DECLASSIFIED ED 1 26 Sec 3 3 bf By in NARA om DECLASSIFIED This A'ua f page Authority UNITED STATES Ho is Eris -- ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION my 1 611 23 D c s 4142 MEMORANDUM FOR Charles W Thomas S Department of State aw SUBJECT INSPECTION or ISRAELI moron by This is in spouse to your recent verbal request that the ABC 3 consider plan for securing periodic U S access to the site of the na reactor in Israel Under this plan the Government of Ismi-mmb Wt access to the Dimona site by ABC safeguards inspectors on a routine basis on the occasion of each visit made by our inspectors to Israel under our Agreement for Cooperation We have carefully considered this proposal and should like to propose that an alternate approach be made to the Israeli Govern- ment Specifically we believe that the Israeli Government should be requested to agree to access on a periodic basis by suitably qualified technical personnel other than AEC safeguards inspectors The ABC will be pleased to recommend and make such personnel avail- able from among its technical staff or those of our contractor organizations We believe it is most important in attempting to 33 set up such an arrangement with the Israeli Government to reach agreement on the following points 1 There must be clear understanding that on the occasion of each visit the U S visitors would have full and complete access to the entire facility for such period of time as they require to complete their observations 2 While the visits would be given no publicity we could not promise to regard them as classified and the visitors could not be required to follow any clandestine procedures with respect to their identity or movements while in Israel ex V51 T s l 347 Our ability to make personnel available for these visits would be dependent on the agreement of the Israeli Government to these points sumac mans - Manson 5 1903 an of _n u I anemia th person At pm 4 1c Isa-u thorium UECLASSIF We would also call your attention to the important limitations which would exist on the significance of the results which would be derived from visits of the type contemplated From such visits it is possible to ascertain at most the nature and capabilities of the facilities of the Dimona site It would not be possible for the visitors to perform materials accountability fUnctions which are a critical part of the inspections carried out under our Agreements for Cooperation since these require the submission and review of'records the Opportunity to take samples and the right to make inquiries or visits wherever necessary to establish the location and use of the material Thus these visits to Dimona would not provide assurance that the materials being used or produced in the Dimona facilities were not being employed for-military purposes We strongly recommend that the Israeli Government be requested to accord the United States not only the opportunity to satisfy itself with respect to the nature of the facilities at the Dimona site but also with respect to the disposition of the materials produced in the Dimona reactor We have previously indicated to you the nature of our concern with respect to the making available of ABC safeguards inspectors for these visits but would like to record them here for your information It is our belief that the successful accomplishment of the primary mission of our safeguards inspectors depends among other things on their acceptability to the countries in which they carry out their inspections These inspections are undertaken on an entirely open basis through reliance on the rights accorded the United States under our Agreements The acceptability of our inspectors would undoubtedly be prejudiced if the countries concerned felt that the inspectors had intelligence missions in addition to their agreedpupon access to the atomic energy activities of the other government Disclosure that our inspectors were involved in visits to the Israeli closed site at Dimona would almost certainly be construed elsewhere as evidence that these inspectors also had other responsibilities of an intelligence nature we believe this would be the case even though their access to Dimona would be with the agreement of the Israeli Government We understand that the Department of State is willing to approach the Israeli Government in the first instance on the basis of under- taking these visits with personnel other than safeguards inspectors but that the Department wishes to know in advance whether in the event this approach is unacceptable the Commission would be willing to make its safeguards inspectors available Authority gj'gfg DECLASSIFIED In the event that the approach were unacceptable to the Israeli Government the Commission is prepared to consider whether it should make its safeguards inspectors available We believe however that this consideration should not take place until a most strenuous effort has been made to secure the agreement of the Israeli Government to the first course of action If the Israeli Government were to reject this proposal the nature of their reac- tion to it including any conditions which it appeared might be required to secure their agreement to some alternative proposal could then form the basis for a careful consideration of'whether safeguands inspectors should be employed in this type of activity In view of the Commission's reservations as to the desirability of this use of safeguards inspectors we believe that any request for their use should be made from a very high level in the Department of State s rec or Division of International Affairs 48L a This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu