U fought much more than military men ordinarily realise in an Ideological context The guerrilla succeeds when hid program enlists graiirooti support and It 1$ very difficult Indead to beat him when the countrytide is with Van Mode told Central Marshall in 1946 not to wot r y about th# guerrillas in Indonesia w are sending 50 000 men out there and will clean the situation vp in the three months Marshall who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Rdllppines oreplied It won't be o easy You will find that they will bleed you to death Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force Serious guerrilla movements hare been defeated only three times since tha and of the Second World Wars In Greece because T to s defection dosed the northern border in the Philippines and in Malaya In o the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures - The struggle in Malaya as Field Marshal Tempier understood and said was for the minds and heartsof the people it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program# organisation of trade unions political reform and an offer of national independence If the guerrilla power lies In Ms revolutionary program the answer lies In part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside Without a political goal H wrote Mao Teo-tung guerrilla warfare must fail as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy cooperation and assistance cannot be gained H He added NGBPo we want the support of the maoses If we do we must go among the matures arouse them to activity concern ourselveo with their weal and xre w JTor these reasons paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon It is primarily a political weapon and coust therefore be crubj acted to close and careful political oversight probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA ra er than transferred to Defense crLunt ij iu 5 Botr to BetaMlah Policy Control Here f wonder whether the British experience might not be of ralueT The actable feature of Cm British Intelligence system U the determination to keep activity osder strict Foreign Office eontrei Thia control u achieved in a camber of vtjrti a Secret tBtiUlgwci Service Itself eptndi under the tirtctiea of the Joint btilUgtBC Committee which bu ft Foreign Office chairman until recently Sir Patrick Bean who ll twrsrthe Britts rapreaenfcatWe at the UN and which Includes the 8m k i Intelligence director and representatives of the Colonial Office and tha Commonwealth Relation Office as wtU ' aa the Chief of 819 b basic political warfare directtore are originated not feySIS but by the Information Re-arch Department la the Foreign Office often la consultation with an Interdepartmental Working Croup on International Comsxoalet Front and wnder the ultimate control at the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Undor-Secretary's Department in the Foreign o OKleo c SIS covert political action campaigns must not only eon form to Foreign Office directives but moat be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks d working groups under l X chairmanship govern opera tlona In special areas such os for example Slno-Soviet rela tions or the World Youih Festival o a Foreign Cffice Staff Liaison Officer site next tothe SIS Chief and Foreign Qttice officiala serve toora of duty in SIS sections All these devleea might be adapted for use by tha Btate Department Organisationally this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that Us operations would be at all pointa subject to Stato Departmsnt clearance -- a clearance to be OC l'ltL I llL saforced by directive by Suti Departmast of working gvocps and by the InGltretioa of State Department personnel Into the Intelligence igftnqr Cbvtaniy thU eet up would not eucceed however unles the State Department Utdf w t prepared to overcome ft inbred habits cf diffusion negativism and dtUy mzad to take a firm and purposeful grip on fh situation IV Operations ted Istelllgencs Th# relationship between operations and intelligence raises particu laxly perplexing questions v 'Intelligence include two separable acttvitieti clandestine collection and research analyst and evaluation The firft d o ll with that small portion cf raw intelli gence procured by secret mean Mr Dullea estimated la 1947 that a proper analysis of th intelligence obtainable by cnrert# normal and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent I should estimate of th information required for the guidance of 60r national policy the second involves the collation and Interpretation of all forms of Intelligence however obtained and the production of estimates Under the British system clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service The research analysis and estimating function Is located in the Foreign Office Research Department Under the American C yutem CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis The State Depart meat's Bureau cf Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities but In practice CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its view to CZA for acceptance or rejection In other words where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role In the intelligence field in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA o-SESS'ET-- The argument against Incorporating tb research and estimate function In State was mads feyDalles la 194 jPoy Cm proper judging of tbs situation la fluqrforeign country It U important that Information should be processed by an agency whose duty it ie to weigh facto lad todraw conclusion from those feet without having either the fectl r fha conclusions warped by the inevitable and eren proper prejudices d the men whose duty it ie to determine policy and who having once determined a policy are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty Precisely the came argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation ci the research and eetimate function la CIA -- L e if intelligence to too closely connected with operatione then those committed to a particular operation will tend to eelect out the intelligence which validates the operation Obviously both arguments conclude in a eaee to t the establlehme t of a fairly independent research and estimate group But if the R E group is too independent one runs into the opposite dangerI that is that neither policy nor operations will be subjected toadequate Intelligence checks The trouble with the Cuban operation for m x I e f was not that intelligence and operations were combined but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment The in telligenco branch PDX of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation The Office of ational Estimates was neve asked to comment on the assumption or m c t f that discontent had re chod the point b Cuba where a successful landing operation would prcrok uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia- In December and February the Office of ational Estimates produced general appraisals d the Cuban situation but these were TTbolly independent of the Cuban operation I gather that if its opinion had been Invitod E D I would have ghren uite a different estimate o t the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the opera tion was based There odsted is short the ridiculous situation 14 that of the Cuban operation flaunted in Miami h r i by any number oGBPlow-level agents ia the operationa branch of CIA wa dented to aven the top offlciale of tha intelligence branch Tha Bureau of fatalligenc and Reaearch of tha Department of State knew even taaa about tha Cuban operation Tha problem then la to hare an R E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to reaiat the pressure to snake the caee for vested idea and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to aubject projected operationa or pollciee to the moat intense and eearching ecrutiny Where could thia group be located If the CIA were to become subordinate to State aa M I-6 ia to the Foreign Office then the RtiE function might be vetted In a coordinate subagency eomewhat inde pendent of both State and CIA yet cloaely connected with both in day to-day operational Tha E GBP aubagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State aa well aa from the eervicea and of courae from public oourcea It would r e p r e s e n t in effect a fusion of CIA JDDI and State Intelligence and Research It might also take over certain of the aervice functiona now confided to CIA -- photographic interpre talion biographical data foreign broadcast monitoring overt collec tion maps etc There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with repreaentativea from all the Intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman V Conclusion The argument of thia memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrange meet cf our present intelligence set-up It aleo implies the capacity of the State Department to aaaume command of the situation and to do 00 in an effective and purposeful way If the State Department as at present staffed ia not capable of aasuming effective command this is not in my Judgments an argument against a rational reorganisation of Intelligence ia an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department SECRE-Th - -seeREf 15 The structure which would matt the criteria suggested la thlt memorandum would bt at follows 1 The State Department would bd granted general clearance authority ova all clandestine activity Thit might bt effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of Slate for Intelligence who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board 2 The Joifct Intelligence Board would include repreeentatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House 3 The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless Utle the National Information Service -This new agency would be charged with responsi billty for clandestine collection for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance In general the agency would bear somewhat the same relation ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do 4 A second aemi-independent agency would be set up again bearing a blameless title the Foreign Research Agency coordi note with the operations agency This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation It would include CIA DDI the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State and the various service functions now carried on by CIA photographic interpretation biographical files foreign broadcast monitoring scientific intelligence maps overt collection etc o it might well be located in the CIA building in McLean Arthur Schlesinger jr cc The Attorney General Mr Bundy 2vlr Ihxngan gigfe R 3 R 1 S M j pk C 4 J f r a j s f o s p j s t 1 P l i M GBP J i r ---- ggatss HfL feGBP SS9w -vo S f ' i w V K W 3r L S r a f c y o f A - ft v a S M i r i -V rjgT- # jjiRW mm OTi $ This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu