25 A p r i l 1963 M E M O R A N D U M ON C U B A N P O L I C Y v r R a n d o m thoughts d e v e l o p e d b y DCI on v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of the C u b a n p r o b l e m and the d i s c u s s i o n a t Sta n d in g G r o u p p r e p a r e d f o r u s e b y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of DCI a t m e e t i n g s on t h i s s u b j e c t d u r i n g h i s a b s e n c e f r o m the c o u n t r y 1 C a s t r o ' s p o s i t i o n - I a g r e e w i t h the O N E e s t i m a t e th at C a s t r o ' s p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n w i l l i m p r o v e w i th i n th e n e x t y e a r b a r r i n g a s s a s s i n a t i o n H is i m a g e a m o n g l i b e r a l s and i n s u r g e n t g r o u p s in the W e s t e r n H e m i s p h e r e t w i l l i m p r o v e though t h i s w i l l not be th e c a s e w ith the H eads of S t a t e E c o n o m i c h a r d s h i p s and o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s such a s i n s u r g e n c y r a i d s e t c w i t h i n C u b a w i l l c o m p l i c a t e h i s p r o b l e m s but on b a l a n c e it s e e m s to m e C a s t r o ' s s i tu a ti o n h a s i m p r o v e d s i n c e about D e c e m b e r and w ill c o n t i n u e to i m p r o v e T h e Cuban people w i l l b e c o m e r e s i g n e d to h i s p r e s e n c e and w i l l g o a b o u t t h e i r b u s i n e s s e x p r e s s i n g t h e i r r e s e n t m e n t in a p a t h y r a t h e r than in a c t i v e b e l l i g e r e n c e ' T h i s t r e n d c a n be slowed and p o s s i b l y r e v e r s e d if U nited S t a t e s a c t i o n is ta k e n with d e t e r m i n a t i o n J c o n t i n u i t y and c o n s i s t e n c y 2 4w E c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n - Undoubtedly the C a s t r o G o v e r n m e n t i s s e r i o u s l y h u r t by US e c o n o m i c a c t i o n s T h e s e a c t i o n s a l o n e h ow ever f c a n n o t b r in g C a s t r o down althou gh th e y w i l l continue to give h im tr ou ble and to i n c r e a s e S ovie t p r o b l e m s and c o s t s in supportin g him e c o n o m i c b lo ck ade m u st be kept up and i n t e n s i f i e d be exercised The G r e a t e f f o r t must to shut off supply of p a r t s f r o m Canada which is now 0 E C L -- ' H r 5 D 'IT f l o w i n g in s m a l l but v e r y i m p o r t a n t q u a n t i t i e s Continuing e f f o r t m u st be e x e r c i s e d with a l l W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s M oreover a con- t i n u in g e f f o r t m u s t be e x e r c i s e d w ith m a j o r U S c o r p o r a t i o n s a s has b e e n done w ith I n t e r n a t i o n a l H a r v e s t e r on t r a c t o r s f r o m Spain and with th e o i l c o m p a n i e s in c o n t r o l l i n g the ''b r i g h t s t o c k ' supply L a t i n A m e r i c a p la y s a m i n o r T r a d e with r o l e in C u b a ' s e x p o r t - i m p o r t e c o n o m y but th e L a t i n A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s shou ld continue t h e i r e c o n o m i c b o y c o tt wh ich has been effectiv e T h e p r i n c i p a l a n d m o s t e f f e c t i v e m e a n s of h a r d e n i n g C a s t r o ' s e c o n o m i c s i t u a t i o n w i l l c o m e th r o u g h C a n a d a W e s t e r n E u r o p e and Ja p a n I n t e n s i f i e d e f f o r t s m i g h t be e f f e c t i v e but I would e x p e c t that t h e p a s s a g e of t i m e and the ''a c c e p t a n c e of C a s t r o and h i s C o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t th e p r e s s u r e s of t r a d e the s e e k i n g of m a r k e t s the ta k ing I a d v a n t a g e of b u s i n e s s o p p o r t u n i t i e s e t c w i l l c a u s e a d e c i d e d w e a k e n in g of C a n a d i a n - E u r o p e a f i s u p p ort of four p r o g r a m of e c o n o m i c s a n c t i o n s T h i s h a s b e e n t r u e of o t h e r U S e f f o r t s of this type in the p a s t s u c h a s tr a d e w i th the S o v i e t Union C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s and o t h e r s % 3 T h e s u g a r m a r k e t - C a s t r o ' s p r o b l e m s and the S o v i e t c o s t of s u p p o r t i n g C a s t r o i s o f f s e t to a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e by the d r a m a t i c i n c r e a s e iO the p r i c e of s u g a r Th e i n c r e a s e in the l a s t y e a r when applied to 757o of e s t i m a t e d 1963 p r o d u c tio n of s u g a r about e q u a l s the e s t i m a t e d e c o n o m i c aid the Soviets a r e r e q u i r e d to give Cuba in 1963 T h e r e f o r e 0 it m ig h t be said that the F re e World is supplying the money with which the S oviets a r e supporting C astro C areful exploration should be made as to why the su g ar m ark et has gone up so d ram atically 2 - 3 4 GBP in 1961 - 6 -1 2 to 7$ now The United States should break the sugar m arket if possible This is a sen sitiv e m a rk e t and is m ad e by middlemen and can be manipulated An upw ard m ovem ent of a cent a pound would d e cre a se the Soviet Cuban dollar incom e by $ 6 0 -7 0 million this y e a r Although th ere a r e som e indications th at the dem and for sugar exceed s supply it is hard to believe that this facto r in its e lf is to tally responsible for thepresent p rice of su g a r 4 To use shipping as a weapon is not very effectiv e There a re lots of idle bottom s and the Soviets can employ them for th eir non-Cuban trade and use th e ir tan k ers and dry ca rg o ships for Cuban tra d e While our e ffo rts w ith the F r e e World cou n tries should be continued we should not co n sid e r this a s a very im portant and effective means of hurting C astro 9 In fa c t to the extent that non-B loc ships could be con veyors of agents and v ario u s sabotage d evices their o ccasion al tra n sit into Cuba might be % an advantage rath er than a disadvantage frona our standpoint NOTE In s u m m a r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t C a s t r o ' s e c o n o m y should be c o n t in u e d and h a r d e n e d and m ig h t m a k e th in g s m o r e d i f f i c u l t f o r h i m B ut t h e s e w i l l not b r in g him down F u r t h e r m o r e it w ill b eco m e in - c r e a s i n g l y d iffic ult to s e c u r e F r e e W o rld c o o p e r a t i o n a s the w o r l d p u b l ic g e t s u eed to C a s t r o -3- 5 The Soviet p resen ce in Cuba continues There has been no a p p reciab le exodus in recen t w eeks there a re no la rg e p assenger ships enroute to Cuba now Indications a re that Khrushchev has met his com m itm en t of rem oving 11se v e ra l thousand S ov iets and may have called a halt to the exodus It m ay be resum ed as Cubans becom e proficient in handling the equipment C astro apparently exp ects th is to judge fro m his sta te m e n ts to Donovan I re a lly have no a ssu ra n ce th is w ill take place and we should not be d e te rre d from any actions of any kind n e c e s s a ry to slow down C a s tro 8 growth or to overthrow him on grounds that this would cau se a K rem lin d ecision not to rem ove its troops 4 6 The Soviet th reat Fin ally the p resen ce of the se v e ra l thousand Soviets in Cuba does not pose a threat to this country The Soviets would i probably not engage them selves in any internal situation within Cuba i N e v e rth e le ss th ere is no reasonable explanation fo r the p resen ce of so m any Soviets o r for the retention in Cuba of a v a riety of v ery sophisticated m ilita ry equipment m ost important of which a re the SAM site s One can % only conclude that the SAMs a re there to be used at the Soviets will in depriving the United States of a e ria l surveillance and our source of knowlecfee of'what is gang on in Cuba Cuba The SAM s a r e not u s e f u l in the d e fe n s e of They can be destroyed quickly by low -level attack Therefore they a re there for some other purpose and this is not adequately explained in my opinion by K h r u s h c h e v ' s pride or l o s s of f a c e or the K h ru sh ch e v C a stro relationsh ip and other 6uch explanations As long aa the SAMs a re th ere there is alw ays the possibility they will be used o r we w ill be threatened with th eir u se and this will be done at a tim e when they a r e willing to take the ris k oGBP another confrontation ' w ith the United S tates I th e re fo re feel that we must not under any c ir c u m s ta n c e d ism iss the p ossib ility of a second confrontation of a type en co u n tered last O ctober I have the sam e feeling about the 9 p re s e n c e of the SAMs in Cuba now as X did last F a ll In our thinking and planning concerning Cuba we m ust not lose sight of the fact h ow ever re m o te that the Soviets can reintroduce m issiles in Cuba a c c e p t the ris k of confrontation and confront us with the p rosp ect of w ar which would p resen t a difficult decision to us or negotiations t a t h igh er p rice than was K hrushchev's original objective If the i situ ation w e re re v e rs e d th ere would be p re ssu re in this country fro m c e r ta in e x tr e m is ts 11 to take such a risk of confrontation and 1 fe e l that Khrushchev might v ery w ell be under exactly the sam e p re s s u re F o r this reaso n this possibility must not be discounted and all m e a su re s of protection against this su rp rise must be taken 7 F r o m the ab ove it s e e m s to m e th at a high p r i o r i t y should be a t t a c h e d to developing m e a s u r e s d i r e c t e d to w a r d r e m o a l of Soviet tro o p s and la rg e r items of equipment from Cuba m an eu v ers should be m ade All possible diplomatic If an opportunity for a tra d e on reasonably fav o rab le te rm s develops this should be explored h a rra s sm e n t of installations en co u rag ed and feints o r for that m atter commando raid s to steal Soviet KOMAR v e s s e ls o r SAM m issile s should be considered W arnings of this possl b ility m ight be one m eans of suggesting to the Soviets that som e of th eir sen sitiv e scie n tific equipment is exposed and hence they might consider rem o v in g it 8 Sabotage C arefully planned and well executed sabotage will intensify C a s t r o ' s p roblem s but will not by itself bring him down L o w -lev el sabotage such a s m in or cro p destruction a ctiv itie s interruption of tran sp o rtatio n e tc w ill be annoying Successful m ajor sabotage from within and without w ill in # my opinion add to the problems cre a te d by the econom ic m e a s u re s This will 4 be p a rtic u la rly tru e as the flow of sp are parts to esse n tia l plants such a s power plants is effectiv ely shut off A combination of econom ic p re ss u re and la rg e - s c a le sabotage will hurt C astro serio u sly but it will not bring him down o I n a d d i t i o n a v a r i e t y of o th e r a c t i o n s c a n be e f f e c t i v e l y c a r r i e d out which w o u ld s e r i o u s l y i m p a i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s b etw een C a s t r o and L a t i n A m e r i c a n countries A l s o the C a s t r o - K h r u s h c h e v r e l a t i o n s h i p could be a f f e c t e d by d e v e lo p in g c h a n n e l s through w h ich the v i t r i o l i c and c r i t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s made by e a c h c o n c e r n i n g the oth er i s t r a n s m i t t e d In addition a p r o g r a m of m i s i n f o r m a t i o n p r o p e r l y c a r r i e d out would be e f f e c t i v e -6 o % mm 9 Sabotage from within and without will resu lt in a Attribution to the United S ta te s Captured sab o teu rs will confess U S im plication th ere will be o c r itic is m in the world p re ss and a v ery con sid erab le amount of e m b a rra s sm e n t to the United States G overnm ent These p ro g ra m s should not be initiated unless we a re willing to a cce p t the re su lts of the attribution and being blamed for a c ts of sabotage and b Enorm ous com plications for our intelligence e ffo rts and % c P ossib le re p risals in the form of sabotage within the United States as was recen tly planned in New Y ork again st United States shipping in foreign p o rts and possibly re ta lia to ry action against our aerial su rv eillan ce On b alan ce I feel we can run these ro sk s but we should not initiate the p rogram unless we are willing to accep t the c r itic is m which is bound to resu lt 10 om T h e m o s t e x t r e m e m e a s u r e s which would b e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t i the population are feasible but I am against them on humane and m oral grounds T h e y wovld be a t t r i b u t a b l e to the United S t a t e s stand as a b l a c k m a r k on our r e c o r d fo r a l l t i m e T h e y would T h e y would c au s e untold h a r d s h ip to th o u san d s perhaps m i l l i o n s of individuals who a r e nQt re sp o n sib le for C a s tro and can do nothing about him and they owould not n e c e s s a r ily an sw er the C astro -C o m m u n ist p ro b lem It seems to m e that if the problem is so serious that we must resort to th e s e m e a s u r e s then we should face up to a d irect confrontation a b lock ad e and an invasion 11 V B rin g in g C a stro down M easu res discussed above will c r e a t e f o r C a s tr o and his reg im e g reat hardship but as mentioned w ill n o t b rin g him down H ow ever they will cause d is tr e s s and o d is s e n s io n within his organization and will tend to d estro y its m o n olith ic fe a tu re This would p resen t the opportunity of splitting' h is re g im e at the top and catalyzing a revolt on the p art of a ll or a su b sta n tial segm ent of his m ilita r y ' The resu lt could be a m ilita ry ta k e -o v e r typical of Latin A m e rica the establishm ent of a m ilita ry d ictato rsh ip friendly to the United States and to the W e ste rn H em isp here nations unfriendly to the Soviets and it would o be n on -C om m un ist If su cce ssfu l the m ilitary regim e could then fo rc e the withdrawal of Soviet m ilitary personnel and a g reat deal of equipm ent It could solve this problem but would p resen t us with serio u s problem s of econom ic aid sugar quotas resolving the problem of confisfjcated property a id all the r e s t A combination of econom ic sanctions and h arrassm en t on the one hand and a - 8 - on c c f u l e ffo rt to d i en ch n t h i ra UU leader hip and c a u revolt and m ilitary tak eo v er on the other e e m to be the 0 1 c o r e open to bring C w C m down and rem o v e the Soviet th reat r f ' The prospect of an effective npri ing of the peopi r t ag ain st C a s tro seem s remote if he retains control of his m ilitary and security fo rce s Sm all u p risin g s would be suppressed as they are now Large uprisings would probably re s u lt in a blood bath Therefore I conclude we must split C astro m ilitary organio i zation to in su re the su ccess of a revolt against him 12 Splitting C astro from Moscow - - This might be done Perhaps C astro 1# p ro clam atio n s and em brace of Communism is really a recent development # He is knowTi to have been a radical a liberal a revolutionary but not a h ard -co re Communist He disclaim s being such at the present time but he has em braced Com m unism publicly He claim s he is not a satellite that he is independent that i hQ w ill dispose of the Soviets at his convenience and that he seeks a rapprochement witb the United States o s o b scu re Whether this should be done or could be done rem ains i It is not in the Am erican tradition ever to'tru st a man who has been deceitful am bitious and an avowed enemy On the other hand Communists % have changed their stripes e g Chiang Kai- shek and Betancourt and Jictators have changed their orientation e g N asser All of the problems of sugar quotas -aid e tc would immediately arise under this plan and would be far less ' acceptable to the American people and to the Congress than would be the case if C astro w ere disposed of Nevertheless consideration should be given to a highly -9 - i o i- J ll t f com partm ented carefully planned and managed program to defect C a stro fro m Moscow An existing channel might be used for this purpose and this effort might be made concurrently with all other steps mentioned above 13 R elations with the people of Cuba C onstructive dynamic and positive program s must be developed and implemented to breathe hope into the Cuban people This is not for the purpose of creating a n 'U prising am ong the people for it appears to me that as long as C a stro co n tro ls the m ilitary and the internal security fo rce s a popular uprising that assumed serious momentum might result in a blood bath The program should be designed to let the people of i Cuba know that they have a future and that the United States is ' o o determ ined to provide that future for them There a re many ways ' t of developing such a program and many convincing thoughts which' can be projected to tho Cuban people by various means of transm ission All of this is essential to the success of ail long range dynamic United States program for the removal of C astro and Communism from Cuba - 10 - This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu