AttarAe · U S Department of Justice Wark PraetJet II May CaAtaiA Material Prateetee UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 20 16 Presidential Election Volume I of II Special Counsel Robert S Mueller III Submitted Pursuant to 28 C F R § 600 8 c Washington D C March 2019 U S Department of Justice Attafttey Vafit PFatlttet II May Catttaitt Matefial Pfateetetl Utttlef Fetl R Cfim P 6 e U S Department of Justice 1 tt emey Werk Preelttet II May CeAtail'l Matel'ial Preteeteel UAeer Feel R Grim P 6 e TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME I INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME 4 I THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION 11 II RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN 14 A Structure of the Internet Research Agency 15 B Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin 16 C The IRA Targets U S Elections 19 1 The IRA Ramps Up U S Operations As Early As 2014 19 2 U S Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts 22 3 U S Operations Through Facebook 24 4 U S Operations Through Twitter 26 a Individualized Accounts 26 b IRA Botnet Activities 28 5 U S Operations Involving Political Rallies 29 6 Targeting and Recruitment of U S Persons 31 7 Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign 33 a Trump Campaign Promotion ofiRA Political Materials 33 b Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies 35 III RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS 36 A GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 36 1 GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign 36 2 Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks 38 a Initial Access 38 b Implantation of Malware on DCCC and DNC Networks 38 c Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks 40 B Dissemination of the Hacked Materials 41 1 DCLeaks 4 1 2 Guccifer 2 0 42 3 Use of WikiLeaks 44 a WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign 44 b WikiLeaks' s First Contact with Guccifer 2 0 and DCLeaks 45 U S Department of Justice Pdt6rHey 1t6rk Pr6tittet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teeteti UHtier Feti R Griff P 6 e c The GRU' s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks 45 d · WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials 48 C Additional GRU Cyber Operations 49 l Summer and Fall2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims 49 2 Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U S Elections 50 D Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials 51 l 51 a Background 51 b Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks 52 c Harm to Ongoing Matter 54 d WikiLeaks's October 7 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails 58 e Donald Trump Jr Interaction with WikiLeaks 59 2 Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials 61 a Henry Oknyansky alk a Henry Greenberg 61 b Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails 62 IV RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN 66 A Campaign Period September 2015- November 8 2016 66 1 Trump Tower Moscow Project 67 a Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group 2013-2014 67 b Communications with I C Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze Summer and Fall2015 69 c Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government October 2015January 2016 70 i Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization 70 ii Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia 72 d Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump December 2015-June 2016 76 i Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia 76 ii Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia 78 2 George Papadopoulos 80 a Origins of Campaign Work 81 b Initial Russia-Related Contacts 82 c March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting 85 ii U S Department of Justice AM erHey 'eric Preel1 1et II May CeRtaiH Material Preteeteel UReler Feel R Grim P 6 e d George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has Dirt in the Form of Clinton Emails 86 e Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign 89 f Trump Campaign Knowledge of Dirt 93 g Additional George Papadopoulos Contact 94 3 Carter Page 95 a Background 96 b Origins of and Early Campaign Work 97 c Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow 98 d Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign 102 4 Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest 103 a CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign 103 b National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel 105 c Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI 107 d Jared Kushner's Continuing Contacts with Simes 108 5 June 9 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower 110 a Setting Up the June 9 Meeting 110 i Outreach to Donald Trwnp Jr ·110 ii Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign 114 b The Events of June 9 2016 116 i Arrangements for the Meeting 116 ii Conduct of the Meeting 117 c Post-June 9 Events 120 6 Events at the Republican National Convention 123 a Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J D Gordon the Week of the RNC 123 b Change to Republican Party Platform 124 7 Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak 127 a Ambassador Kislyak Invites J D Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence 127 b Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak 127 8 Paul Manafort 129 a Paul Manafort' s Ties to Russia and Ukraine 131 iii U S Department of Justice AttefAe · Wefk PFeettet II Mtey· CeHtaiH MateFial Preteetee UHeef Fee R Cfiffi P 6 e i Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work 131 11 Political Consulting Work 132 iii Konstantin Kilirnnik 132 b Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign 134 i Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign 134 ii Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts 135 iii Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States 138 c Post-Resignation Activities 141 B Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts 144 I Immediate Post-Election Activity 144 a Outreach from the Russian Government 145 b High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels 146 2 Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration 147 a Background 147 b Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration 149 c Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles 151 1 George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev 151 ii The Seychelles Meetings 153 iii Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip 155 d Kirill Dmitriev 's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U S -Russia Relations 156 3 Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in Trump Tower Following the Election 159 4 Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov 161 5 Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team 163 6 Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich 166 7 Contacts With and Through Michael T Flynn 167 a United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements 167 b U S Sanctions Against Russia 168 V PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS 174 A Russian Active Measures Social Media Campaign 174 IV At-ten1 e ' U S Department of Justice Werle PreH ttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 UH6er Fe6 R Grim P 6 e B Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 175 1 Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy 175 a Background 175 b Charging Decision As to 176 2 Potential Section 1030 Violation By 179 C Russian Government Outreach and Contacts 180 1 Potential Coordination Conspiracy and Collusion 180 2 Potential Coordination Foreign Agent Statutes PARA and 18 U S C § 951 181 a Governing Law 181 b Application 182 3 Campaign Finance 183 a Overview Of Governing Law 184 b Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting 185 i Thing-of-Value Element 186 ii Willfulness 187 iii Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information 188 c Application to WikiLeaks i u Willfulness 190 iii Constitutional Considerations 190 iv Analysis 190 4 False Statements and Obstruction ofthe Investigation 191 a Overview Of Governing Law 191 b Application to Certain Individuals 192 i George Papadopoulos 192 11 194 HI Michael Flynn 194 IV Michael Cohen 195 v 196 vi Jeff Sessions 197 vii Others Interviewed During the Investigation 198 v U S Department of Justice At terttey Werle Preattet II May Cetttain Material Preteetea Uttaer Fee R Crini P 6 e U S Department of Justice AUerHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C F R § 600 8 c which states that a t the conclusion of the Special Counsel 's work he shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions the Special Counsel reached The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion Evidence ofRussian government operations began to surface in mid-20 16 In June the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that Russian hackers had compromised its computer network Releases of hacked materials-hacks that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began that same month Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks with further releases in October and November In late July 2016 soon after WikiLeaks 's first release of stolen documents a foreign government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to Democratic presidential candidate Hillary C linton That information prompted the FBI on July 31 20 16 to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities That fall two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government directed recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions including US political organizations and t hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process After the election in late December 20 16 the United States imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election By early 2017 several congressional committees were examining Russia's interference in the election Within the Executive Branch these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017 appo intment of Special Counsel Robert S Mueller III The order appointing the Special Counsel authorized him to investigate the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election including any links or coordination between the Russian govern m ent and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign As set forth in detail in this report the Special Counsel's investigation established that Russia interfereq in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations First a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton Second a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities employees and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome and that the Campaign expected it would benefit U S Department of Justice Atterl'l ey Werk Preettet II May Cefl tail'l Material Preteetee Ul'l eer Fee R Grim P 6 e electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions and we then provide an overview of the two vo Iumes of our report The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be supported by the evidence collected in our investigation In some instances the report points out the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event In other instances when substantial credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with confidence the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events occurred A statement that the investigation did not establish patticular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted a crime we applied the framework of conspiracy law not the concept of collus ion In so doing the Office recognized that the word collud e was used in communications with the Acting Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation' s scope and that the term has frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law For those reasons the Office 's focus in analyzing questions ofjoint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law In connection with that analysis we addressed the factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign coordinat ed - a term that appears in the appointment order-with Russian election interference activities Like collusion coordination does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law We understood coordination to require an agreement- tacit or express-between the Trump Campaign and the Russian government on election interference That requires more than the two parties taking actions that were informed by or responsive to the other' s actions or interests We applied the term coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities The report on our investigation consists of two volumes Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel' s investigation of Russia' s interference in the 20 16 presidential election and its interactions w ith the Trump Campaign Section I describes the scope of the investigation Sections II and III describe the principal ways Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election Section IV describes links between the Russian 2 U S Department of Justice Al terHey Verk PreatJet II May CeHtttiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign Section V sets forth the Special Counsel's charging decisions Volume II addresses the President's actions towards the FBI ' s investigation into Russia' s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters and his actions towards the Special Counsel's investigation Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations that guided that investigation 3 A rrtey U S Department of Justice Werk Preattet II May CeH tairt Matel'ial Preteetea UrtEier FeEl R Grim P 6 e EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME I RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The Internet Research Agency IRA carried out the earliest Russian interference operations identified by the investigation-a social media campaign designed to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States The IRA was based in St Petersburg Russia and received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin and · controlled P · · is wide to have ties to Russian President Vladimir The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U S political system through what it termed information warfare The campaign evolved from a generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U S electoral system to a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton The IRA's operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the names of U S persons and entities as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United States To organize those rallies IRA employees posed as U S grassroots entities and persons and made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States The investigation did not identify evidence that any U S persons conspired or coordinated with the IRA Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media campatgn RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus on supporting candidate Trump in early 2016 the Russian government employed a second form of interference cyber intrusions hacking and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign The Russian intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Army GRU carried out these operations In March 2016 the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign volunteers and employees including campaign chairman John Podesta In April 20 16 the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee DCCC and the Democratic National Committee DNC The GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks Around the time that the DNC announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network the GRU began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0 The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks 4 U S Department of Justice AU6rHey W6rk Pmattet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e The presidential campaign of Donald J Trump Trump Campaign or Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks 's releases of documents and welcomed their · I to damage forecast to candidate Clinton Beginning in June 2016 senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks on mag ng to candidate Clinton WikiLeaks's first release came in July 2016 Around the same time candidate Trump announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server of State later said that he was · · used Clinton when she was S one a U S media outlet released video considered damaging to candidate Trump Section III of this Report details the Office's investigation into the Russian hacking operations as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities The Russian contacts consisted of business connections offers of assistance to the Campaign invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person invitations for Campaign officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet and policy positions seeking improved U S -Russian relations Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods the most salient of which are summarized below in chronological order 2015 Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow Candidate Trump signed a Letter oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015 and in January 2016 Trump Organization executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian government press secretary Dmitry Peskov The Trump Organization pursued the project through at least June 2016 including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump Spring 2016 Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact with Joseph Mifsud a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to Moscow in April 2016 Immediately upon his return to London from that trip Mifsud told Papadopoulos that the Russian government had dirt on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands 5 AtterHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet II May CentaiH Material Preteetee UHEler Fee R CritH P 6 e of emails One week later in the first week of May 2016 Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton Throughout that period of time and for several months thereafter Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government No meeting took place Summer 2016 Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of 2016 as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President On June 9 2016 for example a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald Trump Jr Jared Kushner and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email proposing the meeting had described as official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary The materials were offered to Trump Jr as part of Russia and its government's support for Mr Trump The written communications setting up the meeting showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects but the Russian lawyer's presentation did not provide such information Days after the June 9 meeting on June 14 2016 a cybersecurity firm and the DNC announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to opposition research on candidate Trump among other documents In July 2016 Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School Page had lived and worked in Russia between 2003 and 2007 After returning to the United States Page became acquainted with at least two Russian intelligence officers one of whom was later charged in 20 15 with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention The Campaign then distanced itself from Page and by late September 2016 removed him from the Campaign July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the DNC On July 22 2016 WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing information about the Clinton Campaign Within days there was public reporting that U S intelligence agencies had high confidence that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the DNC And within a week of the release a foreign government informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign On July 31 2016 based on the foreign government repmting the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign Separately on August 2 20 16 Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a backdoor way for Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine both men believed the plan would require candidate Trump's assent to succeed were he to be elected President They also discussed the status of the 6 U S Department of Justice A emey Vferlt Pretittet May CeAtaifl Material Preteeteti UAtier Feti R Grim P 6 e Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states Months before that meeting Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting Fall2016 On October 7 2016 the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in graphic terms about women years earlier which was considered damaging to his candidacy Less than an hour later WikiLeaks made its second release thousands of John Podesta's emails that had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016 The FBI and other U S government institutions were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere in the presidential election That same day October 7 the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence issued a joint public statement that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions including from US political organizations Those thefts and the disclosures of the hacked materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks the statement continued are intended to interfere with the US election process Post-2016 Election Immediately after the November 8 e lection Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new administration The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts The Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to arrange a call with President Putin Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there Kirill Dmitriev the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund was among the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration In early December a business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in January 20 17 in the Seychelles and discussed U S -Russia relations During the same period another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served on the Campaign or the Transition Team Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia which Dmitriev implied had been cleared through Putin The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson On December 29 20 16 then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having interfered in the election Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the sanctions The fo llowing day Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted Great move on delay by V Putin The next day on December 3 1 2016 Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result ofFiynn's request On January 6 20 17 members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump on a joint assessment-drafted and coordinated among the Central Intelligence Agency FBI and 7 U S Department of Justice AUerHey Werlt PreE ittet May CeHtaiH Material PreteeteE i UHE iet· Fed R Grim P 6 e National Security Agency-that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton' s A declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day Between mid-January 2017 and early February 201 7 three congressional committees-the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HPSCI the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSCI and the Senate Judiciary Committee SJC -announced that they would conduct inquiries or had already been conducting inquiries into Russian interference in the election Then-FBI Director James Corney later confirmed to Congress the existence ofthe FBI's investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election On March 20 2017 in open-session testimony before HPSCI Corney stated I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI as part of our counterintelligence mission is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 20 16 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's efforts As with any counterintelligence investigation this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed The investigation continued under then-Director Corney for the next seven weeks until May 9 2017 when President Trump fired Corney as FBI Director-an action which is analyzed in Volume II of the repmt On May 17 2017 Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Corney had confirmed in his congressional testimony as well as matters arising directly from the investigation and any other matters w ithin the scope of28 C F R § 600 4 a which generally covers efforts to interfere w ith or obstruct the investigation President Trump reacted negatively to the Spec ial Counsel's appointment He told advisors that it was the end of his presidency sought to have Attorney General Jefferson Jeff Sessions unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counsel removed and engaged in efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it including through public and private contacts with potential w itnesses Those and related actions are described and analyzed in Volume II of the report THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume I of the report the Office determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution See Justice Manual § 9-27 000 et seq 2018 The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime if so whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction 8 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preclttet II M · CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl UH cler Fecl R Critfl P 6 e and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives See Justice Manual § 927 220 Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions which contain three main components First the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016 U S presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operationsviolated U S criminal law Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U S elections as well as related counts of identity theft See United States v Internet Research Agency et al No 18-cr-32 D D C Separately Russian intelligence officers who carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate among other federal laws See United States v the federal computer-intrusion statute and have been so et al No 18-cr-2 15 D C Second while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign the evidence was not sufficient to support criminal charges Among other things the evidence was not sufficient to charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian principal And our evidence about the June 9 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks' s releases of hacked materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation Further the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 201 6 election Third the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign lied to the Office and to Congress about their interactions with Russian-affiliated individuals and related matters Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian election interference The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal falsestatements statute Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period George Papadopoulos a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period pleaded guilty to lying to investigators about inter alia the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud the professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen leaded to false statements to about the Moscow ect 9 U S Department of Justice Attorttey Work Prodttet II May CotttaiH Material Proteeted UHder Fed R Critli P 6 e Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly reported to involve potential Russia-related contacts For example the investigation established that interactions between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate' s April 2016 foreign policy speech in Washington D C and during the week of the Republican National Convention were brief public and non-substantive And the investigation did not establish that one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia The investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September 2016 at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential campaign The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony or a complete picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation Some individuals invoked their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not in the Office 's judgment appropriate candidates for grants of immunity The Office limited its pursuit of other witnesses and information-such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be members of the media-in light of internal Department of Justice policies See e g Justice Manual§§ 9-13 400 13 410 Some of the information obtained via court process moreover was presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter or taint team Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed they sometimes provided information that was false or incomplete leading to some of the false-statements charges described above And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as well-numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad and documents were held outside the United States Further the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct we investigated-including some associated with the Trump Campaign--deleted relevant communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records In such cases the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared inconsistent with other known facts Accordingly while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible given these identified gaps the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional light on or cast in a new light the events described in the report 10 U S Department of Justice Al terney Werk Preeittet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteei UHeier Feel R Grim P 6 e I THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION On May 17 2017 Deputy Attorney General Rod J Rosenstein- then serving as Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General Jeff Sessions on March 2 20 16-appointed the Special Counsel to investigate Russ ian interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen Order No 3915-2017 Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters May 17 201 7 Appointment Order Relying on the authority vested in the Acting Attorney General including 28 U S C §§ 509 510 and 515 the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel in order to discharge the Acting Attorney General 's responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election Appointment Order introduction The Special Counsel the Order stated is authorized to conduct the investigation confirmed by then-FBI Director James B Corney in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 20 201 7 including i any links and or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump and ii any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation and iii any other matters within the scope of28 C P R § 600 4 a Appointment Order b Section 600 4 affords the Special Counsel the authority to investigate and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of and with intent to interfere with the Special Counsel's investigation such as perjury obstruction of justice destruction of evidence and intimidation of witnesses 28 C F R § 600 4 a The authority to investigate any matters that arose directly from the investigation Appointment Order b ii covers similar crimes that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special Counsel's appointment If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate the Order further provided the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation ofthese matters d c Finally the Acting Attorney General made applicable Sections 600 4 through 600 10 ofTitle 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations d d The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel' s investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda A memorandum dated August 2 20 17 explained that the Appointment Order had been worded categorically in order to permit its public release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals It then confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investigate allegations that three Trump campaign officials-Carter Page Paul Manafort and George Papadopoulos- committed a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 201 6 presidential election The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel ' s authority to investigate certain other matters including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort crimes arising from payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans 11 U S Department of Justice Att6t'Hey W6rk Pr6titlet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teetetl UHeler Feel R Crit'ft P 6 e from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration allegations that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli government and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn the former National Security Advisor to President Trump On October 20 2017 the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities First as part of a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate the pertinent activities of Michael Cohen Richard Gates Roger Stone Confirmation of the to such individuals stressed does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has committed a crime Second with respect to Michael Cohen the memorandum recognized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate leads relate d to Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC to inter alia receive funds from Russian-backed entities Third the memorandum memorialized the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities who were possibly engaged in ''jointly undertaken activity with existing subjects of the investigation including Paul Manafort Finally the memorandum described an FBI investigation opened before the Special Counsel's appointment into allegations that then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions made false statements to the United States Senate and confirmed the Special Counsel 's authority to investigate that matter I The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney 28 C F R § 600 6 Like a U S Attorney' s Office the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office' s Russia investigation and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions of federal crimes assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had by that time already investigated Russian election interference for nearly 10 months The Special Counsel's Office exercised its judgment regarding what to investigate and did not for instance investigate every public report of a contact between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affiliated individuals and entities The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign Certain proceedings associated with the Office's work remain ongoing After consultation with the Office ofthe Deputy Attorney General the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components of the Department of Justice and FBI Appendix D lists those transfers Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate Russia election interference and links and or coordination with the Trump Campaign See United States v Manafort 312 F Supp 3d 60 79-83 D D C 20 18 United States v Manafort 321 F Supp 3d 640 650-655 E D Va 2018 In the course of conducting that investigation the Office periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General After consultation with 12 U S Department of Justice Attantey Wat·k Pret'lt tet II Mtt ' Catltain Material Preteete6 UH6er Fee R Grim P 6 e the Office of the Deputy Attorney General the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI Appendix D summarizes those referrals To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him the Special Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys-five of whom joined the Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice components These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before turning those materials over to investigators a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the Department' s Antitrust Division and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget finance purchasing human resources records facilities security information technology and administrative support The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and worked alongside approximately 40 FBI agents intelligence analysts forensic accountants a paralegal and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation Those assigned FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times the matters on which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel 1 During its investigation the Office issued more than 2 800 subpoenas under the auspices of a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U S C § 2703 d obtained almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers made 13 requests to foreign governments pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses including almost 80 before a grand jury From its inception the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI 's broader national security mission FBI personnel w ho assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey such information to the FBI The FBI's Counterinte ll igence Division met with the Office regularly for that purpose for most of the Office's tenure For more than the past year the FBI also embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation but whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send-in writing-summaries of foreign inte lligence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices Those communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain information derived from the investigation not all of which is contained in this Volume This Volume is a summary It contains in the Office's judgment that information necessary to account for the Special Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation's main factual results 1 FBI personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable federal law and all Department and FBI regulations guidelines and policies An FBI attorney worked on FBI-related matters for the Office such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures including the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide DIOG That FBI attorney worked under FBI legal supervision not the Special Counsel's supervision 13 U S Department of Justice A«arHey Werk Pmch tet May Cantain Material Prateetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e II RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research Agency LLC IRA a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and companies he controlled including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering co llectively Concord 2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large U S audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U S po litical system 3 These operations constituted active measures aKTHBHbie MeponpiDITIDI a term that typically refers to operations conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs 4 The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014 Using fictitious U S personas IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages designed to attract U S audiences These groups and accounts which addressed divisive U S political and social issues falsely claimed to be controlled by U S activists Over time these social media accounts became a means to reach large U S audiences IRA employees travelled to the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and photographs for use in their social media posts IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016 U S presidential election By early to mid-2016 IRA operations included supporting the Trump Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton The IRA made various expenditures to carry out those activities including buying political advertisements on social media in the names ofU S persons a nd entities Some IRA employees posing as U S persons and without revealing their Russian association communicated electronically w ith individuals associated with the Trump Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities including the staging of political rallies 5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U S persons knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation By the end of the 201 6 U S election the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U S persons through their social media accounts Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and 2 The Office is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measures operations targeting the United States Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those reports and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM-2230634 serial 44 analysis The FBI case number cited here and other FBI case numbers identified in the report should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context The report contains additional law enforcement sensitive information 4 As discussed in Part V below the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities principally for conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U S C § 371 See Volume I Section V A infra Indictment United States v Internet Research Agency eta 1 18-cr-32 D D C Feb 16 2018 Doc 1 Internet Research Agency Indictment 14 U S Department of Justice Attet'He · Wet'k PPetlttet II May CeHtaiH Matet'ial Pt'eteetea UHaet' Peel R CPim P 6 e Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U S participants IRA-controlled Twitter accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers including multiple U S political figures who retweeted IRA-created content In November 2017 a Facebook representative testified that Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80 000 posts between January 2015 and August 2017 Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as 126 million persons through its Facebook accounts 6 In January 2018 Twitter announced that it had identified 3 814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1 4 million people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an iRA-controlled account 7 A Structure of the Internet Research Agency 6 Social Media Irifluence in the 2016 US Election Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Cong 13 11 1 17 testimony of Colin Stretch General Counsel of Facebook We estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA 's 80 000 posts over the two years Posts from these Pages were also shared liked and followed by people on Facebook and as a result three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from the Russian operation Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period The Facebook representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately 120 000 pieces of content during that time Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via Instagram - 7 Twitter Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election Jan 31 2018 8 See SM-2230634 serial 92 9 Harm to Ongoing Matter 10 Harm to Ongoing Matter 11 See SM-2230634 serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter 15 U S Department of Justice AtterHe ' Werk Preattet II Ma · CeHtftiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Crim P 6 e B Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin Until at least February 2018 Yevgeniy V iktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord compan ies funded the IRA Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord 13 Harm to Ongoing Matter -· · 14 15 See e g SM-2230634 serials 9 113 180 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter s 131 204 17 Harm to Ongoing Matter 18 Harm to Ongoing Matter 16 U S Department of Justice AUerHey Werle Preettet II May CefttatH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e Harm to Ongoing Matter 11Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 19 U S Treasury Department Treaswy Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with Russia's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine Dec 20 2016 Harm to Ongoing Matter 22 See e g Neil MacFarquhar Yevgeny Prigozhin Russian Oligarch Indicted by US Is Known as Putin 's Cook New York Times Feb 16 2018 24 Harm to Ongoing Matter see also SM- 223 0634 17 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werl Preattet II May Centain Material Prateetea Unaer Fee R Grim P 6 e 26 Harm to Ongoing Matter 27 Harm to Ongoing Matter 28 The term troll refers to internet users- in this context paid operatives-who post inflammatory or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites 18 U S Department of Justice MterHey Werk Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer FeEl R Grim P 6 e C The IRA Targets U S Elections 1 The IRA Ramps Up U S Operations As Early As 20 14 The IRA's U S operations sought to influence public opinion through online media and forums By the spring of 2014 the IRA began to consolidate U S operations within a as the Translator known · su operations on different social 29 Investigative Technique See SM-2230634 serials 131 204 30 See SM-2230634 serial 156 Internet Research Agency Indictment 1479936895656747 United Muslims of America 31 19 · see also 5 26 16 Facebook Messages lD U S Department of Justice 2 6rHey Werk Preattet II Mtty CeH tait Material Preteetea URaer Pea R Grim P 6 e graphics and IT 34 See SM-2230634 serial 204 Harm to Ongoing Matter 20 U S Department of Justice Attentey Werk Predttet Ma-y CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UHder Fed R Grim P 6 e 37 IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions In June 2014 four IRA employees applied to the U S Department of State to enter the United States while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party 38 Ultimately two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and entered the United States on June 4 2014 35 Harm to Ongoing Matter 37 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 21 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Pre6ttet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteete6 Utt6er Fee R Grim P 6 e 2 U S Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on different U S social media platforms The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the soc ial media accounts as specialists 42 Starting as early as 2014 the IRA' s U S operations included social media specialists focusing on Facebook YouTube and Twitter 43 The IRA later added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts 44 Initially the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts of U S persons 45 By early 2015 the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public social media pages that claimed falsely to be affiliated with U S political and grassroots organizations In certain cases the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U S organizations For example one IRA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_ GOP purported to be connected to the Tennessee Republican Party 46 More commonly the IRA created accounts in the names of fictitious U S organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as antiimmigration groups Tea Party activists Black Lives Matter protestors and other U S social and political activists Harm to Ongoing Matter 45 See e g Facebook ID 100011390466802 Alex Anderson Facebook ID 100009626173204 Andrea Hansen Facebook ID 100009728618427 Gary Williams Facebook ID 100013640043337 Lakisha Richardson 46 The account claimed to be the Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republicans and made posts that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party See e g @TEN_GOP 4 3 16 Tweet Tennessee GOP backs @realDonaldTrump period #makeAmericagreatagain #tngop #tennessee #gop 22 U S Department ofJustice AtterHey Werle Preettet II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e The focus on the U S presidential campaign continued throughout 2016 Initii2016 internal reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group Secured Borders the 47 Harm 48 to Ongoing Matter See e g SM-2230634 serial 131 49 The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her of presidential campaign IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton' s record as State and various · · ues of her The IRA also used other 50 Harm to Ongoing Matter 23 U S Department of Justice Atterney Werk Preattet Ma · Cefttairt Material Preteetea Urtaer Pea R Grim P 6 e author criticized the lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton and reminded the Facebook specialist it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton 5 1 3 U S Operations Through Facebook Harm to Ongoing Matter I I Harm to Ongoing Matter e during the 20 16 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative 52 Harm to Ongoing Matter 53 Harm to Ongoing Matter 54 Harm to Ongoing Matter 24 A erHe · U S Department of Justice Werk PFeetJet Ma Cefl taiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R CFiffl P 6 e groups with names such as Being Patriotic Stop All Immigrants Secured Borders and Tea Party News purported Black social justice groups Black Matters Blacktivist and Don't Shoot Us LGBTQ groups LGBT United and religious groups United Muslims of America Throughout 2016 IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign For example on May 31 2016 the operational account Matt Skiber began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Face book groups asking them to help plan a pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower 55 To reach larger U S audiences the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U S audience members According to Face book the IRA purchased over 3 500 advertisements and the expenditures totaled approximately $100 000 56 During the U S presidential campaign many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U S rallies organized by the IRA discussed below As early as March 2016 the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly opposed the Clinton Campaign For example on March 18 2016 the IRA purchased an advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part If one day God lets this liar enter the White House as a president -that day would be a real national tragedy 57 Similarly on April 6 2016 the IRA purchased advertisements for its account Black Matters calling for a flashmob of U S persons to take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or #nohillary2016 58 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were with very few exceptions negative 59 IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his campaign The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was purchased on April 19 2016 The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account Tea Party News asking U S persons to help them make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters by uploading photos with the hashtag #KIDS4TRUMP 60 In subsequent months the IRA purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign predominantly through the Facebook groups Being Patriotic Stop All Invaders and Secured Borders age ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber to ID 1 16 Facebook Message ID 100009922908461 56 Social Media Influence in the 20I 6 US Election Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Cong 13 11 1 17 testimony of Colin Stretch General Counsel of Facebook 57 3 18 16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045505 152575 58 4 6 16 Facebook Advertisement ID 60437402253 19 59 See SM-2230634 serial 213 documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger set provided by Facebook 60 4 19 16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045 151094235 25 U S Department of Justice Attoffl e · Werk Precluet Mit ' CeA taiH Material Preteetecl UA cler Fecl R Ct·iffi P 6 e Collectively the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U S persons Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers For example at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017 the IRA's United Muslims of America Facebook group had over 300 000 followers the Don't Shoot Us Facebook group had over 250 000 followers the Being Patriotic Facebook group had over 200 000 followers and the Secured Borders Facebook group had over 130 000 followers 6 1 According to Facebook in total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80 000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017 and these posts reached at least 29 million U S persons and may have reached an estimated 126 million people 62 4 U S Operations Through Twitter on Twitter a Individualized Accounts Harm to Ongoing Matter · Harm to Ongoing Matter 61 See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 United Muslims of America Facebook ID 1157233400960126 Don' t Shoot Facebook ID 1601685693432389 757183957716200 Borders Harm to Ongoing Matter 62 Social Media Influence in the 2016 US Election Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Cong 13 11 11 17 testimony of Colin Stretch General Counsel of Facebook 63 Harm to Ongoing Matter 64 Harm to Ongoing Matter 65 Harm to Ongoing Matter 26 U S Department of Justice Aftet'Rey Werk Pr etittet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Criffl P 6 e 66 Harm to Ongoing Matter The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook accounts by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with U S Twitter users directly through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U S audiences on the election Individualized accounts used to influence the U S presidential election included @TEN_GOP described above @jenn_abrams claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with 70 000 followers @Pamela_Moorel3 claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70 000 followers and @America __lst_ an anti-immigration persona with 24 000 followers 67 In May 2016 the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump which promoted IRA-organized rallies in support of the Trump Campaign described below 68 Using these accounts and others the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media Multiple IRA-posted tweets gained popularity 70 U S media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U S persons 71 Similarly numerous high- 66 Harm to Ongoing Matter 67 Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS an account with 3 800 fo llowers that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material 68 See @ march_for_trump 5 30 16 Tweet first post from account ° 7 For example one IRA account tweeted To those people who hate the Confederate flag Did you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery it was all about money The tweet received over 40 000 responses @Jenn_Abrams 4 24 17 2 37p m Tweet 71 Josephine Lukito Chris Wells Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources fo r Partisan Opinion Study Columbia Journalism Review Mar 8 20 18 see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain #NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz Washington Post Jan 15 2016 citing IRA tweet People Are Slamming the CIA for Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump U S News World Report Dec 12 2016 27 AttarHey Work Prodttet II U S Department of Justice CaHtaiH Material Pt'ateeted UHder fee R Grim P 6 e Ma · profile U S persons including former Ambassador Michael McFaul 72 Roger Stone 3 Sean Hannity 4 and Michael Flynn Jr 75 retweeted or responded to tweets posted to these IRAcontrolled accounts Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA tweets discussed below b IRA Botnet Activities In January 2018 Twitter publicly identified 3 814 Twitter accounts associated with the IRA 79 According to Twitter in the ten weeks before the 2016 U S presidential election these accounts posted approximately 175 993 tweets approximately 8 4% of which were election- · 72 @McFaul4 30 16 Tweet responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams 73 @RogerJStoneJr 5 30 16 Tweet retweeting @Pamela_Moore l 3 @RogerJStoneJr 4 26 16 Tweet same 74 @seanhannity 6 21117 Tweet retweeting @Pamela_ Moore 13 75 @mflynnJR 6 22 17 Tweet RT @Jenn_Abrams This is what happens when you add the voice over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs 76 A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send specific automated messages On the Twitter network botnets can be used to promote and republish retweet specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences 77 Harm to Ongoing Matter 78 Harm to Ongoing Matter 79 Eli Rosenberg Twitter to Tell 6 77 000 Users they Were Had by the Russians Some Signs Show the Problem Continues Washington Post Jan 19 2019 28 U S Department of Justice Atterney Werk PreE'Ittet Mit · CentsiH Material Preteetea Unser FeEl R Grim P 6 e related 80 Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1 4 million people who Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account 81 5 U S Operations Invo lving Political Rallies The IRA organized and promoted po litical rallies inside the United States while posing as U S grassroots activ ists First the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas Facebook groups and Twitter accounts for example to announce and promote the event The IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking them to attend the event From those who responded with interest in attending the IRA then sought a U S person to serve as the event' s coordinator In most cases the IRA account operator would tell the U S person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preexisting conflict or because they were somewhere else in the United States 82 The IRA then further promoted the event by contacting U S media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator 83 After the event the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA' s social media accounts 84 The Office identified dozens of U S rallies organized by the IRA The earliest evidence of a rally was a confederate rally in November 2015 85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even after the 2016 U S presidential election The attendance at rallies varied Some rall ies appear to while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these have drawn few if any pattie rallies was close monitored 80 Twitter Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election updated Jan 31 20 18 Twitter also reported identifying 50 258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government which tweeted more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election 81 •• 82 Twitter Update on Twitter's Review ofthe 20 16 US Election updated Jan 31 2018 8 20 16 Facebook Message ID 10000992290846 1 Matt Skiber to ID See e g 7 21 16 gmail com to joshmilton024@gmai l com t o 83 84 7 21116 Email @march_for_trump 6 25 16 Tweet posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower 85 Instagram ID 2228012168 Stand For Freedom 1113 15 Post Good evening buds Well I am planning to organize a confederate rally in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people to attend 29 U S Department of Justice AM erRe · Werk Pre6ttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 UHeer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e 30 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Work Pre6ttet II May Cet'ttttiA Mttterittl Preteete6 UH6er Fee R Grim P 6 e From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign almost all of the U S rallies organized by the IRA focused on the U S election often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign Pro-Trump rallies included three in New York a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016 and a series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania The Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign which posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook account as discussed below 86 IRA Poster for Pennsylvania Rallies organized by the IRA 6 Targeting and Recruitment of U S Persons IRA employees frequently used Investigative Technique Twitter Facebook and lnstagram to contact and recruit U S persons who followed the group The IRA recruited U S ons from across the litical For example the IRA targeted the family o f and a number of black social justice activists 86 The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook Twitter and eman accounts See e g Facebook ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Being Patriotic Twitter Account @march_for_trump beingpatriotic@gmail com Rallies were organized in New York on June 25 2016 Florida on August 20 2016 and Pennsylvania on October 2 2016 87 Harm to Ongoing Matter 88 Harm to Ongoing Matter 31 U S Department of Justice Attarl'l e · 'Nark Pracl1 1et II Ma · CaHtaiH Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R CriHl P 6 e while posing as a grassroots group called Black Matters US 89 In February 2017 the persona Black Fist purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted by law enforcement hired a self-defense instructor in New Y ark to offer classes sponsored by Black Fist The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote IRA-generated content 90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts such as walking around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask 9 1 as the IRA's online audience became larger the IRA tracked U S icated and had successfully tasked tasks from s with certain 89 3111 16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928 5 6 16 Facebook Advetiisement ID 6051652423528 10 26 16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687 10 27 16 Facebook Message ID ID 100011698576461 Taylor Brooks 90 8 19 16 Face book Message ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber to ID 91 12 8 16 Email robot@craigslist org to beingpatriotic@gmail com confirming Craigslist advertisement 92 8 18-19 16 Twitter OMs @march_for_trump 11111-27 16 Facebook 100011698576461 Taylor Brooks ging to pay for plane tickets and for a Facebook Message ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber discussing payment for rally supplies 8 18 16 Twitter DM scussing payment for construction materials 32 U S Department of Justice AMert'le · Weft Pret it Jet Mtey· CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Criffi P 6 e 7 Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and members of the Trump Campaign The investigation identified no similar connections between the IRA and the Clinton Campaign First on multiple occasions members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign promoted-typically by linking retweeting or similar methods of repostingpro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media accounts Additionally in a few instances IRA employees represented themselves as U S persons to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effmt to seek assistance and coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States a Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials Among the U S leaders of public opinion targeted by the IRA were various members and surrogates of the Trump Campaign In total Trump Campai gn affiliates promoted dozens of tweets posts and other political content created by the IRA Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @TEN_GOP were cited or retweeted by multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates including Donald J Trump Jr 96 Eric 96 See e g @DonaldJTrumpJr 10 26 16 Tweet RT @TEN_GOP BREAKING Thousands of names changed on voter rolls in Indiana Police investigating #VoterFraud #DrainTheSwamp @DonaldJTrumpJr 11 2 16 Tweet RT @TEN_GOP BREAKING #VoterFraud by counting tens of thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County Florida @DonaldJTrumpJr 11 8 16 Tweet RT @TEN_GOP This vet passed away last month before he could vote for Trump Here he is in his #MAGA hat #voted #ElectionDay Trump Jr retweeted additional @TEN_GOP content subsequent to the election 33 U S Department of Justice Attarney Werk Preelttet Mtty CeHtaitl Material Preteeteel UHEler Feel R Grim P 6Ee Trump 97 Kellyanne Conway 98 Brad Parscale 99 and Michael T Fly nn 100 These posts included allegations of voter fraud 101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled classified information 102 A November 7 2016 post from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @Pamela_Moore 13 was retweeted by Donald J Trump Jr 103 On September 19 2017 President Trump's personal account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from the IRA-controlled account @ 10_gop the backup account of @ TEN_GOP which had already been deactivated by Twitter The tweet read We love you Mr President 104 IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump Campaign and later Trump Administration officials to their tweets For example on August 23 2016 the IRAcontrolled persona Matt Skiber Facebook account sent a message to a U S Tea Party activist writing that Mr Trump posted about our event in Miami This is great 105 The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate Trump' s Facebook account which included a post about the August 20 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA Screenshot of Trump Facebook Account from Matt Skibet 97 @EricTrump 10 20 16 Tweet RT @TEN_GOP BREAKING Hillary shuts down press conference when asked about DNC Operatives conuption #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpS 98 @KellyannePolls 11 6 16 Tweet RT @TEN_GOP Mother of jailed sailor ' Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on Classified info' #hillarysemail #WeinerGate 99 @parscale 10 15 16 Tweet Thousands of dep1orables chanting to the media ' Tell The Truth ' RT if you are also done w biased Media #FridayFeeling 100 @GenFlynn 1117 16 retweeting @TEN_GOP post that included in part @realDonaldTrump @mike_ pence will be our next POTUS VPOTUS 101 @TEN_GOP 10 11 16 Tweet North Carolina finds 2 214 voters over the age of 110 102 @TEN_ GOP 11 6 16 Tweet Mother of jailed sailor 'Hold Hillary to same standards as my son on classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate ' 103 @DonaldJTrumpJr 1117 16 Tweet RT @Pamela_Moore 13 Detroit residents speak out against the failed policies of Obarna Hillary democrats 104 @reaiDonaldTrump 9 19 17 7 33p m Tweet THANK YOU for your support Miami My team j ust shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY yesterday I love you - and there is no question- TOGETHER WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN 105 8 23 16 Facebook Message ID 100009922908461 Matt Skiber to ID 34 U S Department of Justice Att entey Werk Preelttet II Mtt · CefttaiH Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Criffi P 6 e Harm to Ongoing Matter •• b Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies Starting in June 2016 the IRA contacted different U S persons affiliated with the Trump Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States In all cases the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U S political activists working on behalf of a conservative grassroots organization The IRA's contacts included requests for signs and other materials to use at rallies 107 as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate logistics 108 While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support for example agreeing to set aside a number of signs the investigation has not identified evidence that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals In sum the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election through the active measures social media campaign carried out by the IRA an organization funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled As explained further in Volume I Section V A infra the Office concluded and a grand jury has alleged that Prigozhin his companies and IRA employees violated U S law through these operations principally by undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U S elections 107 See e g 8 16 16 Email joshmilton024@gmail com to @donaldtrump com asking for Pence signs for Florida rally 8 18 16 Email joshmilton024@gmail com to @donaldtrump com for Trump Pence signs for Florida rally 8 12 16 Email JOS lton024@gmail com to -@donaldtrump com asking for contact phone numbers for Trump Campaign affiliates in various Florida cities and signs 108 8 15 16 Email locations to the 6 16 Email joshmilton024@gmail com volunteering to send an email blast to fol 35 to U S Department of Justice AttarHey 'Nark Praattet II Mtty CaRtttitl Mttterittl Prateetea URaer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e Ill RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS Beginning in March 2016 units of the Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff GRU hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations e·mployees and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign including the email account of campaign chairman John Podesta Starting in April2016 the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee DCCC and the Democratic National Committee DNC The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees advisors and volunteers In total the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks 109 The GRU later released stolen Clinton Campaign and DNC documents through online personas DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0 and later through the organization WikiLeaks The release of the documents was designed and timed to interfere with the 20 16 U S presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign mton-re about WikiLeaks's activities The mve on was unable to resolve WikiLeaks 's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7 years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language A GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign 1 GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton Campaign DNC and DCCC Military Units 26165 and 74455 110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU cyber unit dedicated to targeting military political governmental and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia including in the United States 111 The unit was sub-divided into departments with different specialties One department for example developed specialized while conducted large-scale spearphishing malicious software 11 2 campaigns a bitcoin mining operation to 109 As discussed in Section V below our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from the hacking of these computers principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusions in violation of 18 U S C §§ 1030 and 371 See Volume I Section V B infra Indictment United States v Netyksho No 1 18-cr-215 D D C July 13 2018 Doc 1 Netyksho Indictment 11 0 Netyksho Indictment 1 111 Separate from this Office's indictment of GRU officers in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with hacking the U S Anti-Doping Agency the World Anti-Doping Agency and other international sport associations United States v Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets No 18-263 W O Pa 112 A spearphishing email is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source and solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network or causes the recipient to 36 U S Department of Justice AtlerHe · Werk Preattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R CritH P 6 e secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations 113 Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber operations Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165 the promotion of those releases and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by the GRU Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of elections secretaries of state and U S companies that supplied software and other technology related to the administration ofU S elections 114 Beginning in mid-March 2016 Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the DCCC and DNC as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign 115 Investigative Technique vu autvu any or access to ng that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of opportunity but rather the result of targeting 116 GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers Between March 10 2016 and March 15 2016 Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email accounts at hillaryclinton com Starting on March 15 2016 the GRU began targeting Google email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees along with a smaller number of dnc org email accounts 117 The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers including campaign chairman John Podesta junior volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team informal Clinton Campaign advisors and a DNC employee 118 GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from spearphishing victims including various Clinton Campaign-related communications download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network Netyksho Indictment 10 g 113 Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX io To make purchases the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source of funds Netyksho Indictment 62 114 N etyksho Indictment 69 115 N etyksho Indictment 9 116 See SM-2589105 serials 144 495 ll8 Investigative Technique 37 U S Department of Justice dt erl'le f Wefk Pfetlttet Mtty CeH tttiH Mffiefittl Preteetetl Ul'laer Fee R Grim P 6 e 2 Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks a Initial Access By no later than April 12 2016 the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully spearphished the week before Over the ensuing weeks the GRU traversed the network identifying different computers connected to the DCCC network By stealing network access credentials along the way including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the system the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network 119 Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network on April 18 2016 GRU officers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network VPN connection120 between the DCCC and DNC networks 121 Between April18 2016 and June 8 2016 Unit 26165 compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network including the DNC mail server and shared file server 122 b Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized malware 123 known as X-Agent and X-Tunnel Mimikatz a credential-harvesting tool and rar exe a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration X-Agent was a multi-function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes take screenshots and gather other data about the infected computers e g file directories operating systems 124 XTunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC DNC computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable of large-scale data transfers 125 GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the victim computers 120 A VPN extends a private network allowing users to send and receive data across public networks such as the internet as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain databases housed on the DNC network Therefore while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's private network they could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers 123 Malware is short for malicious software and here refers to software designed to allow a third party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer' s user or operator 124 Investigative Technique 125 Investigative Technique 38 U S Department of Justice Attort'l ey Work ProElttet II Mtt r CemtaiH Material ProteeteEl UHEier FeEl R Grim P 6 e To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks Unit 26165 officers set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted malware 126 The first set of GRU-controlled computers known by the GRU as middle servers sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC DCCC networks The middle servers in tum relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled com ters labeled internally eli ·· served as a by the GRU as an AMS Panel The AMS Panel nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the DNC DCCC networks 127 11it'f11'•§11fJJGa 126 In connection with these intrusions the GRU used computers virtual private networks dedicated servers operated by hosting companies etc that it leased from third-party providers located all over the world The · identified rental and payments for computers located in inter all of which were used in the operations 127 Netyksho Indictment - r 25 128 Netyksho Indictment - r 24 c 129 Netyksho Indictment - r 24 b 39 U S Department of Justice Att orHey Work Pro6ttet Mtty Cet'ltaiH Material Proteete6 UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging sessions captured through X-Agent These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored DCCC and DNC employees' work on infected computers regularly between April2016 and June 2016 Data captured in these keylogging sessions included passwords internal communications between employees banking information and sensitive personal information c Theft ofDocuments from DNC and DCCC Networks Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC networks including significant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U S federal elections Stolen documents included internal strategy documents fundraising data opposition research and emails from the work inboxes of DNC employees 130 The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network On April 14 2016 approximately three days after the initial intrusion GRU officers downloaded rar exe onto the DCCC's document server The following day the GRU searched one compromised DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included Hillary DNC Cruz and Trump 131 On April25 2016 the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents from folders on the DCCC' s shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election 132 The GRU appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from this file server 133 The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access On April22 2016 the GRU copied files from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers Stolen documents included the DNC' s opposition research into candidate Trump 134 Between approximately May 25 2016 and June 1 2016 GRU officers accessed the DNC's mail server from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States 135 During these connections 130 Netyksho Indictment 27-29 Investigative Technique 131 Investigative Technique 135 Investigative Technique See SM-2589105-GJ serial649 As part of its investigation the FBI later received images ofDNC servers and copies of relevant traffic logs Netyksho Indictment 28-29 40 U S Department of Justice AM et'fley 'Nerk Pretlttet Mtty CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl Utleer Fee R Criffi P 6 e Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments which were later released by WikiLeaks in July 2016 136 B Dissemination of the Hacked Materials The GRU's operations extended beyond stealing materials and included releasing documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters The GRU carried out the anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created- DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks 1 DCLeaks The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19 2016 when Unit 26165 registered the domain dcleaks com through a service that anonymized the registrant 137 Unit 26165 paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined 138 The dcleaks com landing page pointed to different tranches of stolen documents arranged by victim or subject matter Other dcleaks com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released bearing the sender recipient and date of the email To control access and the timing of releases pages were sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public Starting in June 2016 the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks com including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts in particular Google and Microsoft accounts rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks DCLeaks victims included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign employee and four other campaign volunteers 139 The GRU released through dcleaks com thousands of documents including personal identifying and financial information internal correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs and fundraising files and information 140 Netyksho Indictment 29 The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May 25 2016 the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server Netyksho Indictment 45 136 138 See SM-2589105 serial 181 Netyksho Indictment 21 a 140 See e g Internet Archive DCLeaks released documents relating t o - and emails from 2015 The United States Republican Party The United States Republican Party portfolio contained approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members PACs campaigns state parties and businesses dated between May and October 2015 According to open-source reporting these victims shared the same 41 U S Department of Justice Afterney Werk Preclttet II May CeHtaifl Material Preteetecl UHEier FeEl R Grim P 6 e GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker which they primarily used to promote releases of materials 141 The Facebook page was administered through a small number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts 142 GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account the Twitter account @dcleaks_ and the email account dcleaksproj ect@gmail com to communicate privately with reporters and other U S persons GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks com website that had not yet become public For example on July 14 2016 GRU officers operating under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DC Leaks webpage to a U S reporter via the Face book account 143 Similarly on September 14 2016 GRU officers sent reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_ with a password to another non-public part of the dcleaks com website 144 The DCLeaks com website remained operational and public until March 2017 2 Guccifer 2 0 On June 14 2016 the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC network and suspected theft of DNC documents In the statements the cyber-response team alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors which they referred to as Fancy Bear were responsible for the breach 145 Apparently in response to that announcement on June 15 2016 GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2 0 created a WordPress blog In the hours leading up to the launch of that WordPress blog GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English including some hundred sheets illuminati and worldwide known Approximately two hours after the last of those searches Guccifer 2 0 published its first post attributing the DNC server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phrases that the GRU officers had searched for that day 146 Tennessee-based web-hosting company called Smartech Corporation William Bastone RNC E-Mail Was In Fact Hacked By Russians The Smoking Gun Dec 13 20 16 141 Netyksho Indictment -r 38 142 See e g Facebook Account l 00008825623 541 Alice Donovan 143 7 14 16 Facebook Message 10 793058100795341 DC Leaks to I 144 9 14 16 Twitter OM co QTvKUjQcOx pass @dcleaks_ to KvFsg% 1 145 Dmitri Alperovitch Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee CrowdStrike Blog June 14 2016 CrowdStrike updated its post after the June 15 2016 post by Guccifer 2 0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion 146 Netyksho Indictment -r -r 4 1-42 42 Att effle · U S Department of Justice Werk Preat1et Ma ' CeH taiH Mttterial Preteetecl UHclet· Fee R Grim P 6 e That same day June 15 2016 the GRU also used the Guccifer 2 0 WordPress blog to begin releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks The Guccifer 2 0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC in a series of blog posts between June 15 2016 and October 18 2016 147 Released documents included opposition research performed by the DNC including a memorandum analyzing potential criticisms of candidate Trump internal policy documents such as recommendations on how to address politically sensitive issues analyses of specific congressional races and fundraising documents Releases were organized around thematic issues such as specific states e g Florida and Pennsylvania that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U S presidential election Beginning in late June 2016 the GRU also used the Guccifer 2 0 persona to release documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals Specifically on June 27 2016 Guccifer 2 0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide exclusive access to some leaked emails linked to Hillary Clinton's staff 148 The GRU later sent the reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks com website that contained an archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016 149 That the Guccifer 2 0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DC Leaks website tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of people 150 The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2 0 into August 2016 For example on August 15 2016 the Guccifer 2 0 persona sent a candidate for the U S Congress documents related to the candidate's opponent 151 On August 22 2016 the Guccifer 2 0 persona transferred approximately 2 5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U S blogger covering Florida politics 152 On August 22 2016 the Guccifer 2 0 persona sent a U S reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement 153 147 Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2 0 blog occurred on June 15 2016 June 20 20 16 June 21 2016 July 6 2016 July 14 2016 August 12 2016 August 15 2016 August 21 2016 August 31 2016 September 15 2016 September 23 2016 October 4 2016 and October 18 2016 ccifer20@aol fr to 149 subject leaked emails 6 27 16 Email project 150 Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website and in an apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0 were operated by the same organization the Guccifer 2 0 persona sent the reporter an email stating that DCLeaks was a Wikileaks sub project and that Guccifer 2 0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with closed access to give reporters a preview of them 151 Netyksho Indictment -r 43 a 152 Netyksho Indictment -r 43 b 153 Netyksho Indictment -r 43 c 43 U S Department of Justice At terHey Werk Pret lttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e s suspension account After it was posing as Guccifer 2 0 wrote via private message thank u for writing back do u find anyt h ing interesting in the cs 1 posted On August 17 2016 the GRU added please tell me if i can help u anyhow it would be a great pleasure to me On September 9 2016 the GRU Uaf$t posing as what do u Guccifer 2 0-referred to a stolen DCCC document posted online and asked 1 1 think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign • responded pretty standard 155 The investigation did not identify evidence of other communications between and Guccifer 2 0 3 Use ofWikiLeaks In order to expand its interference in the 20 16 U S presidential election the GRU units transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton Campaign to WikiLeaks GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0 personas to communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels including possibly through WikiLeaks's private communication system a WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign WikiLeaks and particularly its founder Julian Assange privately expressed opposition to candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents In November 2015 Assange wrote to other members and associates of WikiLeaks that w e believe it would be much better for GOP to win Dems Media liberals woudl sic then form a block to reign in their worst qualities With Hillary in charge GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities dems media neoliberals will be mute She's a bright well connected sadisitic sociopath 156 In March 2016 WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approximately 30 000 Clinton emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation 157 While designing the archive one WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate 154 155 Harm to Ongoing Matter 156 11 19 15 Twitter Group Chat Group ID 594242937858486276 @WikiLeaks et a Assange also wrote that GOP will generate a lot oposition sic including through dumb moves Hillary will do the same thing but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition Hence hillary has greater freedom to start wars than the GOP and has the will to do so d 157 WikiLeaks Hillary Clinton Email Archive available at https wikileaks org clinton-emails 44 U S Department of Justice Att erHe · Werle Preclttet II Mtty CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R Grim P 6 e W e want this repository to become the place to search for background on biliary's plotting at the state department during 2009-2013 Firstly because its useful and will annoy Hillary but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource player in the US election because eit sic may en courage people to send us even more important leaks 158 b WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2 0 and DCLeaks Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks com in June 20 I 6 GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible coordination in the future release of stolen emails On June 14 2016 @dcleaks_ sent a direct message to @WikiLeaks noting You announced your organization was preparing to publish more Hillary's emails We are ready to support you We have some sensitive information too in particular her financial documents Let's do it What do think about · info at the same moment Thank 159 Around the same time WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona Guccifer 2 0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC On June 22 2016 seven days after Guccifer 2 0 's first releases of stolen DNC documents WikiLeaks used Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2 0 Twitter account and suggest that Guccifer 2 0 s end any new material stolen from the DNC here for us to review and it will have a much higher impact than what you are doing 160 On July 6 2016 WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2 0 through Twitter's private messaging function writing if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo sic days prefable sic because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind her after The Guccifer 2 0 persona responded ok i see WikiLeaks also explained we think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary so conflict between bernie and hillary is interesting 161 c The GRU's Transfer ofStolen Materials to WikiLeaks Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications which has limited the Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them Thus although it is clear that the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks Investigative Technique 158 3 14 16 Twitter DM @WikiLeaks to Less than two weeks earlier the same of Clinton in whitehouse with her account had been used to send a private message bloodlutt and amitions sic of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees 11119 15 Twitter Group Chat Group 10 594242937858486276 @WikiLeaks et al 159 6 14 16 Twitter DM @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks 160 Netyksho Indictment 47 a 161 7 6 16 Twitter DMs @WikiLeaks @guccifer_2 45 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preeh tet II Mtt ' CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteetee UHeer Pee R Criffi P 6 e The Office was able to identify when the GRU operating through its personas Guccifer 2 0 and DCLeaks transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set up by the GRU had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Emb En On July 14 2016 GRU officers used a Guccifer 2 0 email account to send WikiLeaks an email bearing the subject big archive and the message a new attempt 163 The email contained an encrypted attachment with the name wk dnc linkl txt gpg 164 Using the Guccifer 2 0 Twitter account GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it 165 On July 18 2016 WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Guccifer 2 0 account that it had the 1Gb or so archive and would make a release of the stolen documents this week 166 On July 22 2016 WikiLeaks released over 20 000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC computer networks 167 The Democratic National Convention began three days later Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona DCLeaks On September 15 2016 @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks hi there I'm from DC Leaks How could we discuss some submission-related issues Am trying to reach out to you via your secured chat but getting no response I've got something that might interest you You won't be disappointed I promise 168 The WikiLeaks account responded Hi there without further elaboration The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately The same day the Twitter account @guccifer_2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message which is the first known contact between the personas 169 During subsequent communications the 163 This was not the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks On June 29 2016 the GRU used a Guccifer 2 0 email accou ted file to a WikiLeaks email account 6 29 16 Email guccifer2@mail com The email appears to have been undelivered 164 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS serial28 analysis 165 6 27 16 Twitter DM @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks 166 7 18 16 Twitter DM @Guccifer_2 @WikiLeaks 167 DNC Email Archive WikiLeaks Jul 22 20 16 available at https wikileaks org dnc-emails 168 9 15 16 Twitter DM @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks 169 9 15 16 Twitter DM @guccifer _ 2 to @de leaks_ 46 U S Department of Justice AtterAe ' Werk Pre61 1et May CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti UAtier Feti R Grim P 6 e Guccifer 2 0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails 170 An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19 2016 171 Based on information about Assange's computer and its possible operating system this date may be when the GRU staged the stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for the DNC emails 172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account these documents had a creation date of October 2 2016 which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by WikiLeaks on its site 173 Beginning on September 20 20 16 WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in a brief exchange On September 22 2016 a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail com sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject Submission and the message Hi from DCLeaks The email contained PG message with the filename 174 wiki_mail txt gpg The email however bears a number of similarities to m officers used the Guccifer 2 0 persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive ofDNC files On September 22 2016 the same day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks the Twitter account leaks sent a si to of characters WikiLeaks with the str The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016 For example public reporting identified A d M ll M h W'kiL k t h h t d 'th th t fi fth Investigative Technique I I 170 See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS serial28 9 15 16 Twitter DM @G uccifer_2 @WikiLeaks 17 1 See SM-2284941 serials 63 64 Investigative Technique systems same as the creation date shown on the host computer explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version ofthe files was still September 19 2016 See SM2284941 serial 62 Investigative Technique 173 When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails its computer system appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date See SM-2284941 serials 63 64 174 See 9 22 16 Email dcleaksproject@gmail com 175 Ellen Nakashima et al A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of JulianAssange and WikiLeaks Washington Post Jan 17 2018 47 A entey U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet II Mtty CeH t tiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e Investigative Technique On October 7 2016 WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email account In total WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7 20 16 and November 7 2016 The releases included private speeches given by Clinton 177 internal communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign 178 and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation 179 In total WikiLeaks released over 50 000 documents stolen from Podesta's personal email account The last-in-time email released from Podesta's account was dated March 21 2016 two days after Podesta received a spearphishing email sent by the GRU d WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source ofStolen Materials As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statements apparently designed to obscure the source of the materials that WikiLeaks was releasing The file-transfer evidence described above and other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the source of material that it posted Beginning in the summer of 2016 Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements about Seth Rich a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016 The statements about Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails On August 9 20 16 the @WikiLeaks Twitter account posted ANNOUNCE WikiLeaks has decided to issue a US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder ofDNC staffer Seth Rich 180 Likewise on August 25 2016 Assange was asked in an interview Why are you so interested in Seth Rich' s killer and responded We're very interested in anything that might be a threat to alleged Wikileaks sources The interviewer responded to Assange's statement by commenting I know you don't want to reveal your source but it certainly sounds like you're suggesting a man who leaked information to WikiLeaks was then murdered Assange replied If there 's someone who's potentially connected to our publication and that person has been murdered in suspicious 179 Netyksho Indictment 43 180 @WikiLeaks 8 9 16 Tweet 48 U S Department of Justice AM erAey Werk Preattet II Ma · CeH taiH Material Preteete€1 UAcler Fea R Grin P 6 e circumstances it doesn' t necessarily mean that the two are connected But it is a very serious matter that type of allegation is very serious as it's taken very seriously by us 181 After the U S intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was behind the hacking operation Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking According to media reports Assange told a U S congressman that the DNC hack was an inside job and purported to have physical proof' that Russians did not give materials to Assange 182 C Additional GRU Cyber Operations While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks Guccifer 2 0 and WikiLeaks GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign and eventually to target entities responsible for election administration in several states 1 Summer and Fall2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims On July 27 Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's personal office Earlier that day candidate Trump made public statements that included the fo ta if you're listening I hope you 're able to find the 30 000 emails that are missing I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press 183 The 30 000 emails were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement GRU officers targeted for the first Unit 26165 created and sent time Clinton's personal office After candidate Trump 's including an email malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain account belonging to Clinton aide The investigatiOn not evidence of earlier GRU attempts to compromise accounts on this domain It is unclear how the GRU was able to identify these email accounts which were not public 184 Unit 26 165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service On September 20 2016 the GRU began to generate coptes ction designed to allow users to produce backups of The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving databases referred to 181 See Assange Murdered DNC Staffer Was 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source Fox News Aug 25 2016 containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly 182 M Raju Z Cohen A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange CNN May 23 2018 183 Donald Trump on Russian Missing Hillary Clinton Emails YouTube Channel C-SPAN Posted 7 27 16 available at https www youtube com watch v 3kxG8uJUsWU starting at 0 41 49 U S Department of Justice AM ef'fle · Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e them to account that they controlled from there the copies were moved to GRUcontrolled computers The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloudbased account 185 2 Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U S Elections In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign GRU officers also targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections Victims included U S state and local entities such as state boards of elections SBOEs secretaries of state and county governments as well as individuals who worked for those entities 186 The GRU also targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related software and hardware such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations 187 The GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016 While the investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities the Office did not investigate further The Office did not for instance obtain or examine servers or other relevant items belonging to these victims The Office understands that the FBI the U S Department of Homeland Security and the states have separately investigated that activity By at least the summer of 20 16 GRU officers sought access to state and local computer networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental entities GRU officers for example targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a technique known as SQL injection by which malicious code was sent to the state or local website in order to run commands such as exfiltrating the database contents 188 In one instance in approximately June 2016 the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website The GRU then gained access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters 189 and extracted data related to thousands of U S voters before the malicious activity was identified 190 GRU officers Investigative Technique -· - scanned state and local websites for ·od in July 2016 GRU officers for vulnerabilities on than 185 Netyksho Indictment 34 see also SM-25891 OS-HACK serial29 Investigative Technique 186 Netyksho Indictment 69 188 Investigative Technique 50 U S Department of Justice A erHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteete€1 UHaer Fe€1 R Grim P 6 e Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election administration and personnel a involved in voting technology In August 2016 GRU officers targeted employees o f - a voting technology company that developed software used by numerous U S counties to manage voter rolls and installed malware on the company network Similarly in November 2016 the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U S election 191 The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software commonly referred to as a Trojan that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer 192 The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation We understand the FBI believes that this operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county government The Office did not independently verify that belief and as explained above did not undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so D Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials 1 a Background 51 U S Department of Justice Aa erHey lferlc Pree1 1et II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e b Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks une to ve 194 which are pending publication but provided no additional context Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter • 194 See Mahita Gajanan Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democratic Convention Time July 27 2016 quoting the June 12 2016 television interview 195 In Februaty 2018 Gates pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses i e tax fraud failure to report foreign bank accounts and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal agai nst the United States as well as making false statements to ow- Office Superseding Criminal Information United States v Richard W Gates III 1 17-cr-201 D D C Feb 23 20 18 Doc 195 Gates Superseding Criminal Information Plea Agreement United States v Richard W Gates III 1 17-cr-20 1 D D C Feb 23 2018 Doc 205 Gates Plea Agreement Gates has provided information and in-coutt testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable 196 Gates 10 25 18 302 at 1-2 197 As explained further in Volume I Section IV A 8 infra Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy to identity issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value or to provide Manafort's explanations for ce1tain events even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible His account appears here principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses 198 52 U S Department of Justice AtterH ey Werk Pmattet II Mit ' Cet'ttait't Material Preteetea UH tler Fea R Crifft P 6 e 199 In November 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him with making false statements to Congress in violation of 18 U S C § lOOl a c He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U S Attorney's Office in the Southern District ofNew York after a referral from this Office In the months leading up to his false-statements guilty plea Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report 202 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 10 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 203 Gates 10 25118 302 seria1 241 at 4 204 205 53 U S Department of Justice Att6rHe · W6rk Pr6clttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl UHcler Feci R Grim P 6 e developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch about future WikiLeaks releases 206 According to Gates by the late summer of 2016 the Trump Campaign was planning a · and me · based on the ible release of press strategy a communications 207 Clinton emails WikiLeaks MMIMIJltiMfiM II 208 rw shortly after the call would be coming 209 c Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 207 Gates 4 10 I8 302 at 3 Gates 4 Il 18 302 at 1-2 SM-2180998 Gates 10 25 18 302 at 2 208 209 Gates 10 25 I8 302 serial 241 at 4 210 211 212 Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for Command Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry In the 2008 election cycle Corsi gained prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United States Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings and that he spoke with Trump on the phone on at least six occasions Corsi 9 6 18 302 at 3 2 13 Corsi I 0 31 18 302 at 2 Corsi was first D C He was interviewed on September 6 2018 at accompanied by counsel throughout the interview Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September I7 2018 September 21 2018 October 31 20I8 November I 2018 and November 2 2018 Counsel was 54 U S Department of Justice A emey Weft Pretltte II Ma · Cefltftil'l Material Pre eetetl Ul' tler Fetl R Ct'ifl'l P 6 e mg to to put m Assange to interview Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the orbit of U K politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect Corsi with Assange 218 present for all interviews and the interviews beginning on September 2 1 2018 were conducted pursuant to a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances 214 2 15 Corsi 10 31 18 302 at4 Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange to contact Assange because he believed he had no 55 A1 1 ente · U S Department of Justice Wefi Preth tet Mit · CoHtaifl Material Proteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e Malloch stated to investigators that be '--i - mm iP multiple FaceTime discussions about WikiLeakslllli lfllj·ili·atiJ···· had made a connection to Assange and that the ' ''' ' ' prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign In one conversation in or around August or September 2016 Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was coming after which we were going to be in the driver's seat 221 Harm to Ongoing Matter IIHarm to Ongoing Matter -Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter · Harm to Ongoing Matter 223 Harm to Ongoing Matter 224 Harm to Ongoing Matter 225 Harm to Ongoing Matter 226 Harm to Ongoing Matter 227 Harm to Ongoing Matter 228 Harm to Ongoing Matter I 56 U S Department of Justice Mtemey Werk Pt·eelttet II Ma · Cetttaitt Material Preteeteel Utteler Feel R Criffl P 6 e 230 Harm to Ongoing Matter 231 Harm to Ongoing Matter 234 Harm to Ongoing Matter 235 Harm to Ongoing Matter 236 Harm to Ongoing Matter 57 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werl Preattet II May Cefltaifl Material Preteetea Uflaer Feel R Criffi P 6 e d WikiLeaks's October 7 2016 Release ofStolen Podesta Emails four days after the Assange press conference the Washington Post published an Access Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely affect the Campaign 239 Less than an hour after the video's publication WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta 239 Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women 240 241 242 243 In a later November 2018 interview Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused on were on which Malloch was not Separate travel records show that at the time of the call Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight Corsi at one point stated that after WikiLeaks's release of stolen emails on October 7 2016 he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with Assange Corsi 11 1118 302 at 6 244 58 U S Department of Justice AMerAey Werk Predttet II May CetttaiH Material Preteeted UAeer Fed R CriHl P 6 e enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming 245 Corsi stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they did 246 In a later November 2018 interview Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether anyone could contact Assange but then said that maybe he had done nothing 247 not any or anyone to Corsi that day who says that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having contacted a member ofWikiLeaks on October 7 2016 after a conversation with Corsi e Donald Trump Jr Interaction with WikiLeaks Donald Trump Jr had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the campaign period On September 20 2016 an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's unprecedented and dangerous ties 245 During the same interview Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweets because he knew Assange was reading his tweets Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets 246 Corsi 9 21 18 302 at 6-7 247 Corsi l l 1118 302 at 6 Harm to Ongoing Matter 59 U S Department of Justice AM arHe · Werk Preettet II Mery· CaHt iH Material Prateeted UHder Fed R Crilfl P 6 e1 to Russia PutinTrump org 252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted ' Let' s bomb Iraq' Progress for America PAC to launch PutinTrump org' at 9 30am Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrump org Several hours later WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr A PAC run anti-Trump site putintrump org is about to launch The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC We have guessed the password It is ' putintrump ' See 'About' for who is behind it Any comments 253 Several hours later Trump Jr emailed a variety of senior campaign staff Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks See below I tried the password and it works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind it Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it 254 Trump Jr attached a screenshot of the About page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump org The next day after the website had launched publicly Trump Jr sent a direct message to WikiLeaks Off the record I don't know who that is but I ' ll ask around Thanks 255 On October 3 2016 WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr asking you guys to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target Julian Assange Trump Jr responded that he already had done so and asked what's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about 256 WikiLeaks did not respond On October 12 2016 WikiLeaks wrote again that it was great to see you and your dad talking about our publications Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us wlsearch tk 257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in digging through leaked emails and stated we just released Podesta emails Part 4 258 Two days later Trump Jr publicly tweeted the wlsearch tk link 259 ' 252 9 20 16 Twitter O Msonfishbein -a to @ WikiLeaks see JF00587 9 21116 Messages @jabber cryptoparty is @jabber cryptoparty is Fishbein 9 5 18 302 at 4 When interviewed by our Office Fishbein pro uced what he c laimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the participants discussed U S politics one of the other participants had posted the website and password that Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks 253 9 20 16 Twitter OM @ WikiLeaks to @OonaldJTrumpJr 254 TRUMPORG_ 28_ 000629-33 9 2 1 16 Email Trump Jr to Conway et al subject Wikileaks 255 9 21116 Twitter OM @OonaldJTrumpJr to @WikiLeaks 256 10 3 16 Twitter OMs @OonaldJTrumpJr @ WikiLeaks 257 At the time the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents 258 10 12 16 Twitter OM @WikiLeaks to @ OonaldJTrumpJr 259 @OonaldJTrurnpJr 10 14 16 6 34 a m Tweet 60 Att erHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Prech tet Mtty CetttaiH Matet·ial Preteeteti l Jiitier Fee R Grim P 6 e 2 Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials Throughout 2016 the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton' s private email server and whether approximately 30 000 emails from that server had in fact been permanently destroyed as reported by the media Several individuals associated with the Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton em ails and other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign Some of these contacts were met with sk pticism and nothing came of them others were pursued to some degree The investigation did not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any s ch Clinton emails or that these contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign a Henry Oknyansky a k a Henry Greenberg In the spring of20 16 Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Floridabased Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian Henry Oknyansky who also went by the name Henry Greenberg claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting 260 Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin a Ukrainian associate involved in Florida real estate At the meeting Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton Rasin claimed to possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton's involvement in money laundering with Rasin's companies According to Oknyansky Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands Stone refused the offer stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research 261 Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin's motivation was financial According to Oknyansky Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other interested parties and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold 262 Rasin is noted in public source documents as the director and or registered agent for a number of Florida companies none of which appears to be connected to Clinton The Office found no other evidence that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities In their statements to investigators Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections about the meeting Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and provided an introduction whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he was never told what information Oknyansky offered Caputo also stated that he was unaware Oknyansky sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact 263 26 °Caputo 5 2 18 302 at 4 Oknyansky 7 13 18 302 at 1 261 Oknyansky 7 13 18 302 at 1-2 262 Oknyansky 7 13 18 302 at 2 263 Caputo 5 2 18 302 at 4 Oknyansky 7 13 18 302 at 1 61 U S Depat1ment of Justice AtterHe 1· Wet·k Preattet Ma y CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHEier Fea R Grim P 6 e The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States although the Office confirmed Rasin had been issued a Florida driver's license The Office otherwise was unable to determine the content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone Finally the investigation did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian interference efforts b Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails After candidate Trump stated on July 27 2016 that he hoped Russia would find the 30 000 emails that are missing Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the deleted Clinton emails 264 Michael Flynn-who would later serve as National Security Advisor in the Trump Administration-recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly and Flynn subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails 265 Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn Ledeen a long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails provided updates to Flynn about her effot1s throughout the summer of 2016 266 Smith an investment advisor who was active in Republican politics also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails 267 Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request as early as December 2015 268 On December 3 2015 she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails stating Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you The person I described to you would be happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone The person can get the emails which 1 Were classified and 2 Were purloined by our enemies That would demonstrate what needs to be demonstrated 269 Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the Clinton email server was in all likelihood breached long ago and that the Chinese Russian and Iranian intelligence services could re-assemble the server's email content 270 The proposal called for a three-phase approach The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis The third phase consisted of checking with certain intelligence sources that have access through liai son work with various foreign services to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server The proposal noted Even if a single email was recovered and the providence sic of that email was a foreign service itwould be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and 264 Flynn4 25 18 302 at 5-6 Flynn 5 1 18 302 at 1-3 265 Flynn 5 1118 302 at 1-3 266 Flynn 4 25 18 302 at 7 Flynn 5 4 18 302 at 1-2 Flynn 11 29 17 302 at 7-8 267 Flynn 11129 17 302 at 7 268 Szobocsan 3 29 17 302 at 1 269 12 3 15 Email Ledeen to Smith 270 12 3 15 Email Ledeen to Smith attachment 62 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preelttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e wrote we can discuss to whom it should be referred 271 On December 16 2015 Smith informed Ledeen that he declined to participate in her initiative According to one of Smith 's business associates Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time 272 Just weeks after Trump' s July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails however Smith tried to locate and obtain the emai Is himself He created a company raised tens of thousands of dollars and recruited security experts and business associates Smith made claims to others involved in the effort and those from whom he sought funding that he was in contact with hackers with ties and affiliations to Russia who had access to the emails and that his efforts were coordinated with the Trump Campaign 273 On August 28 2016 Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject Sec Clinton' s unsecured private email server to an undisclosed list of recipients including Campaign co-chairman Sam Clovis The email stated that Smith was O ust finishing two days of sensitive meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above It is clear that the Clinton's home-based unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players and private mercenaries Parties with varying interests are circling to release ahead of the election 274 On September 2 2016 Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails 275 One of the purposes ofKLS Research was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative 276 KLS Research received over $30 000 during the presidential campaign although Smith represented that he raised even more money 277 Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative including security experts to search for and authenticate the emailsP8 In early September 2016 as part of his recruitment and fundraising effort Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was in coordination with the Trump Campaign to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization 279 The document listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign including Flynn Clovis Bannon 27 1 12 3 15 Email Smith to Szobocsan Safron 272 Szobocsan 3 29 18 302 at I 273 8 31 16 Email Smith to Smith 274 8 28 16 Email Smith to Smith 275 Incorporation papers of KLS Research LLC 7 26 17 Szobocsan 3 29 18 302 at 2 276 277 278 Szobocsan 3 29 18 302 at 3 Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC I 0 31 17 10 11116 Email Smith to Tait 8 22 17 302 at 3 York 7112 17 302 at 1-2 York 11 22 17 302 at 1 279 York 7 13 l7 302 attachment KLS Research LLC Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiative Sept 9 2016 63 U S Department of Justice Aftet'Ae ' Wet'k Pt'eettet Ma · GerttaiA Material Preteetee Urteet' Fee R Gt'im P 6 e and Kellyanne Conway 280 The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails 281 but the Office did not identify evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith' s efforts In September 2016 Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their respective efforts Ledeen wrote to Smith wondering if you had some more detailed reports or memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our eff011s since we last visited We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only '282 Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails from what she described as the dark web that purported to be the deleted Clinton emails Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails and solicited contributions to fund that effort Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor to ascertain the authenticity of the emails According to Prince the tech advisor determined that the emails were not authentic 283 A backup of Smith 's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta The files on Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2 2016 which was prior to the date of their release by WikiLeaks Forensic examination however established that the creation date did not reflect when the files were downloaded to Smith's computer lt appears the creation date was when WikiLeaks staged the document for release as discussed in Volume I Section III B 3 c supra 284 The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their release by WikiLeaks Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton's deleted emails until shortly before the election For example on October 28 20 16 Smith wrote that there was a tug-of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days and that WikiLeaks has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last under the theory this allows little time for response prior to the U S election November 8 285 An attachment to the 280 The same recruitment document listed Jerome Corsi under Independent Groups Organizations Individuals and described him as an established author and writer from the right on President Obama and Sec Clinton 28 1 Flynn 11 29 17 302 at 7-8 10 15 16 Email Smith to Flynn et al 8 28 16 Email Smith to Smith bee Clovis et al 282 9 16 16 Email Ledeen to Smith 283 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 4-5 284 The forensic analysis of Smith's computer devices found that Smith used an older Apple operating system that would have preserved that October 2 2016 creation date when it was downloaded no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith See Volume I Section lii B 3 c supra The Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith's computer from WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple operating system on Smith' s computer both files were successfully downloaded and retained the October 2 2016 creation date See SM-2284941 serial 62 285 10 28 16 Email Smith to Smith 64 U S Department of Justice Mterney Werk Preel let II May CentBifl Material Preteete6 Un6er Fee R Grim P 6 e email claimed that WikiLeaks would release All 33k deleted Emails by November st No emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian hackers For example in one such email Smith claimed that in August 2016 KLS Research had organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails including parties with ties and affiliations to Russia 286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such meetings occurred Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such connection 287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers or that Smith Ledeen or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained the deleted Clinton emails In sum the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons affiliated with the Clinton Campaign as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC The GRU then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers and disseminated that data through fictitious online personas DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 0 and later through WikiLeaks The investigation also that the · · interest in the WikiLeaks re and 286 8 31 16 Email Smith to Smith 287 Safron 3 20 18 302 at 3 Szobocsan 3 29 18 302 at 6 65 U S Department of Justice Al terHey Werk Pretittet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Criffl P 6 e IV RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN The Office identified multiple contacts- links in the words of the Appointment Orderbetween Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government The Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election In particular the investigation examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the Trump Campaign and Russia including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future Based on the available information the investigation did not establish such coordination This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals with ties to the Russian government including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts Each subsection begins with an overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts which are generally presented in chronological order beginning with the early months of the Campaign and extending through the post-election transition period A Campaign Period September 2015- November 8 2016 Russian-government-connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in Trump's campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015 288 Because Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and entertainment dealings this Office investigated whether a business contact with Russia-linked individuals and entities during the campaign period-the Trump Tower Moscow project see Volume I Section IV A l infra-led to or involved coordination of election assistance Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of20 16 when Trump was moving toward- and eventually becoming-the Republican nominee for President As set forth below the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period outreach to two of Trump's then-recently named foreign policy advisors including a representation that Russia had dirt on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails Volume I Sections IV A 2 IV A 3 dealings with a D C -based think tank that specializes in Russia and has connections with its government Volume I Section IV A 4 a meeting at Trump Tower between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was part of Russia and its government's support· for Trump Volume I Section IV A 5 events at the Republican National Convention Volume I Section IV A 6 post-Convention contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States Volume I Section IV A 7 and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort who had previously worked for a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine Volume I Section IV A 8 288 For example on August 18 20 I 5 on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper Vzglyad Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person candidate interview 8 18 15 Email Asatryan to Hicks One day earlier the publication's founder and former Russian parliamentarian Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-Trump2016 ru and DonaldTrump20 16 ru No interview took place 66 U S Department of Justice AM erfle · Werk Preclttet II Mtl' · Centaifl Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R CritH P 6Ee 1 Trump Tower Moscow Project The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as part of its real estate pottfolio Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership through subsidiary corporate structures of property In other cases the Trump Organization has executed licensing deals with real estate developers and management companies often local to the country where the project was located 289 Between at least 2013 and 2016 the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow The project commonly referred to as a Trump Tower Moscow or Trump Moscow project anticipated a combination of commercial hotel and residential properties all within the same building Between 2013 and June 20 16 several employees of the Trump Organization including thenpresident of the organization Donald J Trump pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian counterparties From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016 Michael Cohen spearheaded the Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project including by reporting on the project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization 290 a Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group 2013-2014 The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group a Russian real estate conglomerate owned and controlled by Aras Agalarov began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after the conclusion ofthe 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow 291 Donald J Trump Jr served as the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization Emin Agalarov son of Aras Agalarov and Irakli Ike Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations 292 with the occasional assistance of Robert Goldstone 293 In December 2013 Kaveladze and Trump Jr negotiated and signed preliminary terms of 289 See e g Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee I 15th Cong 151-52 Sept 7 2017 discussing licensing deals of specific projects 290 As noted in Volume I Section III D l supra in November 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress concerning among other things the duration of the Trump Tower Moscow project See Information 7 a United States v Michael Cohen 1 18-cr-850 S D N Y Nov 29 20 18 Doc 2 Cohen Information 29 1 See Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee 115th Cong 13 Sept 7 20 17 Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr Agalarov' s company Crocus Group began preliminarily discussion sic potential real estate projects in Moscow As has been widely reported the Miss Universe pageant-which Trump co-owned at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus City Hall in Moscow in November 2013 Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant and Aras Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event which Trump attended 292 Kaveladze 11 16 17 302 at 2 4-6 KA V_00385 12 6 13 Email Trump Jr to 67 U S Department of Justice A errtey Werk Preettet II Ma · Certtairt Material Preteetee UAeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project 294 On December 23 2013 after discussions with Donald J Trump the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the organization received a flat 3 5% commission on a ll sales with no licensing fees or incentives 295 The parties negotiated a letter of intent during January and February 2014 296 From January 2014 through November 2014 the Trump Organization and Crocus Group discussed development plans for the Moscow project Some time before January 24 2014 the Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a proposal for a 800-unit 194-meter building to be · constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in M oscow called Crocus City which had also been the site of the Miss Universe pageant 297 In February 2014 Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow 298 From March 2014 through July 2014 the groups discussed design standards and other architectural elements 299 For example in July 2014 members ofthe Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the demographics of these prospective buyers in the Crocus City area the development of neighboring parcels in Crocus City and concepts for redesigning portions of the building 300 In August 20 14 the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded tower being built in Crocus City 301 Beginning in September 2014 the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group 302 Communications between the two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency what appears to be the last communication is dated November 24 2014 303 The project appears not to have developed past the planning stage and no construction occurred 294 295 OSC-KA V_00452 12 23 13 Email Trump Jr to Kave1adze E Agalarov 296 See e g OSC-KAV_011 58 Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr E Agalarov OSCKA V_ 0114 7 I 20 14 Email Kaveladze to Trump Jr et al 297 See e g OSC-KA V_00972 10 14 14 Email McGee to Khoo et al email from Crocus Group contractor about specifications OSC-KAV_00540 1 24 14 Email McGee to Trump Jr et al 298 See OSC-KA V_00631 2 5 14 Email E Goldstone Facebook post 2 4 14 8 01 a m lllllilillliliiii lililllli Trump Jr Kaveladze 299 See e g OSC-KAV_0079 1 6 3 1 4 Email Kaveladze to Trump Jr et al OSC-KAV_00799 6 10 14 Email Trump Jr to Kaveladze et al OSC-KA V_ 0081 7 6 16 14 Email Trump Jr to Kaveladze et al 300 OSC-KA V 00870 7 17 14 Email Khoo to McGee et al 301 OSC-KAV_00855 8 4 14 Email Khoo to McGee et al 302 OSC-KA V_ 00903 9 29 14 Email Tropea to McGee Kaveladze noting last response was on August 26 2014 OSC-KAV_00906 9 29 14 Email Kaveladze to Tropea McGee suggesting silence proves my fear that those guys are ·bailing out of the project OSC-KAV_00972 10 14 14 Email McGee to Khoo et al email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications 303 OSC-KA V_01 140 11 24 14 Email Khoo to McGee et al 68 U S Department of Justice At tarHey Wark Pra61 1et II Mit · CaHtftiA Material Prateetetl UHtler Fee R Grim P 6 e b Communications with LC Expert Investment Company and Giorgi Rtskhiladze Summer and Fa 12015 In the late summer of 2015 the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing a Trump Tower project in Moscow In approximately September 2015 Felix Sater a New Yorkbased real estate advisor contacted Michael Cohen then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J Trump 304 Sater had previously worked with the Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects Sater had explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump Organization and therefore knew of the organization's general interest in completing a deal there 305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow previously and had accompanied Ivanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr to Moscow in the mid2000s 306 Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I C Expert Investment Company l C Expert a Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov 307 Sater had known Rozov since approximately 2007 and in 2014 had served as an agent on behalf of Rozov during Rozov' s purchase of a building in New York City 308 Sater later contacted Rozov and proposed that I C Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which I C Expert would license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another employee of I C Expert 309 Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with I C Expert or its agents In approximately September 2015 Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with I C Expert from candidate Trump who was then president of the Trump Organization Cohen provided updates directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016 assuring him the project was continuing 310 Cohen also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka Trump as to design elements such as possible architects to use for the project31 1 and Donald J Trump Jr about his experience in Moscow and possible involvement in the proj ect312 during the fa ll of2015 · information to ow· Office in two 2017 interviews conducted under a proffer 306 Sater9 19 17 302 at 1-2 5 307 Sater 9 19 17 302 at 3 308 Rozov 1 25 18 302 at 1 309 Rozov 1 25 18 302 at 1 see also 11 2 15 Email Cohen to Rozov et al sending Jetter of intent 31 °Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 1-2 4-6 31 1 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 5 3 12 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at4-5 69 U S Department of Justice A ttarAey Wark Praclttet II Mit ' CantaiA Material Prateetecl UAcler Fecl R Grim P 6 e A lso during the fall of 2015 Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with Giorgi Rtskhiladze a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal with the Trump Organization in Batumi Georgia 313 Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow including a licensing deal with the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group 314 On September 22 2015 Cohen forwarded a preliminary design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze adding I look forward to your reply about this spectacular proj ect in Moscow Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen' s email to an associate and wrote i f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian Government and Mr Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention 3 15 On September 24 2015 Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a proposed l etter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org explaining that w e need to send this letter to the Mayor of Moscow second guy in Russia he is aware of the potential project and will pledge his support 316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day Rtskhiladze provided a translation of the letter which described the Trump Moscow project as a symbol of stronger economic business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore United States and the Russian Federation 3 17 On September 27 2015 Rtskhiladze sent another email to Cohen proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with Global Development Group LLC which he described as being controlled by M ichail Posikhin a Russian architect and Simon Nizharadze 318 Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the proposal and instead continued to work with I C Expert the company represented by Felix Sater 319 c Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government October 2015-January 2016 i Trump Signs the Letter ofIntent on behalf of the Trump Organization Between approximately October 13 2015 and November 2 2015 the Trump Organization through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition LLC and I C Expert completed a letter of intent LOI for a Trump Moscow property The LOI signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov on behalf of I C Expert was intended to facilitate further discussions in order to attempt to 3 13 Rtskhiladze was a U S -based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group In approximately 20 11 Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to build a Trump-branded property in Batumi Georgia Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for a ·ect in Astana Kazakhstan The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze 3 14 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 12 see also Rtskhiladze 5 10 18 302 at 1 315 9 22 15 Email Rtskhiladze to Nizharadze 316 9 24 15 Email Rtskhiladze to Cohen 317 9 24 15 Email Rtskhiladze to Cohen 3 18 9 27 15 Email Rtskhiladze to Cohen 3 19 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 12 70 U S Department of Justice AM et'Hey Werk Preclttet II Mtty CeHtaiH Material Preteete€1 UHcler Fe€1 R CrifH P 6 e enter into a mutually acceptable agreement related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow 320 The LOI contemplated a development with residential hotel commercial and office components and called for a pproximately 250 first class luxury residential condominiums as well as o ne first class luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150 hotel rooms 32 1 For the residential and commercial portions of the project the Trump Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales 322 plus 3% of all rental and other revenue 323 For the project's hotel portion the Trump Organization would receive a base fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter plus a separate incentive fee of 20% of operating profit 324 Under the LOI the Trump Organization also would receive a $4 million up-front fee prior to groundbreaking 325 Under these terms the Trump Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project without assuming significant liabilities or financing commitments 326 On November 3 2015 the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI Sater emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate Trump's chances at being elected writing Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it I will get all of Putins team to buy in on this I will manage this process Michael Putin gets on stage with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow and Donald owns the republican nomination And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in We will manage this process better than anyone You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very shortly That the game changer 327 Later that day Sater followed up Donald doesn't stare down he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin only want to deal with a pragmatic leader and a successful business man is a good candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate Business politics whatever it all is the same for someone who knows how to deal 320 11 2 15 Email Cohen to Rozov et al attachment hereinafter LOI'' see also 10 1 3 15 Email Sater to Cohen Davis attaching proposed letter of intent 32 1 LOI p 2 322 The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million 4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500 million 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $ 1 billion and l % of all gross sales over $1 billion LOI Schedule 2 323 LOI Schedule 2 324 LOI Schedule 1 325 LOI Schedule 2 326 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 3 327 11 3 15 Email Sater to Cohen 12 14 p m - 71 U S Department of Justice AM erHe Werk Preattet II Ma r CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHeer Fee R Crittl P 6 e I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference If he says it we own this election Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald is a good guy to negotiate We can own this election Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people we can pull this off Michael lets go 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elected This is good really good 328 According to Cohen he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project to the 2016 U S presidential election at the time Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump Moscow project with him However Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the candidate suggested that his campaign would be a significant infomercial for Trump-branded properties 329 ii Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia Given the size of the Trump Moscow project Sater and Cohen believed the project required approval whether express or implicit from the Russian national government including from the Presidential Administration of Russia 330 Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact 33 1 In early negotiations with the Trump Organization Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials On October 12 2015 for example Sater wrote and that a meeting with Putin to Cohen that all we need is Putin on board and we are and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th of October this meeting was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no the Russian government 333 Approximately a month later after the LOI had been signed Lana Erchova emailed Ivanka Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitry K lokov to offer Klokov 's assistance to the Trump Campaign 334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communications for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System a large Russian electricity transmission 328 1113 15 Email Sater to Cohen 12 40 p m 329 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 3-4 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 15 Sater 12 15 17 302 at2 330 331 Sater 12115 17 302 at 3-4 332 I 0 12 15 Email Sater to Cohen 8 07 a m 333 334 Ivanka Trump received an email from a woman who identified herself as Lana E Alexander which said in part If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov you'll see who he is close to and that he has done Putin's political campaigns 11116 15 Email Erchova to I Trump 72 U S Department of Justice A et'fl ey Werk PreE ittet II May Centaifl Material PreteeteE i UAE ier Fee R Grim P 6 e company and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy minister Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen 335 He told the Office that after receiving this inquiry he had conducted an internet search for Klokov 's name and concluded incorrectly that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter 336 Between November 18 and 19 2015 ·Kiokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call and exchanged several emails Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a trusted person who could offer the Campaign political synergy and synergy on a government level Klokov recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the candidate and an individual K lokov described as our person of interest 337 ln an email to the Office Erchova later identified the person of interest as Russian President Vladimir Putin 338 In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov Cohen discussed his desire to use a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local developers Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified intermediary but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trumpincluding a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin-would need to be in conjunction with the development and an official visit with the Trump Organization receiving a formal invitation to visit 339 Klokov had written previously that the visit by candidate Trump to Russia has to be informal 340 Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over a possible meeting between Trump and the person of interest from any existing business track 341 Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business Klokov added in second email to Cohen that if publicized well such a meeting could have phenomenal impact in a business dimension and that the person of interest 's most important support could have significant ramifications for the level of projects and their capacity Klokov concluded by telling 335 11 16 15 Email I Trump to Cohen 336 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 17 During his interviews with the Office Cohen still appeared to believe that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian The investigation however established that the email address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov as described above 337 11 18 15 Email Klokov to Cohen 6 51 a m 338 In July 2018 the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova in which she wrote that a t the end of2015 and beginning of2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact Ivanka Trump and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials 7 27 18 Email Erchova to Special Counsel's Office The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin Id In order to vet the email's claims the Office responded requesting more details The Office did not receive any reply 339 11 18 15 Email Cohen to Klokov 7 15a m 340 11 18 15 Email Klokov to Cohen 6 51 a m 34 1 11 18 15 Email Klokov to Cohen 6 5 1 a m I would suggest separating your negotiations and our proposal to meet I assure you after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be completely different having the most important support 73 U S Department of Justice AtlorHey Work Prodt tet II Mit · CoHtttiH Material Proteeted UHde - Fed R CPim P 6 e Cohen that there was no bigger warranty in any project than the consent of the person of interest 342 Cohen rejected the proposal saying that c urrently our LOI developer is in talks with VP' s Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet 343 This email appears to be their final exchange and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought Klokov ' s initial offer of assistance to the Campaign 's attention or that anyone associated with the Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date Cohen explained that he did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with Sater who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government 344 By late December 2015 however Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials Cohen told Sater that he was setting up the meeting myself 345 On January 11 2016 Cohen emailed the office of Dmitry Peskov the Russian government's press secretary indicating that he desired contact with Sergei Ivanov Putin's chief of staff Cohen erroneously used the email address Pr_peskova@prpress gof ru instead of Pr_peskova@prpress gov ru so the email apparently did not go through 346 On January 14 2016 Cohen emailed a different address info@prpress gov ru with the following message Dear Mr Peskov Over the past few months I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City Without getting into lengthy specifics the communication between our two sides has stalled As this project is too important I am hereby requesting your assistance I respectfully request someone preferably you contact me so that I might discuss the specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon 347 Two days later Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress gov ru repeating his request to speak with Sergei Ivanov 348 Cohen testified to Congress and initially told the Office that he did not recall receiving a response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump Moscow project as of January 2016 Cohen later admitted that these statements were false In 342 11 19 15 Email Klokov to Cohen 7 40a m 343 11 19115 Email Cohen to Klokov 12 56 p m 344 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 12 345 FS00004 12 30 15 Text Message Cohen to Sater 6 17p m 346 1 11 16 Email Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress gof ru 9 12a m 347 1 14116 Email Cohen to info@prpress gov ru 9 21 a m 348 1 16 16 Email Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress gov ru 10 28 a m 74 U S Department of Justice A1 tarAey Werk Pretittet II Mtty CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Cri1 P 6 e fact Cohen had received and recalled receiving a response to his inquiry and he continued to work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016 349 On January 20 2016 Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova Peskov's personal assistant Writing from her personal email account Poliakova stated that she had been trying to reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided 350 Shortly after receiving Poliakova's email Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes 351 Cohen described to Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow project including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization had partnered Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward both in securing land to build the project and with financing According to Cohen Poliakova asked detailed questions and took notes stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia 352 Cohen could not recall any direct follow-up from Poliakova or from any other representative of the Russian government nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct follow-up However the day after Cohen's call with Poliakova Sater texted Cohen asking him to c all me when you have a few minutes to chat It's about Putin they called today 353 Sater then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project 354 along with a note to t ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes you want and send it back to me 355 After a further round of edits on January 25 2016 Sater sent Cohen an invitation- signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ-to travel to Moscow for a working visit about the prospects of development and the construction business in Russia the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower and the opp01tunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr Donald Trump 356 According 349 Cohen Information 4 7 Cohen's interactions with President Trump and the President's lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II See Vol II Section II K 3 infra 350 1 20 16 Email Poliakova to Cohen 5 57a m Mr Cohen I can't get through to both your phones Pis call me 351 2016 between Cohen and the number Telephone records show a 20-minute call on January After Poliakova provided in her email Call Records of Michael Cohen the call Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump list 1 20 16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry 6 22a m 352 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 2-3 353 FS00011 1 21116 Text Messages Sater to Cohen 354 The invitation purported to be from Genbank a Russian bank that was according to Sater working at the behest of a larger bank VTB and would consider providing financing FS00008 12 31 15 Text Messages Sater Cohen Additional information about Genbank can be found infra 355 FSOOOll 1 21 16 Text Message Sater to Cohen 7 44p m 1121116 Email Sater to Cohen 6 49p m 356 1 25 16 Email Sater to Cohen 12 01 p m attachment 75 U S Department of Justice AtiorAe · Wofk Proclttet II Mtt ' CoHtttiA Mttterittl Proteetecl UHcler Fecl R Cfiffl P 6 e to Cohen he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project 357 d Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump December 2015-June 2016 i Sater's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project Beginning in late 2015 Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump as representatives of the Trump Organization to travel to Russia to meet with Russian government officials and possible financing partners In December 20 15 Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to Russia for meetings 358 On December 19 2015 Sater wrote Please call me I have Evgeney Dvoskin on the other line e 59 He needs a copy ofyour and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports Invitations Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower Moscow Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue invite so they are inviting commercially business VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business meeting not political We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite have visa issued 360 In response Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport 36 1 Cohen told the Office that at one point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff Trump' s executive assistant at the Trump Organization and that Graff later brought Trump ' s passport to Cohen's 357 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 6-7 358 See e g 12 1 15 Email Sater to Cohen 12 41 p m Please scan and send me a copy of your passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 359 Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin Call Records of Felix Sater Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank a large bank with lending focused m that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen Genbank was subject to U S government sanctions see Russia Ukraine-related Sanctions and Identifications Office of Foreign Assets Control Dec 22 20 15 available at https www treasury gov resource-center sanctions OFACEnforcement Pages 20 151222 aspx Dvoskin who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for criminal activity was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker and Gene Shustar See United States v Rizzo et a 2 03-cr-63 E D N Y Feb 6 2003 360 12 19 15 Email Sater to Cohen 10 50 a m FS00002 12 19115 Text Messages Sater to Cohen 10 53 a m 361 FS00004 12 19 15 Text Message Cohen to Sater ERT_0198-256 12 19 15 Text Messages Cohen Sater 76 U S Department of Justice AUerHey Werk Preattet II Ma · Certtairt Material Proteetea Urtaer Fee R Criffl P 6 e office 362 The investigation did not however establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater 363 Into the spring of 2016 Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in connection with the Trump Moscow project On April 20 2016 Sater wrote Cohen t he People wanted to know when you are coming 364 On May 4 2016 Sater followed up I had a chat with Moscow ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention I said I believe but don't know for sure that' s it's probably after the convention Obviously the pre-meeting trip you only can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys where sic the question I said I would confirm and revert Let me know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to speak to them and possibly fly over 365 Cohen responded My trip before Cleveland Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention 366 The day after this exchange Sater tied Cohen' s travel to Russia to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Forum an annual event attended by prominent Russian politicians and businessmen Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum 367 On May 5 2016 Sater wrote to Cohen Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16-19 He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there This is perfect The entire business class of Russia will be there as well He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss 368 The following day Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel Cohen wrote back w orks for me 369 362 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 5 363 On December 21 20 15 Sater sent Cohen a text message that read They need a copy of DJT passport to which Cohen responded After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him FS00004 12 2 1 15 Text Messages Cohen Sater 364 FS00014 4 20 16 Text Message Sater to Cohen 9 06p m 365 FS00015 5 4116 Text Message Sater to Cohen 7 38p m 366 FS00015 5 4116 Text Message Cohen to Sater 8 03p m 367 Sater 12 15 17 302 at 4 368 FS00016 5 5 16 Text Messages Sater to Cohen 6 26 6 27a m 369 FS00016 5 6 16 Text Messages Cohen Sater 77 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Werk Pretlttet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHtler Fea R CritJt P 6 e On June 9 2016 Sater sent Cohen a notice that he Sater was completing the badges for the Forum adding Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well 'mo On June 13 2016 Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director ofthe Roscongress Foundation the Russian entity organizing the Forum 371 Sater also sent Cohen a Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos 372 According to Cohen the invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him Cohen was concerned that Russian officials were not actually invo lved or were not interested in meeting with him as Sater had alleged and so he decided not to go to the Forum 373 On June 14 2016 Cohen met Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be traveling at that time 374 ii Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia The investigation identified evidence that during the period the Trump Moscow project was under consideration the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts First in interviews with the Office Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling to Russia with Trump twice once in late 20 15 and again in spring 2016 375 According to Cohen Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly On one occas ion Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordin te the candidate's schedule Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski who suggested that they speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate Cohen indicated however that he knew that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate's preexisting commitments to the Campaign 376 Second like Cohen Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum In late December 2015 Mira Duma- a contact oflvanka Trump's from the fashion industry-first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump from Sergei Prikhodko a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation 377 On January 14 20 16 Rho na Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was honored to be asked to participate in the highly prestigious Forum event but that he would have to decline the invitation given his very grueling and full travel schedule as a presidential candidate 378 Graff 37 °FS00018 6 9116 Text Messages Sater Cohen 371 6 13 16 Email Sater to Cohen 2 10p m 372 FS000 18 6 13 16 Text Message Sater to Cohen 2 20p m 6113 16 Email Sater to Cohen 373 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 6-8 374 FS00019 6 14 16 Text Messages Cohen Sater 12 06 and 2 50p m 375 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 2 376 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7 377 12 21 15 Email Mira to Ivanka Trump 6 57 a m attachments TRUMPORG_16_000057 1 7 16 Email I Trump to Graff 9 18 a m 378 1 14 16 Email Graff to Mira 78 U S Department of Justice AM arHey Wark Pratittet II Ma y CaHtttiH Ma teria l Prateeteti UHtiet· Feti R Critfl P 6 e asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff send a formal note to the Deputy Prime Minister declining his invitation Duma replied that a formal note would be great 379 It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately According to written answers from President Trump 380 Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on March 17 2016 again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St Petersburg 381 Two weeks later on March 31 2016 Graff prepared for Trump 's signature a two-paragraph letter declining the invitation 382 The letter stated that Trump' s schedule has become extremely demanding because of the presidential campaign that he already ha d several commitments in the United States for the time of the Forum but that he otherwise would have g ladly given every consideration to attending such an important event 383 Graff forwarded the letter to another executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead for Trump to sign 384 At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared Robert Foresman-a New York-based investment banker- began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting with candidate Trump According to Foresman he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov a Russian presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation to see if Trump could speak at the Forum 385 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31 2016 following a phone introduction brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett who produced the television show The Apprentice In his email Foresman referenced his long-standing personal and professional expertise in Russia and Ukraine his work setting up an early private channel between Vladimir Putin and former U S President George W Bush and an approach he had rece ived from senior Kremlin officials about the candidate Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate Corey Lewandowski or another relevant person to discuss this and other concrete things Foresman felt uncomfortable discussing over unsecure email 386 On April 4 2016 Graff forwarded Foresman's meeting request to Jessica Macchia another executive assistant to Trump 387 379 1115116 Email Mira to Graff 380 As explained in Volume II and Appendix C on September 17 2018 the Office sent written questions to the President's counsel On November 20 2018 the President provided written answers to those questions through counsel 38 1 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 20 18 at 17 Response to Question IV Part e D ocuments show that Ms Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation 382 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 17 Response to Question IV Part e see also TRUMPORG_16_000134 unsigned letter dated March 3 1 2016 383 TRUMPORG_16_000134 unsigned letter 384 TRUMPORG 16 000133 3 3 1116 Email Graffto Macchia 385 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 3-4 386 See TRUMPORG_1 6_00136 3 31 16 Email Foresman to Graff see also Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 3-4 387 See TRUMPORG_ 16_00136 4 4 16 Email Graff to Macchia 79 U S Department of Justice ' M emey Werk Pwtlttet II Ma ' CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e With no response forthcoming Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff-first on April26 and again on April 30 2016 388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26 email as well as his initial March 2016 email to Lewandowski 389 On May 2 2016 Graff forwarded Foresman's April 30 email-which suggested an alternative meeting with Donald Trump Jr or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that should be conveyed to the candidate personally or to someone the candidate absolutely trusts -to policy advisor Stephen Miller 390 No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election when he interacted with the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration 391 When interviewed by the Office Foresman denied that the specific approach from senior Kremlin officials noted in his March 31 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to Roscongress According to Foresman the concrete things he referenced in the same email were a combination of the invitation itself Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and Russia policy in general and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U S think tank EastWest Institute Foresman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician Foresman also said that Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out 392 Finally Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump stating the reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials to the Campaign Foresman commented that he had not recognized any of the experts announced as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016 and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with the candidate to share his professional background and policy views including that Trump should decline Kobyakov's invitation to speak at the Forum 393 2 George Papadopoulos George Papadopoulos was a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign from March 388 See TRUMPORG_16_00137 4 26 16 Email Foresman to Graff TRUMPORG_ 16_00141 4 30 16 Email Foresman to Graff 389 See TRUMPORG_16_00139 4 27 16 Email Graff to Foresman TRUMPORG_ l6_00137 4 27 16 Email Graff to Lewandowski 390 TRUMPORG_16_00142 5 2 16 Email Graff to S Miller see also TRUMPORG_ 16_00143 5 2 16 Email Graff to S Miller forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman 39 1 Foresman's contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume I Section IV B 3 infra 392 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at4 393 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 8-9 80 U S Department of Justice Attet'Hey Werk Proeuet II May CeHtB iH MB terial Proteeteei UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e 2016 to early October 2016 394 In late April 2016 Papadopoulos was told by London-based professor Joseph Mifsud immediately after Mifsud's return from a trip to Moscow that the Russian government had obtained dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails One week later on May 6 2016 Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to candidate Clinton Papadopoulos shared information about Russian dirt with people outside of the Campaign and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did -not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information Throughout the relevant period of time and for several months thereafter Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government That meeting never came to pass a Origins of Campaign Work In March 2016 Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign 395 As early as the summer of 2015 he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but in a September 30 2015 email he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors 396 1n late 2015 Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson 397 Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 2016 Papadopoulos had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016 398 At that time Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice LCILP which billed itself as a unique institution comprising high-level professional international law practitioners dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the practice of international law 399 Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson 394 Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall of 2017 after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in a January 2017 FBI interview about inter alia the timing extent and nature of his interactions and communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to an information charging him with making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U S C § 100l a 395 A Transcript of Donald Trump 's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board Washington Post Mar 21 2016 396 7115 15 Linkedln Message Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 6 57a m 9 30 15 Email Glassner to Papadopoulos 7 42 21 a m 397 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2 398 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2 2 4 16 Email Papadopoulos to Idris 399 London Centre oflnternational Law Practice at https www Icilp org via web archive org 81 U S Department of Justice A« emey Werle Pwauet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea Under Fea R Critn P 6 e campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring 400 In early February Papadopoulos agreed to join LCILP and arrived in London to begin work 401 As he was taking his position at LCILP Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his interest in joining the Trump Campaign 402 On March 2 2016 Papadopoulos sent Glassner another message reiterating his interest 403 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos' s interest to another campaign official Joy Lutes who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis the Trump Campaign' s national cochair and chief policy advisor 404 At the time of Papadopoulos' s March 2 email the media was criticizing the Trump Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks 405 To address that issue senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together on short notice 406 After receiving Papadopoulos 's name from Lutes Clovis performed a Google search on Papadopoulos learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute and believed that he had credibility on energy issues 407 On March 3 2016 Clovis arranged to speak with Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor and on March 6 2016 the two spoke 408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mentioned as a topic and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the Campaign 's foreign policy 409 At the end of the conversation Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign and Papadopoulos accepted the offer 41 0 b Initial Russia-Related Contacts Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor Papadopoulos traveled 400 2 4 16 Email Papadopoulos to Idris 40 1 2 5 16 Email Idris to Papadopoulos 6 11 25 p m 2 6 16 Email Idris to Papadopoulos 5 34 15 p m 402 2 4 16 Linkedln Message Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 1 28 p m 2 4 16 Email Papadopoulos to Glassner 2 10 36 p m 403 3 2 16 Email Papadopoulos to Glassner 11 17 23 a m 404 3 2 16 Email Lutes to Papadopoulos 10 08 15 p m 405 Clovis 10 3 17 302 1 of2 at 4 406 Clovis 10 3 17 302 1 of2 at 4 3 3 16 Email Lutes to Clovis Papadopoulos 6 05 47 408 3 6 16 Email Papadopoulos to Clovis 4 24 21 p m Statement of Offense 4 United States v George Papadopoulos 1 17-cr-182 D D C Oct 5 20 17 Doc 19 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 409 41 0 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2 82 U S Department of Justice AUerney Werlt Preattet May Centain Matet·ial Preteetea Unaer Fee R Crirn P 6 e to Rome Italy as part of his duties with LCILP 411 The purpose ofthe trip was to meet officials affiliated with Link Campus University a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian government official 412 During the visit Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of Diplomacy in London England 413 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated with LCILP the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him 414 Mifsud maintained various Russian contacts while living in London as described further below Among 415 a one-time employee of the IRA the entity that carried out his contacts was see Volume I Section II supra In January and February the Russian socia 2016 Mifsud and discussed possibly meeting in Russia The investigation did meetmg in the spring o f 2 0 1 6 was also in contact that was linked to an employee of the Russian Ministry of Defense account ing contacts with a group of Russian militarycontrolled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the course of the GRU's hack-and-release operations see Volume I Section III B l supra According to Papadopoulos Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when they met in Rome 416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign however Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos 4 17 The two discussed Mifsud's European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia Mifsud also offered to introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian government 418 Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud's claim of substantial connections with Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos who thought that such connections could increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign 419 4 11 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2-3 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 5 41 2 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2-3 Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al Joseph Mifsud more questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia The Guardian Oct 31 20 17 Link Campus University is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti 413 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'lf5 414 Papadopoulos 8 10117 302 at 3 416 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'lf5 4 17 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'lf5 418 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 3 Papadopoulos 8 11 17 302 at 2 419 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 'lf5 83 A eraey U S Department of Justice Werk Preclttet May Ceataia Material Preteetecl Uacler Fecl R Grim P 6 e ° On March 17 2016 Papadopoulos returned to London 42 Four days later candidate Trump publicly named him as a member ofthe foreign policy and national security advisory team chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions describing Papadopoulos as an oil and energy consultant and an e xcellent guy 421 On March 24 2016 Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London 422 Mifsud was accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin 423 Papadopoulos understood at the time that Polonskaya may have been Putin's niece but later learned that this was not true 424 During the meeting Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that the Russian ambassador in London was a friend ofhers 425 Based on this interaction Papadopoulos expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London but that did not occur 426 Following his meeting with Mifsud Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team The subject line of the message was Meeting with Russian leadership--including Putin 427 The message stated in pertinent part I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine Joseph Mifsud the director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin 's niece and the Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister 428 The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to discuss U S -Russia ties under President Trump They are keen to host us in a neutral city or directly in Moscow They said the leadership including Putin is ready to meet with us and Mr Trump should there be interest Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving forward with this very important issue 429 420 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 2 421 Phillip Rucker Robert Costa Trump Questions Need for NATO Outlines Noninterventionist Foreign Policy Washington Post Mar 21 2016 422 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 3 3 24 16 Text Messages Mifsud Papadopoulos 423 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 3 424 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 3 Papadopoulos 2 10 17 302 at 2-3 Papadopoulos Internet Search History 3 24 16 revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24 2016 for putin's niece olga putin and russian president niece olga among other terms 425 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 3 426 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 8 n l 427 3 24 16 Email Papadopoulos to Page eta 8 48 21 a m 428 Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false As noted above the woman he met was not Putin's niece he had not met the Russian Ambassador in London and the Ambassador did not also serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister 429 3 24 16 Email Papadopoulos to Page eta 8 48 21 a m 84 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werlt Preelttet II M ey CeHtain Material Preteeteel Urteler Feel R Criffl P 6 e Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign' s approach toward Russia-from one of engaging with Russia throu the NATO framework and stance on Russian in Ukra Clovis's response to Papadopoulos however did not reflect that shift Replying to Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial email Clovis wrote This is most informative Let me work it through the campaign No commitments until we see how this plays out My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies especially France Germany and Great Britain We need to reassure our allies that we are not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page More thoughts later today Great work 431 c March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions and candidate Trump approximately one week later on March 31 2016 in Washington D C 432 The meeting-which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign433- took place at the Trump International Hotel 434 Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event At the meeting Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table while Trump sat at the other As reflected in the photograph below which was posted to Trump's Instagram account Papadopoulos sat between the two two seats to Sessions's left 430 43 1 3 24 16 Email Clovis to Papadopoulos et al 8 55 04 a m 432 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4 Papadopoulos 8 11 17 302 at 3 433 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 16-17 434 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4 85 U S Department of Justice AtlorHey Work Proeuet II Mtl ' Cm taiH Material Proteetee UHeer Pee R Grim P 6 e March 31 20 6 Meeting ofForeign Policy Team with Papadopoulos Fourth from Right ofCandidate Trump During the meeting each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise 435 Papadopoulos spoke about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian officials 436 Specifically Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help arrange that meeting 437 Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement Papadopoulos and Campaign advisor J D Gordon-who told investigators in an interview that he had a crystal clear recollection of the meeting-have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the idea of a meeting with Putin 438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of his efforts to arrange a meeting 439 Gordon and two other attendees however recall that Sessions generally opposed the proposal though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or the strength of the opposition he expressed 440 d George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has Dirt in the Form of Clinton Em ails Whatever Sessions' s precise words at the March 31 meeting Papadopoulos did not understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from 435 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4 436 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4 437 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 9 see Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 14 Carafano 9 12 17 302 at 2 Hoskins 9 14 17 302 at 1 438 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4-5 Gordon 9 7 17 302 at 4-5 439 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 5 Papadopoulos 8 11 17 302 at 3 440 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 17 Gordon 9 7 17 302 at 5 Hoskins 9 14 17 302 at 1 Carafano 9 12 17 302 at 2 86 U S Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rk Pr6elttet II Mtt · C6ntttiH Material Pr6teeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government To the contrary Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive of his efforts to arrange such a meeting 441 Accordingly when he returned to London Papadopoulos resumed those efforts 442 Throughout April 2016 Papadopoulos continued to correspond with meet with and seek Russia contacts through Mifsud and at times Polonskaya 443 For example within a week of her initial March 24 meeting with him Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text messagewhich email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud-addressing Papadopoulos's wish to engage with the Russian Federation 444 When Papadopoulos learned from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him he sent her an email seeking another meeting 445 Polonskaya responded the next day that she was back in St Petersburg but would be very pleased to support Papadopoulos 's initiatives between our two countries and to meet him again 446 Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought a good step would be to introduce him to the Russian Ambassador in London and that he would like to talk to the ambassador or anyone else you recommend about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia 447 Mifsud who had been copied on the email exchanges replied on the morning of April II 20I6 He wrote This is already been agreed I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai meeting plus other meetings at the Duma We will talk tomorrow 448 The two bodies referenced by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government the Duma is a Russian legislative assembly 449 while Valdai refers to the Valdai Discussion Club a Moscow-based group that is close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment 450 Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he would see him tomorrow 451 For her part Polonskaya responded that she had already alerted my personal links to our conversation and your request that we are all very excited the possibility of a good relationship with Mr Trump and that t he Russian Federation would love to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced 452 441 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 4-5 Papadopoulos 8 11 17 302 at 3 Papadopoulos 9 20 17 302 442 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 10 443 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 1 0-15 444 3 29 16 Emails Mifsud to Polonskaya 3 39a m and 5 36a m 445 4 10 16 Email Papadopoulos to Polonskaya 2 45 59 p m 446 4 11116 Email Polonskaya to Papadopoulos 3 11 24 a m 447 4 11 16 Email Papadopoulos to Polonskaya 9 21 56 a m 448 4 11116 Email Mifsud to Papadopoulos 11 43 53 449 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense tO c at 2 450 Anton Troianovski Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US Nuclear Stance Washington Post Feb 10 2018 451 4 11 16 Email Papadopoulos to Mifsud 11 51 53 a m 452 4 12 16 Email Polonskaya to Papadopoulos 4 47 06 a m 87 U S Department of Justice AM erHey l erk Preettet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R CriFH P 6 e Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other tomorrow referenced a meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning April 12 2016 at the Andaz Hotel in London Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office 453 and records from Papadopoulos's UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the meeting took place 454 Following the meeting Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow 455 On April 18 20 16 while in Russia Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev a member ofthe Russian International Affairs Council RIAC 456 Mifsud had described Timofeev as having connections with the Russian Ministry ofForeign Affairs MFA 457 the executive entity in Russia responsible for Russian foreign relations 458 Over the next several weeks Papadopoulos and Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting the groundwork for a potential meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials 459 Papadopoulos told the Office that on one Skype call he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being monitored or supervised by an unknown third party because Timofeev spoke in an official manner and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line 460 Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April 25 2016 email that he had just spoken to Igor Ivanov the President ofRIAC and former Foreign Minister ofRussia and conveyed Ivanov' s advice about how best to arrange a Moscow visit 461 After a stop in Rome Mifsud returned to England on April 25 201 6 462 The next day Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel the same location as their last 453 Papadopoulos 9 19117 302 at 7 454 4 12 16 Email M ifs ud to Papadopoulos 5 44 39 a m forwarding Libya-related document 4 12 16 Email Mifsud to Papadopoulos Obaid 10 28 20 a m Papadopoulos Internet Search History Apr 11 2016 10 56 49 p m search for andaz hotel liverpool street 4 12 16 Text Messages M ifs ud Papadopoulos 455 See e g 4 18 16 Email Mifsud to Papadopoulos 8 04 54 a m 456 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 5 457 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 458 During the campaign period Papadopoulos connected over Linked In with several MFAaffiliated individuals in addition to Timofeev On April 25 2016 he connected with Dmitry Andreyko publicly identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland In July 2016 he connected with Yuriy Melnik the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA And on September 16 2016 he co Nalobin also identified as an MFA official See Papadopoulos Linked In Connections 459 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 11 460 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 5 Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 10 46 1 4 25 16 Email Timofeev to Papadopoulos 8 16 35 a m 462 4 22 16 Email Mifsud to Papadopoulos 12 41 01 a m 88 U S Department of Justice AMerAe · Werk Preattet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UHEier FeEl R Crit'H P 6 e meeting 463 During that meeting Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow Mifsud also said that on the trip he learned that the Russians had obtained dirt on candidate Hillary Clinton As Papadopoulos later stated to the FBI Mifsud said that the dirt was in the form of emails of Clinton and that they have thousands of emails 464 On May 6 2016 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton 465 e Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials with Russian government officials Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts On April25 2016 the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails Papadopoulos wrote to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that t he Russian government has an open invitation by Putin for Mr Trump to meet him when he is ready and that t he advantage of being in London is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities 466 On April27 2016 after his meeting with Mifsud Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that some interesting messages were coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right 467 The same day Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski telling Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin wanting to host Trump and the team when the time is right 468 Papadopoulos's Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued throughout the spring and summer of 2016 On May 4 2016 he forwarded to Lewandowski an email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow asking Lewandowski whether that was something we want to move forward with 469 The next day Papadopoulos forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis adding to the top of the email Russia update 470 He included the same email in a May 21 2016 message to senior Campaign official Paul Manafort under the subject line Request from Russia to meet Mr Trump stating that Russia has been eager to meet Mr Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me 463 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 14 4 25 16 Text Messages Mifsud Papadopoulos 464 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 14 465 This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials q fte if furmatieA is law eflfereemettt seHsitive LES ana ffittst ee treate6 aeeersiflgly ifl a '· exterflal 6issemittatiefl The foreign government conveyed this information to the U S government on July 26 2016 a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails The FBI opened its investigation of potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information 466 4 25 16 Email Papadopoulos to S Miller 8 12 44 p m 467 4 27 16 Email Papadopoulos to S Miller 6 55 58 p m 468 4 27 16 Email Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 7 15 14 p m 469 5 4 16 Email Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 8 14 49 a m 470 5 5 16 Email Papadopoulos to Clovis 7 15 21 p m 89 U S Department of Justice Aftertle · Werk Pretittet Mtty Cetltaifl M terial Preteeteti URtier Feti R Grim P 6 e to discuss 471 Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official without including Papadopoulos and stated Let ' s discuss We need someone to communicate that Trump is · not doing these trips It sho uld be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send any signa1 472 On June 1 2016 Papadopo ulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about a Russia visit asking if Lewandowski want ed to have a call about this topic and whether we were following up with it 473 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to connect with C lovis because he was running point Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that the Russian MFA was asking him if Mr Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point 474 Papadopoulos wrote in an email that he w anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide w hat's best to do with it and what message I should send or to ignore 475 After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev 476 Papadopoulos sent one mo re email to Lewandowski on June 19 2016 Lewandowski' s last day as campaign manager 477 The email stated that t he Russian ministry offoreign affairs had contacted him and asked whether if Mr Trump could not travel to Russia a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could attend meetings 478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was willing to make the trip off the record if it's in the interest of Mr Trump and the campaign to meet specific people 479 Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign Papadopoulos communicated with Clovis and Walid Phares another member of the foreign policy advisory team about an offthe-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with Papadopoulos's other Russia connections Mifsud and Timofeev 480 Papadopoulos also interacted 47 1 5 21 16 Email Papadopoulos to Manafort 2 30 14 p m 472 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 19 n 2 473 6 1 16 Email Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 3 08 18 p m 474 6 1 16 Email Lewandowski to Papadopoulos 3 20 03 p m 6 1 16 Email Papadopoulos to Clovis 3 29 14 p m 475 6 1 16 Email Papadopoulos to Clovis 3 29 14 p m Papadopoulos's email coincided in time with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting First on May 15 2016 David Kleina distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about a potential Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar the Chief Rabbi of Russia The email stated that Klein had contacted Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was a very close confidante of Putin DJTFP00011547 5 15 16 Email Klein to Clovis 5 45 24 p m The investigation did not find evidence that Clovis responded to Klein's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of Klein' s subsequent meeting with Greenblatt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower Klein 8 30 18 302 at 2 476 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 2 1 a 477 478 6 19 16 Email Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 1 11 11 p m 479 6 19 16 Email Papadopoulos to Lewandowski 1 11 11 p m Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 21 7 14 16 Email Papadopoulos to Timofeev 11 57 24 p m 7115 16 Email Papadopoulos to Mifsud 7 27 16 Email Papadopoulos to Mifsud 2 14 18 p m 480 90 U S Department of Justice 2' tt emey Werle Preattet II Mtt · CefltaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Crii'H P 6 e directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism TAG a group for which Phares was co-secretary general 481 On July 16 2016 Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington D C where he sat next to Clovis as reflected in the photograph below 482 George Papadopoulos far right and Sam Clovis second from right Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit 483 Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares during the event 484 Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with emails sent before and after the TAG summit The pre-summit messages included a July 11 2016 email in which Phares suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat 485 and a July 12 message in the same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees are very nervous about Russia So be aware 486 Ten days after the summit Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud listing Phares and Clovis as other participants in a potential meeting at the London Academy of Diplomacy 487 Finally Papadopoulos 's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a 481 Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 16-17 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism 482 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism 483 484 Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 16-1 7 485 7 11116 Email Phares to Papadopoulos 486 7 12116 Email Phares to Papadopoulos 14 52 29 487 7 27 16 Email Papadopoulos to Mifsud 14 14 18 91 A an ey U S Department of Justice Werk Praattet II Mtty CaH taiH Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Crini P 6 e journal that he kept at the time 488 Those notes which are reprinted in part below appear to refer to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the office of Putin and suggest that Phares Clovis and Papadopoulos Walid Sam me would attend without the official backing of the Campaign no official letter no message from Trump 489 September Have an exploratory meeting te or lose In September - if allowed they will blast Mr Trump We want the meeting in London England Walid Sam me 7ef tn j - q -el l-h k J-Yj# 5e 'f f fe J V Tf f - t 7 '- rt ll c f- Jr 1r Jv· lv4 '- No official letter no message from Trump -Office of Putin -Explore we are a campaign k- J l YYJ _ - t'7- -- U- Willingness to meet the FM sp with Walid Sam -FM coming -Useful to have a session with him vv e f1 f i J o u4' t -- - J r - CP Pti fJ J 1 -- ldpt -e offlsrael EGYPT 'w • c J t- df Hr 1 l'o r They are talking to us -It is a lot of risk k 1 -t 1 · h e 5r -fc tv llr- -- f M IN h ' l · ¢ - 11 '1 c - f '- t ll - - v '1 l rt Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he Clovis could not travel On August 15 2016 Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple foreign governments even Russia for closed door workshops consultations abroad and asked whether there was still interest for Clovis Phares and Papadopoulos to go on that trip 490 Clovis copied Phares on his response which said that he could not travel before the election but that he would encourage Papadopoulos and Walid to make the trips if it is feasible 491 488 Papadopoulos 9 20 17 302 at 3 489 Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes telling investigators that he could not read his own handwriting from the journal Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 21 The notes however appear to read as listed in the column to the left of the image above 490 8 15 16 Email Papadopoulos to Clovis 11 59 07 a m 491 8 15 16 Email Clovis to Papadopoulos 12 01 45 p m 92 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Preettet May CeAtaiA Mffi erial Preteetee UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign ·in early October 2016 after an interview he gave to the Russian news agency Interfax generated adverse publicity 492 f Trump Campaign Knowledge of Dirt Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaignspecifically the then-Greek foreign minister-about Russia's obtaining Clinton-related emails 493 In addition a different foreign government informed the FBI that 10 days after meeting with Mifsud in late April 2016 Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton 494 This conversation occurred after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails and the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC see Volume I Sections liLA III B supra Such disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official about the emails When interviewed Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos's sharing the information that Russia had obtained dirt on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information about Clinton Papadopoulos stated that he could not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell C lovis that Papadopoulos thought they have her emails 495 The Campaign officials who interacted or corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated with varying degrees of certainty that he did not tell them Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller for example did not remember hearing anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate Clinton 496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone including Papadopoulos having given him non-public information that a · · be in of material · to 497 Hil Clinton 492 George Papadopoulos Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards China Interfax Sept 30 2016 493 Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 14-15 Def Sent Mem United States v George Papadopoulos 1 17-cr-182 D D C Aug 31 2018 Doc 45 494 See footnote 465 of Volume I Section IV A 2 d supra 495 Papadopoulos 8 10 17 302 at 5 Papadopoulos 8 11 17 302 at 5 Papadopoulos 9 20 17 302 496 S Miller 12 14 17 302 at 10 at 2 497 498 93 U S Department of Justice AM erAey Werk Preattet II Ms · CeH tsiH Msterisl Preteetea UH aer Feel R Grim P 6 e g Additional George Papadopoulos Contact The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos The Office was not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue-Sergei Millian- remained out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15 2016 shortly after Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clovis 500 Millian an American citizen who is a native of Belarus introduced himself as president of the New York-based Russian American Chamber of Commerce and claimed that through that position he had insider knowledge and direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics 501 Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether he had heard ofMillian 502 Although Timofeev said no 503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York City 504 The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1 2016 505 Afterwards Millian invited Papadopoulos to attend-and potentially speak at-two international energy conferences including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016 506 Papadopoulos ultimately did not attend either conference On July 31 2016 following his first in-person meeting with Mill ian Papadopoulos emailed Trump Campaign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted by some leaders of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr Trump and to ask whether he should put you in touch with their group US-Russia chamber of commerce 507 Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos for taking the initiative but asked him to hold off with 499 500 7 15 16 Linkedln Message Millian to Papadopoulos 50 1 7 15 16 Linkedln Message Mill ian to Papadopoulos 502 7 22 16 Facebook Message Papadopoulos to Timofeev 7 40 23 p m 7 26 16 Facebook Message Papadopoulos to Timofeev 3 08 57 p m 503 7 23 16 Facebook Message Timofeev to Papadopoulos 4 31 37 a m 7 26 16 Facebook Message Timofeev to Papadopoulos 3 37 16 p m 504 7 16 16 Text Messages Papadopoulos Millian 7 55 43 p m 505 7 30116 Text Messages Papadopoulos Millian 5 38 6 05p m 7 31 16 Text Messages Millian Papadopoulos 3 48 4 18p m 8 l 16 Text Message Millian to Papadopoulos 8 19p m 506 8 2 16 Text Messages Millian Papadopoulos 3 04 3 05p m 8 3 16 Facebook Messages Papadopoulos Mill ian 4 07 37 a m 1 11 58 p m 507 7 31 16 Email Papadopoulos to Denysyk 12 29 59 p m 94 Attem ey U S Department of Justice Wark Praettet II May CaHtaiH Material Prateete6 UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e outreach to Russian-Americans because too many articles had already portrayed the Campaign then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort and candidate Trump as being pro-Russian 508 On August 23 2016 Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he would share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work for the campaign 509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter 51 0 On November 9 2016 shortly after the election Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian in Chicago to discuss business opportunities including potential work with Russian billionaires who are not under sanctions 51 1 The meeting took place on November 14 2016 at the Trump Hotel and Tower in Chicago 512 According to Papadopoulos the two men discussed partnering on business deals but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian' s attitude toward him changed when Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing private-sector opportunities and was not interested in a j ob in the Administration 513 The two remained in contact however and had extended online discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia 514 The two also arranged to meet at a Washington D C bar when both attended Trump' s inauguration in late January 2017 51 5 3 Carter Page Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016 He was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March 2016 5 16 Page had lived and worked in Russia and he had been approached by Russian intelligence officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign During his time with the Campaign Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his personal capacity Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 20 13 and Russian officials may hav focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the Campaign However the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated w ith the Russian government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election 508 7 31 16 Email Denysyk to Papadopoulos 2 1 54 52 509 8 23 16 Facebook Message Millian to Papadopoulos 2 5 5 36 a m 510 Papadopoulos 9 20 17 302 at 2 5 11 11 10 16 Facebook Message Millian to Papadopoulos 9 35 05 p m 5 12 l l 14 16 Facebook Message Millian to Papadopoulos I 32 ll a m 513 Papadopoulos 9 19 17 302 at 19 514 E g 11 29 16 Facebook Messages Papadopoulos M illian 5 09 - 5 11 p m 12 7 16 Facebook Message Millian to Papadopoulos 5 10 54 p m 5 15 516 1 20 17 Facebook Messages Papadopoulos Millian 4 37-4 39 a m Page was interviewed Counsel's appointment the FBI 95 U S Department of Justice MterHe f Werk Preet1et II May CeHtatH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6Ee a Background Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016 Page had substantial prior experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow From 2004 to 2007 Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch' s Moscow office 517 There he worked on transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom' s deputy chief financial officer Sergey Yatsenko 518 In 2008 Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC GEC an in focused on the sector in emerging markets 5 19 520 The company otherwise had no sources of income and to s life savings to support himself and pursue his business asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a ln 2008 Page met Alexander Bulatov a Russian government official who worked at the Russian Consulate in New York 523 P later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intell' officer ln 2013 Victor Podobnyy another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the United States under diplomatic cover formed a relationship with Page 525 Podobnyy met Page at an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him 526 Podobnyy and Page also met in person on multiple occasions during which Page offered his outlook on the future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business 527 In a recorded conversation on April 8 2013 Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page was interested in business opportunities in Russia 528 In Podobnyy's words Page got hooked on 517 Testimony of Carter Page Hearing Before the U S House ofRepresentatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 115th Cong 40 Nov 2 2017 exhibit 518 Page 3 30 17 302 at 10 519 520 521 523 524 525 Complaint 22 24 32 United States v Bwyakov 1 15' 'm ' ' Complaint mj-215 S 526 B uryakov Complaint 1 34 527 Buryakov Complaint 34 528 Buryakov Complaint 32 96 U S Department of Justice AM'et'Aey Werk Preattet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Grim P 6 e Gazprom thinking that if they have a project he could rise up Maybe he can I t's obvious that he wants to earn lots ofmoney 529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by feed ing him empty promises that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page 530 Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them 531 In 2015 Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government 532 The criminal complaint detailed Podobnyy's interactions with and conversations about Page who was identified only as Male-1 533 Based on the criminal complaint's description of the interactions Page was aware that he was the individual described as Male-1 534 Page later spoke with a Russian government official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would 535 understand he was Male-1 from the told the official that he didn't 536 do anything In interviews with the FBI before the Office' s opening Page acknowledged that he understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence services but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel 537 Page told investigating agents that the more immaterial non-public information I give them the better for this country 538 b Origins of and Early Campaign Work In January 2016 Page began volunteering on an informal unpaid basis for the Trump Campaign after Ed Cox a state Republican Party official introduced Page to Trump Campaign officials 539 Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate Trump improve relations with Russia 540 To that end Page emailed Campaign officials offering his thoughts on U S -Russia relations prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia and 529 Buryakov Complaint 530 Buryakov Complaint 53 1 Buryakov Complaint 532 See Buryakov Feb 9 2015 Doc 10 536 Page 3 16 17 302 at 4 537 Page 3 30 17 302 at 6 Page 3 31 17 302 at l 538 Page 3 31 17 302 at l 539 Page 3116 17 302 at 1 540 Page 3 10 17 302 at 2 97 U S Department of Justice Atte rftey Werk PreclHet II May CeHtttifl Matet·ial Preteetecl Uftcler Fecl R Grim P 6 e proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow 541 In communications with Campaign officials Page also repeatedly touted his high-level contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior Russian governmental officials For example on January 30 2016 Page sent an email to senior Campaign officials stating that he had spent the past week in Europe and ha d been in discussions with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin who recognized that Trump could have a game-changing effect in bringing the end of the new Cold War 542 The email stated that t hrough his discussions with these high level contacts Page believed that a direct meeting 543 closed the email in Moscow between Mr Trump and Putin could be 544 U S sanctions on Russia On March 21 2016 candidate Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member of his fore ign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector 546 Over the next several months Page continued providing policy-related work product to Campaign officials For example in April 2016 Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel 547 see Volume I Section IV A 4 infra In May 2016 Page prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck North Dakota to watch the candidate deliver the speech 548 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other Campaign officials 549 c Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow Page' s affiliation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor As a result in late April 2016 Page was invited to give a speech at the July 2016 commencement ceremony at the 54 1 See e g 1 30 16 Email Page to Glassner eta 3 17116 Email Page to Clovis attaching a President's Daily Brief' prepared by Page that discussed the severe ofU S -Russia relations following Washington's meddling in Ukraine 542 1 30 16 Email Page to Glassner eta 543 1 30 16 Email Page to Glassner et al 544 1 30 16 Email Page to Glassner et al 545 with the Washington Post Editorial Board 547 548 549 See e g 3 28 16 Email Clovis to Lewandowski et al forwarding notes prepared by Page and stating I wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisors are capable of 98 U S Department of Justice MterHey Werk Prea1 1et II Ma y CeHta iH Materittl Preteetea UHaer Pea R Grim P 6 e New Economic School NES in Moscow 550 The NES commencement ceremony generally featured high-profile speakers for example President Barack Obama delivered a commencement address at the school in 2009 551 NES officials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to speak at NES was· based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the candidate's Russia expert 552 Andrej Krickovic an associate of Page' s and assistant professor at the Higher School of Economics in Russia recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign 553 Denis Klimentov an employee ofNES said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in the Trump Campaign in March 2016 the excitement was palpable 554 Weber recalled that in summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow and he felt that bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be beneficial 555 Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES and he sought approval from Trump Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia 556 On May 16 20 16 while that request was still under consideration Page emailed Clovis J D Gordon and Walid Phares and suggested that candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow 557 On June 19 2016 Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate that NES would love to have Mr Trump speak at this annual celebration in Page 's place 558 Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day saying If you want to do this it would be out side sic of your role with the DJT for President campaign I am certain Mr Trump will not be able to attend 559 In early July 2016 Page traveled to Russia for the NES events On July 5 20 16 Denis Klimentov copying his brother Dmitri Klimentov 560 emailed Maria Zakharova the Director of the R ussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information and Press Department about Page's visit and his connection to the Trump Campaign 56 1 Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to draw the Russian government' s attention to Page's visit in Moscow 562 His message to Zakharova 550 Page 3 16 17 302 at 2-3 Page 3 10 17 302 at 3 55 1 S Weber 7 28 1 7 302 at 3 552 Y Weber 6 1 17 302 at 4-5 S Weber 7 28 17 302 at 3 553 See Y Weber 6 1 17 302 at 4 S Weber 7 28 17 302 at 3 554 De Klimentov 6 9 17 302 at 2 555 S Weber 7 28 17 302 at 3 556 See 5116 16 Email Page to Phares et al referring to submission of a campaign advisor request form 557 5 16 16 Email Page to Phares et al 558 6 19 16 Email Page to Gordon et al 559 6 19 16 Email Lewandowski to Page et al 560 Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant 56 1 7 5 16 Email Klimentov to Zakharova translated 562 7 5 16 Email Klimentov to Zakharova translated 99 U S Department of Justice AHerHey lJerk Preettet May CefltaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e continued Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy He is a known businessman he used to work in Russia If you have any questions I will be happy to help contact him 563 Dmitri Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials 564 The following day Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov-Zakharova email thr ad Peskov wrote I have read about Page Specialists say that he is far from being the main one So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin 565 On July 7 2016 Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow atNES 566 In the speech Page criticized the U S government's foreign policy toward Russia stating that Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization inequality corruption and regime change 567 On July 8 2016 Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement 568 After Page delivered his commencement address Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on Russia had hurt the NES 569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to about · in the future 570 Page said that during his time in Moscow he met with friends and associates he knew from when he lived in Russia including Andrey Baranov a former Gazprom employee who had become the head of investor relations at Rosneft a Russian energy company 572 Page stated that he and Baranov talked about immaterial non-public information 573 Page believed he and Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin and he thought Baranov might have mentioned 563 7 5 16 Email Klimentov to Zakharova translated 564 Dm Klimentov 11 27 18 302 at 1-2 565 7 6 16 Email Peskov to Klimentov translated 566 Page 3 10 17 302 at 3 567 See Carter W Page The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow YouTube Channel Katehon Think Tank Posted July 7 2016 available at https www yo utube com watch time_continue 28 v 1 CYF29saA9w Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides from the speech See Carter Page The Evolution of the World Economy Trends and Potential Speech at National Economic Speech July 7 201 6 568 Page 3 10 17 302 at 3 569 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 570 S Weber 7 28 17 302 at 4 571 572 Page 3 10 17 302 at 3 Page 3 30 17 302 at 3 Page 3 31 17 302 at 2 573 Page 3 30 17 302 at 3 100 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea Urtaer Fea R Grim P 6 e the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing 574 Page recalled mentioning his involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov although he did not remember details of the conversation 575 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft a Russian energy company to discuss possible business deals including having Page work as a consultant 576 On July 8 2016 while he was in Moscow Page emailed several Campaign officials and stated he would send a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here 577 On July 9 2016 Page emailed Clovis writing in pertinent part Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the event In a private conversation Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the vast range of current international problems Based on feedback from a diverse array of other sources close to the Presidential Administration it was readily apparent that this sentiment is widely held at all levels of government 578 was un or may ave met or communicated with in Moscow thus Page 's activities in Russia-as described in his emails with the Campaign-were not fully explained 576 577 578 Page 3 10 17 302 at 3 Page 3 30 17 302 at 7 Page 3 31 17 302 at 2 7 8 16 Email Page to Dahl Gordon 7 9 16 Email Page to Clovis 579 580 581 582 101 U S Department of Justice A erAe · Werk Preattet II May Ce11taitl Material Preteetea UA aer Fee R Criffi P 6 e d Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign In July 2016 after returning from Russia Page traveled to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland 583 While there Page met Russian Ambassador to the U nited States Sergey Kislyak that interaction is described in Volume I Section IV A 6 a infra 584 Page later emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the Convention and he wrote that Ambassador k was worried about candidate Clinton's world views 585 Following the Convention Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign po licy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage The Campaign responded by distancing itself from Page describing him as an informal foreign policy advisor who did not speak for Mr Trump or the campaign 587 On September 23 2016 Yahoo News reported that U S intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U S sanctions p olicy under a possible Trump Administration 588 A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo News that Page had no role in the Campaign and that the Campa ign was not aware of any of his activities past or present 589 On September 24 2016 Page was formally removed from the Campaign 590 Although Page had been removed from the Campaign after the election he sought a position in the Trump Administrat ion 59 1 On November 14 2016 he submitted an application to the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences stating that in his capacity as a Trump Campaign foreign p olicy advisor he had met with top world leaders and effectively 583 Page 3 10 17 302 at 4 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 584 Page 3 10 17 302 at 4 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 7 23 16 Email Page to Clovis 7 25 16 Email Page to 587 See e g Steven Mufson Tom Hamburger Trump Advisor 's Public Comments Ties to Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties Washington Post Aug 5 2016 588 Michael Isikoff U S Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin Yahoo News Sept 23 2016 589 Michael Isikoff U S Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin Yahoo News Sept 23 2016 see also 9 25 16 Email Hicks to Conway Bannon instructing that inquiries about Page should be answered with h e was announced as an informal adviser in March Since then he has had no role or official contact with the campaign We have no knowledge of activities past or present and he now officially has been removed from all lists etc 590 Page 3 16 17 302 at 2 see e g 9 23 16 Email J Miller to Bannon S Miller discussing plans to remove Page from the campaign Transition Online Form 11114 16 - 102 Ai t6rHe · U S Department of Justice W6rk Pr66ttet II Mey C6HtaiH Material Pr6teete6 UHeer Fee R Cril'fl P 6 e responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia Europe the Middle East Africa and the Americas 592 Page received no response from the Transition Team When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 20 16 he met again with at least one Russian government official That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth in Volume I Section IV B 6 infra 4 Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the National Interest CNI principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer Dimitri Simes CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government Simes was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s In April 2016 candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event hosted by the National Interest a publication affiliated with CNI Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and as a result it gained some attention in relation to Sessions' s confirmation hearings to become Attorney General Sessions had various other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters including Russia Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign The investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or from the Russian government through CNI or Simes a CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by former President Richard Nixon 593 CNI describes itself as a voice for strategic realism in U S foreign policy and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine theNationallnterest 594 CNI is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose members at the relevant time included Sessions who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on national security and foreign policy issues 595 Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National Interest 596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union emigrated to the United States in the early 1970s and joined CNI ' s predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International 593 Simes 318 18 302 at 1-2 594 About the Center CNI available at https cftni org about 595 Advisory Counsel CNI available at https web archive org web 20 161030025331 http cftni org about advisory-council Simes 3 8 18 302 at 3-4 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 4 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 16 596 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 2 103 U S Department of Justice At terHey Wtn·k Preattet II May CeHtttiH Material Preteetea UHaer Feel R Criffl P 6 e Peace 597 Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government officials 598 as does CNI collectively As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie Corporation in 2015 CNI has unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among Washington think tanks 599 in part because CNI has arranged for U S delegations to visit Russia and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as part of so-called Track II diplomatic -efforts 600 On March 14 2016 CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and its honorary chairman Henry Kissinger at the Time Warner Building in New York 60 1 The idea behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI 602 Along with Simes attendees at the event included Jared Kushner son-in-law of candidate Trump 603 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that as a result he decided to seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event 604 Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24 2016 teleP hone call 605 three days after Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short notice 606 On March 31 2016 Simes and Kushner had an in-person one-on-one meeting in Kushner' s New York office 607 During that meeting Simes told Kushner that the best way to handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent with Trump's voice 608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion 609 Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign regarding the Campaign' s foreign policy positions For example on June 17 2016 Simes sent J D Gordon an email with a memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting 597 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 1-2 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 19 598 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 10-15 599 C00011656 Rethinking U S-Russia Relations CNI Apr 18 2015 600 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 5 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 29-30 Zakheim 1 25 18 302 at 3 601 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 6 C00006784 3 11 16 Email Gilbride to Saunders 3 43 12 p m cf Zakheim 1125 18 302 at 1 Kissinger was CNI's Honorary Chairman of the Board Boyd 1 24 18 302 at 2 P Sanders 2 15 18 302 at 5 602 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 5-6 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 2 603 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 6 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 2 604 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 2 605 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 6-7 606 see Volume I Section IV A 2 supra 607 Simes 3 8118 302 at 7-9 608 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 7-8 609 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 8 see also Boyd 1 24 18 302 at 2 104 U S Department of Justice AtterRey Werk Preattet II Ma 7· CeH taifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Criffi P 6 e and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions The memorandum proposed building a small and carefully selected group of experts to assist Sessions with the Campaign operating under the assumption that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign policy issues The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign including a new beginning with Russia 610 b National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting Simes and Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump 611 Following those conversations Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff including Sessions's chief of staff Rick Dearborn 612 In mid-April 2016 Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller and forwarded to Simes an outline of the foreign-policy speech that Miller had prepared 613 Simes sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt 614 Simes received subsequent draft outlines from Miller and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive changes to the speech 615 It is not clear however whether CNI officials received an actual draft of the speech for comment while Saunders recalled having received an actual draft Simes did not and the emails that CNI produced to this Office do not contain such a draft 616 After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNI's hosting the speech could be perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate CNI decided to have its publication the National Interest serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club 617 Kushner later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel which was another venue that Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign in order to address concerns about security and capacity 618 61 °C00008187 6 1 7 16 Email Simes to Gordon 3 35 45 p m 611 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 7 612 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 8-11 C00008923 4 6 16 Email Simes to Burt 2 22 28 p m Butt 2 9 18 302 at 7 6 13 C0000855 1 4 17 16 Email Kushner to Simes 2 44 25 p m C00006759 4 14 16 Email Kushner to Simes S Miller 12 30 p m 614 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 7 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 7-8 615 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 13 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 7-8 616 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 13 Saunders 2115 18 302 at 7-8 6 17 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 8 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 12 C00003834-43 4 22116 Email Simes to Boyd et al 8 47a m 618 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 12 18 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 11 105 U S Department of Justice AM et'Ae ' Werk Predttet II Ma · Cetttsin Material Preteeted Utteler Feel R Griff P 6 e On April25 2016 Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand 619 Saunders understood that the receptionat which invitees would have the chance to meet candidate Trum would be a small event 620 Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI' s invitees to the speech itself and then choosing a subset for the reception 621 CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and Kislyak 622 The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to the speech and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump 623 When the pre-speech reception began on April27 a receiving line was quickly organized so that attendees could meet Trump 624 Sessions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the members of Congress who were in attendance 625 After those members had been introduced Simes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance including Kislyak 626 Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly but thought it clear that Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time 627 Kislyak also met Kushner during the prespeech reception The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two during which Kushner recalled Kislyak saying we like what your candidate is saying it's refreshing 628 Several public reports state that in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech reception Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time 629 Sessions stated to investigators however that he did not remember any such conversation 630 Nor did anyone else affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception 63 1 It appears that if a conversation occurred at the pre-speech reception it was a brief one conducted in public view similar to the exchange between Kushner and Kislyak 619 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 11-12 C00006651-57 Mayflower Group Sales Agreement 620 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 12-13 621 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 12 622 C00002575 Attendee List C00008536 4 25 16 Email Simes to Kushner 4 53 45 p m 623 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 19-20 624 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 21 625 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 21 626 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 21 627 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 21 628 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 4 629 See e g Ken Dilanian Did Trump Kushner Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting With Russian NBC News June 1 2016 Julia Ioffe Why Did JeffSessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak The Atlantic June 13 20 17 630 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 22 631 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 21 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 14 21 Boyd 1 24 1 8 302 at 3-4 Heilbrunn 2 1 18 302 at 6 Statement Regarding President Trump 's April 27 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the Center for the National Interest CNl Mar 8 2017 106 U S Department of Justice AM en ey Werk Pt eattet II May CerttaiA Mftterial Preteetea UAaer Feel R Ct iffi P 6 e The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after the speech or would have had the opportunity to do so Simes for example did not recall seeing Kislyak at the post-speech luncheon 632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed for Capitol Hill 633 Saunders recalled based in part on a food-related request he received from a Campaign staff member that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the airport 634 c Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI In the wake of Sessions's confirmation hearings as Attorney General questions arose about whether Sessions' s campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian-related matters With respect to Kislyak contacts on May 23 2016 Sessions attended CNI's Distinguished Service Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington D C 635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event 636 A seating chart prepared by Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak who appears to have responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event 637 Sessions however did not remember seeing speaking with or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner 638 Although CNI board member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner 639 Simes Saunders and Jacob Heilbrunn--editor of the National Interest-all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May 23 event 64 Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office obtained ° In the summer of 2016 CNI organized at least two dinners in Washington D C for Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals 641 The dinners included CNIaffiliated individuals such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad a former U S ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April27 2016 foreign- 632 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 22 Heilbrunn 2 1 18 302 at 7 633 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 4 634 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 15 635 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 22 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 17 636 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 17 C00004779-80 5 23 16 Email Cantelmo to Saunders Hagberg 9 30 12 a m C00004362 5 23 16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al 2 02 32 a m 637 C00004362 5 23 16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al 2 02 32 a m 638 Sessions l 17 18 302 at 22 639 Boyd 1 24 18 302 at 4 640 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 23 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 18 Heilbrunn 2 1 18 302 at 7 641 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 31 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 19 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 9-10 Khalilzad 1 9 18 302 at 5 107 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Preelttet II Mtt · CeAtaitt Material Preteeteel UAEler Feel R CritH P 6 e policy speech 642 Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on-one separately from the dinners 643 At the dinners and in the meetings the participants addressed U S relations with Russia including how U S relations with NATO and European countries affected U S policy toward Russia 644 But the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia 645 Khalilzad for example recalled discussing nation-building and violent extremism with Sessions 646 In addition Sessions asked Saunders ofCNI to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia one on Hillary Clinton's foreign policy shortcomings and another on Egypt 647 d Jared Kushner's -Continuing Contacts with Simes Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election Jared Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes 648 Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings and phone conversations which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes had proposed 649 Simes recalled that he not Kushner initiated all conversations about Russia and that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians 650 According to Simes after the Mayflower speech in late April Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with Kushner advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts and told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle any contacts with Russians with care 65 1 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his interactions with Simes 652 Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17 2016 at Simes's request in Kushner' s New York office The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's Russia-related attacks on candidate 642 BUit 2 9 18 302 at 9- 10 Khalilzad 1 9 18 302 at l-2 5 643 Khalilzad 1 9 18 302 at 5-6 644 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 31 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 9-10 Khalilzad 1 9 18 302 at 5 645 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 20 646 Khalilzad 1 9 18 302 at 6 647 Saunders 2 15 18 302 at 19-20 648 Simes 3 8118 302 at 27 649 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 27 650 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 27 65 1 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 27 During this period of time the Campaign received a request for a highlevel Campaign official to meet with an officer at a Russian state-owned bank to discuss an offer that officer claims to be carrying from President Putin to meet with candidate Trump NOSC00005653 5117 16 Email Dearborn to Kushner 8 12a m Copying Manafort and Gates Kushner responded Pass on this A lot of people come claiming to carry messages Very few are able to verify For now 1 think we decline such meetings Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain importance for themselves Be careful NOSC00005653 5 17 16 Email Kushner to Dearborn 652 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 11-1 3 108 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet II Mtty CeHtaiA Mffierial Preteetea UAaer Fee R Criffl P 6 e Trump 653 In advance of the meeting Simes sent Kushner a Russia Policy Memo laying out what Mr Trump may want to say about Russia 654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and a phone call to set up the meeting Simes mentioned a well-documented story of highly questionable connections between Bill Clinton and the Russian government parts of which according to Simes had even been discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and shared with the Independent Counsel at the end of the C linton presidency 655 Kushner forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller Paul Manafort and Rick Gates with the note suggestion only 656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes 657 Manafort was on the verge of leaving the Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes and Simes ended up meeting only with Kushner During the August 17 meeting Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related · that he had ised 658 Simes told Kushner an official Fritz Ermarth who claimed to have learned it from U S intelligence sources not from Russians 660 Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the Campaign because it was in Simes's words old news 661 When interviewed by the Office Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about the Clintons given their long career as public figures and that he never received from Simes information that could be operationalized for the Trump Campaign 662 Despite Kushner' s 653 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 29-30 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 6 Kushner 4 11118 302 at 12 C00007269 8 10 16 Meeting Invitation Vargas to Simes eta DJTFP00023484 8 11 16 Email Hagan to Manaf01t 5 57 15 p m 654 C00007981-84 8 9 16 Email Simes to Kushner 6 09 21 p m The memorandum recommended downplaying Russia as a U S foreign policy priority at this time and suggested that some tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russianrelated questions in the framework of how to work with Russia to advance important U S national interests and that a Trump Administration not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy The memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions including questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea 655 C0000798 1 8 9 16 Email Simes to Kushner 6 09 21 p m 656 DJTFP00023459 8 10 16 Email Kushner to S Miller eta 11 30 13 a m 657 DJTFP00023484 8 1 1 1 6 Email Hagan to Manafort 5 57 15 p m 658 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 29-30 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 6 Kushner 4 11118 302 at 12 659 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 30 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 6 660 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 30 66 1 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 30 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 6 662 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 12 109 U S Department of Justice Atfst'He ' Wade Pt'settet II May CsHtaiH Mtttet'ial Pt'steetee UHeet' Fee R Crit1'1 P 6 e reaction Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions 663 5 June 9 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower On June 9 2016 senior representatives ofthe Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the Russian government The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr in an email from Robert Goldstone at the request of his then-client Emin Agalarov the son of Russian real-estate developer Aras Agalarov Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr that the Crown prosecutor of Russia offered to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia as part of Russia and its government's support for Mr Trump Trump Jr immediately responded that if it's what you say I love it and arranged the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls Trump Jr invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to attend the meeting and both attended Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it occurred and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr may have told candidate Trump about an upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton without linking the meeting to Russia According to written answers submitted by President Trump he has no recollection of learning of the meeting at the time and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he was made aware of the meeting-or its Russian connection-before it occurred The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting Natalia Veselnitskaya had previously worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout this period of time She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats Trump Jr requested evidence to support those claims but Veselnitskaya did not provide such information She and her associates then turned to a critique of the origins of the Magnitsky Act a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children Trump Jr suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected After the election Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting but the Trump Transition Team did not engage a Setting Up the June 9 Meeting i Outreach to Donald Trump Jr Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate developer with ties to Putin and other members of the Russian government including Russia' s Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika 664 Aras Agalarov is the president of the Crocus Group a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian government construction contracts and that-as discussed above Volume I Section IV A l supra 663 Simes 3 8 18 302 at 30 664 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 4 110 U S Department of Justice Atteffie · Werk Preattet Mtty CeH tttiH Material Pwteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e -worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a potential Trump Moscow real-estate project 665 The relationship continued over time as the parties pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016 666 For example in April 2016 Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten note 667 Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump' s campaign passed on congratulations for winning in the primary and-according to one email drafted by Goldstone-an offer of his support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues especially with reference to U S Russian relations 668 On June 3 2016 Emin Agalarov called Goldstone Emin' s then-publicist 669 Goldstone is ·a music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until late 2016 670 While representing Emin Agalarov Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact an invitation that Tr sent to Putin to attend between the Trumps and the the 2013 Miss Universe Kaveladze Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 10 6 4 25 16 Email Graffto Goldstone 667 RG000033-34 4 25 16 Email Graffto Goldstone attachment 669 Call Records of Robert Goldstone Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 6 670 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 1-2 Beniaminov 1 6 18 302 at 3 67 1 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 1-5 DJTJR00008 2 29 19 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr at 17 302 at 2 TRUMPORG_l8_001325 6 21113 Email Goldstone to Graff TRUMPORG_18_001013 6 24 13 Email Goldstone to Graff TRUMPORG 18 001014 6 24 13 Email Graff to Shugart TRUMPORG_I8_001018 6 26 13 Email Graffto Goldstone TRUMPORG_18_001022 6 27 13 Email Graff to L Kelly TRUMPORG_18_001333 9 12 13 Email Goldstone to Graff Shugart MU000004289 7 27 13 Email Goldstone to Graff Shugart 672 see Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 6-7 673 674 111 U S Department of Justice AM erHe ' Weft Pre6ttet II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 UH6er Fee R Grim P 6 e The mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia Veselnitskaya approx unt1 2001 Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor's Office 677 and she continued to perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her departure 678 She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act which imposed financial sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison 679 Putin called the statute a purely political unfriendly act and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U S officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U S citizens 680 Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv 681 the son of Russian businessman Peter Katsyv and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky 682 She also 675 676 In December 2018 a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing thePrevezon litigation discussed in the text above See Indictment United States v Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya No 18-cr-904 S D N Y The indictment alleges among other things that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and her involvement in responding to a U S document request sent to the Russian government 7 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary at 2 678 Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary Nov 20 2017 at 33 Keir Simmons Rachel Elbaum Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr Info on Clinton NBC News July 11 20 17 Maria Tsvetkova Jack Stubbs Moscow Lawyer Who Met Trump Jr Had Russian Spy Agency As Client Reuters July 21 2017 Andrew E Kramer Sharon LaFraniere Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On New York Times Apr 27 2018 679 See Pub L No 112-208 §§ 402 404 a l 126 Stat 1502 1502-1506 Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder a former investment fund manager in Russia Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian officials and Magnitsky was charged with helping Browder embezzle money After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison Browder lobbied Congress to pass the Magnitsky Act See e g Andrew E Kramer Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case Russia Accuses Nemesis ofMurder New York Times Oct 22 20 17 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary Nov 20 2017 Exhibits at 1-4 Rosie Gray Bill Browder's Testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee The Atlantic July 25 201 7 680 Ellen Barry Russia Bars JBAmericans After Sanctions by US New York Times Apr 13 2013 Tom Porter Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They've Been Targets of Russian Assassination and Kidnapping Bids Newsweek July 16 2017 681 Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary Nov 20 2017 at 21 682 See Veselnitskaya Dec United States v Prevezon Holdings Ltd No 13-cv-6326 S D N Y see Prevezon Holdings Second Amended Complaint Prevezon Holdings Mem and Order Prevezon Holdings Deposition ofOieg Lurie 112 U S Department of Justice At t6rHey W6rk Pr66ttet II Mfly C61 ltfliA Mflterifll Pf6teete6 UHeer Fee R Criffl P 6 e appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U S congressional delegation in Moscow offering confidential information from the Prosecutor General of Russia about interactions between certain political forces in our two countries 683 I Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov Goldstone emailed Trump Jr 684 The email stated Good morning Emln just called-and asked me to contact you with something very Interesting The Crown prosecutor of Russia met with his father Aras this morning and in their meeting offered to provide the Trump campaign with some oflicial documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to your father This is obviously very high level and sensitive information but is part of Russia and Its government's support for Mr Trump - helped along by Aras and Em in What do you think is the best way to handle this information and would you be able to speak to Em in about it directly I can also send this Info to your falher via Rhona but it Is ultra sensitive so wanted to send to you first Best Rob Goldstone Within minutes of this email Trump Jr responded emailing back Thanks Rob I appreciate that I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I just speak to Em in first Seems we have some time and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer Could we do a call first thing next week when I am back 685 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr 's interest to Emin Agalarov emailing that Trump Jr wants to speak personally on the issue 686 On June 6 2016 Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone if there was a ny news and Goldstone explained that Trump Jr was likely still traveling for the final elections where T rump will be 'crowned' the official nominee 687 On the same day Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr and asked when Trump Jr was free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info 688 Trump Jr asked if 683 See Gribbin 8 31 17 302 at 1-2 IA undated one-page document given to congressional delegation The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the Russian legal system See Federal Law on the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation 1992 amended 2004 684 RG00006l 6 3 16 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr DJTJR00446 6 3 16 Email Goldstone to Donald Trump Jr @DonaldJTrumpJr 07 11 17 11 00 Tweet 685 DJTJR00446 6 3 1 6 Email Trump Jr to Goldstone @DonaldJTrumpJr 07 11 17 1 1 00 Tweet RG000061 6 3 16 Email Trump Jr to Goldstone 686 6 3 16 Email Goldstone Trump Jr 687 RG000063 6 6 16 Email A Agalarov to Goldstone RG000064 6 6 16 Email Goldstone to A Agalarov 688 RG000065 6 6 16 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr DJTJR00446 6 6 1 6 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr 113 U S Department of Justice Attemey Werlt Preet tet Mtty Centttin Mttterittl Preteetee Urteer fee R Crifft P 6 e they could speak now and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr and Emin Agalarov 689 On June 6 and June 7 Trump Jr and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls 690 Also on June 6 20 16 Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a meeting in New York with the Trump Organization 691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born naturalized U S citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras Agalarov 692 Kaveladze told the Office that in a second phone call on June 6 2016 Aras Agalarov asked Kaveladze if he knew anything about the Magnitsky Act and Aras sent him a short synopsis for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card According to Kaveladze Aras Agalarov said the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act and he asked Kaveladze to translate 693 ii Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign On June 7 Goldstone emailed Trump Jr and said that Emin asked that I schedule a meeting w ith you and t he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow 694 Trump Jr replied that Manafort identified as the campaign boss Jared Kushner and Trump Jr would likely attend 695 Go d to learn that Trump Jr Manafort and Kushner would attend 696 Kaveladz e - puzzled by the list of attendees and that he checked with one of Emin Agalarov' s assistants Roman Beniaminov who said that the purpose of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey negative information on Hillary Clinton 697 Beniaminov however stated that he did not recall having known or said that 698 Early on June 8 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant asking her to discuss a 3 00p m Goldstone and Trump Jr RG000065-67 6 6 1 6 Email Goldstone Call Records 693 Kaveladze 11 16 17 302 at 6 694 DJTJR00467 617 16 Email Goldstone to Trum Tweet RG000068 617 16 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr 695 DJTJR00469 6 7 16 Email Trump Jr to Goldstone @DonaldJTrumpJr 07111117 11 00 Tweet RG000071 16 Email Jr to Goldstone OSC-KAV_00048 6 7 16 Email Goldstone to Kaveladze 697 KAY 0004 698 Beniaminov 1 6 18 302 at 3 114 U S Department of Justice A erHey Werk Preattet II May CeAtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Criffl P 6 e meeting the following day with Trump Jr 699 Later that day Trump Jr forwarded the entirety of his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner under the subject line FW Russia- Clinton - private and confidential adding a note that the m eeting got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices 70° Kushner then sent his assistant a second emai l informing her that the m eeting with don jr is 4pm now 70 1 Manafort responded See you then P 702 Rick Gates who was the deputy campaign chairman stated during interviews with the Office that in the days before June 9 2016 Trump Jr announced at a regular morning meeting of senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation 703 Gates believed that Trump Jr said the information was coming from a group in Kyrgyzstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend 704 Gates recalled that the meeting was attended by Trump Jr Eric Trump Paul Manafort Hope Hicks and joining late Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner According to Gates Manafort warned the group that the meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be carefuJ 1°5 Hicks denied any knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017 706 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9 meeting came up at all earlier that week 7°7 M ichael Cohen recalled being in Donald J Trump's office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward 708 Cohen did not recall Trump Jr stating that the meeting was connected to Russia 709 From the tenor of the conversation Cohen believed that Trump Jr had previously discussed the meeting with his father although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation 710 In an interview with the Senate Judiciary Committee however Trump Jr stated that he did not inform his father about the 699 NOSC0000007-08 6 8 18 Email Kushner to Vargas 700 NOSC00000039-42 6 8 16 Email Trwnp Jr to Kushner Manafort DJTJR00485 6 8 1 6 Email Trump Jr to Kushner Manafort 70 1 NOSC0000004 6 8116 Email Kushner to Vargas 702 6 8 16 Email Manaf01t to Trump Jr 703 Gates 1 30 18 302 at 7 Gates 3 1 18 302 at 3-4 Although the March 1 302 refers to June 19 that is likely a typographical error external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants occurred on June 6 See NOSC00023603 6 6 16 Email Gates to Trump Jr et al 704 Gates 1 30 18 302 at 7 Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan and public reporting indicates that his company the Crocus Group has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan See Neil MacFarquhar A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion Was He a Conduit to Trump New York Times July 16 20 17 705 Gates 3 1 18 302 at 3-4 706 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 6 707 Kushner 4111118 302 at 8 708 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 4-6 709 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 4-5 71 °Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 15-1 6 115 A erHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Preti1 1et II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Pl'eteeteti UHtier Fee R Crit'H P 6 e emails or the upcoming meeting 7 11 Similarly neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone informing candidate Trump of the meeting including Trump Jr 712 President Trump has stated to this Office in written answers to questions that he has no recollection of learning at the time that his son Manafort or Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 20 16 concerning potentially negative information abo ut Hillary Clinton 713 b The Events of June 9 2016 i Arrangements for the Meeting Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9 2016 for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon civ il forfeiture · 714 That d Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin a Soviet-born U S lobbyist when she learned that he was in New York invited him to lunch n to that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation 716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov a 711 Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee 115th Cong 28-29 84 94-95 Sept 7 2017 The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath but Trump Jr was advised that it is a violation of 18 U S C § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation I d at 10-11 712 Manafort 9 1 1 18 302 at 3-4 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 10 713 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 8 Response to Question I Parts a c We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous knowledge of the June 9 meeting On June 7 20 16 Trump announced his intention to give a major speech probably Monday of next week - which would have been June 13-about all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons See e g Phillip Bump What we know about the Trump Tower meeting Washington Post Aug 7 2018 Following the June 9 meeting Trump changed the subject of his planned speech to national security But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change oftopic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton Other events such as the Pulse nightclub shooting on June 12 could well have caused the change The President's written answers to our questions state that the speech's focus was altered i n light of' the Pulse nightclub shooting See Written Responses supra As for the original topic of the June 13 speech Trump has said that he expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available negative information about the Clintons and that the draft of the speech prepared by Campaign staff was based on publicly available material including in particular information from the book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer Written Responses supra In a later June 22 speech Trump did speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt drawing from the Clinton Cash book See Full Transcript Donald Trump NYC Speech on S akes of the Election politico com June 22 20 16 714 Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary Nov 20 20 17 at 41 42 Alison Frankel How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US for Trump Tower Meeting Reuters Nov 6 20 17 Michael Kranish et al Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr Has Long History Fighting Sanctions Washington Post July 11 2017 see OSC-KA V00113 6 8 16 Email Goldstone to Kaveladze RG000073 6 8 16 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr Lieberman 12113 17 302 at 5 see also Prevezon Holdings Order Oct 17 2016 7 15 116 U S Department of Justice Att offl ey Work Produet II May CoH taiH Material Proteeted UHeer Fed R Criffi P 6 e v Russian-born translator who had assisted HJ • lated lobbying and the 17 Prevezon case also attended the lunch 7 said she was meeting and asked to participants m Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and the Ziff brothers Americans with business in · and those individuals maki itical donations to the DNC 719 H'I C The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting 721 ii Conduct of the Meeting Trump Jr Manafort and Kushner participated on the Trump side while Kaveladze Samochornov Akhmetshin and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya 722 The Office spoke to and the latter of whom declined to be every participant except V interviewed the Office reca to not say ng subject of the meeting 725 Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton Campaign 726 She asserted that the Ziffbrothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering Samochornov 7 13 17 ng up at Samochornov 7 12 17 302 In her later Senate statement press eselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting 720 721 E g Samochornov 7 12 17 302 at 4 722 E g Samochornov 7 12 17 302 at 4 723 E g Samochornov 7 12117 302 at 4 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 9 724 725 726 117 U S Department of Justice Attentey 'Nerk Preattet II May CeHtaiR Material Preteetea URaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e in both the United States and Russia 727 728 questiOns payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign but Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States 729 Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr asked what they have on Clinton and Kushner became aggravated and asked w hat are we doing here 730 Akhmetshin then spoke about U S sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and Russia's response prohibiting U S adoption of Russian children 731 Several participants recalled that Trump Jr commented that Trump is a private citizen and there was nothing they could do at that time 732 Trump Jr also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in government 733 Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation although not all of its details 734 At some point in the meeting Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating waste of time followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that 733 Akhmetshin 11 14 17 302 at 12-13 7 13117 302 at 3 Trump Jr confirmed this in a statement 2016 meeting broke Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee US Senate Washington DC 115th Cong 57 Sept 7 2017 734 Manafort's notes state Bill browder Offshore - Cyprus 133m shares Companies Not invest - loan Value in Cyprus as inter Illici Active sponsors ofRNC Browder hired Joanna Glover Tied into Cheney Russian adoption by American families PJM-SJC-00000001-02 Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee 118 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Work Pret lttet May CoAtaiH Material Proteetet l UAeler Feel R Grim P 6 e they call him to give him an excuse to leave 735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the meeting before it concluded Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in July 2017 736 Veselnitskaya's press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from other accounts In a July 2017 press interview Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials 737 Veselnitskaya's November 2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9 meeting was not to connect with the Trump Campaign but rather to have a private meeting with Donald Trump Jr -a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress 738 In other words Veselnitskaya claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign No witness however recalled any reference to Congress during the meeting Veselnitskaya also maintained that she attended the meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv the pr eviously mentioned owner ofPrevezon Holdings but she did not introduce her self in this capacity 739 In a July 2017 television interview Trump Jr stated that while he had no way to gauge the reliability credibility or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting if someone has information on our opponent maybe this is something I should hear them out 740 Trump Jr fmther stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he should listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say 741 Depending on what if any information was provided Trump Jr stated he could then consult with counsel to make an informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration 742 735 NOSC00003992 6 9 16 Text Message Kushner to Manafort Kushner 4 1 1 18 302 at 9 Vargas 4 4 18 302 at 7 NOSC00000044 6 9 16 Email Kushner to Vargas NOSC00000045 6 9 16 Email Kushner to Cain 736 Kushner 4 11 18 15th Cong 48-49 737 Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr Info on Clinton NBC News Samochornov 7 12 17 302 at 4 302 at 9-10 see also Interview of Donald Sept 7 2017 July 11 2017 738 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 115th Cong 10 Nov 20 2017 739 Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1 115 h Cong 21 Nov 20 20 17 740 Sean Hannity Transcript-Donald Trump Jr Fox News July 11 20 17 74 1 Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee 115th Cong 16 Sept 7 2017 742 Interview of Donald J Trump Jr Senate Judiciary Committee I 15th Cong 16-17 Sept 7 2017 119 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preettet May CerttaiH Material Preteetee Urteer Fee R Grim P 6 e Aras '' ' 'v report m meetmg cou I Aras Agalarov called him 747 Veselnitskaya next to him Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well but he later told Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was not with lawyers and they were preaching to the wrong crowd 748 c Post-June 9 Events Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the Magnitsky Act 749 On November 23 2016 Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setting up another meeting with T people and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on June 9 75 Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone stating that Mr A which Goldstone understood to mean Aras Agalarov called to ask about the meeting 751 Goldstone emailed the d ocument to Rhona Graff saying that Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team If needed a lawyer representing the case is ° Goldstone 2 8 18 302 one text message the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9 OSC-KA V_00029 6 14 16 Email Goldstone to E a m on did not identify evidence connecting the events of Agalarov June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation OSC-KA V_00029-30 6 14 16 Email Goldstone to E Agalarov v c F 746 747 Kaveladze 11 16 17 302 at 8 Call Records oflke Kaveladze 748 Kaveladze 11 16 17 302 at 8 Call Records of Ike Kaveladze On June 14 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the Kaveladze responded meeting was boring The Russians did not have KA V_00257 6 14 16 Email I Kaveladze to A Kaveladze 749 750 751 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 11 OSC-KAV 001 38 RG000196 11126-29 16 Text Messages Goldstone Kaveladze 12 0 U S Department of Justice Atterfte ' Werk Preeh tet II May Cefttaifl Mat erial Pt·et eeteti UHtier Fee R Grim P 6 e in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team 752 According to Goldstone around January 2017 Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting but Goldstone did not make the request 753 The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition team following up Participants in the June 9 2016 meeting began rece Vlng inqumes from attorneys representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017 754 On approximately June 2 2017 Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten general counsel of the Trump Organization about his participation in the June 9 meeting 755 The same day Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya' s name to Garten identifying her as the woman who was the attorney who spoke at the meeting from Moscow 756 Later in June 2017 Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and Alan Futerfas outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal counsel for Trump Jr 757 On June 27 20 17 Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subj ect Trump attorneys and stated that he was interviewed by attorneys about the June 9 meeting who were concerned because it links Don Jr to officials from Russia-which he has always denied meeting 758 Goldstone stressed that he did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible meeting 759 Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kaveladze 760 The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017 In a July 9 20 17 text message to Emin Agalarov Goldstone wrote I made sure I kept you and your father out of t his story 761 and i f contacted 1 can do a dance and keep you out of it 762 Goldstone added FBI now investigating and I hope this favor was worth for your dad-it could blow up 763 On July 12 2017 Emin Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father Aras never listens to him and that their 752 DJTJR00118 11 28 16 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 11 Email Goldstone to Graff 753 754 755 756 RG000256 6 2 17 Email Goldstone to Garten 757 758 RG000092 6 27 17 Email Goldstone to E Agalarov 760 OSC-KAV_01190 6 27 17 Text Message E Agalarov to Kaveladze 761 RG000286-87 7 9 17 Text Messages E Agalarov Goldstone 121 U S Department of Justice AM erRey Werle Preeh tet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UH6er Feel R Criffi P 6 e relationship with mr T has been thrown down the drain 764 The next month Goldstone commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated stating that his reputation was basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do 765 Goldstone added I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father So am painted as some mysterious link to Putin 766 After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began representatives from the Trump Organization again reached out to participants On July 10 2017 Futerfas sent Goldstone an email with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue which read As the person who arranged the meeting I can definitively state that the statements I have read by Donald Trump Jr are 100% accurate The meeting was a complete waste oftime and Don was never told Ms Veselnitskaya's name prior to the meeting Ms Veselnitskaya mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted 20 to 30 minutes at most There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the meeting 767 statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was He proposed a different statement asserting that he had been m cow- Emin Agalarov- to facilitate a meeting between a Russian attorney Natalia Veselnitzkaya sic and Donald Trump Jr The lawyer had apparently stated that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia which she believed Mr Trump Jr might fmd interesting 769 Goldstone never released either statement 770 On the Russian end there were also communications about what participants should say about the June 9 meeting Specifically the organization that hired Samochornov-an antiMagnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon- offered to pay $90 000 of Samochornov's legal fees 771 At Veselnitskaya's request the organization sent Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview and Samochornov understood that the organization would pay his legal fees only if he made statements consistent with Veselnitskaya's 772 Samochornov declined telling the Office that he did not want to perjure 764 OSC-KAV 01197 7 11-12 17 Text Messages Kaveladze E Agalarov 765 Investigative Technique 766 Investigative Technique 767 7 10 17 Email Goldstone to Futerfas Garten 768 769 7 10 17 Email Goldstone to Futerfas Garten 770 772 122 U S Department of Justice Attef'fley Werle Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Criffi P 6 e himself 773 The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya's request to Samochornov stated that he did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya's answers but in hindsight recognized that by sending the transcript Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account 774 Volume II Section II G infra discusses interactions between President Trump Trump Jr and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting 6 Events at the Republican National Convention Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief and non-substantive During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention J D Gordon a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security diluted a proposed amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing lethal assistance to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression Gordon requested that platform committee personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only appropriate assistance be provided to Ukraine The original sponsor of the lethal assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her the sponsor that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to dilute the language Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor although he acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the candidate to make that proposal Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the proposed language was inconsistent with Trump's position on Ukraine a Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J D Gordon the Week of the RNC In July 2016 Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy event a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in Cleveland Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention RNC or Convention 775 Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States including Kislyak were invited to the conference 776 On July 20 2016 Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference 777 In his speech Gordon stated in pet1inent part that the United States should have better relations with 773 Samochornov 7 13 17 302 at 1 774 775 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 22 Allan Smith We Now Know More About why JeffSessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention Business Insider Mar 2 20 17 776 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 Laura DeMarco Global Cleveland and Sen Bob Corker Welcome International Republican National Convention Guests Cleveland Plain Dealer July 20 2016 777 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 22 123 U S Department of Justice Atteme · Werk PreE ttet II Mit · CeHtaiR Material Preteetea URE er FeEl R Grim P 6 e Russia 778 During Sessions's speech he took questions from the audience one of which may have been asked by Kislyak 779 · When the speeches concluded several ambassadors lined up to greet the speakers 780 Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said in the speech about improving U S -Russia relations 781 Sessions separately spoke with between six and 12 ambassadors including Kislyak 782 Although Sessions stated during interviews with the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak he believed that the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said some things about U S -Russia relations 783 Later that evening Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference 784 Gordon ran into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food and they decided to sit at the same table to eat 785 They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and by Trump Campaign advisor Carter Page 786 As they ate Gordon and Kislyak talked for w hat Gordon estimated to have been three to five minutes during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant what he said in his speech about improving U S -Russia relations 787 b Change to Republican Party Platform In preparation for the 2016 Convention foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign working with the Republican National Committee reviewed the 2012 Convention's fo reign policy platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump's positions 788 The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia as the country's number one threat given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U S relations with Russia 789 The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10 201 6 the evening before its 778 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 779 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 22 Luff l 30 18 302 at 3 780 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 Luff l 3 0 18 302 at 3 78 1 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9 782 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 22 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 3 see also Volume I Section IV A 4 b supra explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception held on April26 2016 at the Mayflower Hotel 783 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at22 784 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9-10 785 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 9-10 786 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 10 see also Volume I Section IV A 3 d supra explaining that Page acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event 787 Gordon 8 29 1 7 302 at 10 788 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 10 789 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 10 124 U S Department of Justice AttsrHe ' Wsrl Prsattet May CsHtsiH Msterisl Prsteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e first meeting to propose amendments 7 0 Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform the Trump Campaign could request changes and members of the Trump Campaign attended committee meetings 791 John Mashburn the Campaign's policy director helped oversee the Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings 792 He told the Office that he directed Campaign staff at the Convention including J D Gordon to take a hands-ofT approach and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump's wishes 793 On July 11 2016 delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that included provision of armed support for Ukraine 794 The amendment described Russia's ongoing military aggression in Ukraine and announced support for maintaining and if warranted increasing sanctions against Russia until Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully restored and for providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces and greater coordination with NATO on defense planning 795 Gordon reviewed the proposed platform changes including Denman' s 796 Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of Trump' s stated position on Ukraine which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March 31 foreign policy meeting-namely that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any assistance to Ukraine that there should be improved U S -Russia relations and that he did not want to start World War III over that region 797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution 798 On July 11 2016 at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee Denman offered her amendment 799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer Matt Miller approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further discussion 800 Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing lethal 790 Gordon 8 29117 302 at 10 Hoff 5 26 17 302 at 1-2 791 HoffS 26 17 302 at 1 Gordon 9 7 17 302 at 10 792 Mashburn 6 25 18 302 at 4 Manafort 9 20 18 302 at 7-8 793 Mashburn 6 25 18 302 at 4 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 10 794 DENMAN 000001-02 DENMAN 000012 DENMAN 000021-22 Denman 12 4 17 302 at 1 Denman 617 17 302 at 2 795 DENMAN 000001-02 DENMAN 000012 DENMAN 000021-22 796 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 10-11 797 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 11 Gordon 917 17 302 at 11 Gordon 2 14 19 302 at 1-2 5-6 798 Gordon 2 14119 302 at 5-6 799 Denman 6 7 17 302 at 2 see DENMAN 000014 800 Denman 6 7 17 302 at 2 Denman 12 4 17 302 at 2 Gordon 917 17 302 at 11 -12 see Hoff 5 26 17 302 at 2 125 U S Department of Justice AEt6rney W6rlt Pf'6clttet II Ma y C6HtaiH Material Pf'6teetecl Uneler Feel R Ct'im P 6 e defensive weapons to Ukraine 801 Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate's views 802 According to Denman she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller and they told her that they had to clear the language and that Gordon was talking to New York 803 Denman told others that she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike lethal defense weapons from the proposal but that she refused 804 Denman recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with candidate Trump but she was skeptical whether that was true 805 Gordon denied having told Denman that he was on the phone with Trump although he acknowledged it was possible that he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter 806 Gordon's phone records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon but do not include calls directly to a number associated with Trump 807 And according to the President's written answers to the Office's questions he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the platform amendment 808 Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn a senior foreign policy advisor and Mashburn the Campaign policy director Gordon stated that he connected with both of them he could not recall if by phone or in person and apprised them of the language he took issue with in the proposed amendment Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation appropriate assistance 809 Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment but not weighing in because Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance 810 Mashburn stated that Gordon reached him and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that the Campaign should not intervene 811 When the amendment came up again in the committee's proceedings the subcommittee changed the amendment by striking the lethal defense weapons language and replacing it with 801 Denman 617 17 302 at 3 802 M Miller 10 25 17 302 at 3 803 Denman 12 4 1 7 302 at 2 Denman 6 7 17 302 at 2 804 Hoff 5 26 17 302 at 2 805 Denman 6 7117 302 at 2-3 3-4 Denman 12 4 17 302 at 2 806 Gordon 2114 19 302 at 7 807 Gordon stated to the Office that 4 19 302 at 7 808 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 20 18 at 17 Response to Question IV Call Records of J D Gordon his calls with Sessions were unrelated to Part f 809 Gordon 2 14119 302 at 6-7 Gordon 917 17 302 at 11-12 see Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 11 810 Dearborn 11 28 17 302 at 7-8 811 Mashburn 6 25 18 302 at 4 126 U S Department of Justice i M 6mey W6rk Pr6ch tet II May C6RtftiR Material Pt·6teetea Unser Fee R Crilfl P 6 e appropriate assistance 8 12 Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with appropriate assistance 8 13 The subcommittee accordingly approved Denman' s amendment but with the term appropriate assistance 8 14 Gordon stated that to his recollection this was the only change sought by the Campaign 815 Sam Clovis the Campaign 's national co-chair and chief policy advisor stated he was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance 8 16 Mashburn stated that when he saw the word appropriate assistance he believed that Gordon had violated Mashburn's directive not to intervene 817 7 Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio-among them Sessions and Gordon-in the weeks after the Convention The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coord ination between the Campaign and the Russian government a Ambassador Kislyak Invites J D Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's Residence On August 3 2016 an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States wrote to Gordon o n behalf of' Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon to have breakfast tea with the Ambassador at his residence in Washington D C the following week 818 Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation He wrote t hese days are not optimal for us as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing for the first debate with HRC Hope to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down a bit Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador 819 The investigation did not identify evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet or met with Kislyak after this email b Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak Also in August 20 16 a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions's Senate office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak 820 At the time Sessions was a member of the 812 Hoff 5 26 17 302 at 2-3 see Denman 12 4 17 302 at 2-3 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 11 8 13 Gordon 8 29 17 302 at 11 Gordon 9 7 17 302 at 12 81 4 Hoff 5 26117 302 at 2-3 815 Gordon 2 14 19 302 at 6 8 16 Clovis 10 3 17 302 at 10-11 817 Mashburn 6 25 18 302 at 4 81 8 DJTFP00004828 8 3 16 Email Pchelyakov embassy@russianembassy org to Gordon 819 DJTFP00004953 8 8 16 Email Gordon to embassy@russianembassy org 820 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 5 127 U S Department of Justice AfterHey Werlt Preclttet II Mtty CeHtaiH Mttterittl Preteetea UHaer Fea R Crit'fl P 6te Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity 821 But Sessions's staff reported and Sessions himself acknowledged that meeting requests from ambassadors increased substantially in 2016 as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future Trump Administration 822 On September 8 2016 Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office 823 Sessions said that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors including Kislyak 824 He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff Sandra Luff his legislative director and Pete Landrum who handled military affairs 825 The meeting lasted less than 30 minutes 826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missiledefense system to Iran Russian planes buzzing U S military assets in the Middle East and Russian aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova 827 Kislyak offered explanations on these issues and complained about NATO land forces in former Soviet-bloc countries that border Russia 828 Landrum recalled that Kislyak referred to the presidential campaign as an interesting campaign 829 and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign 830 None of the attendees though remembered any discussion ofRussian election interference or any request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump Campaign 831 During the meeting Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U S -Russia relations with him over a meal at the ambassador's residence 832 Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak extended the invitation After the meeting ended Luff advised Sessions against accepting the oneon-one meeting with Kislyak whom she assessed to be an old school KGB guy 833 Neither Luff nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or made any further effort to dine 821 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23-24 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 5 822 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23-24 Luff l 30 18 302 at 5 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 3-5 823 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 824 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 825 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 5-6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 4-5 stating he could not remember if election was discussed 826 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 5 827 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 4-5 828 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 4-5 829 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 5 830 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump Sessions 1 17 1 8 302 at 23-24 83 1 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 5 832 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 5 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 4 833 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 5 128 U S Department of Justice A erne f Werk Pmclttet II Mit · CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R Crifft P 6 e or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election 834 Sessions and Landrum recalled that after the election some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak 835 According to Sessions the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak two other ambassadors and the Governor of Alabama 836 Sessions however was in New York on the day ofthe anticipated meeting and was unable to attend 837 The investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8 meeting 8 Paul Manafott Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign including a period as campaign chairman from March to August 2016 838 Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin Kilimnik a longtime Manafort employee who previously ran Manafort' s office in Kiev and who the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence Manafort instructed Rick Gates his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee 839 to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including internal polling data although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction Manafort expected Kilimnik to share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska Gates periodically sent such polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign 834 Luff 1 30 18 302 at 6 Landrum 2 27 18 302 at 4-5 835 Sessions 1 17118 302 at 23 836 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 837 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 23 838 On August 21 20 I 8 Manaf01t was convicted in the Eastem District of Virginia on eight tax Foreign Bank Account Registration FBAR and bank fraud charges On September 14 2018 Manafort pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to 1 conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States money laundering tax fraud FBAR Foreign Agents Registration Act FARA and FARA false statements and 2 conspiracy to obstruct justice witness tampering Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern District of Virginia but as to which the jury hung The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort's work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended On March 7 2019 Manafortwas sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution On March 13 the district court in D C sentenced Manaf01t to a total term of 73 months 60 months on the Count 1 conspiracy with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence and 13 months on the Count 1 conspiracy to be served consecutive to the other two sentences The two sentences resulted in a total term of 90 months 839 As noted in Volume I Section III D 1 b supra Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in the District of Columbia including making a false statement to the FBI pursuant to a plea agreement He has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable See also Transcript at 16 United States v Paul J Manafort Jr 1 17-cr-201 D D C Feb 13 2019 Doc 514 Manafort 2 13 19 Transcript court's explanation of reasons to credit Gates's statements in one instance 129 U S Department of Justice A erHe Werk Preclttet II Mtty CeH tttiH M lterittl Preteetecl UHcler Fee R Grim P 6 e Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and conveyed campaign information The second meeting took place on August 2 20 16 in New York City Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych who was then living in Russia The message was about a peace plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a backdoor means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine Several months later after the presidential election Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view-which Manafort later said he shared-that the plan's success would require U S support to succeed all that is required to start the process is a very minor 'wink' or slight push from Donald Trump 840 The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U S representative and started the process Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia at the very top level Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2 December 2016 the Kilimnik email described above January 2017 February 2017 and again in the spring of 2018 The Office reviewed numerous Manafmt email and text communications and asked President Trump about the plan in written questions 841 The investigation did not uncover evidence ofManafort's passing along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or the Administration The Office was not however able to gain access to all of Manafort's electronic communications in some instances messages were sent using encryption applications And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new Administration about the peace plan he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan and his meetings with Kilirnnik and his unreliability on this subj ect was among the reasons that the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement 842 The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's with Kilirnnik during the campaign period Manafort a downside to sharing campaign information and 841 According to the President's written answers he does not remember Manafort communicating to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to suppo1t Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 16- 17 Response to Question IV Part d 842 Manafort made several false statements during debriefings Based on that conduct the Office determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness The judge presiding in Manafort's D C criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications with Ki limnik and concerning two other issues Although the report refers at times to Manafort' s statements it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful responses may themselves be of evidentiary value or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible 130 A erHey U S Department of Justice Werk Pre6ttet II Mtty CeAtttifl Mttterittl Preteete6 UH6er Fee R Critfl P 6 e be good for business and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed in the Ukraine As to Deripaska Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with him Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a disagreement -a reference to one or more outstanding lawsuits Because of questions about Manafort's credibility and our limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik the Office could not assess what Kilimnik or others he may have given it to did with it The Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort's sharing polling data and Russia's interference in the election which had already been reported by U S media outlets at the time of the August 2 meeting The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts a Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine Manafort' s Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015 including through his company DMP International LLC DMI Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018 Kilimnik who speaks and writes Ukrainian and Russian facilitated many of Manafort' s communications with Deripaska and Ukrainian oligarchs i Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work In approximately 2005 Manafort began working for Deripaska a Russian oligarch who has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with Vladimir Putin 843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in 2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits that the work could confer on the Putin Government 844 Gates described the work Manafort did for Deripaska as political risk insurance and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests 845 Manafort's company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions of dollars by Deripaska as well 846 In 2007 Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Pat1ners L P Pericles an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner Richard Davis The Pericles fund was established to pursue investments in Eastern Europe 847 Deripaska was the sole investor 848 Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led 843 Pinchuk et al Russian Tycoon Deripaska in Putin Delegation to China Reuters June 8 20 18 844 6 23 05 Memo Manafort Davis to Deripaska Rothchild 845 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 7 846 Manafort 9 20 18 302 at 2-5 Manafort Income by Year 2005 - 2015 Manafort Loans from Wire Transfers 2005-2015 847 Gates 3 12 18 302 at 5 848 Manafort 12 16 15 Dep at 157 8-11 131 U S Department of Justice ' uerHey Verk Preclttet II Mtty Cefttaift Material Preteetecl UHcler Fee R Grim P 6 e to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska 849 In particular when the fund failed litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued Gates stated that by 2009 Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had dried up 850 According to Gates various interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to resolve the legal dispute 851 As described below in 2016 Manafort Gates Kilimnik and others engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation ii Political Consulting Work Through Deripaska Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov a Ukrainian oligarch who hired Manafort as a political consultant 852 In 2005 Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in political work supporting the Party of Regions 853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally understood to align with Russia Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power and its candidate Yiktor Yanukovych won the presidency in 2010 Manafort became a close and trusted political advisor to Yanukovych during his time as President of Ukraine Yanukovych served in that role until2014 when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests 854 iii Konstantin Kilimnik Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a longtime Manafort employee 855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his senior entourage and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients including Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oli garchs 856 Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with Deripaska's deputy Yiktor Boyarkin 857 a Russian national who previously served in the defense attache office of the Russian Embassy to the Unjted States 858 849 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 9 850 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 6 85 1 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 9-10 852 Manafort 7 30 14 302 at 1 Manafort 9 20 18 302 at 2 853 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 5-6 854 Gates 3 16 18 302 at 1 Davis 2 8 18 302 at 9 Devine 7 6 18 302 at 2-3 855 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 5 Gates 1129 18 302 at 18-19 10 28 97 Ki limnik Visa Record U S Department of State 856 Gates 1 29 18 302 at 18- 19 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 8 Gates l 31 18 302 at 4-5 Oates 1 30 18 302 at 2 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 11 857 Gates 1 29 18 302 at 18 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 8 858 Boyarkin V isa Record U S Department of State 132 U S Department of Justice AM erHe · Werlt Preelttet II May CeHtaiH Matet'ial Pt'eteeteel UHeler Feel R Criffi P 6 e Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian spy 859 The FBI however assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence 860 Several pieces of the Office's evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through courtauthorized search warrants-support that assessment • Kilimnik was born on April27 1970 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast then of the Soviet Union and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until1992 861 Sam Patten a business partner to Kilimnik 862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian armament industry selling arms and military equipment 863 • U S government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997 864 • Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute's IRI Moscow office where he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005 865 While another official recalled the incident differently 866 one former associate of Kilimnik' s at IRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian intelligence were too strong The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that Kilimnik had links to the Russian government 867 • Jonathan Hawker a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI Consulting worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych After Hawker's work for DMI ended Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian 859 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 5 860 The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings E g Gov't Opp to Mot to Modify United States v Paul J Manafort Jr 1 17-cr-201 D D C Dec 4 20 17 Doc 73 at 2 Manafort D D C Gov't Opp to Mot to Modify 861 12 17 16 Kilimnik Visa Record U S Department of State 862 In August 2018 Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian election interference Plea Agreement United States v W Samuel Patten 1 18-cr-260 D D C Aug 31 20 18 Doc 6 Statement of Offense United States v W Samuel Patten 1 18-cr-260 D D C Aug 31 20 18 Doc 7 863 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 5-6 864 10 28 97 Kilimnik Visa Record U S Department of State 865 Nix 3 30 18 302 at 1-2 866 Nix 3 30 18 302 at 2 867 Lenzi 1 30 18 302 at 2 133 U S Department of Justice A1 tefHe · Wefl Preattet II May CeHtaiH Matet·ial Preteetea UH aer Fea R Crifl'l P 6 e government entity on a public-relations project that would promote in Western and Ukrainian media Russia's position on its 2014 invasion ofCrimea 868 • Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a spy a view that he shared with Manafort Hawker and Alexander van der Zwaan 869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 870 Investigative Technique b Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign i Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19 2016 On March 29 2016 the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign 's Convention Manager 871 On May 19 2016 Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief strategist and Gates who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign was appointed deputy campaign chairman 872 Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump 873 In early 2016 at Manafort' s request Barrack suggested to Trump that Mana fort join the Campaign to manage the Republican Convention 874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately 1980 until the mid-1990s through various consulting and lobbying firms Manafort met Trump in 1982 when Trump hired the Black Manafort Stone and Kelly lobbying firm 875 Over the years Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone ' s wedding and Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort 876 868 Hawker 1 9 18 302 at 13 3 18 14 Email Hawker Tulukbaev 869 van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U S District Court for the District of Columbia to making false statements to the Special Counsel' s Office Plea Agreement United States v Alex van der Zwaan 1 18-cr-31 D D C Feb 20 20 18 Doc 8 870 Hawker 6 9 18 302 at 4 van der Zwaan 11 3 17 302 at 22 Manafort said in an interview that Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler Manafort 10 16 18 302 at 7 871 Press Release-DonaldJ TrumpAnnounces Campaign Convention Manager Pau J Manafort The American Presidency Project- U C Santa Barbara Mar 29 2016 872 Gates l 29 18 302 at 8 MeghanKeneally Timeline ofManafort 's role in the Trump Campaign ABC News Oct 20 2017 873 Gates 1 29 18 302 at 7-8 Manafmt 9 11118 302 at 1-2 Barrack 12 12 17 302 at 3 874 Barrack 12 12 17 302 at 3 Gates 1 29 18 302 at 7-8 875 Manafort 10 16 18 302 at 6 876 Manafort 10 16 18 302 at 6 134 U S Department of Justice AtterHe v-reflE Pretlttet II 1 ia-y CeiTtain l 4ft1 erial Preteeteell J-fteler Fetl R Grim P 6 e According to Gates in March 2016 Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in Florida to meet with Trump Trump hired him at that time 877 Manafort agreed to work on the Campaign without pay Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time but resuscitating his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future Gates reported that Manafort intended if Trump won the Presidency to remain outside the Administration and monetize his relationship with the Administration 878 ii Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts Immediately upon joining the Campaign Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska Akhmetov Serhiy Lyovochkin and Boris Kolesnikov 879 the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc officials 880 The memoranda described Manafort' s appointment to the Trump Campaign and indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future On March 30 2016 Gates emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort' s appointment to Kilimnik for translation and dissemination 881 Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages had been delivered emailing on April 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown our friends the media coverage of his new role 882 Kilimnik replied Absolutely Every article Manafort further asked How do we use to get whole Has Ovd Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska operation seen Kilimnik wrote back the same day Yes I have been sending everything to Victor Boyarkin Deripaska's deputy who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD 883 Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be good for business and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine 884 Gates also explained to the Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help confirm that Deripaska had dropped the Pericles lawsuit and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska as 877 Gates 2 2 18 302 at I 0 878 Gates 1130 18 302 at 4 879 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 11 880 See Sharon LaFraniere Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia but It Will Be in the Air New York Times July 30 2018 Tierney Sneed Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in Ukraine Talking Points Memo July 30 2018 Mykola Vorobiov How Pro-Russian Forces Will Take Revenge on Ukraine Atlantic Council Sept 23 2018 Sergii Leshchenko Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still Calling the Shots Foreign Policy Aug 14 2014 Interfax-Ukraine Kolesnikov Inevitability of Punishment Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine Kyiv Post June 23 2018 Igor Kossov Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants Kyiv Post Mar 7 2019 Markian Kuzmowycz How the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections Atlantic Council Nov 19 2018 The Opposition Bloc is a Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions 881 3 30 16 Email Gates to Kilimnik 882 4 11 16 Email Manafort Kilimnik 883 4 11 16 Email Manafort Kilimnik 884 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 10 135 A 6rney U S Department of Justice W6rl Pr66ttet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teete6 UH 6er Fee R Grim P 6 e discussed further below so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against Manafort 885 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States that Deripaska could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be helpful to Deripaska and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other ways as well 886 Gates stated however that Manafort never told him anything specific about what if anything Manafort might be offering Deripaska 887 Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik in turn could share 888 it with Ukrainian ol Gates understood that the information would also be shared with 889 Gates reported to the Office mg mformation but Gates thought it was a way to showcase Manafort's work and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the Trump Campaign ended 890 Gates said that Manafort's instruction included sending internal polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio 89 1 Fabrizio had worked with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort Gates stated that in accordance with Manafort's instruction he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis 892 Gates futther told the Office that after Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August Gates sent Kilimnik polling data Jess frequently and that the data he sent was more publicly available information and less internal data 893 mu emat sent to press contacts and mid-August of 2016 Those emails referenced internal polling described the status of the Trump Campaign and 885 Gates 2 2118 302 at 11 Gates 9 27 18 302 serial 740 at 2 886 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 12 887 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 12 888 Gates 1 31 18 302 at 17 Gates 9 27 18 302 serial 740 at 2 In a later interview with the Office Gates stated that Manafott directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7 2016 meeting between Manafmt and Kilimnik in New York discussed in Volume I Section IV A 8 b iii infra Gates 11 7 18 302 at 3 889 Gates 9 27 18 302 Part II at 2 890 ·Gates 2 12118 302 at 10 Gates 1 31 18 302 at 17 89 1 Gates 9 27 18 302 serial 740 at 2 Gates 217 18 302 at 15 892 Gates 1 31 18 302 at 17 893 Gates 2 12 18 302 at 11-12 According to Gates his access to internal polling data was more limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point 894 136 U S Department of Justice At tarAey Wark Pt·atlttet II May CaHtaiA Material Prateetea UAaer Fea R Grim P 6 e and assessed Trump's prospects Gates to send Kilimnik internal The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates's account For example in response to a July 7 2016 email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort' s failed Deripaskabacked investment Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on this issue with our friend 897 Gates stated that our friend likely referred to Deripaska 898 and Manafort told the Office that the issue and our biggest interest as stated below was a solution to the Deripaska-Pericles issue 899 Kilimnik replied I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest Our friend Boyarkin said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in his boss' Deripaska's mind and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to you pretty soon understanding all the time sensitivity I am more than sure that it will be resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V ' s boss Deripaska 900 Eight minutes later Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin' s boss a reference to Deripaska that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate 901 Manafort has alleged to the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an example why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate 902 Manafort said he never gave Deripaska a briefing 903 Manafort noted that if Trump won Deripaska would want to use Manafort to advance whatever interests Deripaska had in the United States and elsewhere 904 895 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Dirkse 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Schultz 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Marson 7 27 16 Email Kilimnik to Ash 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Ash 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Jackson 8 18 16 Email Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson 8 19 16 Email Kilimnik to Patten 896 897 7 7 16 Email Manafort to Kilimnik 898 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 13 899 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 6 900 7 8 16 Email Kilimnik to Manafort 901 7 8 16 Email Kilimnik to Manafort Gates 2 2 18 302 at 13 902 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 6 903 Manafort 9111 18 302 at 6 904 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 6 137 U S Department of Justice AH erHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtftiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R CritH P 6 e iii Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik in the United States Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period-once in May and again in August 2016 The first meeting took place on May 7 2016 in New York City 905 In the days leading to the meeting Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the political situation in Ukraine That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow-a trip that likely included meetings between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials 906 Kilimnik then traveled to Washington D C on or about May 5 2016 while in Washington Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State Department employees 907 Late on the evening of May 6 Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3 00a m train to meet Manafort in New York for breakfast on May 7 908 According to Manafort during the meeting he and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump Campaign expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and elsewhere 909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort's position on the Campaign was an opportunity but Kilimnik did not ask for anything 91 Kilimnik spoke about a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine which was the base for the Opposition Bloc 91 1 Ki1imnik returned to Washington D C right after the meeting with Manafort ° Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City on the evening of August 2 2016 The events leading to the meeting are as follows On July 28 2016 Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow 912 The next day Kilimnik wrote to Manafort requesting that they meet using coded language about a conversation he had that day 913 In an email with a subject line Black Caviar Kilimnik wrote I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago We spent about 5 hours talking about his story and I have several important messages from him to you He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation 1 said I have to run it by you first but in principle I am prepared to do it It has to do about the future of his 905 Investigative Technique 906 4 26 16 Email Kilimnik to Purcell at 2 Gates 2 2 18 302 at 12 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 6-7 Gates 11 7 18 302 at 3 907 5 7 16 Email Kilimnik to Charap Kimmage 5 7 16 Email Kasanofto Kilimnik 908 516116 Email Manafort to Gates 5 6 16 Email Gates to Kilimnik 909 Manafort 10 11118 302 at 1 9 10 Manafort 10 11118 302 at 1 911 Mana fort 10 11 18 302 at 1 9 12 7 25 16 Email Kilimnik to katrin@yana kiev ua 2 17 34 a m 9 13 7 29 16 Email Kilimnik to Manafort 10 5 1 a m 138 U S Department of Justice AUsrHey Wsrk Prsettet II May CsHtaiH Material Prsteeteel UHeler Fee R Grim P 6 e country and is quite interesting 914 Manafort identified the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar as Yanukovych He explained that in 2010 he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30 000 to $40 000 915 Manafort' s identification ofYanukovych as the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow-where Yanukovych resided-when Kilimnik wrote I met today with a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik referred to Yanukovych as BG -916 Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29 email Tuesday August 2 is best Tues or weds in NYC 9 17 Three days later on July 3 1 2016 Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow and on that same day wrote to Manafort that he needed about 2 hours for their meeting because it is a long caviar story to tell 918 Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7 30 p m and he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night 919 Documentary evidence-including flight phone and hotel records and the timing of text messages exchanged920-confirms the dinner took place as planned on August 2 92 1 As to the contents of the meeting itself the accounts ofManafort and Gates-who arrived late to the dinner--differ in certain respects But their versions of events when assessed alongside available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten indicate that at least three principal topics were discussed First Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region ofDonbas 922 914 7 29 16 Email Kilimnik to Manafot1 10 5 1 a m 9 15 Manafort 9 12118 302 at 3 Investigative Technique 9 17 7 29 16 Email Manafort to Kilimnik 918 7 3 1 16 Email Manafort to Kilimnik 919 7 3 1 16 Email Manafort to Kilimnik ° 92 Kilimnik 8 2 16 CBP Call Records of Rick Gates Receipt · Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik 8 2-3 16 921 Deripaska's private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August 2 2016 According to Customs and Border Protection records the only passengers on the plane were Deripaska's wife daughter mother and father-in-law and separate records obtained by our Office confirm that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York 922 The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics which are located in the Donbas region of Ukraine declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President Yanukovych from power Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces with backing from the Russian military have occupied the region since 2014 Under the Yanukovych-backed plan Russia would assist in withdrawing the military and Donbas would become an autonomous region within Ukraine with its own 139 U S Department of Justice A arHey Wark Praclttet II May CaH tatn Material Prateetecl UH cler Fecl R Crilfl P 6Ee and having Yanukovych the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014 elected to head that republic 923 That plan Manafort later acknowledged constituted a backdoor means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine 924 Manafort initially said that ifhe had notcutoffthe discussion Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan 925 Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik that the plan was crazy that the discussion ended and that he did not recall Kilimnik a · 926 Manafort to reconsider the after their Manafort said to mg-years ater-an request Y anu needed him When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December 8 2016 however Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email 928 Manafort ultimately acknowl Kilimnik also raised the ian in ary 2017 meetings with -929 Second Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort' s plan to win the election 930 That briefing encompassed the Campaign' s messaging and its internal polling data According to Gates it also included discussion of battleground states which Manafort identified as Michigan Wisconsin Pennsylvania and Minnesota 931 Manafort did not states in his of the 2 d · ' ' ' '' refer to battl prime minister The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the region as prime minister of the republic and facilitate the reintegration ofthe re aine with the support of the U S and Russian presidents As noted above according to - - the written the an to work both U S and Russian support were necessary documentation the 2 21 18 Email Manafort Ward Fabrizio at 3-5 925 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 4 926 Manafort 9 12118 302 at 4 927 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 5 Manafort 9 12 18 302 at 4 928 Manaf01t 9 12 18 302 at 4 Investigative Technique evidence from Manafort 2 21 18 Email Manafort to Ward Fabrizio 930 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 5 93 1 Gates l 30 18 302 at 3 5 932 140 U S Department of Justice At tentey Werk Preattet II May CeHtl liH M1 1teril ll Preteetea UHaer Fea R Criffi P 6 e Third according to Gates and what Kilimnjk told Patten Manafort and Kilimnik discussed two sets of financial disputes related to Manafort' s previous work in the region Those consisted of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment 933 After the meeting Gates and Manafort both stated that they left separately from Kilimnik because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his connections to Kilimnik 934 c Post-Resignation Activities Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016 approximately two weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik amidst negative media reporting about his political consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine Despite his resignation Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner Bannon and candidate Trump 935 and some of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails For example on October 21 2016 Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the Campaign make the case against Clinton as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment and that Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible way - by using the words of Clinton its campaign officials and DNC members 936 Later in a November 5 2016 email to Kushner entitled Securing the Victory Manafort stated that he was really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory and that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by mov ing immediately to discredit the Trump victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud including the claim that the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results 937 Trump was elected President on November 8 2016 Manafort told the Office that in the wake of Trump's victory he was not interested in an Administration job Manafort instead preferred to stay on the outside and monetize his campaign position to generate business given his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incomjng Administration 938 Manafort appeared to follow that plan as he traveled to the Middle East Cuba South Korea Japan and China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entaii 939 Manafort's activities in early 2017 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia The 933 Gates 1 30 18 302 at 2-4 Patten 5 22 18 302 at 7 934 Gates 1 30 18 302 at 5 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 5 935 Gates 2 12 18 302 at 12 936 NOSC00021517-20 10 21 16 Email Manafort to Kushner 937 NOSC00021573-75 11 5 16 Email Manafort to Kushner 938 Manafort 9 12 18 302 at 1 4-5 Gates 1 30 18 302 at 4 939 Manafort 9 12 18 302 at I 141 U S Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rk Pr6thtet II May CeHt iH Material Preteetecl UAEier Feel R Crim P 6 e first meeting which took place in Madrid Spain in January 2017 was with Georgiy Oganov Oganov who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States was a senior executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska 940 Manafort initially denied attending the meeting When he later acknowledged it he claimed that the meeting had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit 94 1 Other evidence however provides reason to doubt Manafort' s statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the Pericles lawsuit In particular text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin- not Manafort's counsel-had arranged the meeting between Manafort and Oganov 942 Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be not about money or Pericles but instead about recreating the old friendship -ostensibly between Manafort and Deripaska- and talking about global politics 943 Manafort also replied by text that he need s this finished before Jan 20 944 which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles before the inauguration On January 15 2017 three days after his return from Madrid Manafort emailed K T McFarland who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was formally appointed to that position on January 20 2017 945 Manafort's January 15 email to McFarland stated I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my travels over the last month 946 Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue regarding Cuba not Russia or Ukraine and Manafott had traveled to Cuba in the past month 947 Either way McFarland-who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiryappears not to have responded to Manafort 948 Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presidential Inauguration in January he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hotel in Alexandria Virginia 949 During this meeting Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8 20 16 message found in Kilimnik' s DMP email account 950 In that December 8 email which Manafort ° Kalashnikova 5 17 18 302 at 4 Gary Lee Soviet Embassy's Identity Crisis Washington Post Dec 20 1991 Georgy S Oganov Executive Profile Biography Bloomberg Mar 12 201 9 94 94 1 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 7 942 Text Message Manafort Kilimnik 943 Text Message Manafort Kilimnik Manafort 9 12 18 302 at 5 944 Text Message Manafort Kilimnik 94 5 I I I 5 17 Email Manafort McFarland Flynn 946 III 5 17 Email Manafort McFarland Flynn 947 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 7 948 I 15 17 Email Manafort McFarland Flynn McFarland 12 22 17 302 at t 8-1 9 949 Manafort 9 11 18 302 at 7 Manafort 9 2 1 18 an 19 and 22 201 7 2 016-17 Text Messages 302 at 3 Kilimnik Patten at 1-2 950 Investigative Technique 142 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preelttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Critn P 6 e acknowledged having read 95 1 Kilimnik wrote a ll that is required to start the process is a very minor ' wink' or slight push from DT -an apparent reference to President-elect Trump- and a decision to authorize you to be a ' special representative' and manage this process Kilimnik assured Manafort with that authority he could start the process and w ithin 10 days visit Russia Yanukovych guarantees your reception at the very top level and that DT could have peace in Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration 952 On February 26 2017 Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid where Kilimnik had flown from Moscow 956 In his first two interviews with the Office Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik on his Madrid trip and then-after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was in Madrid at the same time as him-recognized that he met him in Madrid Manafort said that Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called black ledger payments to Manafort that was be conducted Ukraine 's National Bureau 957 Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018 951 Manafort 9111118 302 at 6 952 Investigative Technique 956 2 21 17 Email Zatynaiko to Kilimnik 951 Manafort 9 13 18 302 at 1 In resolving whether Manafort breached his agreement court found that Manafort lied about among other things his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan including the meeting in Madrid Manafort 2 13 19 Transcript at 29-31 40 143 U S Department of Justice At-t errtey Werk Pre6ttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 Ut 6er Fee R Grim P 6 e Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office 959 and the Ukraine peace plan In early 2018 Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft poll in Ukraine sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik and worked with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions 960 The primer sent to the pollsters specifically called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic ofDonbas with Yanukovych as Prime Minister 961 and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions on Yanukovych' s role in resolving the conflict in Donbas 962 The poll was not solely about Donbas it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to the 2019 Ukraine presidential election The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration Kilimnik continued his efforts to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch e g U S Depa1tment of State into the summer of2018 963 B Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts Trump was elected President on November 8 2016 Beginning immediately after the election individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the Trump Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels-sometimes through Russian Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through U S persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts The investigation did not establish that these efforts reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its electioninterference activities 1 Immediate Post-Election Activity As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President Russian government officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new Administration They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with senior officials around the President-Elect As explained below those efforts entailed both official contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches- sanctioned at high levels of the Russian government-through business rather than political contacts Manafort D D C Gov' t Opp to Mot to Modify at 2 Superseding Indictment 48-51 United States v Paul J Manafort Jr 1 17-cr-201 D D C June 8 2018 Doc 318 959 960 2112 18 Email Fabrizio to Manafort Ward 2116 18 Email Fabrizio to Manafort 2 19 18 Email Fabrizio to Ward 2 21 18 Email Manafort to Ward Fabrizio 961 2 21 18 Email Manafmt to Ward Fabrizio 7 16 49 a m attachment 962 3 9 18 Email Ward to Manafort Fabrizio attachment 144 U S Department of Justice AM erHe ' Werk Preettet II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e a Outreach from the Russian Government At approximately 3 a m on election night Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was calling from a number with a DC area code 964 Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the person she could make out the words Putin call 965 Hicks told the caller to send her an email 966 The following morning on November 9 2016 Sergey Kuznetsov an official at the Russian Embassy to the United States emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line Message from Putin 967 Attached to the email was a message from Putin in both English and Russian which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect 968 In the message Putin offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory stating he look ed forward to working with Trump on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis 969 Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner asking Can you look into this Don't want to get duped but don't want to blow off Putin 97 Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the Russian Ambassador whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016 971 Unable to recall the Russian Ambassador' s name Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI whom he had consulted previously about Russia see Volume I Section IV A 4 supra and asked What is the name of Russian ambassador 972 Kushner forwarded Simes' s response-which identified Kislyak by name- to Hicks 973 After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned Hicks conveyed Putin' s letter to transition officials 974 Five days later on November 14 2016 Trump and Putin spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Team members including incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn 975 ° 964 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 3 965 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 3 966 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 3 967 NOSC00044381 1119 16 Email Kuznetsov to Hicks 5 27a m 968 NOSC00044381-82 1119116 Email Kuznetsov to Hicks 5 27a m 969 NOSC00044382 11 9 16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump Nov 9 2016 translation 970 NOSC0004438 1 11 9 16 Email Hicks to Kushner 10 26 a m 97 1 Statement of Jared C Kushner to Congressional Committees at 4 Jul 24 20 17 972 NOSC00000058 11 9 16 Email Kushner to Simes 10 28 a m Statement of Jared Kushner to Congressional Committees at 4 Jul 24 2017 973 NOSC00000058 11 9 16 Email Kushner to Hicks 11 05 44a m 974 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 3-4 975 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 8-10 see Doug G Ware Trump Russia 's Putin Talk about Syria Icy Relations in Phone Call UPI Nov 14 2016 145 U S Department of Justice Att EH'He r Werk Pretittet II Mtt r CeHtaiH Mttterittl Preteeteti UHtier Feci R Grim P 6 e h Higlz-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team a number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make contact Petr Aven a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank Russia's largest commercial bank described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the flurry of Russian activity 976 · A ven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin these 50 men are often referred to as oligarchs 977 A ven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin including in the fourth quarter Q4 of2016 shortly after the U S presidential election 978 Aven said that he took these meetings seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit directives and that there would be consequences for A ven if he did not follow through 979 As was typical the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin' s chief of staff Anton Vaino 980 According to Aven at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin 981 Putin raised the prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests including sanctions against Aven and or Alfa-Bank 982 Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to protect himself and Alfa-Bank 983 Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration 984 According to A ven Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and generally did not know the people around the President-Elect 985 r '' o information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer 977 Aven 8 2118 3 02 at 7 978 979 Aven 8 2 18 302 at 2-3 and interview with the Office Aven ng usmg e g Official 1 Official2 Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's chief of staff Vaino See Affidavit of Ryan Junek Aug 2 2018 hard copy on file 981 At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin Aven was generally aware of the press coverage about Russian interference in the U S election According to Aven he did not discuss that topic with Putin at any point and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions Aven 8 2 18 302 at 5-7 982 983 984 985 146 U S Department of Justice AM 6rfley W6Fk Pf6Eittet II May C6Htail'l Material Pr6teeteel Ul'lelef Feel R Grim P 6Ee Aven told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank shareholders sanctions and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming Administration to establish a line of communication 986 Aven described Putin responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success 987 According to Aven although Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team Aven understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised 988 Aven' s efforts are described in Volume I Section IV B S infra 2 Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration A ven' s description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill Dmitriev a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected to Putin Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in the months after the election Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United Arab Emirates UAE royal court George Nader to introduce him to Trump transition officials and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince a Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon 989 In addition the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner Rick Gerson in late November 2016 In December 2016 and January 2017 Dmitriev and Gerson worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia which Dmitriev implied he cleared through Putin Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson a Background Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund the Russian Direct Investment Fund RDIF when it was founded in 2011 990 Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his boss 991 RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds 992 Dmitriev regularly interacted with Nader a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed ° 99 Kirill Dmitriev Biography Russian Direct Investment Fund available at https rdif ru Eng_person_dmitriev_kirill See also Overview Russian Direct Investment Fund available at https rdif ru Eng_About 99 1 Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 1 See also e g 12 14 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 1 9 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 992 147 U S Department of Justice MterHey Werk Preattet II Ma y CeHtairt Mftf erial Preteetea UHaer ¥ea R Criffl P 6 e Crown Prince Mohammed in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE 993 Putin wanted Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the Gulf states in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently 994 Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region and would relay Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed 995 Nader developed contacts with both U S presidential campaigns during the 2016 election and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so 996 According to Nader Dmitriev said that his to · and asked Nader to and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate 997 assist him in members of the Tru Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated with the Trump Campaign including Steve Bannon Donald Trump Jr and Roger Stone 1005 Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign although he offered to host a fundraiser for 993 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 1-2 Nader 1 23 18 302 at 2-3 5 3 16 Email Nader to Phares - 994 Nader 1122 18 302 at 1-2 995 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 3 996 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 3 998 999 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 3 1000 100 1 1002 1003 1004 1005 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 1-5 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 21 148 U S Department of Justice AtterHe ' Werk Preeh tet Mtty CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy trade and Russian election interference to Bannon 1006 After the election Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower primarily to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others 1007 Prince and Bannon would discuss inter alia foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who should be appointed to fill key natio sitions 1008 A lthough affiliated with the transition Nader received a s s u r a n c e s that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate 10 b Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration Investigative Technique 1006 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 1 3-4 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 2 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 19-20 10 18 16 Email Prince to Bannon 1007 Flynn 11120 17 302 at 6 Flynn Ill 1118 302 at 5 Flynn 1 24 18 302 at 5-6 Flynn 5 1 18 302 at 11 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 5 8 Bannon 2114 18 302 at 20-21 11 12 16 Email Prince to Corallo 1008 Prince 4 4118 302 at 5 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 21 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 5-6 lOll Investigative Technique 10 12 Investigative Technique Investigative Technique 1014 Investigative Technique 10 15 Investigative Technique 149 U S Department of Justice At t arAe y· Wark Pradttet II M y CatttttiH Material Prateetea Uttaer Fed R Grim P 6 e Later that morning Dmitriev contacted Nader who was in New York to request a meeting with the key people in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the g reat results 1016 He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that we want to start rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them We understand all of the sensitivities and are not in a rush 1017 Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed N ader introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign 10 18 Dmitriev also told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States where he would be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for reconciliation between the United States and Russia 101 9 Later that day Dmitriev flew to New York where Peskov was separately traveling to attend the chess tournament 1020 Dmitriev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and noted that if there was a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp he would love to start building for the future 1021 Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he Dmitriev could meet him 1022 Nader did not pass along Dmitriev's invitation to anyone connected with the incoming Administration 1023 Although one World Chess Federation official recalled hearing from an attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament the investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended the event 1024 And the President's written answers denied that he had 1025 Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition officials and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr 1026 Dmitriev told Nader that - - 10 16 1119 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 9 34a m Nader 1 22 18 302 at 4 1017 1119 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 11 58 p m 1018 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 3 1019 11 9 16 Text Mess Nader 10 10 a m 10 06 a m 11 9 1 6 Text Message Dmitriev to 1020 11 9 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 1 0 08 a m 11 9 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 3 40p m Nader 1 22 18 302 at 5 102 1 11 9 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 7 10p m 1022 11 1 0 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 5 20a m 1023 Nader 1122 18 302 at 5-6 1024 Marinello 5 31 18 302 at 2-3 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 5-6 1025 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 17-18 Response to Question V 1026 Nader 1122 18 302 at 6 1027 Nader 1122 18 302 at 6 Part a 150 U S Department of Justice Atterftey Vlerk Pt'eth iet II Ma · Cefttaift Material Preteetee UHeet' Fee R Grim P 6 e ev was very and told Nader that he would try other routes to do so besides Nader himself Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev' s post-election trip to New York 103 1 In early December 2016 Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming Administration officials with Nader in January or February 1032 Dmitriev sent Nader a list of publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump in case they were helpful 1033 c Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles i George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings with Erik Prince ·on January 3 2017 1034 Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev 1035 Nader informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link w ith the incoming Trump Administration 1036 he told Prince that Dmitriev had been Nader to mutual concern 1038 that he needed to After his dinner w ith Prince Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met with some key people within the family and inner circle -a reference to Prince-and that he had spoken at length and positively about 1028 1029 1030 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 6 1031 Nader 1122 18 302 at 5-7 1032 12 8116 Text Messages Dmitriev to Nader 12 10 31 a m Nader 1 22 18 302 at 11 1033 12 8 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 12 10 3 1 a m 12 8 1 6 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 12 10 57 a m 1034 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 8 151 U S Department of Justice AUerttey Werk Preattet II May Cetttaitt Material Preteetea Uttaer Fea R Crin t P 6 e Dmitriev 1040 Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio and Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it 1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two files concerning Dmitriev one was a two-page biography and the other was a list ofDmitriev's positive quotes about Donald Trump 1042 The next morning Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him to Prince 1043 Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions to be used with some additional details for them with them referring to members of the incoming Administration 1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving them 1045 Prince stated that while he was at Trump Tower that day he spoke with Kellyanne Conway Wilbur Ross Steve Mnuchin and others while waiting to see Bannon 1046 Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for approximately three hours 1047 Prince said that he could not recall whether · those three 1048 he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7 201 7 1050 The following day Nader wrote to Dmitriev that he had a pleasant surprise for him namely that he had arranged for Dmitriev to meet a Special Guest from the New Team referring to Prince 1051 Nader asked Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12 2017 and Dmitriev agreed 1052 The following day urance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting would be worthwhile 1053 - D m i t r i e v was not enthusiastic about the idea of meeting with Prince and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming 1040 1 4 17 Text Message Nader to Pri 5 26a m Nader 1 22 18 302 at 8-9 104 1 1 4 17 Text Messages Nader Dmitriev 7 24 27 a m 1042 1 4 1 7 Text Messages Dmitriev to Nader 7 25-7 29 a m 1043 1 4 17 Text Messages Nader to Prince 1044 1 4 17 Text Messages Nader to Prince 1045 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 1-3 1046 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 2-3 1047 Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone Investigative Technique 1048 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 3 1049 1050 115 17 Email Kasbo to Prince 1051 118 17 T ext Messages Nader to Dmitriev 6 05 - 6 10p m 1052 1 8117 T ext Messages Nader Dmitriev 6 10 -7 27 p m 1053 1 9 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 152 U S Department of Justice AUerHe · Werk Prec lttet II Mey CeHt iH Meteriel Preteetec l UHaer Feet R Grim P 6 e Administration 1054 Nader wrote to Dmitriev This guy Prince is designated by Steve Bannon to meet you I know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team His sister is now a Minister of Education 1055 According to Nader Prince had led him to believe that Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev and Prince acknowledged that it was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team 1056 Bannon however told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting with Dmitriev 1057 ii The Seychelles Meetings Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11 2017 and checked into the Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying 1058 Prince arrived that same day 1059 Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa with Nader present 1060 The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes 1061 years on terms that he was looking forward to a 1063 new era of cooperation and conflict resolution According to Prince he told Dmitriev that Bannon was effective if not conventional and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon 1064 1054 1055 119 17 Text Message Nader to Dmitriev 2 12 56 p m Nader 1 19 18 302 at 13 1056 Nader 1119 18 302 at 13 1057 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 25-26 5 3 18 302 at 3 1058 1 10 17 Text Messages Dmitriev Nader 2 05 54- 3 30 25 p m 1 1 1 17 Text Messages Dmitriev Nader 2 16 16 - 5 17 59 p m 1059 1060 1 7 17 Email Kasbo to Prince 1 11117 Text Messages Nader Dmitriev 5 18 24 - 5 37 14 p m 1062 1063 1064 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 4 1065 153 U S Department of Justice Att6rney V Z6rlt Pr66ttet II May C6ntain Material Pr6teetea UAaer Fed R Grim P 6 e Afterwards Prince returned to his room where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier had sailed to Libya which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with Dmitriev 1073 According to Nader Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was off the table 1074 Nader wrote to Dmitriev that Prince had received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately and arranged for himself Dmitriev and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons propetty I075 At the second meeting Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not Russian involvement in because it would make the situation there much worse 1076 1066 1067 1068 1069 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 4-5 1070 1072 1073 Prince 4 4 18 302 at I 0 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 4 1074 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 14 wasm for the transition but based on his experience as a former naval officer 154 U S Department of Justice Alteme · Wet·k Pretlttet II Ma y Cel' taiH Material Preteetetl Ul' tler ret R Criffi P 6 e 1077 After the brief second meeting concluded Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had transpired 1078 Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two reasons first he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had 1079 Second he had hoped to have a discussion of greater substance such as o roadmap for both countries to follow 1080 Dmitriev told Nader that Prince's comments1081 Hours after the second meeting Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the Seychelles 1082 As described further below investigators were unable to obtain the content of these or other messages between Prince and Bannon and the investigation also did not identify evidence of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles iii Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip After the Seychelles meetings Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his discussion with Dmitriev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration 1083 On January 12 2017 Prince contacted Bannon 's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week 1084 Several days later Prince messaged her again asking about Bannon's schedule 1085 Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon 's home after returning to the United States in mid-January and briefed him about several topics including his meeting with Dmitriev 1086 Prince told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia 1087 Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot ofDmitriev's Wikipedia page dated January 16 2017 - 1079 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 9 15 1080 Nader 1 22 18 302 at 15 1081 1083 Prince 4 4 18 302 at I 0 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 4 1084 1112 17 Text Messages Prince to Preate 1085 1 15 17 Text Message Prince to Preate 1086 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 11 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 1087 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 11 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 155 U S Department of Justice AM erHe · Werk Pt etlt tet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHEiet FeEl R Grift' P 6 e and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon 1088 Prince also believed he provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information 1089 According to Prince Bannon instructed Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a priority for Bannon 1090 Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry just relatively uninterested 1091 Bannon by contrast told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding Dmitriev RDIF or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin 1092 Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting Bannon would have remembered it and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place 1093 The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently clarified by reviewing their communications because neither one was able to produce any of the messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting Prince's phone contained no text messages prior to March 2017 though provider records indicate that he and Bannon exchanged dozens of messages 1094 Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017 1095 Bannon's devices similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period and Bannon also stated he did not know why messages did not appear on his device 1096 Bannon told the Office that during both the months before and after the Seychelles meeting he regularly used his personal Blackberry and personal email for work-related communications including those with Prince and he took no steps to preserve these work communications 1097 d Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U S Russia Relations Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by Nader In approximately late November 2016 the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to Rick Gerson a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York 1098 Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump 1088 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 1 16 17 Image on Prince Phone on file with the Office 1089 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 1090 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 109 1 Prince 5 3 18 302 at 5 1092 Bannon 10 26 18 302 at 10-11 1093 Bannon 10 26 18 302 at 10-11 1094 Call Records of Erik Prince 1095 Prince 4 4 18 302 at 6 1096 Bannon 10 26 18 302 at 11 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 36 1097 Bannon 10 26 18 302 at 11 1098 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 1 3 11 26 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 1 25 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 156 U S Department of Justice AUorHey Work Proettet May CoHtaiH Material Proteetetl UHaer Feel R Crifl'l P 6 e Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner 1099 After the election Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed 1100 When Dmitriev and Gerson met they principally discussed potential joint ventures between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF 1101 Dmitriev was interested in improved economic cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in the incoming Administration who would be helpful towards this goal 1102 Gerson replied that he would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions but noted that confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the new Administration took power and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the Senate 1103 Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the key person or people were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia joint security concerns and economic matters 1104 Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia He noted in a text message to Gerson that if Russia was approached with respect and willingness to understand our position we can have Major Breakthroughs quickly 1105 Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016 about what such a reconciliation plan would include 1106 Gerson told the Office that the Transition Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev and that he did so on his own initiative and as a private citizen 1107 On January 9 2017 the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be worthwhile Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could share it with Jared or somebody else very senior in the team - so that they know that we are focused from our side on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that 1108 Dmitriev also asked Gerson if he knew Prince and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time 1099 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 1 1100 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 1-2 Kushner 4 11118 302 at 21 1101 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 3-4 see e g 12 2 16 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson 12 14 16 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson 1 3117 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev 12 2 16 Email Tolokonnikov to Gerson 1102 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 3 12 14 16 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 1103 12 14 16 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev 1104 12 14 16 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev 1105 12 14 16 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 1 1106 12114 1 6 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson 1107 Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 1 1108 1 9 17 Text Messages Dmitriev to Gerson 1 9 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 157 U S Department of Justice MterHey Werk Preeh tet II May C mtttiH Mttterittl Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R Cfim P 6 e with 1109 After his trip to the Seychelles Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting 1110 On January 16 2017 Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U S -Russia reconciliation that he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points 1 jointly fighting terrorism 2 jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts 3 developing win-win economic and investment initiatives 4 maintaining an honest open and continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement and 5 ensuring proper communication and trust by key people from each country 1111 On January 18 2017 Gerson gave a copy of the document to Kushner 1112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time 1113 Gerson explained that Dmitriev was the head of ROlF and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev's being well connected 11 14 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right people 1115 Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex Tillerson according to Kushner neither of them followed up with Kushner about it 1116 On January 19 2017 Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two-page document telling him that this was a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our friends Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from 1117 Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering it 1118 On January 26 2017 Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his boss -an apparent reference to Putin-was asking ifthere had been any feedback on the proposal 1119 Dmitriev said w e do not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed At the same time my boss asked me to try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible 1120 He informed Gerson that Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday and noted that that information was very confidential 1121 The same day Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his boss again yesterday who had emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication 110 9 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 4 1 llo 1 18 17 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson 11 1 1 1I 16 1 7 Text Messages Dmitriev Gerson 1112 Gerson 6 5118 302 at 3 Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 2 1113 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 3 1114 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 3 Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 1-2 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 22 1115 Gerson 6 5 18 302 at 3 111 6 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 32 111 7 1 19 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 11 11 56 a m 1118 1 18 17 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 2 19 1 26 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 1120 1 26 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 112 1 1126 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson ll 158 U S Department ofJustice AUerrtey Werle Pretlttet II May CerttaiH Material Preteetetl Urttler Feel R Crilfl P 6 e channel to avoid bureaucracy 1122 On January 28 20 17 Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I sent you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST 1123 an apparent reference to the call scheduled between President Trump and Putin Nader replied Definitely paper was so submitted to Team by Rick and me They took it seriously 1124 After the call between President Trump and Putin occurred Dmitriev wrote to Nader that the call went very well My boss wants me to continue making some public statements that us sic Russia cooperation is good and important 1125 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well and Dmitriev replied that the document they had drafted together played an important role 1126 Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately March 20 17 when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of progressing 1127 3 Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn m Trump Tower Following the Election On November 16 2016 Catherine Vargas an executive assistant to Kushner received a request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak 1128 That same day Vargas sent Kushner an email with the subject MISSED CALL Russian Ambassador to the US Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak 1129 The text of the email read RE setting up a time to meet w you on 12 1 LMK how to proceed Kushner responded in relevant part I think I do this one --confirm with Dimitri Simes of CNI that this is the right guy 1130 After reaching out to a colleague of Simes at CNI Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was the best go-to guy for routine matters in the US while Yuri Ushakov a Russian foreign policy advisor was the contact for more direct substantial matters 1131 Bob Foresman the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia see Volume I Section IV A l d ii supra may have provided similar information to the Transition Team According to 1122 1 26 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 1 0 04 41 p m 1123 1 28 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 11 05 39 a m 1124 1 28 17 Text Message Nader to Dmitriev 11 11 33 a m 1125 1 29 17 Text Message Dmitriev to Nader 11 06 35 a m 1126 1 28 17 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev 1129117 Text Message Dmitriev to Gerson 11 27 Gerson 6 15 18 302 at 4 3 21117 Text Message Gerson to Dmitriev 11 28 Statement ofJared C Kushner to Congressional Committees Kushner Stmt at 6 7 24 17 written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee 1129 NOSC00004356 1 1 16 16 Email Vargas to Kushner 6 44p m 11 30 NOSC00004356 11 16 16 Email Kushner to Vargas 9 54p m 1131 11 17 16 Email Brown to Simes 10 41 a m Brown 10 13 17 302 at 4 11 17 16 Email Vargas to Kushner 12 31 18 159 A erHe · U S Department of Justice Werle Preclttet M · Ce Htait'i Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R Grim P 6 e Foresman at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and his designated deputy K T McFarland in New York Flynn asked Foresman for his thoughts on Kislyak Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that while Kislyak was an important person Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin 1132 Foresman subsequently traveled to Moscow inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin and heard back from that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U S national security advisor 1133 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do so 1134 Email correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward 1135 but Flynn has no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting 1136 The investigation did not identify evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov after being given his name 1137 In the meantime although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not necessarily the right point of contact 1138 Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had requested on November 16 It took place at Trump Tower on November 30 2016 1139 At Kushner's invitation Flynn also attended Bannon was invited but did not attend 1140 During the meeting which lasted approximately 30 minutes Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the incoming Administration to start afresh with U S -Russian relations 1141 Kushner also asked Kislyak to identify the best person whether Kislyak or someone else with whom to direct future discussions-someone who had contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him 1142 The three men also discussed U S policy toward Syria and Kislyak fl oated the idea of having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications line 1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices 1132 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 17 1133 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 17-18 ll 34 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 18 1135 RMF-SC0-00000015 115 17 Email Foresman to Atencio Flaherty RMF-SC0-00000015 1 5117 Email Flaherty to Foresman Atencio 11 36 9 26 18 Attorney Proffer from Covington Burling LLP reflected in email on fil e with the 11 37 Vargas 4 4 18 302 at 5 1138 Kushner 11 1 17 302 at 4 1139 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_000001 6-019 11129 16 Email Vargas to Kuznetsov Office 114 ° Flynn 1111118 302 at 2 NOS00004240 Calendar Invite Vargas to Kushner Flynn 114 1 Kushner Strut at 6 1142 Kushner Stmt at 6 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 18 1143 Kushner Stmt at 7 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 18 Flynn 1 11118 302 at 2 160 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet II M y CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHeer Fee R Crim P 6 e Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate usmg secure facilities at the Russian Embassy 1144 Kislyak quickly rejected that idea 1145 4 Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov On December 6 2016 the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner 1146 Kushner declined several proposed meeting dates but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second meeting 11 47 Kushner told the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia so he arranged to have one of his assistants A vi Berkowitz meet with Kislyak in his stead 1148 Although embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it important to continue the conversation with Mr Kushner in person 1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet -instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12 2016 at Trump Tower 1150 The meeting lasted only a few minutes during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet someone who had a direct line to Putin Sergey Gorkov the head of the Russian-governmentowned bank Vnesheconombank VEB Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov 11 51 The one-on-one meeting took place the next day December 13 2016 at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan where Kushner had previously scheduled meetings 1152 VEB was and is the subject of Department of Treasury economic sanctions imposed in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea 1153 Kushner did not however recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions more generally 11 54 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for 1144 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 18 1145 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 18 1146 Kushner Stmt at 7 NOSC00000123 12 6 16 Email Vargas to Kushner 12 11 40 p m 1147 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 19 NOSC00000130 12 12 16 Email Kushner to Vargas 10 41 1148 at 19 Kushner Stmt at 7 DJTFP_SC0_01442290 12 6 16 Email p m Berkowitz to 11 49 DJTFP_SC0_01442290 12 7 16 Em to Berkowitz 12 31 39 p m 1150 Berkowitz 1 1 2 18 302 at 7 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000 1-04 12 1 2 16 Text Messages Berkowitz 202-70 1-8532 1151 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 19 NOSC00000130-135 12 12 16 Email Kushner to Berkowitz 1152 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 19 NOSCOOOOO 130-135 12 12 16 Email Kushner to Berkowitz 1153 Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy Sectors of Russia Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities and those Undermining Ukraine's Sovereignty United States Department ofthe Treasury Jul 16 2014 1154 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 20 161 U S Department of Justice AfffirRe ' Werk Preettet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UReer Fee R Criffl P 6 e the meeting and that no one on the Transition Team even did a Google search for Gorkov' s name 1155 At the start of the meeting Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts a painting and a bag of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner' s family originated 1156 The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic or business in nature Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic with Gorkov expressing disappointment with U S -Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for improved relations with the incoming Administration 1157 According to Kushner although Gorkov told Kushner a little bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy the two did not discuss Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind 1158 At the time of the meeting Kushner Companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at 666 Fifth Avenue and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his company's borrowing from foreign Jenders 1159 In contrast in a 2017 public statement VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in Kushner' s capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the purpose of discussing business rather than as part of a diplomatic effort In particular VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with Kushner as part of a series of road show meetings with representatives of major US banks and business circles which included negotiations and discussion of the most promising business lines and sectors 1160 Foresman the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume I Sections IV A l and IV B 3 supra told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deputy chairman Nikolay Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner 1161 According to Foresman Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were traveling to New York to discuss postelection issues with U S financial institutions that their trip was sanctioned by Putin and that they would be reporting back to Putin upon their return 1162 11 55 Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 19 Berkowitz by contrast stated to the Office that he had googled Gorkov's name and told Kushner that Gorkov appeared to be a banker Berkowitz 1 12 18 302 at 8 11 56 Kushner4111 18 302 at 19-20 1157 Kushner Stmt at 8 1158 Kushner Stmt at 8 1159 See e g Peter Grant Donald Trump Son-in-Law Jared Kushner Could Face His Own Conflictof-Interest Questions Wall Street Journal Nov 29 2016 1160 Patrick Reevell Matthew Mosk Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes of Questions About Meeting with Jared Kushner ABC News June 1 20 17 11 61 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 14-15 1162 Foresman 10 17 18 302 at 15-16 162 U S Department of Justice At tarAey Wark PraeltJet II Mtty Cantain Material Prateeteel Uneler Feel R CrifH P 6 e The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature as Kushner stated focused on business as VEB's public statement indicated or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters Regardless the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting Rather a few days after the meeting Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant Hi please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response 11 63 Over the following weeks the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts 1164 On February 8 2017 Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant Berkowitz to try to set up another meeting and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed 1165 According to Berkowitz he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russ ia investigation and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request 1166 5 Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team In December 2016 weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I Section IV B l b supra Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate all-hands oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen 1167 As in Aven's one-on-one meeting a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U S economic sanctions 1168 After the December 2016 all-hands meeting A ven tried to establish a connection to the Trump team Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump Administration Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne L l another company headed by Aven and had done work for Alfa-Bank 1169 Burt had previously served as U S ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and L1 was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries 1170 While at a L 1 board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016 Aven pulled Burt aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed 1163 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_OOOOOll 12 19 16 Text Message Ivanchenko to Berkowitz 9 56a m 1164 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000011-15 12 19 16- 2116117 Text Messages Ivanchenko Berkowitz 11 65 AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_000001 5 2 8 17 Text Message Ivanchenko to Berkowitz 10 41 a m 1166 Berkowitz 3 22 18 302 at 4-5 1168 1169 11 70 Aven 8 2 18 302 at 6 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 2 163 U S Department of Justice At t 6t'rtey ' lt6rk Pf6Eittet II May C6rttaift Material Pr6teeteEi UttEier FeEi R Cl'iffl P 6 e interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition Team 1171 Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team 1172 Although Burt had been responsible for helping A ven build connections in the past Burt viewed A ven' s request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with A ven 1173 Burt who is a member of the board of CNI discussed at Volume I Section IV A 4 supra 1174 decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner 1175 At the time Simes was lobbying the Trump Transition Team on Burt's behalf to appoint Burt U S ambassador to Russia 1176 Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming Administration 1177 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the U S presidential election 1178 According to Simes he understood that Burt was seeking a secret channel and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian government and the incoming Administration 1179 Based on what Simes had read in the media he stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by Russia and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement in facilitating any connection 1180 In an email dated December 22 2016 Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with Simes Through a trusted third party I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned in Luxembourg concerning Project A There is an interest and an understanding for the need to establish such a channel But the individual emphasized that at this moment with so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking and who ordered what Project A was too explosive to discuss The individual agreed to discuss it again after the New Year I trust the individual's instincts on this 1173 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 4 1174 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 5 1175 Butt 2 9 18 302 at 3 1176 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3 1177 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 4 1178 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 4 1179 Simes 3 27 18 302 at 5 11 80 Simes 3 27118 302 at 5 164 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk PFoclttet II Mtty Co At iH Material Preteetecl U Acler Fecl R Grim P 6 e If this is unclear or you would like to discuss don't hesitate to cal1 118 1 According to Burt the very influential person referenced in his email was Simes and the reference to a trusted third party was a fabrication as no such third party existed Project A was a term that Burt created for Aven 's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U S presidential election 1182 According to Burt his report that there was interest in a communications channel reflected Simes' s views not necessarily those of the Transition Team and in any event Burt acknowledged that he added some hype to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed 1183 Aven replied to Burt' s email on the same day saying Thank you All clear 1184 According to Aven this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue 11 85 Burt spoke to A ven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the hat the current environment made it impossible 1186 - Burt did not recall discussing A ven' s request w he recall speaking to anyone else about the request 1187 In the first quarter of 2017 Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials 1188 At that meeting Putin asked about Aven's to build relations with the T 1189 and A ven recounted his lack of success 11 90 Putin continued to inquire s Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings 1191 A ven also told Putin' s chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI 1192 A s part of that conversation he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration 11 93 1181 12 22 16 Email Burt to Aven 7 23p m 11 82 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3 1183 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3-4 1184 12 22 16 Email Aven to Burt 4 58 22 p m 1185 Aven 8 2 18 302 at7 1186 11 87 Burt 2 9 18 302 at 3-4 11 88 1189 1190 11 9 1 1192 Aven 8 2 18 302 at 8 1193 Aven 8 2 18 302 at 8 165 U S Department of Justice AtterH ey Werk Preattet II Ma y CeAta ifl Material Preteetee UAeer Pee R Critfl P 6 e According to A ven the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care 1194 6 Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich In December 2016 more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter visited Moscow in an to business rtunities 119S M matort' s in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump In a December 8 2016 email intended for Manafort Kilirnnik wrote Carter Page is in Moscow today sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf ofDT on a range of issues of mutual interest including Ukraine 1197 On December 9 2016 Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic 1198 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page 11 99 Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump 's election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia 1200 Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to a discussion of future on 1201 1194 A ven 8 2 18 302 at 8 1195 Page 3 10 17 302 at 4 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 ons other meetings Page contacted Andrey Baranov head of investor the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin 1197 Investigative Technique 1198 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 Page 3 30 17 302 at 8 1199 Weber 7 28 17 302 at 4 Page 3 16 1 7 302 at 3 1200 Page 3 16 17 302 at 3 1202 1203 166 A rHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet II May CeHtaiH Msterisl Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e 7 Contacts With and Through Michael T Flynn Incoming National Security Advisor Michael F lynn was the Transition Team 's primary conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive matters during the transition period a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian government's reaction to the United States's imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in the 2016 election 1207 Despite Kushner's conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside the Russian government the Transition Team turned to Flynn 's relationship with Kislyak on both issues As to the sanctions Flynn spoke by phone to K T McFarland his incoming deputy to prepare for his call to Kislyak McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time Although transition officials at Mara-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions the investigation did not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak Flynn asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U S sanctions imposed on December 29 2016 and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request a United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements On December 21 2016 Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory 1208 The Security Council which includes Russia was scheduled to vote on the resolution the following day 1209 There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the resolution 1210 1204 1205 1206 1207 As discussed further in Volume I Section V C 4 infra Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U S C § 1001 about these communications with Ambassador Kislyak Plea Agreement United States v Michael T Flynn No 1 17-cr-232 D D C Dec 1 2017 Doc 3 Flynn's plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office and the statements from Flynn in this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 20 17 and 20 18 1208 Settle ents Karen DeYoung How the U S Came to Abstain on a UN Resolution Condemning Israeli Washington Post Dec 28 2016 1209 Karen DeYoung How the U S Came to Abstain on a UN Resolution Condemning Israeli Settlements Washington Post Dec 28 2016 1210 Michelle Nichols Lesley Wroughton U S Intended to Allow Passage of UN Draft Critical ofIsrael Reuters Dec 21 20 16 167 At t eme · U S Department of Justice Werl Preattet II Mey CeAt iH Meteriel Preteetea UHc ler Fea R Criffi P 6 e According to Flynn the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution 1211 On December 22 2016 multiple members of the Transition Team as well as President-Elect Trump communicated with foreign government officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat the resolution 1212 Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team Flynn was responsible for the Russian government 1213 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December 22 Flynn called Kislyak 1214 According to Flynn he informed Kislyak about the vote and the Transition Team's opposition to the resolution and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution 1215 Later that day President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi about the vote 1216 Ultimately Egypt postponed the vote 1217 On December 23 2016 Malaysia New Zealand Senegal and Venezuela resubmitted the resolution 121 8 Throughout the day members of the Transition Team continued to talk with foreign leaders about the resolution with Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian government through Kislyak 12 19 When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak Kislyak informed Flynn that if the resolution came to a vote Russia would not vote against it 1220 The resolution later passed 14-0 with the United States abstaining 1221 b U S Sanctions Against Russia Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election On December 28 2016 then-President Obama signed Executive Order 13757 which took effect at 12 01 a m the following day and 12 11 Flynn 11 16117 302 at 12 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 2 1212 Flynn 11116 17 302 at 12-14 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 2 1213 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 12-14 Flynn 11 17 17 3 Email Kushner to Flynn 12 22 16 Email McFarland to 12 14 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 13 Call Records of Michael T Flynn Statement of Offense 3 d United States v Michael T Flynn No 1 17-cr-232 D D C Dec 1 20 17 Doc 4 Flynn Statement of Offense Flynn 11 I 16 17 302 at 12-13 121 5 1216 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 2 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 13 1217 U N Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed Potentially Indefinitely Reuters Dec 22 2016 1218 Somini Sengupta Rick Gladstone Rebuffing Israel U S Allows Censure Over Settlements New York Times Dec 23 2016 12 19 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 12-14 Kushner 11 1 17 302 at 3 12 23 16 Email F lynn to Kushner et al °Flynn Statement of Offense 3 g 122 1221 Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law Security Council Reaffirms 7853rd Meeting PM United Nations Security Council Dec 23 20 16 168 U S Department of Justice M6rHey 'N6fk PF6elttet II Ma y C6HtfliH Material Pf6teeteel UHeler Feel R CFim P 6Ee imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities 1222 On December 29 2016 the Obama Administration also expelled 35 Russian government officials and closed two Russian government-owned compounds in the United States 1223 During the rollout of the sanctions President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team senior officials including McFarland Steve Bannon and Reince Priebus were staying at the Mara-Lago club in Palm Beach Florida Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic 1224 but was in daily contact with McFarland 1225 The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions would harm the United States's relationship with Russia 1226 Although the details and timing of sanctions were unknown on December 28 2016 the media began reporting that retaliatory measures from the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming 1227 When asked about imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 20 16 presidential election President-Elect Trump told the media I think we ought to get on with our lives 1228 Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team On the evening of December 28 2016 Kislyak texted Flynn can you kindly call me back at your convenience 1229 Flynn did not respond to the text message that evening Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn the next morning at 10 38 a m but they did not talk 1230 The sanctions were announced publicly on December 29 2016 1231 At 1 53 p m that day McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration 1232 At 2 07p m a Transition Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions 1233 At 2 29 1222 Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-EnabledActivities The White House Office ofthe Press Secretary Dec 29 2016 1223 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment The White House Office ofthe Press Secretary Dec 29 2016 1224 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 14 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at3-8 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 5 1225 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 5 Flynn 1119 18 302 at 1 McFarland 11 22 17 302 at 3-9 1226 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 3 1227 Christine Wang US to announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election hacking CNBC Dec 28 2016 1228 John Wagner Trump on alleged election interference by Russia Get on with our lives Washington Post Dec 29 2016 1229 SF000006 12 28 16 Text Message Kislyak to Flynn °Call Records of Michael T Flynn 123 123 1 Flynn 11117 17 302 at 2-3 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 4-5 1232 12 29 16 Email McFarland to O' Brien eta 12 29 16 Email McFarland to Flynn et al 1233 SFOOOOO 1 12 29 16 Text Message Flaherty to Flynn 169 Atter ey U S Department of Justice ' Veflt Preettet II Ma · Ce taiH Material Preteetee U eer Fee R Criffi P 6 e p m McFarland called Flynn but they did not talk 1234 Shortly thereafter McFarland and Bannon discussed the sanctions 1235 According to McFarland Bannon remarked that the sanctions would hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia and that Russian escalation would make things more difficult 1236 McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak later that night 1237 McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night 1238 At 3 14p m Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland Time for a call 1239 The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert a Transition Team senior official to which Flynn responded Tit for tat w Russia not good Russian AMBO reaching out to me today 1240 Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago 1241 He first spoke with Michael Ledeen 1242 a Transition Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters for 20 minutes 1243 Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what if anything to communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions 1244 On that call McFarland and Flynn discussed the sanctions including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration's foreign policy goals 1245 McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation 1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand 1247 1234 Call Records ofK T McFarland 1235 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 5-6 1236 McFarland 12 22 1 7 302 at 5-6 1237 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6 1238 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6 1239 SF000001 12 29 16 Text Message Flynn to Flaherty 1240 SF000001 12 29 16 Text Message Flynn to Flaherty 124 1 Flynn 11 20 17 302 at 3 1242 Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Ledeen the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate Hillary Clinton's missing emails are described in Volume I Section III D 2 supra 1243 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 3 Call Records of Michael'-' ' ' at 3-4 Flynn Statement of Offense Call Records of Michael T Flynn 1245 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 3-4 1246 Flynn 11 17117 302 at 3-4 Flynn Statement of Offense 3 c McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6- 1247 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 4 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6-7 7 170 A entey U S Department of Justice Werlt Preclttet II Mtty Centairt Material Preteetecl Uncler Fecl R Critfl P 6 e Immediately after speaking with McFarland Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak 1248 Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak including the sanctions scheduling a video teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin an upcoming terrorism conference and Russia' s views about the Middle East 1249 With respect to the sanctions Flynn requested that Russia not escalate the situation not get into a tit for tat and only respond to the sanctions in a reciprocal manner 1250 Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that day In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus at 4 43 p m McFarland sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions informing the group that Gen F lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening 1251 Less than an hour later McFarland briefed President-Elect Trump Bannon Priebus Sean Spicer and other Transition Team members were present 1252 During the briefing President-Elect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did it meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election 1253 McFarland said yes and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians 1254 McFarland also discussed potential Russ ian responses to the sanctions and said Russia's response would be an indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward 1255 President-Elect Trump opined that the sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians 1256 McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening 1257 After the briefing Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone 1258 Flynn reported on the substance of his call with Kislyak including their discussion of the sanctions 1259 According to McFarland Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration 1260 McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump 1261 1248 Flynn Statement of Offense 3 d 124 9 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 3-4 Flynn Statement of Offense 3 c 12 30 16 Email Flynn to McFarland 125 °Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 1 Flynn Statement of Offense 3 d 125 1 12 29 16 Email McFarland to Flynn et a 1252 12 29 16 Email Westerhout to Flaherty McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 1253 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 1254 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 1255 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 1256 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 1257 McFarland 12 22 1 7 302 at 7 1258 McFarland 12 22 1 7 302 at 7 1259 Flynn 11 1 7 17 302 at 4 Flynn Statement of Offense 1 3 e 1260 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 8 126 1 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 8 171 U S Department of Justice Att erHe · Werk Preettet Mtt ' Cet tttiH M tferittl Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e The next day December 30 2016 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions 1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions at that time 1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted Great move on delay by V Putin 1264 Shortly thereafter Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with Kislyak from the day before which she emailed to Kushner Bannon Priebus and other Transition Team members 1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics discussed with Kislyak 1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's foreign policy 1267 On December 31 2016 Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the request 1268 Two hours later Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with Kislyak 1269 According to McFarland Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better relationship and that the relationship was back on track 127 Flynn also told McFarland that he believed his phone call had made a difference 1271 McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in response 1272 Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions 1273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak 1274 Bannon ° 1262 Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of Russian diplomats Moscow December 20 2016 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Dec 30 2016 5 32a m 1263 Statement of the President of the Russian Federation Kremlin Office of the President Dec 30 2016 7 15a m 1264 @realDonaldTrump 12 30 16 11 41 a m Tweet 1265 12 30 16 Email Flynn to McFarland 12 30 16 Email McFarland to Kushner eta 1266 12 30 16 Email McFarland to Kushner eta 1267 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 4 1268 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 1 1269 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 5 Call Records ofMichael T Flynn Flynn 1119 17 302 at 3 Flynn Statement of '-'U· ' ' Call Records of Michael T Flynn Flynn 1 19 17 302 at 3 McFarland 12 22 17 1270 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 10 1271 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 10 1272 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 10 1273 Flynn 11 17117 302 t 5-6 1274 Flynn 11121117 302 at 1 Flynn 11 20 17 302 at 3 Flynn 1119 17 302 at 5 Flynn Statement of Offense 3 h 172 U S Department of Justice A1 terney Werle PreEh tet II Ma · Centain Material Preteetea Unaer FeEl R Criffi P 6 e for his part recalled meeting with Flynn that day but said that he did not remember discussing sanctions with him 1275 Additional information about Flynn's sanctions-related discussions with Kislyak and the handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration is provided in Volume II ofthis report In sum the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and individuals tied to the Russian government Those links included Russian offers of assistance to the Campaign In some instances the Campaign was receptive to the offer while in other instances the Campaign officials shied away Ultimately the investigation did not establish that the Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interference activities 1275 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 9 173 U S Department of Justice AtterAey ' Vefk Preettet II MB ' CeH t iiH MftteriBI Preteetee UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e V P ROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office to prosecute federal crimes arising from its investigation of the matters assigned to it In deciding whether to exercise this prosecutorial authority the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal Prosecution set forth in the Justice formerly U S Attorney's Manual In particular the Office has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be suffic ient to obtain and sustain a conviction for such an offense Justice Manual § 9-27 220 2018 Where the answer to those questions was yes the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction and there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution Id As explained below those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of Russian nationals for their roles in · the active-measures social media and s1m contacts hPt• XIPI• n either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or in the case of campaign-finance offenses that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction At the same time the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations A Russian Active Measures Social Media Campaign On February 16 2018 a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including the Internet Research Agency IRA and Concord Management and Consulting LLC Concord - with violating U S criminal laws in order to interfere with U S elections and political processes 1276 The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States Count One three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud Count Two and five defendants with aggravated identity theft Counts Three through Eight Internet Research Agency Indictment Concord which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy entered an appearance through U S counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15 2018 the district court denied Concord's motions to dismiss United States v Concord Management Consulting LLC 347 F Supp 3d 38 D D C 2018 United States v Concord Management Consulting LLC 317 F Supp 3d 598 D D C 20 18 As of this writing the prosecution of Concord remains ongoing before the U S District Court for the District of Columbia The other defendants remain at large 1276 A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment 174 U S Department of Justice Al terttey Werk Pretittet II May Cetttaitt Material Preteeteti Utttier Fee R Criffi P 6 e Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U S person with participating in the conspiracy That is because the investigation did not identify evidence that any U S person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy The Office therefore determined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States Count One or in the separate count alleging a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Russian nationals Count Two The Office did however charge one U S national for his role in supplying false or stolen bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U S online payment systems by circumventing those systems' security features On February 12 2018 Richard Pinedo pleaded guilty pursuant to a single-count information to identity fraud in violation of 18 U S C § 1028 a 7 and b l D Plea Agreement United States v Richard Pinedo No 1 18-cr-24 D D C Feb 12 20 18 Doc 10 The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him Pinedo' s sales of account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through which they transacted with U S persons and companies See Gov't Sent Mem at 3 United States v Richard Pinedo No 1 I8-cr-24 D D C Sept 26 20 18 Doc 24 On October I 0 2018 Pinedo was sentenced to six months of imprisonment to be followed by six months of home confinement and was ordered to complete I 00 hours of community service B Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations 1 Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy a Background On July 13 2018 a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various U S computers used by the Clinton Campaign DNC DCCC and other U S persons in violation of 18 U S C §§ 1030 and 371 Count One committing identity theft and conspiring to commit money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy in violation of 18 U S C §§ 1028A and 1956 h Counts Two through Ten and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of U S persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U S election in violation of I8 U S C §§ 1030 and 371 Count E leven Netyksho Indictment 1277 As ofthis writing al I2 defendants remain at large The Netyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and w ith others to hack into the computers ofU S persons and entities involved in the 2016 U S presidential election steal documents from those computers and stage releases of the stolen documents to interfere in the election Netyksho Indictment 2 The indictment also describes how in staging 1277 The Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in meetings with the Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment 175 U S Department of Justice AtterHe · Werk Pretittet II Ma y CeAta iH Ma teria l Preteeteti UAtier Fea R Grim P 6 e the releases the defendants used the Guccifer 2 0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks On July 22 2016 WikiLeaks released over 20 000 emails and other documents that the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC Netyksho Indictment 48 In addition on October 7 2016 WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had sto len from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation Netyksho Indictment 49 b Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter 1278 The Office also considered but ruled out charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act NSPA 18 U S C §§ 2314 and 23 15 The statutes comprising the NSPA cover goods wares or merchandise and lower colllts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v United States 473 U S 207 1985 See United States v Yijia Zhang 995 F S upp 2d 340 344-48 E D Pa 2014 collecting cases One of those post-Dowling decisions- United States v Brown 925 F 2d 1301 lOth Cir 1991 -specifically held that the NSPA does not reach a computer program in source code form even though that code was stored in tangible items i e a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook d at 1302-03 Congress in turn cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U S C § 1030 a 2 that would ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items is protected S Rep 104-357 at 7 1996 That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form which are the relevant stolen items here constitute goods wares or merchandise within the meaning of the NSPA 176 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Prea1 1et Mit · CeHtsiH Mttterial Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e 177 U S Department of Justice AM erAe r 'Nerk Preeittet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UH ier Feel R Grim P 6 e 178 U S Department of Justice A erHe · Werle Preauet II Me · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e 2 V is n amendments to Section 1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach ' intentional acts of unauthorized access-rather than mistaken · or careless ones' quoting S Rep 99-432 at 5 1986 In addition the computer likely qualifies as a protected one under the statute which reaches Internet access United States v Nosal 676 F 3d 854 Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution however the Office determined that prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted Those Principles instruct prosecutors to consider among other things the nature and seriousness of the offense the person's culpability in if the · connection with the offense and the probable sentence to be · successful Justice Manual 9-27 230 179 U S Department of Justice Al l6rHe ' W6rk Pmat tet II May C6Htaifl Material Pr6teete8 UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e C Russian Government Outreach and Contacts As explained in Section IV above the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of numerous links i e contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or claiming to have ties to the Russian government The Office evaluated the contacts under several sets of federal laws including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate in the United States After considering the available evidence the Office did not pursue charges under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above-with the exception ofFARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on behalf of Ukraine One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian-affi liated individualsthe June 9 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising derogatory information on Hillary Clinton- implicates an additional body of law campaignfinance statutes Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions As below the Office evaluated those questions in connection with the June 9 were The Office ultimately concluded that even if the princ to the government a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law Finally although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russiaaffiliated individuals may not have been suffic ient to establish or sustain criminal charges several U S persons connected to the Campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other steps to obstruct the Office's investigation and those of Congress This Office has therefore charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice 1 Potential Coordination Conspiracy and Collusion As an initial matter this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of collusion but through the lens of conspiracy law In so doing the Office recognized that the word collud e appears in the Acting Attorney General's August 2 2017 memorandum it has frequently been invoked in public reporting and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law see e g Brooke Group v Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp 509 U S 209 227 1993 But collusion is not a specific offense or theory of liability found in the U S Code nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law To the contrary even as defined in legal dictionaries collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute 18 U S C § 371 See Black's Law Dictionary 32 1 lOth ed 2014 collusion is a n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law 1 Alexander Burrill A Law Dictionary and Glossary 31 1 1871 An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law or to employ such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object 1 Bouvier 's Law Dictionary 352 180 U S Department of Justice AtterHe ' Werl Preattet II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Criffl P 6 e 1897 An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law or to obtain an object forbidden by law For that reason this Office's focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was on conspiracy as defined in federal law not the commonly discussed term collusion The Office considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russ ia-linked individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy-either under statutes that have their own conspiracy language e g 18 U S C §§ 1349 1951 a or under the general conspiracy statute 18 U S C § 371 The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume I Section IV supra amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal criminal law- including foreign-Influence and campaign-finance laws both of which are discussed further below The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts either under a spec ific statute or under Section 371 ' s offenses clause The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under Section 371 's defraud clause That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a lawful function of the U S government or its agencies through deceitful or dishonest means See Dennis v United States 384 U S 855 861 1966 Hammerschmidt v United States 265 U S 182 188 1924 see also United States v Concord Mgmt Consulting LLC 347 F Supp 3d 38 46 D D C 2018 The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officialsor between such officials and Russia-linked individuals-to interfere with or obstruct a lawful function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period And as discussed in Volume I Section V A supra the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the Office charged namely the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I Section II supra Accordingly the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U S person with conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-related contacts described in Section IV above 2 Potential Coordination Foreign Agent Statutes FARA and 18 U S C § 951 The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of or work done for a foreign government a Governing Law Under 18 U S C § 95 1 it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General Although the defendant must act on behalf of a foreign government as opposed to other kinds of foreign entities the acts need not involve espionage rather acts of any type suffice for liability See United States v Duran 596 F 3d 1283 1293-94 11th Cir 2010 United States v Latchin 554 F 3d 709 715 7th Cir 2009 United States v Dumeisi 424 F 3d 566 581 7th Cir 2005 An agent of a foreign government is an individual who agrees to operate in the Un ited States subject to the direction or control of a foreign government or official 18 U S C § 95 1 d 181 A arHey U S Department of Justice Wark Praclttet II MBry· CafttttiH Material PmteeteEI UHEier FeEl R Grim P 6 e The crime defmed by Section 95 1 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States as an unregistered forei gn-government agent 18 U S C § 95l a The statute does not require willfulness and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense United States v Campa 529 F 3d 980 998-99 11th Cir 2008 Duran 596 F 3d at 1291-94 Dumeisi 424 F 3d at 581 The Foreign Agents Registration Act FARA generally makes it illegal to act as an agent of a foreign principal by engaging in certain largely political activities in the United States without registering with the Attorney General 22 U S C §§ 611-621 The triggering agency relationship must be with a foreign principal or a person any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised directed controlled financed or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign principal 22 U S C § 6ll c l That includes a foreign government or political party and various foreign individuals and entities 22 U S C § 6ll b A covered relationship exists if a person acts as an agent representative employee or servant or in any other capacity at the order request or under the foreign principal' s direction or control 22 U S C § 61l c l It is sufficient if the person agrees consents assumes or purports to act as or who is or holds himself out to be whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship an agent of a foreign principal 22 U S C § 6ll c 2 The triggering activity is that the agent directly or through any other person in the United States 1 erigages in political activities for or in the interests of the foreign principal which includes attempts to influence federal officials or the public 2 acts as public relations counsel publicity agent information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such foreign principal 3 solicits collects disburses or dispenses contributions loans money or other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal or 4 represents the interests of such foreign principal before any federal agency or official 22 U S C § 6 11 c I It is a crime to engage in a w illful violation of any provision ofthe Act or any regulation thereunder 22 U S C § 618 a l It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements 22 U S C § 618 a 2 Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $ 10 000 fine 22 U S C § 618 b Application The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort' s and Richard Gates's pre-campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated F ARA Manafort and Gates were charged for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal informations in the District of Columbia prosecution 1280 The evidence underlying those charges is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate 1280 Gates Superseding Criminal Information Waiver of Indictment United States v Richard W Gates III 1 17-cr-20 1 D D C Feb 23 2018 Doc 203 Waiver of Trial by Jury United States v Richard W Gates III 1 17-cr-20 1 D D C Feb 23 20 18 Doc 204 Gates Plea Agreement Statement of Offense United States v Richard W Gates III 1 17-cr-201 D D C Feb 23 2018 Doc 206 Plea Agreement United States v Paul J Manafort Jr 1 17-cr-201 D D C Sept 14 2018 Doc 422 Statement of Offense United States v Paul J Manafort Jr 1 17-cr-201 D D C Sept 14 2018 Doc 423 182 U S Department of Justice AfterAey ' Verk Preettet II May CeAtaiA Material Pt·eteetee UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment in that case In addition the investigation produced evidence ofFARA violations involving Michael Flynn Those potential violations however concerned a country other than Russia i e Turkey and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge Statement of Offense United States v Michael T Flynn No 1 17-cr-232 D D C Dec 1 2017 Doc 4 Flynn Statement of Offense 1281 The investigation did not however yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the meaning ofFARA or in terms of Section 951 subject to the direction or control ofthe government of Russia or any official thereof In particular the Office did not find evidence likely to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort George Papadopoulos at its di · and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian 1282 the relevant time ng to do so based on contacts with the Russian Finally the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors-George Papadopoulos-acted as an agent of or at the direction and control of the government of Israel While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel and search warrants were obtained in part on that basis the Office ultimately determined that the evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain· a conviction under F ARA or Section 951 3 Campaign Finance Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by forei gn nationals to provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that information to the public to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign As explained below the Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular- the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump 1282 On four occasions the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FISC issued warrants based on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power 50 U S C §§ 1801 b 1805 a 2 A The FISC's probable-cause finding was based on a different and lower standard than the one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page which is whether admissible evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the Russian Federation during the period at issue Cf United States v Cardoza 713 F 3d 656 660 D C Cir 2013 explaining that probable cause requires only a fair probability and not certainty or proof beyond a reasonable doubt or proof by a preponderance of the evidence 183 A erHey U S Department of Justice Work Preclttet II Ma · CeAtaiA Material Proteetecl UH cler Fecl R Grim P 6 e Tower Harm to Ongoing Matter -- -Constituted prosecutable violations of the campaign-finance laws The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge either incident as a criminal violation a Overview Of Governing Law T he United States has a compelling interest in limiting the participation of foreign citizens in activities of democratic self-government and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U S political process Bluman v FEC 800 F Supp 2d 281 288 D D C 20 11 Kavanaugh J for three-judge court aff'd 565 U S 1104 20 12 To that end federal campaignfinance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions donations expenditures or other disbursements in connection with federal state or local candidate elections and prohibits anyone from soliciting accepting or receiving such contributions or donations As relevant here foreign nationals may not make-and no one may solicit ' accept or receive from them- a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value or an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation in connection with a Federal State or local election 52 U S C § 30121 a l A a 2 1283 The term contribution which is used throughout the campaign-finance law includes any gift subscription loan advance or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office 52 U S C § 30101 8 A i It excludes among other things the value of volunteer services 52 U S C § 30101 8 B i Foreign nationals are also barred from making an expenditure independent expenditure or disbursement for an electioneering communication 52 U S C § 30121 a l C The term expenditure includes any purchase payment distribution loan advance deposit or gift of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office 52 U S C § 30101 9 A i It excludes among other things news stories and non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities 52 U S C § 30 l 01 9 B i - ii An independent expenditure is an expenditure expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate and made independently ofthe campaign 52 U S C § 3010 1 17 An electioneering communication is a broadcast communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate 52 u s c § 30104 f 3 The statute defines forei gn national by reference to FARA and the Immigration and Nationality Act with minor modification 52 U S C § 30121 b cross-referencing 22 U S C § 6ll b l - 3 and 8 U S C § 1101 a 20 22 That definition yields five sometimesoverlapping categories of foreign nationals which include all of the individuals and entities relevant for present purposes-namely foreign governments and political parties individuals 1283 Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions 52 U S C § 30 116 a and prohibits contributions from corporations banks and labor unions 52 U S C § 30118 a see Citizens United v FEC 558 U S 3 10 320 2010 Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved possible electoral activity by foreign nationals the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily applicable provision 184 AtterHe f U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet II Mit · CeHtaiH Material Preteetee Utuler Feel R Grim P 6 e outside of the U S who are not legal permanent residents and certain non-U S entities located outside of the U S · A knowingD and willful violation involving an aggregate of $25 000 or more in a calendar year is a felony 52 U S C § 30109 d 1 A i see Bluman 800 F Supp 2d at 292 noting that a willful violation will require some proof of the defendant' s knowledge of the law United States v Danielczyk 917 F Supp 2d 573 577 E D Va 2013 applying w illfulness standard drawn from Bryan v United States 524 U S 184 191-92 1998 see also Wagner v FEC 793 F 3d I 19 n 23 D C Cir 2015 en bane same A knowing and w illful violation involving an aggregate of $2 000 or more in a calendar year but less than $25 000 is a misdemeanor 52 U S C § 30109 d l A ii b Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in connection with the June 9 meeting described in Volume I Section IV A 5 supra The Office concluded that in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent knowing and willful and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction Justice Manual § 9-27 220 In brief the key facts are that on June 3 2016 Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump Jr to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an offer from Russia's Crown prosecutor to the Trump campaign of official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to Trump Jr 's father The email described this as very high level and sensitive information that is part of Russia and its government's support to Mr Trump-helped along by Aras and Emin '' Trump Jr responded if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer Trump Jr and Emin Agalarov had follow-up conversations and within days scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was attended by Trump Jr Manafort and Kushner The communications setting up the meeting and the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and donations by foreign nationals 52 U S C § 30 121 a l A Specifically Goldstone passed along an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide official documents and information to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influencing the presidential election Trump Jr appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those materials Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner and Manafort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the foreign contributions ban in violation of 18 U S C § 371 the solicitation of an illegal foreignsource contribution or the acceptance or receipt of an express or implied promise to make a 185 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werle Preattet II May CeHtttiH Material Preteetea Ut taer Fea R Grim P 6 e foreign-source contribution both in violation of 52 U S C § 30121 a 1 A a 2 There are reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a thing of value within the meaning of these provisions but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons first the Office did not obtain admissible evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these individuals acted willfully i e with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct and second the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation see 52 U S C § 30l09 d 1 A i i Thing-of-Value Element A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign documents and information of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution The foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money It expressly prohibits a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value 52 U S C § 30121 a 1 A a 2 emphasis added And the term contribution is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws to includeD any gift subscription loan advance or deposit of money or anything of value 52 U S C § 30101 8 A i emphasis added The phrases thing of value and anything of value are broad and inclusive enough to encompass at least some forms of valuable information Throughout the United States Code these phrases serve as term s of art that are construed broad ly United States v Nilsen 967 F 2d 539 542 11th Cir 1992 per curiam thing of value includes both tangibles and intangibles see also e g 18 U S C §§ 201 b 1 666 a 2 bribery statutes id § 641 theft of government property For example the term thing of value encompasses law enforcement reports that would reveal the identity of informants United States v Girard 601 F 2d 69 7 1 2d Cir 1979 classified materials United States v Fowler 932 F 2d 306 310 4th Cir 1991 confidential information about a competitive bid United States v Matzkin 14 F 3d 1014 1020 4th Cir 1994 secret grand jury information United States v Jeter 775 F 2d 670 680 6th Cir 1985 and information about a witness's whereabouts United States v Sheker 618 F 2d 607 609 9th Cir 1980 per curiam And in the public corruption context 'thing of value' is defined broadly to include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received United States v Renzi 769 F 3d 731 744 9th Cir 2014 internal quotation marks omitted Federal Election Commission FEC regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at least some forms of information stating that the term anything of value includes the provision of any goods or services without charge such as membership lists and mailing lists 11 C F R § 100 52 d 1 The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of activists See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v FEC 475 F 3d 337 338 D C Cir 2007 describing the FEC's fmdings Likewise polling data provided to a campaign constitutes a contribution FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 Strub 1990 WL 153454 citing 11 C F R § 106 4 b And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban the FEC has concluded that election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns including flyers advertisements door hangers tri-folds signs and other printed material constitute anything of 186 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Pre61 1et II May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteel UH6er Feel R Criffi P 6 e value even though the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain FEC Advisory Opinion 2007-22 Hurysz 2007 WL 5172375 at 5 These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which the foreign-source ban could apply A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision offunds but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent Political campaigns frequently conduct and pay for opposition research A foreign entity that engaged in such research and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election and a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate than a gift of money or tangible things of value At the same time no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount to a contribution under campaign-finance law Such an interpretation could have implications beyond the foreign-source ban see 52 U S C § 30116 a imposing monetary limits on campaign contributions and raise First Amendment questions Those questions could be especially difficult where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts It is uncertain how courts would resolve those issues ii Willfulness Even assuming that the promised documents and information that would incriminate Hillary constitute a thing of value under campaign-finance law the government would encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction Most significantly the government has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement beyond a reasonable doubt To prove that a defendant acted knowingly and willfully the government would have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was unlawful U S Department of Justice Federal Prosecution ofElection Offenses 123 8th ed Dec 2017 Election Offenses see Bluman 800 F Supp 2d at 292 noting that a willful violation requires proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law Danielczyk 917 F Supp 2d at 577 knowledge of general unlawfulness This standard creates an elevated scienter element requiring at the very least that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear When there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter the · offender is more likely to have an intent defense Election Offenses 123 On the facts here the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or eff01ts at concealment at the time of the June 9 meeting While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a showing of scienter see Volume II Section II G infra that concealment occurred more than a year later involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting and may reflect an intention to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality Additionally in light of the unresolved legal questions about whether giving documents and information of the sort offered here constitutes a campaign contribution Trump Jr could mount a factual defense that he 187 U S Department of Justice AtterRey Wet'it Pretl1 1et II May CtmtaiH Material Preteetetl UHtler Fee R Crilfl P 6 e did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law Given his less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting Kushner could likely mount a similar defense And while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns the Office has not developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues iii Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2 000 threshold for a criminal violation as well as the $25 000 threshold for felony punishment See 52 U S C § 30109 d l The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions-such as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost or the cost of distribution-would likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign it appears that the information Jltimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable And while value in a conspiracy may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement see e g United States v Tombrello 666 F 2d 485 489 lith Cir 1982 Goldstone's description of the offered material here was quite general His suggestion of the information's value-i e that it would incriminate Hillary and would be very useful to Trump Jr 's father -was nonspecific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability given Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source The uncertainty over what would be delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr 's response if it 's what you say I love it emphasis added Accordingly taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation the Office decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr or other campaign officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting c Application to Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 188 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preettet Mit · CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e i er Harm to Ongoing Matter 189 U S Department of Justice Atterfley·Werk Prodttet II May CoHtaifl Material Proteeted UHder Fed R Griff P 6 e ii Willfulness As discussed to establish a criminal campaign-finance violation the government must prove that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully 52 U S C § 30109 d l A i That standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful Election Offenses 123 Given the uncertainties noted above the willfulness requirement would pose a substantial barrier to prosecution iii Constitutional Considerations iv Analysis as t o - - 190 U S Department of Justice A erHey Werk Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Pmteetee UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e 4 False Statements and Obstruction ofthe Investigation The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with the investigation As explained below the Office therefore charged some U S persons connected to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses a Overview Of Governing Law False Statements The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to government investigators is 18 U S C § 1001 As relevant here under Section 1001 a 2 it is a crime to knowingly and willfully make any materially false fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of the Government An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction United States v Rodgers 466 U S 475 479 1984 The statute also applies to a subset of legislative branch actions-viz administrative matters and investigation s or review s conducted by a congressional committee or subcommittee 18 U S C § 1001 c 1 and 2 see United States v Pickett 353 F 3d 62 66 D C Cir 2004 Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non-jurisdictional elements the statement was false fictitious or fraudulent the defendant knew both that it was false and that it was unlawful to make a false statement and the false statement was material See e g United States v Smith 831 F 3d 1207 1222 n 27 9th Cir 20 17 listing elements see also N inth Circuit Pattern Instruction 8 73 cmt explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in light of the Department of Justice 's position that the phrase knowingly and willfully in the statute requires the defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful In the D C Circuit the government must prove that the statement was actually false a statement that is misleading but literally true does not satisfy Section 100l a 2 See United States v Milton 8 F 3 d 39 45 191 U S Department of Justice Attartley Wark Praelttet II May Catltaitl Material Prateeteel Utleef Feel R Grim P 6 e D C Cir 1993 United States v Dale 991 F 2d 819 832-33 n 22 D C Cir 1993 For that false statement to qualify as material it must have a natural tendency to influence or be capable of influencing a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed See United States v Gaudin 515 U S 506 509 1995 United States v Moore 612 F 3d 698 701 D C Cir 2010 Perjury Under the federal perjury statutes it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration See 18 U S C § 1623 The government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under Section 1623 a the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury the defendant' s testimony was false in one or more respects the false testimony concerned matters that were material to the grand jury investigation and the false testimony was knowingly given United States v Bridges 717 F 2d 1444 1449 n 30 D C Cir 1983 The general perjury statute 18 U S C § 1621 also applies to grand jury testimony and has similar elements except that it requires that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy strict common-law requirements for establishing falsity See Dunn v United States 442 U S 100 106 n 6 1979 explaining the two-witness rule and the corroboration that it demands Obstruction of Justice Three basic elements are common to the obstruction statutes pertinent to this Office's charging decisions an obstructive act some form of nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding and criminal i e corrupt intent A detailed discussion of those elements and the Jaw governing obstruction of justice more generally is included in Volume II ofthe report b Application to Certain Individuals i George Papadopoulos Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and his suggestion to a foreign government representative that Russia had indicated that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to candidate Clinton On January 27 2017 Papadopoulos agreed to be interviewed by FBI agents who informed him that the interview was part of the investigation into potential Russian government interference in the 2016 presidential election During the interview Papadopoulos lied about the timing extent and nature of his communications with Joseph Mifsud Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev With respect to timing Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians had dirt on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails But Papadopoulos stated multiple times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campaign and that it was a very strange coincidence to be told of the dirt before he started working for the Campaign This account was false Papadopoulos met Mifsud for the first time on approximately March 14 2016 after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the Campaign Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos only after learning of his role on the Campaign And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing dirt on candidate Clinton in late April 2016 more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and 192 U S Department of Justice Att erHey Werk Preelttet II May CoAtaiH Material Proteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e been publicly announced by candidate Trump Statement of Offense 25-26 United States v George Papadopoulos No 1 17-cr-182 D D C Oct 5 20 17 Doc 19 Papadopoulos Statement of Offense Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to mtmmtze the extent and importance of his communications with Mifsud For example Papadopoulos stated that Mifsud 's a nothing that he thought Mifsud was just a guy talk ing up connections or something and that he believed Mifsud was BS' ing to be completely honest with you In fact however Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high-level Russian government officials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling Papadopoulos about the dirt Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the Campaign including efforts to arrange a history making meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials In addition Papadopoulos failed to inform investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or a nyone with a Russian accent during the campaign Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 27-29 Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campaign and falsely told the FBI that he had no relationship at all with her He stated that the extent of their communications was her sending emails- Just 'Hi how are you ' That' s it In truth however Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24 2016 after he had joined the Campaign he believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia During the campaign he emailed and spoke with her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia Papadopoulos Statement of Offense 30-31 Papadopoulos's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into Russian interference in the 20 16 presidential election Most immediately those statements hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby of a Washington D C hotel on February 10 2017 See Gov 't Sent Mem at 6 United States v George Papadopoulos No 1 17-cr-182 D D C Aug 18 20 17 Doc 44 During that interview Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and Timofeev But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of emails damaging to candidate Clinton stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their conversation Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meeting at which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya even though emails text messages and other information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions-April 12 and April 26 2016 In addition Mifsud omitted that he had drafted or edited the follow-up message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meeting and that as reflected in the language of that email chain Baby thank you Mifsud may have been involved in a personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time The false information and omissions in Papadopoulos ' s January 2017 interview undermined investigators' ability to challenge Mifsud when he made these inaccurate statements 193 U S Department of Justice AM'entey Vleflt Pfeelttet Mtty CeHtttiH M Rerial Preteeteel UHEier Feel R Grim P 6 e Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U S C § 1001 Information United States v George Papadopoulos No 1 17-cr-182 D D C Oct 3 2017 Doc 8 On October 7 2017 Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement On September 7 2018 he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment a $9 500 fine and 200 hours of community service ii - iii Michael Flynn Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24 2017 four days after he had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President During the interview Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian ambassador First Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador IUslyak in late December 2016 at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response See Flynn Statement of Offense Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions That statement was false On December 29 2016 Flynn called Kislyak to request Russian restraint Flynn made the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official K T McFarland about what to communicate to Kislyak Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to report on the substance of that conversation Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to the U S sanctions as a result of Flynn's request On December 31 2016 Flynn in fact had such a conversation with Kislyak and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak See Flynn Statement of Offense 3 194 U S Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rk Pr6th tet II May C6AtaiA Material Pr6teeteci UH cier Feci R Grim P 6 e Second Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives of Russia and other countries regarding a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations Security Council on December 21 2016 Specifically Flynn stated that he only asked the countries ' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any of the countries take any particular action on the resolution That statement was false On December 22 2016 Flynn called Kislyak informed him of the incoming Trump Administration' s opposition to the resolution and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution Flynn also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request regarding the resolution Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23 2016 that Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote See Flynn Statement of Offense 4 Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that ongoing investigation Flynn Statement of Offense 1-2 They also came shortly before Flynn made separate submissions to the Department of Justice pursuant to FARA that also contained materially false statements and omissions d 5 Based on the totality of that conduct the Office decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI in violation of 18 U S C § IOOl a On December 1 2017 and pursuant to a plea agreement Flynn pleaded guilty to that charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing See id Plea Agreement United States v Michael T Flynn No 1 17-cr-232 D D C Dec 1 2017 Doc 3 Flynn is awaiting sentencing iv Michael Cohen Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organization Information 1 United States v Cohen No 1 18-cr-850 S D N Y Nov 29 20 18 Doc 2 Cohen Information From the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016 Cohen was involved in a project to build a Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow The project was mown as Trump Tower Moscow In 2017 Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HPSCI and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSCI both of which were investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between Russia and the presidential campaigns In late August 2017 in advance of his testimony Cohen caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow Cohen Information 2-3 The letter contained three representations relevant here First Cohen stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it Second Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the project and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project Third Cohen stated that he did not recall any Russian government contact about the project including any response to an email that 195 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Verk Preelttet M t ' CeHt l iH M tteri tl Preteeteel UHEier Feel R Grim P 6 e he had sent to a Russian government email account Cohen Information 4 Cohen later asked that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI and he ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement Cohen Information 5 Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and misleading Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump Cohen had discussed with Felix Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project and he had inquired about the possibility of Trump traveling there-both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey Lewandowski Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian government spokesman Dmitry Peskov-in particular that he received an email reply and had a follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016 Cohen Information 7 Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time and admitted that he made them in an effort 1 to minimize the links between the project and Trump who by this time was President and 2 to give the false impression that the project had ended before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process in the hopes of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations Jd Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial interview with the Office we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001 On November 29 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch in violation of 18 U S C § 1001 a 2 and c Cohen Information The case was transferred to the district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District of New York after a referral from our Office On December 7 2018 this Office submitted a letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern District prosecution On December 12 2018 the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of imprisonment on the false-statements count to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence imposed on the other counts v 196 U S Department of Justice AttorHey Work Prodttet II May CoHtaiH Material Proteeteci UHcier Feci R Grim P 6 e vi Jeff Sessions As set forth in Volume I Section IV A 6 supra the investigation established that while a U S Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July 2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions's Senate office in September 2016 The investigation also established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's 197 U S Department of Justice AtlorHey Work Pro6ttet II May CoH taiH Material Proteete6 UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington D C in April2016 and that it is possible that they met briefly at that reception The Office considered whether in light of these interactions Sessions committed perjury before or made false statements to Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney General In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing Sessions stated in response to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have - did not have communications with the Russians In written responses submitted on January 17 2017 Sessions answered n o to a question asking whether he had been in contact with anyone connected to any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election either before or after election day And in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony Sessions identified two of the campaign-period contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above which had been reported in the media following the January 2017 confirmation hearing Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador or any other representatives of the Russian government regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one occasion the evidence is not sufftcient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to Russia-related questions in light ofthe wording and context of those questions With respect to Sessions ' s statements that he did not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador regarding the political campaign and he had not been in contact with any Russian official about the 2016 election the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions's interactions with Kislyak makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of his statements Similarly while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he did not have communications with Russians he did so in response to a question that had linked such communications to an alleged continuing exchange of information between the Trump Campaign and Russian government intermediaries Sessions later explained to the Senate and to the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with Russians that involved the exchange of campaign information as distinguished from more routine contacts with Russian nationals Given the context in which the question was asked that understanding is plausible Accordingly the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Sessions was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for perjury or false statements Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution the Office therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that decision in March 2018 vii Others Interviewed During the Investigation The Office considered whether during the course of the investigation other individuals interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determined to be false Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution the Otlice did not seek criminal charges against any individuals other than those listed above In some instances that decision was due to 198 Atlon ey U S Department of Justice Wot e Proclttet II May CoHtaiH Material Pl'oteetecl UHcler Fecl R Grim P 6 e evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity In others the Office determined that the witness ultimately provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability deterrence and resource on See Justice Manual 9-27 220 9-27 230 - 199 U S Department of Justice AM emey Werk Preclttet May CeRtaiR Material Preteetecl UHcler Fecl R Criffi P 6 e Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election Volume II of II Special Counsel Robert S Mueller III Submitted Pursuant to 28 C F R § 600 8 c Washington D C March 2019 U S Department of Justice AM eme · Werk Pret ittet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetet i UHt ier Feci R Grim P 6 e TABLE OF CONTENTS -VOLUME II INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME IT 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II 3 I BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES 9 A Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice 9 B Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations 12 II FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION 15 A The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump 15 1 Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia 16 2 The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release ofHacked Emails 17 3 The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump 18 4 After the Election Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election 21 B The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn 24 1 Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak 24 2 President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens Election-Interference Investigations 27 3 Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to Incoming Adm in istration Officials the Media and the FBI 29 4 DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn 31 5 McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Corney 32 6 Flynn's Resignation 36 7 The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Corney 38 8 The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn 41 9 The President Attempts to Have K T McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak 42 C The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation ofthe FBI' s Russia Investigation 48 I Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation 48 A t6mey U S Department of Justice W6rk Pr66ttet II May C6Htaifl Material Pr6teetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e 2 FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI 52 3 The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No Connection to Russia 55 4 The President Asks Corney to Lift the Cloud Created by the Russia Investigation 57 D Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Corney 62 1 Corney Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation 62 2 The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Corney 64 E The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel 77 l The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction 78 2 The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts oflnterest 80 3 The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel Removed 84 F The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation 90 1 The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation 90 2 The President Follows Up with Lewandowski 92 3 The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview 93 4 The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions 's Resignation 94 G The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure ofEmails About the June 9 2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials 98 l The President Learns About the Existence ofEmails Concerning the June 9 2016 Trump Tower Meeting 98 2 The President Directs Communications StaffNot to Publicly Di sclose Information About the June 9 Meeting 100 3 The President Directs Trump Jr 's Response to Press Inquiries About the June 9 Meeting 101 4 The Media Reports on the June 9 20 16 Meeting 103 H The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the Investigation I 07 1 The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal 107 2 Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered by his Recusal 109 II U S Department of Justice Atterftey V erk Preattet II Ma ' Cefttaift Mttterial Preteetee Uftaer Fee R Criffl P 6 e I The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel 113 I T he Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel 113 2 The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports 1 14 J The President's Conduct Towards Flynn Manafort 120 1 Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn 120 2 Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort ' 122 3 Harm to Ongoing Matter 128 K The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen 134 I Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project 134 2 Cohen Determines to Adhere to a Party Line Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia 138 3 Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line 139 4 The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen 144 5 The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government 148 L Overarching Factual Issues 156 TTl LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES TO THE PRESIDENT 159 A Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under Investigation 160 1 The Text of Section 1512 c 2 Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts 160 2 Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512 c 2 162 3 The Legislative History of Section 1512 c 2 Does Not JustifY Narrowing Its Text 164 4 General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 1512 c 2 is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation 165 5 Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation 167 B Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to Presidential Conduct 168 I The Requirement of a C lear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes 169 iii U S Department of Justice Al terrtey Verk Pretlttet May Certtairt Materia· Preteetetl Urteer Fee R Critfl P 6 e 2 Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President' s Official Powers 171 a The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In This Context 172 b The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President' s Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited 173 c Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional Grand Jury and Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source 176 3 Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties 178 IV CONCLUSION 182 iv U S Department of Justice J' M erHey ' Verk Preal let II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UH6er Fee R Grim P e e INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME II This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C F R § 600 8 c which states that a t the conclusion ofthe Special Counsel's work he shall provide the Attorney General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions the Special Counsel reached Beginning in 2017 the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the ongoing FBI investigation into Russia' s interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice The Order appointing the Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the FBI's Russia investigation including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection with Russia-related investigations The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel ' s investigation itself This Volume of our report summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice investigation and then provide an overview of this Volume First a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment The Office of Legal Counsel OLC has issued an opinion finding that the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions in violation of the constitutional separation ofpowers 1 Given the role ofthe Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations see 28 U S C § 515 28 C F R § 600 7 a this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorialjurisdiction And apart from OLC's constitutional view we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct 2 Second while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted it recognizes that a criminal investigation during the President's term is permissible 3 The OLC opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office 4 And if individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense they may be prosecuted at this time Given those considerations the facts known to us and the strong public interest in 1 A Sitting President 's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution 24 Op O L C 222 222 260 2000 OLC Op 2 See U S CONST Art I § 2 cl 5 § 3 cl 6 cf OLC Op at 257-258 discussing relationship between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President 3 OLC Op at 257 n 36 A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of immunity 4 OLC Op at 255 Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Pretlttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P e e safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system we conducted a thorough factual investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary materials were available Third we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions but we determined not to apply an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes The threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct constitutes a federal offense U S Dep't of Justice Justice Manual § 9-27 220 2018 Justice Manual Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges can be brought The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a speedy and public trial with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case An individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name In contrast a prosecutor's judgment that crimes were committed but that no charges will be brought affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator 5 The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case of a sitting President where a federal prosecutor' s accusation of a crime even in an internal report could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice OLC noted similar concerns about sealed indictments Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term OLC reasoned it would be very difficult to preserve an indictment's secrecy and if an indictment became public t he stigma and opprobrium could imperil the President's ability to govern 6 Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation akin to an indictment the possibility of the report's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining that the person's conduct constitutes a federal offense Justice Manual§ 9-27 220 Fourth if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice we would so state Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards however we are unable to reach that judgment T he evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred Accordingly while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime it also does not exonerate him This report on our investigation consists of four parts Section I provides an overview of obstruction-of-justice principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary considerations Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and analyzes the evidence Section TIT addresses statutory and constitutional defenses Section IV states our conclusion 5 For that reason criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted coconspirators in an indictment See United States v Briggs 514 F 2d 794 802 5th Cir 1975 The courts have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording them no forum in which to vindicate themselves see also Justice Manual § 9-11 130 6 OLC Op at 259 n 38 citation omitted 2 U S Department of Justice At terAe '' Werle Pro61 1et II Ma CeAtaiA Material Preteetea Uttaer Fea R Grim P 6 e EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME II Our obstruction-of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that related to the Russian-interference investigations including the President' s conduct towards the law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION The key issues and events we examined include the following The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump During the 20 16 presidential campaign questions arose about the Russian government' s apparent support for candidate Trump After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately about any further planned WikiLeaks sought information releases Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia even though as late as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow After the election the President expressed concerns to advisors that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn In mid-January 20 17 incoming National Security Advisor Michae l Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President other administration officials and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about Russia' s response to U S sanctions on Russia for its election interference O n January 27 the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar statements to the FBI the President invited FBI Director Corney to a private dinner at the White House and told Corney that he needed loyalty On February 14 the day after the President requested Flynn's resignation the President told an outside advisor Now that we fired Flynn the Russia thing is over The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue Later that afternoon the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting with Corney Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn the President said I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go to letting Flynn go He is a good guy I hope you can let this go Shortly after requesting Flynn 's resignation and speaking privately to Corney the President sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K T McFarland draft an internal letter stating that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak McFarland declined because she did not know whether that was true and a White House Counsel's Office attorney thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation In February 20 17 Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaignrelated investigations because of his ro le in the Trump Campaign In early March the President told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing And after Sessions announced his recusal on March 2 the President expressed anger at the decision and told adv isors that he should have an Attorney Genera l who would protect him That weekend the President took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to unrecuse Later in March Corney publicly 3 At tarAe ' U S Department of Justice Werle Praettet II May CaAtaiA Material Preteetee UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election including any links or coordination between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign In the following days the President reached out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency CIA and the National Security Agency NSA to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort The President also twice called Corney directly notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid direct contacts with the Department of Justice Corney had previously assured the President that the FBI was not investigating him personally and the President asked Corney to lift the cloud of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly The President's termination of Comey On May 3 2017 Corney testified in a congressional hearing but declined to answer questions about whether the President was personally under investigation Within days the President decided to terminate Corney The President insisted that the termination letter which was written for public release state that Corney had informed the President that he was not under investigation The day of the firing the White House maintained that Corney's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Corney should be discharged for mishandling the Hillary Clinton email investigation But the President had decided to fire Corney before hearing from the Department of Justice The day after firing Corney the President told Russian officials that he had faced great pressure because of Russia which had been taken off' by Corney's firing The next day the President acknowledged in a television interview that he was going to fire Corney regardless of the Depattment of Justice' s recommendation and that when he decided to just do it he was thinking that this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story In response to a question about whether he was angry with Corney about the Russia investigation the President said As far as I'm concerned I want that thing to be absolutely done properly adding that firing Corney might even lengthen out the investigation The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him On May 17 2017 the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conduct the investigation and related matters The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been appointed by telling advisors that it was the end of his presidency and demanding that Sessions resign Sessions submitted his resignation but the President ultimately did not accept it The President told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts ofinterest and suggested that the Special Counsel therefore could not serve The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice On June 14 2017 the media reported that the Special Counsel's Office was investigating whether the President had obstructed justice Press reports called this a major turning point in the investigation while Corney had told the President he was not under investigation following Corney's firing the President now was under investigation The President reacted to this news with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel's investigation On June 17 2017 the President called McGahn at home and directed him to call the Acting Attorney General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be removed McGahn did not carry out the direction however deciding that he would resign rather than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday N ight Massacre 4 U S Department of Justice AM 6rrtey ' V6rlc Preelttet II May C6fltaifl Material Pr6teeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation Two days after directing McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation On June 19 2017 the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski a trusted advisor outside the government and dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions The message said that Sessions should publicly announce that notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation the investigation was very unfair to the President the President had done nothing wrong and Sessions planned to meet with the Special Counsel and let him move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections Lewandowski said he understood what the President wanted Sessions to do One month later in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19 20 17 the President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel investigation to future election interference Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon Hours after that meeting the President publicly criticized Sessions in an interview with the New York Times and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that Sessions' s job was in jeopardy Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President's message personally so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions Dearborn was uncomfortable with the task and did not follow through Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence In the summer of 2017 the President learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between senior campaign officials including Donald Trump Jr and a Russian lawyer who was said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as part of Russia and its government's support for Mr Trump On several occasions the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting suggesting that the emails would not leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited Before the emails became public the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr by deleting a line that acknowledged that the meeting was with an individual who Trump Jr was told might have information helpful to the campaign and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions of Russian children When the press asked questions about the President's involvement in Trump Jr ' s statement the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any role Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation In early summer 2017 the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal from the Russia investigation Sessions did not reverse his recusal In October 20 17 the President met privately with Sessions in the Oval Office and asked him to take a look at investigating Clinton In December 2017 shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and suggested according to notes taken by a senior advisor that if Sessions unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia investigation he would be a hero The President told Sessions I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything I just want to be treated fairly In response Sessions volunteered that he had never seen anything improper on the campaign and told the President there was a whole new leadership team in place He did not unrecuse Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel removed In early 2018 the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to 5 U S Department of Justice At ferHey Werk Pret lttet Ma · CeHtttiH Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather than carry out the order The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed McGahn told those officials that the media reports were accurate in stating that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the reports In the same meeting the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special Counsel about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes of his conversations with the President McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle Conduct towards Flynn Manafort litllll After Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President and began cooperating with the government the President' s personal counsel left a message for Flynn ' s attorneys reminding them of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn which he said still remains and asking for a heads up if Flynn knew information that implicates the President When Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement the President's personal counsel said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn's actions reflected hostility towards the President During Manafort's prosecution and when the jury in his criminal trial was deliberating the President praised Manafort in public said that Manafort was being treated unfairly and declined to rule out a pardon After Manafort was convicted the President called to break and said that almost ou to be Manafort a brave man for refusi Conduct involving Michael Cohen The President' s conduct towards Michael Cohen a former Trump Organization executive changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project to castigation of Cohen when he became a cooperating witness From September 2015 to June 20 16 Cohen had pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal Tn 2017 Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed travel to Russia with him in an effort to adhere to a party line that Cohen said was developed to minimize the President's connections to Russia While preparing for his congressional testimony Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel who according to Cohen said that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President After the FBI searched Cohen 's home and office in April 2018 the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not flip contacted him directly to tell him to stay strong and privately passed messages of support to him Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message he would be taken care of But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in the summer of20 l8 the President publicly criticized him called him a rat and suggested that his family members had committed crimes 6 A erHey U S Department of Justice Werlt Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Feel R Cf'im P 6 e Overarching factual issues We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about these facts but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President's conduct Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-ofjustice cases First the investigation concerned the President and some of his actions such as firing the FBI director involved facially lawful acts within his Article IT authority which raises constitutional issues discussed below At the same time the President's position as the head of the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings subordinate officers and potential witnesses-all ofwhich is relevant to a potential obstruction-of-justice analysis Second unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of justice to cover up a crime the evidence we obtained did not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference Although the obstruction statutes do not require proof of such a crime the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct Third many of the President's acts directed at witnesses including discourage ment of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons took place in public view That circumstance is unusual but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the obstruction laws Ifthe likely effect of public acts is to influence witnesses or alter their testimony the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts the overall pattern of the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature ofthe President' s acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent In particular the actions we investigated can be divided into two phases reflecting a possible shift in the President' s motives The first phase covered the period from the President's first interactions with Corney through the President's firing of Corney During that time the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally under investigation Soon after the firing of Corney and the appointment of the Special Counsel however the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigated in an obstruction-of-justice inquiry At that point the President engaged in a second phase of conduct involving public attacks on the inve tigation non-public efforts to control it and efforts in both public and private to encourage witnesses not to cooperate with the investigation Judgments about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality ofthe evidence STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES The President's counsel raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated We concluded that none of those legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts Statutory defenses Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general approach to interpreting obstruction statutes we concluded that several statutes could apply here See 18 U S C §§ 1503 1505 151 2 b 3 1512 c 2 Section 1512 c 2 is an omnibus obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or contemplated official proceedings No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the provision to cover only conduct that impairs the integrity or availability of evidence Sections 1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury 7 U S Department of Justice Aa emey Werk Preattet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e judicial administrative and congressional proceedings and they are supplemented by a provision in Section 151 2 b aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime Constitutional defenses As for constitutional defenses arising from the President' s status as the head of the Executive Branch we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not definitively resolved these issues We therefore examined those issues through the framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues The Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority With respect to w hether the President ca n be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the Constitution we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice Under applicable Supreme Court precedent the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings including those of courts and grand juries from corrupt obstructive acts regardless of their source We also concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission The term corruptly sets a demanding standard It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an inte nt to obtain an improper advantage for him self or someone else inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others A preclusion of corrupt official action does not diminish the President's ability to exercise Article II powers For example the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himse lf from criminal punishment avoiding financia l liability or preventing personal embarrassment To the contrary a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers rather than hinders the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law It also aligns with the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws Finally we concluded that in the rare case in which a crimina l investigation of the President' s conduct is justified inquiries to determine whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance of hi s constitutionally assigned duties The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President's corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutiona l system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law CONCLUSION Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment At the same time if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice we would so state Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards we are unable to reach that judgment Accordingly while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime it also does not exonerate him 8 U S Department of Justice AM'erHey Werl Prea et II May Cefltaifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e I BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES A Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice The May 17 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this Office with jurisdiction to investigate federal crimes committed in the course of and with intent to interfere with the Special Counsel's investigation such as perjury obstruction of justice destruction of evidence and intimidation of witnesses 28 C F R § 600 4 a Because of that description of our jurisdiction we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with the elements of obstruction offenses in mind Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the elements of such offenses although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution See Justice Manual § 9-27 000 et seq 2018 Here we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction statutes in an ordinary case This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that arise in an inquiry into official acts by the President Those issues are discussed in a later section of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President's counsel have raised See Volume II Section III B infra Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes 1 an obstructive act 2 a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding and 3 a corrupt intent See e g 18 U S C §§ 1503 1505 1512 c 2 We describe those elements as they have been interpreted by the courts We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering see 18 U S C § 1512 b and describe the requirements for attempted offenses and endeavors to obstructjustice see 18 U S C §§ 1503 1512 c 2 Obstructive act Obstruction-of-justice law reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered regardless of the means employed United States v Silverman 745 F 2d 1386 1393 11th Cir 1984 interpreting 18 U S C § 1503 An effort to influence a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct justice even if the effort was subtle or circuitous and however cleverly or with whatever cloaking of purpose it was made United States v Roe 529 F 2d 629 632 4th Cir 1975 see also United States v Quattrone 441 F 3d 153 173 2d Cir 2006 The verbs ' obstruct or impede' are broad and can refer to anything that blocks makes difficult or hinders Marinello v United States 138 S Ct 1101 1106 2018 internal brackets and quotation marks omitted An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority See United States v Cueto 151 F 3d 620 631 7th Cir 1998 affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for litigationrelated conduct United States v Cintolo 818 F 2d 980 992 1st Cir 1987 any act by any party- whether lawful or unlawful on its face- may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt motive Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding Obstruction-of-justice law generally requires a nexus or connection to an official proceeding In Section 1503 the nex us must be to pending judicial or grand jury proceedings United States v Aguilar 515 U S 593 9 U S Department of Justice AttarRey Wark Pratittet II May CarttaiH Material Prateeteti UHtier Fee R Crirrt P 6 e 599 1995 In Section 1505 the nexus can include a connection to a pending federal agency proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation Under both statutes the government must demonstrate a relationship in time causation or logic between the obstructive act and the proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed Id at 599 see also Arthur Andersen LLP v United States 544 U S 696 707-708 2005 Section 1512 c prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings 18 U S C § 1515 a 1 A ' For purposes of' Section 1512 an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense 18 U S C § 1512 f l Although a proceeding need not already be in progress to trigger liability under Section 1512 c a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must be shown United States v Young 916 F 3d 368 386 4th Cir 2019 United States v Petruk 781 F 3d 438 445 8th Cir 2015 United States v Phillips 583 F 3d 1261 1264 lOth Cir 2009 United States v Reich 479 F 3d 179 186 2d Cir 2007 The nexus requirement narrows the scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have fair warning of what the law proscribes Aguilar 515 U S at 600 internal quotation marks omitted The nexus showing has subjective and objective components As an objective matter a defendant must act in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice such that the statute excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful Aguilar 515 U S at 601-602 emphasis added internal quotation marks omitted T he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice d at 599 citation and internal quotation marks omitted As a subjective matter the actor must have contemplated a particular foreseeable proceeding Petruk 781 F 3d at 445-446 A defendant need not directly impede the proceeding Rather a nexus exists if discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third party would act on the defendant' s communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding United States v Martinez 862 F 3d 223 238 2d Cir 2017 brackets ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted Corruptly The word corruptly provides the intent element for obstruction ofjustice and means acting knowingly and dishonestly or with an improper motive United States v Richardson 676 F 3d 491 508 5th Cir 20 12 United States v Gordon 7 10 F 3d 1124 1151 lOth Cir 2013 to act corruptly means to act with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert impede or obstruct the relevant proceeding some quotation marks omitted see 18 U S C § 1515 b As used in section 1505 the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose personally or by influencing another see also Arthur Andersen 544 U S at 705-706 interpreting corruptly to mean wrongful immoral depraved or evil and holding that acting knowingly corruptly in 18 U S C § 1512 b requires consciousness of wrongdoing The requisite showing is made when a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for him self or someone else inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others BALLENTINE' s LAw DICTIONARY 276 3d ed 1969 see United States v Pasha 797 F 3d 1122 1132 D C Cir 20 15 Aguilar 515 U S at 616 Scalia J concurring in part and dissenting in part characterizing this definition as the longstanding and well-accepted meaning of corruptly Witness tampering A more specific provision in Section 1512 prohibits tampering with a witness See 18 U S C § 1512 b l 3 making it a crime to knowingly use intimidation or corruptly persuade another person or engage in misleading conduct towards another 10 U S Department of Justice A erMey Work Protlttet May CoHtaiM Material Preteetetl UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e person with the intent to influence delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding or to hinder delay or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense To establish corrupt persuasion it is suffic ient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct United States v Edlind 887 F 3d 166 174 4th Cir 2018 United States v Sparks 791 F 3d 1188 1191-1192 lOth Cir 2015 United States v Byrne 435 F 3d 16 23-26 1st Cir 2006 United States v LaShay 417 F 3d 715 718-719 7th C ir 2005 United States v Burns 298 F 3d 523 539-540 6th Cir 2002 United States v Pennington 168 F 3d 1060 I 066 8th Cir 1999 The persuasion need not be coercive intimidating or explicit it is sufficient to urge induce ask argu e giv e reasons Sparks 79 1 F 3d at 1192 or coach or remind witnesses by planting misleading facts Edlind 887 F 3d at 174 Corrupt persuasion is shown where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true intending that the witness believe the story and testify to it United States v Rodolitz 786 F 2d 77 82 2d Cir 1986 see United States v Gabriel 125 F 3d 89 I 02 2d Cir 1997 It also covers urging a witness to recall a fact that the w itness did not know even if the fact was actually true See LaShay 417 F 3d at 719 Corrupt persuasion also can be s hown in certain circumstances when a person with an improper motive urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement See United States v Shotts 145 F 3d 1289 1301 11th Cr 1998 telling Secretary not to say anyth ing to the FBI and she would not be bothered When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder delay or prevent the communication of information to law enforcement under Section 1512 b 3 the nexus to a proceeding inquiry articulated in Aguilar-that an individual have knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding 515 U S at 599-does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the commun ication of information to investigators not at impeding an official proceeding Acting knowingly corruptly requires proof that the individual was conscious of wrongdoing Arthur Andersen 544 U S at 705-706 declining to explore t he outer limits of this e lement but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if the defendant honestly and sincerely believed that the conduct was lawful It is an affirmative defense that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole intention was to encourage induce or cause the other person to testify truthfully 18 U S C § 15 12 e Attempts and endeavors Section 15 12 c 2 covers both substantive obstruction offenses and attempts to obstruct justice Under general principles of attempt law a person is guilty of an attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that constitutes a substantial step towards that goal See United States v Resendiz-Ponce 549 U S 102 l 06-107 2007 T he act must be substantial in that it was strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal purpose United States v Pratt 351 F 3d 131 135 4th Cir 2003 While mere abstract talk does not suffice any concrete and specific acts that corroborate the defendant's intent can constitute a substantial step United States v Irving 665 F 3d 1184 11981205 1Oth Cir 201 1 Thus soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element ofthe crime may qualify as a substantial step Model Penal Code§ 5 01 2 g see United States v Lucas 499 F 3d 769 78 1 8th Cir 2007 11 U S Department of Justice Attarrtey Wark Pra6ttet May Carttairt Material Prateete6 Urt6er Fee R Grim P 6 e The omnibus clause of 18 U S C § 1503 prohibits an endeavor to obstruct justice which sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision See United States v Sampson 898 F 3d 287 302 2d Cir 2018 United States v Leisure 844 F 2d 1347 1366-1367 8th Cir 1988 collecting cases It is well established that a n obstruction-of-justice offense is complete when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice the prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or impeded United States v Davis 854 F 3d 1276 1292 lith Cir 2017 internal quotation marks omitted B Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations After the appointment of the Special Counsel this Office obtained evidence about the following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President a The President's January 27 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Corney in which the President reportedly asked for Corney's loyalty one day after the White House had been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador b The President's February 14 2017 meeting with Corney in which the President reportedly asked Corney not to pursue an investigation of Flynn c The President's private requests to Corney to make public the fact that the President was not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud d The President's outreach to the Director ofNational Intelligence and the Directors of the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI's Russia investigation e The President's stated rationales for terminating Corney on May 9 2017 including statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBI's Russia investigation was a factor in Corney' s termination and f The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional principles discussed below in Volume II Section III iifra we determined that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of-justice issues involving the President Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual ' s actions and intent We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary evidence in its possession on the relevant events We also sought and obtained the White House's concurrence in our conducting interviews of White House personnel who had relevant information And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge obtained documents on a 12 U S Department of Justice AM arAey Wark Praattet II May CaAtaiA Material Prateetea UAaet' Fee R Grim P 6 e voluntary basis when possible and used legal process where appropriate These investigative steps allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence We also sought a voluntary interview with the President discussi the President declined to be interviewed ng course o our agree to answer wr tten que ons on certain Russia-related topics provided us with answers He did not simi larly agree to provide written answers to questions on obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition Ultimately while we believed that we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President's testimony we chose not to do so We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such an investigative step would likely produce at a late stage in our investigation We also assessed that based on the s ignificant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions we had sufficient evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the Pres ident's testimony The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in Appendix C infra in a note that precedes the President's written responses In assessing the evidence we obtained we relied on common principles that app ly in any investigation The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence See e g United States v Croteau 819 F 3d 1293 1305 II th Cir 20 16 G ui lty knowledge can rarely be established by direct evidence Therefore mens rea e lements such as knowledge or intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence internal quotation marks omitted United States v Robinson 702 F 3d 22 36 2d Cir 20 12 The government's case rested on circumstantial evidence but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom internal quotation marks omitted The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence is a necessity in criminal cases given the right of a subject to assert his privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the F ifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify Accordingly determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an investigatory subj ect Obstruction-of-justice cases are consistent with this rule See e g Edlind 887 F 3d at 174 176 relying on significant circumstantial evidence that the defendant was conscio us of her wrongdoing in an obstruction case b ecause evidence of intent will almost always be circumstantial a defendant may be found cu lpab le where the reasonable and foreseeab le consequences of her acts are the obstruction of justice internal quotat ion marks ellipses and punctuation omitted Quattrone 441 F 3d at 173-174 C ircumstantial evidence that illuminates intent may include a pattern of potentially obstructive acts Fed R Evid 404 b Evidence of a crime wrong or other act may be admissible to prov e motive opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity absence of mistake or lack of accident see e g United States v Frankhauser 80 F 3d 641 648-650 I st C ir 1996 United States v Arnold 773 F 2d 823 832-834 7th Cir 1985 Cintolo 818 F 2d at 1000 Credibility judgments may a lso be made based on objective facts and circumstantial evidence Standard jury instructions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in 13 U S Department of Justice AM erHe · Werk Pre61 1et II Mit · Ceflffitfl Material Preteetea Uruler Fea R Grim P 6 e assessing credibility These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth whether the witness had a good memory whether the w itness had the opportunity to observe the events about which he testified whether the witness's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony See e g First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 1 06 20 18 Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions Criminal Cases § 1 08 2012 Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3 0 I 20 12 In addition to those general factors we took into account more specific factors in assessing the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts For example contemporaneous written notes can provide strong corroborating evidence See United States v Nobles 422 U S 225 232 1975 the fact that a statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report wou ld tend strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview Similarly a w itness' s recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witness's credibility See Tome v United States 5 13 U S 150 158 1995 A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebutta l of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive Finally a witness's false description of an encounter can imply consciousness of wrongdoing See Al-Adahi v Obama 613 F 3d 1102 1107 D C Cir 201 0 noting the well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence-often strong evidence-of guilt We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of our investigation 14 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werl Pretittet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHtler Fetl R Crilfl P 6 e II FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION This section of the report details the evidence we obtained We first provide an overview of how Russia became an issue in the 20 16 presidential campaign and how candidate Trump responded We then tum to the key events that we investigated the President's conduct concerning the FBI investigation ofMichael Fly nn the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI's Russ ia investigation events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Corney efforts to terminate the Special Counsel efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel 's investigation efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9 2016 Trump Tower meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials efforts to have the Attorney General unrecuse and conduct towards McGahn Cohen and other witnesses We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory obstruction-of-justice elements obstructive act nexus to a proceeding and intent We focus on e lements because by regulation the Special Counsel has jurisdiction to investigate federal crimes committed in the course of a nd with intent to interfere with the Specia l Counsel's investigation such as perjury obstruction of justice destruction of evidence and intim idation of witnesses 28 C F R § 600 4 a Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal obstruction crimes we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of those crimes and analyzed them within an elements framework-while refraining from reaching ultimate conclusions about whether crimes were committed for the reasons explained above This section also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President those defenses are analyzed in Volume II Section TIT infra A The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for T rump During the 2016 campaign the media raised questions about a possible connection between the Trump Campaign and Russia 7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia Trump responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement in Russia- even though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late as June 2016 Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information about any further planned WikiLeaks releases After the election when q ns possible links between Russia and the Trump Campai gn the President-Elect continued to deny any connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy ofhis election 8 7 This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information contained in the stories but rather to place candidate Trump's response to those stories in context Volume I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media during the campaign 8 As discussed in Volume I while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign the evidence was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with representatives ofthe Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election 15 U S Department of Justice AUerfte · Werk Pretittet II May CerttaiR Material Preteeteti URtier Fee R Grim P 6 e 1 Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia On June 16 2015 Donald J Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the Re publican candidate for President 9 By early 2016 he distinguished himself among Republican candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia 10 saying he would get along well with Russ ian President Vladimir Putin 11 questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete 12 and praising Putin as a strong leader 13 The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators perceived Trump as favorable to Russia 14 Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer the media reported that several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia For example the press reported that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst 15 The press also reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company 16 and that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the Russian-backed former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych 17 In addition the press raised questions during the Republican 9 @realDonaldTrump 6 16 15 11 57 a m ET Tweet 10 See e g Meet the Press Interview with Donald J Trump NBC Dec 20 20 IS Trump I think it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along Presidential Candidate Donald Trump News Conference Hanahan South Carolina C-SPAN Feb 15 20 16 You want to make a good deal for the country you want to deal with Russia 11 See e g Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees CNN July 8 20 IS I think I get along with Putin fi ne Andrew Rafferty Trump Says He Would Get Along Very Well With Putin NBC July 30 2015 quoting Trump as saying I think Twould get along very well with Vladimir Putin 12 See e g @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3 24 16 7 47 a m ET @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3 24 16 7 59a m ET 13 See e g Meet the Press Interview with Donald J Trump NBC Dec 20 20 IS Putin is a strong leader What am I gonna say he's a weak leader He's making mincemeat out of our President Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia Ohio C-SPAN Mar 12 2016 I said Putin was a strong leader which he is I mean he might be bad he might be good But he 's a strong leader 14 See e g Andrew Osborn From Russia with love why the Kremlin backs Trump Reuters M ar 24 20 16 Robert Zubrin Trump The Kremlin's Candidate National Review Apr 4 2016 15 See e g Mark Hosenball Steve Holland Trump being advised by ex-US Lieutenant General who favors closer Russia ties Reuters Feb 26 20 16 Tom Hamburger et al Inside Trump's financial ties to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin Washington Post June 17 20 16 Certain matters pet1aining to Flynn are described in Volume I Section TV B 7 supra 16 See e g Zachary Mider Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's Gazprom Bloomberg Mar 30 20 16 Julia Iofee Who is Carter Page Politico Sep 23 20 16 Certain matters pertaining to Page are described in Volume r Section IV A 3 supra 17 Tracy Wilkinson In a shift Republican platform doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia spurring outrage Los Angeles Times July 21 20 16 Josh Rogin Trump campaign guts GOP's antiRussia stance on Ukraine Washington Post July 18 20 16 16 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Crilfl P 6 e National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican platform's stance on giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces 18 2 The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release ofHacked Emails On June 14 2016 a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the Democratic National Committee DNC posted an announcement that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents 19 On July 22 2016 the day before the Democratic National Convention WikiLeaks posted thousands ofhacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations 20 Soon thereafter Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump 21 On July 26 2016 the New York Times reported that U S intelligence agencies ha d told the White House they now have 'high confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the Democratic National Committee 'm aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks 23 discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the of the Michael Cohen then-executive vice recalled hearin 18 Josh Rogin Trump campaign guts GOP's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine Washington Post Opinions July 18 2016 The Republican Platform events are described in Volume 1 Section IV A 6 supra 19 Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee CrowdStrike June 15 20 16 post originally appearing on June 14 2016 according to records of the timing provided by CrowdStrike Ellen Nakashima Russian government hackers penetrated DNC stole opposition research on Trump Washington Post June 14 20 16 20 Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton and internal deliberations Washington Post July 22 2016 21 Amber Phillips Clinton campaign manager Russians leaked Democrats' emails to help Donald Trump Washington Post July 24 20 16 22 David E Sanger and Eric Schmitt Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D N C New York Times July 26 2016 23 Gates 4 l 0 18 302 at 5 Newman 8 23 18 302 at I 24 Gates 4 11 18 302 at 2-3 SM-2180998 Gates I 0 25 18 302 at 2 see also Volume I Section 11I D 1 supra 25 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 8 see also Volume I Section III D l supra According to Cohen after DNC emails on July 22 2016 Trump said to Cohen words to the effect of Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 10 Cohen's role in the candidate's and later WikiLeak tolen 17 Aften ey U S Department of Justice Wefk Pwtlttet May CoHtaiH Matefittl Pfoteeted UHtief Fetl R Cfim P 6 e and Harm to Ongoing Matter 2016 release of hacked uv' ·'' 26 3 The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid Candidate Trump In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22 2016 release of hacked DNC emails the Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump On July 26 2016 Trump tweeted that it was c razy to suggest that Russia was dealing with Trump 32 and that f or the record he had ZERO investments in Russia 'm In a press conference the next day July 27 2016 Trump characterized this whole thing with Russia as a total deflection and stated that it was farfetched and ridiculous 34 Trump said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven but stated that it would give him no pause if Russia had Clinton's emails 35 Trump added Russia ifyou' re listening I hope you' re able to find the 30 000 emails that are missing I think you will probably be rewarded President's activities and his own criminal conduct is descriped in Volume II Section ILK infra and in Volume T Section IV A I supra 26 Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 8 27 As explained in footnote 197 of Volume I Section supra account of these events because it aligns with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent 28 Gates 10 25 18 302 at 4 29 Gates I 0 25 18 302 at 4 30 Bannon 1 18 19 302 at 3 Gates 4 11 18 302 at 1-2 SM-2180998 Gates 10 25 18 302 at2 messa formed in June J timeframe based on claims on June 12 2016 - - - 31 32 @rea1DonaldTrump 7 26 16 6 47p m ET Tweet 33 @reaiDonaldTrump 7 26 16 6 50p m ET Tweet 34 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 35 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 18 U S Department of Justice AttofHey Wofk Pfotittet II Mtt ' CoHtttiH Mtttefittl Pfoteeteti UHtief Fee R Cfiffi P 6 e mightily by our press 36 Trump also said that there' s nothing that I can think of that I'd rather do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now and in response to a question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting sanctions Trump replied We ' ll be looking at that Yeah we'll be looking 3 7 During the press conference Trump repeated I have nothing to do with Russia five tirnes He stated that the closest he carne to Russia was that Russians may have purchased a horne or condos from him 39 He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013 he had be e n interested in working with Russian companies that wanted to put a lot of money into developments in Russia but it never worked out 40 He explained t rankly I didn't want to do it for a couple of different reasons But we had a major developer that wanted to develop property in Moscow and other places But we decided not to do it 41 The Trump Organization however had been pursuing a building project in Moscow-the Trump Tower Moscow projectfrom approximately September 2015 through June 2016 and the candidate was regularly updated on developments including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and by Trump himself to finalize it 42 38 Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump' s denial of any business dealings in Russia which Cohen regarded as untrue 4 3 Trump told Cohen that Trump Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said Why mention it if it is not a dea 44 According to Cohen at around this time in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia campaign 36 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 Within five hours of Trump's remark a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary Clinton for possible hacks See Volume I Section III supra In written answers submitted in this investigation the President stated that he made the Russia if you're listening statement in jest and sarcastically as was apparent to any objective observer Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 13 Response to Question II Part d 37 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 In his written answers submitted in this investigation the President said that his statement that we'll be looking at Crimea and sanctions did not communicate any position Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 17 Response to Question IV Part g 38 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 39 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 40 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 41 Donald Trump News Conference Dora Florida C-SPAN July 27 2016 42 The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in Volume I Section TV A l supra and Volume TI Section TT K infra 43 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 4 44 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 4-5 19 U S Department of Justice AttorRey Work Proti1 1et II Ma · CoRtaiR Material Proteeteti URtier Feti R Grim P 6 e advisors had developed a party line that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections to Russia 45 In addition to denying any connections with Russia the Trump Campaign reacted to reports of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian contacts For example in August 2016 foreign policy advisor J D Gordon declined an invitation to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was not optimal in view of media reports about Russian interference 46 On August 19 2016 Manafort was asked to resign amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine and links to Russian business 47 And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in September 2016 Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and told the press that he had played no role in the Campaign 48 On October 7 2016 WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta 49 The same day the federa l government announced that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-m ails from US persons and institutions including from US political organizations 50 The government statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks with the goal of interfering with the presidential election and concluded that only Russia's senior-most officials could have authorized these activities based on their scope and sensitivity 51 On October 11 2016 Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were going to be released 52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump 45 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at I Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 3-5 The formation of the party line is described in greater detail in Volume II Section II K infra 46 DJTFP00004953 8 8 16 Email Gordon to Pchelyakov stating that t hese days are not optimal for us as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories The invitation and Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I Section IV A 7 a supra 47 See e g Amber Phillips Paul Manafort 's complicated ties to Ukraine explained Washington Post Aug 19 2016 There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into Manafort's ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine Tom Winter Ken Dilanian Donald Trump Aide Paul Manafort Scrutinized for Russian Business Ties NBC Aug 18 20 16 Relevant events involving Manafort are discussed in Volume I Section IV A 8 supra 48 Michael Tsikoff US intel officials probe ties between Trump adviser and Kremlin Yahoo News Sep 23 2016 see e g 9 25 16 Email Hicks to Conway Bannon 9 23 16 Email J Mill er to Bannon S Miller Page 3 16 17 302 at 2 49 @WikiLeaks 10 7 16 4 32p m ET Tweet 50 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security DHS Oct 7 2016 51 Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security DHS Oct 7 20 16 52 John Wagner Anne Gearan Clinton campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians suggests Trump had early warning Washington Post Oct 11 2016 20 U S Department of Justice At tame · Wark Pratit tet Ma · CaHtaiH Material Prateeteti UHtier Feti R Grim P 6 e Campaign was in cahoots with WikiLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information and responded Nothing could be further from the truth 53 4 After the Election Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election On November 8 2016 Trump was e lected President Two days later Russian officials told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump's immed iate entourage during the campaign 54 In response Hope Hicks who had been the Trump Campaign spokesperson said We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with any foreign entities before yesterday when Mr Trump spoke with many world leaders 55 Hicks gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia Tt never happened There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the campaign 56 On December 10 2016 the press reported that U S intelligence agencies had concluded that Russia interfered in last month's presidential election to boost Do'nald Trump's bid for the White House 57 Reacting to the story the next day President-Elect Trump stated T think it's ridiculous I think it's just another excuse 58 He continued that no one really knew who was responsible for the hacking suggesting that the inte Jigence community had no idea if it's Russia or China or somebody It could be somebody sitting in a bed some place 59 The President-Elect 53 Louis Nelson Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks Politico Oct 14 2016 54 Ivan Nechepurenko Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies Diplomat Says New York Times Nov 10 2016 quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying t here were contacts and I cannot say that all but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian representatives Jim Heintz Matthew Lee Russia eyes better ties with Trump says contacts underway Associated Press Nov It 20 16 quoting Ryabkov saying I don' t say that all of them but a whole array of them supported contacts with Russian representatives 55 Ivan Nechepurenko Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies Diplomat Says New York Times Nov II 2016 quoting Hicks 56 Jim Heintz Matthew Lee Russia eyes better ties with Trump says contacts underway Associated Press Nov I 0 20 16 quoting Hicks Hicks recalled that after she made that statement she spoke with Campaign advisors Keltyanne Conway Stephen Miller Jason Miller and probably Kushner and Bannon to ensure it was accurate and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them Hicks 12 8117 302 at 4 57 Damien Gayle CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election say reports Guardian Dec I 0 20 16 58 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump CQ Newsmaker Transcripts Dec II 2016 59 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump CQ Newsmaker Transcripts Dec II 20 16 21 U S Department of Justice Al'temey 'Nerk Pretlttet II May Cetttaitt Material Preteetetl Utttler Fetl R Grim P 6 e also said that Democrats were putting 0 out the story of Russian interference because they suffered one ofthe greatest defeats in the history ofpolitics 60 On December 18 20 I 6 Podesta told the press that the election was distorted by the Russian intervention and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been in touch with the Russians 61 The same day incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's determination that Russia intervened in the election 62 When asked about any contact or coordination between the Campaign and Russia Priebus said Even this question is insane Of course we didn' t interface with the Russians 63 Priebus added that this whole thing is a spin job and said the real question is why the Democrats are doing everything they can to delegitimize the outcome of the election 64 On December 29 20 16 the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian cyber operations aimed at the U S e lection it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities 65 When first asked about the sanctions President-Elect Trump said I think we ought to get on with our lives 66 He then put out a statement that said It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things but indicated that he would meet with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference 67 The briefing occurred on January 6 2017 68 Following the briefing the intelligence community released the public version of its assessment which concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton 's ° 6 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump CQ Newsmaker Transcripts Dec 11 20 16 61 David Morgan Clinton campaign It 's an 'open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia Reuters Business Insider Dec 18 20 16 62 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with Incoming While House ChiefofStaff Reince Priebus Fox News Dec 18 20 16 63 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus Fox News Dec 18 2016 64 Chris Wallace Hosts Fox News Sunday Interview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus Fox News Dec 18 20 16 65 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment White House Dec 29 2016 see also Missy Ryan et al Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference Washington Post Dec 29 20 16 66 John Wagner Trump on alleged election interference by Russia 'Get on with our lives ' Washington Post Dec 29 20 16 67 Missy Ryan et al Obama administration announces measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference Washington Post Dec 29 20 16 68 Corney I II 15117 302 at 3 22 U S Department of Justice Aa erHey Werle Preattet II May CeHtaiH Mate• ial Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e electability 69 The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian government had developed a clear preference for Trump 70 Several days later BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump's Russia connections under the headline These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia 71 In a press conference the next day the President-Elect called the release an absolute disgrace and said I have no dealings with Russia I have no deals that could happen in Russia because we've stayed away So I have no deals I have no loans and I have no dealings We could make deals in Russia very easily if we wanted to I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict 72 Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian connections the Russia investigations and the intelligence community assessment of Russian interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory 73 Hicks for example said that the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his Achilles heel because even if Russia had no impact on the election people would think Russia helped him win taking away from what he had accomplished 74 Sean Spicer the first White House communications director recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the legitimacy of his election 75 Gates said the President viewed the Russia investigation as an attack on the legitimacy of his win 76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence a ssessment came out the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win 77 Office of the Director of National rntelligence Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 20 I 6 US Presidential Election at 1 Jan 6 2017 69 70 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election at 1 Jan 6 2017 71 Ken Bensinger et al These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia BuzzFeed Jan 10 2017 72 Donald Trump's News Coriference Full Transcript and Video New York Times Jan II 20 17 avai able at https www nytimes com 20 17 01 I 11 us politics trump-press-conferencetranscript html 73 Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 7 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 18 Spicer 1Oil 6 17 302 at 6 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 2 Gates 4 18 18 302 at 3 see Pompeo 6 28 17 302 at 2 the President believed that the purpose of the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency 74 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 18 75 Spicer 10 17 17 302 at 6 76 Gates 4118 18 302 at 3 77 Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 7 23 U S Department of Justice AtterRey Werk PrtHittet II Ma · CeRtaiR Material Preteetea HRa er Fea R Criffi P 6 e B The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn Overview During the preside ntial trans ition incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to U S sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference After the press reported on Flynn 's contacts with the Russian Ambassador Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls The officials publicly repeated those lies in press interviews The FBI which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration and Flynn told s imilar lies to the FBI On January 26 2017 Department of Justice DOJ offic ia ls notified the White House that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Fly nn had been interviewed by the FBI The next night the President had a private dinne r with FBI Director James Corney in which he asked for Corney's loyalty On February 13 2017 the Pres ident asked Flynn to resign The following day the President had a one-on-one conversation with Corney in wh ich he said I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go to letting Flynn go Evidence 1 Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak Shortly after the election President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael Flynn as his National Security Adv isor 78 For the next two months Flynn played an active role on the Presidential Transition Team PTT coordinating policy positions and communicating with foreign government officials including Russian Ambassador to the Un ited States Sergey Kislyak 79 On December 29 2016 as noted in Volume II Section IT A 4 supra the Obama Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian individuals and entities 80 That day multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration and Flynn informed members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day 81 78 Flynn 11 16 17 302 at 7 President-Elect Donald Trump Selects U S Senator JeffSessions for Attorney General Lt Gen Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and US Rep Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency President-Elect Donald J Trump Press Release Nov 18 20 16 see also e g Bryan Bender Trump names Mike Flynn national security adviser Politico Nov 17 20 16 79 Flynn 11 16 1 7 302 at 8-14 Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 3-5 80 Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment The White House Office of the Press Secretary Dec 29 20 16 81 12 29 16 Email O'Brien to McFarland et al 12 29 l6 Email Bossert to Flynn et at 12 29 16 Email McFarland to Flynn et al SFOOOOOl 12 29 16 Text Message Flynn to Flaherty Tit for tat w Russia not good Russian AMBO reaching out to me today Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 2 24 U S Department of Justice AM emey Werlt Preattet Ma · CeRtaiH Material Preteetea URaer Aea R Crim P 6 e Flynn who was in the Dominican Republic at the time and K T McFarland who was slated to become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with the President-Elect and other senior staff talked by phone about what if anything Flynn should communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions 82 McFarland had spoken with incoming Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia's possible responses and thought she had mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak 83 Based on those conversations McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-aLago did not want Russia to escalate the situation 84 At 4 43 p m that afternoon McFarland sent an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that Gen F lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening 85 Approximately one hour later McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses 86 Inco ming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions situation could be cooled down and not escalated 87 McFarland recalled that at the end of the meeting someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the Russian Ambassador that evening 88 McFarland did not recall any response by the PresidentEiect 89 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election 90 Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29 2016 Flynn called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner without escalating the situation 91 After the call Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance 92 Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration 93 On December 30 2016 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures 82 Statement of Offense at 2-3 United States v Michael T Flynn I 17-cr-232 D D C Dec I 2017 Doc 4 Flynn Statement of Offense Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 3-4 Flynn 11120 17 302 at 3 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6-7 83 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 4-7 recalling discussions about this issue with Bannon and Priebus 84 Flynn Statement of Offense at 3 Flynn 11117 17 302 at 3-4 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 6-7 85 12 29 16 Email McFarland to Flynn et al 86 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 87 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 3 88 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting although he was not certain Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 3 89 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7 90 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at3 91 Flynn Statement of Offense at 3 Flynn 11 17117 302 at 3-4 92 Flynn Statement of Offense at 3 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 7-8 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 4 93 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 8 25 U S Department of Justice A1 terHey Werle Preettet Mtty CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteetee UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead plan further steps to restore RussianUS relations based on the policies of the Trump A ministration 94 Following that announcement the President-Elect tweeted Great move on delay by V Putin - I always knew he was very smart 95 On December 31 2016 Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn's request had been received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request 96 Later that day Flynn told McFarland about this fo llow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn's request 97 McFarland recalled that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference 98 Flynn spoke with other incoming Administration officials that day but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions 99 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official Stephen Bannon the next day 10 Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversations w ith Kislyak and he and Bannon agreed that they had stopped the train on Russia's response to the sanctions 101 On January 3 20 17 Flynn saw the President-E lect in person and thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions but Flynn did not have a specific reco llection of telling the Pres ident-Elect about the substance of his calls w ith Kislyak 102 ° Members ofthe intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to reta liate in response to the sanctions 103 When analyzing Russia's response they becam e aware ofFlynn' s discussion of sanctions with Kislyak 104 Previously the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn based on his relationship with the Russian government 105 Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became a key component of that investigation 106 94 Statement by the President ofRussia President of Russia Dec 30 20 16 12 30 16 95 @reaiDonaldTrump 12 30 16 2 41 p m ET Tweet 96 Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 3 Flynn Statement of Offense at 3 97 Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 3 Flynn 11 17117 302 at 6 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 10 Flynn Statement of Offense at 3 98 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at I 0 see Flynn I 19118 302 at 4 99 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 5-6 ° Flynn I 19 18 302 at 4-5 Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day but said he did not remember discussing sanctions with him Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 9 10 101 Flynn l l 21 17 302 at Flynn l 19 18302 at5 102 Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 6 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at 6 103 McCord 7117 17 302 at 2 104 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 2 105 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 2-3 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 5 106 McCord 7 17117 302 at 2-3 26 U S Department of Justice Atterfte · 'erk Preflttet II May Cefttaift Material Preteetefl UHaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e 2 President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens E lectionInterference Investigations On January 6 2017 as noted in Volume II Section II A 4 supra intelligence officials briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election 107 When the briefing concluded Corney spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified personally sensitive allegations compiled by Steele 108 According to a memorandum Corney drafted immediately after their private discussion the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Corney he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation 109 The President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Corney looked forward to working with him and hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director 11 Corney responded that he intended to continue serving in that role 111 Corney then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the Steele reporting 112 Corney recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive so Corney decided ° 107 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 1-2 108 Corney 11115117 302 at 3 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director ofthe FBI at 1-2 109 Corney 1 7117 Memorandum at I Corney began drafting the memorandum summarizing the meeting immediately after it occurred Corney 11 115117 302 at 4 He finished the memorandum that evening and finalized it the following morning Corney 11115117 302 at 4 ° Corney 1 7117 Memorandum at I Corney I II 15117 302 at 3 Corney identified several other occasions in January 20 I 7 when the President reiterated that he hoped Corney would stay on as FBI director On January II President-Elect Trump called Corney to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought Corney was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director Corney II 115117 302 at 4 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 testimony of James B Corney former Director of the FBI CQ Cong Transcripts at 90 D uring that call he asked me again 'Hope you're goi ng to stay you're doing a great job ' And I told him that I intended to On January 22 at a White House reception honoring law enforcement the President greeted Corney and said he looked forward to working with him Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 testimony of James B Corney former Director of the FBI CQ Cong Transcripts at 22 And as discussed in greater detail in Volume TT Section II D irifra on January 27 the President invited Corney to dinner at the White House and said he was glad Corney wanted to stay on as FBI Director 11 111 Corney I 7 17 Memorandum at I Corney II I 15117 302 at 3 112 Corney 1 7117 Memorandum at 1-2 Corney 11115117 302 at 3 Corney's briefing included the Steele reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving conduct when he was a private citizen during a 20 I 3 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant During the 2016 presidential campaign a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump On October 30 2016 Michael Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said Stopped flow of tapes from Russia but not sure if there's anything else Just so you know I 0130116 Text Message Rtskhiladze to Cohen Rtskhiladze said tapes referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group which had helped host 27 U S Department of Justice AM erfte · Werk Preattet II Ma y CeRta iR Ma teria l Preteetea URaer Fee R Criffl P 6 e to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally 113 Corney recalled he did not want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a J Edgar Hoover move 114 On January l 0 2017 the media reported that Corney had briefed the President-Elect on the Steele reporting 115 and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele on line stating that the information included specific unverified and potentially unverifiable allegations of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives 116 The next day the Pres ident-E lect expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the a llegations in the Steele reports 117 In the following weeks three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine Russia's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with Russia 118 On January 13 2017 the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence SSCT announced that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election including any links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns 119 On January 25 2017 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HPSCI announced that it had been conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and possible coordination with the political campaigns 120 And on February 2 2017 the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election 121 the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia Rtskhiladze 4 4 18 302 at 12 Cohen said he spoke to Trump about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhiladze Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 13 Rtskhiladze said he was told the tapes were fake but he did not communicate that to Cohen Rtskhiladze 5 10 1 8 302 at 7 11 3 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 3-4 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record ofJames B Corney former Director of the FBI at 2 11 4 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 3 11 5 See e g Evan Perez et al Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him CNN Jan I 0 20 17 updated Jan 12 20 17 116 Ken Bensinger et al These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia BuzzFeed News Jan I 0 20 17 117 See I I I 17 Email Clapper to Corney He asked ifl could put out a statement He would prefer of course that I say the documents are bogus which of course I can't do 1 12 17 Email Corney to Clapper He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation Corney 11 15 17 302 at 4-5 118 See 20I 6 Presidential Election Investigation Fast Facts CNN first published Oct 12 20 17 updated Mar I 2019 summarizing starting dates of Russia-related investigations 119 Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities SSCI Jan 13 20 17 120 Joint Statement on Progress ofBipartisan HPSCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures HPSCI Jan 25 20 17 121 Joint Statement from Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian Influence on Democratic Nations' Elections Feb 2 20 17 28 U S Department of Justice Attsrttey Wsrk Prs6ttet May Cstttaitt Material Prsteete6 Utt6er Fee R Grim P 6 e 3 Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kis lyak to Incoming Administration Officials the Media and the FBI On January 12 2017 a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions 122 The column questioned whether Flynn had said something to undercut the U S sanctions and whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act 123 President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger about it 124 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked What the he ll is this all about 125 Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President-E lect was angry about the reporting o n Flynn's conversations with Kislyak 126 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had spoken to the boss and said Flynn needed to kill the story 127 Flynn directed McFarland to call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctio ns had occurred 128 McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of I want to kill the story 129 McFarland made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false informatio n and the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a Trump official had denied that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions 130 When Priebus and other incoming Administration officials questioned Flynn internally about the Washington Post column Flynn maintained that he had not discussed sanctions with Kislyak 13 1 Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-Elect Michael Pence and to incoming press secretary Sean Spicer 132 In subsequent media intervi ews in mid-January Pence Priebus and 122 David Ignatius Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking Washington Post Jan 12 20 17 123 David Ignatius Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking Washi ngton Post Jan 12 2017 The Logan Act makes it a crime for a ny citizen of the United States wherever he may be to without authority of the United States directly or indirectly commence or carr y on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States or to defeat the measures of the United States 18 U S C § 953 124 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 6 125 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at6 126 Priebus 1118 18 302 at 6 127 Flynn 11 21 17 302 at I Flynn 11 20 17 302 at 6 128 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 12-1 3 129 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 12 130 McFarland 12 22117 302 at 12-1 3 McFarland 8 29 17 302 at 8 see David Ignatius Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking Washington Post Jan 12 2017 13 1 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at I 8 Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 7 Priebus 10 13117 302 at 7-8 S Miller 8 3 1117 302 at 8-11 132 Flynn 11 17 17 302 at I 8 Flynn 1 19118 302 at 7 S Miller 8 3 1 17 302 at I0- 11 29 U S Department of Justice A sfftey Wsrk Prsettet May CsAtaiH Material PFsteetee UAeer Fee R Criffl P 6 e Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions basing those denials on their conversations with Flynn 133 The public statements of incoming Administration officials deny ing that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials who were aware that the statements were not true 134 Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues-who in turn had unwittingly misled the American public- creating a compromise situation for Flynn because the Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied 135 The FBI investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader Russia investigation 136 On January 20 2017 President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as National Security Advisor On January 23 2017 Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated that he had spoken with Flynn the night before who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were about topics unrelated to sanctions 137 Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice's concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory information to compromise him 138 On January 24 2017 Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI 139 During the interview which took place at the White House Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from escalating the s ituation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the Obama Administration 14 Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those sanctions as a result of Flynn's request 141 ° 133 Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence CBS Jan 15 20 17 Julie Hirschfield Davis et al Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions Were Imposed Washington Post Jan 13 20 17 Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus NBC Jan 15 2017 134 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 2-3 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 3-4 McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 5 DOJ officials were really freaked out about it 135 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 3 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 4 136 McCord 7 17117 302 at 4 McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 5-6 137 Sean Spicer White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Jan 23 20 17 138 Yates 8115 17 302 at 4 Axelrod 7 20117 302 at 5 139 Flynn Statement of Offense at 2 °Flynn Statement of Offense at 2 14 14 1 Flynn Statement of Offense at 2 On December 1 2017 Flynn adm itted to making these false statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U S C § I 00 I which makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully make any materially false fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation to federal law enforcement officials See Volume I Section IV A 7 supra 30 U S Department of Justice Afterrte Werk Predt tet M a y Certta irt Ma teria l Preteeted UHcler Fee R Grim P 6 e 4 DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Conc e rns About Flynn On January 26 2017 Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in person 142 Later that day Yates and Mary McCord a senior national security official at the Department of Justice met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office attorney James Burnham 143 Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied 144 Yates disclosed that Flynn had been interviewed by the FBT 145 She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn had performed during that interview 146 but she indicated that Flynn's statements to the FBI were simi lar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed sanctions 147 McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not pinned Flynn down in lies 148 but he asked John E isenberg who served as legal advisor to the National Security Council to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and his contacts with Kislyak 149 That afternoon McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to discuss concerns about Flynn 150 McGahn described what Yates had told him and the President asked him to repeat it so he did 151 McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of Flynn he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanctions with Kislyak but that there may not have been a clear violation of 18 U S C § I 001 152 The President asked about Section l 001 and McGahn explained the law to him and also explained the Logan Act 153 The President 142 Yates 8 15117 302 at 6 143 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 6 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 6 SCR015 000198 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President 144 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 6-8 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 6-7 Burnham 11 3 17 302 at 4 SCRO 15_ 000 198 2115117 Draft Memorandum to ft le from the Office of the Counsel to the President 145 McGahn 11 30117 302 at 5 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 7 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 7 Burnham II 3 17 302 at 4 146 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 7 McCord 7 17 17 302 at 7 SCR015_000198 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file fr m the Office of the Counsel to the President Burnham 11 3 17 302 at 4 147 148 McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 5 149 SCRO I5_000198 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President McGahn I I 30117 302 at 6 8 150 McGahn II 30 17 302 at 6 SCRO 15 000278 White House Counsel 's Office Memorandum re Flynn Tick Tock on January 26 McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS SCR015_000198 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office oftht Counsel to the President 15 1 McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 6 152 McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 7 153 McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 7 31 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Werle PreElttet May CeHtaiH Material PreteeteEl UHEler FeEl R Grim P 6 e instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed that they not discuss it with any other officials 154 Priebus recalled that the President was angry with Flynn in light ofwhat Yates had told the White House and said not again this guy this stuff 155 That evening the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what they thought about FBI Director Comey 156 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats who was at the dinner no one openly advocated terminating Corney but the consensus on him was not positive 157 Coats told the group that he thought Corney was a good director 158 Coats encouraged the President to meet Corney face-to-face and spend time with him before making a decision about whether to retain him 159 5 McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates President Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Corney The next day January 27 2017 McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of Eisenberg' s initial legal research into Flynn's conduct and specifically whether Flynn may have violated the Espionage Act the Logan Act or 18 U S C § 1001 160 Based on his preliminary research Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18 U S C § 1001 and the Logan Act 161 Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses and 154 McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 7 SCRO 15_000 198-99 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President 155 Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 8 Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn for other reasons at this time Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by December 2016 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 12 The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama had warned him about Flynn shortly after the election Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 4-5 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 7 President Obama's comment sat with President-Elect Trump more than Hicks expected Priebus said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 8 Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets sent by Flynn and his son and she described Flynn as being on thin ice by early February 2017 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 7 I 0 156 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 2 157 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 2 158 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 2 159 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 2 160 SCRO 15 000199 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 8 161 SCRO 15_ 000199 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 9 32 U S Department of Justice AfterHey Werk Preettet May Cetttaitt Material P'reteetee Utteer Fee R Grim P 6 e told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge under the circumstances 162 That same morning McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn again 163 In that second meeting McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn but stated that the White House did not want to take action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn 164 Yates responded that Department of Justice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the information provided 165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to F lynn's discussions with Kislyak 166 Also on January 27 the President called FBI Director Corney and invited him to dinner that even ing 167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner he told the President something Iike don't talk about Russia whatever you do and the President promised he would not talk about Russia at the dinner 168 McGahn had previously advised the President that he s hould not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference in law enforcement 169 When Bannon learned about the President's planned dinner with Corney he suggested that he or Priebus also attend but the President stated that he wanted to dine with Corney alone 17 Corney said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening he was surprised and concerned to see that no one else had been invited 171 ° 162 SCROI5 000199 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President Eisenberg II 29 17 302 at 9 163 SCR015_000199 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 8 Yates 8 15 17 302 at 8 164 Yates 8 15117 302 at 9 McGahn 11 30117 302 at 8 165 Yates 8 15117 302 at 9 Burnham II 3 17 302 at 5 see SCRO 15_ 00 199 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President Yates was unwilling to confirm or deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not object to the White House taking action against Flynn 166 Yates 9115 17 302 at 9 Burnham 11 3 17 302 at 5 In accordance with McGahn's request the Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in early February Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 5 FBI 217 17 Electronic Communication at I documenting 2 2 17 meeting with Eisenberg 167 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 6 SCROI2b_OOOOOI President's Daily Diary 1 27 17 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 2-3 168 Priebus I OJ13 1 7 302 at 17 169 See McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 9 Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 2 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 17 170 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 17 171 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 3 see Corney 11 15 17 302 at 6 33 U S Department of Justice Attarney Wark Praettet II May Cantain Material Prateetee Uneer Fee R Grim P 6 e Corney provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo an interview with this Office and congressional testimony According to Corney's account of the dinner the President repeatedly brought up Corney's future asking whether he wanted to stay o n as FBI director 172 Because the President had previously said he wanted Corney to stay on as FBI director Corney interpreted the President's comments as an effort to create a patro nage relationship by having Corney ask for his job 173 The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Corney had raised in the January 6 2017 briefing and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI to investigate the allegations to prove they were false 174 Corney responded that the President should think carefully about issuing such an o rder because it could create a narrative that the FBI was investigating him personally which was incorrect 175 Later in the dinner the President brought up Flynn and said the guy has serious judgment issues 176 Corney did not comment on Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn 177 According to Corney's account at one point during the dinner the President stated I need loyalty I expect loyalty 178 Corney did not respond and the conversation moved o n to other topics but the President returned to the s ubject of Corney's job at the end of the dinner and repeated I need loyalty 179 Corney responded You will always get honesty from me 180 The 172 Corney ll 15 17 302 at 7 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at I 3 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 3 173 Corney ll 15 17 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 3 174 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at 3 Hearing on Russian Election Intetference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 175 Corney l 28 1 7 Memorandum at 3 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 176 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at 4 Corney ll 15117 302 at 7 177 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at 4 Corney II 115117 302 at 7 178 Corney 1 28 18 Memorandum at 2 Corney ll 15 17 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 3 179 Corney 1 28117 Memorandum at 3 Corney 11 15117 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 3-4 ° 18 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at 3 Corney 11 1511 7 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Con g June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 34 U S Department of Justice AM erttey Werle Preattet II May CetttaiH Material Preteetea Uttaer FeEl R Crifft P 6 e President said That's w hat I want honest loy alty 181 Corney said You will get that from me 1 s2 After Corney's account ofthe dinner became public the President and his advisors disputed that he had asked for Corney's loyalty 183 The President also indicated that he had not invited Corney to dinner telling a reporter that he thought Corney had asked for the dinner because he wanted to stay on 184 But substantial evidence corroborates Corney's account of the dinner invitation and the request for loyalty The President's Daily D iary confirms that the President extend ed a dinner invitation to Corney on January 27 185 With respect to the substance of the dinner conversation Corney documented the President' s request for loyalty in a memorandum he began drafting the night of the dinner 186 senior FBI officials recall that Corney told them about the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred 187 and Corney described the request while 181 Corney 1 28 17 Memorandum at 3 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 I 7 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 182 Corney 1128117 Memorandum at 3 Corney 11115 17 302 at 7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 I 7 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 183 See e g Michael S Schmidt In a Private Dinner Trump Demanded Loyalty Corney Demurred New York Times May I I 20 17 quoting Sarah Sanders as saying The President would never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty Ali Vitali Trump Never Asked for Corney's Loyalty President's Personal Lawyer Says NBC June 8 20 I 7 quoting the President's personal counsel as saying The president also never told Mr Corney ' I need loyalty J expect loyalty ' in form or substance Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House June 9 20 I7 J hardly know the man I' m not going to say ' I want you to pledge allegiance ' Who would do that Who would ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath In a private conversation with Spicer the President stated that he had never asked fo r Corney's loyalty but added that if he had asked for loyalty Who cares Spicer I0 16 17 302 at 4 The President also to ld McGahn that he never said what Corney sai d he had McGahn 12 12 I7 302 at 17 184 Interview of Donald J Trump NBC May II 20 17 185 SCR012b_OOOOOI President's Daily Diary 1 27 17 reflecting that the President called Corney in the morning on January 27 and t he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation In addition two witnesses corroborate Corney' s account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner without Corney having asked for it Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 17 the President asked to schedule the January 27 dinner because he did not know much about Corney and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on as FB I Director Rybicki 11 2 1 18 302 at 3 recalling that Corney told hi m about the President's dinner invitation on the day of the dinner 186 Corney II 15 17 302 at 8 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 187 McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 9-10 Rybicki l l 2 1 18 302 at 3 After leaving the Whi te House Corney called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe summarized what he and the President had discussed including the President's request for loyalty and expressed shock over the President's request McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 9 Corney also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty properly McCabe 8 17117 302 at 10 Rybicki 11 2 1 18 302 at 3 In addition Corney distributed his 35 U S Department of Justice AlferAey Werk Pr6tlttet II May C6Atail'l Material Pr6teetetl UAtler Fetl R Grim P 6 e under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U S C § 100 I Corney's memory of the details of the dinner including that the President requested loyalty has remained consistent throughout 188 6 F lynn 's Resignation On February 2 2017 Eisenberg reviewed the underly ing information relating to Flynn's calls with Kislyak 189 Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes that could apply to Flynn's conduct but he did not believe the White House had enough information to make a definitive recommendation to the President 190 Eisenberg and McGahn discussed that E isenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act 191 B ecause W hite House officials were uncerta in what Flynn had told the FBI however they could not assess his exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U S C § I 001 192 T he week of February 6 Flynn had a one-on-one conversation w ith the President in the Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak 193 F lynn recalled that the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations 194 Flynn listed the specific dates on which he remembered speaking w ith Kislyak but the President corrected o ne of the dates he listed 195 T he Pres ident asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and F lynn responded that he might have talked about sanctions 196 memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team and McCabe confirmed that the memorandum captured what Corney said on the telephone call immediately followi ng the dinner McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 9-10 188 There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Corney wrote documenting his interactions with the President For example Corney recalled and his memoranda refl ect that he told the President in his January 6 2017 meeting and on phone calls on March 30 and April It 2017 that the FBI was not investigating the President personally On May 8 2017 during White House discussions about firing Corney the President told Rosenstein and others that Corney had told him three times that he was not under investigation including once in person and twice on the phone Gauhar-000058 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes 189 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 5 FBI 217 17 Electronic Communication at I documenting 2 2 17 meeting with Eisenberg 190 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 6 19 1 Eisenberg 11129 17 302 at 9 SCR01 5_000200 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President 192 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 9 193 Flynn 11121117 302 at 2 194 Flynn 11 2 1 17 302 at 2 195 Flynn 11 21 17 302 at2 196 Flynn 11 21117 302 at 2-3 36 U S Department of Justice AttarRey War Preattet May CeHtaift Material Prateetea URaer Fed R Grift P 6 e On February 9 2017 the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with Kislyak the month before the President took office 197 After the publication of that story Vice President Pence learned of the Department of Justice' s notification to the White House about the content of Flynn's calls 198 He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak 199 FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when they reviewed it recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan Act 200 McCabe responded that he did not know but the FBI was investigating the matter because it was a possibility 201 Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak 2°2 Flynn had also told White House officials that the FBI had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation ofhim 203 but Eisenberg did not believe him 204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be terminated and recommended that course of action to the President 205 That weekend Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago 206 F lynn recalled that on February 12 2017 on the return flight to D C on Air Force One the President asked him whether he had lied to the Vice President 207 Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his calls but he did not think he lied 208 The President responded Okay That's fine I got it 209 197 Greg Miller et al National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian ambassador despite denials officials say Washington Post Feb 9 20 17 198 SCR015_000202 2 15 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President McGahn 11 30117 302 at 12 199 SCR015_000202 2115117 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President McCabe 8117 17 302 at 11-13 Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 10 McGahn 11130 17 302 at 12 200 McCabe 8 17117 302 at 13 201 McCabe 8117117 302 at 13 202 McGahn 11 30117 302 at 12 Priebus I 118118 302 at 8 Priebus I 0113117 302 at I 0 SCR015_000202 2115 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office ofthe Counsel to the President 203 McGahn 11130117 302 at II Eisenberg 11 129117 302 at 9 Priebus 10113117 302 at 11 204 Eisenberg 11 129117 302 at 9 205 SCR015_000202 2115117 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President Priebus 10113 17 302 at 10 McGahn 11130117 302 at 12 206 Flynn 11117117 302 at 8 207 Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 9 Flynn 11 I 17117 302 at 8 208 Flynn 11117117 302 at 8 Flynn II 19 18 302 at 9 209 Flynn 1119118 302 at 9 37 U S Department of Justice AM'erttey Werlt Pree i1 1et May CetttttiH Material Preteetee i Utte ier Fee R Grim P 6 e ° On February 13 2017 Priebus told Flynn he had to resign 21 Flynn said he wanted to say goodbye to the President so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office 211 Priebus recalled that the President hugged Flynn shook his hand and said We' ll give you a good recommendation You ' re a good guy· We'll take care ofyou 21 2 Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and distributed to the White House communications team stated that McGahn had advised the President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted and the President had determined that the issue with Flynn was one oftrust 213 Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign not based on a legal issue but based on a trust issue where a level of trust between the President and General Flynn had eroded to the point where the President felt he had to make a change 2 14 7 The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Corney On February 14 2017 the day after Flynn's resignation the President had lunch at the White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie 215 According to Christie at one point during the lunch the President said Now that we fired Flynn the Russia thing is over 216 Christie laughed and responded No way 2 17 He said this Russia thing is far from over and w e'll be here on Valentine' s Day 20 18 talking about this 218 The President said w hat do you mean Flynn met with the Russians That was the problem I fired Flynn It's over 2 19 Christie recalled responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been investigated firing Flynn would not end the investigation 22 Christie said there was no way to make an investigation shorter but a lot of ways to make it longer 221 The President asked Christie what he meant and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation even if he was ° 2 10 Priebus l 18 18 302 at 9 211 Priebus l l8 18302 at9 F1ynn 11 17 17302 at 10 212 Priebus II 18 18 302 at 9 Flynn II 117 17 302 at 10 213 SCR004_00600 2 16117 Email Burnham to Donaldson 214 Sean Spicer White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Feb 14 20 17 After Flynn pleaded guilty to violating 18 U S C § 100 I in December 2017 the President tweeted I had to fire General Flynn because he lied to the Vice President and the FBI @realDonaldTrump 12 2 17 12 14 p m ET Tweet The next day the President' s personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet Maegan Vazquez et at Trump's lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn CNN Dec 3 20 17 21 5 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 2-3 SCR012b_000022 President' s Daily Diary 2 14117 2 16 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3 217 Christie 2 13 1 9 302 at 3 218 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3 Christie said he thought when the President said the Russia thing he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia Christie thought the more important th ing was that there was an investigation Christie 2 13 19 302 at 4 2 19 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3 °Christie 2113 19 302 at 3 22 221 Christie 2 13 1 9 302 at 3 38 U S Department of Justice At teraey Werk Preattet May Ceataia Material Preteetea Uaaer Fea R Grim P 6 e frustrated at times 222 Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of Flynn like gum on the bottom of your shoe 22 3 Towards the end of the lunch the President brought up Corney and asked if Christie was still friendly with him 224 Christie said he was 225 The President told Christie to call Corney and tell him that the President really like s him Tell him he's part of the team 226 At the end ofthe lunch the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey 227 Christie had no intention of complying with the President's request that he contact Comey 228 He thought the President's request was nonsensical and Christie did not want to put Corney in the position of having to receive such a phone call 229 Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass on that message 230 At 4 p m that afternoon the President met with Corney Sessions and other officials for a homeland security briefing 231 At the end of the briefing the President dismissed the other attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Corney alone 232 Sessions and senior advisor to the President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other patticipants left but the President 222 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3-4 223 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3 Christie also recalled that during the lunch Flynn called Kushner who was at the lunch and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that day Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of You know the President respects you The President cares about you I' ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later Kushner looked at the President when he mentioned the tweet and the President nodded his assent Christie 2 13 19 302 at 3 Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did not appreciate the comments Flynn 1 19 18 302 at 9 224 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 4 225 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 4 226 Christie 2 13119 302 at 4-5 227 Christie 2 13119 302 at 5 228 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 5 229 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 5 °Christie 2 13 19 302 at 5 23 23 1 SCROI2b 000022 President's Daily Diary 2 14 17 Corney 11 15 17 302 at9 232 Corney 11115 17 302 at 10 2114 17 Corney Memorandum at I Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 Priebus 10 1 3117 302 at 18 confirming that everyone was shooed out like Corney said in his June testimony 39 A tarAey U S Department of Justice Werle Praattet II May CeA a iA Material Prateetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e excused them repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey 233 At some point after others had left the Oval Office Priebus opened the door but the President sent him away 234 According to Corney's account of the meeting once they were alone t he President began the conversation by saying I want to talk about Mike Flynn 235 The President stated that Flynn had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians but had to be terminated because he had misled the Vice President 236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified information but the President returned to Flynn saying he is a good guy and has been through a lot 237 The President stated I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go to Jetting Flynn go He is a good guy I hope you can let this go 'm 8 Corney agreed that F lynn is a good guy but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn 239 Corney testified under oath that he took the President's statement as a direction because of the President's position and the circumstances of the one-on-one meeting 240 233 Corney 11115 17 302 at I 0 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 1 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 Sessions recalled that the President asked to speak to Corney alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room he described Corney's testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as pretty accurate Sessions I 17 18 302 at 6 Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Corney to stay behind Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 24 234 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 2 Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 18 235 Corney 1 I 15 17 302 at 10 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 1 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 115th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 4 236 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at I Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 5 237 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 10 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 2 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 5 238 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 5 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 2 Corney said he was highly confident that the words in quotations in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President He said he knew from the outset of the meeting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence and he remembered the words used by the President and wrote them down soon after the meeting Corney 11115 17 302 at 10-ll 239 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 10 Corney 2 14 17 Memorandum at 2 240 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 31 testimony of James B Corney former Director of the FBI Corney further stated I mean this is the president of the United States with me alone saying ' I hope' this I took it as this is what he wants me to do d see also Corney II 15 17 302 at I0 Corney took the statement as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation 40 U S Department of Justice AM6mey W6rk Pr6thtet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e Shortly after meeting with the President Corney began drafting a memorandum documenting their conversation 241 Corney also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the President' s request and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the President's statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request 242 Corney also asked for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Corney alone with the President again 243 8 The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn After Flynn was forced to resign the press raised questions about why the President waited more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had known about Flynn' s contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification 244 The press also continued to raise questions about connections between Russia and the President's campaign 245 On February 15 2017 the President told reporters General Flynn is a wonderful man I think he's been treated very very unfairly by the media 246 On February 16 2017 the President held 241 Corney II I 5 17 302 at II Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 5 242 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 11 Rybicki 6 9 17 302 at 4 Rybicki 6 22 17 302 at 1 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 5-6 243 Corney 11115 17 302 at II Rybicki 6 9117 302 at 4-5 Rybicki 6 22 17 302 at 1-2 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 6 confirming that later in the week following Corney's one-on-one meeting with the President in the Oval Office Corney told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the President Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 6 within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting Corney told Sessions he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President Rybicki 11 21 18 302 at 4 Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Corney wanted to talk about his concerns about meeting with the President alone Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6 244 See e g Sean Spicer White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Feb 14 2017 questions from the press included if the President was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President other officials here and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians why would he be kept on for almost three weeks and Did the President instruct Flynn to talk about sanctions with the Russian ambassador Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term Priebus l 18 18 302 at 8 245 E g Sean Sullivan eta Senators from both parties pledge to deepen probe of Russia and the 2016 election Washington Post Feb 14 20 17 Aaron Blake 5 times Donald Trump's team denied contact with Russia Washington Post Feb 15 20 17 Oren Dorell Donald Trump's ties to Russia go back 30 years USA Today Feb 15 2017 Pamela Brown et al Trump aides were in constant touch with senior Russian officials during campaign CNN Feb 15 2017 Austin Wright Corney briefs senators amidfuror over Trump-Russia ties Politico Feb 17 20 17 Megan Twohey Scott Shane A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia Courtesy of Trump Associates New York Times Feb 19 20 17 246 Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu oflsrael in Joint Press Conference White House Feb 15 2017 41 A ePHe · U S Department of Justice Wet'lt PPeettet May CeHtaiH MatePial PPeteetee Ufleef Fee R CPim P 6 e a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn didn't tell the Vice President of the United States the facts and then he didn ' t remember And that j ust wasn ' t acceptable to me 247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak but it certainly would have been okay with me if he did I would have directed him to do it ifl thought he wasn ' t doing it I didn' t direct him but I would have directed him because that's his job 248 In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him 249 The President also denied having any connection to Russia stating I have nothing to do with Russia Ttold you I have no deals there I have no anything 250 The President also said he had nothing to do with WikiLeaks's publicatio n of information hacked from the Clinton campaign 2 51 9 The President Attempts to Have K T McFarland Create a Witness Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak On February 22 2017 Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor but they suggested to her that the Administration could make her the ambassador to Singapore 252 The next day the President asked Priebus to have McFarland draft an internal emai I that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call the Russian Ambassador about sanctions 253 Priebus said he told the President he would only direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it 254 Priebus cal led McFarland into his office to convey the Pres ident's request that she memorialize in writing that the President did not direct Flyrm to talk to Kislyak 255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions and she declined to say yes or no 247 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 17 248 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 17 The President also said that Flynn's conduct wasn't wrong - what he did in terms of the information he saw The President said that Flynn was just doing the job and if anything he did something right 249 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 17 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 9 250 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 17 25 1 Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 17 252 KTMF_00000047 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 16-17 253 See Priebus 1 18 18 302 at II see also KTMF_ 00000048 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 254 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at II 255 KTMF_ 00000048 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 42 U S Department of Justice AttarRe · Wark Pradttet II May CaRtaiR Material Prateetefl URder Fed R Criffi P 6 e to the request 256 Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's request and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office 257 McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg 258 McFarland told him that she had been fired from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapo re but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak 259 Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the requested letter 260 As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous Memorandum for the Record that she wrote because she was concerned by the President' s request Eisenberg thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea- from my side because the email would be awkward Why would I be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record But it would also be a bad idea for the President because it looked a s if my ambassadorial appointment was in some way a quid pro quo 261 Later that evening Priebus stopped by McFarland 's office and told her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned it 262 Around the same time the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know that the President still cared about him 263 Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in and that Flynn was an American hero 264 Priebus thought the Pres ident did not want Flynn saying bad things about him 265 On March 31 2017 following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and congressional investigators in exchange for immunity the President tweeted Mike Flynn should ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt excuse for big election loss by media Dems of 256 KTMF_00000047 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record I said I did not know whether he did or didn't but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's while Flynn was on vacation in Carribean and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump or Trump-Russian phone calls McFarland 12 22 1 7 302 at 17 257 Priebus 1118118 302 at II 258 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 259 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 °KTMF_00000048 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record McFarland 12 22 17 302 26 at 17 26 1 KTMF_ 00000048 McFarland 2 26 17 Memorandum for the Record see McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 262 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 17 KTMF 00000048 McFarland 2 26 1 7 Memorandum for the Record 263 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 9 264 Priebus I 18 18 302 at 9 Flynn 1 1 9 18 302 at 9 265 Priebus 1118 18 302 at 9-10 43 U S Department of Justice A1 terfle ' Werl Prea1 1et II Ma · Cefltaifl Material Preteetea Uf aer Fee R Grim P 6 e historic proportion 266 Tn late March or early April the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong 67 Analysis In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act According to Corney's account of his February 14 2017 meeting in the Oval Office the President told him I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go to letting Flynn go I hope you can let this go In analyzing whether these statements constitute an obstructive act a threshold question is whether Corney's account of the interaction is accurate and if so whether the President's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of justice by shutting down an inquiry that cou ld result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal charge After Corney's account of the President' s request to let Flynn go became public the President publicly disputed several aspects of the story The President told the New York Times that he did not shoo other people out of the room when he talked to Corney and that he did not remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey 268 The President also publicly denied that he had asked Corney to let Flynn go or otherwise communicated that Corney should drop the investigation ofFiynn 269 In private the President denied aspects of Corney's account to White House advisors but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Corney and stated that Flynn was a good guy 270 Despite those denials substantial evidence corroborates Corney' s account 266 @reaiDonaldTrump 3 31 17 7 04a m ET Tweet see Shane Harris at a Mike Flynn Offers to Testify in Exchange for Immunity Wall Street Journal Mar 30 2017 267 McFarland 12 22 17 302 at 18 268 Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 20 17 Hicks recalled that the President told her he had never asked Corney to stay behind in his office Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 12 269 In a statement on May 16 2017 the White House said While the President has repeatedly expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country the President has never asked Mr Corney or anyone else to end any investigation including any investigation involving General Flynn This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President and Mr Corney See MichaelS Schmidt Corney Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation New York Times May 16 2017 quoting White House statement @realDonaldTrump 12 3 17 6 15 a m ET Tweet I never asked Corney to stop investigating Flynn Just more Fake News covering another Corney lie 270 Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Corney that Flynn was a good guy and he hoped everything worked out for him Priebus I0 13 17 302 at 19 McGahn recalled that the President denied saying to Corney that he hoped Corney would let Flynn go but added that he was allowed to hope The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 8 44 U S Department of Justice AttorHe ' Work Prothtet May CoHtaifl Material Pmteetetl UHtler Fetl R Grim P 6 e First Corney wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the same day it occurred Corney also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President that day and their recollections of what Corney told them at the time are consistent with Corney's account 271 Second Corney provided testimony about the President' s request that he letD Flynn go under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to penalties for lying under 18 U S C § 100 I Corney's recollections ofthe encounter have remained consistent over time Third the objective corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to occur support Corney' s description of the event Corney recall ed that the President cleared the room to speak with Corney alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office that Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President and that Priebus briefly opened the door during the meeting prompting the President to wave him away While the President has publicly denied those details other Administration officials who were present have confirmed Corney' s account of how he ended up in a one-on-one meeting with the President 272 And the President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Corney about Flynn in their one-on-one meeting Fourth the President's decision to clear the room and in particular to exclude the Attorney General from the m eeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Corney which is consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Corney recalls rather than a more innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General Finally Corney' s reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President having asked him to let Flynn go Corney met with the FBI leadership team which agreed to keep the President' s statements closely held and not to infotm the team working on the Flynn investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President' s request Corney also promptly met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again an account verified by Sessions FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki and Jody Hunt who was then the Attorney General's chief of staff A second question is whether the President's statements which were not phrased as a direct order to Corney could impede or interfere with the FBI ' s investigation of Flynn While the President said he hope d Corney could let Flynn go rather than affirmatively directing him to do so the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Corney to close the FBI's investigation into Flynn First the President arranged the meeting with Corney so that they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General which suggests that the President meant to make a request to Corney that he did not want anyone else to hear Second because the President is the head of the Executive Branch when he says that he hopes a subordinate will do something it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the President wants Indeed the President repeated a version of let this go three times and Corney 271 Rybicki 11 21 18 302 at4 McCabe 8 17 17 302 at 13-14 272 See Priebus I0 13 17 302 at 18 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 6 45 Atterfle · U S Department of Justice Werk Pre6t1et II May Cefltaifl Material Preteete6 UHeer Fee R Criffl P 6 e testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive which is corroborated by the way Corney reacted at the time b Nexus to a proceeding To establish a nexus to a proceeding it would be necessary to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the investigation of flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Corney no grand jury subpoenas into Fl But 's lies to the FBI violated had been issued as part of the FBI's federal criminal law and resulted in Flynn 's prosecution for violatmg e t1me spoke to Corney about Flynn DOJ officials had informed McGahn who informed the President that Flynn 's statements to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had told the same version of events to the FBI McGahn also informed the President that Flynn's condu t could violate 18 U S C § I 00 I After the Vice President and senior White House officials reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February I 0 2017 they believed that Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been lying In addition the President's instruction to the FBI Director to let Flynn go suggests his awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution c Intent As part of our investigation we examined whether the President had a personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for exampl e whether the President was aware ofFiynn's communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred such that the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been passed on to the public Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and content of Flynn's calls when they occurred but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be relied upon to establish the President's knowledge In advance ofFlynn's initial call with Kislyak the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak Flynn told Mcfarland about the substance ofhis calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response and Flynn recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully stopped the train on Russia's response to the sanctions It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request and the President was pleased by the Russian response calling it a g reat move And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him about the calls with Kislyak But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his calls with Kislyak and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect directly about the calls Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn And in February 2017 the President asked Flynn what was discussed on the calls and whether he had lied to the Vice President suggesting that he did not already know Our investigation accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn ' s discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White House of those discussions in late January 2017 The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise 46 U S Department of Justice AtterRe ' Werk Preattet II May CeRtaiR Material Preteetea URaer Fe€1 R CrifH P 6 e possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive to end the FBI's inquiry into Flynn's conduct Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's broader Russia investigation and that he believed as he told Christie that terminating Flynn would end the whole Russia thing Flynn ' s firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the President's campaign had colluded with Russia Multiple witnesses recalled that the President viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election The President paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak Just hours before meeting one-on-one with Corney the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to the Russia inquiries And after Christie pushed back telling the President that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation the President asked Christie to reach out to Corney and convey that the President liked him and he was part of the team That afternoon the President cleared the room and asked Corney to let Flynn go We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President's direction to Corney was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn In public statements the President repeatedly described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation and the President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President care d about him and felt bad for him At the same time multiple senior advisors including Bannon Priebus and Hicks said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn Priebus said he believed the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard but from concern about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early in the Administration And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of support for Flynn were motivated by the President' s desire to keep Flynn from saying negative things about him The way in which the President communicated the request to Corney also is relevant to understanding the President's intent When the President first learned about the FBI investigation into Flynn he told McGahn Bannon and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the White House The next day the President invited Corney for a one-on-one dinner against the advice of an aide who recommended that other White House officials also attend At the dinner the President asked Corney for loyalty and at a different point in the conversation mentioned that Flynn had judgment issues When the President met with Corney the day after Flynn's termination-shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia investigation-the President cleared the room even excluding the Attorney General so that he could again speak to Corney alone The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Corney contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement activities And the President later denied that he cleared the room and asked Corney to let Flynn go - a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion 47 U S Department of Justice AM errtey Werlt Preattet May CerttaiH Material Preteetea Urtaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e Finally the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President's concern about being associated with Flynn' s conduct The evidence does not establish that the President was trying to have McFarland lie The President's request however was sufficiently irregular that McFarland-who did not know the full extent of Flynn's communications with the President and thus could not make the representation the President wanted-felt the need to draft an internal memorandum documenting the President's request and Eisenberg was concerned that the request would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship C The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBI's Russia Investigation Overview In early March 2017 the President learned that Sessions was considering recusing from the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal After Sessions announced his recusal on March 2 the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked Sessions to unrecuse On March 20 2017 Corney publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation In the days that followed the President contacted Corney and other intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to lift the cloud of the ongoing investigation Evidence 1 Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation In late February 2017 the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether Sessions should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump Campaign 273 On March I 2017 the press reported that in his January confirmation hearing to become Attorney General Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election leading to congressional calls for Sessions to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election 274 Also on March I the President called Corney and said he wanted to check in and see how Corney was doing 275 According to an email Corney sent to his chief of staff after the call the President talked about Sessions a bit said that he had heard Corney was doing great and said that he hoped Corney would come by to say hello when he was at the White House 276 Corney 273 Sessions 1117 18 302 at I Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 3 274 E g Adam Entous et al Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year encounters he later didnotdisclose Washington Post Mar 1 2017 275 3 1 17 Email Corney to Rybicki SCR012b_000030 President's Daily Diary 3 1 17 reflecting call with Corney at II 55 am 276 3 1 17 Email Corney to Rybicki see Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 86 testimony 48 U S Department of Justice Att6rHey W6rk Pr6thtet Ma · C6Htttifl Material Pr6teetea UHaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e interpreted the call as an effort by the President to pull him in but he did not perceive the call as an attempt by the President to find out what Corney was doing with the Flynn investigation 277 The next morning the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell him not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation 278 McGahn understood the President to be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his confirmation hearing leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the presidency and derail his policy objectives and detract from favorable press coverage of a Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week 279 McGahn reached out to Sessions and reported that the President was not happy about the possibility of recusal 280 Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal 281 McGahn reported back to the President about the call with Sessions and the President reiterated that he did not want Sessions to recuse 282 Throughout the day McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to avert Sessions's recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel Sessions's chief of staff and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and by contacting Sessions himself two more times 283 Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his recusal 284 That afternoon Sessions announced his decision to recuse from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the U nited States 285 Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call given the applicable of James B Corney former Director of the FBI H e called me one day H e just called to check in and tell me I was doing an awesome job and wanted to see how I was doing 277 Corney I 1115117 302 at 17- I 8 278 McGahn I I 30 17 302 at I 6 279 McGahn 11130 17 302 at 16-17 see SCAD 00123 Donaldson 3 2 17 Notes Just in the middle of another Russia Fiasco 280 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 3 281 McGahn 11 30 I 7 302 at 17 282 McGahn I 1 30 17 302 at 17 283 McGahn 11130 17 302 at 18-19 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 3 Hunt 2 1 1 8 302 at 4 Donaldson II 6 17 302 at 8- I 0 see Hunt-0000 17 SC_AD_00121 Donaldson 3 2 17 Notes 284 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 3 285 Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal Department of Justice Press Release Mar 2 20 17 During the course of the last several weeks I have met with the relevant senior career Department officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for President of the United States Having concluded those meetings today I have decided to recuse myself from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns fo r President of the United States At the time of Sessions's recusal Dana Boente then the Acting Deputy Attorney General and U S Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia became the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the Department of Justice Id Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice Dana Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from 49 U S Department of Justice AMerRey Werk Pretittet Ma · CeRtaiH Material Preteeteti URtier Feti R Grim P 6 e language in the Code of Federal Regulations CFR which Sessions considered to be clear and decisive 286 Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was very thin 287 Sessions got the impression based on calls he received from White House officials that the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney General 288 Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal the White H ouse Counsel 's Office directed that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter 289 Internal White House Counsel' s Office notes from March 2 2017 state No contact w Sessions and No comms I Serious concerns about obstruction 290 On M arch 3 the day after Sessions' s recusal McGahn was called into the Oval Office 29 1 Other advisors were there inc luding Priebus and Bannon 292 T he President opened the conversation by saying I don't have a lawyer 293 The President expressed anger at McGahn about the recusal a nd brought up Roy Cohn stating that he w ished Cohn was h is attorney 294 McGahn inte rpreted this comm ent as directed at him suggesting that Cohn would fight for the which r have recused myself to the extent they exist see Exec Order No 13775 82 Fed Reg 10697 Feb 14 2017 286 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 1-2 28 C F R § 45 2 provides that no employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with a ny person or organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution and defines political relationship as a close identification with an elected official a candidate whether or not successful for elective public office a political party or a campaign organization ari sing from service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof 287 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 2 288 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 3 289 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 11 SC_AD_00123 Donaldson 3 2 17 Notes It is not clear whether the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his recusal 290 SC_AD_00123 Donaldson 3 2117 Notes McGahn said he believed the note No comms I Serious concerns about obstruction may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team saying crazy thi ngs and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about obstruction McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 19 Donaldson recalled that No comms referred to the order that no one should contact Sessions Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at II 29 1 McGahn 12 l2 17302 at2 292 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 2 293 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 2 294 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 2 Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President during his career as a private businessman Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn he said Cohn would win cases for him that had no chance and that Cohn had done incredible things for him Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 5 Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer someone who got things done Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 6 50 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Werk PFeattet II May CeHtaifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e President whereas McGahn would not 295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about the recusal but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions's decision to recuse Z96 The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents 297 The President also pushed back on the DOJ contacts policy and said words to the effect of You're telling me that Bobby and Jack didn 't talk about investigations Or Obama didn ' t tell Eric Holder who to investigate 298 Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed at McGahn about how weak Sessions was 299 Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would have to recuse from campaign-related investigations because of his work on the Trump Campaign 300 That weekend Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar-a-Lago to meet w ith the President 301 Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and s uggested that Sessions should unrecuse from the Russia investigation 302 The President contrasted Sessions with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy w ho had developed a strategy to he lp their presidents where Sessions had not 303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern wh ich Sessions could have helped avert if he were still overseeing it 304 On March 5 2017 the White House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him 305 On March 6 the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney 295 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 2 296 McGah n 12 12 17 302 at2 297 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 3 Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served The President thought Holder always stood up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him and Robert Kennedy always had his brother's back Bannon 2 1 4 18 302 at 5 Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his entire life he needed to have a great lawyer a bulldog and added that Holder had been willing to take a contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 5 298 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 3 299 Bannon 2 1 4 18 302 at 5 300 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 5 301 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 3 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 5 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 3 302 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 3-4 303 Sessions 1117 18 302 at3-4 304 Sessions I 117 18 302 at 3-4 Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused the President was angry and scolded Sessions in her presence but she could not remember exactly when that conversation occurred Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 13 305 SC_ AD_000 137 Donaldson 3 5 17 Notes see Donaldson II 6 1 7 302 at 13 51 U S Department of Justice AM arA ey Wark Praa1 1et II Mtt ' CaA tttiH Material Prateetea UAaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated a lthough it is not clear w hether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn 306 2 FBI Director Corney Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia Investigatio n in Testimony Before HPSCI On March 9 2017 Corney briefed the Gang of Eight congressio nal leaders about the FBI's investigation of Russian interference including an identification of the principal U S subjects of the investigation 307 Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing at the time notes taken by Annie Donaldson then McGahn's chief of staff on March 12 2017 state POTUS in panic chaos Need binders to put in front ofPOTUS 1 All things related to Russia 308 The w eek after Corney's briefing the White House Counse l's Office was in contact with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have received information about the status of the FBI investigation 309 On March 20 2017 Corney was scheduled to testify before HPSCT 310 In advance of Corney's testimony congressional officials made clear that they wanted Corney to provide information about the ongoing FBI investigation 3 11 Dana Boente who at that time was the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation authorized Corney to confirm the existence of the Russia investigation and agreed that Corney should decl ine to comment o n whether any particular individua ls including the President were being investigated 312 306 Donaldson 11 16117 302 at 14 see SC_AD_ 000 168 Donaldson 316117 Notes POTUS wants to call Dana then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations I Is investigation I No I We know something on Flynn I GSA got contacted by FBI I There' s something hot 307 Corney 1111 5 17 302 at 13-14 SNS-Ciassified-0000140-44 3 8 17 Email Gauhar to Page et a 308 SC_AD_00 188 Donaldson 3 12 18 Notes Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation that led to these notes and must have been told about it from others Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 13 309 Donaldson 11 16117 302 at 14-1 5 On March 16 2017 the White House Counsel's Office was briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of 4-5 targets Donaldson 11 6117 302 at 15 The targets were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as Flynn FBI was ooking for phone records Comey-tManafort Ukr Russia not campaign Carter Page $ game and Greek Guy potentially referring to George Papadopoulos later charged with violating 18 U S C § 1001 for lying to the FBI SC_AD_00198 Donaldson 3 16 17 Notes Donaldson and McGahn both said they believed these were targets ofSSCI Donaldson 1116 17 302 at 15 McGahn 1211 2117 302 at 4 But SSCI does not formally investigate individuals as targets the notes on their face reference the FBI the Department of Justice and Corney and the notes track the background materials prepared by the FBI for Corney's briefing to the Gang of8 on March 9 See SNS-Classified-0000 140-44 3 8117 Email Gauhar to Page et al see also Donaldson 11 6117 302 at 15 Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had told McGahn those individuals were the FBI' s targets 3 10 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 115th Cong Mar 20 20 17 31 1 Corney 11 1 5 17 302 at 16 McCabe 8 17117 at 15 McGahn 12 14117 302 at I 312 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 5 Corney 11 15 17 302 at 16-17 52 U S Department of Justice At terRey Werle Preattet May Cefttatft Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing which were drafted in consultation with the Department of Justice Corney stated that he had been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI as part of its counterintelligence mission is investigating the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia 's efforts As with any counterintelligence investigation this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed 31 3 Corney added that he would not comment further on what the FBI was doing and whose conduct it was examining because the investigation was ongoing and classified-but he observed that he had taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the Department ofJustice of briefing this Congress' s leaders in a classified setting in detail about the investigation 314 Corney was specifically asked whether President Trump was under investigation during the campaign or under investigation now 31 5 Corney declined to answer stating Please don't over interpret what I've said as-as the chair and ranking know we have briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing but T' m not gonna answer about anybody in this forum 316 Corney was also asked whether the FBI was investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting and he declined to answer 317 According to McGahn and Donaldson the President had expressed frustration with Corney before his March 20 testimony and the testimony made matters worse 318 The President had previously criticized Corney for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence briefings at the White House and the President suspected Corney of leaking certain information to the media 319 McGahn said the President thought Corney was acting like his own branch of government 320 3 13 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 115th Con g Mar 20 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 11 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney Corney 11 15 17 302 at 17 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 5 confirming that the Department of Justice authorized Corney's remarks 314 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 115th Cong Mar 20 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 11 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney · 3 15 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 115th Cong Mar 20 2017 CQ Cong Transcripts at 130 question by Rep Swalwell 316 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong Mar 20 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 130 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney 3 17 Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong Mar 20 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 143 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney 3 18 Donaldson 1116117 302 at 21 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 7 319 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 21 McGahn 12112 17 302 at 6-9 320 McGahn 12 12117 302 at7 53 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e Press reports following Corney's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was investigating the President contrary to what Corney had told the President at the end of the January 6 20 I 7 intelligence assessment briefing 321 McGahn Donaldson and senior advisor Stephen Miller recalled that the President was upset with Corney' s testimony and the press coverage that followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation 322 Notes from the White House Counsel 's Office dated March 21 2017 indicate that the President was bes ide himself' over Corney's testimony 323 The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him to intervene with the Department of Justice and according to the notes the President was getting hotter and hotter get rid 324 Officials in the White House Counsel's Office became so concerned that the President would fire Corney that they began drafting a memorandum that examined whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director 325 At the President's urging McGahn contacted Boente several times o n March 21 20 I 7 to seek Boente's assistance in having Corney or the Department of Justice correct the misperception that the President was under investigation 326 Boente did not specifically recall the conversations although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible 327 Boente said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern 328 Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and attempting to do so could erode confidence in the investigation' s conclusions 329 Boente said McGahn agreed and dropped the issue 330 The President also sought to speak with Boente directly but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request 32 1 E g Matt Apuzzo et al F B I Is Investigating Trump's Russia Ties Corney Confirms New York Times Mar 20 2017 Andy Greenberg The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump's Russia Ties·Since July Wired Mar 20 20 17 Julie Borger Spencer Ackerman Trump-Russia collusion is being investigated by FBI Corney corifirms Guardian Mar 20 20 17 see Corney I 6 17 Memorandum at 2 322 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 16-1 7 S Miller I0 31 17 302 at 4 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 5-7 323 SC_AD_00213 Donaldson 3 21117 Notes The notes from that day also indicate that the President referred to the Corney bombshell which made him look like a fool SC_AD_00206 Donaldson 3 21 17 Notes 324 SC_AD_0021 0 Donaldson 3 21 17 Notes 325 SCR016 000002-05 White House Counsel 's Office Memorandum White House Counsel's Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office to begin this research Dhillon II 21 17 302 at 5 Metadata from the document which was provided by the White House establishes that it was created on March 21 2017 326 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 16-21 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 5-7 327 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 5 328 Boente 1 3 1 18 302 at 5 329 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 5 330 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 5 54 U S Department of Justice Attet'Hey Werk Preettet May Cefl taiH Material Preteetee Ufl eer Fee R Criffl P 6 e to intervene with Comey 331 McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not think it was sustainable for Corney to stay on as FBI director for the next four years which McGahn said he conveyed to the President 332 Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or anyone else the idea that Corney should not continue as FBI director 333 3 The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public Statements that he had No Connection to Russia In the weeks following Corney's March 20 2017 testimony the President repeatedly asked intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a connection to the Russian election-interference effort On March 22 2017 the President asked Director ofNational Intelligence Daniel Coats and CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily Briefing 334 According to Coats the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no link existed between him and Russia 335 Coats responded that the Office of the Director ofNational Intelligence ODNI has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public statement on the Russia investigation 336 Pompeo had no recollection of be ing asked to stay behind after the March 22 briefing but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia 337 Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Corney about the FBI investigation 338 Some ODNI staffers however had a different recollection of how Coats described the meeting immediately after it occurred According to senior ODNI official Michael Dempsey Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation and asked him to contact Corney to see if there was a way to get past the investigation get it over with end it or words to that effect 339 Dempsey said that Coats described the President' s comments as falling somewhere between musing about hating the investigation and wanting Coats to do something to stop it 340 Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he would not get involved with an ongoing FBI investigation 341 Edward Gistaro another ODNI official recalled 331 SC AD 00210 Donaldson 3 21 17 Notes McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 7 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 19 332 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 7 Burnham 11 03 17 302 at 11 333 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 3 334 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 3 Culver 6 14 17 302 at 2 335 Coats 6 14 1 7 302 at 3 336 Coats 6 1 4 17 3 02 at 3 337 Pompeo 6 28 17 302 at 1-3 338 Coats 6 14117 302 at 3 339 Dempsey 6 14 17 302 at 2 340 Dempsey 6 14 17 302 at 2-3 34 1 Dempsey 6 1 4 17 302 at 3 55 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Werle Preattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee R Grim P 6 e that right after Coats' s meeting with the President on the walk from the Oval Office back to the Eisenhower Executive Office Building Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask him what he could do to help with the investigation 342 Another ODNI staffer who had been waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Corney to convince him there was nothing to the Russia investigation 343 On Saturday March 25 2017 three days after the meeting in the Oval Office the President called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations saying words to the effect of I can ' t do anything with Russia there's things I'd like to do with Russia with trade with ISIS they' re all over me with this 344 Coats told the Pres ident that the investigations were going to go on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course 345 Coats later testified in a congressional hearing that he had never fe lt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and shape-with shaping intelligence in a political way or in relationship to an ongoing investigation 346 On March 26 2017 the day after the President called Coats the President called NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers 347 The President expressed frustration with the Russia investigation saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult 348 The President told Rogers the thing with the Russians wa s messing up his ability to get things done with Russia 349 The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories 350 Deputy Director of the NSA Richard Ledgett who was present for the call said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40 years of government service 3 51 After the call concluded Ledgett prepared a memorandum that he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President's request and they placed the memorandum in a safe 352 But Rogers did not perceive the President's request to be an order and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia 342 Gistaro 6 14 17 302 at 2 343 Culver 6 14 17 302 at 2-3 344 Coats 6 14 17 302 at4 345 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 4 Dempsey 6 14 17 302 at 3 Coats relayed that the President had asked several times what Coats could do to help get the investigation done and Coats had repeatedly told the President that fastest way to get it done was to let it run its course 346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 7 2017 CQ Cong Transcripts at 25 testimony by Daniel Coats Director ofNational Intelligence 347 Rogers 6 12 17 302 at 3-4 348 Rogers 6 12 17 302 at 4 349 Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at l-2 see Rogers 6112 17 302 at 4 350 Rogers 6112 17 302 at 4-5 Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at 2 351 Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at 2 352 Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at 2-3 Rogers 6112 17 302 at 4 56 U S Department of Justice Aftantey Wark Prat ittet Ma · Cm taiH Material Prateetet i UHEier FeEl R Crim P 6 e investigation itself 353 Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he had never been directed to do anything he believe d to be illegal immoral unethical or inappropriate and did not recall ever feeling pressured to do so 354 In addition to the specific comments made to Coats Pompeo and Rogers the Pres ident spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations 355 On at least two occasions the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no collus ion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued 356 Pompeo recalled that the President vented about the investigation on multiple occasions complaining that there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him 357 Rogers recalled a private conversation with the President in which he vent ed about the investigation said he had done nothing wrong and said something like the Russia thing has got to go away 358 Coats recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times and Coats said he fina lly told the President that Coats's j ob was to provide intelligence and not get involved in investigations 359 4 The President Asks Corney to Lift the C loud Created by the Russia Investigation On the morning of March 30 2017 the President reached out to Corney directly about the Russia investigation 360 According to Corney's contemporaneo us record ofthe conversation the President said he was trying to run the country and the c loud ofthis Russia business was maki ng 353 Rogers 6 12 17 302 at 5 Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at 2 354 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 7 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 20 testimony by Admiral Michael Rogers Director of the National Security Agency 355 Gistaro 6 14 17 302 at I 3 Pompeo 6 28 17 302 at 2-3 356 Gistaro 6 14 17 302 at I 357 Pompeo 6 28117 302 at 2 358 Rogers 6 12 17 302 at 6 359 Coats 6 14 17 302 at 3-4 360 SCRO 12b 000044 President's Daily Diary 3 30 17 reflecting call to Corney from 8 14- 8 24 a m Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at I The President called me on my CMS phone at 8 13 am today The call lasted 11 minutes about 10 minutes when he was connected Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6 57 U S Department of Justice AM en'ley Werk Pre6ttet II May CeHtaifl Material Preteetea Uf eer Fea R Grim P 6 e that difficult 361 The President asked Corney what could be done to lift the cloud 362 Corney explained that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great benefit ifwe didn' t find anything to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval but we had to do our work 363 Corney also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI was not investigating the President personally 364 The President said several times We need to get that fact out 365 The Pres ident commented that if there was some satellite which Corney took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign that did something it would be good to find that out but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Corney would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating him 366 After the call ended Corney called Boente and told him about the conversation asked for guidance on how to respond and said he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation 367 On the morning of April 11 2017 the President called Corney again 368 According to Corney's contemporaneous record of the conversation the President said he was following up to see if Corney did what the President had asked last time-getting out that he personally is not under investigation 369 Corney responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard back and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to 361 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at l Corney subsequently testified before Congress about this conversation and described it to our Office his recollections were consistent with his memorandum Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6 Corney ll 15 17 302 at 18 362 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at l Corney 11 15 17 302 at 18 363 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at I Corney ll 15117 302 at 18 364 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at l Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 115th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record ofJames B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6 365 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at I Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 2017 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6 · 366 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at I Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 6-7 367 Corney 3 30 17 Memorandum at 2 Boente I 3 II 18 302 at 6-7 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee I 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 7 368 SCR012b_000053 President' s Daily Diary 4 11 17 reflecting call to Corney from 8 27 - 8 31 a m Corney 4 ll 17 Memorandum at 1 I returned the president's call this morning at 8 26am EDT We spoke for about four minutes 369 Corney 4 II 17 Memorandum at 1 Corney subsequently testified before Congress about this conversation and his recollections were consistent with his memo Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBI at 7 58 U S Department of Justice AM af'ftey Waf'k Prae1 1et May CaHtaift Matef'ial Pf'ateetee Ufteef' Fee R Cf'im P 6 e have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership 370 The President said he would take that step 371 The President then dded Because I have been very loyal to you very loyal we had that thing you know 372 In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon the President was asked if it was too late for him to ask Corney to step down the Pres ident responded No it's not too late but you know I have confidence in him We ' ll see what happens You know it's going to be interesting 373 After the interview Hicks told the Pres ident she thought the President's comment about Corney sho uld be removed from the broadcast of the interview but the President wanted to keep it in which Hicks thought was unusual 374 Later that day the President told senior advisors including McGahn and Priebus that he had reached out to Corney twice in recent weeks 375 The President acknowledged that McGahn would not approve of the outreach to Corney because McGahn had previously cautioned the President that he should not talk to Corney directly to prevent any perception that the White House was interfering with investigations 376 The President to ld McGahn that Corney had indicated the FBT could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department of Justice approved that action 377 After speaking with the Pres ident McGahn followed up w it h Boente to relay the President's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if the Department of Justice cleared it 378 McGahn recalled that B oente said Corney had to ld him there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President but they made Corney uncomfortable 379 According to McGahn Boente responded that he did not want to issue a statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political ramificatio ns and did not want to order Corney to do it because that action could prompt the °Corney 4 11 117 Memorandum at 1 37 371 Corney 4 11 17 Memorandum at I 372 Corney 4 11117 Memorandum at I In a footnote to thi s statement in his memorandum Corney wrote His use of these words did not fit with the fl ow of the call which at that point had moved away from any request of me but I have recorded it here as it happened 373 Maria Bartiromo Interview with President Trump Fox Business Network Apr 12 20 17 SCROI2b_000054 President's Daily Diary 4 1111 7 reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12 30- 12 55 p m 374 Hicks 12 8117 302 at 13 375 Priebus 10 13117 302 at 23 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 376 Priebus 10 13 1 7 302 at 23 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 see McGahn 11 30 17 302 at 9 Dhillon I I 2 1 17 302 at 2 stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations Later in April the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called Corney even though he knew they had advised against direct contact Dhillon 11 2 1 17 302 at 2 recalling that the President said I know you told me not to but I called Corney anyway 377 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 378 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 379 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 see Boente 1 31 1 8 302 at 6 recalling that Corney told him after the March 30 2017 call that it was not obstructive 59 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Predttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UHder Fed R Grim P 6 e appointme nt of a Special Counsel 380 Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with McGahn but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Corney were a problem 381 Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to address that issue 382 Analysis In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions's recusal and the requests he made to Coats Pompeo Rogers and Corney the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of j ustice a Obstructive act The evidence shows that after Corney's March 20 20 17 testimony the President repeatedly reached out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBI's investigation But witnesses had different recollections of the preci se content of those outreaches Some OONI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Corney and stop the investigation But the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently Pompeo had no memory of the specific meeting but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the word out that the President had not done anything wrong related to Russia Coats recalled that the President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia but did not ask him to speak with Corney or to help end the investigation The other outreaches by the President during this period were similar in nature ' The President asked Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia and the President asked Corney to make a public statement that would lift the cloud of the ongoing investigation by making clear that the President was not personally under investigation These requests while significant enough that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a written memorandum were not interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the investigation b Nexus to a proceeding At the time of the President's outreaches to leaders of the intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017 the FBI's Russia investigation did not yet involve grand jury proceedings The outreaches however came after and were in response to Corney's March 20 2017 announcement that the FBI as a part of its counterintelligence mission was conducting an investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election Corney testified that the investigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign officials and would include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed c Intent As described above the evidence does not establish that the President asked or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI's Russia investigationand the President affirmatively told Corney that if some satellite was involved in Russian election interference it would be good to find that out But the President's intent in trying to prevent Sessions' s recusal and in reaching out to Coats Pompeo Rogers and Corney fo llowing 380 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9- 10 381 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 7 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 9 382 Boente 1 31 18 302 at 7 60 U S Department of Justice AlfarHey Wark Praettet Ma ' CaHtaift Material Prateetee Ufteer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e Corney's public announcement of the FBI's Russia investigation is nevertheless relevant to understanding what motivated the President's other actions towards the investigation The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's implications for his presidency- and specifically on dispelling any suggestion that he was under investigation or had links to Russia In early March the President attempted to prevent Sessions's recusal even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules After Sessions recused the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions about the matter although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President The President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and when he had the opportunity he pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse The President also told advisors that he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents The Pr e sident made statements about being able to direct the course of criminal investigations saying words to the effect of You' re telling me that Bobby and Jack didn't talk about investigations Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate After Corney publicly confirmed the existence of the FBI's Russia investigation on March 20 2017 the President was beside himself' and expressed anger that Corney did not issue a statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation The President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to contact Boente to request that Corney make a clarifying statement The President then asked other intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the President had links to Russia but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the investigation On March 30 and April 11 against the advice of White House advisors who had informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in an ongoing investigation the President made personal outreaches to Corney asking him to lift the cloud of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally under investigation Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation which he knew was not true based on Corney' s representations The President complained to advisors that if people thought Russia helped him with the election it would detract from what he had accomplished Other evidence indicates that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia investigation on his ability to govern The President complained that the perception that he was under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations particularly with Russia The President told Coats he can't do anything with Russia he told Rogers that the thing with the Russians was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs and he told Corney that he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult 61 AMef'fley Werlt Preattet II D U S Department of Justice CeAtaift Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Criffi P 6 e Ma · Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director Corney Overview Corney was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3 2017 Leading up to that testimony the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Corney to make public that the President was not under investigation At the hearing Corney declined to answer questions about the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was not under investigation Two days later on May 5 2017 the President told close aides he was going to fire Corney and on May 9 he did so using his official termination letter to make public that Corney had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation The President decided to fire Corney before receiving advice or a recommendation from the Department of Justice but he approved an initial public account of the term ination that attributed it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing to his recommendation the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Corney regardless of the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister I just ftred the head of the F B I He was crazy a real nut job I faced great pressure because of Russia That's taken off I'm no t under investigation Evidence 1 Corney Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation On May 3 2017 Corney was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee 383 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hearing the President said that it would be the last straw if Corney did not take the opportunity to set the record straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation 84 The President had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was under investigation was hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with fore ign Ieaders 385 At the hearing Corney declined to answer questions about the status of the Russia investigation stating t he Department of Justice ha d authorized him to confirm that the Russ ia investigation exists but that he was not going to say another word about it until the investigation was completed 386 Corney also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had ruled 383 Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee I 15th Cong May 3 384 McGahn 12112117 302 at 10-11 2017 385 McGahn 12 12117 302 at 7 10-11 McGahn believed that two foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to the President for being under investigation SC_AD_ 00265 Donaldson 4 11 17 Notes P Called Corney - Day we told him not to 'You are not under investigation' NK China Sapping Credibility 386 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee I I 5th Cong CQ Cong Transcripts at 70 May 3 20 17 testimony by FBI Director James Corney Corney repeated this point 62 U S Department of Justice Attemey Werk Pmettet II Ma · Cm'ltaiA Material Preteetee UAeer Fee R Grim P 6 e out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target ofth e criminal investigation including whether the FBI had ruled out the president of the United States 387 Corney was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce II days before the presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation 388 Corney stated that it made him mildly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election but added that even in hindsight he would make the same decision 389 He later repeated that he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had done the right thing at each turn 390 In the afternoon following Corney 's testimony the President met with McGahn Sessions and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt 391 At that meeting the President asked McGahn how Corney had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Corney had declined to answer questions about whether the President was under investigation 392 The President became very upset and directed his anger at Sessions 393 According to notes written by Hunt the President said This is terrible Jeff It' s all because you recused AG is supposed to be most important appointment Kennedy appointed his brother Obama appointed Holder I appointed you and you recused yourself You left me on an island I can't do anything 394 The President said that the recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his authority with foreign leaders 95 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse and it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision 396 Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at several times during his testimony See id at 26 explaining that he was not going to say another peep about the investigation until we're done id at 90 stating that he would not provide any updates about the status of investigation before the matter is concluded 387 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 15th Cong May 3 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 87-88 questions by Sen Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James B Corney 388 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 15th Cong May 3 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 15 question by Sen Feinstein 389 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 15th Cong May 3 2017 CQ Cong Transcripts at 17 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney 390 Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee 15th Cong May 3 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 92 testimony by FBI Director James B Corney 391 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 8 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 8 392 Sessions l 17118 302 at 8 Hunt-000021 Hunt 5 3 17 Notes McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 6 393 Sess ions 1 17118 302 at 8-9 394 Hunt-000021 Hunt 5 3 17 Notes Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting and others with the President after the events occurred Hunt 2 I 17 302 at 2 395 Hunt-000021-22 Hunt 5 3 17 Notes I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being investigated Sessions 1 17I 18 302 at 8 Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President that he was sorry the President was under investigation which the President interpreted as undermining his authority Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 8 396 Sessions 1 17118 302 at 8 Hunt-000022 Hunt 5 3 17 Notes 63 U S Department of Justice At terfte · Werle Preattet May Ctmtaift Material Preteetea Uf aer Fee R Grim P 6 e some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the President should consider replacing Corney as FBI director 397 According to Sessions when the meeting concluded it was clear that the President was unhappy with Corney but Sessions did not think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey 398 Bannon recalled that the President brought Corney up with him at least eight times on May 3 and May 4 2017 399 According to Bannon the President said the same thing each time He told me three times I'm not under investigation He's a showboater He's a grandstander I don't know any Russians There was no collusion 400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire Corney because that ship had sailed 401 Bannon also told the President that firing Corney was not going to stop the investigation cautioning him that he could fire the FBI director but could not fire the FBI 402 2 The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Corney The weekend following Corney's May 3 2017 testimony the President traveled to his resort in Bedminster New Jersey 403 At a dinner on Friday May 5 attended by the President and various advisors and family members including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller the President stated that he wanted to remove Corney and had ideas for a letter that would be used to make the announcement 404 The President dictated arguments and specific language for the letter and Miller took notes 405 As reflected in the notes the President told Miller that the letter should start While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship pertaining to the 2016 presidential election please be informed that J and I believe the American public- including Ds and Rs - have lost faith in you as Director of the FBI 406 Following the dinner Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to support the President's arguments 407 Over the weekend the President provided several rounds of 397 Hunt-000022 Hunt 5 3 17 Notes 398 Sessions 1 17118 302 at 9 399 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 20 400 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 20 401 Bannon 2 12 18 302 at 20 402 Bannon 2 12 1 8 302 at 20-21 see Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 28 403 S Miller 10 31117 302 at4-5 SCR025_000019 President's Daily Diaty 5 4 17 404 S Miller I0 31 17 302 at 5 405 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at 5-6 406 S Miller 5 5 17 Notes at I see S Miller I0 31 17 302 at 8 407 S Miller J0 31 17302 at6 64 U S Department of Justice Al terRey Werk Preettet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UReer Fee R Criffi P 6 e edits on the draft letter 408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks 409 In his discussions with Miller the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open with a reference to him not being under investigation 410 Miller said he believed that fact was important to the President to show that Corney was not being terminated based on any such investigation 411 According to Miller the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that Corney had been under a review period and did not have assurance from the President that he would be permitted to keep his job 412 The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner Dear Director Corney While I greatly appreciate your informing me on three separate occasions that I am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election please be informed that I along with members of both political parties and most importantly the American Public have lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated 413 The four-page letter went on to critique Corney's judgment and conduct including his May 3 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee his handling of the Clinton email investigation and his failure to hold leakers accountable 4 14 The letter stated that Corney had asked the President at dinner shortly after inauguration to let Corney stay on in the Director's role and the President said that he would consider it but the President had concluded that he ha d no alternative but to find new leadership for the Bureau- a leader that restores confidence and trust 41 5 In the morning of Monday May 8 2017 the President met in the Oval Office with senior advisors including McGahn Priebus and Miller and informed them he had decided to terminate Comey 416 The President read aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with 408 S Miller I 0 31 17 302 at 6-8 409 S Miller 10 31117 302 at 7 Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided so on Sunday night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the Corney situation and there would be an important discussion on Monday S Miller I 0 31 1 7 302 at 7 410 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at 8 411 S Miller I 0 31 17 302 at 8 41 2 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at I 0 4 13 SCROI3c_000003-06 Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Corney 4 14 SCRO 13c_ 000003-06 Draft Tetmination Letter to FBI Director Corney Kushner said that the termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to fire Corney and was the truest representation of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner Kushner 4 11 18 302 at 25 41 5 SCRO 13c_000003 Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Corney 416 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at II Priebus 10 13 17 302 at24 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at II Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 6 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 13 65 U S Department of Justice A erHe · Werk Preettet May CeHtaiH Material PreteeteEi UHEier Fee R Criffi P 6 e Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion 417 The President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the authority to terminate Corney without cause 418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making process McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Corney's status and suggested that White House Counse l's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod Rosenstein who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General 419 McGahn said that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity to find out what they thought about firing Comey 420 At noon Sessions Rosenstein and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House 421 McGahn said that the President had decided to fire Corney and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views 422 Sessions and Rosenstein criticized Corney and did not raise concerns about replacing him 423 McGahn and Dhillon said the fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Corney gave them peace of mind that the President's decision to fire Corney was not an attempt to obstruct justice 424 An Oval Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the issue with the President 425 At around 5 p m the President and several White House officials met with Sessions and Rosenstein to discuss Comey 4 26 The President told the group that he had watched Corney's May 417 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at II observing that the President started the meeting by saying I'm going to read you aletter Don't talk me out of this I've made my decision Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 6 the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Corney Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 13 the President did not leave whether or not to fire Corney up for discussion Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 25 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 11-12 4 18 Dhillon 302 11 21 17 at 6 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 13 McGahn 12 1 2 _17 302 at II 419 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 12 13 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at II Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 7 Because of the Attorney General's recusal Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General See 28 U S C § 508 a In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General or of his absence or disability the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office 420 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 12 421 Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 7 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 13 Gauhar-000056 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes see Gauhar-000056-72 2 1 1 19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes Ms Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday May 16 2017 422 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 13 see Gauhar-000056 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes 423 Dhillon II 21 17 302 at 7-9 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 9 McGahn 12 12 1 7 302 at 13 424 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 13 Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 9 425 Hunt-000026 Hunt 5 8 17 Notes see Gauhar-000057 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes 426 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 2 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 14 see Gauhar-000057 Gauhar 5 16117 Notes 66 Attet He · U S Department of Justice Werk Pfeettet May CeHtaifl Material Preteete6 UHeel' Fee R Grim P 6 e 3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was not right with Comey 427 The President said that Corney should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their views 428 Hunt who was in the room recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously recommended that Corney be replaced 429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his concerns about Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation 430 The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller and the discussion turned to the mechanics ofhow to fire Corney and whether the President's letter should be used 431 McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Corney to resign but the President was adamant that he be fired 432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Corney should be removed 433 The President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum but said he wanted to receive it first thing the next morning 434 Hunt' s notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his recommendation the fact that Corney had refused to confirm that the President was not personally under investigation 435 According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein's description of his meeting with the President the President said Put the Russia stuff in the memo 436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his recommendation so he did not think Russia should be mentioned 437 The President told Rosenstein he would appreciate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway 438 When Rosenstein 427 Hunt-000026-27 Hunt 5 8 17 Notes 428 Sessions 1117118 302 at 10 see Gauhar-000058 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes POTUS to AG What is your rec 429 Hunt-000027 Hunt 5 8 17 Notes 430 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 14 Dhillon II 21 I 17 302 at 7 431 Hunt-000028 Hunt 5 811 7 Notes 432 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 13 433 Hunt-000028-29 Hunt 5 8 17 Notes 434 McCabe 9 26117 302 at 13 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 2 see Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes POTUS tells DAG to write a memo 435 Hunt-000028-29 Hunt 5 8 17 Notes POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would include the fact that although Corney talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under investigation So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Corney refuses to say public ly what he said privately 3 times 436 Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes 437 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 10 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 13 see Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 16 17 438 Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes McCabe 5 1 6 17 Memorandum I McCabe 9 26 17 Notes 302 at 13 67 U S Department of Justice Al terRe · Werk Preattet II MB ' CeRta iR Ma teria l Preteetea UR6er Feel R Grim P 6 e left the meeting he knew that Corney would be terminated and he told DOJ colleagues that his own reasons for replacing Corney were not the President's reasons 439 On May 9 Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending Corney's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein addressed to the Attorney General titled Restoring Public Confidence in the FBJ 440 McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the Pres ident accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey 441 Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9 reflected the view ofthe White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination letter should n ot see the I ight of day and that it would be better to offer n o other rationales for the firing than what was in Rosenstein ' s and Sessions's memoranda 442 The President asked Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Corney had informed the President three times that he was not under investigation 443 McGahn Priebus and Dhillon objected to including that language but the President insisted that it be included 444 McGahn Priebus and others perceived that language to be the most important part of the letter to 439 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 2 Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 16 1 7 Notes DAG reasons not their reasons POTUS Gauhar-000060 Gauhar 5 16117 Notes I st draft had a recommendation Took it out b c knew decision had already been made 440 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 4 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 5 9 1 7 Letter Sessions to President Trump Based on my evaluation and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the attached memorandum I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI 5 9 17 Memorandum Rosenstein to Sessions concluding with The way the Director handled the conclusion of the email investigation was wrong As a result the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them Having refused to admit his errors the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary corrective actions 441 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at 12 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 Hunt-00003 I Hunt 5 9 17 Notes 442 SC_AD_ 00342 Donaldson 5 9 17 Notes Donaldson also wrote i s this the beginning of the end because she was worried that the decision to terminate Corney and the manner in which it was carried out would be the end of the presidency Donaldson 1116 17 302 at 25 443 S Miller 10 3 1 17 302 at 12 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 Hunt-000032 Hunt 5 9 17 Notes 444 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 S Miller 10 31 17 302 at 12 Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 8 10 Priebus 10 13 17 302 at 27 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 14-15 Hunt-000032 Hunt 5 9 17 Notes 68 U S Department of Justice Attarrtey Werlt Preattet II May Certtairt Material Preteetea Urtaer Fee R Grim P 6 e the President 445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Corney should be permitted to resign but the President refused 446 Around the time the President's letter was finalized Priebus summoned Spicer and the press team to the Oval Office where they were told that Corney had been terminated for the reasons stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions 447 To announce Corney's termination the White House released a statement which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President 448 Tn full the statement read Today President Donald J Trump informed FBI Director James Corney that he has been terminated and removed from office President Trump acted based on the clear recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff Sessions 449 That evening FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summ oned to meet with the President at the White House 450 The President told McCabe that he had fired Corney because of the decisions Corney had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons 45 1 The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Corney had told the President three times that he was not under investigation 452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the FBI disliked Corney and whether McCabe was part of the res istance that had d isagreed with Corney's decisions in the Clinton investigation 453 McCabe told the President that he knew Corney had told the President he was not under investigation that most people in the FBI felt pos itively about Corney and that McCabe worked very closely with Corney and was part of all the decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation 454 445 Dhillon 11121 17 302 at 10 Eisenberg 11 29 17 302 at 15 providing the view that the President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the driving animus of the whole thing Burnham 11 3 17 302 at 16 Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was the line that said Corney advised the President on three separate occasions that the President was not under investigation According to Hunt's notes the reference to Corney's statement would indicate that notwithstanding Corney's having informed the President that he was not under investigation the President was terminating Corney Hunt-000032 Hunt 5 9 17 Notes McGahn said he believed the President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated Corney because the President was under investigation McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 446 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 15 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 25 see SC_ AD_ 00342 Donaldson 5 9 17 Notes Resign vs Removal - POTUS removal 447 44 Spicer 10 16117 302 at 9 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 16 K Priebus 449 10 13 17 302 at 28 Statement ofthe Press Secretary The White House Office of the Press Secretary May 9 20 17 450 McCabe 9 26117 302 at 4 SCR025_000044 President's Daily Diary 5 9 17 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1 45 1 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 5 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1 452 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 5 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1-2 453 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 5 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1-2 454 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 5 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1-2 69 U S Department of Jt stice AttarAey Werk Pl'atittet II May Cafltaifl Material Prateetea Uf aer Fea R Criffi P e e Later that evening the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the press coverage of Corney's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him 455 The President also called Chris Christie and according to Christie said he was getting killed in the press over Corney' s termination 456 The President asked what he should do 457 Christie asked Did you fire Corney because ofwhat Rod wrote in the memo and the President responded Yes 458 Christie said that the President should get Rod out there and have him defend the decision 459 The President told Christie that this was a good idea and said he was going to call Rosenstein right away 460 That night the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein 's idea to fire Comey 461 Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a false story ' 462 The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News that the coverage had been great and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference 463 Rosenstein responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him he would tell the truth that Corney's firing was not his idea 46 4 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being pottrayed as the reason for Corney's termination 465 In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9 2017 Spicer told reporters It was all Rosenstein No one from the White House It was a DOJ decision 466 That evening and the next morning White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the 455 Spicer I 0 16 17 302 at II Hicks 12 8117 at 18 Sanders 7 3 1 8 302 at 2 456 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 6 457 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 6 458 Christie 2113 19 302 at 6 459 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 6 46 °Christie 2 13 19 302 at 6 46 1 Gauhar-000071 Gauhar 5 16 17 Notes Page Memorandum at 3 recording events of 5 16 1 7 McCabe 9 26 17 302 at 14 462 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 4-5 Gauhar-000059 Gauhar 5 1 6 1 7 Notes 463 Rosenstein 5 23 17 302 at 4-5 Gauhar-000071 Gauhar 5 16 1 7 Notes 464 Gauhar-000071 Gauhar 5116117 Notes DOJ notes from the week of Corney's firing indicate that Priebus was screaming at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press conference and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not doing it Gauhar-000071-72 Gauhar 5 16117 Notes 465 McGahn 12112117 302 at 16-17 Donaldson II 6117 302 at 26-27 Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 11 466 Jenna Johnson After Trump fired Corney White House staff scrambled to explain why Washington Post May 10 2017 quoting Spicer 70 U S Department of Justice At'tarAe · Wark Praattet II May CaHtaiH Material Prateetea UAeler Feel R Crilfl P 6 e President's decision to terminate Corney was driven by the recommendations the President received from Rosenstein and Sessions 467 In the morning on May 10 2017 President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office 468 The media subsequently reported that during the May l 0 meeting the President brought up his decision the prior day to terminate Corney telling Lavrov and Kislyak T just fired the head of the F B I He was crazy a real nut job I faced great pressure because of Russia That's taken off I'm not under investigation ' 469 The President never denied making those statements and the White House did not dispute the account instead issuing a statement that said By grandstanding and politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions James Corney created unnecessary pressure on our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia The investigation would have always continued and obviously the termination of Corney would not have ended it Once again the real story is that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified information 470 Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with Lavrov he did not look concerned and said of Corney he is crazy 471 When McGahn asked the President about his comments to Lavrov the President said it was good that Corney was fired because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he could get more work done 472 That same morning on May I 0 2017 the President called McCabe 473 According to a memorandum McCabe wrote following the call the President asked McCabe to come over to the White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to 467 See e g Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN May I 0 20 17 SCR013_00 1088 5110 17 Email Hemming to Cheung et al internal Whi te House email describing comments on the Corney termination by Vice President Pence 468 SCR08_000353 5 9 17 White House Document Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia SCR08_001274 5 10117 Email Ciaramella to Kelly et al The meeting had been planned on May 2 2017 during a telephone call between the President and Russian President Vladimir Putin and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5 2017 the same day the President dictated ideas for the Corney termination letter to Stephen Miller SCR08_001274 5 10 17 Email Ciaramella to Kelly et al 469 Matt Apuzzo et al Trump Told Russians That Firing Nut Job Corney Eased Pressure From Investigation New York Times May 19 20 17 470 SCR08_002117 5 19 17 Email Walters to Farhi CBS News see Spicer I 0 16 17 302 at 13 noting he would have been told to clean it up if the reporting on the meeti ng with the Russian Foreign Minister was inaccurate but he was never told to correct the reporting Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 19 recalling that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meeting and that the President had said similar things about Corney in an off-the-record meeting with reporters on May 18 2017 calling Corney a nut job and crazy 47 1 Hicks 12 8117 302 at 19 472 McGahn 12 12117 302 at 18 473 SCR025_000046 President' s Daily Diary 5 10 17 McCabe 5110 17 Memorandum at I 71 AM eme · U S Department of Justice Werlt Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UH aer Fee R Grim P 6 e employees 474 The President said he had received hundreds of messages from FBI employees indicating their support for terminating Comey 475 The President also to ld McCabe that Corney should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington D C on the FBI's airplane after he had been terminated and that he did not want Corney in the building again even to collect his belong ings 476 When McCabe met with the Pres ident that afternoon the President without prompting told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President estimated that at least 80% of the FBI had voted for him and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 pres identia l · election 477 In the afternoon of May 10 2017 deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the President about his decision to fire Corney and then spoke to reporters in a televised press confere nce 478 Sanders told reporters that the President the Department of Justice and bipartisan members of Congress had lost confidence in Corn ey a nd most importantly the rank and fi le of the FBI had lost confidence in their director Accordingly the President accepted the recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Corney from his position 479 In response to questions from reporters Sanders said that Rosenstein decided on his own to review Corney's performance and that Rosenstein decided on his own to come to the President on Monday May 8 to express his concerns about Corney When a reporter indicated that the vast majority of FB I agents supported Corney Sanders said Look we've heard from countless members of the FBI that say very different things 48 Following the press conference Sanders spoke to the President who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccurac ies in her comments 481 Sanders told this Office that her reference to hearing from countless members of the FBI was a slip of the tongue 482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Corney was a comment she made in the heat of the moment that was not founded on anything 483 ° Also on May I 0 20 17 Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenstein had initiated the decision to 474 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at I 475 McCabe 5 1 Oil 7 Memorandum at I 476 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at I Rybicki 6 13 17 302 at 2 Corney had been visiting the FBI's Los Angeles office when he found out he had been terminated Corney II 15 17 302 at 22 477 McCabe 5 10 17 Memorandum at 1-2 McCabe's memorandum documenting his meeting with the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counsel's Office See SC_AD_00347 Donaldson 5 10 17 Notes · 478 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 4 Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN May I0 201 7 479 Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-S PAN May I 0 20 17 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 4 480 Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN May I 0 20 17 481 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 4 482 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 4 483 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 3 72 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werlt Pffiattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaet' Fee R Grim P 6 e fire Comey 484 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that the Department of Justice had initiated Corney's termination 485 and McGahn asked attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative 486 The next day on May 11 2017 the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the communication s team could not get the story right so he was going on Lester Holt to say what really happened 487 During the interview the President stated that he had made the decision to fire Corney before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions The President told Holt I was going to fire regardless of recommendation Rosenstein made a recommendation But regardless of recommendation I was going to fire Corney knowing there was no good time to do it 488 The President continued And in fact when I decided to just do it Tsaid to myself-T sai d you know this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story It's an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an e lection that they should ' ve won 489 In response to a question about whether he was angry with Corney about the Russia investigation the President said As far as I'm concerned I want that thing to be absolutely done properly 490 The President added that he realized his termination of Corney probably maybe will confuse people with the result that it might even lengthen out the investigation but he ha d to do the right thing for the American people and Corney was the wrong man for that position 491 The President described Corney as a showboat and a grandstander said that t he FBI has been in turmoil and said he wanted to have a really competent capable director 492 The President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation 493 On the evening of May 11 2017 following the Lester Holt interview the President tweeted Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watching as the U S tears itself apart over a Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election 494 The same day the media reported that the President had demanded that Corney pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly 484 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 16-17 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 26 see Dhillon 11 21 17 302 at 485 Donaldson 11 6 17 302 at 27 486 McGahn 12 12 17 302 at 17 487 Dhillon 11 2 1117 302 at II 488 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May II 20 17 Transcript at 2 489 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May II 20 17 Transcript at 2 490 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May II 20 17 Transcript at 3 491 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May 11 20 17 Transcript at 3 492 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May II 20 17 Transcript at 1 5 493 Interview with President Donald Trump NBC May II 20 17 Transcript at 7 494 @rea DonaldTrump 5 11 11 7 4 34 p m ET Tweet II 73 U S Department of Justice Aa-entey Werk Pret lttet May CeAt iH Material Preteetet l UAt ler Fet l R Grim P 6 e after being sworn in 495 Late in the morning of May 12 20 17 the President tweeted Again the story that there was collusion between the Russians Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems as an excuse for losing the election 496 The President also tweeted James Corney better hope that there are no 'tapes ' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press and When James Clapper himself and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt says there is no collusion when does it end 497 Analysis In analyzing the President's decision to fire Corney the following ev idence is relevant to the elements of obstruction ofjustice a Obstructive act The act of firing Corn ey removed the individual overseeing the FBI's Russia investigation The President knew that Corney was personally involved in the investigation based on Corney's briefing of the Gang of Eight Corney's March 20 2017 public testimony about the investigation and the President's one-on-one conversations with Corney Firing Corney would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect of interfering with or impeding the investigation-for example if the termination would have the effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President perceived as more protective of his personal interests Relevant circumstances bearing on that issue include whether the President' s actions had the potential to discourage a successor director or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation The President fired Corney abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign banned him from the FBI building and criticized him publicly calling him a showboat and claiming that the FBI was in turmoil under his leadership And the President followed the termination with public statements that were highly critical of the investigation for example three days after firing Corney the President referred to the investigation as a witch hunt and asked when does it end Those actions had the potential to affect a successor director's conduct of the investigation The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director however would not necessarily be to prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation As a general matter FBI investigations run under the operational direction of FB I personnel levels below the FBI director Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director but could not fire the FBI The White House issued a press statement the day after Corney was fired that said The investigation would have always continued and obviously the termination of Corney would not have ended it In addition in his May II interview w ith Lester Holt the President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Corney that the action might prolong the investigation And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim director even 495 MichaelS Schmidt In a Private Dinner Trump Demanded Loyalty Comey Demurred New York Times May I I 20 17 496 @realDonaldTrump 5 12 17 7 51 a m ET Tweet 497 @reaiDonaldTrump 5 12 17 8 26a m ET Tweet @reaiDonaldTrump 5 12 17 8 54a m ET Tweet 74 U S Department of Justice At terRey l Zerk Preattet II May CeRtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e though McCabe told the President he had worked very closely with Corney and was part of a ll the dec isions made in the Clinton investigation b Nexus to a proceeding The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminated Corney Several facts would be relevant to such a showing At t he time the President fired Corney a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury subpoenas had been issued On March 20 2017 however Corney had announced that the FBI was investigating Russia's interference in the election including an assessment of whether any crimes were committed It was widely known that the FBI as part of the Russia investigation was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers- a clear criminal offense In addition at the time the President fired Corney evidence indicates the President knew that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentia lly be prosecuted desp ite the President's February 14 20 17 request that Corney let Flynn go On March 5 2017 the White House Counsel 's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him The same day the President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente then the Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated On March 3 1 2017 the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal j eopardy by tweeting that Mike Flynn should ask for immunity before he agreed to provide testimony to the FBI or Congress And in late March or early April the President asked McFarland to pass a message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he shou ld stay strong further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn ' s criminal exposure c Intent Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President' s decision to fire Corney was Corney' s unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally under investigation despite the President's repeated requests that Corn ey make s uch an announcement In the week lead ing up to Corney's May 3 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee testimony the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Corney did not set the record straight a nd publicly announce that the President was not under investigation But during his May 3 testimony Corney refused to answer questions about whether the President was being investigated Corney's refusal angered the President who criticized Sessions for leaving him isolated and exposed saying You left me on an island Two days later the President told advisors he had decided to fire Corney and dictated a letter to Stephen Mi ller that began with a reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation concern ing what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship The President later asked Rosenstein to include Russia in his memorandum and to say that Corney had told the President that he was not under investigation And the President's final termination letter included a sentence at the President's insistence and against McGahn 's advice stating that Corney had told the President on three separate occasions that he was not under investigation The President's other stated rationales for why he fi red Corney are not similarly supported by the evidence The termination letter the President and Stephen M iller prepared in Bedminster 75 U S Department of Justice At terAey Werk Pretittet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti UAtier Fefl R Grim P 6 e cited Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation and the President told McCabe he fired Corney for that reason But the facts surrounding Corney's handling of the Clinton email investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed office and the President had made it clear to both Corney and the President's senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted Corney to stay on as director And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Corney's handling ofthe Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Corney The President's draft termination letter also stated that morale in the FBT was at an all-time low and Sanders told the press after Corney's termination that the White House had heard from countless FBI agents who had lost confidence in Corney But the evidence does not support those claims The President told Corney at their January 27 dinner that the people of the FBJ really like him no evidence suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Corney and Sanders acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything We also considered why it was important to the President that Corney announce publicly that he was not under investigation Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and foreign affairs particularly in dealings with Russia The President told Corney that the cloud of this Russia business was making it difficult to run the country The President told Sessions and McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues The President complained to Rogers that the thing with the Russians was messing up his ability to get things done with Russia and told Coats I can't do anything with Russia there's things I'd like to do with Russia with trade with ISIS they' re all over me with this The President also may have viewed Corney as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that the President was not under investigation Other evidence however indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an investigation into his campaign The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn the President had a one-on-one dinner with Corney against the advice of senior aides and told Corney he needed Corney's loyalty When the President later asked Corney for a second time to make public that he was not under investigation he brought up loyalty again saying Because I have been very loyal to you very loyal we had that thing you know After the President learned of Sessions 's recusal from the Russia investigation the President was furious and said he wanted an Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder to have protected their presidents The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney General who to investigate In addition the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him The evidence does not establish that the termination of Corney was designed to cover up a conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia As described in Volume I the evidence uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies or that the President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official But the evidence does indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise to personal and political concerns Although the President publicly stated during and after the election that he had no connection to Russia the Trump Organization through Michael Cohen 76 U S Department of Justice At terRey 'Nerk Preelttet II May CeRtaiR Material Preteeteel UReler Fee R Grim P 6 e was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump was repeatedly briefed on the ss of those efforts 498 In additio some witnesses said that s aware that at a time when pu reports an gence were hacks and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases 499 More broadly multiple witnesses described the President' s preoccupation with press coverage of the Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his election 500 Finally the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the press and the public for Corney's termination In the immediate aftermath of the firing the President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ recommendations and White House press officials repeated that story But the President had decided to fire Corney before the White House solicited those recommendations Although the President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Corney regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendations he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would resist the White House's suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Corney's termination The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing although the evidence does not resolve whether those concerns were personal political or both E The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel Overview The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17 2017 prompting the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had failed to protect him and should resign Sessions submitted his resignation which the Pres ident ultimately did not accept The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest but they responded that those claims were ridiculous and posed no obstacle to the Special Counsel's service Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special Counsel's service On June 14 2017 the press reported that the President was being personally investigated for obstruction of justice and the President responded with a series of tweets 498 See Volume II Section fi K l infra 499 See Volume I Section III D I supra 500 In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI investigation could uncover we considered whether the President's intent in firing Corney was connected to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBI's Russian-interference investigation In particular Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities And facts uncovered in the Russia investigation which our Office referred to the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District of New York for campaign-finance offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President See Volume II Section II K S infra The investigation however did not establish that when the President fired Corney he was considering the possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's intent in firing Corney was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light 77 U S Department of Justice AEtet'l'ley Wet'k P¥eettet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e criticizing the Special Counsel ' s investigation That weekend the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President did not follow up with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed Evidence I The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President' s Reaction On May 17 2017 Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed RobertS Mueller IJT as Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose from the investigation 501 The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from Sessions who was with the President Hunt and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI Director 502 Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein who told him about the Special Counsel appointment and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the news 503 According to notes written by Hunt when Sessions told the President that a Special Counsel had been appointed the President slumped back in his chair and said Oh my God This is terrible This is the end of my Presidency I'm fucked 504 The President became angry and lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation stating How could you let this happen Jeff 505 The President said the position of Attorney General was his most important appointment and that Sessions had let him down contrasting him to Eric Holder and Robert Kennedy 506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him you were supposed to protect me or words to that effect 507 The President returned to the consequences of the appointment and said Everyone tells me if you get one of these independent counsels it ruins your presidency It takes years and years and T won ' t be able to do anything This is the worst thing that ever happened to me 508 501 Office of the Deputy Attorney General Order No 3915-2017 Appointment ofSpecial Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters May 17 2017 502 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 13 Hunt2 1 18 302 at 18 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 4 Hunt-000039 Hunt 5 17117 Notes 503 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 13 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 18 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 4 Hunt-000039 Hunt 5117117 Notes 504 Hunt-000039 Hunt 5 17 17 Notes 505 Hunt-000039 Hunt 5 17117 Notes Sessions I 17 18 302 at 13-14 506 Hunt-000040 see Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 14 507 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 14 508 Hunt-000040 Hunt 5117117 Notes see Sessions 1117 18 302 at 14 Early the next morning the President tweeted This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history @reaiDonaldTrump 5 18 17 7 52a m ET Tweet 78 U S Department of Justice AUerHey Werle Pretittet' May CeAtaift Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee R Grim P 6 e The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General 509 Sessions agreed to submit his res ignation and left the Oval Office 510 Hicks saw the Pres ident shortly after Sessions departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's appointment 511 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time when the Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign 512 The next day May 18 2017 FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that discussed an investigation related to Corney's termination and directed the White House to preserve all relevant documents 513 When he received the letter McGahn issued a document hold to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while he sorted things out 514 A so on May 18 Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday and at your request I hereby offer my resignation 515 Sessions accompanied by Hunt brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President 5 16 The President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he wanted to continue serving as Attorney General 5 17 Sessions ultimately told the President he wanted to stay but it was up to the President 518 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay 5 19 At the conclusion of the meeting the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the resignation letter 520 When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's resignation letter they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of Justice 52 1 Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to have the letter because it 509 Hunt-000041 Hunt 5 17 17 Notes Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 14 510 Hunt-000041 Hunt 5 17 17 Notes Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 14 5 11 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 21 512 Hicks 12 8 1 7 302 at 21 The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7 20 16 as discussed in Volume I Section Irl D 1 supra 5 13 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 9 SCR015_000175-82 Undated Draft Memoranda to White House Staff 514 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 9 SCR015_000 175-82 Undated Draft Memoranda to White House Staff The White House Counsel's Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27 20 17 SCR015_000 171 2 17 17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff 515 Hunt-000047 Hunt 5118 17 Notes 5 18 17 Letter Sessions to President Trump resigning as Attorney General 516 Hunt-000047-49 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 14 5 17 Hunt-000047-49 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 14 518 Hunt-000048-49 Hunt 5 18 1 7 Notes Sessions Il l 7 18 302 at 14 519 Sessions 1117 18 302 at 14 520 Hunt-000049 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes 521 Hunt-000050-51 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes 79 U S Department of Justice At terHe · Werk Pretittet Mli ' CeHtaiH M iterial Preteeteti UHtier Peti R Criffi P 6 e would function as a kind of shock collar that the President could use any time he wanted Priebus said the President had DOJ by the throat 522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting Sessions's resignation 523 On May 19 2017 the President left for a trip to the Middle East 524 Hicks recalled that on the President's flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv the President pulled Sessions's resignation letter from his pocket showed it to a group of senior advisors and asked them what he should do about it 525 During the trip Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to Sessions but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House somewhere in the residence 526 It was not until May 30 three days after the President returned from the trip that the President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying Not accepted 527 2 The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts oflnterest In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment the President repeatedly told advisors including Priebus Bannon and McGahn that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of interest 528 The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director position sh01tly before being appointed as Special Counsel that he had worked for a law firm that represented people affiliated with the President and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia 529 The President's advisors pushed 522 Hunt-000050 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 21 Hunt 2 1118 302 at 21 523 Hunt-000051 Hunt 5 18 17 Notes 524 SCR026_ 000 II 0 President's Daily Diary 5 19 17 525 Hicks 12 8117 302 at 22 526 Priebus I 0 13 17 302 at 21 Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip Priebus told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter but when he asked for it the President slapped the desk and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel Hunt-000052 Hunt Notes undated 521 Hunt-000052-53 Hunt 5 30 17 Notes 5 18 17 Letter Sessions to President Trump resignation letter Robert Porter who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time said that in the days after the President returned from the Middle East trip the President took Sessions's letter out of a drawer in the Oval at 8 Office and showed it to Porter Porter 4 13 18 3 528 Priebus 1118 18 302 at 12 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 10 McGahn 3 8118 302 at I McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 10 Bannon 10 26118 302 at 12 529 Priebus 1 1 8 18 302 at 12 Bannon 2 14118 302 at 10 In October 2011 Mueller resigned his family 's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling Virginia in a letter that noted that we live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club and that inquired whether we would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee which was paid in 1994 I 0 12 II Letter Muellers to Trump National Golf Club About two weeks later the controller of the club responded that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October 31 2011 and that they would be placed on a waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned I first refunded basis in accordance with the club's legal 80 U S Department of Justice At-t emey Werlt Preattet II May CerHaiR Material Preteetea URaer Fee R Cl'im P 6 e back on his assertion of conflicts telling the President they did not count as true conflicts 530 Bannon recalled telling the President that the purported conflicts were ridiculous and that none of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special Counse1 531 As for Mueller's interview for FBI Director Bannon recalled that the White House had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a perspective o n the institution of the FBT 532 Bannon said that although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Director again he did not come in looking for the job 533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community 534 And Bannon told the President that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was ridiculous and petty 535 The President did not respo nd when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of interest 536 On May 23 2017 the Department ofJustice announced that ethics officials had determined that the Special Counsel's prior Jaw firm position did not bar his service generating media reports that Mueller had been cleared to serve 537 McGahn recalled that around the same time the President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein about the issue 538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue 539 Contemporaneous notes of a May 23 2017 conversation between McGahn and the President reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest that the President not make such a call either 540 McGahn advised that the President could discuss the issue with his personal attorney but it would look like still trying to meddle in the investigation and knocking out Mueller would be a nother fact used to claim obst ruction of documents I 0 27 11 Letter Muellers to Trump National Golf Club The Muel ers have not had further contact with the club · 530 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 3 Bannon I0 26 18 302 at 13 confirming that he Priebus and McGahn pushed back on the asserted conflicts 531 Bannon I0 26 18 302 at 12-13 532 Bannon 10 26 18 302 at 12 533 Bannon I0 26 18 302 at 12 534 Bannon I 0 26 18 302 at 12 535 Bannon I 0 26 18 302 at 13 536 Bannon I0 26118 302 at 12 537 Matt Zapotosky Matea Gold Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller to lead Russia probe Washington Post May 23 2017 538 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 10 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 12 539 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at I McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special Counsel they considered themselves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that inquiries related to the investigation should be brought to his personal counsel McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 7 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 5 540 SC AD 00361 Donaldson 5 31 17 Notes 81 AtierAe · U S Department of Justice 'Nerk Preat tet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Feel R Grim P 6 e just ice 541 McGahn told the President that his biggest exposure was not his act of firing Corney but hi s other contacts and calls and his ask re Flynn 542 By the time McGahn provided this advice to the President there had been widespread reporting on the President's request for Corney's loyalty which the President publicly denied his request that Corney let Flynn go which the President also denied and the President's statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination of Corney had relieved great pressure related to Russia which the President did not deny 543 On June 8 2017 Corney testified before Congress about his interactions with the President before his termination including the request for loyalty the request that Corney let Flynn go and the request that Corney lift the cloud over the presidency caused by the ongoing investigation 544 Corney's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President had obstructedjustice 545 On June 9 2017 the Special Counsel 's Office informed the White House Counsel' s Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation 546 On Monday June 12 2017 Christopher Ruddy the chief executive of Newsmax Media and a longtime friend of the President's met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon 547 Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel 541 SC_AD_00361 Donaldson 5 3 1 17 Notes 542 SC AD 00361 Donaldson 5 31 17 Notes 543 See e g Michael S Schmidt In a Private Dinner Trump Demanded Loyalty Corney Demurred New York Times May II 2017 Michael S Schmidt Corney Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation New York Times May 16 20 17 Matt Apuzzo et al Trump Told Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Corney Eased Pressure From Investigation New York Times May 19 2017 544 Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 Statement for the Record of James B Corney former Director of the FBT at 5-6 Corney testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14 2017 meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President sent on May 12 2017 that stated James Corney better hope that there are no ' tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter might prompt the appointment of a special counsel Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 15th Cong June 8 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 55 testi mony by James B Corney former Director of the FBI 545 See e g Matt Zapotosky Corney lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice Washington Post June 8 20 17 Legal analysts said Corney's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the president obstructed justice 546 6 9 17 Email Special Counsel 's Office to the Whi te House Counsel's Office This Office made the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the interviews On June 12 20 17 the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of agency counsel Rogers 6 1 2 17 302 at I On June 13 the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett Ledgett 6 13 17 302 at 1 On June 14 the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office Coats 6 14 17 302 at I Gistaro 6 14 17 302 at I Culver 6 14 17 302 at I 547 Ruddy 6 6 1 8 302 at 5 82 U S Department of Justice AkerAey Werle Preattet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Grim P 6 e and that he would do so precipitously without vetting the decision through Administrati on officials 548 Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the d iscussion they had about the Special Counsel and Priebus said he could 549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up like the one that followed the termination of Corney did not happen 550 Later that day Ruddy stated in a televised interview that the President was considering perhaps terminating the Special Counsel based on purported conflicts of interest 551 Ruddy later told another news outlet that Trump is definitely considering terminating the Special Counsel and it's not something that' s being dismissed 552 Ruddy' s comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President was cons idering firing the Special Counsel 553 White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard fro m friends that the President was upset with him 554 On June 13 201 7 Sanders asked the President for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special Counsel 555 The President dictated an answer which Sanders delivered saying that w hile the president has every right to fire the Special Counsel he has no intention to do so 556 Also on June 13 2017 the President' s personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts 557 The President's counsel cited Mueller' s previous partnership in his law firm his interview for the FBI Director position and an asserted personal relationship he had with Comey 558 That same day Rosenstein had testified publi cly before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special Counsel including for conflicts of interest 559 Two days later on June 15 2017 the Special Counsel's 548 Ruddy 6 6 18 302 at S-6 549 Ruddy 6 6 1 8 302 at 6 550 Ruddy 6 6 18 302 at 6 55 1 Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has real conflicts as special counsel PBS June 12 20 17 Michael D Shear Maggie Haberman Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel New York Times June 12 2017 552 Katherine Faulders Veronica Stracqua1ursi Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Spicer 's 'bizarre ' statement doesn 't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing ABC June 13 20 17 553 See e g Michael D Shear Maggie Haberman Friend Says Trump Is Considering Firing Mueller as Special Counsel New York Times June 12 20 17 554 Ruddy 6 6 18 302 at 6-7 555 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 6-7 556 Glenn Thrush et al Trump Stews StaffSteps In and Mueller Is Safe for Now New York Times June 13 20 17 see Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 6 Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to the press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give 557 Special Counsel 's Office Attorney 6 13 17 Notes 558 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6 13117 Notes 559 Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Department Budget before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce Justice and Science 11 5th Cong June 13 20 17 CQ Cong Transcripts at 14 testimony by Rod Rosenstein Deputy Attorney General 83 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Predttet Ma '· CeHtaiH Material Prateeted UH6er Fed R Criffl P 6 e Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas of concern raised by the President's counsel and told the President's counsel that their concerns had been communicated to Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action 560 3 The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special Counsel Removed On the evening of June 14 2017 the Washington Post published an article stating that the Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstructjustice 561 This was the first public report that the Pres ident himself was under investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report 562 The Post story stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders including Coats and Rogers about what the President had asked them to do in response to Corney's March 20 2017 testimony that the inquiry into obstruction marked a major turning point in the investigation and that while Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director James B Corney starting in January that he was not personally under investigation o fficials say that changed shortly after Corney's firing 563 That evening at approximately 10 31 p m the President called McGahn on McGahn 's personal cell phone and they spoke for about 15 minutes 564 McGahn did not have a clear memory ofthe call but thought they might have discussed the stories reporting that the President was under investigation 565 Beginning early the next day June 15 2017 the President issued a series of tweets acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it He wrote They made up a phony collusion with the Russians story found zero proof so now they go for obstruction ofjustice on the phony story Nice 566 You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH HUNT in American political history-led by some very bad and conflicted people 567 and Crooked H destroyed phones w hammer 'bleached' emails had husband meet w AG days 560 Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6 15 17 Notes 561 Devlin Barrett et al Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction ofjustice officials say Washington Post June 14 20 17 562 CNN for example began running a chyron at 6 55 p m that stated WASH POST MUELLER INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTlON OF JUSTICE CNN June 14 2017 publi shed online at 7 15 p m ET 563 Devlin Barrett et al Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction ofjustice officials say Washington Post June 14 20 17 564 SCR026_000 183 President's Daily Diary 6 14117 reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6 14117 with start time 10 31 p m and end time 10 46 p m Call Records ofDon McGahn 565 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 1-2 McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked about the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch which was scheduled for the following day McGahn 2 28 18 302 at 2 566 @realDonaldTrump 6 15 17 6 55 a m ET Tweet 567 @reaiDonaldTrump 6 15 17 7 57a m ET Tweet 84 U S Department of Justice A1 1 emey Werle Preattet May Cefl taifl Material Pt·eteel ea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e before she was cleared- they talk about obstruction 568 The next day June 16 2017 the President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation After 7 months of investigations committee hearings about my ' collusion with the Russians ' nobody has been able to show any proof Sad 569 and Jam being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director Witch Hunt 570 On Saturday June 17 2017 the President called McGahn and directed him to have the Special Counsel removed 57 1 McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David 572 In interviews with this Office McGahn recalled that the President called him at home twice and on both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded him from serving as Special Counse1 573 On the first call McGahn recalled that the President said something like You gotta do this You gotta call Rod 574 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he cou ld do 575 McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request 576 He and other advisors believed the asserted conflicts were silly and not real and they had previously communicated that view to the President 577 McGahn also had made clear to the President that the White House Counsel ' s Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts 578 McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge 568 @reaiDonaldTrump 6 15 17 3 56p m ET Tweet 569 @reaiDonaldTrump 6 16 17 7 53a m ET Tweet 570 @reaiDonaldTrump 6 16 17 9 07 a m ET Tweet 57 1 McGahn 3 8118 302 at 1-2 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 10 572 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1 3 SCR026_000196 President' s Daily Diary 6117 17 records showing President departed the White House at 11 07 a m on June 17 2017 and arrived at Camp David at II 37 a m 573 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1-2 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at I 0 Phone records show that the President called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17 2017 and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes SCR026_000196 President's Daily Diary 6 17 17 reflecting call from the President to McGahn on 6 17 17 with start time 2 23 p m and end time 2 46p m Call Records of Don McGahn Phone records do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day Although McGahn recalled receiving multiple calls from the President on the same day in light of the phone records he thought it was possible that the first call instead occurred on June 14 20 17 shortly after the press reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction ofjustice McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 1-3 While McGahn was not certain of the specific dates of the calls McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations wi th the President in which the President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special Counsel removed McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 1-3 574 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at I 575 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at I 576 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at I 577 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1-2 578 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1-2 85 U S Department of Justice Aa erfle · 'Nork Preettet Ma · Cefltaif Material Proteete6 UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e Robert Bark and not Saturday Night Massacre Bork 579 McGahn considered the President's request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes 580 When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the Department of Justice McGahn recalled that the President was more direct saying something like Call Rod tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel 58 1 McGahn recalled the President telling him Mueller has to go and Call me back when you do it 582 McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by Rosenstein 583 To end the conversation with the President McGahn left the President with the impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein 584 McGahn recalled that he had already said no to the President's request and he was worn down so he just wanted to get off the phone 585 McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to fo llow the President's directive but did not know what he would say the next time the President called 586 McGahn decided he had to resign 587 He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff Annie Donaldson to inform her of his decision 588 He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his resignation letter 589 Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something that McGahn did not want to do 590 McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least twice and in one of the calls asked have you done it 591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson the specifics of the President' s request because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the 579 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 580 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 581 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 582 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 5 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3 583 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 1-2 5 584 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 585 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 586 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 587 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 588 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2-3 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 4 Call Records of Don McGahn 589 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 2 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 4 590 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 4 591 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 4 86 U S Department of Justice At torHey 'orlc Proa et Ma · CoHtaiH Material Proteetea UHtler Fea R Criffl P 6 e investigation but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia investigation 592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn 593 That evening McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to resign 594 McGahn recalled that after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the President's request he decided not to share details of the President's request with other White House staff 595 Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to do crazy shit but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President's request because McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know 596 Priebus and Bannon both urged McGahn not to quit and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and remained in his position 597 He had not told the President directly that he planned to resign and when they next saw each other the President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through with calling Rosenstein 598 Around the same time Chris Christie recalled a telephone call with the President in which the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing the Special Counsel 599 Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the President to fire the Special Counsel and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress if he did so 600 Analysis In analyzing the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of j ustice a Obstructive act As with the President's firing of Corney the attempt to remove the Special Counsel would qualiry as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the 592 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3-4 Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 4-5 Donaldson said she believed McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the investigation Donaldson 4 2 18 302 at 5 see McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3 593 Donaldson 4 211 8 302 at 5 594 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 10 Call Records of Don McGahn McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3-4 Priebus 4 3 I 8 302 at 6-7 595 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 4 Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them the specific details ofthe President's request Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 7 Bannon 2 14 18 302 at 10 596 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 7 597 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 3 McGahn 2 28 19 302 at 3-4 598 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 3 599 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 7 Christie did not recall the precise date of this call but believed it was after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director which was on June 7 2017 Christie 2 13 19 302 at 7 Telephone records show that the President called Chri stie twice after that time period on July 4 2017 and July 14 2017 Call Records ofChris Christie 60 °Christie 2 13 19 302 at 7 87 U S Department of Justice AtterRey Work Protittet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Proteeteti URtier Fee R Criffl P 6 e investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry Even if the removal of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigatio n from continuing under a new appointee a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay furth er action in the investigation chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel or otherwise impede the investigation A threshold question is whether'the President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the Pres ident had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the President publicly disputed these accounts and privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the Department of JustiCe's attention See Volume II Section 11 1 infra Some of the President's specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation Substantial evidence however supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed First McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenste in not only that conflicts existed but also that Mueller has to go McGahn is a credible witness with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White Ho use 601 McGahn spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times making it unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the President' s request In response to that request McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to partic ipate in events that he described as akin to the Saturday Night Massacre He called his lawyer drove to the White House packed up his office prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff told Priebus that the President had asked him to do crazy shit and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving Those acts would be a highly unusua l reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of Justice Second in the days before the calls to McGahn the President through his counsel had already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice Accordingly the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to rai se conflicts issues that already had been raised Third the President's sense of urgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate action on a weekend- You gotta do this You gotta ca ll Rod - suppott McGahn's recollection that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special C ounsel Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar it would have been unnecessary to set the process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn Finally the President had discussed knocking out Mueller and raised conflicts of interest in a May 23 2017 call with McGahn reflecting that the President connected the contl icts to a plan to remove the Special Counsel And in the days leading up to June 17 201 7 the President made clear to Priebus and Bannon who then to ld Ruddy that the President was considering terminating 60 1 When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic he was reluctant to share detailed information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning See McGahn 12 14 17 302 agent notes 88 U S Department of Justice Attefftey Werk Pretittet II May CeHtaiR Material Preteete6 Urttier Fee R Grim P 6 e the Special Counsel Also during this time period the President reached out to Christie to get his thoughts on firing the Special Counsel This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a way to terminate the Special Counsel b Nexus to an official proceeding To satisfy the proceeding requirement it would be necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17 2017 the President knew his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a grand jury On May 23 2017 McGahn explicitly warned the President that his b iggest exposure was not his act of firing Corney but his other contacts and calls and his ask re Flynn By early June it was widely reported in the media that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn investigation 602 On June 9 2017 the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedly had been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation On June 14 2017 news outlets began reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice Based on widespread reporting the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for Corney's loyalty his request that Corney let Flynn go his outreach to Coats and Rogers and his termination of Corney and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had relieved great pressure related to Russia And on June 16 2017 the day before he directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the President publicly acknowledged that his conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor tweeting I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director c Intent Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel 's oversight of investigations that involved the President's conduct- and most immediately to reports that the President was being investigated for potential obstruction of justice Before the President terminated Corney the President considered it critically important that he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated As described in Volume II Section II D supra advisors perceived the President whi le he was drafting the Corney termination letter to be concerned more than anything else about getting out that he was not personally under investigation When the President learned of the appointment of the Special Counsel on May 17 2017 he expressed further concern about the investigation saying t his is the end of my Presidency The President also faulted Sessions for recusing saying you were supposed to protect me On June 14 2017 when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was investigating the President for obstruction of justice the President was fac ing what he had wanted 602 See e g Evan Perez et al CNN exclusive· Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBI's Russia investigation CNN May 9 20 17 Matt Ford Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury The Atlantic June 2 20 17 89 Al tel'rte · U S Department of Justice Werlt Pl'eclttet II May Certtairt Material Pl'eteetecl Urtclel' Fecl R CrifH P 6 e to avoid a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject ofwidespread media attention The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed By mid-June the Department of Justice had already cleared the Special Counsel 's service and the President's advisors had told him that the claimed conflicts of interest were silly and did not provide a basis to remove the Special Counsel On June 13 2017 the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good cause for removing the Special Counsel existed and the President dictated a press statement to Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel But the next day the media reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Special Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction-spurring the President to write critical tweets about the Special Counsel's investigation The President called McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David The evidence accordingly indicates that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made those calls to McGahn The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the President that the White House Counsel's Office- and McGahn himself-could not be involved in pressing conflicts claims and that the President should consult with his personal counsel if he wished to raise conflicts Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims the President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel And after the media reported on the President's actions he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story as discussed in Volume II Section II I infra Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper F The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation Overview Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation On June 19 2017 the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia investigation to future election interference only One month later the President met again w ith Lewandowski and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia investigation Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon Hours later the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview raising questions about Sessions's job security 1 The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation On June 19 2017 two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign 90 U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaifl Material Pl'eteetea UHael' Fea R Criffl P 6 e manager Corey Lewandowski 603 Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a devotee of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was c Io se 604 During the June 19 meeting Lewandowski recalled that after some small talk the President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation 605 The President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the likelihood of recusal in advance he would not have appointed Sessions 606 The President then asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said write this down 607 This was the first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation and Lewandowski wrote as fast as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly 608 The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas But our POTUS is being treated very unfairly He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor Counsel b c he hasn't done anything wrong I was on the campaign w him for nine months there were no Russians involved with him I know it for a fact b c I was there He didn't do anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history 609 The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit his jurisdiction to future election interference Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States I am going to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections 610 604 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 7 Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 1 describing Lewandowski as a comfort to the President whose loyalty was appreciated Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President had meetings with friends like Lewandowski Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the residence to create distance from the West Wing Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 7 605 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 2 606 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 2 607 Lewandowski 4 6118 302 at 2 608 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 3 609 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 2-3 Lewandowski 6 19 17 Notes at 1-2 610 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 3 Lewandowski 6 19 17 Notes at 3 91 U S Department of Justice At terHe ' Werk Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Preteete6 UHeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the most popular guy in the country 61 1 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the Pres ident wanted Sessions to do 61 2 Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the phone 6 13 He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public log of his vis it and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf 614 Lewandowski called Sessions and a rranged a meeting for the fo llowing evening at Lewandowski's office but Sess ions had to cancel due to a last minute confl ict 615 Shortly thereafter Lewandowski left Washington D C without having had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President' s message 616 Lewandowski stored the notes in a safe at hi s home which he stated was his standard procedure w ith sens itive items 6 17 2 The President Follows Up with Lewandowski Fo llowing his June meeting with the President Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn then a senior White House official and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions 618 Dearborn agreed w ithout knowing what the message was and Lewandowsk i later confirmed that Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then 6 19 Lewandowski recalled thin king that the President had asked him to pass the message because the President knew Lewandowski could be trusted but Lewandowski be lieved D earborn would be a better messenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn was in the government while Lewandowski was not 620 O n July 19 20 17 the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office 621 In the preceding days as described in Volume IT Section II G infra emails and other information about the June 9 2016 meeting between several Russians and Dona ld Trump Jr Jared Kushner and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski the 611 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 3 Lewandowski 6119 17 Notes at 4 612 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 3 61 3 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 3-4 614 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 6 15 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 6 16 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 6 17 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 61 8 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 see Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 3 619 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4-5 620 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 4 6 62 1 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 SCR029b_000002-03 6 5 1 8 Additional Response to Special Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information 92 U S Department of Justice AUerrtey ' Verk Preettet Ma t· Certtairt Material Preteetee Urteer Fee R Grim P 6 e President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions 622 Lewandowski told the Pres ident that the message would be delivered soon 623 Lewandowski recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him Lewandowski should tell Sessions he was fired 624 Immediately following the meeting with the President Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President had dictated to be delivered to Sessions 625 Lewandowski told D earborn that the notes were the message they had discussed but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message was from the President 626 The message definitely raised an eyebrow for Dearborn and he recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it 627 Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him uncomfortable 628 He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation but he did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions and he did not keep a copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him 629 3 The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview Within hours ofthe President's meeting with Lewandowski on July 19 2017 the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decision to recuse from the Russia investigation 630 The President said that Sessions should have never recused himself and if he was going to recuse himself he should have told me before he took the job and I would have picked somebody else 631 Sessions's recusal the President said was very unfair to the president How do you take a job and then recuse yourself If he would have recused himself before the job I would have said 'Thanks Jeff but I can't you know I'm not going to 622 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 623 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 624 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 6 Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in approximately May or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation Priebus recalled that Lewandowski described his reaction as something like What can I do I'm not an employee of the administration I'm a nobody Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 6 625 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when he went in to the Oval Office and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with the President Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 626 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 5 Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 3 627 Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 3 628 Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 3 629 Dearborn 6 20 18 302 at 3-4 630 Peter Baker et al Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 2017 63 1 Peter Baker et al Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 2017 93 U S Department of Justice A erRe ' Verk Preettet May CeRtaiR Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e take you ' It's extremely unfair and that's a mild word to the president 632 Hicks who was present for the interview recalled trying to throw herself between the reporters and the President to stop parts of the interview but the President loved the interview 633 Later that day Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York Times interview 634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions would not meet with him 635 As Hicks remembered the conversation Lewandowski told her the President had recently asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to do the right thing and resign 636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together the President called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview criticizing Sessions was playing out 637 4 The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation Three days later on July 21 2017 the Washington Post reported that U S inte lligence intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russ ian ambassador contrary to what Sessions had said publicly 638 That evening Priebus called Hunt to talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign 639 Priebus had previously talked to Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President and after speaking to Sessions Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit 640 According to Hunt who · took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call Hunt told Priebus that as they had previously discussed Sessions had no intention ofresigning 641 Hunt asked Priebus what the President would 632 Peter Baker et al Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 2017 633 Hicks 12 8 17 302 at 23 634 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I 0 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 6 635 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 6 636 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I 0 Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I0 Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19 2017 fol lowing his meeting with the President he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 7 637 Lewandowski 4 6 18 302 at 6 638 Adam Entous et al Sessions discussed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian ambassador US intelligence intercepts show Washington Post July 21 20 17 The underlying events concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume I Section IV A 4 c supra 639 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 23 640 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 23 641 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 23-24 Hunt 7 21 17 Notes at I 94 U S Department of Justice Atterrtey Werk Preettet May Certtairt Material Preteetee Urteer Fee R Griff P 6 e accomplish by firing Sessions pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be an investigation after 642 Early the following morning July 22 2017 the Pres ident tweeted A new INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post this time against A G Jeff Sessions These illegal leaks like Corney's must stop 643 Approximately one hour later the Pres ident tweeted So many people are asking why isn't the A G or Special Council looking at the many Hillary Clinton or Corney crimes 33 000 e-mails deleted 644 Later that m orning while aboard Marine One on the way to Norfolk Virginia the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions to resign immediately 645 The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and the negative publicity was not tolerable 646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus the President told Priebus to say that he need ed a letter of resignation on his desk immediately and that Sessions had no choice but must immediately resign 647 Priebus replied that if they fired Sessions they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President but the President suggested he could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions 648 Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem so he called McGahn and asked for advice explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was all wrong 649 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative press and poor performance in congressional testimony Priebus believed that the President's desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation 650 McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President's order and said they should consult their personal counsel with whom they had attorney-client privilege 651 McGahn 642 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 23-24 Hunt 7 21 17 Notes at 1-2 643 @reaiDonaldTrump 7 22117 6 33 a m ET Tweet @realDonaldTr mp 7 22 17 7 44a m ET Tweet Three minutes later the President tweeted What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia including Podesta Company Uranium deal Russian Reset big dollar speeches etc @realDonaldTrump 7 22 17 7 47a m ET Tweet 644 645 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 13- 14 646 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 14 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 4-5 see RP_000073 Priebus 7 22 17 Notes 647 RP 000073 Priebus 7 22 17 Notes 648 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 5 649 Priebus 1118 18 302 at 14 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 4-5 650 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 5 651 RP 000074 Priebus 7 22 17 Notes McGahn 12 14117 302 at 11 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 14 Priebus followed McGahn's advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President's request because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 14 95 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Pt'eteetea Uruier Fee R Crilfl P 6 e and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the President' s order to fire Sessions 652 That afternoon the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's resignation using words to the effect of Did you get it Are you working on it 653 Priebus said that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions although the President did not directly say so 654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out the President's directive he told the President he would get Sessions to resign 655 Later in the day Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would a lso resign and the President would be unable to get anyone e lse confirmed 656 The President agreed to hold off on demanding Sessions 's resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day to prevent the shows from focus ing on the firing 657 By the end of that weekend Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to ask Sessions to resign 658 Over the next several days the President tweeted about Sessions On the morning of Monday July 24 2017 the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to investigate Clinton and called him beleaguered 659 On July 25 the Pres ident tweeted Attorney General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes where are Emails DNC server Intelleakers 660 The following day July 26 the President tweeted Why didn ' t A G Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe a Corney friend who was in charge of Clinton investigation 661 According to Hunt in light ofthe President's frequent public attacks Sessions prepared another resignation Jetter and for the rest of the year carried it with him in his pocket every time he went to the White House 662 652 McGahn 12 14117 302 at II RP_000074 Priebus 7 22 17 Notes discuss resigni ng together 653 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 14 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 4 654 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 4 655 Priebus 1 1 8 18 302 at 15 656 Priebus 1 18 18 302 at 15 657 Priebus 1 18 1 8 302 at 15 658 Priebus I 18 1 8 302 at 15 659 @realDonaldTrump 7 24 17 8 49 a m ET Tweet So why aren't the Committees and investigators and of course our beleaguered A G looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes Russia relations 660 @realDonaldTrump 7 25 17 6 12a m ET Tweet The President sent another tweet shortly before this one asking where is the investigation A G @realDonald Trump 7 25 17 6 03a m ET Tweet 661 @reaiDonaldTrump 7 26 17 9 48a m ET Tweet 662 Hunt 2 1 18 302 at 24-25 96 U S Department of Justice Attemey Werle Pree ittet II Ma ' CeHtairt Material Preteetee i UHe ier Fee i R Grim P 6 e Analysis In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confi11ed to future election interference the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act The President's effort to send Sessions a message through Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President shouldn' t have a Special Prosecutor Counsel and that Sessions was going to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections The President wanted Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation which had followed from a formal DOJ ethics review and have Sessions declare that he knew for a fact that there were no Russians involved with the campaign because he was there The President further directed that Sessions should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation because he hasn't done anything wrong Taken together the President's directives indicate that Sessions was being instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and hi s campaign with the Special Counsel being permitted to move forward with investigating election meddling for future elections b Nexus to an official proceeding As described above by the time of the President's initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19 2017 the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was lie the time of the President's fol with ectlon nexus reqmrement tt wou necessary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding c Intent Substantial evidence indicates that the President's effort to have Sessions limit the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President's and his campaign's conduct As previously described see Volume TT Section II B supra the President knew that the Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign and he perceived allegations of Russian interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election The President further knew that the investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel'sjurisdiction were limited to future election interference only The timing and circumstances of the President's actions support the conclusion that he sought that result The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel's investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to ave the Special Counsel removed which itself followed public reports that the President was personally under 97 U S Department of Justice AlterRey Werle PreEittet May CeRtaiR Material Preteete€1 UREier Feel R Grim P 6 e investigation for obstruction of justice The sequence of those events raises an inference that after seeking to terminate the Special Counsel the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's conduct from the investigation's scope The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again on July 19 20 17 just days after emails and information about the June 9 2016 meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials had been publicly disclosed generating substantial media coverage and investigative interest The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent Rather than rely on official channels the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office The President selected a loyal devotee outside the White House to deliver the message supporting an inference that he was working outside White House channels including McGahn who had previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel The President also did not contact the Acting Attorney General who had just testified publicly that there was no cause to remove the Special Counsel Instead the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly take any action on it The July 19 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent The President followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated the message for Sessions demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request And just hours after Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions the President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked Sessions and raised questions about his job security Four days later on July 22 2017 the President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation That evidence could raise an inference that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated whether to comply with the President's direction that Sessions publicly announce that notwithstanding his recusal he was going to confine the Special Counsel' s investigation to future election interference G The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Em ails About the June 9 2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials Overview By June 2017 the President became aware of em ails setting up the June 9 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary Clinton as part of Russia and its government's support for Mr Trump On multiple occasions in late June and early July 2017 the President directed aides not to publicly disclose the emails and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr describing the meeting as about adoption Evidence I The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9 2016 Trump Tower Meeting Tn mid-June 201 7- the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a message to Sessions-senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during 98 U S Department of Justice AM 6rRey W6rk Pr68ttet II May C6RtttiR Material Pr6teetea URaer Fee R Criffi P 6 e the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort Jared Kushner and a Russian attorney 663 As described in Volume I Section TV A 5 supra the emails stated that the Crown P rosecutor of Russia had offered to provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her deal ings with Russia as part of Russia and its government' s support for Mr Trump 664 Trump Jr responded I f it's what you say I love it 665 and he Kushner and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9 2016 666 At the meeting the Russian attorney claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act a 2012 U S statute that imposed financ ial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory ban in Russia on U S adoptions of Russian children 667 According to written answers subm itted by the President in response to questions from this Office the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election 668 The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called for the production of various information including a list and a description of all meetings between any i ndividual affi liated with the Trump campaign and any individual formally or informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place between June 16 2015 and 12 pm on January 20 2017 and associated records 669 Trump Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June 2017 when they began interviewing the meeting participants and the Trump Organization attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel 670 Mark Corallo who had been hired as a spokesman for the President' s personal legal team recalled that he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22 2017 671 Priebus recalled learning about the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June 2017 672 Priebus notified one 663 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at l Raffel2 8 18 302 at 2 664 RG000061 6 3 16 Email Goldstone to Trump Jr @DonaldJTrumpJR 7 11 17 11 01 a m ET Tweet 665 RG000061 6 3 16 Email Trump Jr to Goldstone @DonaldJTrumpJR 7 1 1117 11 01 a m ET Tweet 666 Samochornov 7 12 17 302 at 4 667 See Volume I Section TV A 5 supra describing meeting in detail 668 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 8 Response to Question I Parts a through c The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeting or other events after the election 669 DJTFP_SCO_PDF_0000000 1-02 5 17 17 Letter SSCT to Donald J Trump for President Inc 670 Goldstone 2 8 18 302 at 12 6 2 17 and 6 5 17 Emails Goldstone Garten Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 3 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 67 1 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 3 672 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 7 99 U S Department of Justice AM emey Werlt Preattet II May CeA taiA Material Preteetea UA aer Fea R Crifft P 6 e of the President's personal attorneys who told Priebus he was already working on it 673 By late June several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting 674 2 The President Directs Communications Staff Not to Publicly Disclose Information About the June 9 Meeting Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked 6 75 Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the em ails to the press 676 On or about June 22 2017 Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the President Kushner and Ivanka Trump 677 According to Hicks Kushner said that he wanted to fill the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the congressional committees involving a meeting with him Manafort and Trump Jr 678 Kushner brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President but the President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it shutting the conversation down 679 On June 28 2017 Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner's attorney's office 680 She recalled being shocked by the emails because they looked really bad 681 The next day Hicks spoke privately with the President to mention her concern about the emails which she understood were soon going to be shared with Congress 682 The President seemed upset because too many people knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter 683 The President indicated that he did not think the em ails would leak but said they would leak if everyone had access to them 684 673 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 7 674 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 3 Hicks 1217 17 302 at 8 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 3 675 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 2-3 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 676 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 2-3 5 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 Hicks 1217 17 302 at 8 677 Hicks 1217 17 302 at 6-7 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I 678 Hicks 1217 17 302 at 7 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I 679 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 7 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at I Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other events involving Ivanka Trump set forth in this section of the report Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails Kushner 4 11118 302 at 30 680 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 1-2 68 1 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 682 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 8 683 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2-3 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 8 684 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 8 100 AM erHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Pre6ttet II Mey CeHteiH Meteriel Preteete6 UH6er fee R Grim P 6 e Later that day Hicks Kushner and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President 685 Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about Russian adoption but that emails existed setting up the meeting 686 Hicks said she wanted to get in front of the story and have Trump Jr release the emails as part of an interview with softball questions 687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the press 688 Hicks warned the President that the emails were really bad and the story would be massive when it broke but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and said he did not want details 689 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document production was due 69 Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President said then leave it alone 691 Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to but the President did not think they would be leaked to the press 692 Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group not to be proactive in disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak 693 ° 3 The President Directs Trump Jr 's Response to Press Inquiries About the June 9 Meeting The following week the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in Hamburg Germany accompanied by Hicks Raffel Kushner and Tvanka Trump among others 694 On July 7 2017 while the President was overseas Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting 695 The next day Hicks told the President about the story and he directed her not to comment 696 Hicks thought the President's reaction was odd because he usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin 697 Later t hat day Hicks and the President again spoke about the story 698 Hicks recalled that the President asked 685 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 8 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 686 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 9 687 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2-3 688 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 2-3 Hicks 12 7117 302 at 9 6 9 R Hicks 3113 18 302 at 3 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 9 690 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 3 691 Hicks 3113118 302 at 3 692 Hicks 12 7117 302 at 9 693 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 5 694 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 6 695 Raffel2 8 18 302 at 6-7 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 3 696 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at 10 Hicks 3113 18 302 at 3 697 Hicks 12 7 17 302 at I 0 698 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 3 10 I U S Department of Justice AM errtey Wert Preattet May Certtairt Material Preteetea UHaer FeEl R Crim P 6 e her what the meeting had been about and she said that she had been told the meeting was about Russian adoption 699 The President responded then just say that 700 On the flight home from the G20 on July 8 2017 Hicks obtained a draft statement about the meeting to be released by Trump Jr and brought it to the President 701 The draft statement began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the meeting Twas asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe pageant with an individual who T was told might have information helpful to the campaign 702 Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story but the President directed that the statement not be issued because it said too much 703 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr took a brief meeting and it was about Russian adoption 704 After speaking with the President Hicks texted Trump Jr a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read It was a short meeting Tasked Jared and Paul to stop by We discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government but it was not a campaign issue at that time and there was no follow up 705 Hicks's text concluded Are you ok with this Attributed to you 706 Trump Jr responded by text message that he wanted to add the word primarily before di scussed so that the statement would read We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children 707 Trump Jr texted that he wanted the change because t hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs and some other nonsense which we shot down fast 708 Hicks texted back Tthink that's right too but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions U Itimately d efer to you and your attorney on that word Be I know it's important and Tthink the mention of a campaign issue adds someth ing to it in case we have to go further 709 Trump Jr responded lfl don' t have it in there it appears as though I' m lying later when they inevitably leak something 710 Trump Jr 's statement- adding 699 Hicks 3113 18 302 at 3 Hicks 1217 17 302 at 10 700 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 3 see Hicks 1217 1 7 302 at I 0 701 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 4 702 Hicks 7 8 17 Notes 703 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 4-5 Hicks 12 7117 302 at II 704 Hicks 121711 7 302 at II 705 SCROI a_000004 7 8 17 Text Message Hicks to Trump Jr 706 SCROIIa_000004 7 8 17 Text Message Hicks to Trump Jr 707 SCROI a_OOOOOS 7 8 17 Text Message Trump Jr to Hicks 708 SCRO Ia_ 000005 7 8 17 Text Message Trump Jr to Hicks 709 SCROila_OOOOOS 7 8 17 Text Message Hicks to Trump Jr 710 SCROlla_000006 7 8 17 Text Message Trump Jr to Hicks 102 U S Department of Justice A 6f'He · W6rk Pr66ttet II Mit ' C6HtttiH Material Pr6teete6 UH ier Fee R Criffi P 6 e the word primarily and making other minor additions- was then provided to the New York Times 711 The full statement provided to the Times stated It was a short introductory meeting I asked Jared and Paul to stop by We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government but it was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up I was asked to attend the meeting by an acquaintance but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting with beforehand 712 The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion of the Magnitsky Act or U S sanctions which were the principal subjects of the meeting as described in Volume I Section IV A S supra A short while later while still on Air Force One Hicks learned that Priebus knew about the emails which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front ofthe story 713 Hicks recalled again going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting but he again said no telling Hicks You've given a statement We're done 7 14 Later on the flight home Hicks went to the President's cabin where the President was on the phone with one of his personal attorneys 715 At one point the President handed the phone to Hicks and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story and that she should not talk to the New York Times 716 4 The Media Reports on the June 9 2016 Meeting Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed the New York Times published its story about the June 9 2016 meeting 717 In addition to the statement from Trump Jr the Times story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele reporting 718 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that 711 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 6 see Jo Becker et al Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign New York Times July 8 2017 712 See Jo Becker eta Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign New York Times July 8 2017 713 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 6 Raffel 2 8 18 302 at 9-10 714 Hicks 12 7 17302 at 12 Raffel2 8 18302 at 10 715 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 7 716 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 7 717 See Jo Becker eta Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign New York Times July 8 2017 Raffel2 8 18 302 at 10 718 See Jo Becker eta Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign New York Times July 8 20 17 103 Attertte · U S Department of Justice Werlt Preattet Ma · Cetttaitt Material Preteetea Utteer Fee R Crilfl P 6 e questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members 719 Hicks was upset about Corallo's public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not approved the statement 720 The next day July 9 2017 Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the President criticized Corallo for the statement he had released 72 1 Corallo told the President the statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump Jr 's statement was inaccurate and that a document existed that would contradict it 722 Corallo said that he purposely used the term document to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know what the President knew about the emails 723 Corallo recalled that when he referred to the document on the call with the President Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said it will never get out 724 Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say Also mention existence of doc Hope says 'only a few people have it It will never get out '725 Hicks later told investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails would eventually be leaked but she might have been channeling the Pres ident on the phone call because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think the emaiis would leak 726 On July II 2017 Trump Jr posted redacted images ofthe emails setting up the June 9 meeting on Twitter the New York Times reported that he did so a fter being told that The Times was about to publish the content of the emails 727 Later that day the media reported that the President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr ' s initia l statement to the New York Times that had claimed the meeting primarily concerned a program about the adoption of Russian children 728 Over the next several days the President's personal counsel repeatedly and 7 19 See Donald Trump Jr gathered members of campaign for meeting with Russian lawyer before election Circa News July 8 20 17 720 Hicks 3 13 1 8 302 at 8 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 6-7 72 1 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 7 722 Corallo 2 1 5 18 302 at 7 723 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 7-9 724 Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 8 725 Corallo 2 15 1 8 302 at 8 Corallo 7 9 17 Notes Sunday 9th - Hope calls w POTUS on line Corallo said he is I 00% confident that Hicks said It will never get out on the call Corallo 2 15 18 302 at 9 726 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 9 727 @DonaldJTrumpJR 7 11117 II 0 1 a m ET Tweet Jo Becker et at Russian Dirt on Clinton 'I Love It 'Donald Trump Jr Said New York Times July II 20 17 728 See e g Peter Baker Maggie Haberman Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to Let the Page Turn New York Times July II 20 17 reporting that the President signed off on Trump Jr 's statement 104 U S Department of Justice AttorHey Work Proel tet II Ma · CoHtaiH Material Proteeteel UHeier Fea R Grim P 6 e inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr 's statement 729 After consulting with the President on the issue White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the media that the President certain ly didn 't dictate the statement but that he weighed in offered suggestions like any father would do 730 Several months later the President's personal counsel stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that the President dictated a short but accurate response to the New York Times article on beha lf of his son D onald Trump Jr 731 The President later told the press that it was irrelevant whether he dictated the statem ent and said It's a statement to the New York Times That's not a statement to a high tribunal of judges 732 ecial Counsel ' s Office related to the June Trump Jr attended the On July 19 2017 the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then met with reporters for the New York Times In addition to criticiz ing Sessions in his Times interview the President addressed the June 9 2016 meeting and said he didn ' t know anything about the meeting at the time 734 The President added As I've said-most other peo ple you know when they call up and say ' By the way we have information on your o pponent ' I think most politicians - I was just with a lot of people they said ' Who wouldn't have taken a meeting like that ' 735 Analysis In analyz ing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June 9 meeting the following evidence is re levant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act On at least three occasions between June 29 2017 and July 9 201 7 the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June 729 See e g David Wright Trump lawyer President was aware of nothing CNN July 12 20 17 quoting the President's personal attorney as saying I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor was the President see also Good Morning America ABC July 12 20 17 The President didn't sign off on anything The President wasn't involved in that Meet the Press NBC July 16 20 17 I do want to be clear- the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement 730 Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Aug I 20 17 Sanders 7 3 18 302 at 9 the President told Sanders he weighed in as any father would and knew she intended to tell the press what he 'said 731 I 29 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 18 732 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle June 15 2018 733 734 Peter Baker et al Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 2017 735 Peter Baker et al Excerpts From The Times's Interview With Trump New York Times July 19 201 7 105 U S Department of Justice AM arftey Werle Pratlttet May Cafttaifl Materiel Prateetetl UHtler Feel R Criffi P 6 e 9 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney On June 29 Hicks warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were really bad and the story would be massive when it broke but the President told her and Kushner to leave it a lone Early on July 8 after Hicks to ld the President the New York Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting the President directed her not to comment even though Hicks said that the President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin Later that day the President rejected Trump Jr ' s draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign The President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting The statement dictated by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was di rected at the press They would amount to obstructive acts only if the Preside nt by taking these actions sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counse l On May 17 2017 the President's campaign received a document request from SSCT that clearly covered the June 9 meeting and underly ing emails and those documents also plainly would have been relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the ema ils or other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special Counsel The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy The only evidence we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29 2017 when Hicks recalled the President acknowledging that Kushner's attorney should provide email s related to the June 9 meeting to whomever he needed to give them to We do not have evidence of what the President discussed with his own lawyers at that time b Nexus to an official proceeding As described above by the time of the President' s attempts to prevent the public release of the emai ls regarding the June 9 meeting the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge and the President had been told that the ema ils were responsive to congressional inquiries To satisfy the nexus requirement however it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding or congressional inquiries As noted above the evidence does not establish that the President sought to prevent disclosure of the emails in those official proceedings c Intent The evidence establishes the President's substantial involvement in the communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Russia and his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connections The President became aware of the emails no later than June 29 2017 when he di scussed them with Hicks and Kushner and he could have been aware of them as early as June 2 2017 when lawyers for the Trump Organization began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting The President thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information about the June 9 meeting The President expressed concern that multip le people had access to the emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter And the President 106 U S Department of Justice lrl terrte ' Werk Preelttet II Mtt ' CeHtaifl Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R CritH P 6 e dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr in response to the first press accounts of the June 9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption But as described above the evidence does not establish that the President intended to prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9 meeting or other information about that meeting The statement recorded by Corallo--that the emails will never get out -can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be made pub ic if the President's press strategy were followed even if the emai Is were provided to Congress and the Special Counsel H The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the Investigation Overview From summer 2017 through 20 18 the President attempted to have Attorney General Sessions reverse his recusal take control of the Special Counsel's investigation and order an investigation of Hillary Clinton Evidence I The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017 but before the President's July 19 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for recusing from the Russia investigation the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse his recusal In particular at some point after the May 17 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel Sessions recalled the President called him at home and asked if Sessions would unrecuse himself136 According to Sessions the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton and the gist of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecuse from all of it including the Special Counsel's Russia investigation 737 Sessions listened but did not respond and he did not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton 738 In early July 2017 the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand 739 Porter recalled that the President asked him ifBrand was good tough and on the team 740 The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want 736 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 15 That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations See Volume II Section II C I supra describing President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse 737 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 15 738 Sessions 1 17 18 302 at 15 739 Porter 4 13 18 302 at II Porter 5 8 18 302 at 6 740 Porter 4 13 18 302 at II Porter 5 8 18 302 at 6 107 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werle Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee Ufteer Fee R CritH P 6Ee to be Attorney General one day 741 Because Pmter knew Brand the President asked him to sound her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General 742 Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to Keep in touch with your fri end in reference to Brand 743 Later the President asked Porter a few times in passing whether he had spoken to Brand but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable with the task 744 In asking him to reach out to Brand Porter understood the President to want to find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel although the President never said so explicitly 745 Porter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an effort to end the investigation or fire the Special Counsel 746 McGahn recalled that during the summer of 2017 he and the President discussed the fact that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a nonrecused Attorney Genera1 747 McGahn told the President that things might not change much under a new Attorney Genera1 748 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017 the President frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions 749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation as an act ofdisloyalty 750 In addition to criticizing Sessions's recusal the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his j ob performance with McGahn and Hicks 751 741 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 11 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 6 Because of Sessions's recusal if Rosenstein were no longer in his position Brand would by default become the DOJ official in charge of supervising the Special Counsel's investigation and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed Brand would be next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters See 28 U S C § 508 742 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 11 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 6 743 SC_RRP000020 Potter 7 10 17 Notes 744 POtter 4 13 18 302 at 11-12 745 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 11- 12 746 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 11-12 Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General Brand l 29 19 302 at 2 747 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 11 748 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 11 749 McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 9 750 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 10 75 1 McGahn 12 1 4 17 302 at 9 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 10 108 U S Department of Justice AfterRey Werk Predttet May CeRtaiR Material Preteeted URder Fed R Grim P 6 e 2 Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered by his Recusal Later in 2017 the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who would not be recused On October 16 2017 the President met privately with Sessions and said that the Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the Department should be investigating 752 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter who was at the meeting the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said Don't have to tell us just take a look 753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the Department of Justice would comply with that request 754 Two days later on October 18 2017 the President tweeted Wow FBI confirms report that James Corney drafted letter exonerating Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete Many people not interviewed including Clinton herself Corney stated under oath that he didn't do this-obviously a fix Where is Justice Dept 755 On October 29 2017 the President tweeted that there was ANGER UNITY over a lack of investigation of Clinton arid the Corney fix and concluded DO SOMETHING 756 On December 6 2017 five days after Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about his contacts with the Russian government the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end of a cabinet meeting 757 During that Oval Office meeting which Porter attended the President again suggested that Sessions could unrecuse which Porter linked to taking back supervision of the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton 758 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter the President said I don't know if you cou ld un-recuse yourself You'd be a hero Not telling you to do anything Dershowitz says POTUS can get involved Can order AG to investigate I don ' t want to get involved I'm not going to get involved I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything I just want to be treated fairly 759 According to Porter's notes Sessions responded We are taking steps whole new leadership 752 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 10 753 SC_ RRP000024 Porter I0 16 17 Notes see Porter 5 8 18 302 at I0 754 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 10 755 @reaiDonaldTrump 10 18 17 6 21a m ET Tweet @reaiDonaldTrump 10 18 17' 6 27 a m ET Tweet 756 @realDonaldTrump I 0 29 17 9 53 a m ET Tweet @real DonaldTrump I 0 29 17 I 0 02a m ET Tweet @rea DonaldTrump I0 29 17 I 0 17 a m ET Tweet 757 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 5-6 see SC RRP000031 Porter 12 6 17 Notes 2 45pm With the President Gen Kelly and Sessions who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting SC_RRP000033 Porter 12 6 17 Notes Post-cabinet meeting- POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions Asked me to stay Also COS Kelly 758 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 12 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 5-6 759 SC_ RRP000033 Porter 12 6 17 Notes see Porter 4 13 1 8 302 at 6 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 12 109 U S Department of Justice AttorHey Work Proettet Ma · CoHtaiH Material Proteetee UHeer Pee R Criffl P 6 e team Professionals will operate according to the law 760 Sessions also said I never saw anything that was improper which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the previous discussion about Clinton 761 Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President that he was on the President's team 762 At the end of December the President told the New York Times it was too bad that Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation 763 When asked whether Holder had been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him the President said I don't want to get into loyalty but I will tell you that I will say this Holder protected President Obama Totally protected him When you look at the things that they did and Holder protected the president And I have great respect for that I'll be honest 764 Later in January the President brought up the idea of replacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to clean house at the Department of Justice 765 In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on January 27 2018 Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the past with successful win records such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg and said that one of his biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys citing Sessions as an example 766 The President raised Sessions's recusal a nd brought up and criticized the Special Counsel's investigation 767 Over the next several months the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in the Russia investigation despite his recusal 768 On June 5 2018 for example the President 760 SC_RRP000033 Porter 12 6117 Notes see Porter 4 13 18 302 at 6 761 SC RRP000033 Porter 12 6117 Notes Porter 4 13 18 302 at 6 762 Porter 4113 18 302 at 6-7 763 Michael S Schmidt Michael D Shear Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US Look Very Bad New York Times Dec 28 20 17 764 Michael S Schmidt Michael D Shear Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US Look Very Bad New York Times Dec 28 20 17 765 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 14 766 Porter 5 8118 302 at 15 Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state Roy Cohn 14-0 I Jay Goldberg 12-0 SC_ RRP000047 Potter 1 27 18 Notes 767 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 15-16 768 See e g @realDonaldTrump 2 28 18 9 34a m ET Tweet Why is A G Jeff Sessions asking the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse Will take forever has no prosecutorial power and already late with reports on Corney etc Isn't the I G an Obama guy Why not use Justice Department lawyers DISGRACEFUL @realDonaldTrump 4 7 18 4 52p m ET Tweet Lawmakers of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse FBI Corney Lynch McCabe Clinton Emails and much more Slow walking - what is going on BAD @realDonald Trump 4 22 18 8 22 a m ET Tweet 'GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Corney and Hillary Clinton ' @FoxNews Good luck with that request @realDonaldTrump 12116 18 3 37p m ET Tweet II 0 U S Department of Justice AM-tm ey Verk Preelttet Mf t · CeRtaiA Material Preteeteel UReer Feel R Grim P 6 e tweeted The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues all because Jeff Sessions didn't tell me he was going to recuse him self I would have quickly picked someone else So much time and money wasted so many lives ruined and Sessions knew better than most that there was No Collusion 769 On August I 2018 the President tweeted that ' Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now 'mo On August 23 2018 the President publicly criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafort had been prosecuted but Democrats had not 771 The President said I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice Department JeffSessions 772 That day Sessions issued a press statement that said I took control of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in While I am Attorney General the actions of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations 773 The next day the President tweeted a response 'Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations ' Jeff this is GREAT what everyone wants so look into all of the corruption on the ' other side' including deleted Emails Corney lies leaks Mueller conflicts McCabe Strzok Page Ohr FISA abuse Christopher Steele his phony and corrupt Dossier the Clinton Foundation illegal surveillance of Trump campaign Russian collusion by Dems- and so much more Open up the papers documents without redaction Come on Jeff you can do it the country is waiting 774 On November 7 2018 the day after the midterm elections the President replaced Sessions with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General 775 Analysis In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse himself and regain control of the Russia investigation the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act To determine if the President's effmts to have the Attorney General unrecuse could qualify as an obstructive act it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation That inquiry would take into account the supervisory role that the Attorney General if unrecused would play in the Russia investigation It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General's recusal covered Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first place 769 @realDonaldTrump 6 5 18 7 31 a m ET Tweet 770 @reaiDonaldTrump 8 1 18 9 24a m ET Tweet 771 Fox Friends Interview ofPresident Trump Fox News Aug 23 2018 772 Fox Friends Interview of President Trump Fox News Aug 23 2018 773 Sessions 8 23 18 Press Statement 774 @ realDonaldTrump 8 24 18 6 17a m ET Tweet @ reaiDonaldTrump 8 24 1 8 6 28 a m ET 775 @realDonaldTrump 11 17 1 8 2 44p m ET Tweet Tweet Ill U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Griff P 6 e other campaign-related matters The inquiry would not turn on what Attorney General Sessions would actually do if unrecused but on whether the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally have had the effect of impeding the Russia investigation On multiple occasions in 2017 the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and prosecution of Hillary Clinton For example in early summer 2017 Sessions recalled the President asking him to unrecuse but Sessions did not take it as a directive When the President raised the issue again in December 2017 the President said as recorded by Porter Not telling you to do anything I'm not going to get involved I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything I just want to be treated fairly The duration of the Pres ident' s efforts- which spanned from March 2017 to August 20 18-and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is relevant to assessing whether the President's efforts to have Sessions unrecuse could quality as obstructive acts b Nexus to an official proceeding As described above by mid-June 2017 the existence of a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge In addition in July 2017 a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the District of Columbia and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August 2017 776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the obstructive-act element c Intent There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President' s conduct toward Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a way that would restrict its scope By the summer of20 17 the President was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice And in the wake of the disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the campaign see Volume II Section IT G supra it was evident that the investigation into the campaign now included the President' s son son-in-law and former campaign manager The President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference Yet Sessions remained recused In December 2017 shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty the President spoke to Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if he unrecused Porter linked that request to the President's desire that Sessions take back supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton The President said in that meeting that he just want ed to be treated fairly which could reflect his perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not But a principal effect of that act would be to restore s upervision of the Russia investigation to the Attorney General-a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy who the President described as protecting their 776 E g Del Quentin Wilbur Byron Tau Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington Grand Jury in Russia Probe Wall Street Journal Aug 3 20 17 Carol D Leonnig et at Special Counsel Mueller using grand jury in f ederal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation Washington Post Aug 3 20 17 I 12 U S Department of Justice AM erRe ' Werlt Preettet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UHder Fee R Grim P 6 e presidents A reasonable inference from those statements and the President's actions is that the President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation I The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel Overview In late January 2018 the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn had refused saying he would quit instead After the story broke the President through his personal counsel and two aides sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove the Special Counsel Each time he was approached McGahn responded that he would not refute the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort to have the Special Counsel removed The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office with only the Chief of Staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered him to fire the Special Counsel McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President's direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate In that same meeting the President challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed Evidence I The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel On January 25 2018 the New York Times reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel 777 According to the article a mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr Mueller was examining a possible obstruction case the president began to argue that Mr Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disqualified him from overseeing the investigation 'm8 The article further reported that a fter receiving the president's order to fire Mr Mueller the White House counsel refused to ask the Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel saying he would quit instead 'm 9 The article stated that the president ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive 780 After the article was published the President 777 MichaelS Schmidt Maggie Haberman Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit New York Times Jan 25 20 18 778 MichaelS Schmidt Maggie Haberman Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit New York Times Jan 25 2018 779 MichaelS Schmidt Maggie Haberman Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit New York Times Jan 25 2018 780 MichaelS Schmidt Maggie Haberman Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit New York Times Jan 25 20 18 113 U S Department of Justice AMerHey Werk Pretlttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHeer Fee R Grim P 6 e dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters saying Fake news folks Fake news A typical New York Times fake story 781 The next day the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had not told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have the Special Counsel terminated 782 In that respect the Post story clarified the Times story which could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit causing the President to back down from the order to have the Special Counsel fired 783 2 The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports On January 26 2018 the President's personal counsel called McGahn 's attorney and said that the Pres ident wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest 784 McGahn ' s attorney spoke w ith McGahn about that request and then called the President's personal counsel to relay that M cGahn would not make a statement 785 McGahn ' s attorney informed the Pres ident's personal counsel that the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel removed 7 86 Accordingly McGahn's attorney said although the article was inaccurate in some other respects McGahn could not comply with the President's request to dispute the story 787 Hicks recalled relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn's attorney about the issue 788 78 1 Sophie Tatum Kara Scannell Trump denies he called f or Mueller's firing CNN Jan 26 2018 MichaelS Schmidt Maggie Haberman Trump Ordered Mueller Fired but Backed Off When White House Counsel Threatened to Quit New York Times Jan 25 20 18 782 The Post article stated Despite internal objections Trump decided to assert that Mueller had unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position In response McGahn said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move McGahn did not deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave Rosalind S Helderman Josh Dawsey Trump moved to fire Mueller in June bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving Washington Post Jan 26 20 18 783 Rosalind S Helderman Josh Dawsey Trump moved to fire Mueller in June bringing White House counsel to the brink of leaving Washington Post Jan 26 20 18 see McGahn 3 8 17 302 at 3-4 784 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 3 agent note 785 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 3 agent note 786 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 3-4 agent note 787 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 agent note 788 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at II Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted the story and was going to put out a statement Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 11 But Kelly said that he did not speak to McGahn when the article came out and did not tell anyone he had done so Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 1-2 114 U S Department of Justice AM erRe · Werk Pre6ttet II May Cer'ltaiR Material Preteete6 UR6er Fee R Grim P 6 e Also on January 26 2017 Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact McGahn about the story 789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that some of the article was accurate 79 Consistent with that position McGahn did not correct the Times story ° On February 4 20 18 Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired 791 After Priebus's appearance the President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press 792 The President also told Priebus that the President had never said any of those th ings about the Special Counsel 793 The next day on February 5 20 18 the President complained about the Times article to Porter The P resident told Porter that the article was bullsh it and he had not soug ht to terminate the Special Counsel 795 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make himselflook good 796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make clear that the President never directed McGahn to fire the Specia l Counsel 797 Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White House communications office but the President said he wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file for our records and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate 798 The President referred to McGahn as a lying bastard and said that he wanted a record from him 799 Porter recalled the President 794 789 Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 11 Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to McGahn or if she did it on her own Sanders 7 23 18 302 at 2 790 Sanders 7 23 18 302 at 1-2 791 Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus NBC Feb 4 20 18 792 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at 10 793 Priebus 4 3 18 302 at I 0 794 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 16-17 Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the President Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 Evidence indicates it was February 5 2018 On the back of a pocket card dated February 5 2018 Potter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion COS I Letter from OM - Never threatened to quit- DJT never told him to fire M SC RRP000053 Porter Undated Notes Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 But Porter also said that COS referred to matters he wanted to discuss w ith Chief of Staff Kelly Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 and Kelly took notes dated February 5 2018 that state POTUS Don McGahn letter - Mueller resigning WH000017684 Kelly 2 5 18 Notes Kelly said he did not recall what the notes meant but thought the President may have mused about having McGahn write a letter Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 3 McGahn recalled that Porter spoke with him about the President's request about two weeks after the New York Times story was published which is consistent with the discussion taking place on or about February 5 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 795 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 796 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 797 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 798 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 18 799 Porter 4113 18 302 at 17 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 18 115 U S Department of Justice Attet'fley Verk Pretlttet M B CeHtB iA M B teriB I Preteetetl UHtler Fee R Grim P 6 e saying something to the effect of If he doesn' t write a letter then maybe I' ll have to get rid of him soo Later that day Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President' s message 80 1 Porter to ld McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special Counsel 802 McGahn shrugged off the request explaining that the media reports were true 803 McGahn told Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel and that McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order although he had not personally told the President he intended to quit 804 Porter told McGahn that the Pres ident suggested that McGahn would be fired if he did not write the letter 805 McGahn dismissed the threat saying that the optics wo uld be terrible if the Pres ident followed through with firing him on that basis 806 McGahn said he would not write the letter the President had requested 807 Porter said that to his knowledge the issue ofMcGahn 's letter never came up with the President again but Porter did recall telling Kelly about his conversation with McGahn 808 The next day on February 6 2018 Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article 809 The morning of the meeting the President's personal counsel called M cGahn's attorney and said that the President was going to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the meeting 810 The President began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times story did not look good and McGahn needed to correct it 8 11 McGahn recalled the President said I never said to fire Mueller I never said ' fire ' This story doesn' t look good You need to correct this You ' re the White House counsel 812 800 Porter 4 1311 8 302 at 17 80 1 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 802 Porter 4113 18 302 at 17 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 803 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 804 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 805 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 806 Porter 4 13 18 302 at 17-18 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 807 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 808 Potter 4113 18 302 at 18 809 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 WH000017685 Kelly 2 6 18 Notes McGahn recalled that before the Oval Office meeting he told Kelly that he was not inclined to fix the article McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 8 10 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 agent note 2 26 19 Email Counsel for Don McGahn to Special Counsel's Office confirming February 6 2018 date of call from the President' s personal counsel 811 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 81 2 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 116 U S Department of Justice At teFfle · Werk PFeattet May Cef taifl Material Preteetea UAaer Fee R Griff P 6 e In response McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directly that he planned to resign but said that the story was otherwise accurate 813 The President asked McGahn · Did T say the word ' fire' 8 14 McGahn responded What you said is 'Call Rod Rosenstein tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel '8 15 The President responded I never said that 816 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do 817 McGahn told the President he did not understand the conversation that way and instead had heard Call Rod There are conflicts Mueller has to go 818 The President asked McGahn whether he would do a correction and McGahn said no 819 McGahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed McGahn was to what happened 82 Kelly described the meeting as a little tense 821 ° The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed 822 McGahn responded that he had to and that his conversations with the Pres ident were not protected by attorney-client privilege 823 The President then asked What -about these notes Why do you take notes Lawyers don't take notes I never had a lawyer who took notes 824 McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a real lawyer and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing 825 The President said I've had a lot of great lawyers like Roy Cohn He did not take notes 826 After the Oval Office meeting concluded Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn and the President did have that conversation about removing the Special Counsel 827 McGahn recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn 813 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 814 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 4 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 81 5 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 816 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 817 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 818 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 819 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 820 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 82 1 Kelly 8 211 8 302 at 2 822 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 823 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 824 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes which the President thought of as McGahn 's notes McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 825 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 826 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 827 Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 117 U S Department of Justice AH errtey Werlt Preettet May Certtairt Material Preteetee Urteer Fee R Grim P 6 e had not backed down and would not budge 828 Following the Oval Office meeting the President's personal counsel called McGahn 's counsel and relayed that the President was ' fine with McGahn 829 Analysis In analyzing the President's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have the Special Counsel removed the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfu lly or to undermine his credibility as a potential witness if he testified consistently with his memory rather than with what the record said There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were published in late January 2018 the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel The President correctly understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign In addition the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel and in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn the President said I never said to fire Mueller I never said 'fire ' That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own-but different-recollection of the substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President's conduct As previous ly described see Volume IT Section II E supra substantial evidence supports McGahn's account that the President had directed him to have the Special Counsel removed including the timing and context of the President's directive the manner in which McGahn reacted and the fact that the President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial were being considered by the Department of Justice and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn In addition the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed were carefully worded When first asked about the New York Times story the President said Fake news folks Fake news A typical New York Times fake story And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office he focused on whether he had used the word fire saying I never said to fire Mueller I never said ' fire ' and Did I say the word 'fire' The President's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence Tn addition even ifthe President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June 17 20 17 events the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office 828 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meeting with the President after the fact Kelly 8 2 18 302 at 2 Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state Don Mueller discussion in June -Bannon Priebus- came out okay WHOOOOI 7685 Kelly 2 6 18 Notes 829 McGahn 3 8 18 302 at 5 agent note 118 U S Department of Justice AM erfley Werl Pretlttet II Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl Uritler Fetl R Grim P 6 e meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in hi s views Shortly after the story broke the President' s counsel told McGahn's counsel that the President wanted McGahn to make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel but McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the President's request The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the President' s order Consistent with that position McGahn never issued a correction More than a week later the President brought up the issue again with Porter made comments indicating the President thought McGahn had leaked the story and directed Porter to have McGahn create a record denying that the Pres ident had tried to fire the Special Counsel At that point the President said he might have to get rid of' McGahn ifMcGahn did not comply McGahn again refused and told Porter as he had told Sanders and as hi s counsel had told the President's counsel that the President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate b Nexus to an official proceeding By January 2018 the Special Counsel's use of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments The President also was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because among other reasons on January 8 2018 the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President 830 The President knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many ofthe events the Special Counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators And in the Oval Office meeting the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's Office about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel The President challenged McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure That evidence indicates the President's awareness that the June 17 2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it To establish a nexus it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder delay or prevent the communication of information to investigators Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel investigators before January 2018 the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior statements in those interviews But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics If the President were focused solely on a press strategy in seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown But the President' s effot1s to have McGahn write a letter for our records approximately ten days atler the stories had come out-well past the typical 830 1 29 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 1-2 In our conversation of January 8 your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of justice listing 16 topics 119 U S Department of Justice AM erHe ' Werk Pretittet II MB ' Cefl tB iH Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Criffl P 6 e time to issue a correction for a news story-indicates the President was not focused solely on a press strategy but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from it c Intent Substantial evidence indicates that in repeated ly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated the President acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's conduct towards the investigation Several facts supp011 that conclusion The President made repeated attempts to get McGahn to change his story As described above by the time of the last attempt the evidence suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated McGahn interpreted his encounter with the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how comm itted he was to his memory of what had occurred The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did not deny the story and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn Additional evidence of the President's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn 's counsel and said that McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day The President's counsel was well aware of McGahn' s resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events despite the President's request Finally as noted above the President brought up the Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for telling this Office about the June 17 2017 events The President' s statements reflect his understanding- and his displeasure-that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice mqmry J The President's Conduct Towards Flynn Manafort Overview In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above the President has taken other actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel 's investigation including Flynn Manafort li'•mland as described in the next section Cohen When Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the President the President's personal counsel stated that Flynn 's actions would be viewed as reflecting hostility towards the President During Manafort's prosecution and while the jury was deliberating the President repeatedly stated that Manafot1 was bei treated unfai and made it known that Manafort could receive a Evidence I Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn As previously noted see Volume II Section II B supra the President asked for Flynn 's resignation on February 13 2017 Following Flynn's resignation the President made positive public comments about Flynn describing him as a wonderful man a fine person and a very 120 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Preattet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UAE'Ier Fee R Grim P 6 e good person 83 1 The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong 832 In late November 2017 Flynn began to cooperate with this Office On November 22 2017 Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President 833 Flynn's counsel told the President's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidential communications with the White House or the President 834 Later that night the President's personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said I understand your situation but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms I t wouldn't surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with the government I f there's information that implicates the President then we've got a national security issue so you know we need some kind of heads up Urn just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can R emember what we've always said about the President and his feelings toward Flynn and that still remains 835 On November 23 2017 Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail 836 Flynn's attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege 837 According to Flynn's attorneys the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement 838 The President's personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection ofFlynn 's 831 See e g Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference White House Feb 16 20 18 stating that Flynn is a fine person and I don't think Flynn did anything wrong If anything he did something right You know he was just doing his job Interview ofDonald J Trump NBC May I I 20 17 stating that Flynn is a very good person 832 See Priebus II 18117 302 at 9-1 0 the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was terminated to convey that the President still cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him McFarland 12122117 302 at 18 about a month or two after Flynn was terminated the President asked McFarland to get in touch with Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy he should stay strong and the President felt bad for him Flynn I 19 18 302 at 9 recalling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay Clu-istie 2113119 302 at 3 describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner said You know the President respects you The President cares about you I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising a tweet 833 Counsel for Flynn 311 18 302 at I 834 Counsel for Flynn 31II 18 302 at I 835 11122117 Voicemail Transcript President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn 836 Counsel for Flynn 311118 302 at I 837 Couns l for Flynn 3 1 I 18 302 at I 838 Counsel for Flynn 31II 18 302 at I 121 U S Department of Justice AM erAey ark Pretlttet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea URaer fea R Grim P 6 e hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation 839 F lynn's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such a message would be conveyed to the President 840 On December I 2017 Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a cooperation agreement 841 The next day the President told the press that he was not concerned about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel 842 In response to a question about whether the President still stood behind Flynn the President responded We' II see what happens 843 Over the next several days the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and indicating he had not been treated fairly 844 On December 15 2017 the President responded to a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying I don't want to talk about pardons for Michael Flynn yet We' ll see what happens Let's see I can say this When you look at what's gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department people are very very angry s4s 2 Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort On October 27 2017 a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates o n multiple felony counts and on February 22 2018 a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony 839 Counsel for Flynn 3 1 18 302 at 2 Because of attorney-client privilege issues we did not seek to interview the President's personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to Flynn's attorneys with the President °Counsel for Flynn 311 18 302 at 2 84 841 Information United States v Michael T Flynn I 17-cr-232 D D C Dec I 20 17 Doc I Plea Agreement United States v Michael T Flynn 1 17-cr-232 D D C Dec I 20 17 Doc 3 842 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea C-SPAN Dec 2 843 President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea C-SPAN Dec 2 2017 2017 844 See @realDonaldTrump 12 2 17 9 06 p m ET Tweet So General Flynn lies to the FBI and his life is destroyed while Crooked Hillary Clinton on that now famous FBI holiday ' interrogation ' with no swearing in and no recording lies many times and nothing happens to her Rigged system or just a double standard President Trump Departure Remarks C-SPAN Dec 4 2017 Well I feel badly for General Flynn I feel very badly He's led a very strong life And I feel very badly 845 President Trump White House Departure C-SPAN Dec 15 2017 122 U S Department of Justice Atterrtey Werk Preattet May Certtairt Material Preteetea Urtaer Fee R Grim P 6 e counts 846 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and continued through 2018 847 In January 2018 Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel and they were going to take care ofus 848 Manafort told Gates it was stupid to plead sayi ng that he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should sit tight and we'll be taken care of 849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardon s and Manafort said no one used that word 850 As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court the President told Porter that he never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign 851 The President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the Special Counsel's investigation and whether Manafort knew any information that would be harmful to the President 852 In public the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that Manafort was being treated unfairly On June 15 2018 before a scheduled court hearing that day on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail the President told the press I feel badly about a lot of them 846 Indictment United States v Paul J Manafort Jr and Richard W Gates III I 17-cr-20 1 D D C Oct 27 2017 Doc 13 Manafort and Gates D D C Indictment Indictment United States v Paul J Manafort Jr and Richard W Gates III I 18-cr-83 E D Va Feb 22 2018 Doc 9 Manafort and Gates E D Va Indictment 847 Manafort and Gates D D C Indictment Manafort and Gates E D Va Indictment 848 Gates 4 18 18 302 at 4 In February 2018 Gates pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses i e tax fraud failure to report foreign bank accounts and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal against the United States as well as making false statements to our Office Superseding Criminal Information United States v Richard W Gates III I 17-cr-20 1 D D C Feb 23 20 18 Doc 195 Plea Agreement United States v Richard W Gates III I 17-cr-20 1 D D C Feb 23 20 I8 Doc 205 Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable 849 Gates 4 18 18 302 at 4 850 Gates 4 18 18 302 at 4 Manafmt told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of Manafort also said he hoped for a pardon but never discussed one with the President although he noticed the President's public comments about pardons Manafort I 0 1 18 302 at II As explained in Volume I Section IV A 8 supra Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office The U S District Court for the District of Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the grand jury Order United States v Manafort 1 I7-cr-201 D D C Feb 13 2019 Doc 503 851 Porter 5 8 18 302 at 11 Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort See Priebus 4 3 18 302 at II Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort's judgment while he worked on the Campaign but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort Hicks 3 13 18 302 at 16 852 Porter 5 8 18 302 at II McGahn 12 14 17 302 at 14 123 U S Department of Justice At t erttey Werk Preattet May CerttaiH Material Preteetea Urtaer Fee R Grim P 6 e because I think a lot of it is very unfair I mean I look at some of them where they go back 12 years Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign But I feel so-l tell you I feel a little badly about it They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago I feel badly for some people because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody and I don' t think it's right 853 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel ' s investigation the President said Tdon't want to talk about that No I don't want to talk about that But look I do want to see people treated fairly That's what it' s all about 854 Hours later Manafort's bail was revoked and the President tweeted Wow what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort w ho has represented Ronald Reagan Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns Didn ' t know Manafort was the head of the Mob What about Corney and Crooked Hi llary and all the others Very unfair 855 Immediately following the revocation ofManafort's bail the President's personal lawyer Rudolph Giuliani gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for Manafort Giuliani told the New York Daily News that w hen the whole thing is over things might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons 856 Giuliani also said in an interview that although the President should not pardon anyone while the Special Counsel's investigation was ongoing when the investigation is concluded he's kind of on his own right 857 In a CNN intervi ew two days later Giuliani said T guess I should clarifY this once and for all The president has issued no pardons in this investigation The president is not going to issue pardons in this investigation When it's over hey he 's the president of the United States He retains his pardon power Nobody is taking that away from hirn 858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the President' s comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow saying the comments were certainly not intended that way 859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be excluded from a pardon if in fact the president and his advisors come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly 860 Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations but said That doesn't mean they're going to happen 853 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle White House June 15 20 18 854 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle White House June 15 20 18 855 @rea DonaldTrurnp 6 15 18 I 41 p m ET Tweet 856 Chris Sommerfeldt Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential pardons' in light ofPaul Manafort going to jail New York Daily News June 15 20 18 m Sharon LaFraniere Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial Citing New Obstruction Charges New York Times June 15 2018 quoting Giuliani 858 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript CNN June 17 2018 see Karoun Demitjian Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller 's probe Washington Post June 17 20 18 859 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript CNN June 17 20 18 860 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript CNN June 17 20 18 124 Al l erHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Pl'edttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted Ur der Fed R Grift P 6 e here Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it Big signal is nobody has been pardoned yet 861 On July 31 2018 Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia generating substantial news coverage 862 The next day the President tweeted This is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now before it continues to stain our country any further Bob Mueller is totally conflicted and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA 863 Minutes later the President tweeted Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan Bob Dole and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders He worked for me for a very short time Why didn't government tell me that he was under investigation These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion-a Hoax 864 Later in the day the President tweeted Looking back on history who was treated worse Alfonse Capone legendary mob boss killer and 'Public Enemy Number One ' or Paul Manafort political operative Reagan Dole darling now serving solitary confinement-although convicted of nothing Where is the Russian Collusion 865 The President's tweets about the Manafort trial were widely covered by the press 866 When asked about the President's tweets Sanders told the press Certainly the President's been clear He thjnks Paul Manafort's been treated unfairly 867 On August 16 2018 the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began At that time Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation needed to be done in the next two or three weeks 868 and media stories reported that a Manafort acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and expense whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature 869 861 State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript CNN June 17 20 18 862 See e g Katelyn Polantz Takeaways from day one of the Paul Mancifort trial CNN July 31 20 18 Frank Bruni Paul Manafort 's Trial Is Donald Trump's Too New York Times Opinion July 31 20 18 Rachel Weiner eta Paul Manafort trial Day 2 Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases home remodels lavish cars paid with wire transfers Washington Post Aug I 20 18 863 @ realDonaldTrump 8 1118 9 24 a m ET Tweet Later that day when Sanders was asked about the President's tweet she told reporters It's not an order It's the President' s opinion Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Aug I 20 18 864 @ realDonaldTrump 811 18 9 34a m ET Tweet 865 @realDonaldTrump 8 1 18 11 35 a m ET Tweet 866 See e g Carol D Leonnig et al Trump calls Manafort prosecution a hoax says Sessions should stop Mueller investigation right now Washington Post Aug I 2018 Louis Nelson Trump claims Manafort case has nothing to do with collusion Politico Aug 1 20 18 867 Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Aug 1 20 18 868 Chris Strohm Shannon Pettypiece Mueller Probe Doesn't Need to Shut Down Before Midterms Officials Say Bloomberg Aug 15 2018 869 See e g Katelyn Po Iantz et a Manafort jury ends first day ofdeliberations without a verdict CNN Aug 16 2018 David Voreacos What Mueller's Manafort Case Means for the Trump Bailie to 125 U S Department of Justice At torttey Work Proattet II May Cotttaitt Materia Pl'oteetea Uttaer FeEl R Criffi P 6 e On August 17 2018 as jury deliberations continued the President commented on the trial from the South Lawn of the White House In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately five minutes the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a rigged witch hunt 870 When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted the President said I don't talk about that now I don ' t talk about that 871 The President then added without being asked a further question I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what's going on there I think it's a very sad day for our country He worked for me for a very short period of time But you know what he happens to be a very good person And I think it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort 872 The President did not take further questions 813 In response to the President's statements Manafort's attorney said Mr Manafort really appreciates the support of President Trump 874 On August 21 20 18 the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts Also on August 21 Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses including a campaign-finance violation that he said had occurred in coordination with and at the direction of a candidate for federal office 875 The President reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters Paul Manafort's a good man and it's a very sad thing that happened 876 The President described the Special Counsel's investigation as a witch hunt that ends in disgrace 877 The next day the President tweeted I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family ' Justice' took a 12 year old tax case among other things applied tremendous pressure on him and unlike Michael Cohen he refused to 'break'-make up stories in order to get a ' deal ' Such respect for a brave man 878 In a Fox News interview on August 22 2018 the President said Cohen makes a better deal when he uses me like everybody else And one of the reasons T respect Paul Manafort so much is he went through that trial-you know they make up stories People make up stories This Come Bloomberg Aug 2 20 18 Gabby Morrongiello What a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean for Trump and Mueller Washington Examiner Aug 18 20 18 870 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe C-SPAN Aug 17 20 18 871 President Trump Rem rks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe C-SPAN Aug 17 20 18 872 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe C-SPAN Aug 17 2018 873 President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe C-SPAN Aug 17 2018 874 Trump calls Manafort very good person Allin with Chris Hayes Aug 17 2018 transcript Manafort lawyer We appreciate Trump 's support CNN Aug 17 2018 https www cnn com videos politics 20 18 08 17 paul-manafort-attorney-trump-jury-deliberationsschneider-lead-vpx cnn 875 Transcript at 23 United States v Michael Cohen I 18-cr-602 S D N Y Aug 21 20 18 Doc 7 Cohen 8 21 18 Transcript 876 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial C-SPAN Aug 21 2018 877 President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial C-SPAN Aug _21 20 18 878 @ rea DonaldTrump 8 22 18 9 21 a m ET Tweet 126 U S Department of Justice AUerAe ' ' Verlt Preattet May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fed R Criffl P 6 e whole thing about flipping they call it T know all about f1ipping 879 The President said that flipping was not fair and almost ought to be outlawed 880 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort the President said I have great respect for what he's done in terms of what he's gone throug h He worked for many many people many many years and I would say what he did some of the charges they threw against him every consultant every lobbyist in Washington probably does 88 1 Giul iani told j ournalists that the President really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated and that he and the President had discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort 882 The next day Giuliani to ld the Washingto n Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides and had been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation concluded 883 On September 14 2018 Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators 884 Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the President following Manafort' s guilty plea and agreement to cooperate and that Manafort's attorneys regu larly briefed the President' s lawyers on the topics discussed and the information Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office 885 On November 26 2018 the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by ly ing about multiple subjects 886 The next day Giuliani said that the Pres ident had been upset for weeks about what he considered to be the un-American horrible treatment of 879 Fox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump Fox News Aug 23 2018 recorded the previous day ° 88 Fox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump Fox News Aug 23 20 18 recorded the previous day 881 Fox Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump Fox News Aug 23 2018 recorded the previous day 882 Maggie Haberman Katie Rogers How Did We End Up Here Trump Wonders as the White House Soldiers On New York Times Aug 22 2018 883 Carol D Leonnig Josh Dawsey Trump recently sought his lawyers' advice on possibility of pardoning Manafort Giuliani says Washington Post Aug 23 2018 884 Plea Agreement United States v Paul J Manafort Jr I 17-cr-20 1 D D C Sept 14 20 18 Doc 422 885 Karen Freifeld Nathan Layne Trump lawyer Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller interviews Reuters Oct 22 20 18 Michael S Schmidt et at Manafort 's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump Attorneys on What He Told Mueller New York Times Nov 27 20 18 Dana Bash Manafo rt team briefed meetings CNN Posted 11 28 18 available at Giuliani on Mueller https www cnn com videos pol itics 20 18 11 28 manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-gi ul i aniupdated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx cnn see Sean Hannity Interview with Rudy Giuliani Fox News Sept 14 20 18 Giuliani T here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea agreement has and cooperation agreement has nothing to do with the Trump campaign Now I know that because l 've been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat 886 Joint Status Report United States v PaulJ Manafort Jr D D C Nov 26 20 18 Doc 455 127 U S Department of Justice At terAey Werk Preattet May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAE ier Fee R Criffl P 6 e Manafort 887 In an interv iew on November 28 20 18 the President suggested that it was very brave that Manafort did not fl ip If you told the truth you go to jail You know this flipping stuff is terrible You flip and you lie and you get- the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people to flip It's rare that they can't But I had three people Manafort Corsi-1 don' t know Corsi but he refuses to say what they demanded 888 Manafort Corsi It's actually very brave 889 Tn response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort the President said It was never discussed but I wouldn't take it off the table Why wou ld I take it off the table 890 3 Harm to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter ·· Harm to Ongoing Matter 887 Stephen Collinson Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge CNN Nov 29 2018 888 Corsi is a reference to Jerome Corsi who was involved in efforts me that he had refused a plea to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange and offer fro 's Office because he was not going to sign a lie Sara Murray Eli Watkins says he won't agree to plea deal CNN Nov 26 20 18 889 Marisa Schultz N ikki Schwab Oval Office Interview with President Trump Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility New York Post Nov 28 2018 That same day the President tweeted Whi le the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously tell ing w itnesses to lie about facts they will get relief This is our Joseph McCarthy Era @ rea DonaldTrump 11 28118 8 39a m ET Tweet 890 Marisa Schultz Nikki Schwab New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility New York Post Nov 28 20 18 128 U S Department of Justice At terAey Werle Preattet II May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Criffl P 6 e -• 895 Harm to Ongoing Matter 896 Harm to Ongoing Matter 129 A erfley U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet May Cefltaifl Material Preteetee Ufleer Fee R Grim P 6 e 900 Harm to Ongoing Matter 905 Harm to Ongoing Matter 907 Harm 908 to Ongoing Matter Harm to Ongoing Matter 130 U S Department of Justice A erfle · 'Nerk Pretittet II May CefltaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Grim P 6 e Analysis In analyzing the President's conduct towards Flynn Manafort the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular witnesses from testifying truthfully or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing delaying or preventing their testimony to law enforcement With regard to Flynn the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to cooperate with the government When Flynn 's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the President signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn 's counsel of the President's warm feelings towards Flynn and said that still remains But when Flynn' s counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement the President's personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn 's hostility towards the President That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's decision to cooperate as well as the extent of that cooperation Because of privilege issues however we could not determine whether the President was personally invo lved in or knew about the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn 's counsel With respect to Manafort there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to influence Manafort' s decision whether to cooperate with the government The President and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to fl ip and cooperate with the government On June 15 2018 the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D C case was considering whether to revoke his bail the President said that he felt badly for Manafort and stated I think a lot of it is very unfair And when asked about a pardon for Manafort the President said I do want to see people treated fairly That' s what it's a ll about Later that day after Manafort's bail was revoked the President called it a tough sentence that was Very unfair Two days later the President's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the Special Counse l's investigation could receive a pardon if in fact the P resident and his advisors come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly -using language that paralleled how the President had already described the treatment ofManafort Those statements combined with the President's commendation ofManafort for being a brave man who refused to 'break' suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators The President's public statements during the Manafort trial including during jury deliberations also had the potential to influence the trial jury On the second day of trial for example the President called the prosecution a terrible situation and a hoax that continues to stain our country and referred to Manafort as a Reagan Dole darling who was serving solitary confinement even though he was convicted of nothing Those statements were widely picked up by the press While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and 131 U S Department of Justice AM erRey Wark Praattet II MB y CaRtB iR MB teriB I Prateetea URaet' Fea R Grim P 6 e are presumed to follow those instructions the President' s statements during the trial generated substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements or learned about them from others And the President's statements during jury deliberations that Manafort happens to be a very good person and that it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements which the President made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort b Nexus to an official proceeding The President's actions towards Flynn Manafort - - appear to have been connected to pending or d official proceedings involving each individual The President's conduct towards Flynn principally occurred when both were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation And the Preside nt's conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him The President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal trial And the President's comments about the prospect of Mana fort fl ipping occurred when it was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings c Intent Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential witness is inconclusive As previously noted because of privilege issues we do not have evidence establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting hostility towards the President And regardless of what the President's personal counsel communicated the President continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement stating that Flynn had led a very strong life and the President fe lt very badly about what had happened to him Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government Before Manafort was convicted the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly One day after Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term the President said that Manafort was a brave man for refusing to break and that flipping almost ought to be outlawed At the same time although the President had privately told aides he did not like Manafort he publicly called Manafort a good man and said he had a wonderful family And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort the President did not respond directly and instead said he had great respect for what Manafort 's done in terms of what he' s gone through The President added that some of the charges they threw against him every consultant every lobbyist in Washington probably does In light of the President' s counsel ' s previous statements that the investigations might get cleaned up w ith some presidential pardons and that a pardon would be possible if the President come s to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly the evidence supports the inference that the 132 U S Department of Justice AtterRey 'Nark Preattet II May Ce 'ltail'l Material Preteetea U 'laer Fea R Grim P 6 e President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon which would make cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary We also examined the evidence of the President' s intent in making public statements about Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating Some evidence supports a conclusion that the President intended at least in part to influence the jury The trial generated widespread publicity and as the jury began to deliberate commentators suggested that an acquittal would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation By publicly stating on the second day of deliberations that Manafort happens to be a very good person and that it's very sad what they' ve done to Paul Manafort right after calling the Special Counsel' s investigation a rigged witch hunt the President's statements could if they reached jurors have the natural tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors and a factfinder could infer that the President intended that result But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments including that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion The President's comments also could have been intended to continue sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible As described above the President made his comments about Manafort being a very good person immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort 133 U S Department of Justice AtterAe · K Werk Preti1 1et Ma · CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti UHtier Fee R Grim P 6 e The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen Overview The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our investigation During the campaign Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal After the media began questioning Trump' s connections to Russia Cohen promoted a party line that publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there Cohen continued to adhere to that party line in 2017 when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation In an attempt to minimize the President's connections to Russia Cohen submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow project three times that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia that Cohen had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government and that the project ended in January 2016 before the first Republican caucus or primary While working on the congressional statement Cohen had extensive discussions with the President's personal counsel who according to Cohen said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the statement short and tight After the FBI searched Cohen ' s home and office in April 2018 the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not flip and privately passed messages of support to him Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message he would get a pardon or the President would do something else to make the investigation end But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018 the President publicly criticized him called him a rat and suggested his family members had committed crimes Evidence 1 Candidate Trump's Awareness of and Involvement m the Trump Tower Moscow Project The President' s interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project As described in detail in Volume I Section IV A l supra from September 2015 until at least June 2016 the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia with negotiations conducted by Cohen then-executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J Trump 909 The Trump Organization had previously and 909 In August 2018 and November 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project as described later in this section When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office he repeated the same lies he told Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project Cohen 8 7 18 302 at 12-17 But after Cohen pleaded guilty to offenses in the Southern District ofNew York on August 21 2018 he met with investigators again and corrected the record The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated Starting with his second meeting with the Special Counsel 's Office in September 2018 the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for 134 U S Department of Justice AttorAey Werle Prodttet II May CoAtaiA Material Proteeted UAEier Feel R Criffi P 6 e unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow 91 0 According to Cohen in approximately September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name and brand 911 Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project 9 12 Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happe ning on it 913 Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr and Ivanka Trump 9t4 In the fall of 2015 Trump signed a Letter of Intent for the project that specified highly lucrative terms for the Trump Organization 915 In December 2015 Felix Sater who was handling negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation asked Cohen for a copy of his and Trump's passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possible financing partners 916 Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of Trump's passport from Trump ' s personal secretary Rhona Graff 917 By January 2016 Cohen had become frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with Russian government officials so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry his false statements concerning the Trump Tower Moscow Project but also his broader efforts through public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in and what he knew about contacts between the Trump Organization and Russian interests during the course of the campaign The information provided by Cohen about the Trump Tower Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Special Counsel 's Office's investigation The defendant without prompting by the Special Counsel's Office also corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts with Russian officials during the course ofthe campaign Gov't Sentencing Submission at 4 United States v Michael Cohen I 18-cr-850 S D N Y Dec 7 20 18 Doc 14 At Cohen's sentencing our Office fu rther explained that Cohen had provided valuable information while taking care and being careful to note what he knows and what he doesn't know Transcript at 19 United States v Michael Cohen I 18-cr-850 S D N Y Dec 12 2018 Doc 17 Cohen 12 12 18 Transcript 910 See Volume I Section IV A 1 supra noting that starting in at least 2013 several employees of the Trump Organization including then-president of the organization Donald 1 Trum p pursued a Trump Tower Moscow deal with several Russian counterpatties 911 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 1-4 Cohen 817 18 302 at 15 912 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 2 4 9 13 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 4 9 14 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 4 I 0 915 MDC-H-000618-25 10 28 15 Letter oflntent signed by Donald J Trump Trump Acquisition LLC and Andrey Rozov I C Expert Investment Company Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 3 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 2018 at 15 Response to Question III Parts a through g 916 MDC-H-000600 12 19 15 Email Sater to Cohen 9 17 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 5 135 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preattet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e Peskov who was Putin's deputy chiefofstaffand press secretary 918 On January 20 2016 Cohen received an email response from Elena Poliakova Peskov's personal assistant and phone records confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes during which Cohen described the Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward 919 Cohen recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards 92 Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identified as someone from the Kremlin and Cohen reported that she was very professional and asked detailed questions about the project 921 Cohen recalled telling Trump he wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the Kremlin 922 ° Cohen th ought his phone call renewed interest in the project 923 The day after Cohen's call with Poliakova Sater texted Cohen asking him to c all me when you have a few minutes to chat It's about Putin they called today 924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project and on January 25 2016 sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow for a working visit 925 After the outreach from Sater Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the project forward 926 After January 2016 Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status of the project 927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign 928 In March or April 2016 Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia 929 Cohen also 9 18 See FS00004 12 30 15 Text Message Cohen to Sater TRUMPORG_MC_000233 Ill 1116 Email Cohen to pr__peskova@prpress gof ru MDC-H-000690 1 14 16 Email Cohen to info@prpress gov ru TRUMPORG_MC_ 000235 1116 16 Email Cohen to pr__peskova@prpress gov ru 919 1 20 16 Email Poliakova to Cohen Call Records ofMichael Cohen Showing a 22-minute call on January 20 2016 between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 2-3 After the call Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organization Outlook contact list I 20 16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry 6 22a m ° Cohen t 1 20 18 302 at 5 92 921 Cohen II 20 18 302 at 5-6 Cohen I r 12 18 302 at 4 922 Cohen I 1120 18 302 at 5 923 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 5 924 FSOOOII 1 21 16 Text Messages Sater Cohen 925 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 5 1125 16 Email Sater to Cohen attachment 926 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 927 Cohen 9 12118 302 at 6 In later congressional testimony Cohen stated that he briefed Trump on the project approximately six times after January 2016 Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee I 16th Cong Feb 27 20 19 CQ Cong Transcripts at 24 testimony of Michael Cohen 928 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 6 929 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 4 136 U S Department of Justice At torHey Worl Preelttet Ma · CoHtaiH Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr in the spring-a conversation that Cohen said was not idle chit chat because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal 930 Cohen recalled that around May 2016 he again raised w ith candidate Trump the possibility of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project 931 At that time Cohen had received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip 932 On May 4 2016 Sater wrote to Cohen Thad a chat with Moscow ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after the convention Obviously the premeeting trip you only can happen anytime you want but the 2 big guys is the question I said I would confirm and revert 933 Cohen responded My trip before Cleveland Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention 934 On May 5 2016 Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably read to Trump Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St Petersburg Forum which is Russia's Davos it's June 16- 19 He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev Thi s is perfect The entire business class of Russia will be there as well He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss 935 Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St Petersburg Economic Forum w ith candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there 936 Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be w illing to travel to Russia if Cohen could lock and load on the deal 937 In June 2016 Cohen decided not to attend the St Petersburg Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov 938 Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again-off-again if it were revived 939 During the summer of20 16 Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow project which Cohen found interesting 940 At some point 93 °Cohen 9 12 18 302 at I 0 93 1 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7 932 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7 933 FSOOO 15 5 4 16 Text Message Sater to Cohen 934 FSOOO 15 5 4 16 Text Message Cohen to Sater 935 FSOOO 16-17 5 5 16 Text Messages Sater Cohen 936 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7 937 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7 938 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 7-8 939 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 8 94 °Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 137 U S Department of Justice AM erRey Werk Preattet II Ma y· CeH taiR Material Preteetea URaer Fee R Crittt P 6 e that summer Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company had not secured a piece of property for the project 941 Trump said that was too bad and Cohen did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that 942 Cohen said that at no time during the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be abandoned 943 2 Cohen Determines to Adhere to a Party Line Distancing Candidate Trump From Russia As previously discussed see Volume II Section II A supra when questions about possible Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign Trump denied having any personal financial or business connection to Russia which Cohen described as the party line or message to follow for Trump and his senior advisors 944 After the election the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in advance of the inauguration 945 Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals to be closed out 946 Jn approximately January 2017 Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about Trump Tower Moscow and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those inquiries came in 947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might not be consistent with the message that the President-Elect had no relationship with Russia 948 In an effort to stay on message Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016 949 Cohen recalled that this was part of a script or talking po ints he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to 94 1 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation but said he thought it occurred in June or July 2016 Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 942 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 943 Cohen 3119 19 302 at 2 944 Cohen 11120 18 302 at I Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 3 5 Cohen 9 12 1 8 302 at 9 945 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 1-2 see also Rtskhiladze 4 4 18 302 at 8-9 946 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 1-2 947 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 3 948 Cohen 1 I 20 18 302 at 4 949 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 5 The article was published on February 19 2017 and reported that Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow as recently as the fall of 20 IS but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign Consistent with Cohen's intended patty line message the article stated Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not feasible Megan Twohey Scott Shane A Back-Channel Plan for Ukraine and Russia Courtesy ofTrump Associates New York Times Feb 19 2017 138 U S Department of Justice Attantey Wark Pra6ttet II May Carttairt Material Prateete6 Urt6er Fee R Crilfl P 6 e ° dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia 95 Cohen said that he discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue 951 Cohen thought it was important to say the deal was done in January 2016 rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and June 2016 because it limited the period w he n candidate Trump could be a lleged to have a relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign before Trump had become the party's presumptive nominee 952 3 Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow Pro ject in Accordance with the Party Line In early May 20 17 Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 election 953 At that time Cohen understood Congress's interest in hi m to be focused on the a llegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials in Prague during the campaign 954 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned about those allegations which he believed were provably false 955 On May 18 2017 Cohen met w ith the President to discuss the request from Congress and the President instructed Cohen that he should cooperate because there was nothing there 956 Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement JDA with the President and other individuals who were part of the Russia investigation 957 In the months leading up to his congressional testimony Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counsel 958 Cohen 95 °Cohen 9 18 18 302 at S-6 95 1 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 6 952 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 10 953 P-SC0-000000328 5 9 17 Letter HPSCI to Cohen P-SC0-000000331 5 12 17 Letter SSCI to Cohen 954 Cohen I I 20 18 302 at 2-3 955 Cohen 11 20 1 8 302 at 2-3 956 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 2 Cohen 11 20 19 302 at 3 957 Cohen 11 I 12 18 302 at 2 958 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 2-3 Cohen 11 20118 at 2-6 Cohen told investigators about his conversations with the President' s personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege As a result most of what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President's personal counsel concerned what Cohen had communicated to the President's personal counsel and not what was said in response Cohen described certain statements made by the President's personal counsel however that are set fm1h in this section Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to privileged communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared After interviewing Cohen about these matters we asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about 139 U S Department of Justice At tan'le · WaFit PFat h tet May CaHtaiH MateFial PFateetee UHEleF Fee R Grim P 6 e said that in those conversations the President's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had just been with the President 959 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel told him the JDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on message the investigations would come to an end soon 960 At that time Cohen' s legal bills were being paid by the Trump Organization 961 and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017 962 Cohen said that the President's personal counsel also conveyed that as part ofthe JDA Cohen was protected which he would not be if he went rogue 963 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that the President loves you and told him that if he stayed on message the President had his back 964 In August 2017 Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit to Congress along with his document production 965 The final version of the statement contained several false statements about the project 966 First although the Trump Organization continued to pursue the project until at least June 2016 the statement said The proposal was under consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016 By the end of January 2016 I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued further Based on my business determinations the Trump Organization abandoned the proposal 967 Second although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture the statement said Desp ite overtures by Mr Sater I never considered asking Mr Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal I told Mr Sater that Mr Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive agreement in place 968 Third although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status Trump Tower Moscow The President's personal counsel declined and through his own counsel indicated that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained from other parties in the IDA Tn view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold communications that could be covered by privilege the President's personal counsel's uncertainty about the provenance of his own knowledge the burden on a privilege holder to establ ish the elements to support a claim of privilege and the substance of the statements themselves we have included relevant statements Cohen provided in this repott Tf the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report further analysis could be warranted 959 Cohen II 20 18 302 at 6 °Cohen 11120 18 302 at 2 4 96 961 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 4 962 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 8 Cohen I I 20 18 302 at 3-4 963 Cohen 11120 18 302 at 4 964 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at II Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 2 965 P-SC0-000003680 and P-SC0-0000003687 8 16117 Email and Attachment Michael Cohen's Counsel to Cohen Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 966 P-SC0-00009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 20 17 967 P-SC0-00009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 20 17 968 P-SC0-00009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 2017 140 U S Department of Justice AM 6rHey W6rk Pr6attet II May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teetea UHaer FeEl R CrifH P 6 e of the project and had numerous conversations about it the statement said Mr Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015 969 Fourth although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin the statement said that Cohen did not recall any response to my email to Peskov nor any other contacts by me with Mr Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal 970 Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to and edited by members of the JDA 971 Before the statement was finalized early drafts contained a sentence stating The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials 972 In the final version of the statement that line was deleted 973 Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JDA to take out that sentence and he did not push back on the deletion 974 Cohen recalled that he told the President's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA 975 Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress he spoke with the President' s personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia Cohen ' s efforts to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United Nations General Assembly 976 In September 2015 Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump who told Cohen to reach out to Putin 's office about it 977 Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian official about a possible meeting and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on the proposed meeting with Putin 978 When Cohen called the Russ ian official a second time she told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump and Cohen relayed that 969 P-SC0-00009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 2017 970 P-SC0-00009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 20 17 971 Cohen 9112 18 302 at 8-9 Cohen also testified in Congress that the President' s counsel reviewed and edited the statement Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee I 16th Cong Feb 27 20 19 CQ Con g Transcripts at 24-25 testimony by Michael Cohen Because of concerns about the common interest privilege we did not obtain or review all drafts of Cohen's statement Based on the drafts that were released through this Office's filter process it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel P-SC0-0000003680 and P-SC0-0000003687 8 16 17 Email and Attachment Cohen's counsel to Cohen 972 P-SC0-0000003687 8 16 17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen Cohen 11 20 1 8 302 at 4 973 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 4 A different line stating that Cohen did not recall any response to my email to Peskov in January 20 16 nor any other contacts by me with Mr Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal remained in the draft See P-SC0-0000009478 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 20 17 974 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 4 975 Cohen 11 20118 302 at 5 976 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at I 0-11 977 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at II Cohen II 112 18 302 at 4 978 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at II Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 5 141 AMerfte · U S Department of Justice Werk Prethtet II Ma · CeRtain Material Preteetee Ufteer Fee R Grim P 6 e message to Trump 979 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed TrumpPutin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean Hannity's radio show 98 Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel the whole story ofthe attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it 98 1 Cohen recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and should not be included in his statement to Congress 982 ° Cohen said that his agenda in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project and the President give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential primaries and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations 983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to him by not contradicting anything the President had said 984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that if he told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about travel to Russia to pursue the project he would contradict the message that no connection existed between Trump and Russia and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because the deal never happened 985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole group 986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House and he believed that following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional investigations 987 Between August 18 2017 when the statement was in an initial draft stage and August 28 2017 when the statement was submitted to Congress phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with the President' s pctrsonal counsel almost daily 988 On August 27 2017 the day before Cohen 979 98 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 5 °Cohen 9 18 18 302 at II 981 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 982 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 2 see Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 11 recalling that he was told that if he stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative the President would have his back 983 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 8 Information at 4-5 United States v Michael Cohen I 18-cr-850 S D N Y Nov 29 2018 Doc 2 Cohen Information 984 Cohen II 20 18 302 at 4 985 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 4 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 2-3 4 6 986 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 9 987 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 8-9 988 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 2-3 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 Call Records of Michael Cohen Reflecting three contacts on August 18 2017 24 seconds 5 minutes 25 seconds and 10 minutes 58 seconds two contacts on August I 9 23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds three contacts on August 23 8 seconds 20 minutes 33 seconds and 5 minutes 8 seconds one contact on August 24 I I minutes 59 seconds 14 contacts on August 27 28 seconds 4 minutes 37 seconds I minute 16 seconds I minutes 35 142 At teme · U S Department of Justice Werk Preflttet Mtt ' CetttttiH Mttterittl Preteetefl Uttfler Fee R Criffi P 6 e submitted the statement to Congress Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous contacts by phone including calls lasting three four six eleven and eighteen minutes 989 Cohen recalled telling the President's personal counsel who did not have first-hand knowledge of the project that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected 99 Cohen stated that the President's personal counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight and the matter would soon come to an end 991 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said his client appreciated Cohen that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President that there was no need to muddy the water and that it was time to move on 992 Cohen said he agreed because it was what he was expected to do 993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project this Office sought to speak with the President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen but counsel declined citing potential privilege concerns 994 ° At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress he served as a source for a Washington Post story published on August 27 2017 that reported in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow at the same time as candidate Trump was running for president in late 2015 and early 2016 995 The article reported that the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016 just before the presidential primaries began several people familiar with the proposal said 996 Cohen recalled that in speaking to the Post he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January 2016 997 seconds 6 minutes 16 seconds I minutes 10 seconds 3 minutes 5 seconds 18 minutes 55 seconds 4 minutes 56 seconds II minutes 6 seconds 8 seconds 3 seconds 2 seconds 2 seconds 989 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 Call Records of Michael Cohen Reflecting 14 contacts on August 27 2017 28 seconds 4 minutes 37 seconds 1 minute 16 seconds I minutes 35 seconds 6 minutes 16 seconds I minutes 10 seconds 3 minutes 5 seconds 18 minutes 55 seconds 4 minutes 56 seconds II minutes 6 seconds 8 seconds 3 seconds 2 seconds 2 seconds 990 Cohen It 20 I 8 302 at 5 991 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President's personal counsel responded to the effect of so what because the deal never happened Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 992 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 993 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 5 994 2 8 19 email Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office 995 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 Carol D Leonnig et al Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ran for president Washington Post Aug 27 20 17 996 Carol D Leonnig et al Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he ranfor president Washington Post Aug 27 2017 997 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 143 U S Department of Justice At terH e Work Preattet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e On August 28 2017 Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project to Congress 998 Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow 999 He recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his testimony 1000 On September 19 2017 in anticipation of his impending testimony Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress which criticized the allegations in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project was terminated in January of 20 16 which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary 1001 Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow the same message 1002 Cohen said his decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner's decision to release a statement in advance of Kushner's congressional testimony which the President's personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked 1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20 2017 after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media the President's personal counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had gone out 1004 On October 24 and 25 2017 Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow 1005 Phone records show that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both days 1006 4 The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen In January 2018 the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130 000 pay ment during the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had 998 P-SC0-000009477- 9478 8 28 17 Letter and Attachment Cohen to SSCI 999 Cohen 11 12 18 302 at 2 Cohen 9112 18 302 at 9 °Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 9 100 1001 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 see e g READ Michael Cohen 's statement to the Senate intelligence committee CNN Sept 19 20 17 1002 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 1003 Cohen 9 18 18 302 at 7 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 6 1004 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 6 Phone records show that the President's personal counsel called Cohen on the morning of September 20 2017 and they spoke for approximately II minutes and that they had two more contacts that day one ofwhich lasted approximately 18 minutes Call Records of Michael Cohen Reflecting three contacts on September 20 2017 with calls lasting fo r II minutes 3 seconds 2 seconds and 18 minutes 38 seconds 1005 Cohen Information at 4 Executive Session Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence U S House of Representatives Interview of Michael Cohen Oct 24 2017 at I 0-11 117-119 1006 Call Records of Michael Cohen Reflecting two contacts on October 24 2017 12 minutes 8 seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds and three contacts on October 25 2017 I second 4 minutes 6 seconds and 6 minutes 6 seconds 144 U S Department of Justice Aftet'fley Werl PreElttet May CerttaiH Material Preteetee UrtEler Fee R Grim P 6 e with the President before he ran for office 1007 This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaignperiod payments to women 1008 However those events as described here are potentially relevant to the President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began to cooperate with the government On February 13 2018 Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated In a private transaction in 2016 I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130 000 to the woman Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the transaction with the woman and neither reimbursed me for the payment either directly or indirectly 1009 In congressional testimony on February 27 2019 Cohen testified that he had discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed Cohen to say that the President was not knowledgeabl e of Cohen's actions in making the payment 10 10 On February 19 2018 the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's fixer Cohen received a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated C lient says thanks for what you do IOII On April 9 2018 FBI agents working with the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen 's home hotel room and office 10 12 That day the President spoke to reporters and said that he had just heard that they broke into the office of one of my personal attorneys-a good man 10 13 The President called the searches a real disgrace and said It's an attack on our country in a true sense It' s an attack on what we all 1007 See e g Michael Rothfeld Joe Palazzolo Trump Lawyer Arranged $130 000 Payment for Adult-Film Star's Silence Wall Street Journal Jan 12 20 18 1008 The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen's establishment and use of Essential Consultants LLC which Cohen created to facilitate the $ 130 000 payment during the campaign based on evidence that the entity received funds from Russian-backed entities Cohen's use of Essential Consultants to facilitate the $130 000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Office's referral of certain Cohen-related matters to the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District ofNew York 1009 See e g Mark Berman Longtime Trump attorney says he made $130 000 payment to Stormy Daniels with his money Washington Post Feb 14 20 18 1010 Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform Committee I 16th Cong Feb 27 2019 CQ Cong Transcripts at 147-148 testimony ofMichael Cohen Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five minutes on January 19 2018 and for approximately seven minutes on January 30 2018 and that Cohen called Melania Trump's cell phone several times between January 26 2018 and January 30 20 18 Call Records of Michael Cohen 1011 2 19 18 Text Message President's personal counsel to Cohen see Jim Rutenberg et al Tools of Trump's Fixer Payouts Intimidation and the Tabloids New York Times Feb 18 20 18 10 12 Gov't Opp to Def Mot for Temp Restraining Order In the Matter of Search Warrants Executed onApri 9 2018 18-mj-3161 S D N Y Apr 13 2018 Doc I On April9 2018 agents from the New York field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation executed search warrants for Michael Cohen's residence hotel room office safety deposit box and electronic devices 1013 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership White House Apr 9 20 18 145 U S Department of Justice At'terHey Werk Prea1 1et May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e stand for 1014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was an open book that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to come out and that his fa lse statements to Congress were a big concern 10 15 A few days after the searches the Pres ident called Cohen 1016 According to Cohen the President said he wanted to che k in and asked if Cohen w as okay and the President encouraged Cohen to hang in there and stay strong 10 17 Cohen also recalled that fo llowing the searches he heard fro m individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's support for him 10 18 Cohen recalled that a friend of the Pres ident's reached out to say that he was with the Boss in President had said he loves you and not to worry 1019 Cohen recalled that for the Trump Organizatio n told him the boss loves you a friend of the President's told him everyone knows the boss has your back On or about April 17 2018 Cohen began speaking with an attorney Robert Costello who had a close relationship with Rudolph Giulian i one of the President's personal lawyers 1022 Costello told Cohen that he had a back channel of communication to G iul iani and that Giulian i had said the channel was crucial and must be maintained 1023 On April 20 20 18 the New York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment ofCohen 1024 The Preside nt responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not flip The New York Times and a third rate reporter are going out of their way to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will ' flip ' They use nonexistent 'sources' and a drunk drugged up loser who hates Michael a fine person with a wonderful family M ichael is a businessman for his own account lawyer who I have always liked respected Most people w ill fl ip if the Government lets them out of trouble even 10 14 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership White House Apr 9 20 18 10 15 Cohen 10 17 18 302 at II 1016 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 4 1017 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 4 10 18 Cohen 9 12 1 8 302 at II 1019 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at II °Cohen 9 12 18 302 at I I 102 102 1 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 11 1022 4 17 18 Email Citron to Cohen 4 19 18 Email Costello to Cohen MC-SC0-00 I 717 1 8 redacted billing statement from Davidoff Hutcher Citroh to Cohen 1023 4 2 1 18 Email Costello to Cohen 1024 See Maggie Haberman et al Michael Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump Maybe Not Anymore New York Times Apr 20 20 18 146 U S Department of Justice A 'ferHe · Werk Preelttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e if it means lying or making up stories Sorry I don ' t see Michael doing that despite the horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media 1025 In an email that day to Cohen Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani 1026 Costello told Cohen the conversation was Very Very Positive You are ' loved' they are in our comer Sleep well tonight you have friends in high places 1027 Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White House if he continued to toe the party line and he determined to stay on message and be part of the team 1028 At the time Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization which he said was important to him 1029 Cohen believed he needed the power of the President to take care ofhim so he needed to defend the President and stay on message 1030 Cohen also recalled speaking with the President' s personal counsel about pardons after the searches of his home and office had occurred at a time when the media had reported that pardon discussions were occurring at the White House 1031 Cohen told the Pres ident's personal counsel he had been a loyal lawyer and servant and he said that after the searches he was in an uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him 1032 According to Cohen the President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message that the investigation was a witch hunt and that everything would be fine 1033 Cohen understood based on this conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the Pres ident's personal counsel that as long as he stayed on message he would be taken care of by the President either through a pardon or through the investigation being shut down 1034 1025 @realDonaldTrump 4 21 18 9 I 0 a m ET Tweets 1026 4 21 I 18 Email Costello to Cohen 1028 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 11 1029 Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 10 103 ° Cohen 9 12 18 302 at 10 103 1 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 7 At a White House press briefing on April 23 2018 in response to a question about whether the White House had close d the door one way or the other on the President pardoning Michael Cohen Sanders said It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place I don 't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen I would refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case but we don' t have anything at this point Sarah Sanders White House Daily Briefing C-SPAN Apr 23 201 8 1032 Cohen 11 20 18 302 at 7 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 3 1033 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 3 1034 Cohen 3 19 19 302 at 3-4 147 U S Department of Justice Atteffle · 'Nerk Preettet II Mfiy CeRtfiiA Mftterifil Preteetee UAeer Fee R Criffi P 6 e On April 24 2018 the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen with Stupid question 1035 On June 8 20 18 the President said he hadn' t even thought about pardons for Manafort or Cohen and continued It's far too early to be thinking about that They haven' t been convicted of anything There's nothing to pardon 1036 And o n June 15 20 18 the President expressed sympathy for Cohen Manafort and Flynn in a press interview and said I fee l badly about a lot of them because I think a lot of it is very unfair 1037 5 The Pres ident's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government On July 2 2018 ABC News reported based on an exclusive interview with Cohen that Cohen strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York-even if that puts President Trump in j eopardy 1038 That week the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previo us ly had worked as a legal advisor to President Bill C linton 1039 Beginning on July 20 2018 the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who said she had had an affair with Trump 1040 On July 21 2018 the President responded Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office early in the morning a lmost unheard of Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client- totally unheard of perhaps illegal The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong 104 1 On July 27 2018 after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump Jr told his father about the June 9 2016 meeting to get dirt on Hillary Clinton 1042 the Pres ident tweeted S o the Fake N ews doesn' t waste my time with dumb questions NO I did NOT know of the meeting with my son Don jr Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up 1035 Remarks by President Trump and President Macron of France Before Restricted Bil atera1 Meeting The White House Apr 24 20 18 1036 President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for the G-7 Summit CQ Newsmaker Transcripts June 8 20 18 1037 Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle The White House June 15 20 18 1038 EXCLUSIVE Michael Cohen says family and country not President Trump is his 'first loyalty' ABC July 2 20 18 Cohen said in the interview To be crystal ·clear my wife my daughter and my son and this country have my first loyalty 1039 See e g Darren Samuelsohn Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis Politico July 5 20 18 1040 See e g Matt Apuzzo eta Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model New York Times July 20 20 18 1041 @r ai DonaldTrump 7 21 18 8 10a m ET Tweet 1042 See e g Jim Sciutto Cuomo Prime Time Transcript CNN July 26 20 18 148 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werk Preettet Ma · CeHtaiH Material Pf'6teetee UHeer Fee R Crim P 6 e stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam Taxi cabs maybe He even retained Bill and Crooked Hillary's lawyer Gee T wonder if they helped him make the choice 1043 On August 21 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District ofNew York to eight felony charges including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the President 1044 During the plea hearing Cohen stated that he had worked at the direction of' the candidate in making those payments 1045 The next day the President contrasted Cohen' s cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate tweeting T feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family ' Justice' took a 12 year old tax case among other things applied tremendous pressure on him and unlike Michael Cohen he refused to ' break'-make up stories in order to get a ' deal ' Such respect for a brave man 1046 On September 17 2018 this Office submitted written questio ns to the President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President 1047 Among other issues the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the project whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia and whether the President at any time direct ed or suggest ed that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease or whether the President was informed at any time that the project had been abandoned 1048 On November 20 2018 the President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the timing of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued 1049 Instead the President' s answers stated in relevant part I had few conversations with Mr Cohen on this subject As I recall they were brief and they were not memorable I was not enthused about the proposal and Tdo not recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it I do not remember discussing it with 1043 @reaiDonaldTrump 7 27 18 7 26a m ET Tweet @reaiDonaldTrump 7 27118 7 38a m ET Tweet @reaiDonaldTrump 7 27 18 7 56 a m ET Tweet At the time of these tweets the press had reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators See e g Matt Apuzzo et al Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model New York Times July 20 20 18 1044 Cohen Information 1045 Cohen 8 21 18 Transcript at 23 1046 @reaiDonaldTrump 8 22 18 9 21 a m ET Tweet 1047 9 17 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel attaching written questions for the President with attachments 1048 9 17 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel attaching written questions for the President Question III Parts a through g 1049 Written Responses of Donald J Trump Nov 20 20 18 149 At terA e · U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet May CefltaiA Material Preteeteti Ufltier Fee R Criffl P 6 e anyone e lse at the Trump Organization although it is possible I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of Intent 1050 On November 29 2018 Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project 105 1 In a plea agreement with this Office Cohen agreed to provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which this Office deems relevant 1052 Later on November 29 after Cohen's guilty plea had become public the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project saying I decided not to do the proj ect T decided ultimately not to do it There wou ld have been nothing wrong ifl did do it Ifi did do it there would have been nothing wrong That was my business Tt was an option that I decided not to do I decided not to do it The primary reason I was focused on running for President I was running my bus iness while I was campaigning There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won in which case I would ' ve gone back into the business And why should T lose lots of opportunities 1053 The President also said that Cohen was a weak person And by being weak unlike other people that you watch-he is a weak person And what he 's trying to do is get a reduced sentence So he 's lying about a project that everybody knew about 1054 The Pres ident also brought up Cohen's written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project So here's the story Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and or Senate It talked about his position 1055 The President added Even if Cohen was right it doesn ' t matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign 1056 In light of the Pres ident's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he decided not to do the project thi s Office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued including when he decided not to do the proj ect who he spoke to about that decision and what motivated 1050 Written Responses of Donald J Ttump Nov 20 20 18 at 15 Response to Question III Parts a through g 1051 Cohen Information Cohen 8 21 18 Transcript 1052 Plea Agreement at 4 United States v Michael Cohen I 18-cr-850 S D N Y Nov 29 20 18 1053 President Trump Departure Remarks C-SPAN Nov 29 20 18 In contrast to the President's remarks following Cohen's guilty plea Cohen's August 28 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen not the President decided to abandon the proposal in late January 2016 that Cohen did not ask or brief Mr Trump before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal and that the decision · to abandon the proposal was unrelated to the Campaign P-SC0-000009477 Statement of Michael D Cohen Esq Aug 28 20 17 1054 President Trump Departure Remarks C-SPAN Nov 29 2018 1055 President Trump Departure Remarks C-SPAN Nov 29 2018 1056 President Trump Departure Remarks C-SPAN Nov 29 2018 50 U S Department of Justice AtterAey Werk Preattet II May CeAtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e the decision 1057 The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specifY what period of the campaign he was involved in discussions concerning the project 1058 In response the President's personal counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that the President has fully answered the questions at issue 1059 In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office the President repeatedly implied that Cohen's fam ily members were guilty of crimes On December 3 2018 after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum the President tweeted ' Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time ' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE unrelated to Trump things having to do with fraud big loans Taxis etc and not serve a long prison term He makes up stories to get a GREAT ALREADY reduced deal for himself and get his wife and father-in-law who has the money off Scott Free He lied for this outcome and lete sentence 1060 inion serve a fu ll and On December 12 2018 Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment 1062 The next day the President sent a series of tweets that said I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law Those charges were just agreed to by him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence which he did-including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook As a lawyer Michael has great liability to me 1063 On December 16 2018 the President tweeted Remember Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat' after the FBI did something which was absolute ly unthinkable unheard of until the Witch Hunt was illegally statted They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Why didn't they break into the DNC to get the Server or Crooked 's office 1064 In January 2019 after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a congressional hearing the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's 1057 1 23 19 Letter Special Counsel' s Office to President's Personal Counsel 1058 1 23 19 Letter Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel 1059 2 6 19 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office 1060 @realDonaldTrump 12 3 18 10 24 a m ET and 10 29 a m ET Tweets emphasis added 1061 @realDonaldTrump 12 3 18 I 0 48 a m ET Tweet 1062 Cohen 12 12 18 Transcript 1063 @reaiDonaldTrump 12 13 18 8 17a m ET 8 25a m ET and 8 39a m ET Tweets emphasis 1064 @realDonaldTrump 12 16 18 9 39a m ET Tweet added 151 U S Department of Justice AttorHey Worlt Pm6ttet Me · CoHteiH Meteriel Proteete6 UH6er Fee R Criffi P 6 e family members had committed crimes In an interview on Fox on January 12 2019 the President was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded I n order to get his sentence reduced Cohen says I have an idea I'll ah tell- ' II give you some information on the president Well there is no information But he should give information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at because where does that mone that 's the money in the family And I guess he didn't want to talk about his father-in-law he's trying to get his sentence reduced So it' s ah pretty sad You know it's weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that 1065 On January 18 2019 the President tweeted Kevin Corke @ FoxNews ' Don ' t forget Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud and as recently as this week the Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars ' Lying to reduce his jail time Watchfather-in-law 1066 On January 23 2019 Cohen postponed his congressional testimony citing threats against his family 1067 The next day the President tweeted So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen who sadly will not be testifYing before Congress is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him-Gee how did that happen 106 8 Also in January 2019 Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project well past January 2016 Giuliani stated that it's our understanding that discussions about the Trump Moscow project went on throughout 2016 Weren' t a lot ofthem but there were conversations Can' t be sure of the exact date But the president can remember having conversations with him about it The president also remembers- yeah probably up--could be up to as far as October November 1069 In an interview with the New York Times Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were going on from the day I announced to the day I won 1070 On January 21 20 19 Giuliani issued a statement that said My recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow ' project' were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the president 10 71 1065 Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump Fox News Jan 12 20 19 emphasis added 1066 @reaiDonaldTrump 1 18119 10 02 a m ET Tweet emphasis added 1067 Statement by Lanny Davis Cohen's personal counsel Jan 23 20 19 1068 @realDonaldTrump 1124 19 7 48a m ET Tweet 1069 Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani NBC Jan 20 20 19 1070 Mark Mazzetti et at Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continued Through the Day I Won Trump Is Said to Acknowledge New York Times Jan 20 20 19 107 1 Maggie Haberman Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were Hypothetical New York Times Jan 21 2019 In a letter to this Office the President's counsel stated that Giuliani's publ ic comments were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing 152 U S Department of Justice AMerHe ' 'Nerk Preattet II Ma · GeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grtffl P 6 e Analysis In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice a Obstructive act We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen on two issues i whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements to Congress and ii whether the President took actions that would have the natural tend ncy to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government i First with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress while there is evidence described below that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project the evidence available to us does not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a party line that developed within the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia Cohen also recalled that in speaking with the President in advance of testifying he made it clear that he would stay on message-which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony During the time when his statement to Congress was being drafted and circulated to members of the JDA Cohen did not speak directly to the President about the statement but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel-as corroborated by phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27 2017-the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress-Cohen said that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time According to Cohen the President's personal counsel- who did not have first-hand knowledge of the projectresponded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water that it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take place and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight not elaborate stay on message and not contradict the President Cohen's recollection of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JDA For example Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly and Cohen believed it was a decision of of conversations beyond that contained in the President's written responses to the Special Counsel's Office 2 6 19 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel 's Office 53 U S Department of Justice AttarHey Werle Praattet Ma · CaHtaiH Material Prateetea Utttier Fee R Grim P 6 e the JDA to delete the sentence The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his conversations with Cohen and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel The President' s conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications The absence of evidence about the President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen's statement precludes us fi·om assessing what if any role the President played ii Second we considered whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal investigators or to Congress Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not flip Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go rogue In the days and weeks that followed the April20 18 searches of Cohen's home and office the President told reporters that Cohen was a good man and said he was a fine person with a wonderful family who I have always liked respected Privately the President told Cohen to hang in there and stay strong People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that the President loves you the boss loves you and everyone knows the boss has your back Through the President's personal counsel the President also had previously told Cohen thanks for what you do after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that according to Cohen both Cohen and the President knew was false At that time the Trump Organization continued to pay Cohen' s legal fees which was important to Cohen Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel who told him to stay on message and everything would be fine The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out and also stated publicly that m ost people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble but that he d idn't see Michael doing that After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government however the President accused Cohen of mak ing up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam Taxi cabs maybe called Cohen a rat and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen's family members had committed crimes The evidence concerning this sequence of events could suppott an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating b Nexus to an official proceeding The President's relevant conduct towards Cohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office Congress and the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District ofNew York were investigating Cohen's conduct The President acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with the government investigations 54 U S Department of Justice AUemey Werk Pretl1 1et May CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHtler FeEl R Griff P 6 e c Intent In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a potential witness there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen ' s information would shed adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements i Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations- a goal that was in the President's interest as reflected by the President's own statements During and after the campaign the President made repeated statements that he had no business in Russia and said that there were no deals that could happen in Russia because we've stayed away As Cohen knew and as he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements In connection with his guilty plea Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project that the conversations continued through at least June 2016 and that he discussed with Trump possible travel to Russia to pursue the project The conversations were not off-hand according to Cohen because the project had the potential to be so lucrative In addition text messages to and from Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen 's efforts to advance the project did not end in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016 Cohen was considering the timing for possible trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of Cohen's false statements to Congress Cohen di scussed the project with the President in early 2017 following media inquiries Cohen recalled that on September 20 2017 the day after he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress-which said the project was terminated in January of 2016 -the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow And after Cohen's guilty plea the President told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project which supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign in which the project was being pursued ii The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from this Office about the project and other subjects the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress Accordingly it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided to the government In his written answers the President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided to no longer pursue the project Yet after Cohen pleaded gui lty the President publicly stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions The content and timing of the President' s provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness 155 l tterrte ' U S Department of Justice 'eric Preelttet II May CefltaiA Material Preteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e 111 The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow There also is some evidence that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct The President tweeted that Manafort unlike Cohen refused to break and make up stories in order to get a 'deal ' And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress the President said what Cohen ' s trying to do is get a reduced sentence So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct say ing Even if Cohen was right it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign As described above there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's connections to Russia during the campaign iv Finally the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others It is possible that the President believes as reflected in his tweets that Cohen ma d e up stories in order to get a deal for himself and get his wife and father-in-law off Scott Free It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters But the President's suggestion that Cohen ' s family members committed crimes happened more than once including just before Cohen was sentenced at the same time as the President stated that Cohen should in my opinion serve a full and complete sentence and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation L Overarching Factual Issues Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination decision the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts concerning the President' s course of conduct 1 Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction-ofjustice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice First the conduct involved actions by the President Some of the conduct did not imp licate the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction-of-justice issues Other events we investigated however drew upon the President' s Article II authority which raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II Section IILB infra A factual analysis of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful and that his position as head of the Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings subordinate officers and potential witnesses 156 Atterf e · U S Department of Justice Werle Preclttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetecl Uflcler Fecl R Criffi P 6 e Second many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose see e g United States v Willoughby 860 F 2d 15 24 2d Cir 1988 or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding see e g United States v Binday 804 F 3d 558 591 2d Cir 2015 But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense See United States v Greer 872 F 3d 790 798 6th Cir 2017 stating in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline that obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area or to avoid personal embarrassment The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong In this investigation the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct These include concerns that continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential uncertainty about whether certain events-such as advance notice of WikiLeaks's release of hacked information or the June 9 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russianscould be seen as criminal activity by the President his campaign or his family Third many of the President's acts directed at witnesses including discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons occurred in public view While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent the President' s power to influence actions persons and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications And no principle of law excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony the justice system's integrity is equally threatened 2 Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts-e g the President's statement to Corney about the Flynn investigation his termination of Corney and his efforts to remove the Special Counsel- it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent a Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exetting undue influence over law enforcement investigations including the Russian-interference and obstruction investigations The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels These actions ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation to direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance For example the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective e lection-interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation 157 U S Department of Justice AttarRe y· Werk Pmclttet II May CaRtttifl Matefial Pmteetecl URclef Fecl R Cfitfl P 6 e The President' s efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede to his requests Corn ey did not end the investigation ofFiynn which ultimately resulted in Flynn 's prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General that the Special Counsel must be removed but was instead prepared to resign over the President's order Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President' s message to Sessions that he should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only And McGahn refused to recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special Counsel removed despite the President's multiple demands that he do so Consistent with that pattern the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President' s aides and associates beyond those already filed b In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated the President' s actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives In the first phase before the President fired Corney the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an investigation of him personally The President deemed it critically important to make public that he was not under investigation and he included that information in his termination letter to Corney after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful Soon after he fired Corney however the President became aware that investigators were conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct That awareness marked a significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action The President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could possess evidence adverse to the President while in private the President engaged in a series of targeted efforts to control the investigation For instance the President attempted to remove the Special Counsel he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the investigation he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9 2016 meeting between Russians and campaign officials and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the government Judgments about the nature of the President' s motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence 158 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Werlt Preattet May CeHtaifl Material Preteetea UHEler FeEl R Cril'fl P 6 e Ill LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE PRESIDENT The President' s personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the President's conduct 1072 As a statutory matter the President's counsel has argued that a co re obstruction-of-justice statute 18 U S C § 1512 c 2 does not cover the President' s actions 1073 As a constitutional matter the President's counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate the FBI Director 1074 Under that view any statute that restricts the President's exercise of those powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role The Pres ident's counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve exercises of his Article II authority such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborn ing perjury 1075 But counsel has made a categorical argument that the President's exercise of his constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice 1076 In analyzing counsel 's statutory arguments we concluded that the President's proposed interpretation of Section 1512 c 2 is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction As for the constitutional arguments we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues We therefore analyzed the President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation of powers Under that framework we concluded Article II of the Constitution does not categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that we investigated Rather our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can 1072 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office see also 1 29 1 8 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office 2 6 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel 's Office 8 8 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 4 1073 2 6 18 Letter President' s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 2-9 Counsel has also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes such as 18 U S C § 1505 protect only pending proceedings 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 7-8 Section 1512 c 2 is not limited to pending proceedings but also applies to future proceedings that the person contemplated See Volume If Section TIT A supra 1074 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at I T he President cannot obstruct by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers 1075 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 2 n 1 1076 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel 's Office at 2 n l dashes omitted see also 8 8 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 4 T he obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article II discretionary authority to remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function 159 A erfle · U S Department of Justice Werlt Preelttet Ma · Cmttaif Material Preteetea Uf eler Feel R Criffi P 6 e validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtai l end or interfere with an investigation A Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to the Conduct Under Investigation The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U S C § 1512 c 2 Section 1512 c provides c Whoever corruptly- 1 alters destroys mutilates or conceals a record document or other object or attempts to do so with the intent to impair the object' s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding or 2 otherwise obstructs influences or impedes any official proceeding or attempts to do so shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 15 12 c 2 states a broad independent and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice 1077 While defendants have argued that subsection c 2 should be read to·cover only acts that would impair the availability or integrity of evidence because that is subsection c I 's focus strong arguments weigh against that proposed limitation The text of Section 1512 c 2 confirms that its sweep is not tethered to Section 1512 c 1 courts have so interpreted it its history does not counsel otherwise and no principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view On its face therefore Section 1512 c 2 applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding pending or contemplatedincluding by improper exercises of official power In addition other statutory provisions that are potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of proceedings that are pending before courts grand juries and Congress See 18 U S C §§ 1503 1505 Congress has a lso specifically prohibited witness tampering See 18 U S C § 1512 b I The Text of Section 151 2 c 2 Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts Several textual features of Section 1512 c 2 support the conclusion that the provision broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific prohibitions in Section 1512 c I which focus on evidence impairment First the text of Section 1512 c 2 is unqualified it reaches acts that obstruct influence or impede any official proceeding when committed corruptly Nothing in Section 1512 c 2 's text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of evidence for use in an official proceeding In contrast Section 1512 c l expl icitly includes the requirement that the defendant act with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availabi lity 1077 See U S Br United States v Kumar Nos 06-5482--cr L 06-5654--cr CON 2d Cir fi led Oct 26 2007 at pp 15-28 United States v Singleton Nos H-04-CR-514SS H-06-cr-80 S D Tex filed June 5 2006 160 U S Department of Justice At terHe · ' Verk Preattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHEier Fee R Crit'fl P 6 e for use in an official proceeding a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections of Section 1512 See 18 U S C §§ I 5 I 2 a 2 B ii use of physical force with intent to cause a person to destroy an object with intent to impair the integrity or avai lability of the obj ect for use in an official proceeding I 5 I 2 b 2 B use of intimidation threats corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object with intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding But no comparable intent or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512 c 2 The intent element in Section 1512 c 2 comes from the word corruptly See e g United States v McKibbins 656 F 3d 707 711 7th Cir 201 I The intent element is important because the word 'corruptly' is what serves to separate crim ina l and innocent acts of obstruction internal quotation marks omitted And the conduct element in Section 15 I 2 c 2 is obstruct ing influenc ing or imped ing a proceeding Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language See Loughrin v United States 573 U S 351 358 20 14 W hen 'Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another'-let alone in the very next provision- this Court 'presume s ' that Congress intended a difference in meaning quoting Russel a v United States 464 U S 16 23 1983 accord Digital Realty Trust Inc v Somers 138 S Ct 767 777 20 18 Second the structure of Section I 5 I 2 supports the conclusion that Section 151 2 c 2 defines an independent offense Section 1512 c 2 delineates a complete crime with different elements from Section I 5 I 2 c I -and each subsection of Section 1512 c contains its own attempt prohibition underscoring that they are independent prohibitions The two subsections of Section 1512 c are connected by the conjunction or indicating that each provides an alternative basis for criminal liability See Loughrin 573 U S at 357 ordinary use of 'or' is almost always disjunctive that is the words it connects are to be given separate meanings internal quotation marks omitted In Loughrin for example the Supreme Coutt relied on the use of the word or to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute 18 U S C § 1344 state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344 2 therefore should not be interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344 I d see also Shaw v United States 137 S Ct 462 465-469 20 16 recognizing that the subsections of the bank fraud statute overlap substantially but identifying distinct circumstances covered by each 1078 And here as in Loughrin Section I 5 I 2 c 's two clauses have separate numbers line breaks before between and after them and equivalent indentation-thus p lacing the clauses visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings 573 U S at 359 Third the introductory word otherwise in Section I 512 c 2 signals that the provision covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512 c l See Black's Law Dictionary II 0 I 6th ed 1990 otherwise means in a different manner in another way or in other ways see also e g American Heritage College Dictionary Online I In another way 1078 The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretive principles in concluding that language that appeared in the first clause of the Wire Act 18 U S C § 1084 restricting its prohibition against certain betting or wagering activities to any sporting event or contest did not apply to the second clause of the same statute which reaches other betting or wagering activities See Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling Nov 2 20 18 slip op 7 relying on ·ptain language id at II finding it not tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause id at 12 relying on Digital Realty 161 U S Department of Justice AM arHey 'Nark Pretittet II May CaHtaiH Material Prateeteti UHtier Feti R Crim P 6Ee differently 2 Under other circumstances see also Gooch v United States 297 U S 124 128 1936 characterizing otherwise as a broad term and holding that a statutory prohibition on kidnapping for ransom or reward or otherwise is not limited by the words ransom and reward to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits Collazos v United States 368 F 3d 190 200 2d Cir 2004 construing otherwise in 28 U S C § 2466 1 C to reach beyond the specific examples listed in prior subsections thereby covering the myriad means that human ingenuity might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court cf Begay v United States 553 U S 137 144 2006 recognizing that otherwise is defined to mean in a different way or manner and holding that the word otherwise introducing the residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act 18 U S C § 924 e 2 B ii can but need not necessarily refer to a crime that is sim ilar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others 1079 The purpose of the word otherwise in Section 1512 c 2 is therefore to clarifY that the provision covers obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its integrity or availability which is the conduct addressed in Section 1512 c l The word otherwise does not signal that Section 1512 c 2 has less breadth in covering obstructive conduct than the language of the provision imp lies 2 Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512 c 2 Courts have not limited Section 1512 c 2 to conduct that impairs evidence but instead have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form As one court explained t his expans ive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover ' otherwise' obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document destruction which is listed in c 1 United States v Volpendesto 746 F 3d 273 286 7th Cir 20 14 some quotation marks omitted For example in United States v Ring 628 F Supp 2d 195 D D C 2009 the court rejected the argument that § 1512 c 2 's reference to conduct that ' otherwise obstructs influences or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is similar to the type of conduct proscribed by subsection c l --name ly conduct that impairs the integrity or availabi lity of ' record s documents s or other object s for use in an official proceeding Id at 224 The court exp lained that the meaning of§ 15 12 c 2 is p lain on its face Id alternations in original And courts have upheld convictions under Section 1512 c 2 that did not involve evidence impairment but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly thwarted arrests or investigations See e g United States v Martinez 862 F 3d 223 238 2d Cir 20 17 police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before outstanding warrants cou ld be executed thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding United States v Ahrensfield 698 F 3d 1310 1324-1326 lOth Cir 2012 officer disclosed existence of an undercover investigation to its target United States v Phillips 583 F 3d 1261 1265 1Oth Cir 2009 defendant disclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers Those cases illustrate that Section 1512 c 2 applies to corrupt acts- including by pub ic officials-that frustrate the 1079 In Sykes v United States 564 U S I 15 20 II the Supreme Court substantially abandoned Begay's reading of the residual cl ause and in Johnson v United States 135 S Ct 255 1 20 15 the Court invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague Begay' s analysis of the word otherwise is thus of limited value 162 U S Department of Justice AM eme · Werk Preattet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e commencement or conduct of a proceeding and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or impair its integrity Section 15 12 c 2 ' s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus clause of 18 U S C § 1503 which covers anyone who corruptly obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence obstruct or impede the due administration of justice That clause of Section 1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors judges and court officers The omnibus clause has neverthel ess been construed to be far more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute United States v Aguilar 515 U S 593 599 1995 The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration ofjustice United States v Brenson 104 F 3d 1267 1275 11th Cir 1997 Courts have accordingly given it a non-restrictive reading United States v Kumar 617 F 3d 6 12 620 2d Cir 201 0 id at 620 n 7 collecting cases from the Third Fourth Sixth Seventh and Eleventh Circuits As one court has explained the omnibus clause prohibits acts that are similar in result rather than manner to the conduct described in the first part of the statute United States v Howard 569 F 2d 1331 1333 5th Cir 1978 While the specific clauses forbid certain means of obstructing justice the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of j ustice itself regardless of the means used to reach that result d collecting cases Given the sim ilarity of Section 15 12 c 2 to Section 1503's omnibus clause Congress would have expected Section 1512 c 2 to cover acts that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions-i e the result of obstructing justice-rather than covering only acts that were similar in manner Read this way Section 1512 c 2 serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justi ce statutes it captures corrupt conduct other than document destruction that has the natural tendency to obstruct contemplated as well as pending proceedings Section 15 12 c 2 overlaps with other obstruction statutes but it does not render them superfluous Section 1503 for example which covers pending grand jury and judicial proceedings and Section 1505 which covers pending administrative and congressional proceedings reach endeavors to influence obstruct or impede the proceedings-a broader test for inchoate violations than Section 1512 c 2 's attempt standard which requires a substantial step towards a completed offense See United States v Sampson 898 F 3d 287 302 2d Cir 20 18 E fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an ' endeavor' yet fall short of an 'attempt' cannot be prosecuted under § 15 12 United States v Leisure 844 F 2d 1347 1366-1 367 8th Cir 1988 collecting cases recognizing the difference between the endeavor and attempt standards And 18 U S C § 1519 which prohibits destruction of documents or records in contemplation of an investigation or proceeding does not require the nexus showing under Aguilar which Section 1512 c 2 demands See e g United States v Yielding 657 F 3d 688 712 8th C ir 2011 The requ isite knowledge and intent under Section 1519 can be present even if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in obstructing the matter United States v Gray 642 F 3d 371 376-377 2d Cir 2011 I n enacting § 1519 Congress rejected any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant's conduct and an imminent or pending official proceeding The existence of even substantial overlap is not uncommon in criminal statutes Loughrin 573 U S at 359 n 4 see Shaw 137 S Ct at 458-469 Aguilar 515 U S at 6 16 Scalia J dissenting The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and § 15 12 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause of§ 1503 and the other provisions of§ 1503 itself But given that Sections 1503 1505 and 163 U S Department of Justice Al tante Wark Pr66ttet II May CaHtatfl Material Prsteetee UHE ier Fee R Criffi P 6 e 1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512 c 2 does not the overlap provides no reason to give Section 1512 c 2 an artificially limited construction See Shaw 137 S Ct at 469 1080 3 The Legislative History of Section 1512 c 2 Does Not Justify Narrowing Its Text Given the straightforward statutory command in Section 1512 c 2 there is no reason to resort to legislative his tory United States v Gonzales 520 U S 1 6 1997 In any event the legislative history of Section 1512 c 2 is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its reach Congress enacted Section 1512 c 2 as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Pub L No 107-204 Tit XI § 1102 116 Stat 807 The relevant section of the statute was entitled Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding 116 Stat 807 emphasis added That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent effect Section 1512 c was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a certain loophole with respect to document shredding See 148 Cong Rec S6545 July I 0 2002 Sen Lott id at S6549-S6550 Sen Hatch But those explanations do not limit the enacted text See Pittston Coal Group v Sebben 488 U S I 05 115 1988 l t is not the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history see also Encino Motorcars LLC v Navarro 138 S Ct I 134 1143 20 18 Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading The floor statements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text See Barnhart v Sigmon Coal Co 534 U S 438 457 2002 Floor statements from two Senators cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute We see no reason to give greater weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses which are memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text That principle has particular force where one of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only briefly elaborat ing on some ofthe specific provisions contained in this bill 148 Cong Rec S6550 Sen Hatch Indeed the language Congress used in Section 1512 c 2 -prohibiting corruptly obstruct ing influenc ing or imped ing any official proceeding or attempting to do so-parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen protections against witness tampering and obstruction ofjustice While the earlier provision is not a direct antecedent of Section 1512 c 2 Congress 's understanding of the broad scope of the 1080 The Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v United States 138 S Ct II 0 I 20 I8 does not support impos ing a non-textual limitation on Section I 5 12 c 2 Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction statute 26 U S C § 7212 a to require a ' nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a patticular administrative proceeding d at II 09 The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar interpretation given to other obstruction provisions id citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen as well as considerations of context legis lative history structure of the criminal tax laws fair warning and lenity d at II 06-1108 The type of nexus element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section I 5 I2 c 2 and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section I 5 12 c 2 language that is not there See Bates v United States 522 U S 23 29 1997 the Court ordinarily resist s reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face 164 AM arHe · U S Department of Justice 'Narlt Praelttet II May CaHtaiH Material Prateeteel UHeier Feel R Grim P 6 e earlier provision is instructive Recognizing that the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted by a variety of corrupt methods limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined S Rep No 532 97th Cong 2d Sess 17-1 8 1982 Congress considered a bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime inter alia when a person corruptly influences obstructs or impedes t he e nforcement and prosecution of federal law administration of a law under which an officia l proceeding is being or may be conducted or the exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry Id at 17-19 quoting S 2420 The Senate Committee explained that T he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of j ustice cannot be fully carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice Id at 18 The report gave examples of conduct actually prosecuted under the current residual clause in 18 U S C § 1503 which would probably not be covered in this series of provisions without a residual clause Id One prominent example was a conspiracy to cover up the Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Centra l Intelligence Agency seek to interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary Id citing United States v Haldeman 559 F 2d 31 D C Cir 1976 The report therefore indicates a congressional awareness not only that residual-clause language resembling Section 1512 c 2 broadly covers a wide v ariety of obstructive conduct but a lso that such language reaches the improper use of governmental processes to obstruct justice-specifically the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House officials including the President himself See Haldeman 559 F 3d at 5 1 86-87 120- 129 162 1081 4 General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section 1512 c 2 is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Investigation The requirement of fair warning in crimina l law the interest in avoiding due process concerns in potentially vague statutes and the rule of lenity do not justifY narrowing the reach of Section 1512 c 2 's text 1082 a As with other criminal laws the Supreme Court has exercised restraint in interpreting obstruction-of-justice provisions both out of respect for Congress's role in defining crimes and in the interest of providing individuals with fair warning of what a criminal statute prohibits Marinello v United States 138 S Ct 1101 1106 2018 Arthur Andersen 544 U S at 703 1081 The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill which excluded an omnibus clause See United States v Poindexter 95 1 F 2d 369 382-383 D C Cir 1991 tracing history of the proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation During the floor debate on the bill Senator Heinz one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation explained that the omnibus clause was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely duplicative of other obstruction laws 128 Cong Rec 26 810 1982 Sen Heinz presumably referring to Sections 1503 and 1505 1082 In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency we consider principles of statutory construction relevant in that context See Volume II Section III B I infra 165 U S Department of Justice Aetemey 'Nerlc PreEittet II M · CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHEier FeEl R Grim P 6 e Aguilar 515 U S at 599-602 In several obstruction cases the Court has imposed a nexus test that requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability Marinello 138 S Ct at 11 09 Arthur Andersen 544 U S at 707-708 Aguilar 5 15 U S at 600-602 Section 1512 c 2 has been interpreted to require a similar nexus See e g United States v Young 916 F 3d 368 386 4th Cir 20 19 United States v Petruk 781 F 3d 438 445 8th Cir 20 15 United States v Phillips 583 F 3d 1261 1264 1Oth Cir 2009 United States v Reich 479 F 3d 179 186 2d C ir 2007 To satisfy the nexus requirement the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice such that the statute excludes defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would on ly unnaturally and improbably be successful Aguilar 515 U S at 601-602 internal quotation marks omitted see id at 599 the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due admin istration of justice internal quotation marks omitted The government must also show as a subjective matter that the actor contemplated a particular foreseeable proceeding Petruk 78 1 F 3d at 445 Those requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind b Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns See e g McDonnell v United States 136 S Ct 2355 2373 2016 Skilling v United States 561 U S 358 368 402-404 201 0 Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement d at 402-403 internal quotati on marks omitted The obstruction statutes' requirement of acting corruptly satisfies that test Acting 'corruptly' within the meaning of§ 1512 c 2 means acting with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert impede or obstruct the relevant proceeding United States v Gordon 710 F 3d 1124 1151 1Oth Cir 20 13 some quotation marks omitted The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the defendant's vagueness challenge to the word corruptly 515 U S at 600 n 1 but Justice Scalia's separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge id at 616-617 Scalia J joined by Kennedy and Thomas JJ concurring in part and dissenting in part Statutory language need not be colloquial Justice Scalia explained and the term 'corruptly' in criminal laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning It denotes an act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others d at 616 internal quotation marks omitted citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries Justice Scalia added that in the context of obstructing jury proceedings any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is incredible d at 617 Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word corruptly See e g United States v Edwards 869 F 3d 490 50 1-502 7th Cir 2017 United States v Brenson 104 F 3d 1267 1280-1281 11th Cir 1997 United States v Howard 569 F 2d 1331 1336 n 9 5th Cir 1978 This well-established intent standard precludes the need to limit the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct 1083 1083 In United States v Poindexter 951 F 2d 369 D C Cir 199 1 the court of appeals found the term corruptly in 18 U S C § 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to Congress After suggesting that the word corruptly was vague on its face 951 F 2d at 378 the court 166 A emey U S Department of Justice 'Jlerk Pmattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetetl UHEier Fee R Grim P 6 e c Finally the rule of lenity does not justify treating Section 1512 c 2 as a prohibition on evidence impairment as opposed to an omnibus clause The rule of lenity is an interpretive principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction Clevelandv United States 531 U S 12 25 2000 A s the Court has repeatedly emphasized however the rule of lenity applies only if after considering text structure history and purpose there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended Abramski v United States 573 U S 169 188 n IO 2014 internal quotation marks omitted The rule has been cited for example in adopting a narrow meaning of tangible object in an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title history and list of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records See Yates v United States 135 S Ct 1074 1088 20 15 plurality opinion interpreting tangible object in the phrase record document or tangible object in 18 U S C § 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or preserving informationr Here as discussed above the text structure and history of Section 1512 c 2 leaves no grievous ambiguity about the statute's meaning Section 1512 c 2 defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings 5 Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation Regardless whether Section l512 c 2 covers all corrupt acts that obstruct influence or impede pending or contemplated proceedings other statutes would apply to such conduct in pending proceedings provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied As discussed above the omnibus clause in 18 U S C § 1503 a applies generally to obstruction of pending judicial and grand proceedings 1084 See Aguilar 515 U S at 598 noting that the clause is far more general in scope than preceding provisions Section l503 a ' s protections extend to witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings See Sampson 898 F 3d at 298-303 n 6 collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section 1503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct and cabining prior circuit authority And Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressio nal proceedings 1085 See e g United States v Rainey 757 F 3d 234 241-247 5th Cir 2014 concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the core conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another person to violate a legal duty d at 379-386 Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by providing that a s used in S ection 1505 the term 'corruptly' means acting with an improper purpose personally or by influencing another including by making a false or misleading statement or withholding concealing altering or destroying a document or other information 18 U S C § 1515 b Other courts have declined to follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conduct at issue in that case see Brenson 104 F 3d at 1280-1281 reading it as nan-owly limited to cettain types of conduct see United States v Morrison 98 F 3d 619 629-630 D C Cir 1996 or by noting that it predated Arthur Andersen's interpretation ofthe term corruptly see Edwards 869F 3d at 501-502 1084 Section 1503 a provides for criminal punishment of Whoever corruptly or by threats or force or by any threatening letter or communication influences obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence obstruct or impede the due administration of justice 1085 Section 1505 provides for criminal punishment of 167 U S Department of Justice At terrte ' Werle Pt'eattet May Certtairt Material Preteetea Urtaef Fea R Crim P 6 e Finally 18 U S C § 1512 b 3 criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the communication of information about a crime to law enforcement The nexus inquiry articulated in Aguilar-that an individual has knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding 515 U S at 599- does not apply to Section 1512 b 3 See United States v Byrne 435 F 3d 16 24-25 1st Cir 2006 The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor's intent to prevent communications to a federal Jaw enforcement official See Fowler v United States 563 U S 668 673-678 20 11 In sum in light of the breadth of Section 1512 c 2 and the other obstruction statutes an argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction laws lacks merit B Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to Presidential Conduct The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations The Constitution vests the executive Power in the President and enjoins him to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed U S CONST ART IT §§ 1 3 Those powers and duties form the foundation of prosecutorial discretion See United States v Armstrong 517 U S 456 464 1996 Attorney General and United States Attorneys have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ' take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ' The President also has authority to appoint officers of the United States and to remove those whom he has appointed U S CONST ART II § 2 cl 2 granting authority to the President to appoint all officers with the advice and consent of the Senate but providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone the heads of departments or the courts of Jaw see also Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 561 U S 477 492-493 509 2010 describing removal authority as flowing from the President's responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed Although the President has broad authority under Article II that authority coexists with Congress's Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings federa l investigations the courts and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions Usually those constitutional powers function in harmony with the President enforcing the criminal laws under Article IT to protect against corrupt obstructive acts But when the President's official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes any constitutional tension is reconciled through separation-of-powers analysis Whoever corruptly influences obstructs or impedes or endeavors to influence obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress 168 AUerHe · U S Department of Justice Werk Preattet May CtmtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Grim P 6 e The President's counsel has argued that the President's exercise of his constitutional authority to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice 1086 As noted above no Department of Justice position or Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue We did not find counsel's contention however to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-ofpowers issues Applying the Court's framework for analysis we concluded that Congress can validly regulate the President's exercise of official duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt intent to obstruct justice The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction would not impermissibly undermine the President' s ability to perform his Article II functions I The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential Conduct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes Before addressing Article II issues directly we consider one threshold statutoryconstruction principle that is unique to the presidency The principle that general statutes must be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would arguably limit the President's constitutional role OLC Application of 28 USC § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C 350 352 1995 This clear statement rule id has its source in two principles statutes should be construed to avoid serious constitutional questions and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result OLC The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress 20 Op O L C 124 178 1996 The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases In one leading case the Court construed the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U S C § 70 I et seq not to apply to judicial review of presidential action Franklin v Massachusetts 505 U S 788 800-801 1992 The Court explained that it would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance ofhis statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion d at 801 In another case the Court interpreted the word utilized in the Federal Advisory Committee Act F ACA 5 U S C App to apply only to the use of advisory committees established directly or indirectly by the government thereby excluding the American Bar Association ' s advice to the Department of Justice about federal judicial candidates Public Citizen v United States Department ofJustice 491 U S 440 455 462-467 1989 The Court explained that a broader interpretation of the term utilized in F ACA would raise serious questions whether the statute infringed unduly on the President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers d at 466-467 Another case found that an established canon of statutory construction applied with special force to provisions that would impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly Sale v Haitian Centers Council 509 U S 155 188 1993 applying the presumption against extraterritorial application to construe the Refugee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibi lity See Application 1086 6 23 17 Letter President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office at 2 n 1 169 U S Department of Justice At tef'fl ey Werl Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHder Fee R Criffi P 6 e of 28 U S C § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C at 353-354 discussing Franklin Public Citizen and Sale The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain statutes as not applying to the President at all similar to the approach taken in Franklin See e g Memorandum for Richard T Burress Office of the President from Laurence H Silberman Deputy Attorney General Re Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President 's Nomination of Nelson A Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution at 2 5 Aug 28 1974 criminal conflict-of-interest statute 18 U S C § 208 does not apply to the President Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns See Application of28 U S C § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C at 350-357 consanguinity limitations on court appointments 28 U S C § 458 found inapplicab le to presidential appointments of judges to the federal judiciary Constraints Imposed by 18 U S C § 1913 on Lobbying Efforts 13 Op O L C 300 304-306 1989 limitation on the use of appropriated funds for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and executive officials But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule does not apply w ith respect to a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be app lied to the President such as the federal bribery statute 18 U S C § 201 Application of28 U S C § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C at 357 n 11 OLC explained that a pp lication of § 20 I raises no separation of powers question let alone a serious one because t he Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes d In support of that conclusion OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while in office which is what a bribe would function to do id citing U S CONST ART II § 1 cl 7 and the express constitutional power of Congress to impeach and convict a President for inter alia bribery id citing U S CONST ART II § 4 Under OLC ' s analysis Congress can permissibly criminalize certain obstructive conduct by the President such as suborning perjury intimidating witnesses or fabricating evidence because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions See Application of28 U S C § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C at 357 n 11 The Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct and those actions would transgress the President's duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed U S CON ST ART TT §§ 3 In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the President Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear statement would not apply in this context A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes only certain acts by the President- for example removing prosecutors or ending investigations for corrupt reasons-would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation It is not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section 1512 c 2 to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President' s conduct of office No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning For example the word corruptly has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of official power for corrupt ends Indeed an established definition states that corruptly means action with an 170 U S Department of Justice At tet'fley Werlt Preattet May CeAtflifl Mliterial Preteetea Ufl aer Feel R Criffl P 6 e intent to secure an improper advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 3d ed 1969 emphasis added And it would be contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term only when applied to the President See United States v Santos 553 U S 507 522 2008 plurality opinion of Scalia J rejecting proposal to giv e the same word in the same statutory provision different meanings in different factual contexts cf Public Citizen 491 U S at 462467 giving the term utilized in the F ACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background interpretive presumption such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale The principle that courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature Salinas v United States 522 U S 52 59-60 1997 It is one thing to acknowledge and accept well defined or even newly enunciated generally applicable background principles of assumed legislative intent It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written but are subject to case-by-case exceptions Brogan v United States 522 U S 398 406 1998 When a proposed construction would thus function as an extra-textual limit on a statute's compass thereby preventing the statute from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear terms Loughrin 573 U S at 357 it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's intent That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes which have been given a broad and all-inclusive meaning Rainey 757 F 3d at 245 discussing Sections 1503 and 1505 internal quotation marks omitted Accordingly since no established principle of interpretation would exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503 1505 1512 b and 1512 c 2 we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be raised as an Article II defense to the application of those statutes 2 Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's Official Powers When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers the limitation's validity depends on whether the measure disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches Nixon v Administrator ofGeneral Services 433 U S 425 443 1977 Even when a branch does not arrogate power to itself the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties Loving v United States 517 U S 748 757 1996 The separation of powers does not mean however that the branches 'ought to have no partial agency in or no controul over the acts of each other ' Clinton v Jones 520 U S 681 703 1997 quoting James Madison The Federalist No 47 pp 325-326 J Cooke ed 1961 emphasis omitted In this context a balancing test applies to assess separation-of-powers issues Applying that test here we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President without impermissibly undermining his Article II functions 171 U S Department of Justice Al tamey 'Narlc Praattet May CaAtaiA Material Prateetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e a The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In This Context A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions and ifthe potential for disruption is present whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress Administrator o f General Services 433 U S at 443 see Nixon v Fitzgerald 457 U S 731 753754 1982 United States v Nixon 418 U S 683 706-707 1974 That balancing test applies to a congressional regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws 1087 When an Article II power has not been explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution to be within the sole province of the President but rather was thought to be encompassed within the general grant to the President of the 'executive Power ' the Court has balanced competing constitutional considerations Public Citizen 491 U S at 484 Kennedy J concurring in the judgment joined by Rehnquist C J and O'Connor J As Justice Kennedy noted in Public Citizen the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on the President's power to remove Executive officers a power that is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the Constitution as is the appointment power but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant of the ' executive Power ' d citing Morrison v Olson 487 U S 654 694 1988 and Myers v United States 272 U S 52 115- 116 1926 Consistent with that statement Morrison susta ined a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions 487 U S at 691-693 695-696 The Court has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test For example the Court evaluated the President' s claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications about his official acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in a criminal case United States v Nixon supra recognizing a qualified constitutional privi lege for presidential communications on official matters The Court has also upheld a law that provided for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over the records Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 443-445 451-455 The analysis in those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential exercises of executive power Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework When the President's power is both 'exclusive' and 'conclusive' on the issue Congress is precluded from regulating its exercise Zivotofsky v Kerry 135 S Ct 2076 2084 20 15 In Zivotofsky for example the Court followed Justice Jackson 's familiar tripartite framework in Youngstown Sheet Tube Co v Sawyer 343 U S 579 635-638 1952 Jackson J concurring and held that the President's 1087 OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal prosecution while in office relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section See A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution 24 Op O L C 222 237-238 244-245 2000 relying on inter alia United States v Nixon Nixon v Fitzgerald and Clinton v Jones and quoting the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v Nixon that is applied in the text OLC recognized that t he balancing analysis it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is immune from prosecution had been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court I d at 244 172 U S Department of Justice At tof'He · Work Proettet Ma · CoHtaiH Material Proteetee UHeer Fee R Ct'im P 6 e authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive I d at 2083 2094 See also Public Citizen 491 U S at 485-486 Kennedy J concurring in the judgment citing the power to grant pardons under U S CONST ART IT § 2 cl I and the Presentment Clauses for leg islation U S CONST ART T § 7 Cis 2 3 as examples of exclusive presidential powers by virtue of constitutional text But even when a power is exclusive Congress' powers and its central role in making laws give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and follow the President' s act Zivotofsky 135 S Ct at 2087 For example although the President's power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation see United States v Klein 80 U S 13 Wall 128 147-148 1872 Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt use of anything of value to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial congressional or agency proceeding 18 U S C § 201 b 3 -which would include the offer or promise of a pardon to induce ·a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all The offer of a pardon would precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congress's power to regulate even if the pardon itself is not Just as the Speech or Debate Clause U S CONST ART T § 6 cl l absolutely protects legislative acts but not a legislator's taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a certain way for it is taking the bribe not performance of the illicit compact that is a criminal act United States v Brewster 408 U S 50 I 526 1972 emphasis omitted the promise of a pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act The application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefore would raise no serious separationof-powers issue b The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-powers issues the first task is to assess the degree to which apply ing obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential actions affects the President's ability to carry out his Article II responsibilities Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 443 As discussed above applying obstruction-of-justice statutes to presidential conduct that does not involve the President' s conduct of office- such as influencing the testimony of witnesses-is constitutionally unproblematic The President has no more right than other citizens to impede official proceedings by corruptly influencing witness testimony The conduct would be equally improper whether effectuated through direct efforts to produce false testimony or suppress the truth or through the actual threatened or prom ised use of official powers to achieve the same result The President's action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions or discharging law enforcement officials raises different questions Each type of action involves the exercise of executive discretion in furtherance of the President' s duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed U S CONST ART II § 3 Congress may not supplant the President's exercise of executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remove officers who occupy law enforcement positions See Bowsher v Synar 478 U S 714 726-727 1986 Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment Because t he structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws t his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws · is constitutionally impermissible Yet the obstruction-of-justice statutes do not aggrandize power in Congress or usurp executive authority Instead they impose a d iscrete limitation on conduct 173 U S Department of Justice AM'erHey Wer-k Pra61 1et II May CeHtaiA Material Prateetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e only when it is taken with the corrupt intent to obstruct justice The obstruction statutes thus would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstr_uct official proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests See Volume IT Section TTT A 3 supra The direct effect on the President's freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited one A preclusion of corrupt official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers For example the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act with the intention of shielding himself from criminal punishment avoiding financial liability or preventing personal embarrassment To the contrary a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such personal purposes furthers rather than hinders the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions with no limits whatsoever in order to carry out his Article II functions See Heckler v Chaney 470 U S 821 833 1985 Congress may limit an agency' s exercise of enforcement power if it w ishes either by setting substantive priorities or by otherwise circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue United States v Nixon 4 18 U S at 707 t o read the Art II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege to withhold confidential communications from a crimina l tria l would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts under Art III Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove a ll Executive Branch officials involved in the execution of the laws The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive departments and officer pos itions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed E g U S CONST ART I § 8 cl 18 Necessary and Proper C lause ART IT § 2 cl 1 Opinions Clause ART IT § 2 cl 2 Appointments Clause see Free Enterprise Fund 561 U S at 499 While the President' s removal power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the law Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal Id at 493-495 The President's removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers- that is officers who must be appo inted by the President and who report to him directly See Free Enterprise Fund 56 1 U S at 493 500 The President's exclusive and illimitable power of removal of those principal officers furthers the President' s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed Id at 493 4 98 internal quotation marks omitted Myers 272 U S at 627 Thus there are some ' purely executive' officia ls who must be removable by the Pres ide nt at will if he is able to accomplish his constitutional ro le Morrison 487 U S at 690 Myers 272 U S at 134 the President's cabinet officers must do his w ill and t he moment that he loses confidence in the intelligence ability judgment or loyalty of a ny one of them he must have the power to remove him without delay cf Humphrey's Executor v United States 295 U S 602 1935 Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable only for good cause In light of those constitutional precedents it may be that the obstruction statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the Attorney General See 5 U S C § I 0 1 28 U S C § 503 In that context at least absent circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountabi lity for personal conduct whi le evading ordinary political checks and balances even the high ly limited 174 U S Department of Justice Aftemey W6rk Pr6thtet Ma y C6HtaiH Ma teria l Pr6teetee UHeer fee R Grim P 6 e regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President's freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet The removal of inferior officers in contrast need not necessarily be at will for the President to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch I nferior officers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by the President with the Senate's consent Free Enterprise Fund 561 U S at 510 quoting Edmond v United States 520 U S 651 663 1997 internal quotation marks omitted The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress's authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's removal of inferior Officers whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department U S CONST ART II § 2 ct 2 See United States v Perkins 116 U S 483 485 1886 The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments implies authority to limit restrict and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed quoting lower court decision Morrison 487 U S at 689 n 27 citing Perkins accord id at 723-724 n 4 Scalia J dissenting recognizing that Perkins is established law see also Free Enterprise Fund 561 U S at 493495 citing Perkins and Morrison The category of inferior officers includes both the FBI Director and the Special Counsel each ofwhom reports to the Attorney General See 28 U S C §§ 509 SIS a 531 28 C F R Part 600 Their work is thus directed and supervised by a presidentiallyappointed Senate-confirmed officer See In re Grand Jury Investigation _ F 3 d _ 2019 WL 921692 at 3- 4 D C Cir Feb 26 20 19 holding that the Special Counsel is an inferior officer for constitutional purposes Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-cause limitation on the removal of an Executive Branch officer the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice Limiting the range of permissible reasons for removal to exclude a corrupt purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring an affirmative showing of good cause It follows that for such inferior officers Congress may constitutionally restrict the President's removal authority ifthat authority was exercised for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice And even if a particular inferior officer's position might be of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal authority the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid removal for a corrupt reason 1088 A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations including disagreement over policy or loss of confidence in the officer's judgment or commitment A corrupt-purpose prohibition therefore would not undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions Accordingly because the separation-of-powers question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty Morrison 487 U S at 691 a restriction on removing an inferior officer for a 1088 Although the FBT director is an inferior officer he is appointed by the President and removable by him at will see 28 U S C § 532 note and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionally provide the FBI director with good-cause tenure protection See OLC Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term ofthe FBI Director 20 II WL 2566125 at 3 O L C June 20 20 II tenure protection for an officer with the FBI Director's broad investigative administrative and policymaking responsibilities would raise a serious constitutional question whether Congress had ' impede d the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty' to take care that the laws be faithfully executed quoting Morrison 487 U S at 691 175 U S Department of Justice A erAey Werk Preattet May CeAtfliA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e corrupt reason-a reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends-does not seriously hinder the President's performance of his duties The President retains broad latitude to supervise investigations and remove officials circumscribed in this context only by the requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes 1089 c Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional Grand Jury and Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source Where a law imposes a burden on the President's performance of Article II functions separation-of-powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 443 Here Congress enacted the obstruction-ofjustice statutes to protect among other things the integrity of its own proceedings grand jury investigations and federal criminal trials Those objectives are within Congress's authority and serve strong governmental interests i Congress has Article T authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it to all persons-including the President Congress clearly has authority to protect its own legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact-gathering and lawmaking efforts See Watkins v United States 354 U S 178 187 206-207 1957 Chapman v United States 5 App D C 122 130 1895 Congress also has authority to establish a system of federal courts which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts See U S CONST ART I § 8 cis 9 18 The Congress shall have Power To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court and To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice statutes which can be traced to at least 1831 attests to the necessity for that protection See An Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts ofCourt 4 Stat 487-488 § 2 1831 making it a crime if any person or persons shall corruptly endeavor to influence intimidate or impede any juror witness or officer in any court of the United States in the discharge of his duty or shall corruptly obstruct or impede or endeavor to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice therein ii The Article ITT courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against obstructive acts whatever their source As the Supreme Court explained in United States v Nixon a primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch is to do justice in criminal prosecutions 418 U S at 707 accord Cheney v United States District Court for the District of Columbia 542 U S 367 384 2004 In Nixon the Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive privilege because the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably 1089 The obstruction statutes do not disqualifY the President from acting in a case simply because he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue As the Depa1tment of Justice has made clear a claim of a conflict of interest standing alone cannot deprive the President of the ability to fulfill his constitutional function See e g OLC Application of 28 U S C § 458 to Presidential Appointments ofFederal Judges 19 O L C Op at 356 citing Memorandum for RichardT Burress Office of the President from Laurence H Silberman Deputy Attorney General Re Conflict ofInterest Problems Arising out of the President 's Nomination ofNelson A Rockefeller to be Vice President under the TwentyFifth Amendment to the Constitution at 2 5 Aug 28 1974 176 U S Department of Justice AM ontey Work Protittet II May Corttairt Material Proteeteti Urttier Fee R Grim P 6 e relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts 407 U S at 712 As Nixon illustrates the need to safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest See id at 709 noting that the denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens t he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system iii Finally the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from corrupt acts Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an indictment issued by a grand jury Cobbledick v United States 309 U S 323 327 1940 The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process And the grand jury's function is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment U S CONST AMEND V n o person shall be held to answer for a serious crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury T he whole theory of the grand jury's function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional government serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people United States v Williams 504 U S 36 47 1992 pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special favor Costello v United States 350 U S 359 362 1956 If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all persons its function as an independent charging body would be thwarted And an impartial grand jury investigation to determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separationof-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions See Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 443 see also Morrison 487 U S at 691-693 695-696 United States v Nixon 418 U S at 711-712 In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes our assessment of the weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited restrictions contained in those statutes on the President's official conduct to protect the integrity of important functions of other branches of government A general ban on corrupt action does not unduly intrude on the President's responsibility to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed U S CONST ART TT §§ 3 1090 To the contrary the concept of faithful execution connotes the use of power in the interest of the public not in the office holder's personal interests See 1 Samuel Johnson A Dictionary of the English Language 763 1755 faithfully def 3 w ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance And immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrupt obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws to promote objectives within its constitutional authority Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 425- i e protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article ITT courts and grand juries 1090 As noted above the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may have a unique constitutional status 177 U S Department of Justice Atterrtey Werk Prodttet May Corttairt Material Proteetea Urtder Fed R Criffi P 6 e Accordingly based on the analysis above we were not persuaded by the argument that the President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article TI powers 1091 3 Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would N ot Chill hi s Performance of his Article II Duties Applying the obstruction statutes to the President' s officia l conduct would involve determin ing as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act whether the act had a nexus to official proceedings and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent But applying those standards to the President' s official conduct should not hinder his abil ity to perform his Artic le II duties Cf Nixon v Fitzgerald 457 U S at 752-753 n 32 taking into account chilling effect o n the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presidential immunity from private civil damages action based on official duties Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect the existence of settled legal standards the presumption of reg ularity in prosecutorial actions and the existence of evidentiary limitations on probing the President's motives And historical experience confirms that no impermissible chill should exist a As an initial matter the term corruptly sets a demanding standard It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an improper advantage for him self or someone else inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 3d ed 1969 see United States v Pasha 797 F 3d 1122 1132 D C Cir 20 15 Aguilar 515 U S at 616 Scalia J concurring in part and dissenting in part That standard parallels the President' s constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws And virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear governmental purpose and will not be contrary to his official duty Accordingly the President has no reason to be chilled in those actions because in virtually all instances there will be no credible basis for suspecting a corrupt ·p ersonal motive That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the stringent corrupt-motive standard Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal investigation into his own or his family members' conduct to protect against personal embarrassment or legal liability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the President' s financial inte rests for the purpose of protecting those interests In those examp les 1091 A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves office Impeachment would remove a President from office but would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law Indeed the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that crim inal law plays an independent role in addressing an official's conduct distinct from the political remedy of impeachment See U S CONST ART I § 3 cl 7 Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy and Congress is not restricted to relying only on impeachment rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President as OLC has recognized A Sitting President 's Amenability to Indictm ent and Criminal Prosecution 24 Op O L C at 255 Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment 178 AM errte ' U S Department of Justice 'Nerlc Preat tet II May Certtairt Material Preteetea Uttaer FeEl R Criffl P 6 e official power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President's personal interests In contrast the President's actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt The President's role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings For instance the President' s decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes The criminal law does not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of government And when legitimate interests animate the President's conduct those interests will almost invariably be readily identifiable based on objective factors Because the President's conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law no chilling concern should arise b There is also no reason to believe that investigations let alone prosecutions would occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to believe that obstruction occurred Prosecutorial action enjoys a presumption of regularity absent clear evidence to the contrary courts presume that prosecutors have properly discharged their official duties Armstrong 517 U S at 464 quoting United States v Chemical Foundation Inc 272 U S 1 14-15 1926 The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any matter involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice Under OLC's opinion that a sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment only a successor Administration would be able to prosecute a former President But that consideration does not suggest that a President would have any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leaving office There are obvious political checks against initiating a baseless investigation or prosecution of a former President See Administrator of General Services 433 U S at 448 considering political checks in separation-of-powers analysis And the Attorney General holds the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government United States v Nixon 418 U S at 694 citing 28 U S C § 516 which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized investigations or prosecutions 1092 1092 Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts Prosecutors are generally barred from participating in matters implicating their personal interests see 28 C F R § 45 2 and are instructed not to be influenced by their own professional or personal circumstances Justice Manual § 9-27 260 so prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and personally motivated And if such cases arise criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible officials at the Department of Justice who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent a credible factual basis Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of prosecutorial immunity which protects against the threat of suit by a defendant who often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions Imbler v Pachtman 424 U S 409 425 1976 As the Supreme Court has noted the existence of civil immunity does not justify criminal immunity See 0 'Shea v Littleton 414 U S 488 503 1974 Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial legislative or executive officers requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation of constitutional rights citations omitted 179 A emey U S Department of Justice Werk Preat tet May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v Fitzgerald that in part because inquiries into the President's motives would be highly intrusive the President is absolute ly immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct 457 U S at 756-757 As Fitzgerald recognized there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages than for example in criminal prosecutions Fitzgerald 457 U S at 754 n 37 see Cheney 542 U S at 384 And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity Armstrong 517 U S at 464 c In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an investigation of the President the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect Ascertaining the Preside nt's motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions the advice he received the circumstances surrounding the actions and the regularity or irregularity of the process he employed to make decisions But grand juries and courts would not have automatic access to confidential presidential communications on those matters rather they could be presented in official proceedings only on a showing of sufficient need Nixon 418 U S at 712 In reSealed Case 121 F 3d 729 754 756-757 D C Cir 1997 see also Administrator ofGeneral Services 433 U S at 448-449 former President can invoke presidential communications privilege although successor's failure to support the claim detracts from its weight In any event probing the President's intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably constitutional in at least one context the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive a thing of value in return for being influenced in official action 18 U S C § 201 b 2 There can be no serious argument against the President's potential criminal liability for bribery offenses notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent See U S CONST ART I § 3 ART IT § 4 see also Application of 28 US C § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges 19 Op O L C at 357 n 11 Application of§ 20 I to the President raises no separation of powers issue let alone a serious one d Finally history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies exempting the President from the obstruction laws As a historical matter Presidents have very seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations And it is rarer sti ll for circumstances to raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through the President's use of official power Accordingly the President' s conduct of office should not be chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt-motive standard in this context In s um contrary to the position taken by the President's counse l we concluded that in light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues we had a valid basis for investigating the conduct at issue in this repmt In our view the application of the obstruction statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers And the protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person-including the Preside nt-accords with the fundamental principle of our government that n o person in this 180 U S Department of Justice AtterHey Verk Preattet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee R Crii'H P 6 e country is so high that he is above the law United States v Lee I 06 U S 196 220 1882 see also Clinton v Jones 520 U S at 697 United States v Nixon supra 181 U S Department of Justice At temey Werle Predttet May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UHeer Fed R Criffi P 6 e IV CONCLUSION Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President's conduct The evidence we obtained about the President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment At the same time if we had confidence after a thorough investigation ofthe facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction ofjustice we would so state Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards we are unable to reach that judgment Accordingly while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime it also does not exonerate him 182 U S Department of Justice AttarAe ' Wark Praclttet II Mfly CaAtfliA Mflterifll Pmteetecl Uflcler Fee R Grim P 6 e Appendix A U S Department of Justice Atteme y Werk Preettet II Mtt · CeRtttiR Material Preteetee UReer Fee R Grim P 6 e U S Department of Justice tterl'le · Werle Pfet lttet Ma ' Cel'ltail'l Material Pt•eteeteti Ul'ltier Fee R Crit'l'l P 6 e l ffice of tqe eputg J ftonteg Obenerul u ltingtnn l 2053 1 ORDERNO 3915-2017 APPOfNTMENT OF SPEC AL COUNSEL TO lNVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General including 28 U S C §§ 509 510 and 515 in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and management of the Department of Justice and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election I hereby order as tallows a RobertS Mueller III is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States Department of Justice b The Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investi ation confinned by then-FBI Director James B Corney in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on March 20 2017 including i any links and or coordination belween the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump and c ii any matters that arose or may nrise directly from the investigation and iii any other matters within the scope of28 C F R § 600 4 a If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute tcderal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters d Sections 600 4 through 600 10 ofTitle 28 ofthc Code of Federal Regulations are applicable to the Special Counsel fl 2-- Date A-1 Attente · U S Department of Justice Werk Preat tet May CeHtaifl Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Grim P 6 e U S Department of Justice AtterAe · Werle Preattet Ma ' CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fea R Criffi P 6 e AppendixB U S Department of Justice AUet·ney Werle Precluet May CeHtaifl Matefial Pt·eteetecl Uncler Fee R Grim P 6 e U S Department of Justice Atton ey Work Proelttet II May CoAtaiA Material Proteeteel UAeler Feel R Crii TI P 6 e APPENDIX B GLOSSARY The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities referenced in the two volumes of this report It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report Referenced Persons Agalarov Aras Russian real-estate developer owner of the Crocus Group met Donald Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and he lped arrange the June 9 20 16 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials Agalarov E min Performer executi ve vice president of C rocus Group and son of Aras Agalarov helped arrange the June 9 20 16 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Vese lnitskaya and Trump Campaign official s Akhmetov Rinat Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to conduct work for Ukrainian po litical party the Party of Regions Akhmetshin Rinat U S lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya w ho attended the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials Aslanov Dzbeykhun Jay Head of U S department of the Internet Research Agency which engaged in an active measures socia l media campaign to interfere in the 20 I 6 U S presidential e lection Assange Julian Founder of WikiLeaks which in 2016 posted on the internet documents stolen from entities and individuals affiliated w ith the Democratic Party Aven Petr C hairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the Presidential Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-election sanctions Bannon Stephen Steve White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump Jan 2017 - Aug 20 I 7 chief executive of the Trump Campaign Baranov Andrey Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft and associate of Carter Page Berl owitz Avi Assistant to Jared Kushner Boente Dana Acting Attorney General Jan 2017 - Feb 20 17 Acting Deputy Attorney General Feb 20 17- Apr 20 17 Bogacheva Anna Internet Research Agency employee who worked on active measures social media campaign to interfere in in the 20 16 U S presidentia l election traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 20 14 Bossert T homas Tom Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a senior official on the Presidential Trans ition Team B- 1 U S Department of Justice Attorf ey Work Procluet May Cofltaifl Material Proteetecl Ufleer Feel R Crittt P 6 e Boyarkin Viktor Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska Boyd Charles Chairman of the board of directors at the Center for the National Interest a U S -based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia Boyko Yuriy Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of the Ukrainian parliament Brand Rachel Associate Attorney General May 2017- Feb 2018 Browder William Bill Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the Magnitsky Act which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials Bulatov Alexander Russian intelligence official who associated with Carter Page in 2008 Burchik Mikhail Executive director of the Internet Research Agency which engaged in an active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election Burck William Personal attorney to Don McGahn White House Counsel Burnham James Attorney in the White House Counse l's Office who attended January 2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn Burt Richard Former U S ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board member ofthe Center for the National Interest Bystrov Mikhail General director of the Internet Research Agency which engaged in an active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election Calamari Matt Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization Caputo Michael Trump Campaign advisor Chaika Yuri Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a relationship with Aras Agalarov Christie Chris Former Governor of New Jersey Clapper James Director of National Inte lligence Aug 2010- Jan 20 17 Clovis Samuel Jr Chief policy adv isor and national co-cha ir of the Trump Campaign Coats Dan Director ofNationallnte lligence Cobb Ty Special Counsel to the President July 2017 - May 20 18 Cohen Michael Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald Trump who spearheaded an effoti to build a Trump-branded property in Moscow He admitted to lying to Congress about the project Corney James Jr Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Sept 4 2013 - May 9 20 17 B-2 U S Department of Justice AttorRe · Work Procluet II May CoFttaifl Material Proteetecl Uf cler Feci R Cl'iR1 P 6 e Conway Kellyanne Counselor to President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign Corallo Mark Spokesman for President Trump 's personal legal team June 2017 - July 2017 Corsi Jerome Costello Robert Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani the President's personal counsel Credico Randolph Randy Davis Richard Rick Jr Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank business partner of Paul Manafott and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying firm Dearborn Riel Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions Dempsey Michael Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled discussions with Dan Coats after Coats's meeting with President Trump on March 22 20 17 Denman Diana Delegate to 20 16 Republican National Convention who proposed a platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine Deripaska Oleg Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009 Dhillon Uttam Attorney in the White House Counsel 's Office Jan 2017- June 2018 Dmitriev Kirill Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund ROlF met with Erik Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and separately drafted a U S Russia reconci liation plan with Rick Gerson Donaldson Annie Chiefofstaffto White House Counsel Donald McGahn Jan 2017- Dec 2018 Dvorkovich Arkady Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the board of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow He met with Carter Page twice in 2016 Dvoskin Evgeney Executive ofGenbank in Crimea and associate ofFelix Sater Eisenberg John Attorney in the White House Counsel' s Office and legal counsel for the National Security Council Erchova Lana a l la Lana Alexander Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of20 15 B-3 U S Department of Justice Attomey WDfk Procluet II May Col'ltail'l Material Proteetecl URcler Pecl R Cril'll P 6 e Fabrizio Anthony Tony Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio Lee Associates He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election Fishbein Jason Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump org on September 20 2016 Flynn Michael G a kla Michael Flynn Jr Son of Michael T Flynn National Security Advisor Jan 20 2017- Feb 13 20 17 Flynn Michael T National Security Advisor Jan 20 2017- Feb 13 2017 Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency July 20 12- Aug 7 20 14 and Trump Campaign advisor He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016 Foresman Robert Bob Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy and after the election met with Michael Flynn Futerfas Alan Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal counsel for Donald Trump Jr Garten Alan General counsel of the Trump Organization Gates Richard Rick III Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign Trump Inaugural Committee deputy chairman and longtime employee of Paul Manafort He pleaded gu ilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate U S laws as well as making fa lse statements to the FBI Gerson Richard Rick New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner During the transition period he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for reconcil iation between the United States and Russia Gistaro Edward Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence for Intelligence Integration Glassner Michael Political director ofthe Trump Campaign who helped introduce George Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign Goldstone Robert Publicist for Em in Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr to arrange the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign official s Gordon Jeffrey National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to the Republican party platform and who commun icated with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National Convention J D Gorkov Sergey Chairman of Vnesheconombank VEB a Russian state-owned bank who met with Jared Kushner during the transition period Graff Rhona Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J Trump at the Trump Organization B-4 U S Department of Justice Attarfley Wark Pmduet II M i ' Caflt iifl Material Prateeted UFtder Fed R Grim P 6 e Harm to Ongoing Matter Hawker Jonathan Public relations consu ltant at FTI Consulting worked with Davis Manafort Internati onal LLC on public relations campaign in Ukraine Heilbrunn Jacob Editor of the National Interest the periodical that officiall y hosted candidate Trump 's April 2016 foreign policy speech Hicks Hope White House communications director Aug 2017 - Mar 20 18 and press secretary for the Trump Campaign Holt Lester NBC News anchor who interviewed President Trump on May 11 20 17 Hunt Jody Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions Feb 2017 - Oct 2017 Ivanov Igor President of the Russian International Affairs Council and former Russian foreign minister Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that Ivanov advised on arranging a Moscow visit for the Trump Campaign Ivanov Sergei Special representative of Vladimir Putin former Russian deputy prime minister and former FSB deputy director In January 2016 Michael Cohen emai led the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov Kasowitz Marc President Trump 's personal counsel May 20 17- July 20 17 Katsyv Denis Son of Peter Katsyv owner of Russian company Prevezon Holdings Ltd and associate ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Katsyv Peter Russian businessman and father of Denis Katsyv Harm to Ongoing Matter Kaveladze Irakli Ike Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United States He participated in the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials Kaverzina Irina Employee of the Internet Research Agency which engaged in an active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 20 16 U S presidential election Kelly John White House chief of staff Ju ly 20 17 - Jan 20 19 Khalilzad Zalmay U S special representative to Afghanistan and former U S ambassador He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during fore ign policy dinners put together through the Center for the National Interest Kilimnik Konstantin Russian-Ukrainian political consultant and long-time employee of Paul Manafort assessed by the FBI to have ties to Russ ian intelligence Kislyak Sergey Former Russian ambassador to the Un ited States and current Russian senator from Mordovia Klimentov Denis Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 20 16 visit to Moscow B-5 U S Department of Justice AftemC ' Werl Preduet May· Cet aifl Material Preteeted Ut der Fed R Crif 't P 6 e Klimentov Dmitri Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow Klokov Dmitry Executive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System and former aide to Russ ia's minister of energy He communicated with Michael Cohen about a possible meeting between Vladimir Putin and candidate Trump Kobyakov Anton Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation who invited candidate Trump to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Krickovic Andrej Professor at the Higher School of Econom ics who recommended that Carter Page give a July 2016 commencement address in Moscow Krylova Aleksandra internet Research Agency employee w ho worked on active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 201 6 U S presidential election traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014 Kushner Jared President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor to the President Kuznetsov Sergey Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States who transmitted Vladimir Putin 's congratulations to President-Elect Trump for his electoral victory on November 9 2016 Landrum Pete Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016 meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak Lavrov Sergey Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative of Russia to the United Nations Ledeen Barbara Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U S presidential campaign period Ledeen Michael Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign policy and national security matters Ledgett Richard Deputy director of the National Security Agency Jan 2014- Apr 2017 present when President Trump called Mic hael Rogers on March 26 20 17 Lewandowski Corey Campaign manager for the Trump Campaign Jan 2015 - June 2016 Luff Sandra Legis lative director for Senator Jeff Sessions attended a September 20 16 meeting between Sessions and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak Lyovochkin Serhiy Member of Ukrainian parliament and member of Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc Party Magnitsky Sergei Russian tax specialist who a lleged Russian government corruption and died in Russian police custody in 2009 His death prompted passage of B-6 U S Department of Justice Attome ' Work Procluet II May CoRtaiR MateFial Proteetecl Ut1Eier Feci R Grin' P 6 e the Magnitsky Act which imposed financ ial and travel sanctions on Russian officials Malloch Theodore Ted Chief executive offi cer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the Roosevelt Group He was a London-based associate of Jerome Corsi Manafort Paul Jr Trump campaign member March 2016- Aug 20 16 and chairman and chief strateg ist May 2016- Aug 2016 Mashburn John Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump Campaign McCabe Andrew Acting director of the FBI May 20 17- Aug 20 17 deputy director of the FBI Feb 2016-Jan 2018 McCord Mary Acting Assistant Attorney General Oct 2016- May 20 17 McFarland Kathleen K T Deputy White House National Security Advisor Jan 201 7 - May 20 17 McGahn Donald Don White House Counsel Jan 2017 - Oct 2018 Medvedev Dmitry Prime Minister of Russia Melnik Yuriy Spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington D C who connected with George Papado poulos on social media Mifsud Joseph Maltese national and former London-based professor who immediately after returning from Moscow in April 2016 told George Papadopoulos that the Russians had d irt in the form of thousands of Clinton emails Miller Matt Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 20 16 Miller Stephen Senior advisor to the President Millian Sergei Founder of the Russian Am erican Chamber of Commerce who met with George Papadopoulos during the campaign Mnuchin Steven Secretary of the Treasury Harm to Ongoing Matter Mtiller-Maguhn Andrew Member of hacker association Chaos Computer Club and assoc iate of J u Iian Assange founder of WikiLeaks Nader George Advisor to the United Arab Emirates's Crown Prince w ho arranged a meeting between Kirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transition period Netyksho Viktor Russian mil itary officer in command of a unit involved in Russian hackand-release operations to interfere in the 20 16 U S presidential election B-7 U S Department of Justice Aa on' e ' Work Proelttet II Ma ' CoHtaiR Material Proteeteel UHeler Feel R Grim P 6 e Oganov Georgiy Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of investment company Basic Element He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017 Oknyansky Henry a k a Henry Greenberg Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory information pertaining to Hillary C linton He met with Roger Stone in May 2016 Page Carter Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated proRussian views and made July 2016 and December 2016 visits to Moscow Papadopoulos George Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information from Joseph Mifsud that Russians had dilt in the form of thousands of Clinton emails He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about his contact with Mifsud Parscale Bradley Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign Patten William Sam Jr Lobbyist and business partner ofKonstantin Kilimnik Peskov Dmitry Deputy chief of staff of and press secretary for the Russian presidential administration Phares Walid Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secretary general of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism TAG Pinedo Richard U S person who pleaded guilty to a single-count information of identity fraud Podesta John Jr Clinton campaign chairman whose email account was hacked by the GRU WikiLeaks released his stolen emails during the 20 16 campaign Podobnyy Victor Russian intelligence offi cer who interacted with Carter Page while operating inside the United States later charged in 2015 with conspiring to act as an unregistered agent ofRussia Poliakova Elena Personal assistant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Michael Cohen's outreach about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 2016 Polonskaya Olga Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Joseph Mifsud as an individual with connections to Vladimir Putin Pompeo Michael U S Secretary of State director ofthe Central Intelligence Agency Jan 2017 - Apr 2018 Porter Robert White House staff secretary Jan 2017- Feb 20 18 Priebus Reince White House chief of staff Jan 2017 - July 2017 chair of the Republican National Committee Jan 2011- Jan 2017 Prigozhin Yevgeniy Head ofRussian companies Concord Catering and Concord Management a nd Consu lting supported and financed the Internet Research Agency which engaged in an active measures social med ia campaign to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election B-8 U S Department of Justice At'terRey Werk Pre€1ttet II May CeRtaiR Material Preteete€1 UR€1er Fee R Criffi P 6 e Prikhodko Sergei First deputy head of the Russian Government Office and former Russian deputy prime minister In January 2016 he invited candidate Trump to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum Prince Erik Businessman and Trump Campaign supporter who met with Presidential Transition Team officials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles to meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017 Raffel Josh White House communications advisor Apr 20 17 - Feb 20 18 Rasin Alexei Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to possess derogatory information regarding Hillary Clinton Rogers Michael Director of the National Security Agency Apr 2014- May 2018 Rosenstein Rod Deputy Attorney General Apr 2017- present Acting Attorney General for the Russian election interference investigation May 2017 - Nov 2018 Rozov Andrei Chairman of l C Expert Investment Company a Russian real-estate development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump Tower Moscow project in 2015 Rtskhiladze Giorgi Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic Alliance LLC who communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal Ruddy Christopher Chief executive ofNewsmax Media and associate of President Trump Rybicki James FBI chiefof staff May 2015- Feb 201 8 Samochornov Anatoli Translator who worked with Natalia Veselnitskaya and attended a June 9 2016 meeting at T rump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials Sanders Sarah Huckabee White House press secretary July 2017- present Sater Felix Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump Tower Moscow proj ect Saunders Paul J Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on outlines and logistics of candidate Trump' s April 2016 foreign policy speech Sechin Igor Executive chairman of Rosneft a Russian-stated owned oil company Sessions Jefferson III Jeff Attorney General Feb 2017 -Nov 2018 U S Senator Jan 1997 Feb 20 17 head of the Trump Campaign's foreign policy advisory team Shoygu Sergey Russian Minister of Defense Simes Dimitri President and chief executive officer of the Center for the National Interest B-9 U S Department of Justice Aftentey Werlt Precluet May Cmttaifl Material Preteetecl URcler Pecl R Grim P 6 e Smith Peter Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obtain Hillary Clinton em ails during the 2016 U S presidential campaign period Spicer Sean White House press secretary and communications director Jan 2017July 2017 Stone Roger Tillerson Rex U S Secretary of State Feb 2017 - Mar 2018 Timofeev Ivan Director of programs at the Russian International Affairs Council and program director of the Valdai Discussion Club who communicated in 2016 with George Papadopoulos attempting to arrange a meeting between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign Trump Donald Jr President Trump's son trustee and executive vice president ofthe Trump Organization helped arrange and attended the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials Trump Eric President Trump's son trustee and executive vice president of the Trump Organization Trump Ivanka President Trump's daughter advisor to the President and former executive vice president of the Trump Organization Ushakov Yuri Viktorovich Aide to Vladimir Putin and former Russian ambassador to the United States identified to the Presidential Transition Team as the proposed channel to the Russian government Vaino Anton Chief of staff to Russian president Vladimir Putin Van der Zwaan Alexander Former attorney at Skadden Arps Slate Meagher Flam LLP worked with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates Vargas Catherine Executive assistant to Jared Kushner Vasilchenko Gleb Internet Research Agency employee who engaged in an active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election Veselnitskaya Natalia Russian attorney who advocated for the repeal of the Magnitsky Act and was the principal speaker at the June 9 2016 meeting at Trump Tower with Trump Campaign officials Weber Shlomo Rector of the New Economic School NES in Moscow who invited Carter Page to speak at NES commencement in July 2016 Yanulwvych Viktor Former president of Ukraine who had worked with Paul Manafort B-10 U S Department of Justice AttofRey Work Proclttet II May Cof taiR Matet·ial Proteetecl URcler Fecl R Griff P 6 e Yates Sally Acting Attorney General Jan 20 2017- Jan 30 2017 Deputy Attorney General Jan 10 2015 - Jan 30 2017 Yatsenko Sergey Deputy chief financial officer ofGazprom a Russian state-owned energy company and associate of Carter Page Zakharova Maria Director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Information and Press Department who received notification of Carter Page's speech in July 2016 from Denis Klimentov Zayed al Nahyan Mohammed bin Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and deputy supreme commander of the United Arab Emirates UAE armed forces Entities and Organizations Alfa-Bank Russia's largest commercial bank which is headed by Petr Aven Center for the National Interest CNI U S -based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russia CNI's publication the Nationa l Interest hosted candidate Trump's foreign policy speech in April2016 Concord Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord Catering which are Russian companies controlled by Yevgeniy Prigozhin Crocus Group or Crocus International A Russian real-estate and property development company that in 2013 hosted the M iss Universe Pageant and from 2013 through 2014 worked with the T rump Organization on a Trump Moscow project DCLeal s Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen documents during the 20 I 6 U S presidential campaign period Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Political committee working to elect Democrats to the House of Representatives hacked by the GRU in April 2016 Democratic National Committee Formal governing body fo r the Democratic Party hacked by the GRU in April2016 Duma Lower House of the national legislature of the Russian Federation Gazprom Russian oil and gas company majority-owned by the Russian government Global Energy Capital LLC Investment and management firm founded by Carter Page Global Partners in Diplomacy Event hosted in partnership with the U S Department of State and the Republican N atio nal Convention In 20 16 Jeff Sessions and J D Gordon delivered speeches at the event and interacted with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak B-1 1 U S Department of Justice Atton1ey Work Proelttet Ma ' CoAtaifl Material Proteeteel Ufleler Feel R Grim P 6 e Guccifer 2 0 Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen documents during the 2016 U S presidential campaign period I C Expert Investment Company Russian real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of intent with a Trump Organization s ubsidiary to develop a Trump Moscow property Internet Research Agency IRA Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that engaged in an active measures social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 L S presidential election KLS Research LLC Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails Kremlin Official residence of the president of the Russian Federation it is used colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian government LetterOne Company that includes PetrAven and Richard Burt as board members During a board meeting in December 2016 Aven asked for Burt's help to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team Link Campus University University in Rome Italy where George Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud London Centre of International Law Practice LCILP International law advisory organization in London that employed Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff GRU Russian Federation's military intelli gence agency New Economic School in Moscow NES Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July2016 commencement ceremony Opposition Bloc Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct Party of Regions Party of Regions Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych It was generally understood to align with Russian policies Pericles Emerging Market Partners LLP Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his business partner Rick Davis Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund Prevezon Holdings Ltd Russian company that was a defendant in a U S civil action alleging the launderin g of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky Roscongress Foundation Russian entity that organized the St Petersburg International Economi c Forum Rosneft Russian state-owned oil and energy company Russian Direct Investment Fund Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011 and headed by Kirill Dmitriev B-12 U S Department of Justice Atton ey Work ProEittet II May Cm taiH Material ProteeteEI UHEier Fed R Crif¥1 P 6 e Russian International Affairs Council Russia-based nonprofit establi shed by Russian government decree It is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its members include Ivan Timofeev Dmitry Peskov and Petr Aven Silk Road Group Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing agreement to build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia St Petersburg International Economic Forum Annual event held in Russia and attended by prom inent Russian po liticians and businessmen Tatneft Russian energy company Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism European group that sponsored a summit between European Parliament lawmakers and U S persons George Papadopoulos Sam C lovis and Walid Phares attended the TAG summ it in July 2016 Unit 26165 GRU GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military political governmental and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia It engaged in computer intrusions of U S persons and organizations as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data in order to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election Unit 74455 GRU GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber operations It engaged in computer intrusions of U S persons and organizations as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data in order to interfere in the 2016 U S presidential election Valdai Discussion Club Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government officials including President Putin WikiLeaks Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information onl ine including data stolen from private corporate and U S Government entities Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U S presidential election B-13 U S Department of Justice Attorne · Work Proeuet II May CoAtain Material Proteete€1 UReer Fee R Grim P 6 e Index of Acronyms CNI Center for the National Interest DCCC Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee DNC Democratic National Committee FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FSB Russian Federal Security Service GEC Global Energy Capital LLC GRU Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate ofthe General Staff HPSCI U S House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HRC Hillary Rodham Clinton IRA Internet Research Agency LCILP London Centre of International Law Practice NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NES New Economic School NSA National Security Agency ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence PTT Presidential Transition Team RDIF Russian Direct Investment Fund RIAC Russian International Affairs Council SBOE State boards of elections sco Special Counsel's Office SJC U S Senate Judiciary Committee SSCI U S Senate Select Committee on Intelligence TAG VEB Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism Vnesheconombank B-14 U S Department of Justice Atterfl ey ¥ark Preattet II May CeA taifl Material Preteetetl UA tler Fee R CritH P 6 e AppendixC Aa eme · U S Department of Justice Werk Preattet II May Cet taiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee R Grim P 6 e U S Department of Justice AfterHey Werle Preelttet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Feel R Grim P 6 e APPENDIXC I NT RODUCTORY NOTE The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions s ubmitted to him by the Special Counsel's Office We first explain the process that led to the submission of written questions and then attach the President' s responses Beginning in December 2017 this Office sought for more than a year to interview the President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice We advised counsel that the President was a subject of the investigation under the definition of the Justice Manual- a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation Justice Manual § 9-11 151 20 18 We also advised counsel that a n interview with the President is vital to our investigation and that this Office had carefully considered the constitutional and other arguments raised by counsel and they d id not provide us with reason to forgo seeking an interview ' We additionally stated that it is in the interest ofthe Presidency and the public for an interview to take place and offered numerous accommodations to aid the President's preparation and avoid surprise 2 After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel's objective of securing the President's testimony these accommodations included the submissions of written questions to the President on certain Russia-related topics 3 We received the President's written responses in late November 2018 4 In December2018 we informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respects 5 We noted among other things that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he does not ' recall' or ' remember' or have an ' independent recollection ' of information called for by the questions 6 Other answers were incomplete or imprecise 7 The written responses we informed counsel demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format as we have had no opportunity to ask followup questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh yo ur client' s recollection or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection 8 We again requested an in-person interview limited to certain topics advising the President's counsel that t his is the President's 1 5 16 18 Letter Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel at 1 2 5 16 18 Letter Special Counsels's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at I see 7 30118 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at 1 describing accommodations 3 9 17 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President' s Personal Counsel at 1 submitting written questions 4 11 20 18 Letter President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office transmitting written responses of Donald J Trump 5 12 3118 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at 3 6 12 3 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at 3 7 12 3 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at 3 see noting for example that the President did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease but he has since made public comments about that topic 8 12 3 18 Letter Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel at 3 C-1 A erAey U S Department of Justice Werk Preettet May CeAtaiA Material Preteeteel Utteler Feel R Criffi P 6 e opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of the evidence we have gathered 9 The President declined 10 Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily we considered whether to issue a subpoena for his testimony We viewed the written answers to be inadequate But at that point our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial evidence for our report We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation with resulting delay in finishing our investigation against the anticipated benefits for our investigation and report As explained in Volume 11 Section II B we determined that the substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant factual conclusions on intent and credibility which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation 9 10 12 3 18 Letter Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel 12 12118 Letter President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office at 2 C-2 U S Department of Justice A M erHe · 't¥erk Preet1et May CeHtaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee R Grim P e e WRITIEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J TRUMP I June 9 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower a When did you first learn that Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Ja red Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion b Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of ema ils from June 2016 between among others Donald Trump Jr and Rob Goldstone In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit A Donald Trump Jr had other communications with Rob Goldstone ·and Emin Agalarov between June 3 2016 and June 9 2016 i Did Mr Trump Jr or anyone else tell you about or show you any of th ese communications If yes describe who discussed the communications with you when and the substance of the discussion s ii When did you first see or learn about all or any part ofthe emails reflected in Exhibit A iii When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy iv Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A If yes describe who you communicated with when the substance of t he communication s and why you took that action c On June 9 2016 Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals including a Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya the June 9 meeting i Other than as set forth in your answers to l a and l b what if anything were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place or the scheduling of such a meeting Describe who you discussed this with when and what you were informed about the meeting ii When did you learn that some of the individuals attend ing th e Jun e 9 meeting were Russia n or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government Describe who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion s iii What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was discussed at the meeting who the conversation was with when it occurred and the substa nce of the statements they made about th e meeting C-3 AM srHe · U S Department of Justice Wsrk Prstittet May CsHtaiH Material Prsteeteti UHtier Fee R Criffi P 6 e iv Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about in whole or in part adoption and or the Magnitsky Act If yes describe who you had that discussion with when and the substance of the discussion d For the period June 6 2016 through June 9 2016 for what portion of each day were you in Trump Tower i Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner on June 9 2016 If yes did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting If yes describe who you spoke with and the substance of the conversation e Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the Agalarov family after June 3 2016 If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance of the communication f Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family Natalia Veselnitskaya Rob Goldstone or any Russian official or contact that took place after Jun e 9 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign If yes describe who you learned this information from when and the substance of what you learned g On June 7 2016 you gave a speech in which you said in part I am going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons i Why did you make that statement ii What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons iii What did you believe the source s of that information would be iv Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting v Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to If so who vi Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7 2016 h Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton If yes describe the source s of the information when you were informed and the content of such discussion s i Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader other than Russia or Vladimir Putin had provided wished to provide or offered to provide tangible support to you r campaign including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton If C-4 U S Department of Justice AM emey Werk Preettet II May Cetttaitt Material Preteetee Utteer Fee R Grim P 6 e yes describe the source s of the information when you were informed and the content of such discussion s II Russian Hacking I Russian Efforts Using Social Media I Wikileaks a On June 14 2016 it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee DNC and that Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access or hack Prior to June 14 2016 were you provided any information about any potential or actua l hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee DCCC the Clinton Campaign Hillary Clinton or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign If yes describe who provided this information when and the substance of the information b On July 22 2016 Wikileaks released nearly 20 000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials i Prior to the July 22 2016 release were you aware from any source that Wikileaks Guccifer 2 0 DCLeaks or Russians had or potentia lly had possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign If yes describe who you discussed this issue with when and the substance of the discussion s ii After the release of emails by Wikileaks on July 22 2016 were you told that Wikileaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be released during the campaign If yes describe who provided this information when and what you were told c Are you aware of any communications during the campaign directly or indirectly between Roger Stone Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Rick Gates and a Wikileaks b Julian Assange c other representatives of Wikileaks d Guccifer 2 0 e representatives of Guccifer 2 0 or f representatives of DCLea ks If yes describe who provided you with this information when you learned of the communications and what you know about those communications d On July 27 2016 you stated at a press conference Russia if you're listening I hope you're able to find the 30 000 emails that are missing I think you wil l probably be rewarded mightily by our press i Why did you make that request of Russia as opposed t o any other country entity or individual ii In advance of making that statement what discussions if any did you have with anyone else about the substance of the statement iii Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign If yes describe who provided this information when and what you were to ld C-5 U S Department of Justice Atterrte ' Werlt Preat tet II May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer rea R Grim P 6 e e On October 7 2016 emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by Wikileaks · i Where were you on October 7 2016 ii Were you told at any time in advance of or on the day of the October 7 release that Wikileaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta If yes describe who told you this when and what you were told iii Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign including Roger Stone reaching out to Wikilea ks either directly or through an intermediary on or about October 7 2016 If yes identify the person and describe the substance of the conversations or contacts f Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign in cluding Roger Stone having any discussions directly or indirectly with Wikileaks Guccifer 2 0 or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of relea se of hacked ema ils If yes describe who had such contacts how you became aware of the contacts when you became aware of the contacts and the substance of the contacts g From June 1 2016 through the end of the campa ign how frequently did you communicate with Roger Stone Describe the nature of your communication s with Mr Stone i During that time period what efforts did Mr Stone tell you he was making to assist your campaign and what requests if any did you ma ke of Mr Stone ii Did Mr Stone ever discuss Wikileaks with you or as far as you were aware with anyone else associated with the campaign If yes describe what you were told from whom and when iii Did Mr Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with Wikileaks or any intermediary of Wikileaks or about forthcoming releases of information If yes describe what Stone told you and when h Did you have any discussions prior to January 20 2017 regarding a potential pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange If yes describe who you had the discussion s with when and the content of the discussion s i Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies including those in Russia to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies If yes identify who you discussed such assistance with when and the content of the discussion s C-6 U S Department of Justice At terrtey Werlt PreElttet May CerttaiH Material PreteeteEI UrtEler FeEl R CrirH P 6 e Ill The Trump Organization Moscow Project a In October 2015 a Letter of Intent a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow the Trump Moscow project i When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project By whom What were you told about the project ii Did you sign the letter of intent b In a statement provided to Congress attached as Exhibit C Michael Cohen stated To the best of my knowledge Mr Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions including signing a non -binding letter of intent in 2015 Describe all discussions you had with Mr Cohen or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization about the Trump Moscow project including who you spoke with when and the substance of the discussion s c Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officials including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov regarding the Trump Moscow project If so identify who provided this information to you when and the substance of what you learned d Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 rega rding a potential trip to Russia by you and or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance of the discussion s e Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project should cease or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned If yes describe who you spoke with when the substance of the discussion s and why that decision was made f Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia including the Trump Moscow project If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance of the discussion s g Aside from the Trump Moscow project did you or the Trump Organization have any other prospective or actual business interests investments or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the cam paign If yes describe the business interests investments or arrangements C-7 U S Department of Justice Attert ey 'Nark Pretittet II Ma · Cmttaifl Material Preteeteti UHtier Feti R Griff P 6 e IV Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign a Prior to mid-August 2016 did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government If yes describe who you learned this information from when and the substance of what you were told Did Mr Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign If yes describe that role b Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to Oleg Deripaska If yes describe who you learned this information from when the substance of what you were told what you understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr Deripaska and how you responded to learning this information c Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments If yes identify who provided you with this information when the substance of the discussion s what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information and how you responded to learning this information d Did Paul Manafort communicate to you directly or indirectly any positions Ukraine or Russia would want the U S to support If yes describe when he communicated those positions to you and the substance of those communications e During the campaign were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or senior members of your campaign If yes describe who you had conversations with on this topic when and what you were told f What role if any did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention Prior to the convention what information did you have about this platform provision After the platform provision was changed who told you about the change when did they tell you what w ere you told about why it was changed and who was involved g On July 27 2016 in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia you said We'll be looking at that Yeah we' ll be looking Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and or recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected C-8 U S Department of Justice Atterrtey Werk Preelttet II Ma · Certtairt Material Preteeteel Urteler Peel R Grim P 6 e i What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and or recognizing Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected Describe who you spoke with about this topic when the substance of the discussion s V Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition a Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championsh ip gala on November 10 2016 If yes who asked you to attend when were you asked and what were you told about about why your presence was requested i Did you attend any part of the event If yes describe any interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event b Following the Obama Administration's imposition of sanctions on Russia in December 2016 Russia sanctions did you discuss with Lieutenant General LTG Michael Flynn K T McFarland Steve Bannon Reince Priebus Jared Kushner Erik Prince or anyone else associated with the transition what should be communicated to the Russian government regarding the sanctions If yes describe who you spoke with about this issue when and the substance of the discussion s c On December 29 and December 31 2016 LTG Flynn had conversations with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia's response to the Russia sanctions i Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from the Russian government about the Russia sanctions ii Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn's December 29 2016 conve rsation that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak If yes describe who told you this information when and what you were told If no when and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29 2016 conversation with Ambassador Kislyak iii When did you learn of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak's call on December 31 2016 Who told you and what were you told iv When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and December 31 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak Who told you and what were you told d At any time between December 31 2016 and January 20 2017 did anyone tel l you or suggest to you that Russia's decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's communications with Ambassador Kislyak If yes identify who provided you with this information when and the substance of what you were told C-9 U S Department of Justice Attet·rtey Werk Preattet II May Certtairt Material Preteetea Urtaer Fee R CrirA P 6 e e On January 12 2017 the Washington Post published a column that stated that LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29 2016 After learning of the column did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak If yes who did you make this suggestion or direction to when what did you say and why did you take this step i After learning of the column did you have any conversations with LTG Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016 If yes describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the discussions f Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that took place in December 2016 i If yes describe who you spoke with when the substance of the discussion s and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting g Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in January 2017 i If yes describe who you spoke with when the substance of the discussion s and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting s h Prior to January 20 2017 did you talk to Steve Bannon Jared Kushner or any other individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial line of communication with Russia If yes describe who you spoke with when the substance of the discussion s and what you understood was the purpose of such an unofficial line of communication C-10 U S Department of Justice AfterRey Werk Preeh tet May CeRteiR Materiel Preteetecl URcler Fecl R Cl·im P 6 e RESPONSES OF PRESIDENT DONALD J TRUMP I June 9 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower a When did you first learn that Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton Describe who you learned the information from and the substance of the discussion b Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between among others Donald Trump Jr and Rob Goldstone In addition to the emails reflected in Exhibit A Donald Trump Jr had other communications with Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between une 3 2016 and June 9 2016 c i Did Mr Trump Jr or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these communications If yes describe who discussed the communications with you when and the substance of the discussion s ii When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected in Exhibit A 111 When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy IV Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A If yes describe who you communicated with when the substance of the communication s and why you took that action On June 9 2016 Donald Trump Jr Paul Mana fort and Jared Kushner attended a meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals including a Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya the June 9 meeting 1 Other than as set fatth in your answers to l a and l b what if anything were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place or the scheduling of such a meeting Describe who you discussed this with when and what you were informed about the meeting 11 When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government Describe who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion s 6 C-11 U S Department of Justice Attorl'le · W ork Proattet II M B y Col'ltB il'l M B teriB I P1·oteetea URaer fee R Crirfl P 6 e d iii What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was di scussed at the meeting who the conversation was with when it occurred and the substance of the statements they made about the meeting iv Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about in whole or in part adoption and or the Magnitsky Act If yes describe who you had that discussion with when and the substance of the di scussion For the period June 6 20 16 through June 9 2016 for what portion of each day were you in Trump Tower 1 Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner on June 9 20 16 If yes did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting If yes describe who you spoke with and the substance of the conversation e Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the Aga larov fami ly after June 3 20 16 If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance of the communication f Did you learn of any commun ications between Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family Natalia Veselnitskaya Rob Goldstone or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9 20 16 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign If yes describe who you learned this information from when and the substance of what you learned g On June 7 2016 you gave a speech in which you said in part '• Jam going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons '' h i Why did you make that statement ii What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons 111 What did you believe the source s of that information would be iv Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting v Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to If so who VI Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7 20 16 Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian 7 C- 12 U S Department of Justice AM erney Werk Preattet Ma · Cmttttifl Material Pt·eteetea URaer Feel R Grim P 6 e government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton If yes describe the source s of the information when you were informed and the content of such discussion s 1 Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader other than Russia or Vladimir Putin had provided wished to provide or offered to provide tangible support to your campaign including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton If yes describe the source s of the information when you were informed and the content of such discussion s Response to Question I Parts a through c I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9 2016 meeting had taken place that the referenced emai Is existed or that Donald J Trump Jr had other communications with Em in Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3 2016 and June 9 2016 Response to Question I Part d I have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of 2016 I spent in Trump Tower This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign as the primary season was ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I was in New York City from June 6 - 9 20 16 Calendars kept in my Trump Tower office reflect that I had various calls and meetings scheduled for each of these days While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have taken place they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these working days and I have no reason to doubt that I was When I was in New York City I stayed at my Trump Tower apartment My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during portions of these days The June 7 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower in the early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California New Jersey New Mexico Montana and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day The June 8 2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son's school The June 9 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a fundraising luncheon at the Four Seasons Hotel At this point I do not remember on what dates these events occurred but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as scheduled on my calendar Widely available media reports including television footage also shed light on my activities during these days Fm· example I am aware that my June 7 2016 victory remarks at the Trump 8 C-13 U S Department of Justice Atterfle ' Wefk PFeeittet Ma · CeRtttifl Matel'ittl Preteeteel UReier Feel R CFinL P 6 e National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor New York were recorded and published by the media 1 remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening At this point in time l do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner on June 9 2016 My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9 but I do not recall if that meeting took place It was · more than two years ago at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily Response to Question I Part e I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov family or anyone l understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3 2016 and before the end of the campaign While preparing to respond to these questions I have become aware of written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent received and largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you In general the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories emails about a painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday present and emails regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov The documents reflect that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Service Response to Question I Part t I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Jared Kushner and any member or representative ofthe Agalarov family Robert Goldstone Natalia Veselnitskaya whose name I was not familiar with or anyone I understood to be a Russian official Response to Question I Part g In remarks I delivered the night I won the California New Jersey New Mexico Montana and South Dakota Republican primaries I said I am going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons In general l expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available negative information about the Clintons including for example Mrs Clinton 's failed policies the Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton Foundation Mrs Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business the destruction of33 000 emails on that server and Mrs Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the office of President In the course of preparing to respond to your questions I have become aware that the Campaign documents already produced to you reflect the drafting evolution and sources of information for the speech I expected to give probably on the Monday following my June 7 2016 comments These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff 9 C-14 Atton e U S Department of Justice 'Nork PfoEittet May Cotttaifl Material ProteeteEI UREier FeEl R Crifl'l P 6 e with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material including in particular information from the book CUnton Cash by Peter Schweizer The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday June 12 2016 In light of that tragedy I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and terrorism than to the Clintons That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of Politics in Manchester New Hampshire and as rep01ted opened with the following This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism she would be Even her former Secret Service Agent who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president There will be plenty of opportunity to discuss these important issues at a later time and I will deliver that speech soon But today there is only one thing to discuss the growing threat of terrorism inside of our borders l continued to speak about Mrs Clinton 's failings throughout the campaign using the information prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7 2016 Response to Question I Part h I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian government suppotted my candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton However I was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements about me Response to Question I Part i I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign leader had provided wished to provide or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign II Russian Hacking I Russian Efforts Using Social Media I WikiLeaks a On June 14 2016 it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the computer network of the Democratic National Committee DNC and that Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access or hack Prior to June 14 2016 were you provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee DCCC the Clinton Campaign Hillary Clinton or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign 1f yes describe who provided this information when and the substance of the information 10 C-15 U S Department of Justice AMerRey Werk Preettet Mtty CeHtB iH MB £eriB I Preteetee UHeer Fee R Crittt P 6 e b On July 22 2016 WikiLeaks released nearly 20 000 emails sent or received by Democratic party officials i Prior to the July 22 2016 release were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks Guccifer 2 0 DCLeaks or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign If yes describe who you discussed this issue with when and the substance of the discussion s 11 After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22 2016 were you told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be released during the campaign If yes describe who provided this in formation when and what you were told c Are you aware of any communications during the campaign directly or indirectly between Roger Stone Donald Trump Jr Paul Manafort or Rick Gates and a WikiLeaks b Julian Assange c other representatives ofWikiLeaks d Guccifer 2 0 e representatives of Guccifer 2 0 or t representatives of DC Leaks If yes describe who provided you with this information when you learned of the communications and what you know about those communications d On July 27 2016 you stated at a press conference Russia if you 're listening I hope you ' re able to find the 30 000 emails that are missing I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press e 1 Why did you make that request of Russia as opposed to any other country entity or individual 11 In advance of making that statement what discussions if any did you have with anyone else about the substance of the statement 111 Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign I fyes describe who provided this information when and what you were told On October 7 20 16 emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by WikiLeaks 1 Where were you on October 7 20 I 6 11 Were you told at any time in advance of or on the day of the October 7 release that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta lf yes describe who told you this when and what you were told II C-16 U S Department of Justice tterHey WerlE Preattet May Cel'ttBiH Meterial Preteetea UHaer Fea R Grim P 6 e 111 Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign including Roger Stone reaching out to WikiLeaks either directly or through an intermediary on or about October 7 20 16 lf yes identify the person and describe the substance ofthe conversations or contacts f Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign including Roger Stone having any discussions directly or indirectly with WikiLeaks Guccifer 2 0 or DCLeaks regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails If yes describe who had such contacts how you became aware of the contacts when you became aware of the contacts and the substance of the contacts g From June 1 20 16 through the end of the campaign how frequently did you communicate with Roger Stone Describe the nature or your communication s with Mr Stone t During that time period what efforts did Mr Stone tell you he was making to assist your campaign and what requests if any did you make of Mr Stone ii Did Mr Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or as far as you were aware with anyone else associated with the campaign I fyes describe what you were told from whom and when iii Did Mr Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any intermediary of WikiLeaks or about forthcoming releases of information If yes describe what Stone told you and when h Did you have any discussions prior to January 20 20 I 7 regarding a potential pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange I f yes describe who you had the discussion s with when and the content o f the discussion s i Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies including those in Russia to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies If yes identify who you discussed such assistance with when and the content of the discussion s Response to Question II Part a I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked but my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject of media reporting I do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the hacking of any ofthe named entities or indi viduals before it became the subject of media reporting 12 C-17 U S Department of Justice AtterRe · Work Pt·eetlet Mtty CeRtttifl Mttterittl Proteetee Ulleer Fee R Cl·iffl P 6 e Response to Question II Part b I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about the possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there was a lot of talk about this matter At the time I was generally aware of these media repot1s and may have discussed these issues with my campaign staff or others but at this point in time - more than two years later - I have no recollection of any particular conversation when it occurred or who the participants were Response to Question II Part c I do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals named in Question ll c and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of the other individuals or entities referred to in the question Response to Question II Part d I made the statement quoted in Question II d in jest and sarcastically as was apparent to any objective observer The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the July 27 2016 press conference and I refer you to the publ icly available transcript and video of that press conference I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement in advance of the press conference I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by Russia to intiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media reporting and I have no recollection of any particular conversation in that regard Response to Question II Part e I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7 2016 I have no recollection of being told that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of Mr Podesta's emails was reported by the media Likewise I have no recollection of being told that Roger Stone anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone or anyone associated wi th my campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October 7 20 16 Response to Question II Part t I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my campaign had di scussions with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails Response to Question II Part g I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign l have no recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr Stone between June I 2016 and 13 C-18 U S Department of Justice Attorney Work Pt•ot ttet Mt t ' CoHtt tifl Mt tterit tl Proteetet i UHt ier Fet i R Crit'H P 6 e November 8 2016 I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him nor do I recall being aware of Mr Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign although I was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at the time Response to Question II Part h I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to benefit Julian Assange Response to Question II Part i I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific effm1s by foreign individuals or companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of rallies III The Trump Organization Moscow Project a In October 2015 a Letter oflntent a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B was signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow the Trump Moscow project 1 When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project By whom What were you told about the project ii Did you sign the letter of intent b In a statement provided to Congress attached as Exhibit C Michael Cohen stated To the best of my knowledge Mr Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 20 15 Describe all discussions you had with Mr Cohen or anyone else associated with the Trump Organization about the Trump Moscow project including who you spoke with when and the substance of the discussion s c Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government officials including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov regarding the Trump Moscow project If so identify who provided this infmmation to you when and the substance of what you learned d Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip to Russia by you and or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance of the discussion s e Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project 14 C-19 A1torRe · U S Department of Justice Work Proet1et May CoRtttift Material Proteetee UFtcler Fecl R Crim P 6 e should cease or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned If yes describe who you spoke with when the substance of the discussion s and why that decision was made f Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia including the Trump Moscow project If yes describe who you spoke with when and the substance ofthe discussion s g Aside from the Trump Moscow project did you or the Trump Organization have any other prospective or actual business interests investments or arrangements with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign If yes describe the business interests investments or arrangements Response to Question In Parts a through g Sometime in 20 I 5 Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project in Moscow As I recall Mr Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have done in the past in a variety of locations I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your questions as Exhibit 8 which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world I had few conversations with Mr Cohen on this subject As I recall they were brief and they were not memorable I was not enthused about the proposal and 1 do not recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump Organization although it is possible I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of Intent In the course of preparing to respond to your questions I have become aware that Mr Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to Mr Peskov at a general public email account which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia I understand those documents already have been provided to you I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia I may have spoken with campaign staff or Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information but 1 have no current recollection of any particular conversation with whom l may have spoken when or the substance of any conversation As I recall neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Intent IV Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign a Prior to mid-August 2016 did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the Ukrainian government If yes describe who you learned this information from when and the substance of what you were told Did Mr Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or IS C-20 U S Department of Justice Atterfle · Werle Pretlttet Ma y CeHta in Ma teria l Preteetetl Ut1tler Feel R Critfl P 6 e Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign If yes describe that role b Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to Oleg Deripaska lf yes describe who you learned this information from when the substance of what you were told what you understood the purpose was of sharing such information with Mr Deripaska and how you responded to learn ing this information c Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments If yes identify who provided you with this information when the substance of the discussion s what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information and how you responded to learning this information d Did Paul Manafort communicate to you directly or indirectly any positions Ukraine or Russia would want the U S to support If yes describe when he communicated those positions to you and the substance of those communications e During the campaign were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or senior members of your campaign If yes describe who you had conversations with on this topic when and what you were told f What role if any did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention Prior to the convention what information did you have about this platform provision After the platform provision was changed who told you about the change when did they tell you what were you told about why it was changed and who was involved g On July 27 2016 in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia you said We' ll be looking at that Yeah we' II be looking Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and or recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected 1 What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and or recognizing Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected Describe who you spoke with about this topic when the substance of the discussion s Response to Question IV Parts a through d Mr Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates including Gerald Ford Ronald Reagan George H W Bush and Bob Dole I knew that Mr Manafort had done international consulting work and at some time before Mr Manafort left the 16 C-21 U S Department of Justice AM er 'le ' Werle Pre€1uet Ma · Cetttail'l Material Preteete€1 Utt€1er Fe€1 R Grim P 6 e campaign I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine but I do not remember the specifics of what I knew at the time I had no knowledge of Mr Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an individual named Oleg Deripaska nor do I remember being aware of Mr Manafort or anyone else associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign information to anyone knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or official I do not remember Mr Manafort communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support Response to Question IV Part e I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or with senior members of my campaign In the process of preparing to respond to these questions I became aware that on March 17 2016 my assistant at the Trump Organization Rhona Graff received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Foundation Roscongress inviting me to participate in the St Petersburg International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016 The documents show that Ms Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation I understand these documents already have been produced to you Response to Question IV Part t I have no recollection of the details of what when or from what source I first learned about the change to the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine but I generally recall learning of the issue as part of media reporting I do not recall being involved in changing the language to the amendment Response to Question IV Part g My statement did not communicate any position V Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition a Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10 2016 If yes who asked you to attend when were you asked and what were you told about about sic why your presence was requested 1 Did you attend any part of the event If yes describe any interactions you had with any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event 17 C-22 U S Department of Justice Attofftey Work Proattet May CoRtttifl Matel'ial Proteetea UHser Fee R Cl'im P 6 e Response to Question V Pal t a I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala and I did not attend the event During the course of preparing to respond to these questions l have become aware of documents indicating that in March of20 16 the president of the World Chess Federation invited the Trump Organization to host at Tmmp Tower the 2016 World Chess Championship Match to be held in New York in November 2016 T have also become aware that in November 2016 there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament which was not being held at Trump Tower I understand these documents have already been provided to you on Nf NIMif rc l 2018 D 18 C-23 U S Department of Justice Aa erttey Werk Pret ttet II May Cetttttitt Material Preteetea Uttaer Fee R CritH P 6 e U S Department of Justice AM erHey Werk Preelt tet Mtt ' CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteeteel UHeler Peel R Crifft P 6 e AppendixD U S Department of Justice AM erfley Werk Predttet May CeH taiH Material Preteeted UH aer Fed R CriFH P 6 e U S Department of Justice AttorHey Wofk Pfotfttet Ma · CoHtaiH Material Proteetetf UHtfer Fetf R Criffl P 6 e APPENDIXD SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE TRANSFERRED REFERRED AND COMPLETED CASES This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Counsel's Office as well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed A Transfers The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign Certain matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as ofthe date of this report After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General the Office has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI Those transfers include I United States v Bijan Rafiekian and Kamil Ekim Alptekin US Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia Awaiting trial The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate among other things possib le criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregistered agent for the Government of Turkey See August 2 2017 Memorandum from Rod J Rosenstein to Robert S Mueller III The Acting Attorney General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin because they may have been jointly involved with Flynn in FARA-related crimes See October 20 2017 Memorandum from Associate Deputy Attorney General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J Rosenstein On December 1 2017 Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador to the United States As part of that plea Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offense in which he acknowledged that the Foreign Agents Registration Act FARA documents he filed on March 7 2017 contained materially false statements and omissions Flynn' s plea occurred before the Special Counsel had made a final decision on whether to charge Rafiekian or Alptekin On March 27 20 18 after consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General the Special Counsel's Office referred the investigation ofRafiekian and Alptekin to the National Security Division NSD for any action it deemed appropriate The Special Counsel's Office determined the referral was appropriate because the investigation of Flynn had been completed and that investigation had provided the rationale for the Office's investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin At NSD' s request the Eastern District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin 2 United States v Michael Flynn US Attorney's Office for the District ofColumbia Awaiting sentencing D-1 U S Department of Justice AM'erAey Werk Preattet May CeRtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fed R Crilfl P 6 e 3 United States v Richard Gates U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia Awaiting sentencing 4 United States v Internet Research Agency et al Russian Social Media Campaign U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia National Security Division Post-indictment pre-arrest pre-trial 1 5 United States v Konstantin Kilimnik U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia Post-indictment pre-arrest 6 United States v Paul Manafort U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia U S Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia Post-conviction 7 United States v Viktor Netyksho et al Russian Hacking Operations U S Attorney 's Office for the Western District ofPennsylvania National Security Division Post-indictment pre-arrest 8 United States v William Samuel Patten U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia Awaiting sentencing The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of Patten's conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office The investigation uncovered evidence of a crime the U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia handled the prosecution of Patten 9 Harm to Ongoing Matter Investigation ongoing The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate among other things crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych See August 2 2017 Memorandum from Rod J Rosenstein to Robert S Mueller Ill The Acting Attorney General 1 One defendant Concord Management Consulting LLC appeared through counsel and is in pretrial litigation D-2 U S Department of Justice Attofftey Werlt Proc ittet II MS ' CoHta iH Material Proteetec i UHc ier Fee R Critfl P 6 e Harm to Ongoing Matter On October 27 2017 Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of Columbia with various crimes including F ARA in connection with work they performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine On February 22 2018 Manafort and Gates were charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the payments they received for work for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine During the course of its the Special Counsel's Office substantial evidence with re that wer On February 23 2018 Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multiobject conspiracy and to making false statements the remaining charges against Gates were dismissed 3 Thereafter in consultation with the Office ofthe Deputy Attorney the Special Counsel's Office closed the and referred them for further investigation as it deemed appropriate The Office based its decision to close those matters on its mandate the indictments ofManafort Gates 's plea and its determination as to how best to allocate its resources amon other reasons At Harm to Ongoing Matter d the investigation of those closed matters 10 United States v Roger Stone US Attorney's Office for the District ofColumbia Awaiting trial 11 Harm to Ongoing Matter Investigation ongoing B Referrals During the course of the investigation the Office periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's jurisdiction established by the Acting Attorney General After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI Those referrals listed 3 Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia See Vol I Section IV A 8 The trial and plea happened after the transfer decision described here D-3 U S Department of Justice A ente · V erk Pretlttet II May Cefl taifl Material Preteetetl Ufl tler Feel R Grim P 6 e alphabetically by subject are summarized below 2 Michael Cohen During the course of the investigation the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen That evidence was referred to the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District ofNew York and the FBI's New York Field Office 4 During the course ofthe FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates the Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations pertaini g to Gregory Craig Skadden Arps Slate Meagher Flom LLP Skadden and their work on behalf of the government of Ukraine After consultation with the NSD the evidence regarding Craig was referred to NSD and NSD elected to partne_r with the U S Attorney's Office for the Southern District ofNew York and the FBI's New York Field Office NSD later elected to partner on the Craig matter with the U S Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia NSD retained and handled issues relating to Skadden itself 6 Harm to Ongoing Matter D-4 U S Department of Justice AM on ey Work Proflttet May CoRtaiR Material Proteete€1 URfler Fe€1 R Grim P 6 e Harm to Ongoing Matter D-5 U S Department of Justice AtttJrHey Werk PrtJattet Ma · CeHtaiH Mttterial PrtJteetea UHaer Fea R Critfl P 6 e 14 C Completed Prosecutions In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel 's Office the defendants have completed or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment Because no further proceedings are likely in any case responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other office or component 1 United States v George Papadopoulos Post-conviction Completed term of imprisonment December 7 2018 2 United States v Alex van der Zwaan Post-conviction Completed term of imprisonment June 4 20 18 3 United States v Richard Pinedo Post-conviction Currently in Residential Reentry Center release date May 13 20 19 D-6