3 ' TTBT 3FDT 3FDT P U 1' # # G Date Page 09 24 98 1 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY RECORD NUMBER RECORDS SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER PFIAB 206-10001-10016 PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR FROM TO TITLE DATE PAGES SUBJECTS DOCUMENT TYPE CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTIONS CURRENT STATUS DATE OF LAST REVIEW OPENING CRITERIA COMMENTS NSC A R ASH THE FILE BOARD PANEL ON COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS 09 10 63 7 COVERT ACTION P A P E R TEXTUAL DOCUMENT TOP SECRET I B 1C RELEASED WITH DELETIONS 08 06 98 Box 10 Covert Operations 1954-1967 contained in 206-10001-10001 Duplicate R - ITEM IS RESTRICTED L11tZ 9 Cirt V qamssvTPaq S3AIH0HV TVNOUVN 3H1 iv a3onooad3H TH E W H ITE H O U S E WAS H I NGTON September 10 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE SUBJECT Board Panel on Covert Action Operations The Board Panel met in the Board' s offices on September 6 1963 Panel members present were Mr Robert Murphy Chairman Mr Gordon Gray and Dr William Langer Ash also attended the meeting Messrs Coyne and During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr Richard Helms Deputy DCI Plans CIA and his assistants Mr Cord Meyer and Mr Desmond Fitzgerald head of CIA s headquarters staff dealing with Cuba Highlights of the briefings were as follows MESSRS HELMS and MEYER - r Z J l GBP Z T B C 5 W Auoipny aamssvTPag S3AIH0HV TVNOUVN 3Hi iV Q30000ad3d e rs F C R tr -' v o -- j h r o -y oo V #C o o o ' o ' o oo -i -v oV w - o ooo o o o C ' V T ' o - oo- - o' o 4 - i V - t i - a rr i'1i 1 o fv o I r rv- Dominican Republic Vietnam CIAls role in Vietnam during the past two years has been two-fold - ZTiTGBPZT5 Cuv77 w m V aaonssvToaa 2 - s a A w o a v iv N o a v N 3 h i iv aao n o oad aa 1 Total support of the war against the Viet Cong including the training of some 43 000 irregulars now turned over to U S Special Forces support to th e mountain people in operations against the Viet Cong and CIA training of U S Special Forces in South Vietnam 2 CIA support of infiltration operations in North Vietnam Not a great success High losses of teams a In response to question based on recent U S press allegations that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government UCIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever -- no instigation of the Buddhists -- nothing CIA considers that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame Nhu The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists but the Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U S Embassy has j indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire to unify what is a loosely-joined individual-Pagoda-type religious movement o j r- ' X August 20 saw the temple raids martial law and then the arrests of students One U S reaction was an August 24 cable- j gram from the State Department presumably hastily prepared j which in nice diplomatic language to State Department representar tives in Saigon gave the word to unload the Nhus -- i e j indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that j they should get moving However the Generals proved to be lack- ing in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem sentiments CIA considers that the August 24 State Department cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General fs true capabilities and intentions CIA understands that subsequently the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the sub- j ject and more recent State Department cables have reflected aLrevision of the earlier unload the Nhus message As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not had an adverse effect on the military effort nor any increased Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation Mr Helms departed at this point qmaissriDara 3 J3P-SGBPefiGBPF S3AIH0H V 1VN0UVN 3H 1 IV Q30n 00bd 38 -w -s te R rr MR FITZGERALD On the subject of Cuba In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert actions against Cuba The covert program assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted on the premise that at the present rate of progress the Castro regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage of time runs in Castro s favor Mr Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA covert actions remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals which were previously under consideration it should be kept in mind that they have now been approved as interdependent actions The actions call for l covert collection of intelligence 2 propaganda action to stimulate low-key sabotage 3 stimulate disaffection among the Cuban military 4 an economic denial - 4 - L 11 %L B CitV V huoipny oaajflssvTDaa S3AJH3HV TVNOUVN 3H1IV 0 3 0 0 0 0 4 3 TOP-SEeftEf program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery and other products needed by Cuba 5 a sabotage program of a general nature and 6 support of anti-Castro autonomous groups by giving them money and the means to act but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States and which precludes operations from U S or British soil The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups and the military is felt to be the best bet The CIA effort represents a shif t from external raids to internal sabotage actions CIA mounts about 10 black11 operations a month and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18 and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such'as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government The Special Group Mr Bu dy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIAfs sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time Again referring to the Cuban economy it is hurting badly The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial machinery needed by Cuba and the USSR cannot supply them The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in this respect Castro s re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means increased efforts to produce sugar a crop which presents a good sabotage target Finally the Soviet aid at a rate of $1 million a day military and economic is not enough to keep the Cuban economy goinc Cubans are not starving but they do not eat comfortably even in the larger cities CIA finds that a major problem for their black teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves CIA assets bej ng used against Cuba Staff M i W a s h i n g t o n and M nti U S contractor personnel M l Foreign nationals f HKniostl Cubans Personnel at overseas posts lb DD I staff lb NPIC a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba L I lGBPZ- ' C Cir fV -- aaiDssvToaa -- f m i S3AIH0HV TVNOUVN 3H1IV 030000 138 JN -- CIA considers that of all nationalities the Cubans are the most unreliable prone to exaggerate The best information comes from non-Cuban agents l including friendly diplomatic There are - n Cuba teams working one of which personnel There arejH illej legal travelers working Iip 1 -hasl sub-agents There are penetrations of l pVH agents in Cuban shipping an3 there are penetrations uuban installations abroad As to Soviet shipping into Cuba CIA has an agent in every port - but observers cannot say what is in the crates they'see being off-loaded Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken by agents on-the-grourid in Cuba Also CIA has furnished its agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment CIA s estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba 12 000 Soviet troops 150 Chinese mostly diplomatic personnel an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians and ua lot of Czech and other bloc technicians working with the Cuban military forces CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has been made in l intelligence collection with respect to Cuba and 2 effectiveness of the economic denial program CIA feels that the f X f factor is-the volatility of the Cuban people whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change overnight if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations against the Cuban government CIA penetration of the Cuban militai An agent brought out a Cubai _____ The a medium JLevei acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro but although this view is held by unicating individual members of the it to others within ___________ efectors are naming military 0B acted0 TKere is however a fear of the Castro security system The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting by nonprofessional observers However there is no evidence of offensive missiles There are 47 MIG-21 s operated by Cuban pilots Cubans are at theSA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them We donftknow what is in the caves exactly Neither CIA agents nor Cubans nor even Castro has access to the Soviet armored camps A R Ash Q-p -S-E'C R E-T- - 6 - qamssvTogq S3AIH3HY TVNOUVN 3Hi IV Q30n00 d3a This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu