NSTAC XXIX ISSUE REVIEW “NSTAC Enhancing National Security and Emergency Preparedness through Communications” The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC Issue Review A Review of Issues Addressed Through NSTAC XXIX August 2006 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Table of Contents NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary iii Active Issues Next Generation Networks 3 National Coordinating Center 11 Telecommunications and Electric Power Infrastructure Interdependencies 17 Emergency Communications and Interoperability 23 Termination of Cellular Networks During Emergency Situations 27 Standing Issues Legislation and Regulation 31 Research and Development 41 Previously Addressed Issues Automated Information Processing 47 Commercial Network Survivability 49 Commercial Satellite Survivability 51 Common Channel Signaling 55 Electromagnetic Pulse 57 Energy 59 Enhanced Call Completion 63 Financial Services 67 Funding of NSTAC Initiatives 69 Globalization 71 Industry Government Information Sharing and Response 73 Industry Information Security 77 Information Assurance 79 Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection 83 Intelligent Networks 87 International Diplomatic Telecommunications 89 International National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications 91 Last Mile Bandwidth Availability 93 National Coordinating Mechanism 97 National Information Infrastructure 99 National Research Council Report 103 National Telecommunications Management Structure 105 Network Convergence 107 TABLE OF CONTENTS t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Network Security 113 Obtaining Critical Telecommunications Facility Protection During a Civil Disturbance 117 Physical Security of the Telecommunications Network 119 Response to September 11 2001 Terrorist Attacks 123 Telecommunications Industry Mobilization 125 Telecommunications Service Priority 127 Telecommunications Service Priority Carrier Liability 129 Telecommunications Systems Survivability 131 Underground Storage Tanks 133 Wireless Security 135 Wireless Services Including Priority Services 139 Appendix A – NSTAC Implementing and Governing Documentation Charter of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee A-3 Bylaws of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee A-5 Appendix B – NSTAC Membership The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Membership as of May 10 2006 B-3 Appendix C – NSTAC XXIX Executive Report to the President Executive Report on the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 C-3 Attachment 1 Report Recommendations to the President from the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 C-16 Attachment 2 Attendance of Members at the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 C-21 Appendix D – Acronym Acronym List D-3 Executive Summary The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Executive Summary Purpose This edition of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Issue Review provides a comprehensive report of issues addressed by the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC from its first meeting in December 1982 to its most recent meeting on May 10 2006 For each active standing and previous issue addressed by the NSTAC the NSTAC Issue Review provides the following information when applicable names of the investigating groups length of time required for the investigation issue background a synopsis of NSTAC actions and recommendations actions resulting from NSTAC recommendations reports issued and members of the current active investigating groups Background On September 13 1982 President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order E O 12382 establishing the President’s NSTAC The NSTAC a presidentiallyappointed advisory body composed of up to 30 senior executive level representatives from the communications hardware software and security services banking and aerospace companies provides the President with a unique source of national security and emergency preparedness NS EP communications policy expertise Several factors influenced the establishment of the NSTAC at that time including the divestiture of AT T increased Government reliance on commercial communications and the potential impact of new technologies on communications supporting NS EP requirements Appendix A of this document includes E O 12382 as well as additional NSTAC implementing and governing documentation Appendix B provides a listing of current NSTAC members as of May 10 2006 Since its inception the NSTAC has advised seven administrations on issues pertaining to the reliability and security of communications technologies and their impact on the Nation’s ability to protect its critical infrastructures—issues vital to America’s security and economic interests Today members of the communications and information technology industries as well as the Federal Government recognize the NSTAC as a model for industry Government collaboration NSTAC accomplishments include many substantive recommendations to the President leading to enhancements of the Nation’s NS EP communications capabilities and critical infrastructure policies and increased safeguards to the Nation’s communications infrastructure Over the past 24 years the NSTAC has worked cooperatively with the National Communications System NCS an interagency consortium of Federal departments and agencies that serves as the focal point for NS EP communications planning for any crisis or disaster and provides staff support and technical assistance to the Committee By virtue of its mandate to address NS EP communications issues the NSTAC’s partnership with the NCS is unique in two ways 1 it facilitates industry involvement with both the defense and civil agencies comprising the NCS and 2 it regularly sustains interaction between industry and the NCS member departments and agencies through the National Coordinating Center NCC the Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center the Network Security Information Exchange NSIE process and most recently through the Communications Sector Coordinating Council which serves as a point of contact for its counterpart the Government Coordinating Council The NSTAC’s perspective and its experiences with a wide range of Federal departments and agencies make the committee a key strategic resource for the President and his national security and homeland security teams in their efforts to protect our Nation’s critical infrastructures in today’s dynamic and evolving environment iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Membership on the NSTAC’s primary working body—the Industry Executive Subcommittee IES — consists of one representative from each company appointed by his or her NSTAC Principal The IES holds regular meetings to consider issues analyses and or recommendations for presentation to the NSTAC Principals and in turn to the President and assists in the formation of task forces and working groups as directed by the Committee to address specific issues requiring in-depth analyses During the NSTAC XXIX cycle from May 2005 to May 2006 the NSTAC operated the following subordinate task forces and working group u The Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force initiated an examination of how communications technologies should be integrated into the Federal Government’s emergency communications planning to support NS EP activities and to recommend a future direction to ensure a survivable and interoperable communications architecture for responders u The National Coordinating Center Task Force examined the direction and structure of the NCC and how it should continue to partner with Government In addition the group also developed a roadmap of action items for use by the NCC to assist it in evolving to address new issues over the next five years u The Next Generation Networks NGN Task Force examined how the Government can ensure NS EP telecommunications requirements continue to be addressed on the NGN In addition the group proposed substantive recommendations to the President regarding facilitating NS EP communications over converging networks u The Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force examined the NS EP issues associated with the interdependency of the telecommunications and electric power sectors and how these interdependencies will affect the future of the telecommunications network iv The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Cellular Service Shutdown Ad Hoc Working Group examined a process for determining if and when cellular services should be terminated in the event of a national emergency u The Legislative and Regulatory Task Force continued to review and analyze legislative and regulatory activities affecting the NS EP community In addition the group developed recommendations to the President on the need for adequate Federal assistance to telecommunications infrastructure providers during disasters such as hurricanes u The Research and Development R D Task Force began planning for the first-ever international R D Exchange Workshop in Ottawa Ontario Canada in September of 2006 The Workshop will focus on multilateral collaborative R D to enhance security on the network Many NSTAC recommendations result in operational activities that enhance NS EP communications and information systems For example in its first set of recommendations to the President the NSTAC suggested the establishment of the NCC an industry and Government coordination center for day-to-day operational support to NS EP communications In addition the NSTAC assisted the Office of the Manager National Communications System in developing and eventually implementing the Telecommunications Service Priority TSP System—one of the NCS’ most utilized priority service programs Furthermore an NSTAC recommendation also resulted in the establishment of separate NSTAC and Government NSIEs which meet regularly to address the threat of electronic intrusions and software vulnerabilities as well as to discuss mitigation strategies to protect the Nation’s critical communications and information systems Finally the NSTAC recommended the development of an access and credentialing program to assist private sector companies in gaining access to federal disaster sites following an event of national significant In response to this recommendation the Department of Homeland Security developed in partnership with Federal State and local The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Government entities as well as a private sector company an access standard operating procedure SOP to ensure that private critical infrastructure responders receive priority access to disaster areas The State of Georgia adopted the access SOP which is also being used as an example for other States Appendix C of this document contains the NSTAC XXIX Executive Report to the President which includes summaries of the May 2006 NSTAC XXIX Business and Executive Sessions Executive Breakfast and Executive Luncheon as well as task force recommendations made to the President during the NSTAC XXIX Cycle May 2005–May 2006 Copies of NSTAC reports pertaining to the issues addressed in this document are available through Office of the Manager National Communications System Customer Service Division Mail Stop # 8510 245 Murray Lane Building 410 Washington DC 20528 703 235-5525 www ncs gov nstac nstac html nstac1@dhs gov v Ac velssues The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Next Generation Networks Investigation Group Period of Activity Network Group April 1997 – September 1999 Convergence Task Force June 2000 – June 2001 Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force June 2001 – March 2002 Next Generation Networks Task Force May 2004 – May 2006 Issue Background For several years global communications networks have functioned in a period of transition as customer demands and business imperatives catalyzed the convergence of traditional circuit switched networks with broadband packet-based Internet Protocol IP networks to create the telecommunications industry’s next generation network NGN Although the complete evolution to the NGN is expected to take many years this evolving network infrastructure which includes wireless wireline and IP technologies will alter the way governments and private industry meet their national security and emergency preparedness NS EP communications needs In fact the emergence of the NGN has already effected change in a profound way Many network service providers have already developed the capability to carry voice video text and data transparently to numerous categories of end-user devices a key characteristic of the NGN Mobile phones able to access an array of Web-based services represent only one example of this enhanced ability The scale scope and character of the NGN will fundamentally change the way governments and service providers plan for prioritize and ultimately deliver NS EP communications NGN networks NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES which are largely packet-switched networks differ greatly from legacy circuit-switched networks For example packet-switched environments place control capabilities at the network “edge” and rely heavily on intelligent devices to execute key functions In this new environment NS EP and critical business communications will be subject to an increased number of cyber threats based on inherent vulnerabilities and interdependencies known or expected to exist in the NGN With these changes network operators infrastructure custodians and NS EP users must determine how best to meet NS EP user requirements on the NGN The transition to the NGN also presents challenges for ensuring the security and availability of NS EP communications In addition to the vulnerabilities that arise due to the packet-switched nature of the NGN some vulnerabilities that already existed in legacy networks will persist or worsen in the NGN For example the enhanced interconnectedness of the NGN can be exploited by hackers to provide rapid and far-reaching propagation of malicious payload attacks Another vulnerability is the emulation of network control messages Unlike legacy networks which used separate paths to divide network control messages from normal network payload NGN architectures have network control messages co-existing with normal payload traffic providing more open access to hackers to interfere with these messages These and other vulnerabilities create complex risk scenarios for NS EP communications in an NGN environment which also depends on other infrastructures such as the electric power industry A further challenge is the global nature of the NGN and thus methods for managing incidents of national significance may require international cooperation To ensure NS EP functions remain a priority in the transition to the NGN these concerns must be addressed At the same time the NGN will offer significant improvements for the delivery of NS EP communications capabilities as bandwidth and software continue to improve New communications capabilities including greater access to data and 3 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review new services will better support NS EP functions in critical ways enabling first responders for example to obtain real-time access to voice data and video necessary for the most effective completion of their jobs The NGN will also naturally increase network robustness and resiliency by the nature of its mesh architecture offering many possible paths for service and redundancy of equipment and servers To achieve the benefits of such new capabilities and greater resiliency and to speed and enhance the transition to NGN solutions must be found that address NS EP functional requirements especially for security and availability Doing so requires forward-looking action by industry and Government The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee networks supporting the financial services sector to physical disruptions Building on this prior work the NSTAC Principals agreed at the NSTAC XXVII Meeting to engage subject matter experts SME in an examination of NS EP requirements and emerging threats on the NGN Accordingly the Principals established the Next Generations Network Task Force NGNTF and tasked it with developing u A high-level description of the NGN’s expected network environment or ecosystem and its interdependencies on which NS EP applications will rely u NS EP user requirements for the NGN including how to meet these user requirements both in a mature NGN and in the transition phase how to provision end-to-end services and how the interfaces and accountability among network participants and network layers will work u Relevant user scenarios and expected cyber threats including recommendations on optimal strategies to meet NS EP user requirements and u International concerns including both NS EP functions that must be provisioned internationally and international threats to the NGN History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC has an extensive history of examining the NS EP implications of the transition of the Nation’s telecommunications networks to the NGN environment and providing the President with forward looking and innovative recommendations In its Internet Report Examination of the National Security and Emergency Preparedness Implications of Internet Technologies Report published in June 1999 the NSTAC examined three key transition factors—the extent to which NS EP operations depend on the Internet the network control element vulnerabilities associated with the Internet and their ability to cause a severe disruption of Internet service and how Internet reliability availability and service priority issues applied to NS EP operations In its June 2001 Convergence Task Force Report the NSTAC furthered its network transition-related work to specifically analyze the potential security and reliability vulnerabilities associated with converged networks Its Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report released in March 2002 addressed public network policy and technical issues related to network disruptions the security and vulnerability of the converged network control space and needed countermeasures to mitigate against these vulnerabilities Issues presented by convergence also arose during the Committee’s examination of the resiliency of 4 As an initial step the NGNTF assembled a group of SMEs and government stakeholders in August 2004 to determine how best to meet the task’s significant objectives As a result of the meeting the group identified five fundamental areas of examination 1 NGN description 2 NGN service scenarios and user requirements 3 end-to-end services provisioning 4 NGN threats and vulnerabilities and 5 incident management on the NGN In response to government stakeholder questions during the meeting the NGNTF agreed to undertake a quick turn around report on the near term actions that could be undertaken to reduce the impact of network transition issues on NS EP communications and to identify areas where immediate government involvement was needed NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to foster activities in areas such as NGN standards and systems development activities that may be proceeding without consideration of NS EP needs Based on the near-term analysis conducted by the NGNTF the Committee offered the following recommendations to the President in March 2005 u u Use existing and appropriate cross-Government coordination mechanisms to track and coordinate cross-agency NGN activities and investment Explore the use of Government civilian and Department of Defense DOD networks as alternatives for critical NS EP communications during times of national crisis u Use and test existing and leading-edge technologies and commercial capabilities to support NS EP user requirements for security and availability u Support the development and use of identity management mechanisms including strong authentication u Study and support industry efforts in areas that present the greatest NS EP risks during the period of convergence including gateways control systems and first responder communications systems u Review the value of satellite systems as a broad alternative transmission channel for NS EP communications u Participate more broadly and actively in the NGN standards process in partnership with the private sector in the following areas web services directory services data security network security management and control systems and u Focus on developing cohesive domestic and international NS EP communications policy and conduct inter-governmental discussions on NS EP communications The NGNTF then turned its attention to the longerterm taskings leveraging significant involvement from industry and government SMEs involved in the day-to-day transition of the NGN and creating working groups to address each issue area Ultimately the NSTAC based upon the work of the NGNTF agreed upon nine recommendations the implementation of which they believed would support the ability of the NGN to meet NS EP functional requirements while also providing greater capabilities to NS EP users The NSTAC Principals approved the following recommendations to the President in March 2006 u Identity Management Direct the Office of Management and Budget OMB the Department of Commerce DOC and the Department of Homeland Security DHS to work with the private sector in partnership to build a federated interoperable survivable and effective identity management framework for the NGN that 1 includes a common assurance taxonomy that addresses NS EP requirements and is usable in both the Government and commercial domains 2 minimizes identity “silos” identity stores containing usernames and passwords that is not or cannot be used by another applications allows federation between the Government and commercial domains and supports use of Government issued credentials for identification on the NGN 3 meets other NS EP requirements including priority access to NS EP communications services 4 supports broad use of commercial technology along with existing and emerging protocols and standards and 5 includes explicit protections for privacy u Coordination on Common Operational Criteria for NGN NS EP End-to-End Services Direct the Office of Science and Technology OSTP with support from the collective National Communications System NCS agencies to establish a Common Operational Criteria development framework to meet NS EP user requirements on the NGN This would be a joint industry-Government initiative to ensure NS EP communications capabilities in 5 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review the NGN environment and would include the creation of a regular NGN summit with annual reporting that would enable telecommunication information technology IT industry sector and Government stakeholders to 1 develop and coordinate common NGN planning activities 2 measure progress of NGN-related efforts and 3 recommend and monitor programs that would foster NS EP capabilities within the NGN including initiatives concerning The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee incentives and research supporting the development and use of 1 technology lifecycle assurance mechanisms and 2 innovative trusted technologies that reduce the presence of intrinsic vulnerabilities u Resilient Alternate Communications Direct OMB and DHS in accordance with their respective authorities to ensure that Federal agencies are developing investing in and maintaining resilient alternate communications for the NGN environment Specifically DHS and OMB should require that NS EP communicators including incident managers and emergency responders plan for communications resiliency especially by examining alternative or substitute access methods to the NGN to address specific threat scenarios which methods can augment and possibly replace at least temporarily damaged or diminished access to the communications infrastructure u Agreements Standards Policy and Regulations Direct DHS the Department of State and DOC including NIST and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to engage actively with and coordinate among appropriate domestic and international entities to ensure that the relevant policy frameworks support NGN NS EP capabilities These policy frameworks are established through Agreements Standards Policies and Regulations ASPR As part of the Common Operational Criteria development framework these agencies should continuously monitor the entire lifecycle of ASPR associated with ensuring NS EP capabilities to identify and act on opportunities to enhance ASPR address their vulnerabilities and eliminate potential impediments to providing NS EP capabilities in a globally-distributed NGN environment u Incident Management on the NGN Direct DHS to establish an inclusive and effective NGN incident response capability that includes a Joint Coordination Center incorporating and modeled on the National Coordinating Center NCC for all key sectors but particularly both the • A priority regime for both encrypted and unencrypted packets supported by a set of standards specifying how that priority is to be translated end-to-end among the different networks connected to the NGN consistent with a user’s NS EP authorization and required class of service and • NGN designs that respond to NS EP requirements including supporting a mixed protocol operational environment during the transition into IP version 6 peer-to-peer networks and systems for independence from centralized infrastructure meshed networks for resiliency and deployability and IP Security for authentication and confidentiality u Research and Development R D In support of the prior recommendation direct OSTP with support from other relevant agencies especially the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST and DOD to establish and prioritize within the Federal Government initiatives that will foster collaborative and coordinated R D supporting the Common Operational Criteria and accelerate demonstrations of critical NGN NS EP-supporting capabilities or technology among NGN telecommunication IT and service providers u Technology Lifecycle Assurance and Trusted Technology Direct OMB OSTP DOD DHS and DOC to drive comprehensive change in the security of NS EP information and communications technology through policy 6 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Communications and IT Sectors and supporting mechanisms such as a training academy and a collaboratively developed broadly participatory and regularly evaluated exercise program This capability should be enhanced by an appropriate R D program u u International Policy Direct departments and agencies to develop cohesive domestic and international NS EP communications policy consistent with the recommendations in this report in particular 1 developing intergovernmental cooperative mechanisms to harmonize NS EP policy regimes in participating countries consistent with the recommendations in this report 2 establishing the rules of engagement for non-United States U S companies in NS EP incident response in the U S and 3 addressing how information sharing and response mechanisms should operate in the international NGN environment First Responders Direct DHS and other appropriate Government agencies to assist first responders and public safety organizations in making the transition to the NGN which will provide them with greater capabilities but will also be a challenge to achieve given their limited resources and legacy systems Next Generation Networks Task Force Report Near Term Recommendations March 2005 Next Generation Networks Task Force Report March 2006 Next Generation Networks Task Force Membership Microsoft Corporation Mr Philip Reitinger Chair BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron Vice Chair AT T Inc Ms Rosemary Leffler Bank of America Corporation Mr Roger Callahan BellSouth Corporation Ms Cristin Flynn Goodwin The Boeing Company Mr Robert Steele Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Brian Daly For further detail on the efforts of the NSTAC related to NGN networks please see the Network Convergence section in the Previously Addressed section of this NSTAC Issue Review Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Guy Copeland Reports Issued Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Karl Rauscher Network Group Internet Report An Examination of the NS EP Implications of Internet Technologies June 1999 Lockheed Martin Corporation Dr Allen Dayton Motorola Inc Mr Michael Alagna Convergence Task Force Report June 2001 Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report March 2002 Nortel Dr John S Edwards 7 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Northrop Grumman Corporation Mr Dennis McCallam Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Jon Lofstedt Raytheon Company Mr Frank Newell Science Applications International Corporation Mr Henry Kluepfel Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr John Stogoski Telcordia Technologies Inc Ms Louise Tucker Unisys Corporation Mr J Michael Gibbons United States Telecom Association Mr Thomas Soroka VeriSign Inc Mr Michael Aisenberg Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean Other Next Generation Networks Task Force Industry Participants ATIS Mr Timothy Jeffries BellSouth Corporation Mr Bryan Garrett Ms Pamela Gurule Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Brian Daly Mr Peter Musgrove Mr DeWayne Sennett 8 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Cisco Systems Inc Ms Robin Roberts Mr Chip Sharp COMTek Communications Technologies Inc Mr Lew Morrison Cox Communications Inc Mr Mark Adams Mr Larry Dexter Mr Craig Howell Mr Scott Smith George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund Global Crossing Mr David Cooper Hewlett-Packard Company Mr Joseph Connor Mr Stephen Squires Intel Corporation Mr Ryan Ware Juniper Networks Inc Mr Ron Bonica Lockheed Martin Corporation Dr Kate Cherry Mr Joseph Cramer Mr Chris Nolan Lucent Technologies Mr Tom Anderson Ms Cheryl Blum Mr Glenn Evans Mr Brenton Greene Mr Robert Thornberry Dr Zhibi Wang NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Stuart Goldman Mr Eric Grosse Dr Alan Jeffrey Mr Rick Krock Mr Theodore Lach Dr Anil Macwan Mr James Runyon Mr David Shinberg Mr Rao Vasireddy Microsoft Corporation Mr Khaja Ahmed Mr Jerry Cochran Mr Shawn Hernan Mr Ted Tanner Mr Paul Nicholas Mr Henry Sanders Mr Sanjay Kaniyar Motorola Inc Mr Michael Berta Mr Tom Gaynor Mr James Goldstein Mr Don Dautel Mr Benjamin LaPointe Mr Chip Wood Pennsylvania State University Dr Thomas La Porta PriceWaterhouseCoopers Mr James Craft Raytheon Company Mr Sean Anderson Rutgers University Dr Michael Tortorella Spectrasite Mr Ted Abrams Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Chase Cotton Ms Allison Growney Mr Keecheon Kim Telcordia Technologies Inc Mr Arun Handa Mr Robert Lesnewich Telecommunication Industry Association Mr David Thompson United Telecommunications Council Ms Prudence Parks University of California at Berkeley Dr Shannon Lake VeriSign Inc Mr Anthony Rutkowski Verizon Communications Inc Mr Timothy Beaird Mr Bruce Fleming Mr Stuart Jacobs Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Curtis Ashton 9 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Next Generation Networks Task Force Government Participants Department of Defense Mr Scott Swartz Department of Homeland Security Mr Daniel Ahr Mr Gary Amato Mr Steve Carty Mr David Delaney Mr Thomas Falvey Mr Alan Gallagher Ms Mai Tai Galloway Mr John Graves Mr Rick Lichtenfels Mr Thad Odderstol Ms DeJuan Price Ms Carol-Lyn Taylor Capt Eric Koenig Mr Dan Zink Federal Reserve Board Mr Chuck Madine General Services Administration Mr Doug Covert 10 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee National Coordinating Center Investigation Group Period of Activity National Coordinating Mechanism Task Force December 14 1982 – November 15 1984 Telecommunications System Survivability Task Force March 6 1986 – June 8 1989 participation in the Government’s efforts to ensure the security of the Nation’s infrastructures After studying the directive the NSTAC recommended the NCC be designated the Telecommunications Information Sharing and Analysis Center ISAC as the NCC had already been performing similar functions in preparation for the Year 2000 rollover efforts National Coordinating Center Task Force December 14 2004 – Present The NCC played a key role in maintaining and reestablishing NS EP communications during and after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 In March 2003 the NCC became part of the DHS as a result of the transfer of the NCS from the DOD Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD 7 Critical Infrastructure Identification Prioritization and Protection issued in December 2003 succeeded PDD-63 and established a new national policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize U S critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks As DHS continues to grow and evolve the NCC must also periodically reconsider its structure organization and approach to keep pace with rapid legal and regulatory changes Issue Background In 2006 the NCC finds itself with three distinct missions National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications Vision Task Force October 15 1996 – April 22 1997 Operations Support Group April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force September 23 1999 – May 16 2000 Following the divestiture of the AT T monopoly in 1982 the telecommunications industry and the Federal Government collectively developed the concept of a national coordinating mechanism NCM by which the public and private sectors could coordinate NS EP telecommunications efforts A year later the NSTAC recommended the creation of the NCC as the operational arm for the NCM Consequently in 1984 President Ronald Reagan established the NCC within the NCS via Executive Order 12382 Since that time threats to the NS EP telecommunications infrastructure have changed significantly heightening the importance of daily coordination between industry and Government In May 1998 the President released Presidential Decision Directive PDD 63 Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures a critical infrastructure protection CIP directive calling for among other things industry u Serving the White House and NCS Member Agencies through its NS EP mission u Serving DHS through its CIP mission and u Fulfilling information sharing requirements through its information sharing and analysis function History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The NSTAC has emphasized the importance of industry Government coordination on NS EP telecommunications since its inception over two decades ago In its first report to the President in May 1983 the NSTAC recommended the development of the NCC—the operational arm for the NCM approved by Government a year earlier to assist industry and Government in coordinating NS EP telecommunications services in times of emergency 11 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review In 1984 the NSTAC followed this first report with its National Coordinating Mechanism Implementation Plan to assist the Government in determining how best to execute the coordinating mechanism Since that time the NSTAC has periodically revisited the NCC both conceptually and operationally to evaluate its mission information sharing procedures and overall effectiveness as changes occurred in the threat policy and technological environments facing the telecommunications industry For instance in 1987 the Committee’s Telecommunications Systems Survivability TSS Task Force reviewed Government actions taken on the NCM recommendations and determined that the recommendations were carried out effectively Furthermore the task force determined that NCS member organizations’ representation in the NCC should continue In its The NCC Intrusion Incident Reporting Criteria and Format Guidelines the NCC Vision Task Force established standardized reporting criteria and outlined steps to improve NCC electronic intrusion report collection processing and distribution In 1997 the Operations Support Group OSG worked closely with the NCS member organizations and NCC industry representatives to develop a common framework for assessing the Center’s ongoing role in NS EP telecommunications In its Operations Support Group Report the NSTAC recommended that the President establish a mechanism within the Federal Government with which the NCC could coordinate on intrusion incident information issues and with which NSTAC groups could coordinate the development of standardized reporting criteria In 1999 the Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection IS CIP Task Force investigated potential recommendations to be made in support of the goals outlined in PDD-63 As a result the NSTAC issued numerous recommendations to the President including the development of mechanisms and processes for conducting protected operational information sharing the designation of the NCC as the telecommunications ISAC the necessary continued interaction with Government leaders 12 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee responsible for PDD-63 implementation and the expansion of participation in the telecommunication ISAC during subsequent phases to include a broader spectrum of IT and communications industry companies As a result the Federal Government officially established the NCC as the Telecommunications ISAC in January 2000 Following the October 21 2004 NSTAC Principals’ Conference Call the Committee established the National Coordinating Center Task Force NCCTF to examine how best to balance both traditional network and cyber concerns and the changing national security environment to include homeland security concerns within the NCC moving forward Specifically the Principals requested that the task force examine the future mission and role of the NCC including u How should the industry members of the NCC continue to partner with Government u How should the NCC be structured relative to the dual missions of CIP and NS EP u How does the new DHS Sector Coordinating Council SCC approach affect the NCC Throughout 2005 and early 2006 the NCCTF deliberated on numerous issues focusing its discussions on the NCC’s organizational structure information sharing and analysis leadership incident management and response and international mutual aid To gain additional insight into incident management and information sharing practices in particular the task force co-hosted an all-day incident management subject matter experts meeting with the NGNTF on August 30 2005 The task force also internalized lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina response and recovery efforts including those derived by the White House on improved industry and Government coordination in its The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report Of particular interest and concern to the task force following Hurricane Katrina were questions related to the role of the NCC and the NCS in NS EP NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee telecommunications planning and incident response as entities within the new DHS and command and control issues associated with Emergency Support Function ESF #2—Communications support agencies The task force determined that better delineation of roles and responsibilities especially with regard to data reporting and the prioritization and escalation of requests would improve incident response and establish clearer points of contact to address issues reduce duplication of effort and improve focus on fulfilling missions u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage the private sector in critical infrastructure protection activities by increasing the flow of threat information to the private sector facilitating private sector participation in impact analyses and clarifying policies for the protection of private sector information u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve the ESF#2 Emergency Response Training and Exercise program with a focus on enhancing coordination among industry members and Federal State and local responders during incidents of national significance This program should focus on sector interdependencies for both physical and cyber threats and would aim to produce actionable results Industry must be involved from the earliest planning stages u Encourage the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve the Federal Government’s cyber response strategy to delineate roles and responsibilities of Government and the private sector in the National Response Plan NRP aligning communications and cyber operations centers and enhancing relationships with international computer emergency readiness teams u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security and other Government stakeholders to examine the value derived from the NCC collaboration and if sufficiently supported commit the resources necessary to strengthen and support the organization and its mission Based on the NCCTF’s analysis of issues facing the NCC the NSTAC recommended that the President u u u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security the Director of the OSTP the Secretary of Defense and other ESF#2 Federal support agencies to develop and implement policies and procedures with respect to 1 managing and escalating requests from the NCC and 2 the delineation of authorities and responsibilities when ESF#2 is invoked Direct the OSTP and the Homeland Security Council to join with the Communications SCC and the IT-SCC to support an industry-led task force with the primary goal of planning a regional communications and IT coordinating capability in the Gulf Coast and Southeastern regions prior to the 2006 hurricane season Subsequently the task force will determine the best approach for a long-term regional communications and IT coordinating capability that can serve all regions of the Nation The task force should primarily be made up of industry representatives as well as Federal State and local Government representatives Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to expand the NCC to include both communications and IT companies and organizations The NCC would be a cross sector industry Government facility with a round-the-clock watch and would be brought up to full strength during emergencies To further these recommendations the NCCTF developed an action item roadmap to assist the NCC in its efforts to address new issues and challenges over the next five years For more information regarding the NCC’s development please see the National Coordinating Mechanism Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Industry Government Information Sharing and Response sections in the Previously Addressed Issues section of this NSTAC Issue Review 13 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Reports Issued The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Kent Bowen National Coordinating Mechanism Task Force Report May 1983 National Coordinating Mechanism Implementation Plan Final Report January 1984 Telecommunications Systems Survivability Review of Government Actions in Response to NSTAC-Recommended Initiatives June 1988 Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Guy Copeland CTIA—The Wireless Association Mr Christopher Guttman-McCabe Lockheed Martin Corporation Dr Allen Dayton Operations Support Group Report December 1997 Information Assurance Policy Subgroup of the Information Infrastructure Group and the National Coordinating Mechanism Subgroup of the Operations Support Group Joint Report Information Assurance December 1997 Operations Support Group Report September 1998 Operations Support Group Report June 1999 Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report May 2000 NSTAC Report to the President on the National Coordinating Center May 2006 Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Richard Krock Microsoft Corporation Mr Philip Reitinger Nortel Dr John S Edwards Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Thomas Snee Raytheon Company Mr Frank Newell Science Applications International Corporation Mr Henry Kluepfel National Coordinating Center Task Force Membership The Boeing Company Mr Robert Steele Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean Chair United States Telecom Association Mr David Kanupke Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr John Stogoski Vice Chair VeriSign Inc Mr Michael Aisenberg AT T Inc Ms Rosemary Leffler Mr Harry Underhill Verizon Communications Inc Mr Roger Higgins BellSouth Corporation Ms Cristin Flynn Goodwin 14 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Other National Coordinating Center Task Force Industry Participants BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron Cingular Wireless LLC Mr James Bugel Microsoft Corporation Mr Paul Nicholas Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Jon Lofstedt Sprint Nextel Corporation Ms Allison Growney Telecommunications Industry Association Mr Daniel Bart Mr David Thompson George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund Department of Homeland Security Mr Thomas Falvey Mr Jeffrey Glick Mr Charles Lancaster Mr Michael Lombard Mr John O’Connor Mr Don Smith Ms Christina Watson CAPT Thomas Wetherald Federal Reserve Board Mr Charles Madine General Services Administration Mr John Migliaccio Mr Thomas Sellers Office of Management and Budget Ms Kim Johnson Office of Science and Technology Policy Ms Linda Haller Sloan Mr Mark LeBlanc Verizon Communications Inc Ms Ernie Gormsen National Coordinating Center Task Force Government Participants Department of Defense Ms Hillary Morgan Department of Energy Mr John Greenhill 15 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES Telecommunications and Electric Power Infrastructure Interdependencies the necessary power In this environment the telecommunications and electric power sectors will increasingly be required to work together to ensure NS EP services remain available to respond to terrorist incidents or natural disasters Investigation Group Period of Activity History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Electromagnetic Pulse Task Force September 27 1983 – October 9 1985 Telecommunications System Survivability Task Force March 6 1986 – June 8 1989 Energy Task Force August 31 1988 – March 29 1990 Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force January 15 2005 – Present Issue Background For decades professionals in the telecommunications industry have been concerned with the potential impact a sustained power grid outage would have on the telecommunications network Recent events including the power outage in Eastern Canada in January 1998 the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 the Northeast blackout in August 2003 and the devastating hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005 continued to draw attention to the interdependencies between the two sectors and re-energized industry and Government efforts to find strategies to both dampen the impact of and mitigate against further occurrences In addition to man-made and natural threats to the infrastructure changing trends in telecommunications network design also raise questions about the continued reliance of the telecommunications sector on electric power sources With the growth of the NGN the attendant increase in the use of wireless and mobile technologies and the dispersion of network elements the network and its users will increasingly rely on commercial electric service to supply NSTAC consideration of the interdependencies between the telecommunications and electric power sectors began in 1983 with the Committee’s response to a Government request for industry’s perspective on the options available to industry and Government for improving the electromagnetic pulse EMP survivability of the Nation’s telecommunications networks Based on the analysis conducted by its EMP Task Force the Committee provided several recommendations to the President on the issue in its Electromagnetic Pulse Final Task Force Report The NSTAC gave further consideration to the interdependency between the telecommunications and electric power sectors when it reviewed the vulnerability of the telecommunications network to the loss of commercial electric power and presented its finding in its Telecommunications Systems Survivability Electric Power Survivability Status Report As a follow-up to its vulnerability analysis the Committee established the Energy Task Force which it charged with analyzing solutions to mitigate against the effects of electric power outages on telecommunications In 1988 the Energy Task Force with participation from the Department of Energy DOE the NCS and the North American Electric Reliability Council NERC undertook its activities examining interdependencies between the two sectors after a major earthquake In October 1991 the NSTAC established a follow-on Energy Task Force and charged it to support the OMNCS in its efforts with DOE to develop criteria and a process for identifying critical industry NS EP telecommunications facilities that qualify for electric power restoration and priority fuel distribution Based on the task forces analysis the NSTAC issued its recommendations to the President on the issue in its Energy Task Force Final Report in 1993 17 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Interdependency issues arose again as a result of extensive power and telecommunications outages during the hurricane season of 2004 in the southeast region of the U S Mr F Duane Ackerman Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of BellSouth and NSTAC Chair highlighted his concerns about the situation in his speech at the Research and Development Task Force’s October 2004 Research and Development Exchange RDX Workshop in Monterey California Due to the dependence of the telecommunications network on electric power services Mr Ackerman noted the need for enhanced and alternative emergency power technologies In addition as the network becomes increasingly distributed he noted that issues of reliability and ease of communication and coordination between the telecommunications and electric power industries will become increasingly important during natural disasters or terrorist incidents As a result in 2005 the NSTAC established the Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force TEPITF to further evaluate how the telecommunications and electric power sector interdependencies will affect the future of the telecommunications network The task force subsequently divided the work into two streams—an examination of the people and processes involved in national security communications and restoration and an evaluation of the technological implications of future events Based on the completion of the first work stream the NSTAC issued its People and Processes Current State of Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependencies Report in January 2006 In the report the NSTAC recommended that the President direct his departments and agencies to u 18 Define and establish the term Emergency Responder within the NRP and other appropriate plans guidance directives and statutes including other local State and Federal Government emergency plans The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Ensure key response personnel of critical infrastructure owners and operators in the telecommunications and electric power sectors be designated as Emergency Responders u Include fuel supply security site access and other required logistical support to critical telecommunications and electric power infrastructures as part of the Emergency Responder planning process to ensure priority restoration to critical telecommunications and electric power u Foster and promote effective emergency coordination structures to ensure reliable and robust communication between the two sectors and local regional State and Federal Governments • Review examples of proven priority restoration models at the State and regional levels Encourage States and metropolitan regions without effective models to improve and update their existing frameworks and • Encourage effective information sharing models at the local regional Emergency Responder level both in advance of a natural disaster and during the emergency restoration period When developing these models liability issues should be considered The task force will continue exploring long-term interdependency issues specifically developing a working definition for a long-term outage LTO and reviewing the possible implications of an LTO The task force’s conclusions will form the basis for the Committee’s final report and recommendations that will be submitted to the President in the fall of 2006 For further information on telecommunications and electric power interdependencies please see the Infrastructure Interdependencies section in the Previously Addressed Issues section of this NSTAC Issue Review NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In response to the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina Rita and Wilma the FCC established the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks In its final report the Panel expressed support for the NSTAC’s recommendation to establish a national standard for credentialing telecommunications repair workers as well as its recommendation to designate telecommunications infrastructure providers as “emergency responders” under the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act the NRP and other legislative documents as appropriate In addition the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting comments from industry on the recommendations found within its final panel report including those recommendations made by the Committee In addition in July 2006 Mr Robert Stephan confirmed to the NSTAC that DHS officials had been working closely with Congress to ensure that the Committee’s emergency responder provisions would be sufficiently addressed in future legislation to be formally introduced by the Senate Furthermore the DHS developed in partnership with Federal State and local Government entities as well as a private sector company an access standard operating procedure SOP to ensure that private critical infrastructure responders receive priority access to disaster areas The State of Georgia adopted the access SOP which is also currently being used as an example for other States Reports Issued Electromagnetic Pulse Task Force Status Report January 1984 Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force Membership Nortel Dr John S Edwards Chair AT T Inc Ms Rosemary Leffler Bank of America Corporation Mr Roger Callahan BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Guy Copeland Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Richard Krock Lucent Technologies Mr Karl Rauscher Microsoft Corporation Mr Philip Reitinger Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Jon Lofstedt Raytheon Company Mr Frank Newell Science Applications International Corporation Mr Henry Kluepfel Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr William Hitchcock Electromagnetic Pulse Final Task Force Report July 1985 Telecommunications Systems Survivability Electric Power Survivability Status Report Energy Task Force Final Report August 1988 United States Telecom Association Mr David Kanupke Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean People and Processes Current State of Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependencies January 2006 19 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Other Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force Industry Participants New York Independent System Operator Ms Bonnie Bushnell AT T Inc Mr Harry Underhill North American Electric Reliability Council Mr Stanley Johnson American Public Power Association Mr Michael Hyland Mr Louis Leffler BellSouth Corporation Mr Shawn Cochran Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Kent Bowen PEPCO Holding Inc Mr Richard Kafka Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Ms Patricia Davies Ms Joan Edgan Edison Electric Institute Mr Larry Brown Electric Power Research Institute Mr Thomas Kropp Environmental Energy Inc Mr Mark Razeghi George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund Independent Electricity System Operator Mr Stuart Brindley Industry Canada Mr John Kluver Mr Robert Laforest Mr Robert Leafloor Institute for Defense Analysis Mr Gordy Boezer Microsoft Corporation Ms Lynn Terwoerds MITRE Dr Edward Jacques National Rural Electric Cooperative Association Mr Barry Lawson 20 Public Service Enterprise Group Ms Frances McCormick Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Thomas Snee Southern Company Mr Rusty Williams Sprint Nextel Corporation Ms Allison Growney Mr John Quigley Texas Utilities Mr William Muston United States Telecom Association Mr Murray Liebman United Telecom Council Ms Jill Lyon Ms Prudence Parks Verizon Communications Inc Mr Roger Higgins Mr Charles Romano The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force Government Participants Department of Energy Mr John Greenhill Mr Henry Kenchington Department of Homeland Security Ms Michele Bruich Mr David Delaney Lt Col Cheryl Edwards Mr Gilberto Frederick Ms Carolyn King Mr Gabriel Martinez Mr Chatry Perry Lt Col Joanne Sechrest Capt Thomas Wetherald 21 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Emergency Communications and Interoperability Investigation Group Period of Activity Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force February 2006 – Present Issue Background Over the course of three months in the summer of 2005 the U S witnessed the catastrophic destruction of the Gulf Coast region’s telecommunications infrastructure as a result of Hurricanes Katrina Rita and Wilma The unprecedented communications challenges posed by these hurricanes highlighted the fact that the existing components that comprise the communications infrastructure still lack sufficient levels of operability and interoperability when utilized by the multiple public and private response and recovery organizations they support during emergency communications situations Hurricane Katrina alone impacted an area approximately 90 000 square miles wide disrupted service to approximately 3 million phone lines and disabled first responder communications in multiple parishes The lack of access prioritization to commercial networks for first responders crippled restoration efforts As a result the initial lessons learned from these events highlight the importance of ensuring that Government continues to leverage the full suite of communications capabilities in its efforts to protect and ensure NS EP telecommunications in the future History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations In response to concerns regarding the sufficient operability and interoperability of emergency communications systems during the 2005 hurricane season the NSTAC established the Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force ECITF to develop recommendations regarding short-term interoperability solutions for responders in advance of the 2006 hurricane season In addition the Committee requested that the task force investigate how a complete suite of communications technologies including wireline terrestrial wireless broadcast and satellite communications should be integrated into the Federal Government’s emergency communications planning and how they can more effectively support NS EP activities and to identify rapidly deployable interoperability solutions and recommend a strategic direction for the future that can assure a more survivable and interoperable nationwide communications architecture for responders Based on the ECITF’s initial analysis the NSTAC provided short-term recommendations in its March 2006 Letter to the President on Emergency Communications and Interoperability which outlines emergency communications and interoperability issues and identifies immediately applicable actions to improve responder communications capabilities Specifically the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the DHS to u Establish a uniform protocol working with Federal State and local Governments that can dynamically identify their emergency management coordinators’ contact information especially during times when regular contact information is changed due to event situations and a capability to share that information with DHS u Accelerate efforts to create an initial deployable communications capability for the Gulf Coast region in accordance with Recommendation #37 of the February 2006 report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Lessons Learned Report u Formally integrate the NCS’ NS EP priority programs into the National Emergency Communications Strategy pursuant to Recommendation #34 of the Lessons Learned Report Additionally the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to work in conjunction with the FCC to streamline the 23 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review authorization process for use of Federal incident response frequencies by the larger non-Federal Government emergency response community The task force will continue to explore these issues as well as the need to develop recommendations on how to educate Federal Government departments and agencies State and local Governments first responders and emergency responders on technologies currently available to meet their NS EP communications needs into the next cycle Its conclusions will form the basis for a final report and recommendations that will be submitted by the NSTAC to the President in the fall of 2006 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force Membership Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Jim Bugel Co-Chair Motorola Inc Mr Michael Alagna Co-Chair AT T Inc Ms Rosemary Leffler Mr Harry Underhill Bank of America Corporation Mr Roger Callahan Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations As a result of the devastation caused during the 2006 hurricane season and informed by the NSTAC’s associated recommendations the DHS through the NCS has undertaken several actions to ensure successful emergency communications for future emergencies The activities include the establishment of protocols for contacting and communicating with State and local officials which is also intended to assist in the identification of emergency management and coordinators’ contact information coordination of the creation of a deployable communications package to provide reliable communications to emergency responders at all levels of Government in a disaster-inflicted region integration of NCS priority services programs and other relevant recommendations into the Interim National Emergency Communications Strategy mandated by the White House’s The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report and the development of an emergency communications asset tracking database to aggregate information on those public and private tools to be leveraged during disaster recovery operations BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron In addition the NCS drafted an ESF #2 Operations Plan which addresses deployable communications capabilities in support of incident response specifically deployment of ESF#2 assets and capabilities to designated mobilizations centers and staging areas Science Applications International Corporation Mr Hank Kluepfel 24 The Boeing Company Mr Robert Steele Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Raymond Lehr Intelsat Mr Kalpak Gude Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr Allen Dayton Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Brent Greene Microsoft Corporation Mr Philip Reitinger Nortel Dr Jack Edwards Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr John Stogoski The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES Telcordia Technologies Ms Louise Tucker VeriSign Inc Mr Michael Aisenberg Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean Other Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force Industry Participants George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr David Wye Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Bernie Malone Microsoft Corporation Mr Paul Nicholas SES Americom Ms Leslie Blaker Telecommunications Industry Association Mr Daniel Bart Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force Government Participants Department of Homeland Security Ms Chris Watson Defense Information Systems Agency Ms Hillary Morgan National Telecommunications and Information Adminstration Mr William Belote Mr Thomas Hardy 25 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u ACTIVE ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Termination of Cellular Networks During Emergency Situations To facilitate more coordinated action the NSTAC recommended that the President direct his departments and agencies to Investigation Group Period of Activity u Work to implement a simple process building upon existing processes with DHS NCS coordination enabling the Government to speak with one voice provide decision makers with relevant information and provide wireless carriers with Governmentauthenticated decisions for implementation and u Achieve rapid implementation through the Homeland Security Advisor of each State in conjunction with the NCS and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination DHS Cellular Service Shutdown Ad Hoc Working Group August 18 2005 – January 31 2006 Issue Background As a direct result of the bombings that took place in the London transportation system in July 2005 U S authorities initiated the shut down of cellular network services in the Lincoln Holland Queens and Brooklyn Battery Tunnels The Federal Government based this precautionary measure on the suspicion that similar attacks might also be perpetrated in the tunnels leading to and from New York City Though the decision was rooted in vital security concerns the resulting situation undertaken without prior notice to wireless carriers or the public created disorder for both Government and the private sector at a time when use of the communications infrastructure was most needed Shortly following these activities the NCC hosted a teleconference to discuss the need to develop a process for determining if and when cellular shutdown activities should be undertaken in the future in light of the serious impact these efforts could have had not only on access by the public to emergency communications services during these situations but also on public trust in the communications infrastructure in general History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations These actions highlighted within the NSTAC community the need for a process to ensure that future similar decisions meet the Nation’s security goals and ensure the protection of critical infrastructures Consequently on August 18 2005 the NSTAC established a Principal-level task force to formulate on an expedited basis recommendations to effect efficient coordinated action between industry and Government in times of national emergency The group concluded its activities upon NSTAC approval of the Letter to the President on Emergency Wireless Protocol and recommendations in January 2006 Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In support of the recommendations the NCS approved SOP 303 “Emergency Wireless Protocols ” on March 9 2006 codifying a shutdown and restoration process for use by commercial and private wireless networks during national crises Under the process the NCC will function as the focal point for coordinating any actions leading up to and following the termination of private wireless network connections both within a localized area such as a tunnel or bridge and within an entire metropolitan area The decision to shutdown service will be made by State Homeland Security Advisors their designees or representatives of the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center Once the request has been made by these entities the NCC will operate as an authenticating body notifying the carriers in the affected area of the decision The NCC will also ask the requestor a series of questions to determine if the shutdown is a necessary action After making the determination that the shutdown is no longer required the NCC will initiate a similar process to reestablish service The NCS continues to work with the Office of State and Local Government Coordination at DHS and the Homeland Security Advisor for each State to initiate the rapid implementation of these procedures 27 ACTIVE ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Report Issued The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC Cellular Shutdown Letter to the President Verizon Wireless Ms Alison Brontmen Mr Michael Hickey Cellular Service Shutdown Protocol Membership Cellular Service Shutdown Protocol Government Participants Cingular Wireless LLC—CTIA Mr Stanley Sigman NCS Multi-Disciplinary Working Group Microsoft Corporation Mr Craig T Mundie Motorola Inc Mr Gregory Q Brown Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Gary D Forsee Verizon Wireless Mr Lawrence T Babbio Jr Other Cellular Service Shutdown Protocol Industry Participants Cingular Wireless LLC Mr James Bugel Mr Kent Brown CTIA Mr Robert Bolster Mr Christopher Guttman-McCabe Microsoft Corporation Mr Phillip Reitinger Motorola Inc Mr Michael Alagna Sprint Nextel Corporation Ms Allison Growney 28 Standing Issues NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Legislation and Regulation u National Services Planning Process u Assessment of Federal Critical Infrastructure Recommendations u Information Sharing u Transition to the Year 2000 Y2K u Wireless Communications u Convergence u Foreign Ownership u Cyber Crime u Potential Policy Conflicts with Homeland Security and NS EP Missions u Open Source Information u Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies SAFETY Act u Defense Production Act DPA and u Legislative Concerns Associated with the 2005 Hurricane Season Investigation Group Period of Activity Funding and Regulatory Working Group December 1982 – December 1994 Legislative and Regulatory Group December 1994 – September 23 1999 Legislative and Regulatory Working Group September 23 1999 – February 14 2001 Legislative and Regulatory Task Force February 15 2001 – Present Issue Background Laws and regulations govern the relationship between the Government and the public and provide the framework under which public and private entities conduct business Thus within the evolving telecommunications environment it is essential that legislative and regulatory policies progress to ensure continued fulfillment of national security and emergency preparedness NS EP requirements It is within this context that the President’s National Security and Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC reviews the legislative and regulatory activities underway within Government that could impact NS EP services operations and communications and considers areas for which there is a need for further legislative and regulatory action History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The investigation of legislative and regulatory issues of consequence to NS EP communications comprise a key focus for the NSTAC Over the course of its existence the committee has examined the implications of numerous important topics including u Telecommunications Act of 1996 Telecom Act u Widespread Telecommunications Outages A description of the NSTAC's activities in each of these areas as well as the evolution of the task force follows Task Force Evolution At its inaugural meeting in December 1982 the NSTAC established the Funding and Regulatory Working Group FRWG to examine funding alternatives and regulatory issues for candidate enhancements to NS EP telecommunications The FRWG remained active to address additional issues of a legislative and regulatory nature until 1994 when the committee decided to stand down the group until further issues arose requiring consideration The NSTAC later amended the name of the FRWG to the Legislative and Regulatory Group LRG that same year per the guidance outlined in the December 1994 Industry Executive Subcommittee Guidelines 31 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review however it did not re-activate the LRG again until January 1997 following the passage of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996 Between 1997 and 2001 the LRG was renamed the Legislative and Regulatory Working Group LRWG and was tasked to serve as an ad hoc group to investigate issues and also to serve as a supplementary body to NSTAC task forces In February 2001 the committee again amended the task force’s name to the Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRTF and formally established it as a standing body of the NSTAC Telecommunications Act of 1996 As the first major overhaul of telecommunications policy since 1934 the Telecom Act redefined competition and regulation in virtually every sector of the communications industry In response to passage of the Telecom Act and the resultant evolving telecommunications environment the NSTAC charged the LRG to examine legislative regulatory and judicial actions that potentially impact NS EP telecommunications placing particular emphasis on monitoring implementation of the Act In addressing this charge the LRG established a framework for analysis and in January 1997 began working closely with industry and Government to develop a common understanding of the NS EP implications of the new law Based on the analysis conducted by the task force the NSTAC found that the Telecom Act did not alter carrier responsibilities for the provision of NS EP services However the committee determined that continued change in the regulatory and industry structure warranted increased educational outreach efforts for new entrants and existing carriers with regard to their mandatory and voluntary obligations Widespread Telecommunications Outages At NSTAC XIX in March 1997 the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology asked the NSTAC to investigate the possibility of a widespread telecommunications outage Subsequently the LRG analyzed the legal and regulatory obstacles that would hinder service restoration during widespread major service outages As a result the NSTAC 32 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee presented its related findings in its December 1997 report discussed during NSTAC XX The NSTAC found the most significant legal and regulatory obstacle to be the apparent uncertainty about who could expeditiously address carriers’ concerns regarding their compliance with relevant laws or regulations during emergency situations To further address this finding the NSTAC charged the LRG to examine options for enhancing communication on NS EP matters among industry the Federal Communications Commission FCC and other relevant Government organizations To that end the LRG investigated the role of the FCC Defense Commissioner investigated the need for an NS EP industry advisory body to the FCC on these issues documented the intergovernmental relationships between the FCC the National Communications System and the Office of Science and Technology Policy with regard to NS EP responsibilities and worked jointly with the NSTAC’s Network Group’s Widespread Outage Subgroup to draft procedural guidelines to help telecommunications carriers resolve issues with the FCC when critical emergency telecommunications services needed to be restored in a timely manner National Services Planning Process In July 1997 the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council NRIC provided the FCC with a series of recommendations aimed at improving the planning process for National Services and deployable telecommunications services intended or required on a national or regional basis The NSTAC agreed that a National Services planning process as conceived by the NRIC could serve as an effective means for promoting NS EP telecommunications requirements Consequently the Committee tasked the LRG to assess what actions the NSTAC should take to ensure that industry and Government consider NS EP requirements during the National Services planning process During discussion at NSTAC XX the Committee reviewed the task force’s findings and recommended that the Industry Executive Subcommittee IES continue to assess The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee the development of the NRIC’s National Services recommendations Following NSTAC XX the LRG established the National Services Subgroup to study the feasibility of defining NS EP telecommunications functions as National Services The subgroup submitted its National Services Subgroup White Paper to NSTAC XXI in September 1998 geared to facilitating public awareness of selected NS EP-critical telecommunications functions and capabilities The white paper also promoted the continued consideration of NS EP telecommunications service objectives by industry and Government during the future deployment of NS EP National Services Assessment of Federal Critical Infrastructure Recommendations In October 1997 the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection PCCIP released its final report and recommendations on protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructures including the telecommunications infrastructure Following NSTAC XX the NSTAC charged the LRG to review the potential legislative and regulatory implications for NS EP telecommunications as a result of the PCCIP’s recommendations To address its charge the LRG conducted a preliminary analysis of Presidential Decision Directive PDD 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection which the President issued on May 22 1998 to support the PCCIP recommendations and to establish a national policy to eliminate vulnerabilities in the Nation’s critical infrastructures Based on the LRG’s findings the Committee requested that the IES undertake a more detailed assessment of the planned implementation of PDD-63 and report back to it regularly on progress made Information Sharing Following NSTAC XXI and in response to information sharing policy outlined in PDD-63 the NSTAC tasked the LRG to identify and assess the legal and regulatory obstacles to sharing outage and intrusion information To that end the LRG determined that identification and discussion of existing and proposed NS EP-related outage and intrusion information NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES sharing mechanisms could provide additional insights to assist the group in assessing critical information sharing issues particularly those associated with the implementation of PDD-63 As a result and to better understand the information sharing environment and the entities involved in the process the NSTAC developed its Telecommunications Outage and Intrusion Information Sharing Report which outlined the entities with whom telecommunications companies shared outage and intrusion information and reviewed potential legal barriers that could ultimately inhibit the information sharing process During NSTAC XXIII the NSTAC through its LRWG again examined information sharing issues this time focusing on the impediments to information exchange especially critical infrastructure information sharing As a result the LRWG undertook an in-depth analysis of The Freedom of Information Act FOIA examining FOIA’s potential to hinder industry information sharing with the Government FOIA permits the public to request and gain access to records that Government departments and agencies maintain the disclosure of which could deter industry from sharing further information with the Government Although there are a number of exemptions to FOIA’s requirements for disclosure of information none of the exemptions clearly covers information pertaining to critical infrastructure protection The LRWG met several times with Department of Justice DOJ officials to exchange views on perceived problems including liability and antitrust concerns and potential legal solutions As a result of the LRWG’s deliberations the NSTAC agreed with DOJ representatives on the need for a nondisclosure provision to protect “security-related” information voluntarily shared with the Government The LRWG shared its analysis with the NSTAC’s Information Sharing-Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force which addressed both the technical and legal and regulatory FOIA issues in its May 2000 Information Sharing-Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report NSTAC furthered its information sharing work during the NSTAC XXIV and XXV cycles During this time the committee requested the LRTF to examine pending FOIA legislation from the 106th and 107th 33 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Congresses and to work with Congressional staff to determine the status and outlook of the legislation In response to the analysis conducted by the LRTF the NSTAC delivered a letter to President Bill Clinton on August 7 2000 requesting his support on legislation that would protect critical infrastructure protection CIP information voluntarily shared with the Government from disclosure under FOIA and limit liability Following the NSTAC XXIV Meeting in June 2001 the NSTAC acknowledged the continued importance of the topic and resubmitted the letter to President George W Bush asking him to support such legislation On September 26 2001 President Bush replied that he supported a narrowly drafted exception to FOIA to protect information about corporations’ and other organizations’ vulnerabilities to information warfare and malicious hacking In a December 17 2001 letter to the President the NSTAC encouraged the President to continue to support information sharing legislation The LRTF continued to examine information sharing in the NSTAC XXVI and NSTAC XXVII cycles as well During these cycles Congress passed the Critical Infrastructure Information CII Act which provided additional FOIA and liability protections for companies that voluntarily share critical infrastructure information with the Department of Homeland Security DHS Following enactment of the CII Act the NSTAC requested the LRTF to assess whether additional information sharing barriers remained and to examine other legal and nonlegal barriers for the purposes of homeland security As a result of the LRTF’s analysis the NSTAC drafted its Barriers to Information Sharing Report in which it made a series of recommendations for improving the exchange of CII between industry and the Government and for protecting voluntary CII that critical infrastructure owners and operators provide to the Government The Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act In 1998 with the nearing arrival of the new century the NSTAC tasked the LRG to examine relevant communications-related Y2K issues particularly the success of the Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act Y2K Act in urging greater information sharing within 34 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee industry In response the LRG sent a letter to the NSTAC’s IES representatives seeking their companies’ comments on the Y2K Act and any additional legislative or regulatory actions that could facilitate Y2K-related information sharing and remediation Per request by the President’s Council on Y2K Conversion the NSTAC forwarded a summary of the Committee’s findings in February 1999 Wireless Communications During NSTAC XXII the NSTAC charged the LRG to identify the barriers to the issuance of wireless telecommunications priority access rules by the FCC and to evaluate NSTAC’s level of continued support of the Cellular Priority Access Services CPAS now referred to as the Wireless Priority Service During the course of the LRG’s examination the group learned that the NCS planned to implement a new approach for providing wireless priority access based on channel reservation causing the NSTAC to conclude its study However during NSTAC XXVI the LRTF again engaged in wireless communications issues when the Wireless Task Force requested assistance from the LRTF in assessing the legal and regulatory aspects of the FCC Report Order R O on Priority Access Service PAS The LRTF reviewed the R O and after carefully considering the merits of reopening the PAS rulemaking the task force concluded that revisiting the rules would be a lengthy process and could unintentionally slow the deployment of Wireless Priority Service WPS As a result of this conclusion the NSTAC sent a letter to the President offering recommendations on how to facilitate the widespread deployment of wireless PAS In the letter the NSTAC commended the FCC for adopting a Second R O for PAS which indicates that carriers providing PAS shall have liability immunity from Section 202 of the Communications Act of 1934 The letter also stated that the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration should accelerate ongoing efforts to improve interoperability among Federal State and local public safety communications agencies The letter further encouraged the Administration to support full and adequate Federal funding for wireless PAS NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Convergence During NSTAC XXII the LRG reviewed convergence issues in light of legislative regulatory and judicial actions that might affect existing and future public networks and potentially impact NS EP telecommunications The LRG’s preliminary analysis of convergence revealed no significant implications for NS EP telecommunications would effectively enhance the role of national security issues in foreign ownership situations at that time The LRWG documented its findings in a working group paper and shared its analysis with the NSTAC’s Globalization Task Force GTF Based on the analysis conducted by the LRWG and the GTF the NSTAC issued its Globalization Task Force Report in May 2000 Cyber Crime During the NSTAC XXV cycle the NSTAC tasked the LRTF to undertake a further analysis of convergence issues examining whether the current legal and regulatory environment was adequate to ensure NS EP services in the converged and NGN environment To accomplish its tasking the LRTF coordinated with participants in the Government’s Convergence Task Force to discuss the status of the Government’s work in the area of network convergence and the assurance of NS EP communications services The LRTF concluded that until the standards for packet-based services were established and the Government’s requirements in the evolving environment were certain new legislation or regulation was premature The task force also stated that the legal issues underlying the provisioning of NS EP priority services to the Federal Government in an NGN environment were extremely complex and might require further study Based on the convergence analysis conducted by the LRTF and the Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force the NSTAC issued its Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report in March 2002 At the request of the NSTAC during cycle XXVI the LRTF examined existing legal penalties for committing Internet attacks to determine whether those penalties should be strengthened or whether additional penalties were needed In its Penalties for Internet Attacks and Cyber Crime Report the NSTAC concluded sufficient legal authority exists to penalize and deter those who commit cyber crimes The NSTAC also made additional recommendations for pursuing a well-rounded and proactive approach to combating cyber crime Potential Policy Conflicts with Homeland Security and NS EP Missions Foreign Ownership During the NSTAC XXVII cycle and in response to an NSTAC request the LRTF reviewed the policy landscape for national policies and regulations that could potentially conflict with homeland security and NS EP missions More specifically the LRTF examined telecommunications policy conflicts related to fuel storage water sector infrastructure critical facilities markings jurisdictional conflicts and common underground facilities The task force determined that policy conflicts existed due to the existence of overlapping and contradictory policies and regulations at the Federal State and local levels During NSTAC XXIII the NSTAC engaged the LRWG to conduct an examination of foreign ownership regulations and their possible impact on NS EP communications The task force examined domestic regulatory history and analyzed several mergers and acquisitions between domestic and foreign telecommunications carriers ultimately finding that the current regulatory structure satisfied the different interests of the industry and Government parties involved The LRWG concluded that it was unclear whether further statutory or regulatory changes In response to the LRTF’s analysis the NSTAC sent a letter to President George W Bush in October 2003 recommending that he ask the Homeland Security Council the National Security Council and Federal departments and executive agencies including independent agencies to undertake several activities These activities included evaluating proposed policies and regulations to ensure that homeland security and NS EP implications have been consolidated completing a review of existing 35 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review policies and regulations for potential cross-sector conflicts with homeland security and NS EP priorities and working with DHS to promptly resolve any identified conflicts and implementing a framework to resolve multijurisdictional Federal State and local conflicts and if necessary recommend an appropriate legislative resolution Open Source Information In response to concerns that terrorists or other motivated adversaries could easily access sensitive information such as the location of critical telecommunications facilities on the Internet and use this information to plan an attack on the Nation’s telecommunications infrastructure the NSTAC tasked the LRTF to undertake an analysis of open source information The LRTF completed its analysis during the NSTAC XXVIII cycle and on April 8 2005 the NSTAC sent a letter to President Bush recommending various activities including the development and adoption of Web publishing and access guidelines by the Federal Government incorporating provisions that protect industry-sensitive critical infrastructure information provided to the Government and the promulgation of web publishing and access guidelines for dealing with sensitive but unclassified critical infrastructure information The LRTF’s work on open source information continued during the NSTAC XXIX Cycle when the NSTAC during the March 10 2005 Principals’ Conference Call requested that the LRTF address the concern of open source information on academic web sites and report back to them about the advisability of scoping this issue After conducting its analysis the LRTF reported back to the Principals that the issue did not require further scoping The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Defense Production Act During NSTAC XXVIII the NSTAC commissioned the LRTF to begin an examination of the NS EP implications of the DPA and the proposed amendments to the Act and to Executive Order E O 12919 National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness During the NSTAC XXIX cycle the task force agreed to continue to monitor potential amendments to the DPA and to E O 12919 to ensure essential NS EP needs are met in any revision to law Legislative Concerns Associated with the 2005 Hurricane Season The 2005 hurricane season defined many of the Committee’s legislative and regulatory priorities during the NSTAC XXIX Cycle The Government’s response to Hurricanes Katrina Rita and Wilma prompted the NSTAC to request assistance from the LRTF to review the legal and regulatory environment in which Federal response took place The LRTF analysis revealed that several legislative mechanisms needed revision including the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Stafford Act which the Committee felt did not adequately provide assistance to telecommunications infrastructure providers TIPs in disasters The task force also determined that difficulties carriers faced in obtaining security fuel water site access and billeting for workers could be mitigated if the Federal Government created a designation for “Emergency Responders Private Sector ” and included TIPs in that category Accordingly the NSTAC sent a letter to President Bush advising him to act no later than June 1 2006 to establish and codify the term “emergency responder private sector ” to include TIPs and ensure they receive non-monetary assistance including accessing restricted areas and obtaining fuel water power billeting and workforce and asset security by SAFETY Act During the NSTAC XXVIII Cycle the LRTF initiated an examination of the NS EP telecommunications implications of the implementation of the SAFETY Act at the request of the Committee The LRTF continued to monitor the implementation of the SAFETY Act in the NSTAC XXIX Cycle reporting to the NSTAC periodically on the status of the efforts 36 u Directing DHS to modify the National Response Plan and its emergency support functions to designate TIPs as Emergency Responders Private Sector and to establish protocols and procedures for the way in which Federal State local and tribal Governments should work with TIPs before during and after a national disaster NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Issuing appropriate Presidential guidance to define Emergency Responders Private Sector under the Stafford Act and other authorities as appropriate to align with the broadened definition of national defense in the 2003 amendments to the DPA Specifically the guidance should make clear that key response personnel of critical telecommunications infrastructure owners and operators should be defined as Emergency Responders Private Sector and should receive non-monetary Federal assistance under the Stafford Act and u Directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with Congress to align the Stafford Act and other appropriate legislative authorities with the DPA by codifying the designation of private sector TIPs as Emergency Responders Private Sector and by codifying the official interpretation that for-profit TIPs should receive Federal assistance Finally in July 2006 Secretary Chertoff confirmed to the NSTAC that DHS officials had been working closely with Congress to ensure that the Committee’s emergency responder provisions would be sufficiently addressed in future legislation to be formally introduced by the Senate In addition the DHS announced it had developed in partnership with Federal State and local Government entities as well as a private sector company an access standard operating procedure SOP to ensure that private critical infrastructure responders have priority access to disaster areas The access SOP had been adopted by the State of Georgia and would be used a model for other States Reports Issued Legislative and Regulatory Group Report December 1997 Legislative and Regulatory Group Report September 1998 Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In the Barriers to Information Sharing Report the NSTAC advised the President that DHS should be the clearinghouse and dispenser of CII information and that CII Act protections should cover departments and agencies other than DHS In a related action on February 18 2004 DHS launched the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information PCII Program pursuant to the CII Act The PCII Program Office PO is located within the DHS Preparedness Directorate and serves as the clearinghouse and dispenser of CII Procedure for Problem Resolution with the Federal Communications Commission and the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications During Emergency Telecommunications Disruptions September 1998 Furthermore on October 28 2003 in response to the NSTAC’s Letter to President George W Bush on National Policies and Regulations that Conflict with Homeland Security and NS EP Missions the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security confirmed that the staff of the Executive Office of the President had been tasked to convene a meeting with the other White House stakeholders to review the recommendations in the NSTAC’s letter and to analyze their impact to NS EP communications Letter to President Bill Clinton on Protection of Critical Infrastructure Information August 7 2000 National Services Subgroup White Paper September 1998 Legislative and Regulatory Group Report June 1999 Telecommunications Outage and Intrusion Information Sharing Report June 1999 Letter to President George W Bush on Protection of Critical Infrastructure Information June 2001 Penalties for Internet Attacks and Cyber Crime April 2003 Barriers to Information Sharing September 2003 37 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Letter to President George W Bush on National Policies and Regulations that Conflict with Homeland Security and NS EP Missions October 16 2003 Letter and Addendum to President George W Bush on Open Source Critical Infrastructure Information April 8 2005 Letter and Report to President George W Bush on Federal Support to Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers During National Emergencies Designation as Emergency Responders Private Sector January 31 2006 NSTAC Cycle XXIX Legislative and Regulatory Task Force Membership Telcordia Technologies Inc Ms Louise Tucker Chair Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr Gerald Harvey Vice Chair AT T Inc Ms Rosemary Leffler Mr Harry Underhill BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron The Boeing Company Mr Robert Steele Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Guy Copeland Lucent Technologies Mr Michael Garson Microsoft Corporation Mr Mike Hickey Nortel Mr Raymond Strassburger Northrop Grumman Corporation Mr Scott Freber 38 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Jeffrey Hackman Rockwell Collins Inc Mr Ken Kato Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Michael Fingerhut VeriSign Inc Mr Michael Aisenberg Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean Mr Dennis Guard Other Legislative and Regulatory Task Force Industry Participants AT T Inc Ms Elizabeth Gastor Mr Adam McKinney BellSouth Corporation Mr Lloyd Nault Cingular Wireless LLC Mr Jim Bugel CTIA – The Wireless Association Mr Christopher Guttman-McCabe Computer Sciences Corporation Ms Lucy Thompson Edison Electric Institute Mr Laurence Brown George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Lockheed Martin Corporation Ms Elaine David Dr Allen Dayton Mr Larry Duncan Lucent Technologies Mr Brenton Greene Ms Selma Munden Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Mr Karl Rauscher Microsoft Corporation Mr Scott Forbes Ms Cristin Flynn Goodwin Mr Paul Nicholas Mr Phil Reitinger Northrop Grumman Corporation Mr Larry Blair Nortel Dr John S Edwards Raytheon Company Mr Paul Harris Mr Frank Newell Science Applications International Corporation Mr Henry Kluepfel Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Timothy Bowe Mr Jared Carlson Ms Allison Growney Mr John Stogoski Legislative and Regulatory Task Force Briefers Booz Allen Hamilton Mr Loren Southard Department of Defense Ms Hillary Morgan Department of Homeland Security Mr Larry Hall Ms Wendy Howe Mr Crane Miller Mr Eric Werner Federal Communications Commission Mr Gregory Cooke North American Electric Reliability Council Mr David Cook Mr Louis Leffler Telecommunications Industry Association Mr William Belt Legislative and Regulatory Task Force Government Participants Department of Commerce Mr William Denk Department of Defense Ms Hillary Morgan Department of Energy Mr John Greenhill Verizon Communications Inc Mr Drew Arena Mr Roger Higgins Mr Seth Maiman 39 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Department of Homeland Security Mr David Delaney Mr Thomas Falvey Mr Jeffrey Glick Mr Larry Hall Mr Frank Lalley Mr Crane Miller Mr Eric Werner Mr Paul Winslow 40 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Research and Development Investigation Group Period of Activity Network Security Task Force February 21 1990 – August 26 1992 Network Security Group December 1994 – April 22 1997 Network Group Intrusion Detection Subgroup April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Research and Development Exchange Task Force April 22 1997 – July 29 2003 Research and Development Task Force July 29 2003 – Present Issue Background In today’s global economy advances in communications transform the way in which people live work learn converse and conduct business Research is essential to ensure these transformations are productive for society beneficial for the economy and sustainable over the long term Communications and information technology research and development R D advances the digital technologies that power critical national security and emergency preparedness NS EP capabilities A strong collaborative R D program advances the resilience of telecommunications and information systems Therefore the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC examines areas for future development and seeks to enhance coordination between the public and private sectors and the academic research community History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Periodically the Research and Development Task Force RDTF of the NSTAC’s Industry Executive Subcommittee IES conducts its Research and Development Exchange RDX Workshop the broad purpose of which is to stimulate and facilitate a NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES dialogue among industry Government and academia on emerging security technology R D activities that have the potential to both positively and negatively affect the NS EP posture of the Nation To ensure inclusion of all stakeholders in the R D community the RDTF traditionally invites representatives from a broad number of private sector companies academic institutions and key Government agencies with NS EP and or R D responsibilities such as the Office of Science and Technology Policy OSTP the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST and the Department of Homeland Security’s DHS Directorate for Science and Technology Over the course of the Workshop participants endeavor to frame key policy issues identify and characterize barriers and impediments inhibiting R D discuss how stakeholders can cooperate and coordinate efforts as the communities of interest shift and develop specific and realistic recommendations for further action by key stakeholders and decision makers The RDX Workshops date back to 1990 when the growing prevalence of hacker incidents led to the formation of the NSTAC’s Network Security Task Force NSTF The task force’s purpose was to assess the threats to and the vulnerabilities of the public switched telephone network A key component of the task force’s work included examining R D issues related to security with a particular emphasis on improving commercially applicable tools In mid-1991 the NSTF identified six areas in which R D on commercially applicable security tools was needed and asked the Government to share information about its R D efforts in those areas The subsequent briefings provided by representatives of the National Security Agency and NIST to the NSTAC which constituted the NSTAC’s first RDX Workshop demonstrated that Government already had R D efforts under way in all of those areas NSTAC R D activities gained momentum again in March 1996 when the NSTAC’s Network Security 41 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Group NSG facilitated a seminar for industry and Government to discuss network security R D activities and issues The purpose of the seminar was threefold 1 provide a common understanding of network security problems affecting NS EP telecommunications 2 identify R D activities in progress to address those problems and 3 identify additional network security R D activities needed The NSG identified four areas of interest for further investigation from the seminar—authentication intrusion detection integrity and access control— upon which it conducted the second RDX Workshop on September 18 1996 Because the objective was to facilitate meaningful discussion among participants participation at the Workshop was limited to 50 people representing 15 companies and 11 Government organizations including one federally funded research and development center The Committee limited industry representation to NSTAC member companies only In 1997 in response to a number of stimuli including the recommendations from the 1996 RDX Workshop the Network Group NG —formerly the NSG—conducted a study of intrusion detection technology R D and analyzed it in terms of meeting NS EP requirements As a result of the analysis the NSTAC made four recommendations to the President including the need to increase R D funding for control systems of critical infrastructures and to encourage cooperative development programs to maximize the use of existing R D resources in industry Government and academia The NSTAC’s recommendations reinforced prior Committee recommendations to examine the need for and feasibility of collaborative R D approaches for security technology It also provided the basis for the concept of the third RDX Workshop Enhancing Network Security Technology R D Collaboration held in October 1998 at Purdue University’s Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance IA and Security to examine collaborative approaches to security technology R D The participants which for the first time included members of the academic community also discussed the need to train more 42 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee information technology IT security professionals create large-scale test beds to test security products and solutions and promote the creation of IA Centers of Excellence in academia Deliberations at the RDX Workshop at Purdue University resulted in several findings and recommendations for future industry Government and academic work Discussions also noted three recommendations for future NSTAC consideration including the need to “conduct another R D Exchange in the spring of 2000 to continue the dialogue on the long-term issues associated with infrastructure assurance and network security ” such as new threats and convergence The third RDX Workshop also provided the model for all future workshops Held at the University of Tulsa in September 2000 the fourth RDX Workshop examined issues of transparent security in a converged and distributed network environment Attendees discussed the need to address the shortage of qualified information security professionals expand the number of universities participating in the IA Centers of Excellence program and promote best practices standards and protection profiles to enhance the security of the NGN Findings and recommendations from the Workshop included the establishment of NSTAC task forces to address standards and best practices for network security The fifth Workshop held in March 2003 at the Georgia Tech Information Security Center GTISC at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta Georgia explored the full range of telecommunications and information systems trustworthiness issues as they pertained to NS EP telecommunications systems Specifically the attendees examined trustworthiness from four different perspectives cyber and software security physical security integration issues and human factors From this event the RDTF developed seven specific findings including the need to clearly define the term NS EP in a post-September 11 2001 world characterized by a rapidly changing technology and threat environment and the need for a large-scale The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee testbed that could be used as an environment to test NS EP systems and critical infrastructures To directly address the findings from the 2003 RDX Workshop during the NSTAC XXVII cycle the RDTF developed a “living” discussion paper providing the background for the policy components of the evolving definition of NS EP The RDTF also examined several large-scale public and private testbeds reviewing their capacity to test the telecommunications and information systems infrastructures for NS EP purposes As a result the NSTAC finalized recommendations for a joint collaborative distributed industry Government and academia pilot testbed that could advance the current state of NS EP and critical infrastructure protection integration activities The most recent Workshop held in Monterey California in October 2004 reconsidered the R D issues associated with trustworthy NS EP telecommunications addressed at the 2003 RDX Workshop and examined progress made unfinished work and new challenges Participants again focused on major cyber and software physical human factor and integration research issue areas and discussed the need for information exchange and collaboration efforts within the R D community At the 2004 Workshop participants resoundingly agreed that embedding strong ubiquitous authentication and identity management technologies into future networks was critically important As a result of this discussion the NSTAC is currently evaluating whether it should conduct an analysis of identity management security concerns unique to NS EP telecommunications The task force is also planning its first-ever international Workshop in Ottawa Ontario Canada on September 21-22 2006 The Workshop will focus on international multilateral collaborative R D to enhance security on the network NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u STANDING ISSUES Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations Following the 2003 RDX Workshop in Atlanta Georgia the RDTF provided the Director OSTP with policy advice on specific areas of security technology R D that should be taken into account when providing input to the President’s fiscal year 2004 budget request The RDTF also provided its NS EP Definition Discussion Paper to the Executive Office of the President to utilize in on-going discussions on NS EP communications Reports Proceedings Issued Network Security Research and Development Exchange Proceedings September 1996 Report on the NS EP Implications of Intrusion Detection Technology Research and Development December 1997 Research and Development Exchange Proceedings Enhancing Network Security Technology R D Collaboration October 20-21 1998 Research and Development Exchange Proceedings Transparent Security in a Converged and Distributed Network Environment September 28-29 2000 Research and Development Exchange Proceedings R D Issues to Ensure Trustworthiness in Telecommunications and Information Systems that Directly or Indirectly Impact National Security and Emergency Preparedness March 13-14 2003 NS EP Definition Discussion Paper April 2004 Research and Development Exchange Proceedings A Year Later R D Issues to Ensure Trustworthiness in Telecommunications and Information Systems that Directly or Indirectly Impact National Security and Emergency Preparedness October 28-29 2004 The Critical Importance of Testbeds for NS EP R D May 2005 43 STANDING ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Research and Development Task Force Membership The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Verizon Communications Inc Mr James Bean Mr Dennis Guard Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Guy Copeland Chair Nortel Dr John Edwards Co – Vice Chair Science Applications International Corporation Mr Henry Kluepfel Co – Vice Chair AT T Ms Rosemary Leffler Bank of America Corporation Mr Larry Schaeffer BellSouth Corporation Mr David Barron Other Research and Development Task Force Participants ANSER Dr Ruth David Computer Sciences Corporation Ms Lucy Thomson Georgia Institute of Technology Dr Seymour Goodman George Washington University Dr Jack Oslund The Boeing Company Mr Robert Steele Microsoft Corporation Ms Cristin Flynn Goodwin Mr Phil Reitinger Lockheed Martin Corporation Dr Allen Dayton SRI International Mr Marc Sachs Lucent Bell Labs Mr Kevin Kelly Motorola Inc Ms Julie Kabous Microsoft Corporation Mr Theodore Tanner Northrop Grumman Corporation Mr Scott Freber Sprint Nextel Corporation Ms Allison Growney VeriSign Inc Mr Michael Aisenberg 44 Research and Development Task Force Government Participants Department of Homeland Security Ms Daniela Christopherson Ms Annabelle Lee Dr Douglas Maughan National Coordination Office NCO for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development Dr Simon Szykman Previously Addressed Issues The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Automated Information Processing NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES IV’s AIP recommendations On September 22 1988 the NSTAC approved and forwarded the TSS Task Force findings and recommendations on AIP to the President Investigation Group Period of Activity Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations Automated Information Processing AIP Task Force December 14 1982 – December 12 1984 Issue Background The need to ensure a survivable AIP capability to support NS EP telecommunications prompted the NSTAC to initiate a study of the AIP issue on December 14 1982 The AIP Task Force addressed the issue for nearly 2 years History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations In July 1983 NSTAC II recommended that the President direct the National Security Council in conjunction with industry to identify essential NS EP functions and their dependence on AIP and to rank those functions in order of priority on a time-phased basis In April 1984 NSTAC III recommended that the President establish an AIP vulnerability awareness program within the Government On December 12 1984 NSTAC IV forwarded the following AIP recommendations to the President The TSS Task Force reviewed the Government’s responses to the NSTAC’s AIP recommendations The task force found the Commercial Network Survivability program was addressing the recommendations regarding AIP embedded in telecommunications but the Government had not implemented the recommendations on AIP for telecommunications operational support and AIP required to support NS EP functions in general The TSS Task Force recommended the Government consider the implications of all operational support AIP especially for network management restoration and reconstitution and that the Government implement an NS EP AIP awareness program The NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s findings and recommendations on AIP and forwarded them to the President on September 22 1988 Reports Issued Establish a full-time management entity to implement the telecommunications AIP survivability effort Working Group Proceedings on AIP Survivability October 6 1982 u Conduct AIP vulnerability awareness programs in conjunction with the private sector Strategy and Recommendations for Achieving Enhanced NS EP AIP Survivability October 25 1984 u Develop NS EP AIP policy Final Report Addendum May 1 1985 u Initiate efforts to enhance the survivability of NS EP AIP in general and u Provide the necessary funding and develop incentives for AIP survivability enhancements u AIP Task Force Report June 1983 The TSS Task Force worked on the AIP issue It reviewed the Government’s responses to the NSTAC 47 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Commercial Network Survivability Investigation Group Period of Activity Commercial Network Survivability CNS Task Force February 29 1984 – October 9 1985 Issue Background In September 1983 the NSTAC IES reviewed the issues associated with telecommunications systems survivability and decided its scope was too broad for a single task force to address The IES requested that the Resource Enhancements Working Group REWG and the Emergency Response Procedures Working Group ERPWG meet to discuss and refine the issues The REWG and ERPWG met on November 9 1983 They suggested establishing the CNS Task Force to develop and prioritize initiatives to enhance the survivability of the terrestrial portion of commercial carrier networks The IES initiated the assessment of the CNS issue on February 29 1984 It formed the CNS Task Force and instructed it to improve the survivability of commercial communications systems and facilities and identify initiatives to improve interactive emergency response capabilities among the commercial networks History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On October 9 1985 the NSTAC forwarded five CNS recommendations to the President regarding u Specification of survivability requirements for NS EP services u Development of NS EP network architecture plans u Development of plans and procedures for network emergency operations u Acquisition and maintenance of databases and u Government participation in standards organizations The President endorsed those initiatives and NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES the OMNCS undertook a CNS program On November 6 1987 the NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s findings and recommendations on CNS and forwarded them to the President Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The TSS Task Force reviewed Government actions taken on the NSTAC’s CNS recommendations The task force found the Government’s actions focused on the highest threat level but the Government had taken no action on the CNS Task Force recommendation to form a joint industry and Government group to develop network architecture plans The TSS Task Force recommended that the CNS program be expanded to include the entire threat spectrum and all NS EP users The OMNCS established a CNS Program Office which engineered and implemented enhancements in the PSN for NS EP disaster recovery communications use during regional emergencies and national crises The CNS Program Office evaluated the effectiveness of those enhancements by modeling the anticipated effects of natural disasters and wartime scenarios using computer simulations and through proof-of-concept testing The OMNCS used its computer modeling capabilities and extensive database containing detailed information on the structure of the PSN to assess the CNS enhancements Enhancements included dedicated leased lines in the local exchange carrier networks to provide alternate survivable routes for NS EP communications The program office expected future enhancements to use advanced technology service offerings from those same carriers and from cellular service providers and competitive access providers The Mobile Transportable Telecommunications MTT program an associated effort demonstrated reconnecting isolated portions of the PSN using standard military radio equipment The MTT program performed these demonstrations with National Guard equipment and participation The CNS Program Office worked with other National Level NS EP Telecommunications Program 49 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review NLP elements to ensure interoperability of CNS network enhancements with other NLP component programs such as Commercial Satellite Command Interconnectivity and the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service In September 1994 the CNS program was terminated due to budget constraints Reports Issued CNS Task Force Interim Report December 6 1984 CNS Task Force Final Report August 1985 50 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Commercial Satellite Survivability Investigation Group Period of Activity Commercial Satellite Survivability CSS Task Force December 1982 – April 1984 June 1988 – March 1990 Satellite Task Force STF September 2003 – January 2004 The terrorist attacks on September11 2001 raised security concerns about the protection of the Nation’s vital telecommunications systems against threats and raised awareness that a Federal program did not exist to ensure NS EP communications via commercial satellite systems and services In January 2003 the Director National Security Space Architect requested that the President’s NSTAC consider embarking on a study of infrastructure protection measures for SATCOM systems In response the NSTAC’s IES formed the STF The STF was established to Issue Background At its first formal meeting on December 14 1982 the NSTAC agreed to emphasize commercial satellite communications survivability initiatives The NSTAC directed the CSS Task Force Resource Enhancements Working Group to assess the vulnerability of the commercial satellite communications network and the enhancements to the NS EP telecommunications infrastructure that the use of commercial carrier satellites and Earth terminals could provide A separate CSS Task Force reviewed a set of specific satellite initiatives selected for implementation developed an implementation concept and prepared a report of its actions and recommendations for the NSTAC In June 1988 the NSTAC IES reactivated the CSS Task Force to review the proposed objectives and implementation initiatives of the commercial satellite communications SATCOM Interconnectivity CSI Phase II Architecture and offer recommendations The NSTAC concurred with this action in September 1988 In March 1990 the NSTAC approved the final report of the reactivated CSS Task Force which concluded that the CSI Phase II Architecture approach was reasonable and made several recommendations to the Government u Review applicable documentation that addresses the vulnerabilities of the commercial satellite infrastructure u Define potential policy changes that have to be made to bring the infrastructure into conformance with a standard for mitigating the vulnerabilities u Consider Global Positioning System timing capabilities during the deliberations u Coordinate this response with representatives from the NCS and u Draft a task force report with findings and Presidential recommendations History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations At its first formal meeting on December 14 1982 the NSTAC established the CSS Task Force to review a set of specific satellite initiatives selected for implementation develop an implementation concept and prepare a report of its actions and recommendations for the NSTAC In September 1988 the NSTAC concurred with the IES June 1988 reactivation of the CSS Task Force to review the proposed objectives and implementation initiatives of the CSI Phase II Architecture and offer recommendations 51 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review In March 1990 the NSTAC approved the final report of the reactivated CSS Task Force The report concluded that the CSI Phase II Architecture approach was reasonable and it recommended the Government The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee January 2004 and presented its findings in the STF Report On the basis of its analysis and review of related policy issues the NSTAC offered the following recommendations to the President u Direct the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Director Office of Science Technology Policy to develop a national policy with respect to the provisioning and management of commercial SATCOM services integral to NS EP communications recognizing the vital and unique capabilities commercial satellites provide for global military operations diplomatic missions and homeland security contingency support u Fund the Department of Homeland Security to implement a commercial SATCOM NS EP improvement program within the NCS to procure and manage the non-Department of Defense satellite facilities and services necessary to increase the robustness of Government communications and The NSTAC also approved several specific recommendations to the Government regarding the use and augmentation of satellite assets to achieve various types of connectivity u Appoint several members to represent service providers and associations from all sectors of the commercial satellite industry to the NSTAC to increase satellite industry involvement in NS EP In January 2003 the Director National Security Space Architect requested that the President’s NSTAC conduct a study of infrastructure protection measures for SATCOM systems In response the NSTAC’s IES formed the STF to analyze and assess SATCOM systems’ vulnerabilities and make policy recommendations to the President on how the Federal Government should work with industry to mitigate vulnerabilities to the satellite infrastructure Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations u Include Ku-band assets in the CSI program to provide “access ” u Augment selected large Ku-band earth stations and control facilities to provide Ku-band interoperability u Use very small aperture terminal technology to restore selected trunking between interexchange carrier switches and local exchange carrier end offices and selected users in the United States to access the PSN via direct connection at an access tandem and u Pursue investigations analyses and augmentations necessary to ensure NS EP telecommunications service can be extended from the United States to NS EP users overseas The STF engaged broad participation from representatives of NSTAC member companies non-NSTAC commercial satellite owners and operators commercial satellite trade associations Government agencies and technical experts The STF concluded its analysis of satellite security in 52 The TSS Task Force reviewed the Government actions taken on the NSTAC’s CSS Task Force Phase I recommendations and found that the CSI Program and the Industry Information Security Task Force were pursuing most of the CSS initiatives The TSS Task Force recommended that three aspects of the CSS initiatives be studied further Ku-band interoperability up-link jamming protection and transportable terminals The first CSS Task Force’s investigations resulted in the definition of 12 initiatives for improving the survivability and robustness of commercial satellite communications resources The investigations also resulted in the incorporation of the CSS Program The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Office established in November 1984 as the CSI Program Office in 1987 In addition the CSS Task Force approved the CSI as part of the National Level NS EP Telecommunications Program The CSI Program Office reviewed the CSS Task Force Phase II recommendations The CSI Program Office investigated satellite technologies such as Ku-band and enhanced capabilities such as connecting to local exchange carriers’ switches and providing PSN remote access to NS EP users as part of the CSI architecture development effort The projected CSI Phase II Architecture implementation date was in FY 96 but due to budget constraints the CSI program was terminated in September 1994 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Final Report of the CSS Task Force Appendix B Operational Subgroup Report December 1989 Final Report of the CSS Task Force Appendix C International Subgroup Report December 1989 Satellite Task Force Report March 2004 During its 2004 review of the National Space Policy the White House incorporated aspects of the STF report into the revised policy In particular aspects concerning ground and space links and potential points of failure were included in the revised policy In addition at the recommendation of the STF the President appointed PanAmSat Holdings Inc to the NSTAC to represent the commercial satellite industry Reports Issued Issue Papers for Commercial Communications Satellite Systems Survivability Initiatives March 21 1983 Commercial Satellite Communications Survivability Report prepared by the CSS Task Force Resource Enhancements Working Group May 20 1983 Addendum to the Commercial Satellite Communications Survivability Report May 20 1983 CSS Status Report April 15 1984 Final Report of the CSS Task Force December 1989 Final Report of the CSS Task Force Appendix A Technical Subgroup Report December 1989 53 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Common Channel Signaling Investigation Group Period of Activity Common Channel Signaling CCS Task Force April 28 1993 – January 31 1994 NS EP Panel March 1994 – March 1995 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES At the March 2 1995 IES Meeting the NS EP Group Chair explained that during the preceding year no significant outages had occurred during the group’s monitoring of the CCS network the panel’s name was changed to the NS EP Group in accordance with the December 1994 IES Guidelines The Chair concluded that if no significant outages occurred in the next quarter the group would discontinue monitoring the CCS network History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Issue Background At the April 28 1993 IES Meeting the Operations Working Group NS EP Panel recommended that the IES establish a task force to investigate common channel signaling The task force would determine whether widespread long- duration CCS outages affecting multiple interconnected carriers were a significant risk to the public switched network and NS EP telecommunications The IES established the CCS Task Force to u Determine if there were failure mechanisms that could potentially lead to widespread long-duration CCS outages among multiple interconnected carriers u Evaluate the risk to NS EP user telecommunications u If significant risk existed examine procedural or technological alternatives for mitigating it and u Present appropriate recommendations to NSTAC XVI The task force reported its conclusions and recommendations to NSTAC XVI on March 2 1994 The task force concluded that the CCS architecture was inherently reliable and that the probability of a large-scale long-duration multiple carrier CCS outage resulting from a failure condition propagated to other CCS networks presented a low risk to NS EP telecommunications The IES recommended to deactivate the task force and tasked the NS EP Panel to monitor CCS reliability for a year before reactivating or disbanding the task force After receiving this tasking the NS EP Panel developed plans for a February 1995 tabletop CCS restoration exercise In February 1995 the Network Operations Forum conducted the CCS restoration exercise thus fulfilling the obligations of the CSS Task Force charge Report Issued Final Report of the Common Channel Signaling Task Force January 31 1994 The CCS Task Force received informational briefings on the CCS architecture and on CCS network security incidents and concerns protocol changes the role of the Network Security Information Exchange in evaluating and determining CCS failures and the Network Reliability Council’s Signaling Network System Focus Team At NSTAC XVI March 2 1994 the IES deactivated the task force 55 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Electromagnetic Pulse Investigation Group Period of Activity Electromagnetic Pulse EMP Task Force September 27 1983 – October 9 1985 Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The TSS Task Force reviewed the Government actions taken on the NSTAC’s EMP recommendations It found that the Government had implemented nine of the EMP initiatives or was implementing them The TSS Task Force made the following recommendations u Industry and Government should continue to work together to implement the EMP initiatives u The Government should prepare an unclassified EMP handbook and u Industry consistent with cost should incorporate low-cost mitigation practices in its new upgrade programs Issue Background The NSTAC Industry Executive Subcommittee initiated the EMP assessment on September 27 1983 in response to a Government request for industry’s perspective on the options available to industry and Government for improving the EMP survivability of the Nation’s telecommunications networks The NSTAC approved the EMP study on April 3 1984 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On December 12 1984 the NSTAC forwarded the following recommendations on EMP to the President u Designate an appropriate Federal agency to serve as an industry point of contact for EMP mitigation efforts and information distribution u Support industry through its standards organizations in the development of electromagnetic standards that take the EMP environment into account and u Undertake a program to improve the EMP endurability of the Nation’s commercial electrical power systems On October 9 1985 the NSTAC approved the EMP Final Task Force Report and forwarded a recommendation to the President calling for a joint industry and Government program to reduce the costs of existing techniques for mitigating high-altitude electromagnetic pulse-induced transients and to develop new techniques for limiting transient effects The NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s findings and recommendations on EMP and forwarded them to the President on November 6 1987 The OMNCS designated its Office of Technology and Standards as the Federal office to serve as an industry and Government point of contact It used the American National Standards Institute T1Y1 Committee as a forum for developing electromagnetic standards in support of industry and issued an unclassified EMP handbook EMP Mitigation Program Approach NCS-TIB 87-17 The OMNCS received results from a simulated EMP test on an AT T PSN switch The OMNCS assessed the EMP impact on the PSN based on test results of transmission signaling and switching facilities EMP test analysis results showed little cause for concern regarding the physical EMP survivability of the PSN but revealed an increasing PSN vulnerability to EMP-induced switch and signaling upset Reports Issued EMP Task Force Status Report January 12 1984 EMP Final Task Force Report July 1985 57 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Energy u Establish a nationwide process for restoring electric power and distributing energy supplies during major emergencies Investigation Group Period of Activity Energy Task Force August 31 1988 – March 29 1990 October 3 1991 – May 27 1993 The NSTAC approved the Energy Task Force Final Report which recommended that the Government u Develop a program for assigning electric power restoration priorities to NS EP telecommunications users and providers to provide the soonest possible service restoration u Establish a program for assigning priorities for the supply transport and delivery of fuels to NS EP telecommunications users and providers u Grant a national security waiver from those applicable subparts of the Government’s underground storage tank regulation 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 280 u Ensure that NS EP telecommunications users who need electric power to operate their customer premises equipment have a backup power capability that can operate through at least a 7-day electric power outage and u Fund studies to examine the feasibility of the Government’s developing and supplying longlasting cost-effective backup power sources for critical telecommunications facilities NS EP Panel March 8 1994 – October 5 1994 Issue Background In 1986 the Telecommunications Systems Survivability TSS Task Force initially reviewed the vulnerability of telecommunications to the loss of commercial electric power and presented the results of its review at the February 8 1987 NSTAC VII Meeting The TSS Task Force concluded the telecommunications industry would be extremely vulnerable to an extended electric power outage As a result the NSTAC recommended to the President that Government initiate a study to identify options for ensuring electric power survivability as it related to telecommunications The NSTAC also offered its services to support the effort Following the President’s reply the NSTAC formed the Energy Task Force and it became the focal point of a joint electric power and telecommunications industry effort to address the question of electric power survivability as it relates to telecommunications The Department of Energy DOE NCS and the North American Electric Reliability Council NERC participated in the Energy Task Force The NSTAC IES charged the first Energy Task Force with developing recommendations to mitigate the effects of electric power outages on telecommunications It examined interdependencies between electric power and telecommunications after a major earthquake Further at NSTAC X the task force presented the following recommendations u Sponsor further research on the impact of a major earthquake on electric power telecommunications and transportation systems and In October 1991 the NSTAC reactivated the Energy Task Force to advise the NCS and the DOE concerning the implementation of energy priority initiatives for telecommunications facilities The reactivated task force assisted in developing the DOE’s Telecommunications Electric Service Priority TESP initiative in response to the original task force’s first two recommendations When fully implemented the TESP initiative would provide priority electric power restoration to critical NS EP telecommunications facilities After reviewing DOE’s National Energy Strategy NES in December 1991 the IES also charged the Energy 59 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Task Force to review the NES from the perspective of benefits to NS EP telecommunications enhancements and develop NS EP telecommunications energy concerns issues for incorporation into DOE’s next issue update of the NES Telecommunications Service Priority provisioning or restoration The energy issue concluded when NSTAC XV charged the IES to deactivate the Energy Task Force The NSTAC also tasked the IES to request progress reports from the Government on the status of its recommendations u Encourage State and local Governments to modify their emergency plans to allow telecommunications electric utility and fuel supply company’s access into areas experiencing outages and u Modify the Federal Response Plan and the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Nonwartime Emergencies to include TESP and to address emergency fuel resupply access and safety issues History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations As a result of an NSTAC VIII recommendation the IES formed the first Energy Task Force The task force was the focal point of an electric power telecommunications industry effort to address the issue of electric power survivability as it relates to telecommunications The DOE NCS and the NERC actively participated in the Energy Task Force On October 3 1991 NSTAC XIII approved the recommendation to establish a follow-on Energy Task Force The task force’s charge was to support the OMNCS in its efforts with DOE to develop criteria and a process for identifying critical industry NS EP telecommunications facilities that qualify for electric power restoration and priority fuel distribution At the May 27 1993 NSTAC XV Meeting members approved the Energy Task Force Final Report and the task force’s recommendations and forwarded both to the President The task force recommended that the Government u Continue to support the operation administration and management of DOE’s TESP initiative u Assign Federal responsibility for the establishment of a program to ensure priority availability of fuel supplies for telecommunications companies during emergencies u Encourage the Nation’s electric utilities to coordinate with telecommunications companies to provide safe access to disaster areas requiring 60 The Energy Task Force also recommended that to address the improvement of electric power survivability under disaster conditions the President’s National Energy Strategy should u Increase R D and incentives to reduce transmission and distribution vulnerabilities u Evaluate locating dispersed power generation closer to customer loads as a possible means of further reducing transmission and distribution vulnerabilities and u Focus more R D on alternative backup power technologies for the telecommunications industry by encouraging cooperative R D agreements between the U S national laboratories and interested telecommunications companies On March 8 1994 the NS EP Panel discussed power outages that occurred during the recent winter storms on the East Coast and during the Northridge earthquake and their effect on telecommunications The panel agreed that a call from the power companies would have alerted carriers to the impending rolling blackouts and the need to switch to an emergency backup power source Additionally the panel agreed that the TESP initiative should be more responsive to industry’s requirements during emergencies and disasters As a consequence of this discussion the panel scheduled briefings from the The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NCS Office of Plans and Programs on the status of its discussions with DOE on TESP and then with DOE on the status of the TESP initiative NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES there is sufficient law enforcement personnel available to ensure their protection Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations On October 13 1994 as a result of industry’s concerns about the initiative the NSTAC invited the DOE to address the joint Operations Working Group OWG and Plans Working Group PWG meeting The former TESP initiative was introduced as the National Electric Service Priority ESP Program in Support of Telecommunications ESP was defined as a program developed jointly between DOE the NCS and the telecommunications industry Under ESP electric utilities voluntarily add NS EP telecommunications facilities to their ESP programs The ESP program emphasizes local coordination between electric utilities and telecommunications facilities In response to the Energy Task Force recommendations at NSTAC X the OWG NS EP Panel discussed the status of NCS and DOE activities The panel expressed support for recent NCS and DOE initiatives and concluded that industry should continue to advise the NCS and DOE on implementation of the energy initiatives The IES and NSTAC approved the recommendation to establish a follow-on Energy Task Force Its charge was to support the OMNCS efforts with DOE and NCS to develop criteria and a process for identifying critical industry NS EP telecommunications facilities that qualify for electric power restoration and priority fuel distribution In response to criticism that the DOE was not responsive to industry’s needs during the 1994 winter storms the DOE representative noted several problems contributed to the insufficient generating capacity Utilities had been asked to switch from natural gas barges were unable to get through ice to deliver coal northeastern electric power companies were purchasing power from California Florida and Oklahoma However the rising demand resulted in brownouts followed by rolling blackouts On April 2 1991 the NCS issued Directive 38 Provisioning of Emergency Power in Support of NS EP Telecommunications The DOE and the NCS worked together to identify critical telecommunications facilities that qualify for priority electric power restoration In December 1994 the NCS provided an updated list of critical telecommunications facilities to DOE The DOE collected electric utility points-of-contact information that the telecommunications industry supplied DOE continues to work with all 50 States to ensure nationwide ESP implementation In regard to other telecommunications energy issues DOE recommended industry contact each State and that the State enroll in the fuel set-aside program DOE further stated that as a result of Hurricane Andrew that hit Florida power companies and telecommunications providers were working more closely together Finally in response to industry’s request to obtain access to a disaster site DOE stressed that such access could be dangerous Criminal elements can harm utility workers unless In December 1993 DOE began implementing the TESP initiative and made plans to update the critical facility list As of September 1993 28 States indicated their desire to voluntarily participate in the TESP initiative with additional States expected to follow At the October 13 1994 OWG-PWG meeting DOE explained that it replaced the TESP initiative with its ESP program in support of telecommunications DOE had developed the ESP program in response to the National Security Advisor’s request that the Secretary of Energy develop and implement a priority process for electric power restoration DOE is working with all 50 States in implementing ESP nationwide DOE’s partnership with the NCS and the telecommunications industry is facilitating ESP implementation During NSTAC Cycle XXVIII the NSTAC revisited issues related to interdependency between the telecommunications and electric power infrastructures and formed the Telecommunications 61 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force TEPITF to address these issues See the Interdependency Between Telecommunications and Electric Power Infrastructures section in the Active Issues section of this NSTAC Issue Review Reports Issued Report on Earthquake Hazards June 8 1989 Energy Task Force Final Report February 1990 Energy Task Force Final Report Telecommunications Electric Service Priority and National Energy Strategy Review April 1993 62 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Enhanced Call Completion Investigation Group Period of Activity Industry Executive Subcommittee IES Funding and Regulatory Working Group FRWG Assured access June 7 1990 – September 1990 Regulatory aspect of call-by-call preferential treatment July – December 1993 Enhanced Call Completion ECC Task Force December 13 1990 – July 17 1992 ECC Ad Hoc Group July 17 1992 – August 2 1993 Issue Background Following its reactivation after NSTAC XI the NSTAC IES tasked the FRWG to investigate NS EP issues affecting assured access to the public switched network PSN During FRWG discussions with the Government the group agreed that assured access was only one component of the Government’s need for enhanced NS EP call completion The group defined assured access as priority access to transportation through and egress from the PSN for NS EP users when portions of the PSN were either physically isolated or too congested to permit unhindered access and call completion The FRWG prepared a study addressing the regulatory and technical components of assured access The study reported that at its initial meeting the FRWG concluded that the Government required enhanced call completion for NS EP traffic The FRWG members agreed however that they must further define the technical features of the issue before identifying regulatory issues On August 22 1990 the FRWG recommended that it establish an ECC Task Force to determine how existing and evolving technologies could best be exploited to enhance the priority access transport and egress of NS EP traffic The FRWG’s study also stated that the proposed task force should evaluate the Intelligent Networks Task Force Final Report and recommendations and coordinate its efforts with those of the OMNCS to avoid duplication Following the FRWG’s investigation of issues affecting assured access to the PSN by NS EP callers and its subsequent recommendations the NSTAC at its December 13 1990 meeting charged the IES to establish a task force to review the issue of enhancing call completion for NS EP users during periods of congestion Specifically the IES directed the task force to identify technical approaches and to recommend a plan of action for obtaining enhanced call completion in both the near and long term The ECC Task Force studied existing and evolving technologies that would provide the NS EP user PSN access and call completion without interruption with minimum delay and on a preferential basis during network damage or congestion During its 18-month investigation the task force identified 26 current or planned enhanced call completion features and defined their NS EP application availability and acquisition procedures The task force also determined the importance of the High Probability of Call Completion HPC standard in implementing an NS EP call identifier to provide call-by-call preferential treatment and to enhance existing PSN features At the July 17 1992 NSTAC XIV Meeting members approved the ECC Task Force’s report for forwarding to the President the two proposed recommendations to the President and the proposed NSTAC XIV charges to the IES In response to these charges the IES deactivated the ECC Task Force and established an ad hoc group to work with the Government to u Advocate and support approval of the HPC standard investigate potential ECC regulatory issues with the FRWG and implement ECC network capabilities At the August 2 1993 IES Meeting members approved the deactivation of the ECC Ad Hoc 63 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Group which had completed its work The group served as a forum for issues such as cellular priority access preferential access for North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and future broadband services It assisted the Government in its effort to obtain approval of the HPC standard—published as American National Standards Institute T1 631 in August 1993 The group also worked closely with the Government to develop ECC features demonstration scenarios It met with the GETS integrator and Government contractors to discuss demonstration plans and scenarios As part of its charge to inform the Government about ECC services affecting the National Level NS EP Telecommunications Program initiatives the group assisted the Government in developing educational materials such as the ECC Services Cost Benefit Analysis Report and the 1993 National Communications System NCS Member Agency Telecommunications Enhancement Handbook The group worked with the Government in addressing potential regulatory impediments to implementing enhanced call completion services It framed and defined significant elements in the call-by-call preferential treatment issue before forwarding the issue to the FRWG for its action In July 1993 the FRWG responded to an April 14 1993 memorandum to the NCS Executive Agent directing the NCS to work with the FRWG to investigate potential regulatory issues arising from the implementation of enhanced call completion attributes for NS EP activities The FRWG explored whether the prohibition of undue preferences in Section 202 a of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended required a specific FCC regulation authorizing the provision of priority calling features to NS EP users of the PSN The FRWG determined FCC approval of preferential treatment would benefit both industry and Government Following IES approval the OMNCS forwarded a letter to the FCC requesting that the Commission issue an opinion regarding whether common carriers may provide call-by-call priority service for connecting emergency calls over the public 64 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee switched network The FCC responded by issuing a Public Notice on January 7 1994 which requested that public comments be filed with the Commission by February 15 1994 and that reply comments be filed by March 1 1994 The OMNCS filed reply comments with the FCC on March 1 1994 requesting that the Commission issue a favorable opinion On August 30 1995 the FCC responded to the OMNCS regarding the call-by-call priority issue In its letter the FCC stated that the request for declaratory ruling filed on November 29 1993 was moot because lawful tariffs implementing the federally managed GETS program had gone into effect Call-by-call priority is a feature of the GETS program Therefore the FCC dismissed the petition for declaratory ruling without prejudice History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On December 13 1990 NSTAC XII charged the IES to establish the ECC Task Force as a result of the FRWG’s investigation of assured access issues On July 17 1992 NSTAC members approved the ECC Task Force’s report for forwarding two proposed recommendations to the President u The Government should take the following steps to enhance call completion for NS EP users • Take advantage of existing and emerging services features and capabilities in the PSN • Continue to support the near-term adoption of the HPC standard by the Exchange Carriers Standards Association T1 Committee • Investigate the NS EP advantages of a calling name delivery service • Work with NSTAC’s FRWG to investigate potential regulatory issues • Sponsor industry ECC forums to further define ECC and resolve implementation issues The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The Government should use the ECC Task Force report as a reference for modifying or implementing current or future services and technologies In response to NSTAC XIV charges the IES established the ECC Ad Hoc Group On August 2 1993 IES members deactivated the ECC Ad Hoc Group Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In response to an NSTAC XIV recommendation from the ECC Task Force the White House issued a memorandum to the NCS Executive Agent on April 14 1993 directing the NCS to work with the FRWG to investigate potential regulatory issues arising from the implementation of ECC attributes for NS EP activities The FRWG sought to clarify whether prohibitions of undue preferences in the Communications Act of 1934 required a specific FCC regulation to authorize the provision of priority calling features to NS EP users of the public switched network The FCC resolved the issue on August 30 1995 when the FCC informed the OMNCS of its decision regarding the call-by-call priority issue Reports Issued Assured Access Issue Paper October 13 1989 Report on the FRWG Review of Assured Access November 7 1990 Final Report of the Enhanced Call Completion ECC Task Force July 1992 Final Report of the Enhanced Call Completion ECC Ad Hoc Group December 1993 65 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Financial Services NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES tariffs and the potential for resulting confusion when financial services institutions establish business continuity plans Investigation Group Period of Activity Financial Services Task Force FSTF March 2003 – April 2004 Issue Background In November 2002 the Federal Reserve Board FRB and BITS—a nonprofit industry consortium of the 100 largest financial institutions in the United States that focuses on issues related to security crisis management e-commerce payments and emerging technologies—briefed the IES of the NSTAC on the significant dependence of the financial services FS sector on the telecommunications infrastructure to support core payment clearance and settlement processes of financial institutions Given that dependence disruption of telecommunications services could hamper critical financial services processes potentially affecting the national economy To minimize operational risks and ensure the timely delivery of critical financial services the FRB recommended that the NSTAC analyze telecommunications infrastructure issues pertaining to network redundancy and diversity The NSTAC therefore established the FSTF to conduct the analysis during NSTAC Cycle XXVII History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The FSTF emphasized that the concept of resiliency and its components of diversity redundancy and recoverability are critical to understanding some of the NS EP issues currently challenging the FS and telecommunications industries The task force acknowledged that it is imperative for the FS sector to maintain diversity as a component of resiliency The primary challenges identified by the FSTF with respect to diversity were the failure of critical services resulting from loss of diversity the ability to ensure that diversity is predictable and continually maintained and the potential for lack of clear understanding of terms and conditions in telecommunications contracts or The FSTF recognized that without a real-time process to guarantee that a circuit’s path or route is static and stable an NS EP customer cannot be assured at all times that the diversity component of the resiliency plan will retain its designed characteristics However the telecommunications infrastructure was designed and engineered based on a business model directed at the general public When necessary networks have been modified or developed to meet specific needs at the customer level except where limited by the available technology or a customer’s willingness to purchase unique requirements The FSTF emphasized that all interested parties should support research and development activities for improving managed network solutions and alternative technologies as a potential means for achieving high resiliency for the FS customer base Targeted capital incentives should also be considered as a tool to encourage critical infrastructure owners including the FS sector to make the necessary investments to mitigate telecommunications resiliency risks to their business operations Appropriately structured capital recovery incentives for critical business operations could be used to accelerate immediate investments to mitigate vulnerabilities to critical NS EP operations The FSTF also noted that when different business continuity strategies cannot fully guarantee operational sustainability specifically engineered and managed efforts might be required The degree of assurance that a business operation deems adequate to achieve a high level of resiliency will dictate the decisions and the appropriate approach to be pursued To that end the task force concluded that cross-sector assessments or customerprovider assessments would remain useful tools to facilitate better understanding of the need for resiliency Indeed FSTF members acknowledged the importance of promoting mutual understanding among the FS and telecommunications sectors 67 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review to effectively address NS EP-related issues Both sectors pledged to continue in their efforts to engage members of their communities as well as the public sector in a constructive dialogue to foster mutual understanding of their operations and unique needs Furthermore the framework that the FSTF developed to analyze the dependencies of the FS sector on the telecommunications industry could be adapted to conduct risk assessments of other critical infrastructures The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Provide statutory protection to remove liability and antitrust barriers to collaborative efforts when needed in the interest of national security u Continue to promote the Telecommunications Service Priority program as a component of the business resumption plans of financial services institutions u Promote research and development efforts to increase the resiliency and the reliability of alternative transport technologies u Examine and develop capital investment recovery incentives for critical infrastructure owners operators and users that invest in resiliency mechanisms to support their most critical NS EP telecommunications functions On the basis of the FSTF report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Support the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions’ ATIS National Diversity Assurance Initiative and develop a process to • Examine diversity assurance capabilities requirements and best practices for critical NS EP customers and where needed • Promote research and development to increase resiliency circuit diversity and alternative transport mechanisms u Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In response to the FSTF report ATIS agreed to work with the FRB on an in-depth assessment of diversity assurance A final report on the assessment was completed in February 2006 Representatives from ATIS also visited the IES to brief them on the findings and recommendations discussed in the assessment Support financial services sector initiatives examining Report Issued • The development of a feasible “circuit-bycircuit” solution to ensure telecommunications services resiliency • The benefits and complexities of aggregating sectorwide NS EP telecommunications requirements into a common framework to protect national economic security u 68 Coordinate and support relevant cross-sector activities e g standards development research and development pilot initiatives and exercises in accordance with guidance provided in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 HSPD-7 Financial Services Task Force Report April 2004 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Funding of NSTAC Initiatives Investigation Group Period of Activity Funding of NSTAC Initiatives FNI Task Force April 3 1984 – December 12 1984 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The FRWG reconvened March 1990 reviewed the NSTAC funding methodology and worked with the Enhanced Call Completion Task Force to develop an order-of-magnitude cost model for use by all task forces Report Issued Issue Background On April 3 1984 the NSTAC agreed to address the funding of NSTAC initiatives issue to determine the costs and benefits associated with its recommendations to the Government The purpose of FNI was to guide and prioritize NSTAC actions In August 1984 the FRWG established the FNI Task Force to investigate approaches to NSTAC funding mechanisms NSTAC Funding Methodology October 25 1984 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On December 12 1984 the NSTAC approved the funding methodology developed by the FNI Task Force and instructed the IES to u Adopt the methodology developed by the FNI Task Force u Issue the funding methodology as guidance to all existing and future task forces and u Direct all task forces to determine costs benefits and applicable funding mechanisms for each recommended initiative The NSTAC instructed all NSTAC task forces and working groups to apply the FNI funding methodology to the recommendations they developed The FRWG assists all active and future NSTAC task forces when necessary in providing cost benefit estimates and proposed funding mechanisms for all recommended initiatives using the guidelines from the funding report 69 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Globalization Investigation Group Period of Activity National Information Infrastructure NII Task Force August 2 1993 – March 18 1997 Operations Support Group OSG April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Information Infrastructure Group IIG April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Globalization Task Force GTF September 23 1999 – May 16 2000 Issue Background In 1993 the NSTAC established an NII Task Force and charged it with examining the implications of the evolving U S information infrastructure for NS EP communications The NII Task Force observed that the NII’s connectivity to the emerging Global Information Infrastructure GII potentially presented both opportunities and risks for NS EP communications In its March 1997 report to NSTAC XIX the NII Task Force concluded that the pervasive and rapidly evolving nature of the GII necessitated a continuing effort by NSTAC task forces and working groups to track the GII’s implications for NS EP communications As a result the NSTAC IES tasked the OSG in April 1997 to monitor the U S information infrastructure’s global interfaces because of the potential for increased vulnerabilities adversely affecting the national interest Specifically the OSG gathered information on the International Telecommunication Union’s Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite Memorandum of Understanding In October 1998 the IES tasked the IIG to conduct a forward-looking analysis of the GII and associated NS EP opportunities and challenges During a reorganization of the IES and its working group structure in September 1999 the IES formed the GTF to continue to address the GII issue Specifically the IES tasked the GTF with developing a “picture” of the GII in 2010 identifying NS EP issues The GTF was also given two additional tasks that were global in scope assessing the security implications of foreign ownership of telecommunications networks and examining export policies dealing with the transfer of strong encryption products satellite technology and high-performance computers During the NSTAC XXII and XXIII cycles the IIG and GTF researched and gathered information from industry and Government experts on emerging space- airborne- and land-based communications systems and services These information gathering activities provided the GTF with the insights needed to characterize the GII in 2010 and draw conclusions about NS EP telecommunications preparedness Drawing on these insights the GTF was able to describe what physical network elements services and protocols might be prominently featured in 2010 paying specific attention to the global homogenization of communications capabilities expected improvements to quality of service and network assurance and the ubiquity and availability of advanced communications technologies as pertaining specifically to NS EP users The GTF documented its analysis in its May 2000 report to NSTAC XXIII Based on that analysis the NSTAC recommended that the President direct appropriate departments and agencies to u Conduct exercises in those areas and environments in which NS EP operations can be expected to take place to ensure that the required high-capacity broadband access to the GII is available and 71 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u Ensure that NS EP requirements such as interoperability security and mobility are identified and considered in standards and technical specifications as the GII evolves to 2010 and identify any specialized services that must be developed to satisfy NS EP requirements not satisfied by commercial systems The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Reports Issued National Information Infrastructure Task Force Report March 1997 Operations Support Group Report September 1998 Information Infrastructure Group Report June 1999 In addition the LRWG assisted the GTF in assessing the security implications of foreign ownership of telecommunications networks The LRWG examined domestic regulatory history and conducted analyses of several mergers and acquisitions between domestic and foreign telecommunications carriers Through the case studies the group found that the current regulatory structure satisfied the different interests of the parties involved The LRWG concluded that it was unclear whether further statutory or regulatory changes would effectively enhance the role of national security issues in foreign ownership situations at this time The GTF May 2000 report to NSTAC XXIII includes the LRWG analysis of the issue Based on the GTF’s report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Ensure that the review process for commercial arrangements involving foreign ownership remains adequate to protect NS EP concerns as the environment evolves and becomes more complex Lastly addressing technology export the GTF compiled some basic information on the key technology export issue areas Given that technology progresses faster than export policy can keep up with it the GTF recommended continued monitoring of developing export policies and regulations The GTF also investigated guidelines to assist companies in understanding Government approval of technology sales The GTF completed its tasking to scope the issue of technology export concurring with the Government’s efforts to periodically reevaluate the limits placed on the export of technologies 72 Globalization Task Force Report May 2000 Global Infrastructure Report May 2000 Paper on Foreign Ownership Telecommunications and NS EP Implications May 2000 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Industry Government Information Sharing and Response Investigation Group Period of Activity National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications NCC Vision Task Force October 15 1996 – April 22 1997 Operations Support Group OSG April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection IS CIPTF Task Force September 23 1999 – May 16 2000 Issue Background The NSTAC formed the National Coordinating Mechanism NCM Task Force in December 1982 to facilitate industry Government response to the Government’s growing NS EP telecommunications service requirements in the post-divestiture environment The task force submitted its final report the NCM Implementation Plan to the NSTAC on January 30 1984 That report led to formation of the NCC an emergency response coordination center that supports the Government’s NS EP telecommunications requirements Since 1984 threats to the NS EP telecommunications infrastructure changed significantly In response the NSTAC IES established the NCC Vision Task Force in October 1996 to consider the implications of the new environment for the functions performed by the NCC The IES charged the task force to determine whether the mission organization and capabilities of the NCC were still valid considering the ongoing changes in technology industry composition threats and requirements Following the IES group reorganization in April 1997 the task force became the NCC Vision Subgroup and later the NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup under the OSG NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES In 1997 the NSTAC also revisited the original concept for an industry Government mechanism to coordinate planning information sharing and resources in response to NS EP requirements Unlike the original NCM plan that applied to the telecommunications infrastructure this revised NCM concept involved linking all the Nation’s critical infrastructures e g telecommunications financial services electric power and transportation In July 1997 the OSG created the NCM Subgroup to explore the need for and feasibility of an NCM across infrastructures In May 1998 the President released PDD-63 a critical infrastructure protection directive calling for among other things industry participation in the Government’s efforts to ensure the security of the Nation’s infrastructures As it continued to refine the NCM concept the NCM Subgroup considered this Government initiative In September 1998 the OSG formed the Year 2000 Y2K Subgroup to address several Y2K issues raised at the NSTAC XXI meeting including the need for Y2K outreach efforts the need to emphasize contingency planning and restoration scenarios the potential for public overreaction to the Y2K problem and the lack of a global approach to handle Y2K problems that were international in scope The effort was a continuation of earlier efforts by the NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup which began a study of the NCC’s operational readiness and coordination capabilities for potential public network disruptions caused by the Y2K problem Following NSTAC XXII the IES tasked the OSG to examine potential lessons learned from Y2K experiences that could be applied to critical infrastructure protection efforts The OSG focused on the experiences of the NCC to determine how its operations during the Y2K rollover period translated into functions to be performed as ISAC in accordance with PDD-63 In addition the OSG continued to monitor enhancements to the NCC that ensured an electronic Indications Assessment and Warnings IAW capability to support the ISAC function 73 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review In September 1999 following a reevaluation of NSTAC working groups the IES created the IS CIPTF to examine mechanisms and processes for protected operational information sharing that would help achieve the goals of PDD-63 and further the role of the NCC as an ISAC for telecommunications In addition the IES directed the IS CIPTF to continue through outreach efforts interaction with Government leaders responsible for PDD-63 implementation History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations During 1997 the NCC Vision Subgroup worked closely with the NCS member organizations and NCC industry representatives to develop a common framework for assessing the NCC’s ongoing role The subgroup validated the original 10 NCC chartered functions and updated the NCC Operating Guidelines both written in 1984 for the current operational environment The subgroup also determined that an electronic intrusion incident information processing function could be integrated into the NCC’s activities In August 1997 the subgroup held an industry Government tabletop exercise to test the draft concept of operations for NCC intrusion incident information processing The OSG documented the subgroup’s activities and accomplishments in the OSG’s report to the December 11 1997 NSTAC XX Meeting The NSTAC approved the OSG’s NSTAC XX report and recommended that the President u Establish a mechanism within the Federal Government with which the NCC can coordinate intrusion incident information issues and with which NSTAC groups can coordinate the development of standardized reporting criteria The NSTAC also endorsed NCC implementation of an initial intrusion incident information processing pilot based on voluntary reporting by industry and Government In 1998 the NCC modified its standard operating procedures to accommodate an electronic intrusion 74 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee incident information processing capability With the OSG’s support and assistance the NCC began its intrusion incident information processing pilot on June 15 1998 The NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup worked closely with the OMNCS and the Manager NCC as the NCC implemented the intrusion incident processing pilot which it completed in October 1998 In addition the NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup developed a paper the NCC Intrusion Incident Reporting Criteria and Format Guidelines to establish standardized reporting criteria and to outline steps in NCC electronic intrusion report collection processing and distribution The OSG report to NSTAC XXI includes the paper Leading up to NSTAC XX the NCM Subgroup met jointly with the Information Infrastructure Group’s IA Policy Subgroup and produced a joint report The report concluded that the revised NCM concept provided the framework for the Federal Government and the private sector to address solutions to infrastructure protection concerns The OSG included the joint report in its full NSTAC XX report which the NSTAC approved Specifically the NSTAC recommended that the President u Direct the appropriate departments and agencies to work with the NCS and NSTAC in further investigating the NCM concept Subsequently IES representatives presented the revised NCM concept to senior Government officials to aid the Administration’s efforts to establish national policy on the protection of critical national infrastructures Throughout the NSTAC XXI cycle the OSG considered the infrastructure protection efforts of the Federal Government in conjunction with the enhanced role of the NCC IES and NCM Subgroup members met with members of the National Infrastructure Protection Center NIPC to address the role of industry in the Government’s new IA environment The Government created the NIPC in February 1998 as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment warning vulnerability law NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee enforcement investigation and response entity The NIPC’s mission is to detect deter assess warn of respond to and investigate computer intrusions and unlawful acts both physical and cyber that threaten or target the Nation’s critical infrastructures As a result of these meetings the NCC and NIPC began to develop processes to detail the flow of information between the two entities At the end of the NSTAC XXI cycle the OSG concluded that the NCC provided a model for all infrastructures by which information could be gathered analyzed sanitized and provided to the Government In addition regarding PDD-63 implementation the OSG concluded that more than one individual or entity would be needed to serve as the sector coordinator to represent the highly diverse information and communications sector The NSTAC approved the OSG’s September 1998 report to NSTAC XXI and recommended that the President direct the lead departments and agencies as designated in PDD-63 to u Consider adapting the NCC model as appropriate for the various critical infrastructures to provide warning and information centers for reporting and exchange of information with the NIPC through the NCM process and u Establish an industry Government coordinating activity to advise in the selection of a sector coordinator and provide continuing advice to effectively represent each critical infrastructure Following NSTAC XXI the OSG’s NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup worked closely with the OMNCS and the Manager NCC as the NCC continued its electronic intrusion incident processing function The subgroup continued to assist the NCC in evaluating any needed revisions to the IAW reporting criteria and format guidelines The OSG’s NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup also assessed whether the NCC requires additional industry and Government participation within the NCC to widen the scope of expertise and operational personnel available to fulfill the IAW mission During the NSTAC XXII cycle the subgroup developed a list of companies and Government departments and agencies for the Manager NCS to consider as candidates for participation in the NCC PDD-63 established the concept of an ISAC that would be a private sector entity responsible for gathering analyzing sanitizing and disseminating to industry private sector information related to vulnerabilities threats intrusions and anomalies affecting the critical infrastructures At the end of the NSTAC XXII cycle the OSG concluded that the NCC already performed the primary functions of an ISAC for the telecommunications sector and that industry and Government should establish it as such The OSG’s Y2K Subgroup investigated domestic and international Y2K preparedness and contingency planning efforts for the telecommunications infrastructure The subgroup held a number of informational meetings with Government representatives to address ongoing Y2K readiness and contingency planning efforts To understand public concerns about the Y2K problem the Y2K Subgroup also investigated the initiatives of grassroots Y2K community forums and those groups promulgating “doomsday” scenarios The subgroup’s findings are included in the OSG’s June 1999 NSTAC XXII report Based on that report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Direct the President’s Council on Y2K Conversion and the Federal Government continue providing timely meaningful and accurate Y2K readiness and contingency planning information related to the information and communications critical infrastructures to State and local governments thereby enhancing the flow of information to the general public and community Y2K groups Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The NSTAC’s support for the evolving role of the NCC helped pave the way for the establishment 75 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review of the NCC as an ISAC for telecommunications under the provisions of PDD-63 During 1997 the NSTAC advocated and later endorsed the NCC’s implementation of an electronic intrusion incident reporting capability based on voluntary reporting by industry and Government In January 2000 the National Security Council agreed with the NSTAC’s 1999 conclusion that the NCC was performing the primary functions of an ISAC In March 2000 the NCC formally achieved initial operating capability as an ISAC for the telecommunications sector Following the October 21 2004 Principals Conference Call the NSTAC formed the National Coordinating Center Task Force NCCTF to examine the future mission and role of the NCC Please see the NCCTF section in the Active Issues section of this NSTAC Issue Review for further information Reports Issued Operations Support Group Report December 1997 Information Assurance A Joint Report of the IA Policy Subgroup of the Information Infrastructure Group and the NCM Subgroup of the Operations Support Group December 1997 Operations Support Group Report September 1998 Operations Support Group Report June 1999 76 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Industry Information Security NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Reports Issued The IIS Task Force Report Volume I November 1986 Investigation Group Period of Activity The IIS Task Force Report Volume II Appendices November 1986 Industry Information Security IIS Task Force August 19 1986 – September 22 1988 Status Report of the IIS Task Force October 1987 Issue Background Final Report of the IIS Task Force—Industry Information Protection Volume I June 1988 Based on widespread concern within the Government regarding the protection of sensitive but unclassified information the President requested that the NSTAC identify initiatives that would facilitate the protection of sensitive information processing systems On August 19 1986 the NSTAC IES established the IIS Task Force to develop industry’s perspective on the issue The original IIS Task Force defined and identified sensitive information categories the relationship between telecommunications and automated information systems an analysis methodology and areas for further investigation The IES then established a follow-on IIS Task Force to improve information security in telecommunications and automated information systems The IIS Task Force submitted its final report to the NSTAC on September 22 1988 It contained 10 conclusions and eight recommendations The NSTAC approved the report and forwarded it to the President Final Report of the IIS Task Force—Industry Information Protection Volume II Appendices June 1988 Final Report of the IIS Task Force Industry Information Protection Volume III Annotated Bibliography June 1988 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On September 22 1988 the NSTAC approved the IIS Task Force final report and forwarded it to the President Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The NSA continued and expanded the Protected Communication Zone program NSA developed standardized encryption modules for terminal unit platforms and reendorsed the Data Encryption Standard algorithm Federal agencies continued the information security education program 77 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Information Assurance to continue acting as the focal point for NSTAC IA and CIP issues Investigation Group Period of Activity In investigating IA CIP issues the IIG worked closely with the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and other Federal organizations concerned with examining physical and cyber threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructures Federal efforts in this arena culminated with the release of presidential policy guidance—PDD 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection May 22 1998 Subsequently PDD-63 implementation became a focal point for the IIG’s activities Information Assurance Task Force IATF May 15 1995 – April 22 1997 Information Infrastructure Group IIG April 22 1997 – September 23 1999 Financial Services Task Force FSTF March 2003 – April 2004 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Issue Background At the NSTAC XVII Meeting the Director of the National Security Agency briefed the NSTAC Principals on threats to U S infrastructures In the ensuing months the NSTAC’s Issues Group sponsored a number of meetings with representatives from the national security community law enforcement and civil departments and agencies to discuss information warfare defensive and IA issues At the May 15 1995 IES Working Session the members approved establishing the IATF to serve as a focal point for IA issues More specifically the IES charged the IATF to cooperate with the U S Government to identify critical national infrastructures and their importance to the national interest schedule elements for assessment and propose IA policy recommendations to the President The IATF worked closely with industry and Government representatives to identify critical national infrastructures and ultimately selected three for study electric power financial services and transportation To address the distinctive characteristics of those infrastructures the IATF established three risk assessment subgroups to examine each infrastructure’s dependence on information technology and the associated IA risks to its information systems Following NSTAC XIX the IES renamed the IATF the IIG and gave it the mission The IATF’s Electric Power Risk Assessment Subgroup completed its IA risk assessment report in preparation for the March 1997 NSTAC XIX Meeting In compiling information for this report the Electric Power Risk Assessment Subgroup met with representatives from eight electric utilities two industry associations an electric power pool equipment manufacturers and numerous industry consultants Based on these interviews the subgroup assessed the extent to which the infrastructure depends on information systems and how associated vulnerabilities placed the electric power industry at increased risk to denial-of-service attacks Based on the subgroup’s findings the NSTAC recommended that the President u Assign the appropriate department or agency to develop and conduct an ongoing program within the electric power industry to increase the awareness of vulnerabilities and available or emerging solutions u Establish an NSTAC-like advisory committee to enhance industry Government cooperation regarding regulatory changes affecting electric power and u Provide threat information and consider providing incentives for industry to work with Government to develop and deploy appropriate security features for the electric power industry 79 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The IIG’s Financial Services Risk Assessment Subgroup submitted its final recommendations in a report to NSTAC XX in December 1997 In compiling information for this report the Financial Services Risk Assessment Subgroup conducted confidential interviews with institutions representing money center banks securities credit firms credit card associations third-party processors industry utilities industry associations and Federal regulatory agencies responsible for industry oversight The subgroup found that industry organizations treated security measures as fundamental risk controls—that a system of independent mutually reinforcing checks and balances within critical systems and networks was unique to the financial services industry providing a high level of integrity The subgroup concluded that at the national level the industry was sufficiently protected and prepared to address a range of threats However the subgroup identified security implications and potential vulnerabilities associated with the industry’s dependence on the telecommunications infrastructure being subjected to deregulation the integration of dissimilar information systems and networks resulting from mergers and acquisitions and the introduction of Web-based financial services Based on the Financial Services Risk Assessment Report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Assign to the appropriate department or agency the mission of identifying external threats and risk mitigation to the financial services infrastructure facilitating the sharing of information between industry and Government u Assign the appropriate department or agency the task of working with the private sector to develop a mutually agreeable solution for effective background investigations for sensitive positions u Assign the appropriate department or agency the task of monitoring the new emerging areas of electronic money and commerce including new payment services and 80 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Ensure that the NSTAC continues to have at least one member from the financial services industry The IIG’s Transportation Risk Assessment Subgroup sponsored a workshop on September 10 1997 to discuss the transportation information infrastructure Topics included intermodal information dependencies industry Government information sharing transportation information infrastructure vulnerabilities and Government understanding of the transportation industry’s information infrastructure vulnerabilities The workshop held at Fort McPherson Georgia included representatives from many major transportation companies including airlines multimodal carriers rail highway mass transit and maritime The subgroup documented its findings in an Interim Transportation Information Risk Assessment Report to NSTAC XX in December 1997 The IIG continued to investigate transportation information infrastructure issues through the NSTAC XXII cycle As part of that effort the IIG worked with Department of Transportation representatives to conduct outreach meetings with transportation industry associations to better understand intermodal transportation trends The IIG also hosted another workshop on March 3 and 4 1999 in Tampa Florida which included representation from each transportation sector Participants discussed industry trends including increased reliance on information technology and the rapid growth of intermodal transportation Workshop findings were categorized into four areas 1 threats and deterrents 2 vulnerabilities 3 protection measures and 4 infrastructure-wide issues Based on the IIG’s final Transportation Risk Assessment Report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Continue support for the efforts of the Department of Transportation to promote outreach and awareness within the transportation infrastructure as expressed in PDD-63 Critical Infrastructure Protection NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee As part of the above recommendation the NSTAC specifically recommended that the President and the Administration ensure support for the following activities u Timely dissemination of Government information on physical and cyber threats to the transportation industry u Government research and development programs to design infrastructure assurance tools and techniques to counter emerging cyber threats to the transportation information infrastructure u Industry Government efforts to examine emerging industry-wide vulnerabilities such as those related to the Global Positioning System and u Future Department of Transportation conferences to simulate intermodal and where appropriate inter-infrastructure information exchange on threats vulnerabilities and best practices Following NSTAC XX the IIG formed an Electronic Commerce EC Cyber Security Subgroup to address two issues the short-term technical and time-sensitive issue relating to cyber security training and forensics and the long-term policy oriented high-level issue of the NS EP implications of EC In addressing the short-term issue the subgroup found that industry and Government needed a stronger partnership to establish appropriate levels of trust and understanding and to foster cooperation in addressing cyber security issues At the September 1998 NSTAC XXI meeting the NSTAC approved the subgroup’s study paper along with the IIG report and made the following recommendation u The President should direct the appropriate departments and agencies to continue working with the NSTAC to develop policies procedures techniques and tools to facilitate industry Government cooperation on cyber security To address the long-term issue the IIG continued to investigate the NS EP implications associated with the adoption of EC within industry and Government The group focused its efforts on issues associated with the changing business and security processes and policies necessary to implement EC The IIG’s conclusions and recommendations were included in its June 1999 report to NSTAC XXII Based on that report the NSTAC recommended that the President u In accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by E O 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions designate a focal point for examining the NS EP issues related to widespread adoption of EC within the Government and u Direct Federal departments and agencies in cooperation with an established Federal focal point to assess the effect of EC technologies on their NS EP operations At the NSTAC XXI Executive Session the U S Attorney General requested that the NSTAC and the DOJ work together to address cyber security and crime The IES determined that the projects DOJ suggested should not be addressed by the NSTAC at large but agreed that the NSTAC could help facilitate a partnership between the DOJ and individual corporations This agreement resulted in a meeting on March 5 1999 between the NSTAC chair and the Attorney General where they discussed the possibilities for industry and Government participation on mutually beneficial projects These efforts ultimately resulted in DOJ’s Cyber Citizen program Building on past NSTAC efforts in addressing IA and CIP issues the IIG continued to coordinate with Federal officials responsible for PDD-63 implementation during the NSTAC XXII cycle Specifically in accordance with the PDD-63 emphasis on public-private partnerships IIG members focused on sharing the lessons and successes of NSTAC and offering it as a possible model for other infrastructures 81 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations NSTAC advice to the President and the Administration has had significant applicability to PDD-63 implementation PDD-63 directs Federal lead agencies to identify infrastructure sector coordinators within industry to provide perspective on CIP programs At NSTAC XXI in September 1998 the NSTAC concluded that more than one entity or sector coordinator would be required to represent the diverse information and communications sector In February 1999 following IES outreach to the Administration on the issue the Department of Commerce acted in concert with NSTAC advice and selected three industry associations to serve as sector coordinators for the information and communications sector The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Reports Issued Information Assurance Task Force Report March 1997 Electric Power Information Assurance Risk Assessment Report March 1997 Information Infrastructure Group Report December 1997 Financial Services Risk Assessment Report December 1997 Interim Transportation Information Risk Assessment Report December 1997 Cyber Crime Point Paper December 1997 Information Infrastructure Group Report September 1998 PDD-63 also calls for the private sector to explore the feasibility of establishing one or multiple ISAC On the basis of the December 1997 NSTAC recommendation regarding a cross-infrastructure National Coordinating Mechanism IES representatives engaged in a dialogue with senior Administration officials on the prospects of creating multiple infrastructure-based ISACs That dialogue was important to the eventual decision to establish the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications as an ISAC for telecommunications Finally PDD-63 emphasizes the importance of relying on nonregulatory solutions to address infrastructure vulnerabilities In satisfying this objective the Administration underscored the value of promoting industry standards and best practices to improve IA That approach is consistent with and follows on the December 1997 NSTAC XX recommendation regarding the creation of a private sector Information Systems Security Board 82 Cyber Security Training and Forensics Issue Paper September 1998 Information Infrastructure Group Report June 1999 Transportation Information Infrastructure Risk Assessment Report June 1999 Report on NS EP Implications of Electronic Commerce June 1999 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Investigation Group Period of Activity Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force IS CIPTF September 1999 – March 2002 National Plan to Defend Critical Infrastructures Task Force NPTF June 20 2001 – September 20 2001 Issue Background In investigating Information Assurance issues the NSTAC worked closely with the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and other Federal organizations concerned with examining physical and cyber threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructures Federal efforts in this arena culminated with the release of presidential policy guidance—Presidential Decision Directive PDD 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection May 22 1998 Subsequently PDD-63 implementation became a focal point for NSTAC activities Following a reevaluation of NSTAC subgroups in September 1999 the IES created the IS CIPTF to address information sharing issues associated with critical infrastructure protection CIP Specifically the IES directed the task force to among other things continue interaction with Government leaders responsible for PDD-63 implementation and examine mechanisms and processes for protected operational information sharing that would help achieve the goals of PDD-63 At NSTAC XXIV the National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism requested the NSTAC’s assistance in developing the Administration’s National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Protection The NSTAC’s IES established the NPTF to draft a response to the National Coordinator’s request Subsequently NPTF leadership met with NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES National Security Council and Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office CIAO staff to discuss approaches for providing input to the national plan The chosen approach focused on providing input on capabilities for national information sharing analysis and dissemination to counter cyber threats History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Building on outreach work conducted by the NSTAC Information Infrastructure Group during the NSTAC XXII cycle see the Information Assurance section in this NSTAC Issue Review the IS CIPTF continued to provide input to the Director CIAO on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1 0 This plan was the first major element of a more comprehensive effort by the Federal Government to protect and defend the Nation against cyber vulnerabilities and disruptions The IS CIPTF members shared industry concerns and developed a dialogue with the Government that helped to shape the plan In its May 2000 report to NSTAC XXIII the IS CIPTF provided NSTAC-recommended input to the plan regarding the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications NCC as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center ISAC for the telecommunications industry In parallel with its work associated with the National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1 0 and as part of continuous efforts to share NSTAC expertise with industry and Government the IS CIPTF monitored the development of the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security The Partnership is an industry Government effort to raise awareness about critical infrastructure security and facilitates industry participation in the national process to address CIP Through individual NSTAC member company participation the NSTAC shared expertise successes lessons learned and experiences to further facilitate the development of the Partnership in support of PDD-63 objectives The IS CIPTF also examined mechanisms and processes for protected operational information sharing that would help achieve the goals of PDD-63 and further the role of the NCC as an ISAC for telecommunications See the Industry 83 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Government Information Sharing and Response section in this NSTAC Issue Review for a discussion of how the NSTAC’s support for the evolving role of the NCC helped pave the way for the establishment of the NCC as an ISAC for telecommunications Specifically the task force examined the NCC’s historical experiences to determine how and what information is shared and the utility of information sharing for industry and Government As part of the study the IS CIPTF examined the NCC’s Year 2000 Y2K experiences for lessons learned that could benefit infrastructure protection efforts The task force also identified benefits of information sharing to both industry and Government The IS CIPTF also requested that the NSTAC’s Legislative and Regulatory Working Group LRWG examine the Freedom of Information Act FOIA as a potential impediment to information sharing and report its findings to the task force The LRWG’s work provided the task force with the background necessary to voice industry concerns about the need for legal provisions to protect critical infrastructure protection-related information from disclosure The IS CIPTF documented its findings in its report to NSTAC XIII in May 2000 The IS CIPTF concluded that historical and Y2K experiences demonstrate information sharing to be a worthwhile effort however for widespread information sharing over an extended period of time to take place legal operational and perceived impediments must be overcome Based on the IS CIPTF’s report the NSTAC recommended that the President u Support legislation similar to the Y2K Information and Readiness Disclosure Act that would protect CIP information voluntarily shared with the appropriate departments and agencies from disclosure under FOIA and limit liability At the May 16 2000 NSTAC XXIII Meeting a Government request was made for industry advice and recommendations for revision of the National Plan for Information Systems Protection During the NSTAC XXIV 84 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee cycle the IS CIPTF developed a response based on the NSTAC’s experience with proven processes for industry and Government partnership at the technical operational and policy levels Specifically the task force documented NSTAC findings related to the three broad objectives of Version 1 0 of the national plan—Prepare and Prevent Detect and Respond and Build Strong Foundations—that should be reflected in Version 2 0 of the plan In addition the task force proposed that a new broad objective—International Considerations—be included in the plan’s Version 2 0 The NSTAC approved the response and forwarded it to the President This information was also shared with the Information and Communications I C Sector Coordinators the U S Telecom Association the Telecommunications Industry Association and the Information Technology Association of America and the I C Sector Liaison NTIA The information was subsequently included in the I C Sector Report that NTIA forwarded it to the President in April 2001 During the NSTAC XXIV cycle the IS CIPTF also continued to address barriers to sharing CIP-related information including possible law enforcement restrictions on industry sharing network intrusion data with ISACs or similar information sharing forums The task force requested that the NSTAC and Government Network Security and Information Exchanges NSIE assist in investigating this issue The NSTAC NSIE representatives reported that historically they had not discussed intrusions into their networks and systems with anyone else after reporting them to law enforcement because case agents had told them that doing so might compromise the investigation of their cases In working with the Department of Justice the NSIEs found that although common practice discourages victims of such crimes from sharing information no laws or policies prohibit victims from discussing crimes against them even after they have reported them to law enforcement To address the situation the Chief Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Department of Justice agreed to work with the law enforcement community to implement The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee policies that encourage victims to share such information and to educate victims on those policies The NSIEs concluded that it would be necessary for the private sector to ensure that personnel interacting with law enforcement on such cases are aware that they are permitted and encouraged to share this information for network security purposes using appropriate mechanisms At the June 6 2001 NSTAC XXIV meeting the National Coordinator requested the NSTAC’s assistance in developing the Bush Administration’s National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Assurance At that meeting Federal officials also briefed a new national initiative for information sharing and dissemination the Cyber Warning Information Network CWIN to the NSTAC as part of the discussion on national information sharing capabilities The IES formed the NPTF to discuss the proposed CWIN and develop further input to the national plan The NPTF held discussions with members of the Government’s CWIN Working Group to gain a better understanding of the CWIN initiative The NSTAC input to the national plan—based on the NPTF work—included an industry-based assessment of a national information sharing analysis and dissemination capability for addressing “cyber crises ” The assessment considered CWIN as a part of that larger national capability The NSTAC’s input focused on the need for a recognized authoritative national-level capability to disseminate warnings and facilitate response and mitigation efforts for cyber crises across the Nation’s infrastructures The NSTAC also concluded that key elements of such a capability spanning public and private sectors should include information collection and sharing information analysis dissemination of alerts and warnings and post-event analysis NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Nevertheless the NSTAC clearly determined that the ISACs should be leveraged by both industry and Government in building such a national capability and should serve as the Government’s primary means of interface with industry In addition the NSTAC determined that industry and Government should develop communications mechanisms to link the ISACs to each other as well as with Government The NSTAC also found that infrastructures should consider alternative means for communicating during emergencies as appropriate to the sector For example the telecommunications industry developed an alerting and coordination mechanism which connects key elements of the sector and provides reliable and survivable communications in the event other communications mechanisms are unavailable or requirements warrant its use The NSTAC forwarded its report containing input on the national plan to the President in November 2001 Reports Issued Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report May 2000 The NSTAC’s Response to the National Plan April 2001 Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report June 2001 The NSTAC’s Input to the National Plan An Assessment of Industry’s Role in National Level Information Sharing Analysis and Dissemination Capabilities for Addressing Cyber Crises November 2001 The NSTAC recognized that conceptualizing the architecture for a national capability for addressing cyber crises is a complex undertaking Before a national capability can become fully operational industry and Government must address—individually and in collaboration—numerous policy legal financial operational and technical issues 85 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Intelligent Networks Investigation Group Period of Activity Intelligent Networks IN Task Force August 1989 – October 1991 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations At NSTAC XIII October 3 1991 the NSTAC approved the following recommendation to the President in the IES Executive Report on Intelligent Networks u Issue Background The Telecommunications System Survivability Task Force selected IN as one of five study topics focused on determining the effect of new technologies on telecommunications systems survivability In June 1989 the NSTAC charged the IES with continuing the intelligent network effort on an interim basis pending review by the IES PWG Upon PWG recommendation that intelligent networks become a full task force the IES established the IN Task Force in August 1989 NSTAC XI extended the activities of the IN Task Force until NSTAC XII December 13 1990 To meet its charge the task force worked with the OMNCS to derive a set of desired NS EP user features and compared them with intelligent network services The task force determined the advantages and disadvantages of identified intelligent network services for NS EP telecommunications including interoperability considerations The IES extended the IN Task Force until NSTAC XIII to allow the OWG to work with the task force and the OMNCS to refine the recommendations in the task force final report The IN Task Force presented its final report and recommendations at the November 1990 IES meeting The IES referred the report to the IES OWG for evaluation The OWG’s New Technology Panel developed an executive report on INs in response to the IES charge to evaluate and refine the conclusions and recommendations of the IN Task Force Final Report NSTAC XIII directed the IES to disband the IN Task Force In its Executive Report to the President NSTAC offered to provide additional support to assist the Government in meeting the challenges of intelligent networks The Government should establish an IN Program Office to ensure advantages of evolving intelligent networks are incorporated into planning for and procurement of Government NS EP telecommunications Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The OMNCS established an Advanced Intelligent Networks AIN Program Office in its Office of Plans and Programs The primary objectives of the AIN Program Office are to u Identify AIN service needs for NS EP telecommunications u Determine the current status and planned capabilities of AIN technology u Demonstrate AIN capabilities supporting NS EP requirements u Assess the status of AIN standards activities and u Develop and implement a strategy for influencing the direction of AIN standards The AIN Program Office awarded a 5-year AIN NS EP contract to Bellcore to provide a mechanism for collecting IN and AIN data analyzing new technology developments and demonstrating AIN-based applications By meeting those objectives and obtaining pertinent information from Bellcore the OMNCS will help ensure NS EP telecommunications users benefit from the evolving AIN technology 87 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Reports Issued The IN Task Force Final Report The Impact of IN on NS EP Telecommunications November 7 1990 The Industry Executive Subcommittee Executive Report on IN October 3 1991 88 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES International Diplomatic Telecommunications Reports Issued Investigation Group Period of Activity IDT Task Force Final Report March 15 1984 IDT Task Force Interim Report to IES January 16 1984 International Diplomatic Telecommunications IDT Task Force September 27 1983 – December 12 1984 Issue Background National Security Decision Directive NSDD No 97 stipulates that U S Government missions and posts overseas must have the required telecommunications facilities and services to satisfy the Nation’s needs during international emergencies The National Communications System requested that the NSTAC advise the Department of State DOS on the vulnerability and risks inherent in overseas leased networks and offer remedial measures On September 27 1983 the NSTAC IES formed the IDT Task Force to study the issue and develop recommendations History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations In April 1984 the NSTAC forwarded the following recommendations on IDT to the President u Review vulnerabilities and risks at overseas diplomatic posts using the guidelines established by the IDT Task Force and u Establish a DOS point of contact to serve the telecommunications needs of foreign missions operating in the United States The NSTAC also instructed the IES to assist the DOS in determining the feasibility of using telecommunications resources owned by U S industries to support diplomatic requirements during international emergencies 89 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee International National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications u Develop recommendations for an U S international NS EP telecommunications plan of action using both Government and private sector telecommunications resources and capabilities to meet evolving U S international NS EP telecommunications needs Investigation Group Period of Activity Ad Hoc Group of the Industry Executive Subcommittee IES Plans Working Group PWG July 25 1990 – March 1 1991 Issue Background Effective worldwide communications directly influences the Nation’s ability to promote its national security interests in the global arena and to meet its international responsibilities Changes in the international environment will profoundly affect the telecommunications capabilities needed to support the U S NS EP posture Significant changes in the international telecommunications industry-Eastern European modernization U S carrier involvement in other countries and development of new technologies and international standards will also affect the means for providing the requisite capabilities The PWG concluded that the ad hoc group needed to refocus the issue and directed it to review the international NS EP telecommunications issue again with a sharper focus of the original charge The ad hoc group met several times and presented a revised set of proposed task force charges at the March 6 1991 PWG Meeting The PWG concluded that an international task force was not warranted but that the PWG Chair should send a letter to the Deputy Manager NCS advising of the ad hoc group’s findings and gauging NSTAC’s willingness to address the international issue if requested by the Government The Deputy Manager NCS forwarded a copy of the PWG Chair’s letter to NCS principals to convey the PWG’s willingness to assist the Government in its effort to enhance overseas NS EP communications Report Issued During the last few years the industry Government NS EP telecommunications planning community demonstrated increasing interest in and concern about the international dimensions of NS EP telecommunications After considering a variety of potential problem areas the ad hoc group concluded that although modern telecommunications technologies are increasingly capable of supporting NS EP needs inadequate planning for using such technologies might impede the President’s ability to effectively react to international events Ad Hoc International Group of the IES Plans Working Group International National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Issue October 1990 The ad hoc group recommended to the October 24 1990 PWG meeting that it form a task force to u Identify and assess the biggest problem areas affecting future U S international NS EP telecommunications capabilities and 91 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Last Mile Bandwidth Availability Investigation Group Period of Activity Last Mile Bandwidth Availability Task Force LMBATF January 18 2001 – March 6 2002 Issue Background At the 23rd meeting of the President’s NSTAC on May 16 2000 the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Manager NCS addressed the inability of the Nation’s military and national security organizations to obtain the timely provisioning of high-bandwidth circuits at the local level referred to as the “last mile ” Subsequently in an October 2000 letter to the NSTAC Chair the NCS Manager asked the NSTAC to recommend what the Government could do to expedite the provisioning of “last mile” bandwidth or mitigate the provisioning periods for such services After scoping the key issues in coordination with Government the NSTAC’s IES formed the LMBATF at its January 18 2001 Working Session The task force was to examine the root causes of the provisioning periods how the Government might work with industry to reduce provisioning times or otherwise mitigate their effects and what policybased solutions could be applied to the provisioning of high-bandwidth circuits for NS EP services The task force included broad representation of NSTAC member companies and NCS departments and agencies During the remainder of the NSTAC XXIV cycle the LMBATF gathered data from both industry organizations and the Federal Government regarding their experiences with provisioning at the local level The task force also solicited input from telecommunications service providers on the processes for provisioning at the local level and the factors affecting provisioning periods Based on the input the LMBATF agreed that the scope of the study should apply to non-universally available services throughout the United States including fiber optics T1 and T3 lines integrated services digital network and digital subscriber line technologies NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The LMBATF concluded its analysis of the “last mile” provisionings during the NSTAC XXV cycle and presented its findings and recommendations in the March 2002 “Last Mile” Bandwidth Availability Task Force Report at NSTAC XXV The task force found that the provisioning periods for high-bandwidth services in the “last mile” are affected by a combination of complex factors such as intricate legislative regulatory and economic environments challenging site locations and contracting policies and procedures Furthermore while the Telecommunications Act of 1996 sought to encourage competition many carriers both incumbent and competitive are dissatisfied with the results This combined with a high level of marketplace uncertainty has reduced infrastructure investment by incumbents and competitors alike The task force also concluded that current Government contracting arrangements also create difficulties In many instances contracts are only vehicles for ordering services and do not represent a firm commitment on the part of the Government to purchase a service Because such commitments are not in place the carrier cannot be assured of recovering its infrastructure investment Furthermore when the business case warrants such investment carriers are limited by contracts’ failure to list the sites to be served or the types and quantities of services to be provided Problems also occur because Government contracts legally bind the prime contractor but make no explicit demands on subcontractors on which the prime contractor depends The Government is adversely affected by funding cycles that do not coincide with the time needed to obtain high-bandwidth services Funding is not allocated until the user identifies an immediate need and obtains approval However the deployment of high-bandwidth infrastructure often requires years of planning and coordination for allocating capital obtaining rights-of-way authority and installing service facilities The imperfect intersection of these inherently mismatched processes often results in lengthy provisioning periods 93 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The negative consequences of the funding process are often exacerbated by a fragmented management structure In many cases project managers are responsible for separate portions of the network with no single entity responsible for planning or monitoring the provisioning of end-to-end service Overall project management is vital to effective network deployment systems integration and achievement of project goals Because telecommunications services are provided by a multitude of companies users must track service orders and manage the network from a centralized perspective The task force also studied whether the TSP System can be used to expedite “last mile” provisioning requests because TSP provisioning assignments are used by the NS EP community to facilitate the expedited installation of telecommunications circuits that otherwise could not be installed within the required time frame Although TSP seems to be an applicable solution for many NS EP “last mile” bandwidth requests TSP provisioning assignments can only be applied to services originating from new business requirements Therefore TSP provisioning cannot be used to replace or transfer existing services such as those associated with the contract transition Finally TSP cannot be used to make up for time lost because of inadequate planning or logistical difficulties According to these parameters many “last mile” provisioning requests are not eligible for the TSP System even if the requested service could be used for executing an agency’s NS EP mission An alternative for meeting Government organizations’ service requirements may be the implementation of alternative technologies to fulfill bandwidth requirements on a temporary or permanent basis Based on this analysis the LMBATF report recommended that the President in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order E O 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and other existing authority 94 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Direct the appropriate departments and agencies in coordination with industry to reevaluate their communications service contracting and purchasing procedures and practices and take action to • Provide sufficient authority and flexibility to meet their needs consistent with current conditions • Allow long lead-time ordering and funding commitments based on projected requirements • Allow infrastructure funding where necessary for anticipated future needs or to accelerate installation so that customer requirements can be met • Share or assume risk for new service capital investment to ensure timely delivery • Allow and provide for performance incentives for all performing parties industry and Government organizational and individual • Require end-to-end project management of communications service ordering and delivery u Direct the Federal Government Chief Information Officers Council to propose and assist in implementing improved Government contracting practices for communications services that will enhance the availability of broadband services for the “last mile ” In support of the recommendations NSTAC “Last Mile” Task Force Report also suggested that both industry and Government encourage u Government contracting officers to engage all industry and Government representatives in joint planning sessions u Industry representatives to work with Government contracting officers in joint planning sessions The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u u Use of a contract structure that makes all carriers involved in the delivery of the service parties to the contract with direct accountability to the Government contracting entity and NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Report Issued “Last Mile” Bandwidth Availability Task Force Report to NSTAC XXV March 2002 Contracting practices that require end users to identify requirements and to communicate future needs to network providers End users and network providers should jointly identify complicating factors and discuss alternatives Finally the NSTAC “Last Mile” Bandwidth Availability Task Force Report encouraged Government to u Establish realistic service requirements and timelines and select the service options that meet its needs with acceptable risk u Convene a working group consisting of industry and Government stakeholders in the provisioning process to develop and recommend a streamlined approach to all aspects of the process including planning ordering and tracking The resulting proposal should be comprehensive simplifying steps and organizations as much as possible should share information appropriately at all points and should support flexibility in meeting end-user needs The working group should give strong consideration to a single Government database to support the process and a single point of contact such as a phone number or an e-mail address to ensure accuracy of information and provide exception handling and u Establish or contract for project managers who have all necessary management control tools at their disposal access to pertinent information and experience responsibility and authority for obtaining and overseeing delivery of the end-to-end service The LMBATF concluded its activities upon NSTAC approval of its report 95 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee National Coordinating Mechanism NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES as well as the Industry Government Coordination and Response section in this NSTAC Issue Review for a fuller discussion of recent NCC actions Investigating Group Period of Activity National Coordinating Mechanism NCM Task Force December 14 1982 – November 15 1984 Reports Issued NCM Task Force Report May 16 1983 Issue Background NCM Implementation Plan Final Report January 30 1984 The NSTAC recognized the need to establish a mechanism for coordinating industry and Government responses to the Government’s NS EP telecommunication service requirements in the post-divestiture environment As a result NSTAC formed the NCM Task Force in December 1982 and charged it to identify and establish the most cost-effective mechanism to coordinate industry-wide responses to NS EP telecommunications requests History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The NSTAC forwarded a series of NCM recommendations to the President in 1983 and 1984 The NCC is the most significant result of these recommendations Established on January 3 1984 the NCC is a joint industry Government operations center that supports the Federal Government’s NS EP telecommunication requirements Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The TSS Task Force reviewed Government actions taken on the NSTAC’s NCM recommendations and concluded that the NCM recommendations were carried out promptly and effectively The task force recommended continuing NCS member organizations’ representation in the NCC and continuing Government dissemination of NS EP information The NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s findings and recommendations on the NCM and forwarded them to the President on September 22 1988 The NCS member agencies’ representation in the NCC continues as does the Government’s dissemination of NS EP information See the NCC Task Force section in the NSTAC XXIX Issues section 97 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee National Information Infrastructure Investigation Group Period of Activity National Information Infrastructure NII Task Force August 2 1993 – March 18 1997 Issue Background At the August 2 1993 IES meeting the Plans Working Group subsequently reestablished as the Issues Group recommended that a task force be established to address NS EP telecommunications issues related to the evolution of the U S information infrastructure The IES established an NII Task Force to provide a series of reports with recommendations to the President The task force’s charge was to u Identify in collaboration with Government potential dual-use applications of the NII and recommend Government actions u Identify potential NS EP implications of the NII and recommend Government actions u As a minimum address items identified by the Director OSTP at NSTAC XV for example security resiliency interoperability standards and spectrum u Advise Government on technical and other considerations that will accelerate commercialization of a nationwide high speed network available to NS EP users and u As a minimum address architectural policy and regulatory issues along with those research and development focus areas pilot demonstration projects and civil military telecommunications issues identified by OSTP and the National Economic Council The task force relied on The National Information Infrastructure An Agenda for Action released by the administration on September 15 1993 as a guide NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES for its work This document called for the NSTAC to continue to offer advice to the President on NS EP telecommunications issues work with the Federal Communications Commission’s Network Reliability Council subsequently renamed the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council and complement the work of the U S Advisory Council on the NII To better focus on its charge and coordinate with the Information Infrastructure Task Force and its committees the NII Task Force established three subgroups the Policy Subgroup the Applications Subgroup and the Future Commercial Systems and Architecture Subgroup The Policy Subgroup’s final report Approach to Security and Privacy on the NII summarized the findings of the subgroup in network security It made preliminary recommendations on ways to ensure that expansion and enhancement of the information infrastructure would be compatible with telecommunications security concerns The Applications Subgroup assessed NII applications that the Government was developing In doing so the subgroup developed criteria to select applications for increased emphasis The subgroup made a number of recommendations related to developing dual-use applications Additionally the subgroup established an Emergency Health Care Information Focus Group to address health-care-specific issues for the NII The subgroup chose this application area as a model for examining important information infrastructure application issues such as interoperability privacy and security The final report of the Future Commercial Systems and Architecture Subgroup addressed the architectural principles and trends and NS EP performance issues of the current and future NII It examined the NII from the perspective of three major components the public switched network broadcast networks and the Internet Additionally the Issues Group addressed the information infrastructure issue working with the 99 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review OSTP to develop plans for an NII Symposium at the Naval War College NWC Newport Rhode Island October 17 – 19 1994 The Issues Group planned the symposium with the OSTP in response to an NWC invitation to the NSTAC to participate in a communications-focused game designed to address the NII The NWC produced a non-attribution report for distribution to all participants and it is available to any interested parties upon request History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The task force presented its interim report at the NSTAC XVI Meeting on March 2 1994 The report provides the background on the task force’s establishment its activities and future direction and a summary that includes a proposed statement for the NSTAC XVI Executive Report The statement reiterates the task force’s commitment to assisting the President in ensuring it satisfies NS EP requirements on the NII The NSTAC approved both the report and the proposed statement for forwarding to the President The task force presented an NII Task Force Status Report at NSTAC XVII on January 12 1995 The report discussed the work of the task force’s three subgroups—the Policy Subgroup the Applications Subgroup and the Future Commercial Systems and Architecture Subgroup The status report also addressed the 12 recommendations culled from the individual subgroup reports The task force presented its third report to NSTAC XVIII on February 28 1996 The report included analysis and recommendations regarding three NS EP issues 1 the need for an NII Security Center of Excellence SCOE 2 the emerging GII and 3 Emergency Health Care Information The NSTAC approved forwarding recommendations to the President regarding the latter two issues Following NSTAC XVIII the IES charged the task force to further investigate the advisability of establishing a SCOE henceforth referred to as the Information Systems Security Board ISSB The task force conceptualized the ISSB as a private sector entity that would promote information systems 100 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee security principles and standards to improve the reliability and trustworthiness of information products and services The task force developed the ISSB Concept Paper which outlined the functions and processes of the ISSB and served as the centerpiece for an outreach effort undertaken to ascertain the viability of the ISSB model After contacting more than 100 major information technology companies industry associations Government agencies and major information technology users the NII Task Force determined that there was broad support for the ISSB concept and that industry should take the lead in its formation The task force presented its fourth and final report at NSTAC XIX on March 18 1997 The report focused on the ISSB initiative and the NS EP implications of the GII The NSTAC recommended the President endorse the private sector ISSB initiative Lastly the NSTAC approved a recommendation to sunset the NII Task Force Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The Information Technology Industry Council ITIC sponsored an effort to explore formation of the ISSB the ITIC hosted the first meeting of this group on January 21 1997 Following the meeting the Information Security Exploratory Committee ISEC a consortium of interested stakeholders met regularly to discuss the possibility of operationalizing the ISSB concept The ISEC issued its report in January 1998 in which it recommended that although it supported the concept of the ISSB studies revealed that establishment of such a board would be duplicative of private endeavors At the same time however the ISSB concept influenced the Clinton Administration’s policy on implementing Presidential Decision Directive 63 Critical Infrastructure Protection Specifically in an approach consistent with the NSTAC’s ISSB recommendation the Administration’s Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office underscored the value of promoting industry standards and best practices to improve infrastructure assurance The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Reports Issued NII Task Force Interim Report February 1994 NII Task Force Report January 1995 NII Task Force Report February 1996 NII Task Force Report March 1997 101 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES National Research Council Report that current technologies and competitive trends were enhancing network robustness Investigation Group Period of Activity Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations National Research Council NRC Report Task Force August 18 1989 – March 29 1990 The NRC Report Task Force agreed with some of the recommendations of the NRC report and believed that the issue of growing vulnerabilities of the PSN needed to be further addressed Therefore the IES established the Network Security Task Force Issue Background In June 1989 the NSTAC noted that the NRC report Growing Vulnerability of the Public Switched Networks PSN Implications for National Security Emergency Preparedness differed from Telecommunications Systems Survivability Task Force findings The NSTAC therefore charged the IES with examining those differences and reporting back in early 1990 In response the IES formed the NRC Report Task Force and issued the following charges u If it agreed with the NRC report address what actions should be taken by industry to assist the Government in implementing the NRC’s recommendations In 1991 the NRC report attracted considerable attention in Congress and at the FCC due to recurring outages of the PSN The FCC established the Network Reliability Council on February 27 1992 to make recommendations to the FCC on improving network reliability The Network Reliability Council sponsored a symposium from June 10-11 1993 in Washington DC on industry’s best practices for avoiding and minimizing the risk and impact of future telephone network outages Report Issued NRC Report Task Force Final Report March 1990 u If it did not agree give the reasons why and the factors bearing on the differing perspectives of the IES and the NRC and u Comment on the report’s implications for interoperability The task force issued its final report in March 1990 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations In March 1990 the NSTAC approved the findings of the NRC Report Task Force Contrary to the NRC’s findings the task force concluded the PSN was growing more survivable This survivability stems from the increased network diversity provided by the existence of three major interexchange carriers the increased user demand for network service availability the deployment of robust network architectures and the incorporation of advanced transmission switching and signaling technologies The task force also noted 103 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee National Telecommunications Management Structure Investigation Group Period of Activity National Telecommunications Management Structure NTMS Task Force August 19 1986 – June 8 1989 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES with the implementation of the northeast region in October 1990 In September 1991 the activation of the southwest and northwest regions provided additional capability The subcommittee also completed NTMS regional validations in Chicago Illinois during November 1992 in Atlanta Georgia during February 1993 and in Denver Colorado during April 1993 Report Issued Issue Background On May 22 1986 the NSTAC concurred with the Government that there was a need for a survivable and endurable management structure to support NS EP telecommunications requirements and agreed that industry and Government should work jointly to develop such a capability As a result the NSTAC established the NTMS Task Force in August 1986 and charged it with assisting in developing an NTMS implementation plan NTMS Implementation Concept Final November 1987 History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On November 6 1987 the NSTAC forwarded to the President its recommendation to approve the NTMS Implementation Concept The Executive Office of the President approved the concept on March 25 1988 The NCS opened the NTMS Program Office on June 17 1988 During the week of July 12–15 1988 the NCS conducted the NTMS trial exercise to determine the feasibility of the NTMS concept and funding requirements The NCS successfully tested the National Telecommunications Coordinating Network concept September 27–29 1988 The NCS completed the NTMS program plan in March 1989 and it is updated periodically The NSTAC disbanded the NTMS Task Force on June 8 1989 Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations Through the NCC industry provides advice and assistance in pursuit of NTMS operational capability The NCS established the COR NTMS Subcommittee to assist in achieving NTMS initial operational capability The NTMS program became operational 105 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Network Convergence Investigation Group Period of Activity Information Technology Progress Impact Task Force ITPITF September 1999 – June 2000 Convergence Task Force CTF June 2000 – June 2001 Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force NS VATF NS VATF June 2001 – March 2002 Issue Background Telecommunications carriers are implementing cost-effective packet networks to remain competitive in the evolving telecommunications marketplace and to support wide-scale delivery of diverse advanced broadband services However because of their large investments in circuit switched network infrastructure carriers are initially leveraging the best of both infrastructures resulting in a period of network convergence during the transition to the next generation network NGN In this evolving network environment the NSTAC recognizes that industry and Government must strive to identify and remedy associated network vulnerabilities to ensure sustained critical communications capabilities of the NS EP community Accordingly the NSTAC established task forces to analyze various infrastructure security and operational vulnerabilities stemming from network convergence and to provide recommendations to mitigate the vulnerabilities NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The ITPITF analyzed issues related to GETS functionality in IP networks The ITPITF determined that because IP networks do not have network intelligence features analogous to Signaling System 7 SS7 IP networks may not support activation of GETS access and transport control and features Furthermore without quality of service QoS features to enable priority handling and transport of traffic in IP networks GETS calls may encounter new blocking sources and be subject to poor completion rates during overload conditions The ITPITF concluded that as the NGN evolves telecommunications carriers’ SS7 networks will become less discrete and more dependent on IP technology and interfaces Therefore it will be necessary to consider the security reliability and availability of the NGN control space related to the provision and maintenance of NS EP service capabilities In addition the ITPITF analyzed potential implications of convergence on TSP services The ITPITF concurred with the oversight committee that TSP services remained relevant in converged networks as TSP assignments could still be applied to identifiable segments of the PSN However because TSP applies only to circuit switched networks a new program may be needed to support priority restoration and provisioning in end-to-end packet networks The ITPITF also examined evolving network technologies and capabilities that could support NS EP functional requirements in both converged networks and the NGN The ITPITF concluded that QoS and other new NGN capabilities would require some enhancement to best satisfy specific NS EP requirements History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Following NSTAC XXII in June 1999 the IES created the ITPITF to examine the potential implications of Internet Protocol IP network and public switched network PSN convergence on existing NS EP services e g GETS and TSP and to prepare for a Research and Development Exchange Workshop RDX focusing on network convergence issues Based on the ITPITF’s May 2000 report to NSTAC XXIII the NSTAC recommended that the President in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by E O 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions direct the appropriate departments and agencies in coordination with industry to 107 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u Promptly determine precise functional NS EP requirements for convergence and the NGN and u Ensure that relevant NS EP functional requirements are conveyed to standards bodies and service providers during NGN standards development and implementation Additionally the ITPITF recommended that the NSTAC XXIV work plan include an examination of the potential NS EP implications related to possible security and reliability vulnerabilities of the control space in the NGN On September 28-29 2000 the President’s NSTAC co-sponsored its fourth RDX The event was co-sponsored by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy OSTP and conducted in conjunction with the Telecommunications and Information Security Workshop 2000 held at the University of Tulsa in Tulsa Oklahoma The purpose was to exchange ideas among representatives from industry Government and academia on the challenges posed by network convergence Discussions of convergence issues at the workshop and the RDX led to the following conclusions u The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to reduce the vulnerabilities introduced by malicious software From these conclusions the participants at the RDX offered several recommendations for consideration by the Government and the NSTAC These recommendations focus on improving network security in a converged and distributed environment Specifically the Government should u Establish and continue to fund Government programs to encourage increasing the number of graduate and undergraduate students pursuing study in computer security disciplines u Increase the funding and support to the National Security Agency and other Government agencies to facilitate the certification of additional Information Assurance IA Centers of Excellence to train and educate the next generation of information technology security professionals u Develop tax credits and other financial incentives to encourage industry to invest more capital in the research and development of security technologies u Expand partnerships on critical infrastructure protection issues by encouraging more representatives from academia and State and local Governments to participate and u Invest in R D programs that encourage the development of best practices in NGN security such as improved testing and evaluation broadband protection profiles and NGN security standards There is a shortage of qualified information technology IT professionals particularly those with expertise in information assurance and or computer security u Developing a business case for security poses difficult challenges in the commercial sector and there is a need to offset the high costs and high risks associated with R D in security technology u Given the complexity and interdependence introduced to networks by convergence and the proliferation of network providers and vendors best practices standards and protection profiles that help to ensure secure interoperable solutions must be evenly applied across the NGN and To support the Government the NSTAC should u There is a need to enhance R D efforts to develop better testing and evaluation programs 108 u Consider the issues of best practices and standards in its report to NSTAC XXIV u Consider the evolving standards of due care legal issues discussed at the R D Exchange including linked or third party liability and new privacy legislation and regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Conduct another RDX in partnership with one or more of the IA Centers of Excellence to discuss the difficulties in and strategies for both increasing the number of qualified IT security professionals and enhancing the academic curricula to meet the security challenges of the NGN Beginning in September 2000 the Convergence Task Force CTF analyzed issues related to the potential security and reliability vulnerabilities of converged networks Based on briefings received from industry and Government representatives the CTF concluded that the public switched telephone network PSTN is becomingly increasingly vulnerable as a result of its convergence with packet networks Of particular concern to the CTF was the interoperation of the intelligent network of the PSTN with IP networks via existing gateways The CTF noted that malicious attacks on these gateways could impact overall network availability and reliability Members suggested that possible remedies for these vulnerabilities include signaling firewalls implemented at network gateways and embedded security capabilities defined through standards The CTF determined that additional analysis of these security vulnerabilities is required to gain further understanding of the possible consequences of the evolving NGN Such an analysis should include examination of the convergence of wireless data networks with the PSTN Furthermore it was agreed that the NGN must offer the NS EP community quality of service reliability protection and restoration features analogous to those of the PSTN To achieve this the CTF suggested that Government foster strong working relationships with NGN carriers and work to specify security requirements in packet network procurements in an effort to attain network reliability commensurate with that of the PSTN In response to concerns expressed by prominent Government officials the CTF also examined issues of possible single points of failure in converged networks and associated possibilities of widespread network disruptions Through examination of related past NSTAC reports and participation in a National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications single point of failure exercise the CTF members determined that a scenario could not be envisioned even in the converged network environment in which a single point of failure could cause widespread network disruption Members found it more likely that any single points of network failure would have only local or “last mile” impacts However the CTF concluded that unforeseen points of failure precluded definitive assertions regarding the implausibility of a national level network failure The CTF also found that converged network vulnerabilities and possible points of failure could impact service availability and reliability essential to NS EP operations rather than creating network component failures Members suggested sharing detailed network data among industry Government and academia was needed to further understand converging networks and achieve more accurate network modeling and simulation techniques to analyze vulnerabilities and their impacts The CTF also examined the ongoing standards development efforts supporting NS EP priority requirements in the converged network Group members concluded that as the NGN evolves to offer more advanced broadband services the Government must remain actively involved in the relevant standards bodies’ activities to help define and ensure the consideration of NS EP requirements in the IP environment The CTF further encouraged the Government to remain actively involved in working group activities related to NS EP issues including the Internet Engineering Task Force and the International Telecommunications Union Based on the CTF’s June 2001 report to NSTAC XXIV the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the appropriate departments and agencies in coordination with industry to u Specify network security service level and assurance requirements in contracts to help ensure reliability and availability of NS EP 109 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review communications during network convergence and in the developing NGN u Ensure that standards bodies consider NS EP communications functional requirements during their work addressing network convergence issues including security of PSTN-IP network SS7 control traffic and development of packet network priority services u Plan and participate in additional exercises examining possible vulnerabilities in the emerging public network PN and subsequent NS EP implications on a national and international basis and u Utilize the Telecom-ISAC to facilitate the process of sharing network data and vulnerabilities to develop suitable mitigation strategies to reduce risks Additionally the CTF recommended that the NSTAC XXV work plan include the following tasks u Examine the NS EP security and reliability implications of the convergence of wireless data networks with the PSTN and traditional wireless networks u Support the efforts of the Government Subgroup on Convergence as requested by the Government in accordance with NSTAC’s charter and u Further examine converged network control space-related vulnerabilities including those of signaling and media gateways and analyze possible NS EP implications Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations Based on NSTAC recommendations the NCS is actively participating in various standards bodies to ensure consideration of NS EP functional requirements during convergence and in the NGN The NCS is contributing to activities of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization over Networks ETSI TIPHON group 110 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee ETSI TIPHON is examining several security issues related to convergence including identification and authentication procedures for emergency calls and issues related to cyber attacks and malicious intrusion into networks The NCS is also active in International Telecommunication Union Standardization Sector efforts regarding recommendation E 106 Description of the International Emergency Preference Scheme IEPS IEPS recognizes the requirement for priority communications among Government civil and other essential users of public telecommunications services in crisis situations IEPS which is similar to GETS would give authorized users priority access to and transport of NS EP-related calls on an international basis within the PSTN and integrated services digital network infrastructures Citing findings of the ITPITF on March 9 2001 the National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism established in conjunction with OSTP an interagency Convergence subgroup under the Counter Terrorism and National Preparedness Information Infrastructure Protection Assurance Group The purpose of this Convergence Working Group CWG was to address issues associated with the convergence of the voice and data networks and the implications of this convergence on NS EP telecommunications services The associated policy legal security and technical issues were previously identified in a Report of the CTF dated December 29 2000 The CWG issued its final report on February 14 2002 Following NSTAC XXIV in May 2001 the IES formed the Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force NS VATF and charged the group to address public network policy and technical issues related to u Network disruptions particularly distributed denial of service DDoS attacks u Security and vulnerability of the converged network control space including wireless NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee network simulation and testing standards and consequence management issues and u Needed countermeasures e g functional requirements to address the issues above The NS VATF noted that the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have renewed concerns regarding physical threats to the PN While the telecommunications infrastructure had not been a direct target of terrorism it could be in the future Therefore the NS VATF concluded that Federal State and local Government assistance related to preventing mitigating and responding to such an occurrence should be coordinated through the Telecom-ISAC In addition to the enduring physical threat to the Nation’s networks the NS VATF concluded that cyber attacks present a growing threat to the security of U S information systems and consequently to the critical communications of the NS EP community As cyber network attack techniques increase in sophistication and intruders continue using DDoS techniques to exploit vulnerabilities cyber attacks will likely cause greater collateral impacts to NS EP communications Because of this threat environment the NS VATF concluded that industry and Government should continue participating in ISACs to develop and implement unified and centralized capabilities to respond to attacks as they are occurring The NS VATF also concluded that additional steps are necessary to enhance the security of the control space of the evolving PN As network convergence continues malicious attacks focusing on the network control space are increasingly feasible therefore industry and Government cooperation is necessary to address control space vulnerabilities and implement remedial tools The NS VATF also encouraged industry and Government support of the NSIE efforts to develop a cross-industry security posture that could help provide a foundation for protecting the control space of the emerging PN The NS VATF also expressed concern about security issues affecting NS EP communications transiting wireless networks and technologies including the security of the interoperation of wireless and wireline networks—and more specifically activities addressing the wireless access protocol The task force also concluded that Government should deploy wireless local area networks with higher levels of security and consider policies that would reduce the risks of using personal area network devices On the basis of its analysis the NS VATF stated that some of the best strategies for countering vulnerabilities of the critical telecommunications infrastructure involved u Increasing Government participation in standards bodies and developing a coordinated Government-wide approach to standards development u Specifying security standards in contracts and purchase orders This process would result in more commercial off-the-shelf products and services which the Government can then procure at reduced cost and u Increasing stakeholder awareness of cyber vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies including strong cyber security and response plans The NS VATF concluded that the PN and its services supporting NS EP users would continue to be at risk from increasingly technologically sophisticated well-coordinated threat sources Therefore industry and Government must continue to work together to devise countermeasures and strategies to help mitigate the impacts of physical and cyber attacks on the PN and other critical infrastructures Based on the NS VATF’s March 2002 report to NSTAC XXV the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the appropriate departments and agencies in coordination with industry to 111 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u u The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Coordinate and prioritize through the Telecom-ISAC Government assistance to industry to protect the Nation’s critical communications assets and to mitigate the effects of an attack as it is occurring Reports Issued Encourage and adequately support the development and adoption of baseline standards and technologies including version 6 Internet Protocol Security and the Emergency Telecommunications Service scheme to help bolster core security and reliability of the NGN Research and Development Exchange Proceedings Transparent Security in a Converged Network Environment September 2000 u Support the NSIEs’ efforts to develop a cross-industry security posture that could help provide a foundation for containing the control space of the emerging public network u Work with standards bodies to ensure consideration of NS EP communications functional requirements while addressing the security of the interoperation of wireless and wireline networks and more specifically activities addressing wireless access protocol u Ensure that all wireless local area networks used by the Government meet the highest level of security standards available with priority given to those supporting NS EP missions and u Develop policies and procedures to support the use of personal area network devices while reducing their risk of compromise Following the NSTAC XXVII Meeting held on May 19 2004 the NSTAC created the Next Generation Networks Task Force NGNTF to conduct an examination of NS EP requirements and emerging threats on the NGN See the Next Generation Networks section in the Active Issues section of this NSTAC Issue Review 112 Information Technology Progress Impact Task Force Report on Convergence May 2000 Convergence Task Force Report June 2001 Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force Report March 2002 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Network Security Investigation Group Period of Activity Network Security Task Force NSTF February 21 1990—August 26 1992 Network Security Information Exchange NSIE June 25 2001—Present Network Security Standards Oversight Group NSSOG August 26 1992—January 12 1995 Network Security Steering Committee NSSC August 26 1992—December 1994 Network Security Group NSG December 1994—April 22 1997 Network Group NG April 22 1997—September 23 1999 Embedded Interoperable Security Issue Scoping Group EISISG June 1999—November 1999 Protecting Systems Task Force PSTF September 23 1999—May 2000 Internet Security Architecture Task Force IS ATF April 2002—April 2003 Operations Administration Maintenance and Provisioning OAM P Standard Working Group February 2003—August 2003 Issue Background Network security issues lie at the core of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s NSTAC work on behalf of the President The NSTAC initiated in-depth review of network security issues in February 1990 when the Committee’s Industry Executive Subcommittee IES established the NSTF to address the National NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Security Council’s concern about the vulnerability of the Nation’s telecommunications networks to intentional software disruptions or manipulations that could threaten national security and emergency preparedness NS EP communications Having completed its original task the IES reestablished the NSTF at the December 1990 NSTAC meeting and charged it to work closely with and in support of the Government Network Security Subgroup GNSS In June 1991 the NSTF established the NSTAC NSIE The task force submitted its final report and recommendations to the NSTAC on July 17 1992 On August 26 1992 the IES deactivated the NSTF and established the NSSC and the NSSOG The NSSOG completed its task and disbanded in January 1995 The IES subsequently renamed the NSSC the NSG in accordance with the December 1994 IES Guidelines In April 1997 the IES realigned its groups and renamed the NSG the NG In September 1999 the IES restructured and created the PSTF to accomplish the tasking formerly assigned to the NG During the NSTAC XXVI cycle the IES created the IS ATF to develop policy recommendations with respect to the vulnerabilities in pervasive software and protocols critical to the operation of the Internet In 2002 the NSTAC’s NSIE and the Government NSIE established the Security Requirements Working Group SRWG to examine the security requirements for controlling access to the public switched network in particular with respect to the emerging next generation network Members of the SRWG representing a cross-section of telecommunications carriers and vendors developed an initial list of security requirements that would allow vendors Government departments and agencies and service providers to implement a secure telecommunications network management infrastructure The SRWG developed this initial list of security requirements as a consensus document and submitted it as a contribution to the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions ATIS Committee T1–Telecommunications Working Group T1M1 5 OAM P Architecture Interface and Protocols for consideration as a standard 113 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Representatives from T1M1 5 the NSTAC NSIE the Government NSIE and T1M1 liaison organizations further refined the initial document and developed the standard entitled Operations Administration Maintenance and Provisioning Security Requirements for the Public Telecommunications Network A Baseline of Security Requirements for the Management Plane Committee T1 approved the standard T1 276-2003 in July 2003 During the NSTAC XXVII cycle the IES created the OAM P Standard Working Group to further examine the standard and develop conclusions and recommendations for action The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Correct the legislative deficiencies affecting the capability to gather evidence about computer crimes and to prosecute and convict computer criminals who target computers that support the national telecommunications infrastructure In February 1994 the Government and NSTAC NSIEs sponsored a Network Security Symposium These groups designed the symposium to inform attendees of the potential threats to and vulnerabilities of the public switched network PSN from computer intruders Subject matter experts from industry Government and law enforcement presented information History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On July 17 1992 the NSTAC approved the Network Security Task Force Final Report The report recommended that the President u u Publicly support the NSTAC network security initiative and Establish a Government focal point for coordination on network security standards The NSTAC also endorsed both the NSSOG and a strong network security information exchange among industry companies The NSTAC formed its NSIE in 1991 paralleling a GNSS effort to create a Government NSIE The joint meetings of the NSTAC and Government NSIEs remain a unique industry and Government forum where representatives exchange information on network threats and vulnerabilities in a trusted nondisclosure environment The IES established the NSSOG and the NSSC in response to NSTAC XIV charges to continue network security activities The IES established the NSSC as a permanent IES working group with oversight responsibility for network security activities On May 27 1993 the NSSC recommended that the President 114 At the March 2 1994 NSTAC XVI meeting the NSSC updated its assessment of the risk to the PSN and noted its plans to strengthen the NSTAC NSIE and expand its membership On June 28 1994 the Government and NSTAC NSIEs sponsored a network firewalls workshop The workshop provided an overview of firewall technologies addressed strategies for mitigating vulnerabilities discussed firewall uses and applications and reviewed case histories In October 1994 the NSSOG released a technical report focusing on network security standards issues for the PSN In its report the NSSOG categorized 12 recommendations on policy procedural and technical issues important to promoting interoperability mitigating current or future threat scenarios implementing realistic solutions and or addressing a range of technologies or architectures At the January 12 1995 NSTAC XVII meeting the NSTAC approved the NSSOG report and recommended that the President u Task the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST and other Government organizations to support industry in the development of standards recommended in the NSSOG report NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee At the February 28 1996 NSTAC XVIII meeting the NSTAC approved the NSG’s findings with respect to determining NSTAC’s potential contributions to developing a middle-ground security technology solution The NSTAC also presented the findings of a report entitled An Assessment of the Risk to the Security of Public Networks which was co-authored by the Government and NSTAC NSIEs On September 11 1996 the Government and NSTAC NSIEs sponsored a symposium on securing data networks This event continued successful efforts by the NSIEs to share lessons learned about network security with a broader audience through workshops and analytical reports Also in September 1996 the NSG sponsored the Network Security Research and Development R D Exchange The event’s purpose was to analyze R D activities ongoing in both the public and private sectors and to address issues of authentication intrusion detection and access control from the capabilities management perspective In November 1996 the NSG organized the Forward-Looking Analysis Panel to consider the impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on network security and NS EP telecommunications services The panel addressed issues such as carrier interconnection collocation and open network architecture The Federal Communications Commission’s FCC Network Reliability and Interoperability Council NRIC considered the panel’s input and subsequently included it in the NRIC’s final report At the March 18 1997 NSTAC XIX meeting the NSG reported on its work to address the impact of the changing regulatory and technological environment on NS EP telecommunications services The NSG also reviewed its recent activities in the areas of R D intrusion detection and forwardlooking network control security analysis At the meeting the NSG outlined the efforts of the newly established Intrusion Detection Subgroup IDSG and its charge to explore a more cooperative approach to developing enhanced intrusion detection tools The NSG concluded by addressing the activities of the NSIEs and noted that the NSTAC NSIE expanded its membership from nine to twenty Following NSTAC XIX the NG’s IDSG assessed network intrusion detection R D activities to determine whether NS EP considerations required additional efforts Working with industry groups the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DARPA and other Government groups the IDSG identified the current state of intrusion detection research The IDSG subsequently provided a report to NSTAC XX in December 1997 detailing its findings and recommendations for the President to consider in promoting the R D of intrusion detection technologies The NSTAC accepted and approved the report and recommended that the President u Promulgate a national technology policy to address intrusion detection u Establish an interagency working group for intrusion detection u Increase R D funding for intrusion detection for network control systems vital to continued operation of critical infrastructures and u Encourage cooperative development programs The NG established another subgroup following NSTAC XIX to respond to a request by Dr John Gibbons then Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Dr Gibbons asked NSTAC to determine the likelihood of a widespread telecommunications outage identify industry plans in place for intercarrier coordination to respond to such an outage and describe how telecommunications service providers and the Government would cooperate to assure the President that restoration priorities would meet the national interest The NG established the Widespread Outage Subgroup WOS to focus on these issues and provided a report to NSTAC XX reflecting its findings The WOS determined that given the limited precedent for telecommunications outages of such magnitude there was a low probability of a widespread 115 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review sustained outage of public telecommunications service In December 1997 the NSTAC approved the WOS report and recommended that the President u u Direct the appropriate Federal departments and or agencies to work with industry to improve intercarrier coordination plans and procedures Encourage the FCC to maintain a Defense Commissioner at all times to help industry and Government overcome legal and regulatory impediments to a rapid and orderly restoration of service during a widespread telecommunications outage u Task the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to work with industry to advance the state-of-the-art for software integrity and u Direct the expansion of Government R D efforts to address the most significant vulnerabilities of new and evolving telecommunications technologies and services Following NSTAC XX the NG examined the readiness of the telecommunications industry to ensure continuity of service through the millennium change focusing on NS EP and the national telecommunications infrastructure The NG surveyed telecommunications service providers equipment vendors system integrators industry forums addressing the Year 2000 Y2K problem and vendors providing Y2K solutions The NG concluded that significant efforts were underway in both industry and Government to eradicate the Y2K problem within the Nation’s telecommunications infrastructure However given the extent and complexity of the Y2K software augmentation there were no guarantees that Y2K measures would anticipate and or prevent every problem In September 1998 the NSTAC approved the NG’s Year 2000 Problem Status Report and recommended that the President u Direct appropriate departments and agencies to develop contingency plans to 116 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Respond to Y2K-induced service impairments of the Government’s NS EP customer premises equipment CPE functions and applications u Fulfill mission-critical NS EP responsibilities in the event of Y2K induced PN service impairments u Direct his Y2K focal point to ensure the coordination of the Government’s requests for Y2K readiness information from the telecommunications industry Following NSTAC XXI the NG continued the tasking from the NSTAC XX meeting to examine how NS EP operations might be affected by a severe disruption of Internet service In conjunction with the gap analysis effort by the Office of the Manager National Communications System OMNCS NG members provided their individual perspectives on the Public Network PN Alternatives Analysis Report developed by the OMNCS During this cycle the NG continued to oversee the NSTAC NSIE and worked toward facilitating the exchange of network security R D information between industry and Government The R D effort subsequently resulted in an NGsponsored R D Exchange in October 1998 held in collaboration with activities sponsored by Purdue University’s Computer Operations Audit and Security Technology COAST Laboratory and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IEEE The exchange focused on two themes The first theme examined how industry and Government can better collaborate on R D The second examined the growing convergence of telecommunications and the Internet The attendees overwhelmingly agreed on the need to identify potential centers of excellence in industry Government and academia and provide them with appropriate long-term funding to promote the development of computer and network security professionals disciplines and programs Equally important was the need to establish large-scale testbeds to promote joint research develop and verify metrics and evaluate security products and NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee address other technical needs in network security and information assurance The Government and NSTAC NSIEs completed an after-action report on the workshop The Insider Threat to Information Systems A Framework for Understanding and Managing the Insider Threat in Today’s Business Environment The workshop was held in June 1998 The afteraction report provided for sharing lessons learned in this vital area of insider threat that is affecting both industry and Government In addition the NSIEs completed their 1999 Assessment of the Risk to the Security of the Public Network The NSIEs concluded that the 1995 findings regarding the overall vulnerabilities of the PN were still valid Old vulnerabilities were still being exploited even though fixes were readily available Vulnerabilities in many of the PN’s diverse technologies including Signaling System 7 SS7 Intelligent Networks IN Asynchronous Transfer Mode ATM and Synchronous Optical Network SONET remained unaddressed The interconnectivity among technologies and networks had not merely persisted but had become even greater than it was in 1995 Between 1995 and 1999 three major factors exacerbated the overall vulnerability of the PN the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Telecom Act changing business practices and the Y2K problem The NG concluded that the NS EP community’s direct dependence on the Internet for mission critical operations was modest Departments and agencies with NS EP responsibilities were using the Internet mostly for outreach information sharing and electronic mail The NS EP community was more inclined to depend on dedicated Transmission Control Protocol Internet Protocol TCP IP networks also called intranets for mission-critical NS EP operations at this time because of significant security and reliability concerns associated with the Internet In June 1999 the NSTAC approved the NG’s report and the following recommendations u • Work with the NS EP community to increase understanding of evolving Internet dependencies • Work with key Internet organizations and standards bodies to increase awareness of NS EP requirements In addition the NSTAC NSIE revised its charter to bring it in line with how the NSIEs function The NSIEs are primarily information sharing bodies in the area of network vulnerabilities and threat analysis In June 1999 the NG completed its work on the Internet Report An Examination of NS EP Implications of Internet Technologies The report addressed the following three objectives 1 examine the extent to which NS EP operations will depend on the Internet over the next 3 years 2 identify vulnerabilities of network control elements associated with the Internet and their ability to cause a severe disruption of Internet service applying lessons learned from NSTAC’s similar studies of the PSN and 3 examine how Internet reliability availability and service priority issues apply to NS EP operations Recommend that the President in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions direct the establishment of a permanent program to address NS EP issues related to the Internet The program should have the following objectives • Interact with the appropriate Internet organizations and initiatives to investigate develop and employ NS EP-specific Internet priority services such as end-to-end priority routing and transport • Examine the potential impact of IP networkPSN convergence on PSN specific priority services u Recommend that the President direct the appropriate Government departments and agencies to use existing industry Government partnership mechanisms to increase awareness 117 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review of NS EP requirements within key Internet organizations and standards bodies In addition the NSTAC directed the IES to examine the potential impact of IP network-PSN convergence on PSN-specific NS EP priority services including Government Emergency Telecommunications Service GETS and Telecommunications Service Priority TSP Following the NSTAC XXV Meeting on March 13 2002 the IES again focused on network and Internet security issues At the meeting the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security discussed the serious threats posed by vulnerabilities within the Domain Name Servers and the Border Gateway Protocol In response to these concerns the NSTAC created the ISATF to develop recommendations to the President on how to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in pervasive software protocols define the “edge” elements of the Internet and determine ways that the NSTAC could integrate its efforts to define and monitor significant critical infrastructures supporting the Internet with other industry activities In its First Steps in Identifying and Remediating Vulnerabilities in Pervasive Software Protocols report the ISATF analyzed five stages relevant to identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in pervasive software and protocols prevention detection information sharing analysis and correction In the area of prevention the task force advocated aggressive public-private research and development activities and cited the need to develop adequate alert and warning systems to support the operations of information sharing and analysis centers The task force also identified barriers to the effective detection of vulnerabilities such as the myriad number of forums devoted to detection and the lack of standardization in reporting procedures Next the task force emphasized that significant barriers to information sharing exist such as the Freedom of Information Act FOIA and liability concerns and advocated the creation of legislation that would ease the sharing of critical information The ISATF also concluded that the analysis functions within industry that detect and publish vulnerabilities 118 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee appear to be adequate but the Government may find some benefit in better leveraging available synergies by consolidating Government-funded analysis centers where appropriate Finally the task force observed that while many organizations are successfully correcting and remediating vulnerabilities they fail to utilize a streamlined method for expeditiously disseminating corrected information to the telecommunications and Internet service provider ISP communities Based on the findings of the ISATF report the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the appropriate departments and agencies in coordination with industry to u Consolidate Government-funded watch center operations of agencies and departments dedicated to the detection and dissemination of information related to Internet vulnerabilities into one organization to create a more efficient and effective collaborative industry Government information-sharing partnership u Establish a lead organization within the Department of Homeland Security DHS to coordinate with industry a process for warning notification coordination and remediation of widespread problems in a national emergency u Recognize the need to involve all aspects of the Internet in the process of identifying significant vulnerabilities including the web hosting network access provider backbone and ISP communities u Fund efforts related to identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities in the most critical protocols or software that key sectors of the Nation’s infrastructure rely upon and u Promote and support legislation to address FOIA antitrust and liability concerns regarding information shared by industry for the purposes of critical infrastructure protection NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Additionally the ISATF made other recommendations focused on developing a process for the Internet community both private and public to share information within its component communities and within the larger telecommunications and Internet infrastructure context At the NSTAC XXV Meeting participants also expressed concern over the ability to defend the Internet by protecting the edges of the Internet against attack or exploitation In response to these concerns the IES tasked the ISATF to provide guidance on how to define the edge of the Internet Through detailed analysis the ISATF determined that because the Internet is not a single network but a network of interconnected networks there is no single definition of the edge as the definition depends on perspective The ISATF also noted that there are many different ways to define the edge that include but are not limited to the following all systems that contain Internet Protocol IP addresses that do not route IP packets the composition of information systems and zones of responsibility for network operators versus end-users In addition the group noted that emphasis should focus not on defining the edge of the Internet but on defending the Internet as the adoption of a single definition of the edge could prevent critical security precautions from being addressed in other areas Based on the ISATF’s analysis the NSTAC recommended to the President that u The Government should continue its work to identify the critical national security and emergency preparedness missions and functions supporting those missions that rely on the Internet and encourage the parties responsible for those missions to ensure that they are adequately protected through redundancy and alternative capabilities u Industry standards bodies software vendors equipment vendors network operators and end-users of all products and services that make up the Internet should ensure that these products have built-in baseline security features and that these capabilities are appropriately configured and kept current and u The Government should work with Internet security experts and standards bodies to develop a standard set of key warnings and indicators that all service providers can use as a baseline to measure security threats The NSTAC’s OAM P Working Group recognized that Executive Orders Presidential directives and Presidential commissions have specified infrastructures as national assets that are critical to the defense and economic security of the United States Telecommunications is one of these critical infrastructures Security for the network management functions controlling this infrastructure is essential Many standards for network management security exist however compliance is low and implementation is inconsistent across the various telecommunications equipment and software providers In addition service providers are specifying contradicting requirements for products which results in inconsistent vendor feature sets and potentially higher costs for vendors Finally as the telecommunications industry transitions to a converged network environment new security challenges emerge and threats in the public network become threats in the management and control planes Previous NSIE security assessments of the public network have also documented the management plane’s vulnerabilities and susceptibility to intruder attacks Because an increasing number of networks are closely tied to intranets these networks are susceptible to hacker threats Furthermore the lack of standards to address this issue enables intruders to penetrate vulnerabilities and further deteriorate the telecommunications networks Therefore an urgent need exists for this baseline standard to provide much-needed security mechanisms for telecommunications carriers and vendors to implement 119 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The OAM P Standard Working Group reviewed T1 276-2003 and concluded that the current standard addresses only one aspect such as the management plane of an overall end-to-end security solution T1 276-2003 addresses security for network element management system and element management system equipment only it does not specifically address security for other equipment such as customer premises equipment Apart from the T1 276-2003 requirements the current standard assumes that effective hardware and software controls provided by the operating system protect the data and resources being managed In addition the OAM P Standard Working Group developed recommended to the President that u The National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST review the T1 276-2003 standard If a review finds a conflict between the T1 276-2003 standard and existing Federal Information Processing Standards and NIST publications NIST should make these conflicts known to the appropriate standards bodies u Federal departments and agencies be encouraged to use the T1 276-2003 standard in requests for proposals as appropriate and u Through the DHS encourage officials responsible for other infrastructures to consider the elements of the T1 276-2003 standard as a baseline for security requirements and adapt appropriate requirements for their respective infrastructure Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations In response to an NSTAC XIV charge to continue network security activities the IES established the NSSC and the NSSOG The IES charged the NSSC to u Oversee the NSIE and recommend NSIE follow-on activities u Establish and oversee the NSTAC NSSOG The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Continue involvement in R D information exchange u Represent the NSTAC on NSIE matters to the FCC Network Reliability Council subsequently renamed the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council and the Manager NCS and u Support other network security issues as required The IES charged the NSSOG to establish and prioritize industry objectives for network security standards to support NS EP capabilities and to work with the standards community to provide guidance and motivation to develop and accept industry-wide standards In response to recommendations at NSTAC XV Congress included provisions in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that expanded the law’s applicability to telecommunications operations administration maintenance and provisioning systems However the Act did not fully address the concerns that prompted NSTAC’s recommendations Congress subsequently passed the National Information Infrastructure NII Protection Act of 1996 which provides measures to strengthen Federal laws against computer crime As the IDSG focused primarily on R D issues related to intrusion detection technology the Government was exploring broader R D issues In particular the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection PCCIP examined R D issues affecting the security of all critical infrastructures NSTAC’s findings and recommendations are consistent with those resulting from the PCCIP’s work Further Presidential Decision Directive PDD 63 assigned the Office of Science and Technology Policy OSTP responsibility for coordinating R D agendas and programs for the Government through the National Science and Technology Council Since NSTAC XX three events occurred to address 120 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee the WOS’s recommendations First the OMNCS began expanding the National Telecommunications Coordination Network NTCN to provide a mechanism to support intercarrier coordination in the event of a widespread outage Second the FCC designated a Defense Commissioner and industry and Government developed procedural guidelines to help telecommunications carriers resolve issues with the FCC Third Government began focusing more attention on R D and the need to advance the state-of-the-art equipment for software integrity and address the most significant vulnerabilities of new and evolving telecommunications technologies and services this task The PSTF’s objective was to examine current network security strategies to determine whether alternative strategies might more effectively diminish risk and if appropriate develop recommendations regarding those alternatives The PSTF based the methodology for its study inpart on a model of network security developed by the IDSG in 1997 The IDSG identified four basic components of network security prevention detection response and mitigation Using this model the PSTF sought to answer the question Could the risk to network security be more effectively reduced by changing the relative focus of network security efforts among these four components Following NSTAC XXI the Government took measures to make critical Government systems Y2K compliant and to develop contingency plans to deal with any potential system failures that might occur NSTAC’s Year 2000 Problem Status Report issued in September 1998 influenced the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion on the need to develop comprehensive contingency plans to mitigate any potential harmful effects on the Nation’s NS EP posture While the PSTF initially expected to find an optimal focus that might apply to all organizations analysis of the data yielded a different answer such as security is not a “onesize-fits-all” proposition While it is not feasible to specify an optimal focus among prevention detection response and mitigation that will be suitable for all organizations it is reasonable for each individual organization to consider how it focuses its network security efforts among these four components and ensure that it employs a strategy that is optimal for its own needs In response to the recommendation from the NSTAC’s June 1999 Network Group Internet Report An Examination of the NS EP Implications of Internet Technologies the OMNCS established a permanent program to address NS EP issues related to the Internet The Priority Services and Internet Technology and Standards program actively promotes NS EP requirements among pertinent standards bodies including the Internet Engineering Task Force the European Telecommunications Standards Institute and the International Telecommunication Union Following NSTAC XXII in June 1999 the NSTAC tasked the IES to develop recommendations for the President regarding how the Government can optimally focus its efforts to enhance the security of the Nation’s NS EP telecommunications and information technology systems The PSTF subsequently identified a number of common themes among the organizations providing input to the study as well as some barriers that may impede the ability of an organization to implement an optimal focus among the four components While the PSTF gathered a representative sample of data to reflect a broad range of industry perspectives the PSTF determined that it did not have sufficient information to adequately reflect the Government’s perspective Consequently the PSTF decided to provide a status report to NSTAC XXIII in May 2000 and recommended that the IES consider including in the NSTAC XXIV work plan the following task u Based on the preliminary analysis and general observations of the PSTF report complete the analysis of the focus of network security efforts by seeking a broader range of input from The IES subsequently formed the PSTF to address 121 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Government and academia as well as additional input from industry At the NSTAC XXII meeting the Honorable John Hamre Deputy Secretary of Defense discussed the need for open dialogue between industry Government in the current era of dynamic technological change Dr Hamre requested NSTAC’s assistance to “tackle the much deeper more complicated problem which is how do we embed security in depth in the infrastructure upon which we the Government depend and upon which you and your customers depend ” NSTAC’s IES subsequently began to scope this issue to determine how to respond to Dr Hamre’s request The IES tasked the EISISG to determine the depth and breadth of this request and provide the IES with a recommended action plan The scoping concluded through briefings and various interactions with industry and Government that the NSTAC can help in two distinct ways The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The U S Congress included a provision section 214 in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 establishing the protection of voluntarily shared critical infrastructure information The National Cyber Security Partnership NCSP Task Force 4 Working Group 5 designated a liaison to work with T1M1 as they explore technical standards and Common Criteria T1 276-2003 will be one of the many standards that will be considered as the NCSP works to secure cyberspace In addition the International Telecommunication Union is developing an international standard based on the requirements outlined in T1 276-2003 Finally the General Services Administration required compliance by all Federal departments and agencies with the American National Standard T1 2762003 on OAM P security requirements for the management plane Reports Issued u u Promote the Federal Government’s efforts to work with industry to accomplish their mission of incorporating electronic commerce into their operations and Network Security Scoping Task Force Report Report of the Network Security Task Force October 1990 Individually support and participate in existing successful industry and Government forums NSTAC NSIE Report on Deficiencies in Federal Laws on Computer Crime April May 1993 Following the recommendation of the NSTAC based on the ISATF’s recommendation to establish a lead organization within the Department to coordinate with industry regarding threat warnings and notifications DHS created the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate which was reorganized in 2005 into other directorates within the Department to identify and assess intelligence information concerning threats to the United States issue warnings and take preventative and protective action against those threats Moreover DHS consolidated the watch center capabilities of several Federal Government agencies under its auspices 122 Network Security Task Force Final Report July 1992 Network Security Standards for the Public Switched Network Issues and Recommendations October 1994 An Assessment of the Risk to the Security of Public Networks Government and NSTAC NSIEs December 12 1995 Report of the Network Security Group Research and Development Exchange September 18 1996 Network Security Group Forward Looking Analysis Panel Proceedings November 19 1996 Local Number Portability and Its Implications for the Public Switched Network An NSIE White Paper July 1997 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Software Integrity An NSIE White Paper July 1997 Report on the Likelihood of a Widespread Telecommunications Outage December 1997 Report on the NS EP Implications of Intrusion Detection Technology Research and Development December 1997 The Insider Threat Legal and Practical Human Resources Issues An NSIE White Paper April 1998 The Insider Threat to Information Systems A Framework for Understanding and Managing the Insider Threat in Today’s Business Environment An NSIE White Paper June 1998 The President’s NSTAC Research and Development Exchange Proceedings Enhancing Network Security Technology R D Collaboration October 1998 An Assessment of the Risk to the Security of the Public Network April 1999 Network Group Internet Report An Examination of the NS EP Implications of Internet Technologies June 1999 Protecting Systems Task Force Report on Enhancing the Nation’s Network Security Efforts May 2000 First Steps in Identifying and Remediating Vulnerabilities in Pervasive Software Protocols April 2003 Defining the Edge of the Internet June 2003 Operations Administration Maintenance and Provisioning OAM P Security Requirements for the Public Telecommunications Network A Baseline of Security Requirements for the Management Plane August 2003 123 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review 124 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Obtaining Critical Telecommunications Facility Protection During a Civil Disturbance Investigation Group Period of Activity NS EP Panel September 1993 – April 1994 Issue Background The April 1992 civil disturbance in Los Angeles identified the need for standardized guidelines in requesting the protection of critical telecommunications facilities In response to the problems noted the NS EP Panel met with California State Federal Government and telecommunications industry representatives in San Francisco The meeting participants generally agreed that emergency response personnel were not sufficiently prepared to respond to the crisis that overwhelmed local law enforcement and fire protection services Telecommunications industry representatives discussed their difficulties in obtaining protection for their facilities while other participants acknowledged they had been confused about whom to contact and who had authority during the widespread civil unrest Because the President declared the crisis to be a Federal emergency points of contact and authorities changed causing some confusion Participants raised this issue at the meeting and questioned how to obtain critical telecommunications facility protection during a Federal emergency DOJ and Department of Defense DOD representatives briefed the panel on the roles of the DOJ the National Guard and active duty military personnel during national emergencies As a result of the meeting the NCC working closely with the NS EP Panel agreed to develop guidelines to assist emergency planners during their preparations for and response to civil disturbances NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The NS EP Panel and the NCC developed the document in close coordination with the California Office of Emergency Services and the California Utilities Emergency Association In May 1994 the NCC and the NS EP Panel issued Guidelines for Obtaining Protection of Critical Telecommunications Facilities During Civil Disturbances The document serves as a guide for telecommunications industry emergency planners when discussing their facility protection needs with local State and Federal authorities On October 4 1995 the NS EP Panel conducted an industry Government Critical Telecommunications Facilities Protection exercise simultaneously at three separate locations using video teleconferencing linking sites in Arlington Virginia Oakland California and Los Angeles California The exercise provided an opportunity for key emergency response planners at the local State and national levels to develop working relationships gain a better understanding of the many planning factors required by each participant and define the critical steps in the protection process Participants noted this exercise helped clarify the lines of communication when requesting protection from the city to county to State to national levels and helped clarify the various roles and responsibilities of the organizations involved The activity also highlighted planning shortfalls that required correction to streamline the protection process The NS EP Panel identified two key issues for inclusion in the Guidelines for Obtaining Protection of Critical Telecommunications Facilities During Civil Disturbances document 1 adding procedures for transitioning from Federal control back to State control and 2 discussing the legal aspects of federalized versus non-federalized troops In an October 1996 conference call participants of the industry Government exercise discussed options for clarifying the federalization issues The NS EP Panel added new language to the document indicating that both federalized and non-federalized 125 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review National Guard troops each with different chains of command may participate in restoring and maintaining law and order In addition the panel added a section authorizing the Secretary of Defense to determine when Federal military forces should withdraw from the disturbance area and when National Guard units would return to State control Reports Issued Guidelines for Obtaining Protection of Critical Telecommunications Facilities During Civil Disturbances May 1994 Protection of Critical Facilities Exercise After-Action Report December 1995 126 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Physical Security of the Telecommunications Network Investigation Group Period of Activity Plans Working Group December 1990 – September 1991 Vulnerabilities Task Force May 2002 – February 2003 Trusted Access Task Force April 2003 – April 2004 Issue Background The United States Government recognizes the telecommunications sector as a critical component of national security and emergency preparedness NS EP services and the potential for risk due to the growing reliance on the availability of telecommunications resources by the Government other critical infrastructures and the general public Like all other critical infrastructures in the United States the communications infrastructure remains vulnerable to physical attacks that could significantly damage a facility or free standing component of the network severely enough to interrupt service History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations On December 13 1990 at NSTAC XII an NSTAC Principal questioned the physical security of the public switched network due to issues surfaced by a National Research Council report on the growing vulnerability of the Nation’s communications network As a result the NSTAC established and tasked the Plans Working Group PWG with investigating the Committee’s growing concerns related to physical security of the telecommunications infrastructure In response the PWG in conjunction with the National Communications System NCS Office of the Joint Secretariat prepared a physical security study that examined current industry Government activities including results from a questionnaire NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES given to the National Coordinating Center’s industry representatives on physical security policy operational procedures and methods The study also documented past NCS efforts regarding physical security of NS EP telecommunications facilities sites and assets and relevant conclusions and recommendations of those past efforts The study concluded that current industry Government activity and past NCS documents demonstrated industry and Government had made substantial progress in addressing the physical security of telecommunications facilities sites and assets According to the study physical security was well planned and managed in general After reviewing the information in this study the NSTAC concluded that the document required no further NSTAC action at that time The NSTAC again addressed physical security concerns during the business and executive sessions of the NSTAC XXV Meeting at which time the Principals again raised concerns related to the physical security of the telecommunications infrastructure in the wake of the attacks against the United States on September 11 2001 As a result the NSTAC chartered the Vulnerabilities Task Force VTF to examine possible risks associated with the concentration of critical telecommunications assets in telecom hotels and Internet peering points as well as vulnerabilities involving equipment chain of control and trusted access procedures to telecommunications facilities The VTF concluded that while the telecommunications infrastructure is inherently vulnerable to physical attack the existence of multiple interconnection facilities such as telecom hotels has helped to disperse telecommunications assets over numerous locations thereby reducing service impacts caused by the loss of any one facility The task force acknowledged that the physical destruction of individual critical telecommunications facilities could disrupt service at the local level and restrict access to the infrastructure Therefore site by site mission critical risk analyses are the only way for organizations to identify possible vulnerabilities 127 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review that could affect critical functions supporting those missions The VTF also addressed the Government’s concern that the telecommunications infrastructure may be especially vulnerable because trusted physical access is granted to individuals requiring entrance to sites where critical telecommunications assets are concentrated During its deliberations the task force stressed how the nationwide web of telecommunications assets has become far too extensive to ensure full access control to prevent tampering While owners can secure critical sites and equipment to the extent possible with electronic locks padlocks fences alarms security cameras and the like access control remains an important issue because the loss of or damage to a site housing numerous critical telecommunications assets could have local or “last mile” impacts and adversely affect NS EP services Primary factors influencing the efficacy of access control procedures include individuals with malicious intent the omnipresent insider threat the lack of a standard personal identification and background check capabilities and a lack of universally applied access control procedures and best practices Furthermore the VTF addressed chain of control issues regarding the security of products and services delivered to critical locations The task force concluded that although security will remain a priority no policy actions are deemed necessary at this time However if networks become reliant on commodity equipment this could become an issue for consideration In response to the analysis conducted by the VTF and to mitigate any risks associated with concentration of assets such as telecom hotels the NSTAC presented four consecutive reports to the President titled Chain of Control Telecom Hotels Trusted Access and Internet Peering Security with specific recommendations on measures to be undertaken to secure the telecommunications industry 128 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee In direct response to the work delineated in the Trusted Access Report the NSTAC established the Trusted Access Task Force TATF and charged it to examine how industry and the Government can work together to address concerns associated with implementing a national security background check program for access to key facilities In response to the NSTAC’s earlier findings in this area the TATF further examined the concerns that the telecommunications infrastructure may be vulnerable because trusted physical access is granted to individuals who require entrance to sites where telecommunications assets are concentrated without ensuring that the individual does not pose a threat to the facility or infrastructure The task force proposed that a national standard for personnel screenings using Federal databases such as the program used by the Department of Homeland Security’s DHS Transportation Security Administration TSA may be beneficial for industry in mitigating threats to the telecommunications infrastructure The TATF also examined the need for a standard industry-wide certificate-based picture identification ID card The group noted that the creation of such a card would further solidify the security of the Nation’s telecommunications infrastructure and also assist in the identification of those employees who have passed the national screening In an emergency or crisis the credential will also expedite recovery efforts by helping to easily identify personnel who are needed at the site During the May 2004 NSTAC XXVII Meeting the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection DHS emphasized the importance of the group’s work and commented on the need for short-term initiatives that could be undertaken to increase security at numerous upcoming National Special Security Events NSSE and could also be used as the basis for long-term perimeter access guidelines As a result the TATF with the assistance of the NCC’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center ISAC member companies proposed the establishment of a pilot program to pre-screen against Federal terrorist lists Government NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee databases a small group of industry employees who may need access to physical sites or critical information concerning NSSEs and associated critical facilities The TATF deemed the United States Secret Service USSS the most appropriate resource for conducting industry screenings on the specified personnel due to their role in planning NSSEs The pilot screening program produced a list of key lessons learned as well as several human resources concerns from industry facilities and the networks and information concerning them by building on the ongoing work of the General Services Administration’s Federal Identity Credentialing Committee • Build on the recommendations in the NCC ISAC report Preparing for a National Special Security Event to develop a national plan for controlling access at the perimeter of an NSSE or a disaster area To facilitate the development of a national perimeter access plan to be incorporated in the National Response Plan the Government should continue to support the screening program coordinated by the NCC ISAC with screenings facilitated by DHS and the USSS Based on the TATF’s analysis the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the appropriate departments and agencies to u Coordinate with industry to • Implement and support a standardized screening process for industry to voluntarily conduct screenings on persons who have regular and continued unescorted access to critical telecommunications facilities e g switching facilities including telecommunications employees and vendors suppliers and contractor staff including – Modeling such a program after the current TSA program by including different relative background investigation levels for various facilities and personnel types – Partnering with DHS through TSA to upon request from industry conduct screenings for industry personnel working at critical private telecommunications facilities and – Working with NRIC to develop industry best practices defining specific criteria for determining which telecommunications employees should be subject to screenings u Partner with the ISACs across infrastructures to implement screening credentialing and access control policies mirroring those recommended for the telecommunications infrastructure for all critical infrastructures Actions Related to NSTAC Recommendations In accordance with the NSTAC’s recommendations and the NCC’s Preparing for a National Special Security Event Report the Government implemented a pilot program to coordinate industry access for the 2005 Presidential Inauguration In addition in a related effort the NCS developed in early 2006 in partnership with Federal State and local Government entities as well as a private sector company an access standard operating procedure SOP to ensure that private critical infrastructure responders have priority access to disaster areas The access SOP has been adopted by the State of Georgia and is currently being used as an example for other States • Make available a standard “tamper-proof ” certificate-based picture identification technology to enable the positive identification of screened individuals at critical sites and to support both physical and logical access for such individuals to critical telecommunications 129 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Reports Issued IES Plans Working Group A Review of Physical Security September 1991 Vulnerabilities Task Force Report Chain of Control March 2003 Vulnerabilities Task Force Report Telecom Hotels March 2003 Vulnerabilities Task Force Report Trusted Access March 2003 Vulnerabilities Task Force Report Internet Peering Security April 2003 Trusted Access Task Force Report Screening Credentialing and Perimeter Access Controls Report January 2005 130 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Response to September 11 2001 Terrorist Attacks Investigation Group Period of Activity September 11 “Lessons Learned” Ad Hoc Group October 15 2001 – December 3 2001 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES restoration of the infrastructure Procedures were revised each time a new authority took responsibility for managing access to the disaster area Depending on the phase of the response local responders State authorities or Federal personnel were in control The invocation of both crisis management i e law enforcement officials treated the disaster area as on ongoing crime scene and consequence management measures served to complicate the access control issue even further Issue Background The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 required industry and Government to marshal resources at the national State and local levels to support response and recovery efforts A critical part of those efforts was the restoration of emergency telecommunications services and the provisioning of communications to emergency response personnel The National Communications System and the NCC in partnership with NSTAC companies played a major role in ensuring a quick response and recovery of telecommunications capabilities in the wake of the September 11th attacks Subsequently in response to a request from the Special Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security the NSTAC formed the September 11th “Lessons Learned” Ad Hoc Group to provide an industry perspective on lessons learned in responding to the September 11th tragic events The NSTAC Chair discussed the ad hoc group’s analysis in its December 12 2001 letter to the President History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations After identifying nearly 40 policy and operational lessons learned from the September 11 2001 response the ad hoc group narrowed its focus to the following issues access procedures to disaster sites communications procedures and industry representation within the NCC The major issue dealt with procedures for access to disaster sites affected by the attacks Specifically inconsistent access control procedures for moving telecommunications equipment and personnel into and out of the World Trade Center disaster area created confusion and presented obstacles for the telecommunications companies engaged in the Based on the ad hoc group’s analysis the NSTAC recommended that the President direct the appropriate departments and agencies to lead a national effort to examine remedies to perimeter access control issues The NSTAC determined that these remedies should consider overlapping jurisdictions and result in consistent processes and procedures for incorporation into the Federal Response Plan and State and local emergency response plans The objective was to ensure that any future national response efforts to unanticipated attacks would be fully planned and coordinated and consistently carried out without delay Additionally the ad hoc group addressed communications procedures during emergencies The events of September 11 2001 demonstrated the need for standard procedures to improve communications among decision makers operational personnel and other stakeholders during emergencies Such procedures would have to take into account the severity of the emergency the classification of the communications the location of the communicators and the telecommunications capabilities available among other factors The ad hoc group found that the requisite operational procedures were already developed and in place at the NCC including procedures related to the NCC’s Telecom-ISAC function The NSTAC had consistently identified ISACs as the appropriate focal points for coordinating communications among industry players and between industry and Government in the new threat environment Consequently the ad hoc group concluded that the telecommunications industry should work through NCC representatives 131 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review to address communications requirements during emergencies The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Report Issued NSTAC Letter to the President December 17 2001 The ad hoc group also analyzed NCC industry representation The group acknowledged that the NCC must maintain proper industry representation to meet operational challenges in the evolving threat and technology environments In the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks the NS EP community reaffirmed the critical role wireless communications plays in response to national emergencies Similarly Internet services were deemed to be increasingly important in disaster response and central to the mission-critical operations of business and Government agencies Accordingly the ad hoc group examined the mix of industry representation in the NCC and found that NCC members represented 1 the majority of the wireless carrier market share 2 more than half of the Internet backbone provider market and 3 a minority of the Internet access provider market The ad hoc group concluded that augmenting Internet access provider membership in the NCC could help the NCC better address potential network security issues Such issues included the threat of distributed denial of service attacks and software viruses launched by end users via dial-up connections to the network As part of its lessons learned analysis the ad hoc group reviewed previous NSTAC recommendations recognizing that the NSTAC’s cumulative work could provide valuable information related to ensuring reliable infrastructure services and securing the Nation’s critical facilities The group also recognized that the sharing of such information had gained new importance with the national focus on homeland security Previous NSTAC studies selected for review by the group were in the areas of cellular priority access energy service priority protection of critical facilities public network convergence and vulnerabilities and national information sharing analysis and warning The group concluded that such studies and associated recommendations could demonstrate best practices for use by other organizations concerned with the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructures supporting multiple sectors 132 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Telecommunications Industry Mobilization formation of the Joint Industry Government TIM Group which began addressing TIM subjects on January 29 1986 Investigation Group Period of Activity History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Telecommunications Industry Mobilization TIM Task Force June 7 1985 – June 8 1989 Issue Background Recognizing the prominent role of the telecommunications industry in a national mobilization the NSTAC formed the TIM Task Force and instructed it to develop an issue statement Meanwhile the OMNCS developed the NS EP Telecommunications Plan of Action to implement relevant portions of E O 12472 and National Security Decision Directives 47 and 97 The plan approved by the NCS Committee of Principals COP in 1985 included an action to provide Government leadership in telecommunications industry mobilization planning activities In September 1985 the TIM Task Force identified the following mobilization subjects as needing further study u Telecommunications service surge requirements u Personnel issues u Maintenance of stockpiles and inventories u Dependence on foreign sources u Dependence on other infrastructure systems u Industry and Government mobilization management structure and u Jurisdictional issues The TIM Task Force recommended a industry and Government forum be established to assess the seven TIM subject areas In December 1985 industry and Government concurred with the The NSTAC approved and forwarded to the President the Joint TIM Group’s reports Personnel Issues and Dependence on Foreign Sources on November 6 1987 and approved and forwarded to the President the reports Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure and Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories on September 22 1988 On June 8 1989 the NSTAC approved and forwarded to the President the Joint TIM Group’s final reports on Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements Dependence on other Infrastructure Systems and Jurisdictional Issues a final report with overall recommendations on telecommunications industry mobilization The NSTAC then disbanded the Joint TIM Group Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The original Energy Task Force further defined the TIM recommendations on energy issues including underground storage tank regulations The National Security Council and the Executive Office of the President initiated a review of overall national security mobilization preparedness The Federal Emergency Management Agency implemented several TIM recommendations as part of the Graduated Mobilization Response Plan The OMNCS Office of the Joint Secretariat developed a plan of action involving all NCS member organizations designed to track implementation of the TIM recommendations The plan included identification of task responsibilities a time-phased work plan and a schedule of status reports The Baseline Mobilization program involved assigning “lead” organizations to follow up and take actions necessary to implement each TIM recommendation during a 3-year period with 36 tasks distributed among the NCS member organizations In September 1993 the OMNCS Office of the Joint Secretariat issued its Final Report on TIM Recommendations 133 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The report presented the actions taken by various NCS member agencies on 11 recommendations having a significant and immediate effect on NS EP telecommunications The remaining 25 recommendations while of considerable importance were of somewhat lesser significance relative to their immediate impact on NS EP telecommunications The telecommunications industry had substantially implemented those recommendations and the report addressed them The OMNCS believed that the agencies assigned to implement the recommendations had responded favorably and that the TIM program could be considered a success The OMNCS also believed that further formal monitoring of the TIM program was not necessary Reports Issued Volume I TIM Issue Statement September 5 1985 Volume II Background and Supporting Material September 5 1985 Personnel Issues September 1987 Dependence on Foreign Sources October 1987 Government and Industry Mobilization Management Structure June 1988 Maintenance of Stockpiles and Inventories June 1988 Telecommunications Service Surge Requirements January 1989 Dependence on Other Infrastructure Systems April 1989 Assessment of TIM Capabilities V I April 1989 TIM Subject Reports V II April 1989 Jurisdictional Issues April 1989 Exercise Participation April 1989 Final Report on TIM Recommendations September 1993 134 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Telecommunications Service Priority Investigation Group Period of Activity Telecommunications Service Priority TSP Task Force December 1984 – December 1990 Issue Background In December 1984 the NSTAC identified TSP as an urgent issue because of the need for a system that authorized both priority provisioning and restoration of NS EP services for Federal State and local governments and private users The TSP System replaced the Restoration Priority RP System which covered only the restoration of Federal Government inter-city and private lines The NSTAC IES established the TSP Task Force on February 21 1985 to advise and assist the OMNCS in developing the TSP System specifically regarding provisioning restoration maintenance legal and regulatory issues History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The task force worked closely with the OMNCS in the development of the TSP System and provided assistance with its implementation Specifically the task force had a significant advisory role in creating the Petition for Rulemaking and Proposed Federal Communications Commission FCC Rules for the TSP System The task force also assisted the TSP Program Office in establishing the initial TSP System Oversight Committee charter The NCS Council of Representatives COR TSP Subcommittee and the TSP Task Force drafted and approved the charter in February 1990 and the DOD and the General Services Administration GSA approved the charter in November 1990 Subsequently adoption of an amendment occurred in April 1991 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES TSP Task Force and NCS COR met and discussed the operational framework for the TSP System including the establishment of the TSP Oversight Committee On March 29 1990 the TSP Task Force recommended that the Manager NCS appoint the following initial members to the TSP Oversight Committee AT T Contel McCaw Cellular MCI Bellcore Sprint GTE State of California State of South Carolina Department of Transportation Federal Emergency Management Agency DOD GSA Department of Energy Department of Commerce National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the FCC The NSTAC approved the membership list and delegated future industry TSP Oversight Committee membership nominating authority to the IES Additionally the task force assisted in developing the documentation that made the TSP System operational The task force helped create the TSP Service Vendor Handbook which provides operational details of the TSP System that service vendors will use as guidance for implementation and operation of TSP The task force developed the TSP Information Guide a TSP primer for small telephone companies published by the United States Telephone Association in December 1989 Furthermore the task force had a significant advisory role in creating NCS issuances on TSP procedures Specifically the task force helped develop NCS Directive 3-1 which clarified the responsibilities of and procedures for all TSP System entities The task force also assisted in the development of the TSP Service User Manual which provided a set of guidelines for all users of the TSP System The task force presented its final report at NSTAC XII in December 1990 including a recommendation to the President which stated that the Federal Government should continue to support and administer the TSP System as defined in NCS Directive 3-1 The task force had a role in both the creation of the TSP Oversight Committee and the selection of Oversight Committee members During the week of September 28 through October 3 1987 the 135 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations TSP System implementation began on September 10 1990 The implementation plan included a 2 5-year period for transition from the RP to the TSP System The TSP System became fully operational on March 9 1993 Today the TSP Oversight Committee continues to meet on a biannual basis Likewise the OMNCS continues to provide the operational support for the TSP System Reports Issued TSP Information Guide December 1989 published for the TSP Task Force by the U S Telephone Association now the U S Telecom Association TSP Service Vendor Handbook NCSH 3-1-2 July 1990 Final Report of the TSP Task Force September 1990 136 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Telecommunications Service Priority Carrier Liability Investigation Group Period of Activity Industry Executive Subcommittee IES Funding and Regulatory Working Group FRWG November 16 1990 – January 31 1991 Issue Background The Federal Communications Commission Telecommunications Service Priority TSP Report and Order authorizes telecommunications carriers to install or restore NS EP telecommunications on a priority basis over services that do not serve NS EP requirements The FRWG reviewed this issue to further define the protection against liability offered by the TSP Report and Order One area of concern identified by the working group was 911 service The working group concurred that the TSP Report and Order offered adequate protection to carriers The FRWG also observed that services provided under contract rather than through tariffs may not be protected by the TSP Report and Order language The FRWG reached the following conclusions u The TSP Report and Order offered sufficient protection against liability charges arising from the disruption of non-NS EP user tariffed services u The TSP Report and Order had not fully defined the legal ramifications of preempting a contracted versus a tariffed service and u Carriers should develop internal policies for preempting non-NS EP users On March 15 1991 the FRWG reported its findings to the IES The IES concurred with the FRWG’s findings 137 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Telecommunications Systems Survivability Investigation Group Period of Activity Telecommunications Systems Survivability TSS Task Force March 6 1986 – June 8 1989 Issue Background The NSTAC developed the TSS issue in December 1982 to address all aspects of the telecommunications survivability question The Commercial Satellite Survivability CSS and Commercial Network Survivability CNS issues evolved from the NSTAC’s initial focus on TSS On March 6 1986 the NSTAC IES established the TSS Task Force and directed it to determine whether NSTAC recommendations had inconsistencies whether the recommendations met the Government’s NS EP telecommunications policy requirements and whether the Government effectively responded to the recommendations In early 1987 the NSTAC charged the TSS Task Force to assess the impact of new technologies on telecommunications survivability The TSS Task Force concluded that no serious inconsistencies or gaps existed among NSTAC recommendations and the recommendations sufficiently met the Government’s NS EP telecommunications policy objectives The NSTAC forwarded to the President the TSS Task Force recommendation to initiate a study to identify options for ensuring survivable electric power The TSS Task Force completed reports on Government actions taken in response to NSTAC recommendations from the CNS CSS and Electromagnetic Pulse Task Forces and submitted them to the NSTAC on November 6 1987 The task force submitted similar reports on automated information processing and the National Coordinating Mechanism to NSTAC IX on September 22 1988 The NSTAC approved these reports and forwarded them to the President on the respective dates The TSS Task Force also completed an assessment of the applicability NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES of network management technology to NS EP telecommunications survivability which the NSTAC forwarded to the President on September 22 1988 The TSS Task Force assisted the OMNCS in developing the Federal Government’s policy on essential line service ELS On June 8 1989 the NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s final report and disbanded the task force The NSTAC also directed the IES to proceed with the study of intelligent networks and virtual networks usefulness for enhancing network survivability which the TSS Task Force initiated pending review of the issue by the IES Plans Working Group PWG History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations The NSTAC approved the TSS Task Force’s final report and disbanded the task force on June 8 1989 Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations The TSS Task Force’s electric power recommendations led to the establishment of the original Energy Task Force and the intelligent networks study led to the establishment of the Intelligent Networks Task Force The IES through the OWG NS EP Panel provides a continuing evaluation of the overall progress and direction of TSS The NS EP Panel identifies any new concerns relating to TSS advises the OWG of areas requiring NSTAC or NCS actions or study monitors the status of general survivability of telecommunications systems and reports periodically on the status of TSS to the OWG As part of the CNS program the OMNCS Office of Plans and Programs monitored network management developments including local exchange carrier network management capabilities In addition members assigned to the OMNCS Office of Technology and Standards Network Management and Technology Planning task assessed the effects of congestion on NS EP telecommunications and how expert systems could improve network management for NS EP telecommunications The NCS continued to encourage compliance with NCS Notice 3-0-1 NS EP ELS which recommended that Federal departments and agencies having NS EP 139 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review telecommunications missions consider obtaining ELS to increase their probability of obtaining a timely dial tone The Department of Energy was directed to implement several Energy Task Force recommendations Reports Issued TSS Industry Responses to May 13 1983 Questionnaire September 1983 TSS Task Force–Subgroup 1 Review September 1986 TSS Task Force–Review of Power September 1986 TSS Task Force–Review of Security September 1986 TSS Network Management Report June 21 1988 TSS Review of Government Actions in Response to NSTAC-Recommended Initiatives June 21 1988 TSS Electric Power Survivability Status Report August 9 1988 TSS Task Force Final Report Telecommunications System Survivability–Assessment and Future Directions May 2 1989 140 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Underground Storage Tanks a paper outlining the UST issue and recommended the following Investigation Group Period of Activity u Industry Executive Subcommittee Funding and Regulatory Working Group FRWG April 12 1990 – March 1 1991 Issue Background In 1988 the Energy Task Force voiced concerns that the Environmental Protection Agency EPA regulations on underground fuel storage tanks would encourage telecommunications carriers to reduce the amount of fuel available for their backup generators The EPA regulations 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 280 originally proposed in April 1987 included standards for maintaining the integrity of the tank protecting against spill and overfill and detecting leaks The telecommunications industry modified or replaced several thousand underground storage tanks UST pursuant to these regulations and added detection monitoring systems The Energy Task Force considered the implications of the regulations and concluded that if the telecommunications industry complied with the new EPA regulations the public switched network might not have enough backup fuel storage capacity in all locations to operate through normal power outages The Energy Task Force recommended that the Government grant a national security waiver from those parts of the regulations that affected NS EP telecommunications providers A waiver of EPA UST regulations should not be pursued The waiver would not make a significant contribution to meeting Government backup power needs because companies were already pursuing their own UST programs State and local regulations would be addressed regardless of any Federal waiver and telecommunications companies would probably not use Federal waivers unless mandated by the Government The FRWG supported the implementation of an Energy Task Force recommendation u Government should specify an NS EP backup fuel requirement in cooperation with industry Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations At the December 12 1990 NSTAC XII Meeting members agreed with the recommendation not to pursue a waiver of EPA UST regulations Report Issued Energy Task Force Final Report February 1990 The FRWG received briefings from the EPA and support staff on EPA UST regulations The FRWG also investigated UST regulations at the Federal State and local levels The group also surveyed several local exchange carriers and interexchange carriers to determine UST policies and procedures The survey revealed that industry was reviewing the UST requirements as a result of the EPA regulations and that companies used several criteria when developing UST requirements The FRWG developed 141 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Wireless Security Investigation Group Period of Activity Wireless Task Force WTF April 2002 – January 2003 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES wireless security and other related wireless issues the NSTAC IES formed the WTF at its April 18 2002 meeting The IES tasked the WTF to determine how the NS EP user can operate in a secure environment and to provide conclusions and recommendations to the President regarding wireless security History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations Issue Background Numerous wireless technologies are being used with greater regularity to transmit voice data and video in support of NS EP operations However there are increasing concerns that wireless communications could expose NS EP users to new security threats and vulnerabilities As such the NS EP community needs to understand its security requirements and identify potential wireless vulnerabilities Challenges exist at many levels including product design wireless standards and wireless Internet convergence First the wide use of commercial off-the-shelf products and legacy equipment by the NS EP community is an important consideration because these devices and equipment were not designed with NS EP security requirements in mind and sometimes without security features at all Second interoperability issues arise from the implementation of different security models and standards—for instance there are several conflicting policies either established or in development designed to inhibit or prohibit the use of particular wireless capabilities and connectivity to classified networks and computers Third the extension of the Internet into the wireless domain adds new security challenges At the NSTAC XXV Meeting held on March 13 2002 participants discussed the topic of security vulnerabilities in wireless communications devices and networks Since subscribers use wireless technologies to transmit voice data and video in support of NS EP operations meeting participants agreed that the NS EP community needed to identify its security requirements and understand potential wireless vulnerabilities After an initial scoping of To adequately discuss these subjects and formulate actionable recommendations designed to help offset wireless threats and vulnerabilities the WTF agreed to 1 define the terms “wireless” and “wireless security ” 2 identify NS EP wireless users’ unique requirements 3 compile a list of wireless vulnerabilities and threats and 4 where known identify mitigation approaches to address wireless vulnerabilities and threats The task force used the expertise of subject matter experts from NSTAC member companies as well as other information technology companies industry associations and Government participants throughout its study of wireless security After defining NS EP user requirements the task force identified advantages to using wireless systems for NS EP communications as well as vulnerabilities and threats that must be addressed before using wireless capabilities for mission-critical NS EP communications The WTF’s findings concurred with other prevalent studies which determined that any vulnerabilities that exist in conventional wired and computer communications and networks are applicable to wireless technologies The WTF concluded that there is a range of wireless security which varies from effective practical security on the commercial wireless networks to significantly less security on the public wireless networks As such an NS EP agency must ensure that its NS EP communications are secured appropriately for its mission The WTF also agreed that the extent to which these vulnerabilities have been or can be addressed would be a function of the degree to which organizations with experience in security issues manage the network 143 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The WTF concluded its analysis of wireless security in January 2003 and presented its findings in its WTF Report on Wireless Security The task force found that wireless security challenges exist at many levels including product design wireless standards and wireless Internet convergence Based on its analysis of issues related to wireless security the NSTAC offered the following recommendations to the President u Direct Federal departments and agencies using microwave communications facilities to address unprotected link security vulnerabilities In addition advise State and local Governments and other critical infrastructure providers of the vulnerability of unprotected microwave communications as part of the homeland security initiative and Direct Federal departments and agencies to construct mitigation and alleviation policies regarding wireless vulnerabilities and further consider the applicability of the recent wireless security policies of the NIST and the Department of Defense to all Federal departments and agencies u Establish policies regarding the public availability and dissemination of Federal critical infrastructure information such as the policies on Internet availability of the FCC and the Federal Aviation Administration databases of tower locations u u Direct Government chief information officers to immediately emphasize enterprise management controls with respect to wireless devices to ensure that appropriate security controls are implemented given that the banning of wireless devices is counterproductive and ignores the efficiency that such devices brings to users u Direct Federal departments and agencies to work in concert with industry to develop security principles and to resolve security-related deficiencies in wireless devices when employed by NS EP users u Direct Federal departments and agencies using wireless communications to address wireless security threats and vulnerabilities and to consider the end-to-end security of their respective communications and information system capabilities u Direct Federal departments and agencies using wireless communications to purchase and implement fully tested and compliant secure wireless products and services u Direct appropriate staff to advocate funding initiatives for replacing non-secure analog with secure digital NS EP equipment and systems 144 At a December 2 2002 IES Meeting briefing the Chair of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board requested that the WTF consider examining the security of Internet-enabled wireless communications devices and the efficacy of installing anti-virus software for wireless telephones since such devices are becoming increasingly more integrated with computing functions In response to the Administration’s request the WTF scoped the issue The WTF reported a number of observations on the security of Internet-enabled wireless devices in its Wireless Task Force Findings Security of Internet-Enabled Wireless Devices January 2003 The task force agreed that it is a serious issue which is not limited exclusively to “wireless” or “third generation” wireless devices because any device connected to the Internet can be attacked The WTF concluded that although the tasking referenced wireless specifically the NSTAC has already studied the larger issue as it relates to the convergence of telecommunications networks and the Internet The complete findings based on the task force’s initial scoping were forwarded to NSTAC stakeholders for review The WTF concluded its activities upon NSTAC approval of its reports and finalization of its findings on the security of Internet-enabled wireless devices The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations NSTAC wireless security recommendations were formed after considerable collaboration with experts from industry and the Government The recommendations were provided to and well received by other technical and policy advisory groups For example the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council NRIC VI which assures homeland security optimal reliability interoperability and interconnectivity of and accessibility to the public telecommunications networks maintained close coordination with NSTAC efforts and recommendations NRIC’s best practices and recommendations complemented NSTAC findings regarding wireless security principles and the resolution of security-related deficiencies in wireless devices Reports Issued Wireless Task Force Report Wireless Security January 2003 Wireless Task Force Findings Security of Internet-Enabled Wireless Devices January 2003 145 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Wireless Services Including Priority Services Investigation Group Period of Activity Wireless Low-Bit-Rate Digital Services Task Force W LBRDSTF March 1991 – October 1991 Wireless Services Task Force WSTF December 1991 – September 1995 Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRTF February 2001 – Present Wireless Task Force WTF April 2002 – January 2003 Issue Background At its March 15 1991 meeting the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s NSTAC Industry Executive Subcommittee IES established the Wireless Low-Bit-Rate Digital Services Task Force W LBRDSTF to address Office of the Manager National Communications System OMNCS concerns about the possible adverse effects of developments in the rapidly evolving wireless telecommunications sector that would impact the public switched network’s ability to handle secure voice and data communications The OMNCS recommended that the task force’s charge be to 1 define the scope of the issues regarding wireless services and 2 advise the Government on how to minimize any adverse effects of emerging digital mobile communications standards and technologies on mobile national security and emergency preparedness NS EP users On October 3 1991 in its final NSTAC XIII report the W LBRDSTF concluded that no Government organization existed for defining NS EP requirements for wireless digital communications In addition the task force determined that compatibility problems existed between certain existing and developing voice data devices for example secure telephone unit STU -III analog NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES and the emerging digital wireless network Based on the task force’s report the NSTAC recommended that the Government determine the appropriate organization to address and monitor wireless digital interface issues Accordingly the Government tasked the OMNCS Wireless Services Program Office WSPO with the responsibility In December 1991 following the establishment of the WSPO the IES approved the establishment of a follow-on Wireless Services Task Force WSTF The IES tasked the WSTF to provide an industry perspective to the WSPO and to assist in developing a plan of action for addressing NS EP wireless issues This included identifying Government requirements and developing a white paper to support standards activities The IES also instructed the task force to continue its investigation into wireless services supporting NS EP To that end the task force surveyed the evolving wireless services environment and identified and assessed candidate solutions that would ensure interoperability and connectivity among wireless services and between wireless and non-wireless systems The WSTF in conjunction with the OMNCS WSPO and the Federal Wireless Users Forum addressed methods for incorporating priority access into wireless systems for NS EP use In addition they determined the potential for emerging wireless technologies to complement existing communications support in the Federal Response Plan FRP Emergency Support Function ESF #2 Communications The WSTF established the Cellular Priority Access Services CPAS subgroup in July 1994 to investigate technical administrative and regulatory issues associated with the deployment of a nationwide priority access capability for NS EP cellular users On March 2 1995 the IES instructed the WSTF to determine the NS EP implications of and scope the future task force involvement in wireless technologies These technologies include land mobile radio specialized mobile radio mobile satellite services personal communications services and mobile wireless access to data networks 147 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review At its September 22 1995 meeting the IES placed the WSTF on standby status until needed by the Government At that meeting the IES also voted to place the CPAS subgroup under the direction of the NS EP group Since then the subgroup has assisted in developing CPAS forms and a manual for the administration of CPAS Additionally the subgroup monitored the development and modifications of standards and regulatory issues relevant to CPAS which is now referred to as Wireless Priority Service WPS The NSTAC revisited WPS issues during the NSTAC XXVI cycle March 2002–April 2003 After scoping current wireless issues related to NS EP users the IES formed the Wireless Task Force WTF to study issues relating to the ubiquitous rollout of WPS at its April 18 2002 meeting In addition to analyzing the impediments to the ubiquitous rollout of WPS the IES detailed the task force to study how WPS can be promoted publicly and explore non-device specific and secure solutions for deploying WPS History of NSTAC Actions and Recommendations At the October 3 1991 NSTAC XIII Meeting the NSTAC approved the following W LBRDSTF recommendations to the President u The Government should establish a focal point supported by the National Security Agency NSA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST to address and monitor wireless digital interface issues and u The Government should formulate policies at a high level to ensure that all wireless digital service acquisition activities take NS EP needs into account The NSTAC reconvened the task force following the establishment of the WSPO At the March 4 1994 NSTAC XVI Meeting the NSTAC approved the WSTF report and forwarded recommendations to the Government on pursuing implementation of a single nationwide priority 148 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee access capability for NS EP users and expanding the FRP ESF#2 planning process to make more effective use of wireless technologies and services At the NSTAC XVII Meeting held on January 12 1995 the task force reported on its activities in the areas of wireless interoperability and cellular priority access At the NSTAC XVIII Meeting the WSTF presented its task force report and recommendations on the NS EP implications of land mobile radio specialized mobile radio mobile satellite services personal communications services and wireless data to the President The report had several recommendations related to the Government continuing to actively exploit emerging technologies in support of NS EP activities by working at the international Federal State and local levels in defining wireless requirements Additionally the subgroup submitted the Cellular Priority Access Services Subgroup Report which recommended the Government continue to gain a consensus on CPAS regulatory administrative and technical issues to finalize a comprehensive CPAS implementation strategy At the NSTAC XXV Executive Breakfast on March 13 2002 Senator Robert Bennett R-UT requested that the NSTAC revisit the issue of WPS and further examine obstacles to the ubiquitous rollout of WPS In response to this charge the NSTAC tasked the WTF with assessing the issues related to the ubiquitous deployment of WPS The WTF closely monitored the deployment of WPS noting that the ubiquitous deployment of the program had not been achieved for a variety of operational technical funding and regulatory reasons WTF members agreed that the ubiquitous nationwide deployment of WPS would be achieved through the inclusion of all wireless technologies in the solution set satellite back-up capabilities and the participation of large and small wireless carriers Members also cited inadequate Government funding lack of liability protection for carriers and technological limitations as additional impediments to the ubiquitous rollout of WPS Lastly the WTF NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee determined the need for an effective WPS outreach campaign to State and local Governments smaller wireless carriers private sector critical infrastructure protection providers and the general public Providing these entities with timely and accurate information would dispel misconceptions regarding the WPS program and facilitate the inclusion of WPS in various NS EP homeland security contingency and disaster recovery plans use of Government sites and buildings to increase WPS coverage and ubiquity • Smaller carriers—Educating them on WPS and encouraging their involvement in the program • Private sector critical infrastructure providers—Facilitating greater awareness of the WPS program and enabling improved contingency and disaster recovery programs As a result of this analysis the NSTAC offered the following recommendations to the President u u u u Encourage the development of WPS solutions for all wireless technologies e g cellular personal communications service third generation networks paging and other wireless data services to maximize WPS coverage increase ubiquity and give NS EP users the flexibility to handle a variety of emergencies and disasters • The general public—Detailing the benefits WPS provides for public safety and homeland security u • Stockpiling WPS-enabled phones for large-scale distribution to NS EP users during emergencies Reaffirm that the Federal Communications Commission’s FCC Second Report and Order R O on Priority Access Service PAS does extend liability protection to wireless priority solution providers equivalent to liability protection found in wireline priority communications programs Encourage and support adequate funding for the development and deployment of a multi-technology and multi-carrier WPS program including a satellite backup capability to continue through WPS full operational capability and later generations and integration with the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service GETS Direct the appropriate departments and agencies to conduct outreach and educational campaigns regarding WPS and its role in homeland security specifically targeting • State and local Governments—Emphasizing the role of WPS in homeland security and the importance of expediting zoning and siting requests from wireless carriers including the Direct the National Communications System NCS Government agencies and departments and organizations with NS EP missions to implement proactive policies regarding the implementation and use of the WPS program including • Monitoring WPS usage following distribution of WPS handsets to protect against fraud and abuse • Developing a WPS directory assistance function enabling NS EP users to locate one another during emergencies u Direct the NCS and Government agencies and departments involved in WPS planning and program management to address the technical limitations of wireless and other network technologies that may have a negative impact on the assurance reliability and availability of an end-to-end WPS solution These limitations include but are not limited to • Insufficient commercial capacity available to support NS EP users • Technical infeasibility of offering wireless priority at the network egress within the initial operating capability time frame 149 PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review • Processing limitations of Signaling System 7 SS7 during periods of congestion • Security vulnerabilities resulting from the convergence of voice and data networks and the SS7 • Challenges associated with the integration of GETS with WPS In addition the WTF worked jointly with the Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRTF to assess the legal and regulatory concerns with WPS during the NSTAC XXVI cycle Specifically they addressed whether the FCC should revise the Second R O for PAS The NSTAC reviewed the R O and on January 22 2003 sent a letter to the President offering recommendations on PAS In the letter the NSTAC commended the FCC for adopting a Second R O for PAS which indicates that carriers providing PAS shall have liability immunity from Section 202 of the Communications Act states that the FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration NTIA should accelerate on-going efforts to improve interoperability between Federal State and local public safety communications agencies and encourages the Administration to support full and adequate Federal funding for PAS Actions Resulting from NSTAC Recommendations A Memorandum of Understanding established the WSPO as the Government focal point within the OMNCS Technology and Standards Division now the OMNCS Technology and Programs Division with full-time participation from NSA and NIST On October 19 1995 the OMNCS through the WSPO submitted a CPAS Petition for Rulemaking to the FCC to authorize the nationwide CPAS service After two years of soliciting comments from industry on the CPAS Petition for Rulemaking the FCC adopted the First R O for PAS on August 6 1998 150 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee The OMNCS worked on CPAS implementation through four parallel approaches modifying cellular standards to incorporate CPAS encouraging the FCC to issue CPAS rules developing CPAS administrative processes and stimulating competitive interests of service providers to implement the CPAS capability On July 3 2000 the FCC adopted the Second R O for PAS establishing the regulatory administrative and operational framework enabling commercial mobile radio service providers to offer WPS to NS EP personnel The R O also provided WPS priority levels and qualifying criteria to be used as the basis for all WPS assignments In their rulemaking the FCC determined that 1 WPS was in the public interest 2 WPS offering should be voluntary 3 carriers should have limited liability if uniform operating procedures were followed and 4 the NCS is responsible for day-to-day administration of the program After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 the NS EP community had a renewed interest in fully implementing WPS and White House personnel directed the NCS to establish an active program A WPS-like solution was made available in Salt Lake City in time for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games and the NCS launched an immediate solution in May 2002 in the greater metropolitan areas of Washington DC and New York City As a result of the NCS integration into the Department of Homeland Security DHS WPS is now offered through the DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection IAIP Directorate WPS is offered in most major metropolitan markets on the Global System for Mobile Communications platform The initial carrier for WPS is T-Mobile which will reach full operating capability in 2004 In addition the WPS program expanded to additional GSM carriers in 2004 including AT T Wireless Cingular and Nextel There are also plans to expand WPS to be offered on the Code Division Multiple Access platform in the future The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED ISSUES Reports Issued Wireless Low-Bit-Rate Digital Services Task Force Final Report Towards National Security and Emergency Preparedness Wireless Low-Bit-Rate Digital Services September 1991 Wireless Services Task Force Report January 1994 Emerging Wireless Services Report September 1995 Cellular Priority Access Services Subgroup Report September 1995 Wireless Task Force Report Wireless Priority Service August 2002 151 Appendix A NSTAC Implementing and Governing Documentation NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX A The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Charter of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee I Official Designation Under Executive Order 12382 dated September 13 1982 and Executive Order 13316 dated September 30 2003 this Committee is officially designated the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee “the Committee” information and advice to the President on all telecommunications aspects affecting national security and emergency preparedness Key policy statements include but are not limited to Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and National Security Decision Directive Number 97 NSDD-97 “National Security Telecommunications Policy ” II Membership and Organization B The Committee’s officers will have the A Membership and organization will be in accordance with Executive Order 12382 dated September 13 1982 B There will be an Executive Secretary who will be the Manager National Communications System under section 10 e of the Federal Advisory Committee Act as amended 5 U S C App II C The Committee will provide such guidance and direction as is necessary and appropriate to ensure the effective functioning of any subcommittee so established Except where a special rule applicable to such subcommittees appears in an amendment to this Charter the provisions of this Charter shall apply with necessary changes appropriate to subcommittees to the subcommittees D The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission will be invited to participate in the activities of the Committee and its subcommittees Agencies and officials of the Executive Branch may also be invited to participate III Objective Scope of Activity and Duties A The Committee will function in accordance with Section 2 of Executive Order 12382 dated September 13 1982 The Committee will provide following responsibilities 1 The Chair will convene preside at and adjourn all meetings at his discretion with the advance approval of the Executive Secretary However the Chair will also be obliged to adjourn any meeting the Executive Secretary advises him to adjourn when the Executive Secretary determines an adjournment to be in the public interest 2 The Vice Chair will act as Chair in the absence of the Chair 3 The Executive Secretary who will be the Manager National Communications System will attend all meetings and will advise the Chair to adjourn or will adjourn any meeting when the Executive Secretary determines it is in the public interest The Executive Secretary will invite agencies and officials from the Executive Branch to attend the meetings as he deems appropriate The Executive Secretary will prepare the minutes of each meeting the accuracy of which the Chair will certify and that will at a minimum contain a record of the membership present and the members of the public who participate in the meeting including the interests and affiliations they A-3 APPENDIX A t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review represent a description of matters and materials discussed and the conclusions if any reached and the rationale for any recommendations made by members of the Committee The Executive Secretary will also maintain copies of all reports which the Committee receives issues or approves C The Committee may consult with interested parties agencies interagency committees or groups of the United States Government and with private groups and individuals as the Committee decides is necessary or desirable The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee B The estimated annual cost of operating the Committee and its subcommittees is $2 6 million including travel expenses per diem contractor support and staff support C The Department of Homeland Security in its capacity as Executive Agent for the National Communications System will supply staff and support functions for the Committee The estimated annual personnel staffing of such functions is 7 5 staff years excluding contract support VI Meetings and Termination D The NSTAC will address all matters pertaining to National Security Emergency Preparedness NS EP Communications Cyber and Telecommunications The NSTAC will coordinate NS EP communications interdependency issues with the National Infrastructure Advisory Council A The Committee will meet approximately every 12 months in person and otherwise at the call of the Chair Subcommittees will meet as necessary for their assigned responsibilities B Under Executive Order 13385 IV Official to Whom the Committee Reports A The Committee will report in writing to the President of the United States through the Secretary of Homeland Security in his capacity as Executive Agent for the National Communications System by Executive Order 13286 dated February 28 2003 dated September 29 2005 effective September 30 2005 the Committee will terminate on September 30 2007 unless formally determined to be in the public interest to continue it for an additional period A continuing need for the advice offered by this Committee is anticipated VII Filing Date B The Committee and any subcommittees established by the Committee will work with the Office of the Manager National Communications System and appropriate representatives from National Communications System member organizations C Any subcommittee established by the Committee will report to the Committee V Estimated Costs and Staff Support A Members of the Committee will serve on it without any compensation for their work and in accordance with Section 3 of Executive Order 12382 dated September 13 1982 A-4 December 14 2005 NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX A The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Bylaws of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Adopted Amended Amended Amended Amended July 20 1983 June 8 1989 January 12 1995 April 18 2000 April 7 2003 Article I Organization and Operation NSTAC issues strengthens industry and Government coordination examines legislative and regulatory issues oversees network security activities provides feedback on the status of NSTAC recommendations and directs and oversees the work of subordinate Groups The IES shall report to the NSTAC and the subordinate Groups shall report to the IES Article II Membership Section 1 The National Security and Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC shall be organized and operate in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act as amended 5 U S C App 2 Executive Order 12382 13 September 1982 the Charter of the NSTAC and these Bylaws Section 1 The members of the NSTAC shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 a of Executive Order No 12382 dated 13 September 1982 Section 2 The provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act as amended 5 U S C App 2 Executive Order No 12382 13 September 1982 and the Charter of the NSTAC shall govern in the event of any conflict between the provisions thereof and these Bylaws Each member of the NSTAC shall have the authority to appoint one member of the IES The same individual may represent an industry entity on the IES and on one or more subordinate Groups Except as provided in Article II Section 5 the membership of the subordinate Groups shall consist of IES members elected by the IES for a term of two NSTAC cycles Section 3 Section 3 Section 2 The NSTAC shall be supported by an Industry Executive Subcommittee IES The IES is authorized to form subordinate Groups titled Working Groups Task Forces or other appropriate title necessary to carry out the direction provided by the NSTAC and to develop recommendations for the NSTAC in accord with the NSTAC Charter and the IES’s mission The purpose of the IES is to advise the NSTAC on matters concerning procedures plans and policies for the telecommunications and information systems that support national security and emergency preparedness The IES shall meet approximately one month before and one month after an NSTAC meeting At additional Working Sessions of the Subcommittee of the whole the IES shall carry out its role as the NSTAC’S principal working body The IES performs the following functions identifies plans and defines Only NSTAC entities may be represented on the IES or subordinate Groups Section 4 Members of the NSTAC may not designate alternates Members of the IES or any subordinate Group may designate an alternate Such designation must be in writing with a copy provided to the Office of the Manager National Communications System OMNCS An alternate shall have the privileges of a member Section 5 Consistent with any applicable security clearance requirements any member of the IES or his or her duly designated alternate may be accompanied at any meeting by advisors Any member or alternate may authorize an adviser to speak on behalf of the member or alternate A-5 APPENDIX A t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Article III Chair and Voting Section 1 The Chair and Vice Chair of the NSTAC shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 b of the Executive Order No 12382 dated 13 September 1982 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Article IV Minutes and Reports Section 1 Committee records will be maintained as set forth in the Federal Advisory Committee Act 5 U S C App 2 Section 2 Section 2 The Chair of the IES shall be the Deputy Manager of the National Communications System and not number in the count for a quorum nor vote on issues before the IES At an IES Working Session the IES member from the NSTAC Chair’s company shall chair the Working Session The Chairs of subordinate Groups formed by the IES will be appointed by the IES Working Session Chair Section 3 A quorum of the Committee the IES or subordinate Group is required to vote on issues being addressed Except as set forth in Section 5 a quorum is constituted by the presence of more than half of the membership of the Committee IES or subordinate Group A written summary will be prepared for each IES meeting and meeting of the IES Working Session Summaries of the meetings will be prepared by the OMNCS and forwarded to members of the meeting body and other participating entities to review for accuracy and completeness Section 3 A consolidated annual report of results of all NSTAC activities shall be prepared and distributed to all members and to any Federal Government entity upon request Other reports shall be prepared as directed by the NSTAC Section 4 All reports except minority reports shall be prepared by the OMNCS and forwarded to the members for review and comment at least 15 days prior to final distribution Section 4 Only members of the NSTAC the IES or subordinate Group may vote All issues will be decided and recommendations or decisions made by a majority vote of those members present at any NSTAC IES or subordinate Group meeting Section 5 Absent a request for a recorded and or secret ballot vote all votes shall be by either a show of hands or by voice vote Any member may request a recorded and or secret ballot vote at any time With or without a quorum at a meeting the Chair of the IES or subordinate Group may conduct a recorded vote by mail at any time absent objections of any member In the case of a mail vote a quorum is constituted by receipt of votes from more than half of the membership A non-response from an IES or subordinate Group member will be considered a vote in the affirmative A-6 Section 5 Minority reports may be prepared by any industry member s and forwarded to the OMNCS The OMNCS will attach the minority report to the majority report Article V Issue Development Section 1 Issues for consideration by the NSTAC may be suggested by any Government or industry entity or any other person The OMNCS will prepare suggested issues into issue papers for consideration by the IES Section 2 The IES will review all issue papers and recommend to the NSTAC their approval or disapproval for further consideration or recommend such other action as is deemed necessary For issues sent to a subordinate Group for study analysis and or the development of recommendations or options the IES will provide guidance and direction as necessary The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX A Section 3 Studies analyses recommendations or options developed by any subordinate Group shall be submitted to the IES by report or briefing for consideration prior to presentation or submission to the NSTAC Article VI Amendment of the Bylaws Section 1 Amendment of the Bylaws may be proposed by any member of the NSTAC at any time Such amendments may be adopted or dismissed only by majority vote of the NSTAC Section 2 An amendment to the Bylaws shall become effective immediately following its adoption A-7 Appendix NSTAC Membership The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX B The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Membership as of May 10 2006 Mr F Duane Ackerman NSTAC Chair Chairman and CEO BellSouth Corporation Mr Scott G Kriens Chairman and CEO Juniper Networks Inc Mr Lawrence A Weinbach Chairman Unisys Corporation NSTAC Vice Chair To Be Determined Mr Craig O McCaw Chairman Teledesic Corporation Mr Joseph R Wright CEO PanAmSat Corporation Mr Craig J Mundie Chief Research and Strategy Officer Microsoft Corporation Position Vacant Electronic Data Systems Mr James F Albaugh President and CEO Boeing Integrated Defense Systems The Boeing Company Mr Lawrence T Babbio Jr Vice Chairman and President Verizon Communications Inc Mr Gregory Q Brown Executive Vice President President Networks and Enterprise Motorola Inc Mr Kenneth C Dahlberg Chairman and CEO Science Applications International Corporation Mr Gary D Forsee President and CEO Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Van B Honeycutt Chairman and CEO Computer Sciences Corporation Mr Clayton M Jones Chairman President and CEO Rockwell Collins Inc Mr Richard C Notebaert Chairman and CEO Qwest Communications International Inc Mr Donald J Obert Group Executive Network Computing Group Bank of America Corporation Mr Stratton Sclavos Chairman President and CEO VeriSign Inc Position Vacant Lockheed Martin Corporation Position Vacant Lucent Technologies Position Vacant Nortel Position Vacant Northrop Grumman Corporation Position Vacant United States Telecom Association Mr Stanley T Sigman President and CEO Cingular Wireless LLC CTIA – The Wireless Association Mr Randall L Stephenson Chief Operating Officer AT T Inc Mr William H Swanson Chairman and CEO Raytheon Company B-3 Appendix NSTAC XXIX Executive Report to the President The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C Executive Report on the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC held its 29th meeting NSTAC XXIX on May 10 2006 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC The meeting which centered around the theme “NSTAC Enhancing National Security and Emergency Preparedness through Communications” focused on issues surrounding national security and emergency preparedness NS EP communications in both this time of heightened security and in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season The NSTAC Principals met with Mr George Foresman Under Secretary for Preparedness Department of Homeland Security DHS during the Executive Breakfast met with Vice President Richard Cheney and other senior Administration leadership reviewed NSTAC activities over the past cycle and met with Mr Robert Stephan Acting Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security and Telecommunications Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection and Manager of the National Communications System NCS DHS Mr Kenneth Rapuano Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security Chairman Kevin Martin Federal Communications Commission FCC Mr John Grimes Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and Chief Information Officer Department of Defense DOD and other senior Administration officials during the Business Session met with Dr John H Marburger III Science Adviser to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy OSTP during the Executive Luncheon and engaged in discussion with Ambassador John Negroponte Director of National Intelligence DNI Ambassador David Gross United States U S Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs Department of State DOS Ms Kristjen Nielsen Homeland Security Council Mr Richard Russell OSTP Dr William Luti National Security Council NSC and Mr John Bansemer NSC and a number of senior Administration officials during the Executive Session This Executive Report summarizes those presentations and deliberations Also attached are the recommendations to the President from NSTAC XXIX Attachment 1 and an attendance list of NSTAC Principals Attachment 2 NSTAC XXIX Executive Breakfast Call to Order Opening Remarks Mr F Duane Ackerman BellSouth Corporation and NSTAC Chair called to order the 29th NSTAC Executive Breakfast on May 10 2006 at 8 00 a m at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC Remarks Mr George Foresman Mr Ackerman introduced Mr Foresman Mr Foresman thanked the NSTAC Principals for the opportunity to meet with them and provided an overview of the current state of preparedness He noted that many of the current telecommunications cyber infrastructure protection and disaster response issues such as industry access to restoration sites are the same as many of those encountered during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 In addition recognition of the need for better public-private sector collaboration during response and recovery activities continues to exist Mr Foresman emphasized that his goal as the Under Secretary for Preparedness is to ensure that lessons learned during emergency situations are not just lessons documented The lessons learned today need to be acted upon in the future to improve the Nation’s preparedness posture Mr Foresman emphasized the importance of the industry-Government partnership found in the NSTAC and stated that in his 20 years of Government service he has learned that Government has an obligation to ensure that the Committee’s advice and expertise C-3 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review are used in an efficient and effective manner He recognized that the Government is dependent on the private sector and must improve its ability to clearly articulate its needs to industry Mr Foresman reminded the group that the DHS was established in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks Initially DHS tried to fulfill its mission alone without full consideration of the extensive resources and knowledge that exists within private industry Since then the Department has recognized it cannot fulfill its mission without the private sector and for this reason the Government owes constant feedback on what industry can do to assist DHS in meeting its mission Mr Foresman continued by explaining that as the Under Secretary for Preparedness he is challenged to define what is meant by preparedness It is becoming increasingly important to consider the changing culture of preparedness and how to incorporate new business models of partnership with industry He added that in the past the primary relationship between industry and Government had been one of “regulatee” vs regulator however recent events challenge the effectiveness of this model In the post-Enron scandal environment corporate America has begun to manage risks differently In addition the September 11 terrorist attacks emphasized the need to ensure that we as a Nation are safer and more secure In this environment prevention protection response and recovery must be viewed as a continuum constituting preparedness Finally Hurricane Katrina emphasized the need to be prepared not only for terrorist attacks but also for natural disasters Mr Foresman highlighted that lessons learned from all of these events can be applied to a broader range of risk management For example the severe flooding that paralyzed much of New Orleans Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina is illustrative of the situation that could result if a location were contaminated for an extended period as a result of a chemical attack Mr Foresman informed the Principals that a significant challenge in developing an integrated approach to preparedness is the need to consider these activities within the larger international relations C-4 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee context Decisions made by the United States Government often have significant sometimes negative impacts abroad However at the same time relationships developed through international partnerships are essential to implementing effective preparedness strategies domestically He further noted that lessons learned from the recent events must be effectively integrated into preparedness strategies to ensure that future generations of leaders benefit from these lessons He expressed disappointment that the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina were identical to approximately 70 percent of the lessons learned previously from Hurricane Andrew Mr Foresman underscored the fundamental obligation to ensure that tangible improvements are made so a culture of preparedness can be created Although the Hurricane Katrina response activities yielded numerous lessons learned Mr Foresman noted that there were several success stories A wide range of resources were deployed on the ground helping to save more than 60 000 people and to evacuate 1 2 million people from the disaster area He thanked the industry members present for their contributions to these efforts In closing Mr Foresman reemphasized the need to be better prepared for the next emergency or disaster and to identify the best business model for preparedness Closing Remarks Adjournment Mr Ackerman thanked the Principals and Mr Foresman for their participation and adjourned the Executive Breakfast at 9 00 a m The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Business Session Call to Order Opening Remarks Mr Ackerman called to order the 29th NSTAC Business Session on May 10 2006 at 11 00 a m at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC Mr Ackerman welcomed members of the NSTAC and recognized the senior Government officials participating in the Business Session u Mr Rapuano u Chairman Martin u Mr Grimes u Mr Stephan and u Ambassador Gross Mr Ackerman thanked all those in attendance who contributed to the work of the NSTAC over the past year and specifically noted that the strength of the partnership among the industry and Government participants at the meeting table has enabled the NSTAC to develop timely and responsive recommendations He added that over the past year the NSTAC has effectively adapted and responded to emerging and developing threats with an appropriate sense of their urgency The annual meeting presents an opportunity to review the progress made over the preceding year and to set the stage for the coming year of work Hurricane Katrina seriously tested the Nation’s capabilities and taught hard lessons particularly regarding interdependencies Preparation efforts for next year must respond to those lessons learned To best enable those preparations Mr Ackerman encouraged all members to provide their input on the work of the coming cycle Remarks Mr Kenneth Rapuano Mr Rapuano thanked the members for the opportunity to address the NSTAC He relayed the regrets of Ms Frances Fragos Townsend Assistant NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism who was unable to attend due to her participation in the 2006 Governor’s Hurricane Conference in Florida He thanked Mr Ackerman for his service to date and for agreeing to chair the NSTAC for another year Mr Rapuano also thanked the NSTAC members for their service on behalf of the President noting how much the President relies on the Committee’s advice Mr Rapuano reiterated the extent of the destruction that the 2005 hurricanes wrought on the telecommunications infrastructure The storms overwhelmed emergency services causing response efforts to fall short of expectations As a result President George Bush directed Ms Townsend to study strategies to improve future response efforts The resulting White House report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned identified numerous challenges for ensuring the operability and interoperability of communications networks during all possible hazards and highlighted the need specifically for deployable communications capabilities Mr Rapuano noted that the White House is particularly interested in understanding and developing strategies for using deployable capabilities such as mobile bridges satellite technology and Voice over Internet Protocol to gather situational awareness information during disaster response and recovery activities He further noted that recent NSTAC letters and reports offered valuable recommendations regarding emergency communications and that White House officials will continue to rely on the NSTAC for advice and input to augment the concepts included in the draft National Emergency Communications Strategy In particular Mr Rapuano noted that the White House is interested in better understanding those challenges industry foresees in the implementation of deployable reliable communications He specifically requested insight on the commitments the Federal Government can expect from industry with regard to finalizing the National Emergency Communications Strategy and offering solutions for the implementation of a deployable communications capability as recommended by the NSTAC C-5 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Finally Mr Rapuano commended the NSTAC on its recommendations in the area of next generation networks NGN indicating that the White House found the advice to be of great value He noted the long-term evolution of the communications network and emphasized the need for a similar long-term approach for industry-Government collaboration in this area Remarks Mr Robert Stephan Mr Stephan thanked the NSTAC members for their efforts over the past year noting the more than 20-year history of successful industry-Government collaboration represented by the members around the table He praised Mr Ackerman’s direction and leadership and the NSTAC’s work to address many of the complex problems facing the Nation particularly in the areas of the NGN infrastructure interdependencies and coordination He noted the incredible challenges that the preceding year had presented including the July 2005 London bombings hurricanes Katrina Rita and Wilma and the Congressional hearings and the very timely production of the NSTAC’s work this year with regard to those challenges Terrorism natural disasters and industrial accidents are all examples of the wide range of threats the homeland faces and against which the DHS must remain vigilant on a daily basis He observed that the Executive Office of the President is conducting very important work on how to address NS EP and crisis communications issues into the future Mr Stephan remarked that the NSTAC has remained a valuable partner in protecting the Nation from such threats through its participation in several key DHS efforts Specifically the NSTAC member companies engaged in efforts to strengthen the National Infrastructure Protection Plan resulting in significant yet beneficial changes to the base plan DHS continues to seek industry input on the Sector Specific Plans SSP associated with the base plan particularly those for Information Technology IT and Communications He commented that the C-6 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Department appreciates the input from industry received to date and looks forward to additional feedback as the SSPs are refined In addition the NSTAC provided significant value in helping to integrate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina into Federal plans for addressing future challenges from an all hazards approach He praised the member companies for their work with Federal State and local Government entities to develop an access standard operating procedure SOP to ensure that private critical infrastructure responders have priority access to disaster areas The access SOP has been adopted by the State of Georgia and is currently being used as an example for other states Furthermore NSTAC members collaborated with the NCS to develop a process known as the Emergency Wireless Protocol for determining if and when cellular network connections should be terminated in an emergency such as the London bombings Finally Mr Stephan highlighted the importance of industry participation in exercises and informed the Principals that DHS is working with RAND to host a private sector tabletop exercise to consider the issues protocols and legal concerns associated with disaster response and recovery efforts in the future He noted that the exercise will incorporate the lessons learned identified by the NSTAC with regard to the varied interpretations of the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Stafford Act during Hurricane Katrina Mr Stephan concluded his remarks by emphasizing the need for industry and Government to work as a team to defeat the Nation’s adversaries Remarks Chairman Kevin Martin Chairman Martin commended the NSTAC member companies on their enormous efforts to reestablish communications in the Gulf Coast region after the 2005 hurricanes and the NSTAC as a whole on the recommendations produced to help prepare the Nation for the 2006 hurricane season He noted that the FCC has carefully considered the NSTAC recommendations on the restoration of communications especially the concerns related to access and credentialing The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Chairman Martin encouraged the NSTAC Principals to focus future efforts on three areas—strategies to seamlessly integrate commercial equipment and first responder networks development of a tool kit to ensure more resilient and rapidly deployable communications capabilities and ways to more fully integrate industry response efforts with Government leadership at the State level He offered his thanks to the NSTAC members for their valuable work thus far toward those ends Remarks Mr John Grimes As a founding member of the NSTAC Mr Grimes offered his insights on the value of the NSTAC symbolized by its 20 year longevity in a constantly changing communications network and security context He identified three key drivers that define the partnership in this day and age 1 the way in which the issues the Nation faced in the Cold War have evolved to today’s terrorism-centric domestic threat 2 the importance of Presidential involvement and 3 the operational activities of the National Coordinating Center NCC Mr Grimes informed the NSTAC Principals that DOD will become more involved in domestic emergency response activities While the Department has always played a role in emergency situations that role will intensify with the appropriate divisions taking immediate action in response to major events such as Hurricane Katrina Finally Mr Grimes recalled how the NSTAC process began in the wake of the divestiture of AT T to ensure that industry involvement in protecting the Nation’s communications capabilities would endure within a competitive operating environment and emphasized the continued importance of the process in the evolving communications market environment Mr Ackerman thanked the senior Government officials for their remarks and attendance at the NSTAC XXIX Meeting He then recognized the newly appointed NSTAC Principal Mr Scott Kriens of Juniper Networks Inc and the two pending NSTAC Principals Mr Walter McCormick of the United States Telecom Association and Mr Arthur Johnson of Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr Ackerman NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C welcomed the new Principals and stated that their NSTAC colleagues looked forward to working with them in the coming cycle Ongoing NSTAC Work Mr Ackerman turned the discussions to a review of the NSTAC’s ongoing work efforts He thanked the Industry Executive Subcommittee IES members for their significant work over the past cycle At the beginning of the NSTAC XXIX cycle there were five existing task forces 1 the Next Generation Networks Task Force 2 the National Coordinating Center Task Force NCCTF 3 the Research and Development R D Task Force 4 the Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRTF and 5 the NSTAC Outreach Task Force During the course of the cycle the NSTAC formed the Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force and the Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force ECITF Mr Ackerman thanked the NSTAC Principals who championed these task forces for their extensive insight and leadership Mr Craig Mundie Microsoft Corporation Ms Patricia Russo Lucent Technologies Mr Gregory Brown Motorola Inc Mr Joseph Wright PanAmSat Corporation Mr Lawrence Babbio Verizon Communications Inc Mr Van Honeycutt Computer Sciences Corporation and Ms Susan Spradley Nortel Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force Mr Brown ECITF Champion provided the Principals with an update on the task force’s recent efforts At the December 8 2005 NSTAC Principals’ Hurricane Katrina Response Working Group Meeting members discussed the lack of network operability and effective management processes which hindered the overall management of the response activities He emphasized the need for both network operability and interoperability between the communications networks used by the responder community in the future noting that without the capability to communicate response efforts would be continually challenged He reviewed that the Committee established the ECITF in February 2006 for two purposes 1 to provide recommendations to the President on short-term interoperability solutions for responders in advance C-7 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review of the 2006 hurricane season and 2 to provide mid- to long-term recommendations addressing how a complete suite of communications technologies should be integrated into the Federal Government’s emergency communications planning and how they could more effectively support NS EP activities In response to this tasking the ECITF drafted a letter to the President that outlines emergency communications and interoperability issues and identifies immediately applicable actions to improve responder communications capabilities Specifically the letter recommends the establishment of a uniform protocol for identifying emergency management coordinators’ contact information the creation of a deployable communications capability the integration of the NCS NS EP priority services programs into the National Emergency Communications Strategy and the establishment of cooperative efforts between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the FCC to streamline the authorization process for use of Federal incident response frequencies The Principals formally approved the letter on the March 28 2006 NSTAC Principals’ Conference Call Mr Brown also commented that the February 2006 White House Lessons Learned Report recommends the development of a National Emergency Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability and takes into consideration the direction of the telecommunications industry and the supporting recommendations of the NSTAC Mr Brown noted that the NSTAC fully endorses the development of such a strategy and is committed to help in its development Specifically Mr Brown noted the importance of ensuring that the strategy addresses all-hazards risks and the need to optimize existing capabilities and calls for the seamless integration of first responder and commercial communications capabilities Mr Ackerman thanked Mr Brown for his update and emphasized that the work of the ECITF will continue to be a top priority in the next cycle C-8 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Legislative and Regulatory Task Force Mr Ackerman reported that throughout the past cycle the LRTF continued to analyze legislative and regulatory issues relevant to NS EP telecommunications especially as they related to Hurricane Katrina response and recovery efforts Following the December 8 2005 NSTAC Principals’ Hurricane Katrina Response Working Group Meeting the LRTF drafted a letter and report Federal Support to Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers in National Emergencies Designation as “Emergency Responders Private Sector ” recommending the designation of telecommunications infrastructure providers as “Emergency Responders Private Sector ” and providing them with access to non-monetary Federal assistance such as fuel water and security for industry telecommunications response personnel Furthermore the letter and report recommend the issuance of appropriate Presidential guidance to define “Emergency Responders Private Sector ” under the Stafford Act and other authorities as appropriate to align with the broadened definition of national defense in the 2003 amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950 Lastly the letter and report recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Congress to codify the official “Emergency Responder Private Sector ” term and interpretation that for-profit telecommunications infrastructure providers should receive Federal assistance under the Stafford Act and other appropriate legislative authorities The letter and report received Principal approval during the January 31 2006 NSTAC Principals’ Conference Call Mr Ackerman further reported that the LRTF completed a report to the NSTAC Principals on open source information on academic Web sites and examined NS EP legislative and regulatory issues as they arose throughout the cycle National Coordinating Center Task Force Mr Babbio NCCTF Champion reminded the Principals that the task force was established to study the direction of the NCC over the next year three years and five years and to specifically address 1 how industry members of the NCC should The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee continue to partner with Government 2 how the NCC should be structured and 3 how the new DHS Sector Coordinating Council SCC approach could affect the NCC He noted that the task force recently completed its draft report and recommendations for Principal review and commended the task force members for completing such an important document in the midst of Katrina response activities He thanked Mr James Bean Verizon Communications Inc and NCCTF Chair and Mr John Stogoski Sprint Nextel Corporation and NCCTF Vice Chair as well as all participants for their hard work and dedication NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C The NSTAC Principals unanimously voted to approve the NCCTF Report Closing Remarks Adjournment Mr Ackerman recognized the IES members for all of their efforts during the cycle He thanked the Principals and speakers for their participation in the morning’s proceedings Ambassador Gross remarked that he looked forward to the afternoon discussions regarding the international implications of the NGN Mr Ackerman adjourned the NSTAC Business Session at 11 50 a m Mr Babbio highlighted several key findings in the report first discussing the need to dispel the artificial separation of the telecommunications and IT sectors The report recommends that this issue be addressed through a merger of the NCC and the IT Information Sharing and Analysis Center over the next several years Mr Babbio also noted the report recommends the need to improve industry-Government coordination at the regional level to increase industry participation in Government planning training and exercises to improve information sharing among industry members of the NCC as well as between industry and Government and to include industry in Government impact analyses from the earliest stages to provide for the best possible outcome Mr Babbio noted that the NSTAC completed a letter to the President which received Principal approval during the March 28 2006 NSTAC Principals’ Conference Call urging that a task force be convened to design a regional communications coordinating capability He noted that this task force has been convened by the Communications SCC and work is currently underway Mr Babbio further informed the Principals that the NCCTF Report includes a Roadmap for the NCC’s Future outlining more than 60 actions for the next one three and five years that will better prepare the NCC to meet upcoming challenges C-9 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review NSTAC XXIX Executive Luncheon Call to Order Opening Remarks Mr Ackerman called to order the 29th NSTAC Executive Luncheon on May 10 2006 at 12 00 p m at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC Mr Ackerman introduced Dr Marburger to present the new member certificate and to offer brief remarks to the Principals on the importance of innovation to the Nation’s economic and technological competitiveness Certificate Presentation Dr Marburger called Mr Kriens forward to receive his certificate Mr Kriens rose and accepted his certificate Remarks Dr John Marburger Dr Marburger commended the Principals for participating on one of the Federal Government’s most important advisory bodies He noted that the member companies of the NSTAC possess the most accurate knowledge of the vulnerabilities facing the communications networks as well as the complexities of the networks’ infrastructure key pieces of information that the Government must better understand to effectively conduct its varied missions He asked the members to continue to work in partnership with the Government advising them as necessary on those issues of which they must be aware Dr Marburger remarked that President Bush recently announced in his State of the Union speech on January 31 2006 the establishment of the American Competitiveness Initiative ACI —a Federal effort to continue to maintain the Nation’s economic competitiveness and leadership in science and technology through innovation He noted that the Administration recognized the importance of investing in the future particularly in the areas of IT which has formed the foundation for many of the business plans developed by private industry and workforce training the key to producing the technology platforms needed to compete in the future global marketplace He observed that the concepts underpinning the purpose of the Initiative were highlighted in three reports C-10 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee developed by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology in 2003 and 2004 as well as the NSTAC In addition the National Academies has developed a list of twenty innovative areas for further R D investment Dr Marburger observed that since the end of the Cold War the Federal Government has “flat funded” the key agencies responsible for conducting R D activities To counteract this trend the ACI commits $5 9 billion in fiscal year 2007 to increase investments in R D strengthen education and encourage entrepreneurship Over 10 years the Initiative commits $50 billion to increase funding for research and $86 billion for R D tax incentives The majority of the funding will be provided to three key research agencies—the Department of Commerce’s National Institute for Standards and Technology the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy’s Office of Science—to focus on issues that serve long-term competitiveness goals Furthermore he acknowledged that the President favors the institution of a permanent tax credit for research and is investigating methods for making the tax credit available to a larger number of companies in the R D community particularly smaller entities Dr Marburger concluded his remarks by announcing that significant sections of the ACI reflect the need to undertake additional training and education activities He specifically noted consideration of the extension of the Pell Grants system and efforts to redirect science and technology assets to enrich K-12 math and science education by enhancing understanding of how students learn and applying that knowledge to train highly qualified teachers Dr Marburger thanked the Principals for their continued dedication to the NSTAC and welcomed their further attention to R D issues in the future Closing Remarks Adjournment Mr Ackerman thanked the Principals and speakers for their participation and adjourned the Executive Luncheon at 12 45 p m The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Executive Session Opening Remarks Mr Ackerman called to order the 29th NSTAC Executive Session at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC on May 10 2006 at 1 00 p m Mr Ackerman explained that the NSTAC Executive Session would provide the NSTAC Principals along with the senior Government officials in attendance the opportunity to discuss and refine the key issues for the NSTAC XXX work plan Before commencing the Executive Session discussion Mr Ackerman introduced the Government stakeholders who joined the meeting for the session u Ambassador Negroponte u Mr Bansemer u Dr Luti u Ms Nielsen u Mr Russell and u Ambassador Gross International Implications of Next Generation Networks Mr Stratton Sclavos VeriSign Inc led the discussion on the international implications of the NGN He noted that the NGNTF briefly delved into issues related to the global nature of the NGN and determined that these issues required further examination by the NSTAC He noted that the IES established a scoping group to address international issues following the discussion at the NSTAC XXVIII Meeting last year and suggested that the Principals activate the scoping group as a follow on task to that completed by the NGNTF He further noted that several NSTAC companies have encountered repeated denial-of-service attacks of significant impact since January 2006 thereby increasing the importance of the international issues for many of those companies at the table at this time Further investigations revealed that the attacks originated from China Eastern Europe NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C and the U S Mr Sclavos warned that there is a risk that such attacks could be carried out on an even larger scale and such a threat is illustrative of the critical need to extend the Nation’s NS EP cyber posture internationally Commenting on the interconnected nature of the NGN Ambassador Gross noted that the evolution of the communications network is an important issue for the DOS Although extensive work is underway domestically the U S is not a leader in this area technically and has not assumed a leadership role in NGN standards development He informed the group that the Governments in Korea China Japan and Europe are all expending significant resources both financial and human to advance the evolution of the network He added that there are numerous security issues that must be addressed with the further development of NGN standards globally and that DOS stands ready to assist the private sector in any way with this effort Mr Bansemer emphasized the importance of considering not only the security concerns related to standards development but also the importance of international outreach in response activities He noted that DHS’ National Cyber Security Division is engaged with international partners to discuss response efforts Furthermore the Global IT Working Group is preparing a report on communications in the global marketplace from the Government’s perspective which outlines significant network security implications posed by globalization The Principals agreed that the scoping group should begin work first by reviewing the NGNTF Report and determining which of the recommendations that are of an international nature warrant further investigation Mr Sclavos suggested that to draw conclusions about best practices the International Scoping Group should also consider cataloguing current international assets used by public-private partnerships to better understand existing Computer Emergency Readiness Teams-like capabilities and private information sharing mechanisms He further added that the scoping group should consider the appropriate rules of engagement related to C-11 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee international incident response and should examine the nature of cyber incidents and the appropriate domestic and international response mechanisms input from across the intelligence community on key analyses and emphasizing the need to constantly challenge assumptions A Principal commented that much of the effort to standardize the NGN will be borne by industry and the scoping group should instead focus its efforts on investigating operational issues Ambassador Gross agreed to the importance of operational issues but noted that standardization is a key global issue that should be considered from the perspective of whether it is better to maintain a single system that adheres to a universal operational standard or to have numerous separate but interoperable systems that are less likely to be attacked A member further suggested that should standards be addressed the group consider those associated with the federation of identity management and authentication of foreign persons who must communicate with the U S Government during incidents A Principal proposed that the group also explore the international implications of the deployment of Internet Protocol version 6 IPv6 as well as Multi Protocol Label Switching deployment noting that the U S is falling behind in the deployment of IPv6 Mr Ackerman suggested that it may be necessary to resurrect the NGNTF to further explore the IPv6 issue Ambassador Negroponte informed the Principals that each of the 16 elements of the intelligence community has different strengths which must be pulled together to form one cohesive community Specifically he emphasized the need to ensure not just vertical movement but horizontal movement of intelligence information To reach this goal of a true community consideration is being given to the development of a plan similar to that prescribed in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which required military officers to work at a joint command—working closely with other military branches—to be promoted beyond a certain level Ambassador Negroponte informed the Principals that he envisions a similar program in the intelligence community that would require senior intelligence officers to spend a certain amount of time working for another agency The benefits of such a program will take years to be realized but will be critical to improving the sense of community Remarks Ambassador Negroponte Ambassador Negroponte thanked the NSTAC Principals for the opportunity to meet with them and proceeded to provide an overview of his priorities as DNI He described his three key areas of focus as 1 improving the quality of analysis 2 building a sense of community and 3 using limited resources effectively With regard to improving the quality of analysis Ambassador Negroponte noted that in the post-9 11 environment many safeguards have been put in place to ensure that past mistakes are not repeated In addition as DNI he is emphasizing the use of alternative analysis techniques—the practice of analyzing factual information to reach conclusions different from conventional wisdom He is also creating an analytical resources catalogue gathering C-12 Ambassador Negroponte then emphasized the importance of ensuring that limited intelligence resources are used effectively and wisely He noted that although the intelligence budget is classified it is fairly substantial and efforts are underway to ensure that it is wisely spent Mr Ackerman inquired regarding the process for sharing intelligence information with those members of the private sector with critical infrastructure protection responsibilities Ambassador Negroponte informed the Principals that the Office of the DNI does not have a statutory responsibility for sharing threat information with State and local authorities or by extension with the private sector He noted however that there are mechanisms through the DHS the Federal Bureau of Investigation and State and local Governments for sharing information with industry He further emphasized that threats are typically too general and too vague to be actionable However if specific threat information is received a mechanism would be found to share it with the private sector Ambassador The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Negroponte further stated that currently the biggest threat from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be to our interests abroad In response to an inquiry regarding the risks posed by industrial espionage Ambassador Negroponte stated that although industrial espionage is a priority concern the threat from terrorism is currently a higher priority risk In addition although the major threat of industrial espionage appears to come from a few countries there is a challenge inherent to tracking the activities of countries that send thousands of students to the U S each year Finally a member inquired regarding steps industry could take to assist in improving the intelligence community’s ability to transmit highly sensitive information Ambassador Negroponte noted that the U S still has a technological advantage that must be maintained in the future He emphasized that R D are critical to ensuring that the Government is able to conduct secure operations over the communications network within the current globalizing environment Emergency Communications and Interoperability Mr Brown ECITF Champion continued the morning’s discussion on emergency communications and interoperability and the need to establish a survivable and operable emergency communications infrastructure for the public safety community He emphasized the need to consider the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina in the deliberations of the task force the need for the establishment of a rapidly deployable communications capability that offers a range of functionality the establishment of a process for improved coordination with key public safety officials and the need for improved training Mr Stephan highlighted the complexity of the interoperability challenge and requested industry assistance in the development of the National Emergency Communications Strategy noting a lack of broad industry input to the current draft document He further noted that the document outlines an overarching technical architecture to be established but the Government would value the additional insights that the NSTAC could offer He cautioned NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C however that Government stakeholders involved in the Strategy’s development have “fast tracked” the document requiring input from the NSTAC on an expedited schedule Mr Stephan further noted that once the technical framework for the emergency communications architecture has been agreed upon the Government will need to implement incentives to ensure that interested parties purchase the solution He suggested that the Federal Grants Program could be utilized to encourage purchase of the solution instead of mandating compliance The Principals then discussed and agreed on the need to seamlessly integrate commercial and public safety emergency response networks as raised by Chairman Martin during the NSTAC 29 Business Session The Principals agreed that an inventory of current emergency communications assets be developed including satellite technologies Such an inventory would build knowledge of existing capabilities and could be used to help inform the national strategy Mr Grimes informed the Principals that the NCS has already undertaken such an effort which could form the foundation for future activities undertaken by the NSTAC In addition several members noted that the NCC may already possess a current inventory of emergency communications capabilities In response to a question from the Principals regarding additional areas of support from the NSTAC to the Government Ms Nielsen informed the Principals that DHS maintains a tactical emergency communications plan and regularly conducts full-scale exercises She encouraged NSTAC participation in these exercises In addition she encouraged NSTAC input on the Department’s National Preparedness Goal The Principals agreed that the NSTAC should coordinate with Mr Stephan to review both existing and developing Federal plans for emergency communications and interoperability In particular the NSTAC should provide input to the National Emergency Communications Strategy Mr Brown concluded the discussion with an overview of the scope of work including NSTAC’s plan to review the following 1 the National Emergency C-13 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review Communications Strategy 2 current procedural and jurisdictional concerns regarding operability and interoperability 3 the NCS’ current inventory of emergency communications technologies to ensure that all relevant assets are included 4 the need for the development of short-term operability and interoperability solutions 5 the progress of standards development and the need for inventory of current operability and interoperability solutions and 6 the NSTAC’s role in the recommended pilot program for deployable communications capabilities Mr Ackerman thanked Mr Brown and the group for their participation in this discussion Regional Coordination Planning and Exercises Mr Stephan discussed lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane season and changes DHS has already initiated or intends to make He informed the group that DHS is actively providing training for Federal response teams hosting a week-long intense leadership training program for responders in each region including Federal Emergency Management Agency officials and will engage the participants in tabletop exercises He noted that there is additional room in these exercises for industry participation Mr Stephan reported that in coordination with the 1-year anniversary of the publication of the National Response Plan NRP the Secretary of Homeland Security is performing a comprehensive review of the NRP and its Emergency Support Function ESF Annexes The ESF#2 Communications Annex is being modified to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and the NCS is currently revising the ESF#2 Operations Plan In a related effort DHS is restructuring its ESF#2 training and exercise programs and in May 2006 the NCS will take part in a large-scale ESF#2 exercise Throughout the exercise the ESF#2 community will test standard operating procedures in response to a real-world scenario and determine how information sharing requirements can be clearly communicated and effectively met during an emergency situation In addition senior officials will be in place at all the Joint Field Offices JFO to make decisions in situations where prepared plans are insufficient C-14 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Mr Stephan remarked that DHS has investigated codifying a more user-friendly interpretation of the Stafford Act The new interpretation of the Stafford Act will allow the Federal Government to give greater assistance to the private sector in response and restoration activities and will be clearly communicated and exercised The clarified interpretation enables Federal assistance to the private sector once the requestor has ensured that all other means of meeting the assistance needs have been exhausted and that the Government has the capability to meet the requested needs The agreedupon interpretation essentially prescribes a metric that industry requests must pass to obtain Federal assistance Mr Stephan asked the Principals to keep in mind that catastrophic events such as Hurricane Katrina create a resource-scarce environment for both industry and Government Mr Ackerman asked Mr Stephan about DHS’ plans for the NCC and whether industry should continue to interface with the NCC Mr Stephan emphasized that DHS will continue to use the NCC but added that some requests for assistance might come through the JFO initially He stated that the Government will make sure that those requests are also sent to the NCC Mr Stephan also reported that DHS had reached a final agreement with the State of Georgia to adopt the access pilot to ensure that private critical infrastructure service providers receive priority access to disaster sites This pilot is now being used as an example for other States and the State of Georgia in conjunction with industry is actively encouraging the Gulf States including Louisiana Mississippi Alabama and Texas to adopt it Mr Stephan commented that personal connections are extremely important in an emergency response situation Members of the DHS protective security unit already have robust personal relationships with State and local officials as well as the private sector However during future events the Department plans to position high-level officials at each JFO conduct daily telephone calls with the NCC and hold daily strategic senior-level conferences The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Mr Ackerman thanked Mr Stephan for his responsive update and noted that the NSTAC will plan to review the current Federal efforts for regional response improvements planning training and exercises to ensure that nothing is being omitted in this area Additional Issues for Discussion Mr Don Obert Bank of America Corporation provided the Principals with an overview of the results of the National Diversity Assurance Initiative NDAI study a follow-up to a recommendation in the NSTAC’s Financial Services Task Force FSTF Report Following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks diversity assurance was identified as a key issue across the financial services industry The final NSTAC FSTF Report called for support of the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions’ NDAI and the development of processes to examine diversity assurance capabilities requirements and best practices for critical NS EP customers The report further recommends that R D be promoted to increase resiliency circuit diversity and alternative transport mechanisms The NDAI concluded that 1 it is not currently possible to guarantee that circuits are diverse and will remain diverse over time unless manual assessment and periodic manual assurances are performed 2 assessing telecommunications circuits is a very labor- and cost-intensive process and currently can only be conducted manually 3 circuit diversity assurance cannot be offered as a commercially viable product—only organizations with life-safety missions and critical business needs may be able to justify the expense of manual circuit diversity assurance 4 an automated solution to track circuits across multiple carriers would streamline the process for diversity assessment and assurance and 5 the carriers believe that the marketplace to support requirements of NS EP functions on a wide-scale basis is insufficient to recover costs if the only source is the users of the service external funding is required NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C The NDAI recommends that 1 other industries with critical missions and circuits evaluate current risks with regard to telecommunications continuity and take the necessary steps to mitigate those risks 2 the lessons learned from the initiative should provide information and terminology that could be used by organizations supporting critical NS EP services to better understand the telecommunications infrastructure supporting their business needs in a multiple carrier environment and 3 follow-up efforts should be undertaken to define the requirements for providing an automated end-to-end diversity assurance solution in a multiple-carrier environment Mr Ackerman thanked Mr Obert for the update on actions undertaken in response to the NSTAC’s recommendation noting that information on the status of all the recommendations is important Finally a member suggested that the IES conduct an assessment of the current NSTAC agenda to determine whether the NSTAC is addressing the right issues for both the current and future NS EP communications environment Mr Ackerman thanked him for his suggestion commenting that continual re-evaluation of the agenda to ensure timeliness is essential Adjournment Mr Ackerman thanked the Principals and the Government stakeholders for their participation and adjourned the NSTAC Executive Session at 3 15 p m C-15 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee Attachment 1 Report Recommendations to the President from the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee’s NSTAC Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force TEPITF examined national security and emergency preparedness NS EP concerns associated with interdependencies between the telecommunications and electric power sectors Based on the TEPITF’s examinations of current operational issues between the sectors and how the interdependencies will affect both infrastructures the NSTAC recommends that the President in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and other existing authority direct the appropriate departments and agencies to— u Define and establish the term “Emergency Responder” within the National Response Plan NRP and other appropriate plans guidance directives and statutes u Ensure that key response personnel of critical infrastructure owners and operators in the telecommunications and electric power sectors be designated as Emergency Responders and included in local regional State and Federal Government emergency plans u Include fuel supply to critical telecommunications and electric power infrastructures as part of the Emergency Responder planning process to ensure that fuel deliveries receive adequate priority access and security during a disaster u Foster and promote effective emergency coordination structures to ensure reliable and robust communication between the two sectors and local regional State and Federal Governments C-16 • Review examples of proven priority restoration models at the State and regional levels Encourage States and metropolitan regions without effective models to improve and update their existing frameworks • Encourage effective information sharing models at the local regional Emergency Responder levels both in advance of a natural disaster and during the emergency restoration period When developing these models liability issues should be considered The NSTAC’s Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRTF evaluated the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and developed recommendations designed to strengthen the ability of telecommunications providers to respond even more effectively to future hurricanes and other natural or manmade events Based on the LRTF’s examination the NSTAC recommends that no later than June 1 2006 in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and other existing authorities that the President establish and codify the term “Emergency Responder Private Sector ” to include telecommunications infrastructure providers and ensure non-monetary assistance including accessing restricted areas and obtaining fuel water power billeting and workforce and asset security to them by— u Directing the Department of Homeland Security DHS to modify the NRP and its Emergency Support Functions ESF to designate telecommunications infrastructure providers as Emergency Responders Private Sector and to establish protocols and procedures for the way in which Federal State local NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee and tribal Governments should work with telecommunications infrastructure providers before during and after a national disaster u u Issuing appropriate Presidential guidance to define Emergency Responders Private Sector under the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Stafford Act and other authorities as appropriate to align with the broadened definition of national defense in the 2003 amendments to the Defense Production Act DPA of 1950 Specifically the guidance should make clear that key response personnel of critical telecommunications infrastructure owners and operators should be defined as Emergency Responders Private Sector and should receive non-monetary Federal assistance under the Stafford Act Directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with Congress to align the Stafford Act and other appropriate legislative authorities with the DPA by codifying the designation of private sector telecommunications infrastructure providers as Emergency Responders Private Sector and by codifying the official interpretation that for-profit telecommunications infrastructure providers should receive non-monetary Federal assistance The Next Generation Networks NGN Task Force NGNTF of the NSTAC examined the provisioning of NS EP communications services on converged networks Based on its examination the NSTAC recommends in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions that the President— u Identity Management Direct the Office of Management and Budget OMB the Department of Commerce DOC and DHS to work with the private sector in partnership to build a federated interoperable survivable and effective identity management framework for the NGN that 1 includes a common assurance taxonomy that addresses NS EP requirements and is usable in both the Government and commercial domains 2 minimizes identity “silos ” allows federation between the Government and commercial domains and supports use of Government-issued credentials for identification on the NGN 3 meets other NS EP requirements including for priority access to NS EP communications services 4 supports broad use of commercial technology along with existing and emerging protocols and standards and 5 includes explicit protections for privacy u Coordination on Common Operational Criteria for NGN NS EP End-to-End Services Direct the Office of Science and Technology OSTP with support from the collective National Communication System NCS agencies to establish a Common Operational Criteria development framework to meet NS EP user requirements on the NGN This would be a joint industry-Government initiative to ensure NS EP communications capabilities in the NGN environment and would include the creation of a regular NGN summit with annual reporting that would enable telecommunication IT industry sector and Government stakeholders to 1 develop and coordinate common NGN planning activities 2 measure progress of NGN-related efforts and 3 recommend and monitor programs that would foster NS EP capabilities within the NGN including initiatives concerning • A priority regime for both encrypted and unencrypted packets supported by a set of standards specifying how that priority is to be translated end-to-end among the different networks connected to the NGN consistent with a user’s NS EP authorization and required class of service and • NGN designs that respond to NS EP requirements including supporting a mixed protocol operational environment during the transition into Internet Protocol version 6 peer-to-peer networks and systems for independence from centralized infrastructure C-17 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review meshed networks for resiliency and deployability and Internet Protocol security for authentication and confidentiality u Research and Development R D In support of the prior recommendation direct OSTP with support from other relevant agencies especially the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS the National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST and the Department of Defense DOD to establish and prioritize within the Federal Government initiatives that will foster collaborative and coordinated R D supporting the Common Operational Criteria and accelerate demonstrations of critical NGN NS EP-supporting capabilities or technology among NGN telecommunication IT and service providers u Technology Lifecycle Assurance and Trusted Technology Direct OMB OSTP DOD DHS and DOC to drive comprehensive change in the security of NS EP information and communications technology through policy incentives and research supporting the development and use of 1 technology lifecycle assurance mechanisms and 2 innovative trusted technologies that reduce the presence of intrinsic vulnerabilities u Resilient Alternate Communications Direct OMB and DHS in accordance with their respective authorities to ensure that Federal agencies are developing investing in and maintaining resilient alternate communications for the NGN environment Specifically DHS and OMB should require that NS EP communicators including incident managers and emergency responders plan for communications resiliency especially by examining alternative or substitute access methods to the NGN to address specific threat scenarios which methods can augment and possibly replace at least temporarily damaged or diminished access to the communications infrastructure C-18 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Agreements Standards Policy and Regulations Direct DHS the Department of State and the DOC including NIST and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration NTIA to engage actively with and coordinate among appropriate domestic and international entities to ensure that the relevant policy frameworks support NGN NS EP capabilities These policy frameworks are established through Agreements Standards Policies and Regulations ASPR As part of the Common Operational Criteria development framework these agencies should continuously monitor the entire lifecycle of ASPR associated with ensuring NS EP capabilities to identify and act on opportunities to enhance ASPR address their vulnerabilities and eliminate potential impediments to providing NS EP capabilities in a globally distributed NGN environment u Incident Management on the NGN Direct DHS to establish an inclusive and effective NGN incident response capability that includes a Joint Coordination Center incorporating and modeled on the National Coordinating Center NCC for all key sectors but particularly both the Communications and IT Sectors and supporting mechanisms such as a training academy and a collaboratively developed broadly participatory and regularly evaluated exercise program This capability should be enhanced by an appropriate R D program u International Policy Direct departments and agencies to develop cohesive domestic and international NS EP communications policy consistent with the recommendations in this report in particular 1 developing intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms to harmonize NS EP policy regimes in participating countries consistent with the recommendations in this report 2 establishing the rules of engagement for non-United States companies in NS EP incident response in the United States and 3 addressing how information sharing and response mechanisms should operate in the international NGN environment NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u First Responders Direct DHS and other appropriate Government agencies to assist first responders and public safety organizations in making the transition to the NGN which will provide them with greater capabilities but will also be a challenge to achieve given their limited resources and legacy systems The NSTAC’s Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force ECITF examined and identified immediate action that could be taken of behalf of the Federal Government to significantly improve the Nation’s emergency communications capabilities prior to the upcoming 2006 hurricane season while recognizing that some elements may have already begun Based on the ECITF analysis the NSTAC recommends in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and other existing authority that the President direct the DHS and other appropriate agencies to accelerate their efforts and adequately resource actions to assure completion prior to the summer of 2006 of the recommended initiatives listed below— u u Establish a uniform protocol working with Federal State and local Government organizations that can dynamically identify their emergency management coordinators’ contact information especially during times when regular contact information is changed due to event situations and have capability to share that information with DHS e g via websites This capability should be administered by the NCS in concert with the NCC to assist in its execution of ESF#2 for communications Create a deployable communications capability for the Gulf Coast region in accordance with Recommendation #37 of the White House report The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned This capability must focus on rapidly deployable interoperable mobile communications solutions that will provide reliable communications to emergency responders at all levels of Government in a disaster-affected region u Formally integrate the NCS NS EP priority programs e g Telecommunications Service Priority Government Emergency Telecommunications Service and Wireless Priority Service into the National Emergency Communications Strategy pursuant to Recommendation #34 of the Lessons Learned Report u Direct NTIA to work in conjunction with the Federal Communications Commission to streamline the authorization process for use of Federal incident response frequencies by the larger non-Federal Government emergency response community In addition to these immediately applicable recommendations the NSTAC recommends that the President consider incorporating into the overall National Emergency Communications Strategy the NSTAC’s previous recommendations regarding ensuring access and suitable credentialing for telecommunications infrastructure provider response personnel formally designating such personnel as Emergency Responders Private Sector to enable provision of non-monetary Federal assistance under the Stafford Act and improving industry-Government incident response coordination via the NCC The NSTAC’s NCC Task Force NCCTF undertook a comprehensive review of the NCC and specifically examined the direction of the NCC over the next year three years and five years and considered some of the major challenges that the NCC has faced in disaster response efforts such as Hurricane Katrina response and recovery Based on the findings of the NCCTF the NSTAC recommends that the President in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472 Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions and other existing authority— C-19 APPENDIX C t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u Work to improve and comply with the ESF#2 Federal Operations Plan by— The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to expand the NCC to include both communications and IT companies and organizations This would be a cross-sector industry Government facility with a round-the-clock watch and would be brought up to full strength during emergencies u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage the private sector in critical infrastructure protection activities by increasing the flow of threat information to the private sector facilitating private sector participation in impact analyses and clarifying policies for the protection of private sector information u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve the ESF#2 Emergency Response Training and Exercise program with a focus on enhancing coordination among industry members and Federal State and local responders during incidents of national significance This program should focus on sector interdependencies for both physical and cyber threats and would aim to produce actionable results Industry must be involved from the earliest planning stages u Encourage the Secretary of Homeland Security to improve the Federal Government’s cyber response strategy to delineate roles and responsibilities of Government and the private sector in the NRP aligning communications and cyber operations centers and enhancing relationships with international computer emergency readiness teams u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security and other Government stakeholders to examine the value received from the NCC relationship and if sufficiently supported commit the resources necessary to strengthen and support the organization and its mission • Acknowledging the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator as the lead of ESF#2 in the region • Accommodating communications industry personnel within the Joint Field Offices JFO or as a virtual capability to provide for regional company-to-company and industry to Government information sharing and coordination u u Direct the Secretary of Homeland Security the Director of OSTP the Secretary of Defense and other ESF#2 Federal support agencies to develop and implement policies and procedures with respect to 1 managing and escalating requests from the NCC and 2 the delineation of authorities and responsibilities when ESF#2 is invoked Direct OSTP and the Homeland Security Council to join with the Communications Sector Coordinating Council SCC and the IT-SCC to support an industry-led task force with the primary goal of planning a regional communications and IT coordinating capability in the Gulf Coast and Southeastern regions prior to the 2006 hurricane season Subsequently the task force will determine the best approach for a long-term regional communications and IT coordinating capability that can serve all regions of the Nation The task force should primarily be made up of industry representatives as well as Federal State and local Government representatives C-20 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX C Attachment 2 Attendance of Members at the 29th Meeting of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX – May 10 2006 Mr F Duane Ackerman Chair BellSouth Corporation Mr Gregory Q Brown Motorola Inc Mr Lawrence T Babbio Jr Verizon Communications Inc Mr Kenneth Dahlberg Science Applications International Corporation Mr Gary D Forsee Sprint Nextel Corporation Mr Arthur Johnson Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr Stratton Sclavos VeriSign Inc Mr Clayton M Jones Rockwell Collins Inc Mr Stanley Sigman CTIA—The Wireless Association Mr Scott Kriens Juniper Networks Inc Mr Randall L Stephenson AT T Inc Mr Walter McCormick United States Telecom Association Mr William H Swanson Raytheon Company Mr Craig T Mundie Microsoft Corporation Mr Lawrence A Weinbach Unisys Corporation Mr Donald J Obert Bank of America Corporation Mr Joseph R Wright Jr PanAmSat Corporation Mr Van B Honeycutt Computer Sciences Corporation Pending Principals C-21 Appendix Acronyms The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX D Acronym List AIN Advanced Intelligent Networks AIP Automated Information Processing ASPR Agreements Standards Policies and Regulations ATIS Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions CCS Common Channel Signaling CIAO Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office CII Critical Infrastructure Information CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection CNS Commercial Network Survivability COP Committee of Principals COR Council of Representatives CSI Commercial SATCOM Interconnectivity CSS Commercial Satellite Survivability CTF Convergence Task Force CWIN Cyber Warning Information Network DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DDoS Distributed Denial of Service DHS Department of Homeland Security DOC Department of Commerce DOD Department of Defense DOE Department of Energy DOJ Department of Justice DOS Department of State DPA Defense Production Act E O Executive Order EC Electronic Commerce ECC Enhanced Call Completion ECITF Emergency Communications and Interoperability Task Force ELS Essential Line Service EMP Electromagnetic Pulse EPA Environmental Protection Agency ERPWG Emergency Response Procedures Working Group ESP National Electric Service Priority ETSI TIPHON European Telecommunications Standards Institute Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization over Networks FCC Federal Communications Commission FNI Funding of NSTAC Initiatives FOIA The Freedom of Information Act FRB Federal Reserve Board FRP Federal Response Plan FRWG Funding and Regulatory Working Group FS Financial Services FSTF Financial Services Task Force GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service GII Global Information Infrastructure GSA General Services Administration GTF Globalization Task Force GTISC Georgia Tech Information Security Center HPC High Probability of Call Completion HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive I C Information Communications IA Information Assurance IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection IATF Information Assurance Task Force IAW Indications Assessment and Warnings ID Identification IDSG Intrusion Detection Subgroup IDT International Diplomatic Telecommunications IEPS International Emergency Preference Scheme IES Industry Executive Subcommittee IIG Information Infrastructure Group IIS Industry Information Security IN Intelligent Networks IP Internet Protocol IS CIP Information Sharing Critical Infrastructure Protection ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center ISATF Internet Security Architecture Task Force ISEC Information Security Exploratory Committee ISP Internet Service Provider ISSB Information Systems Security Board IT Information Technology ITIC Information Technology Industry Council ITPITF Information Technology Progress Impact Task Force LMBATF Last Mile Bandwidth Availability Task Force LRG Legislative and Regulatory Group LRTF Legislative and Regulatory Task Force LRWG Legislative and Regulatory Working Group LTO Long-term Outage MTT Mobile Transportable Telecommunications NAP Network Access Provider D-3 APPENDIX D t NSTAC XXIX Issue Review NCC National Coordinating Center NCM National Coordinating Mechanism NCO National Coordination Office NCS National Communications System NCSP National Cyber Security Partnership NERC North American Electric Reliability Council NES National Energy Strategy NG Network Group NGN Next Generation Network NGNTF Next Generation Networks Task Force NII National Information Infrastructure NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NLP National Level Program NPTF National Plan to Defend Critical Infrastructures Task Force NRC National Research Council NRIC Network Reliability and Interoperability Council NRP National Response Plan NS EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness NS VATF Network Security Vulnerability Assessments Task Force NSA National Security Agency NSDD National Security Decision Directive NSG National Security Group NSIE Network Security Information Exchange NSSE National Special Security Events NSTAC National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTF Network Security Task Force NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration NTMS National Telecommunications Management Structure NWC Naval War College OAM P Operations Administration Maintenance and Provisioning OMB Office of Management and Budget OMNCS Office of the Manager National Communications System OS Operating System OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy OWG Operations Working Group PAS Priority Access Service PCCIP President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection D-4 The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information PDD Presidential Decision Directive PN Public Network PO Program Office PSN public switched network PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network PWG Plans Working Group QoS Quality of Service R D Research and Development R O Report and Order RDTF Research and Development Task Force RDX Research and Development Exchange RDXTF Research and Development Exchange Task Force REWG Resource Enhancements Working Group RP Restoration Priority SAFETY Act Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act SATCOM Satellite Communications SCC Sector Coordinating Council SCOE Security Center of Excellence SME Subject Matter Experts SOP Standard Operating Procedure SRWG Security Requirements Working Group SS7 Signaling System 7 Stafford Act Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act STF Satellite Task Force STU Secure Telephone Unit TATF Trusted Access Task Force Telecom Act Telecommunications Act of 1996 TEPITF Telecommunications and Electric Power Interdependency Task Force TESP Telecommunications Electric Service Priority TIM Telecommunications Industry Mobilization TIP Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers TSA Transportation Security Administration TSP Telecommunications Service Priority TSS Telecommunications Systems Survivability USSS United States Secret Service UST Underground Storage Tanks VTF Vulnerabilities Task Force W LBRDSTF Wireless Low-Bit-Rate Digital Services Task Force WPS Wireless Priority Service WSPO Wireless Services Program Office The President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee NSTAC XXIX Issue Review u APPENDIX D WSTF Wireless Services Task Force WTF Wireless Task Force Y2K Year 2000 Y2K Act Year 2000 Readiness and Disclosure Act D-5 Of ce of the Manager National Communications System Customer Service Division Mail Stop 8510 245 Murray Lane Washington DC 20528-8510 703 235-5525 nstacl@dhs gov