v v v v v - ---- 14 February 1964 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT Special Group 5412 Meeting at 1600 on 13 February 1 Present were Mr McGeorge Bundy Mr McCone Mr Vance General Taylor Mr Alexis Johnson Mr Mann General Carter Mr FitzGerald and Peter Jessup General Taylor and Mr FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item z Prior to the arrival of Mr Bundy General Taylor mentioned to Mr Alexis Johns o n an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk Fort Bragg and Panama After some jocul_a r bantering Mr Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs _of Staff 3 Mr McCone mentioned the possibility tl iat he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador d that while he and Mr McNamara might be going out_ later as a follow-up to their December trip he felt the need to go now General Taylor _point d out that the r e have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while In any event he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip General Taylor seemed reluctant -to have Mr McCone go at this time Mr Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr McCone early next week 4 The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the -Va nce memo of 10 February on Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba '' Mr Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action that the- risks were minimal and that - - - J VV'VVV o - zthe JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it Mr Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures Mr Vance stated that the committee knows all about it'and are for it Mr McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough He pointed out that our economic denial program -w as eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr Vance's memo ga ve Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything Mr Vance stated that prior ac t ivities in this regard had created great consternatio in Cuba and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof Mr McCone -pointed out the _m any times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level General Taylor said that what we really mu_st do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this n pe must be continued Mr Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President along with Secretary Rusk that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr McNa nfara had reversed his position Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthr9w of Castro At about this point both Mr Mann and Mr McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against eastro Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk Mann stated that we need to do a lot more bomework before the next OAS meeting presently unscheduled and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the _P resident to discuss this whole matter The agenda item was left as follows a Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on o1her alternative courses of action to include pros and cons noise levels estimated results etc - 3 - b Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time c As to the specific paragraphs of the vance memo Bundy indicated his personal views not an Adzninistration commitment that items 1 and 2a were OK 2b for Cuban ships only 3a should be intensified 3b and 3c were directly -connected to a separate black- list enterprise 4 was OK As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are and on paragraph 2 CIA should deter ine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be Finally after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba General Taylor and Mr McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday Saturday and Sunday and to take a fresh reading ori the matter on Monday Ac tion DD I to cove r the low-level OUltter over the weekend DD P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo 5 The next item s a very cursory review _of the covert action programs fori I France Tibet r - 7 and China Mr Vance asked how we could measure th veness of such actions and Mr McCone pointed out to him that this could not be rea lly adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor Mr Va' rice stated that was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appre_c iate some briefings by the action officers It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to cliscuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations he 6 Mr McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U -2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution Mr McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be us d either SAC or CIA Mr Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems the JCS Mr McNamara and he had agreed_ that SAC should fly the flight - He stated that Mr McAfee of the State Deparb nent _bad been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commande in the Philippines also knew about it He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight Mr McCone pointed out that the question bad not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or saniti ed aircraft nor he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties Mr Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course Vance said this was a oneshot problem only and that as soon as it was completed the planes and crews would be withdrawn He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC bad sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission He said they could understand the need for two airplane in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage_mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this was 7 It was apparetlt that all were in agreement that the Director of Cent r al lnte lligence had the responsibility for approvi g requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate r e sources to be used for this coverage whenever it req'lii red overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory Mr Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare th e necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting Action DD S tT - 5to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the si J nplest most concise directive along the foregoing lines a __ e Marshall S Carter Lieutenant General USA Deputy Directqr Distribution Original - DDCI l - Elder Enright Paras 1-5 to Mr Paul Eckel DDP SGO Paras 6 8t 1 - DD S T This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu