Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy a LILI I 2 LI LI 0 May 17 2016 OIG-16-93 DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy May 17 2016 Why We Did This Audit We evaluated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ I A safeguards for the sensitive privacy and intelligence information it collects and maintains Our objective was to determine whether I A ensures compliance with Federal laws regulations and policies What We Recommend We are making six recommendations to I A which if implemented should reduce the risk to privacy and intelligence information What We Found I A has made progress in developing a culture of privacy Specifically I A has centralized the oversight of privacy and civil liberties and has been working to ensure that it meets the requirements of pertinent legislation regulations directives and guidance I A conducted specialized onboarding and advanced training that address safeguards for privacy and civil liberties in its intelligence processes In addition I A designed intelligence oversight reviews to ensure that its employees observe the required safeguards However I A has faced challenges because it did not place priority on institutionalizing other capabilities and processes to ensure timely and complete compliance with requirements regarding privacy and intelligence information Specifically • I A has not responded timely to requests for agency transparency under the Freedom of Information Act potentially creating financial liabilities • I A continuity capabilities have not had an adequate oversight structure risking the loss of essential records and intelligence information in an emergency • I A has not implemented an infrastructure for risk assessment and end-to-end monitoring of high-impact solicitations and contracts that would ensure safeguards for sensitive data and systems throughout the acquisition processes I A Response I A concurred with all six recommendations For Further Information Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 202 254-4100 or email us at DHS-OIG OfficePublicAffairs@oig dhs gov www oig dhs gov OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Washington DC 20528 www oig dhs gov May 17 2016 MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Brigadier General Francis X Taylor Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis o r o1 nd Analysis FROM aMcCaue Assistant Inspec or General Office of Information Technology Audits SUBJECT Office ofIntelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy Attached for your action is our final report Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy We incorporated the formal comments provided by your office The report contains six recommendations aimed at improving transparency and privacy Your office concurred with these six recommendations As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01 Follow­ Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations within 90 days of the date of this memorandum please provide our office with a written response that includes your 1 agreement or disagreement 2 corrective action plan and 3 target completion date for each recommendation Also please include responsible parties and any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the recommendation Until your response is received and evaluated the recommendations will be considered open and unresolved Once your office has fully implemented the recommendations please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendations The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary amounts Please send your response or closure request to OIGITAuditsFollowup@oig dhs gov Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security We will post the report on our website for public dissemination www oig dhs gov OIG- 16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Please call me with any questions or your staff may contact Marj Leaming Director of Information Privacy and Security Division at 202 254-4172 Attachment www oig dhs gov   OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Table of Contents Background 3 Results of Audit 6 I A Progress in Complying with Privacy Requirements 7 I A Faces Challenges in Protecting Sensitive Data 9 Responding to Freedom of Information Act Requests ………… ……………9 Recommendations 14 Continuity Capability for Safeguarding Essential Records and Intelligence Information ………………………………………………………………………… 15 Recommendations 17 Securing Sensitive Information in Acquisitions………………………………18 Recommendation 20 Appendixes Appendix A Objective Scope and Methodology 21 Appendix B I A Comments to the Draft Report 22 Appendix C Office of Information Technology Audits Major Contributors to This Report 25 Appendix D Report Distribution 26 Abbreviations CEWG COOP ERMS EO FCD FOIA HSAR www oig dhs gov Continuity and Exercise Working Group continuity of operations electronic records management system Executive Order Federal Continuity Directive Freedom of Information Act Department of Homeland Security Acquisition Regulations OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security I A ICB ISE IT NARA NIST OIG OMB PII www oig dhs gov Office of Intelligence and Analysis Information Compliance Branch information sharing environment information technology National Archives and Records Administration National Institute of Science Technology Office of Inspector General Office of Management and Budget personally identifiable information OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Background The Office of Intelligence and Analysis I A ensures that information related to threats is collected analyzed and disseminated to relevant customers I A is involved in the routine collection maintenance or use of intelligence information which may include personally identifiable information PII I A provides intelligence support across the range of Department of Homeland Security missions including preventing terrorism and enhancing security securing and managing our borders enforcing and administering our immigration laws and safeguarding cyberspace I A is part of a larger Homeland Security Enterprise that includes departmental leaders and components state local tribal territorial and private sector partners and other Intelligence Community members all of whom require and generate homeland security information and intelligence Table 1 indicates the various purposes for which I A collects or uses PII to carry out its mission Table 1 PII Collected by I A I A Source DHS State Local and Regional Fusion Center Initiative DHS Information Sharing Environment Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative PII From Whom What PII May be Collected Any person deemed a suspect witness or other person of interest whose actions or statements are “reasonably believed to be” in a collection category knowledge or involvement in an act of terrorism terror-related event or incident Suspects or witnesses of terror-related activity or events DHS employees contractors submitters or analysts private sector officials whose agency is part of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative Relevant information including PII in any form may be collected for the purposes of preventing disrupting or halting terrorism-related incidents and for analytical purposes to identify possible trends and provide general analytical products that inform other components as well as non-Federal users agencies or organizations PII may relate to identifying assessing or analyzing threats of a terroristic nature Source Office of the Inspector General OIG -compiled from I A documentation Various laws executive orders regulations and policies ensure the protection of privacy rights and civil liberties of United States Persons 1 The Privacy Act of 1 United States Person means a United States citizen an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien an unincorporated association substantially composed of www oig dhs gov 3 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security 1974 as amended imposes various requirements on agencies whenever they collect use or disseminate PII The Privacy Act establishes Fair Information Practice Principles that govern the collection maintenance use and dissemination of PII about individuals in systems of records maintained by Federal agencies The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the issuance of guidelines to protect privacy and civil liberties in the development and use of the “information sharing environment” ISE Executive Order EO 12333 United States Intelligence Activities dated December 4 1981 defines protected information for the Intelligence Community Specifically the U S Government is obligated in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order to protect fully the legal rights of all U S Persons including freedoms privacy and civil liberties guaranteed by Federal law EO 12333 was amended by EO 13470 in 2008 to strengthen the role of intelligence activities EO 13388 Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans provides guidelines for ensuring information privacy civil liberties and legal rights of Americans in the development and use of the ISE Further ISE Privacy Guidelines ensure that the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans are protected in the development and use of the ISE The ISE requires that each agency designate a senior official for information privacy issues as designated by statute or executive order or as otherwise identified in response to Office of Management and Budget OMB Memorandum M-05-08 dated February 11 2005 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 as amended requires that the DHS Secretary appoint a senior official in the Department who shall report directly to the Secretary to assume primary responsibility for privacy policy as well as for being familiar with the agency’s activities as they relate to the ISE such as • ensuring the agency’s policies procedures and systems are appropriately designed and executed in compliance with the ISE Privacy Guidelines • providing intelligence oversight training to personnel authorized to share protected information through the ISE regarding the agency’s requirements and policies for the collection use and disclosure of protected information 2 • reporting violations of agency privacy protection policies United States citizens or permanent resident aliens or a corporation incorporated in the United States except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments 2 Intelligence Oversight training applies to Federal employees contractors detailees and individuals who perform foreign intelligence or counterintelligence functions www oig dhs gov 4 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security • receiving reports or copies thereof if the agency already has a designated recipient of such reports regarding alleged errors in protected information that originate from that agency • implementing adequate review and audit mechanisms to enable the agency’s ISE privacy official and other authorized officials to verify that the agency and its personnel are complying with the guidelines for the development and use of the ISE and • executing authority and resources as appropriate to identify and address privacy and other legal issues arising out of the agency’s participation in the ISE In addition the E-Government Act of 2002 requires Privacy Impact Assessments on systems of records including I A’s information technology IT systems containing PII and other activities with potential privacy impacts The Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum 2008-02 DHS Policy Regarding Privacy Impact Assessments December 30 2008 and the DHS Instruction 047-01-001 Privacy Policy and Compliance implement this legislation within the Department The DHS Deputy Secretary’s “Memorandum Designation of Component Privacy Officers ” dated June 5 2009 directs each of the Department’s 10 major components including I A to designate a senior-level Federal employee as a full-time Privacy Officer Also I A is required to designate a Privacy Officer per Intelligence Community Directive 107 Privacy Officers are to • oversee implementation of Federal privacy law and regulations and DHS privacy policies and guidance • report on privacy program 3 activities and accomplishments 4 • provide component personnel with mandatory annual privacy training developed by the DHS Privacy Office as well as advanced or supplementary training as needed • address complaints and incidents and • manage records retention schedules However an organization’s culture of privacy results from how well the privacy commitment is understood implemented and enforced by executive management the Office of the Chief Information Officer the Privacy Office and program offices managers and employees in their respective roles Promotion of an effective culture of privacy leads to embedded shared attitudes values goals and practices for complying with the proper handling of PII 3 A privacy program is a comprehensive approach to managing privacy compliance and risk in programs and activities 4 OMB Memorandum M-15-01 Fiscal Year 2014-2015 Guidance on Improving Federal Information Security and Privacy Management Practices October 3 2014 www oig dhs gov 5 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Results of Audit We evaluated the safeguards for sensitive privacy and intelligence information collected and maintained by I A Our objective was to determine whether I A ensures compliance with applicable Federal laws regulations and policies We examined internal controls for managing all I A information but did not look at classified content as part of this audit I A has made progress in developing a culture of privacy Specifically I A centralized the oversight of privacy civil liberties and intelligence information under its I A Intelligence Oversight Officer Information Compliance Branch ICB Chief Among other functions this Branch has been responsible for ensuring proper handling of sensitive data preparing documentation and reporting on I A’s privacy activities The ICB assisted in developing a culture of compliance with pertinent Federal laws regulations and policies such as the Freedom of Information Act Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions and EO 12333 In addition the I A Intelligence Oversight Officer conducted reviews of intelligence operations to ensure safeguards are observed and provided intelligence oversight training emphasizing requirements for the privacy and civil rights of U S Persons However I A faces challenges because it did not place priority on institutionalizing other capabilities and processes needed to ensure timely and complete compliance with requirements regarding privacy and intelligence information Specifically • I A did not timely respond to requests for agency transparency under the Freedom of Information Act potentially creating financial liabilities • I A continuity capabilities did not have an adequate oversight structure risking the loss of essential records and intelligence information in an emergency • I A did not implement an infrastructure for continuous risk assessment and end–to-end monitoring of high-impact solicitations and contracts that would ensure safeguards for sensitive data and systems throughout the acquisition processes We are making six recommendations to I A which if implemented should reduce the risks to privacy and intelligence information www oig dhs gov 6 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security I A Progress in Complying with Privacy Requirements I A has made progress in developing a culture in which employees are trained and work daily to safeguard privacy and civil liberties of U S Persons I A has instituted a centralized approach to ensuring compliance with pertinent legislation regulations directives and guidance Oversight Structure for Complying With Privacy Requirements I A’s Intelligence Oversight Officer ICB Chief has responsibility for managing a comprehensive intelligence oversight program There are three Assistant I A Intelligence Oversight Officer positions under the ICB Chief to provide specialized and advanced training on privacy and civil liberties and review I A’s intelligence processes to ensure that safeguards are observed I A’s Privacy Office had one Federal employee and one contractor for assistance The Freedom of Information Act FOIA Officer and the Records Management Officer also each had one contractor for assistance The organizational structure for the oversight of the privacy FOIA and intelligence information compliance at the time of our field work is shown in figure 1 Figure 1 Information Compliance Branch Source I A organization chart According to I A’s Intelligence Oversight Officer ICB Chief the branch has the following responsibilities for • overseeing I A’s implementation of Federal privacy law and regulations including compliance with the ISE Guidelines • conducting privacy threshold analyses for National Security Systems • ensuring employee and contractor completion of mandatory annual privacy training developed by the DHS Privacy Office www oig dhs gov 7 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security • providing specialized training regarding I A’s requirements and policies for collection use and disclosure of protected information • conducting privacy and civil liberties risk assessments as part of I A’s intelligence oversight review program 5 • managing I A’s records retention and disposal schedules • addressing and reporting complaints and violations of I A’s privacy protection policies and • reporting on privacy activities and accomplishments Mandatory Annual Privacy and Civil Liberties Training Routine training is a key element of developing and maintaining an effective privacy culture I A has used the DHScovery online learning system to provide training for new hires and DHS employees annually This training entitled “Privacy at DHS Protecting Personal Information ” meets the mandatory privacy training requirements of OMB M-07-16 Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information Also the Intelligence Oversight Officer provided specialized onboarding and an annual 2-hour training course “DHS I A Intelligence Oversight Training ” addressing requirements when information on U S Persons is collected retained or disseminated This training is designed for Federal employees contractors detailees and individuals responsible for performing foreign intelligence or counterintelligence functions Intelligence Oversight Inspections to Ensure Compliance with Privacy Guidelines The I A Intelligence Oversight Officer conducted an Intelligence Oversight Program to ensure observance of the requisite safeguards This program includes inspections during which the Officers ensure compliance with EO 12333 and other pertinent requirements Review areas include a authorized collection retention and dissemination of intelligence b proper marking of intelligence materials c tracking of hard and soft copy files containing information on U S Persons and d information dissemination within the Intelligence Community The program includes a combination of inspections and training to assess the extent to which I A personnel have been complying with the ISE Privacy Guidelines 5 A national security system is a telecommunications or information system operated by the Federal Government the function operation or use of which involves intelligence activities cryptologic activities related to national security command and control of military forces equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions 40 U S C section 11103 a www oig dhs gov 8 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security I A Faces Challenges in Protecting Sensitive Data Although it has made progress I A faces challenges protecting the sensitive data it collects and manages to conduct its mission Specifically • I A did not timely respond to requests for agency transparency under the Freedom of Information Act potentially creating financial liabilities • I A continuity capabilities did not have an adequate oversight structure risking the loss of essential records and intelligence information in case of an emergency • I A did not implement an infrastructure for risk assessment and end-toend monitoring of high-impact solicitations and contracts that would ensure safeguards for sensitive data and systems throughout the acquisition processes Lacking such improvements accountability and internal controls I A could not ensure adequate protection of sensitive data to support its mission operations Responding to Freedom of Information Act Requests I A did not always timely respond to requests for agency transparency under FOIA FOIA provides any person the right enforceable in court to submit written requests for access to Federal agency records or information All Federal Executive branch agencies must respond to FOIA requests within 20 business days for simple requests and up to 30 business days for complex requests However an agency may extend this response time by writing to the requestor and offering the opportunity to modify or narrow the initial request which may shorten the overall time to complete the agency response If an agency is not responsive the requestor of government information has the right to an administrative appeal or may file a lawsuit in Federal district court I A inaction or tardiness could result in an investigation forfeited fees and costs related to a legal action Backlog of FOIA Requests According to our review of I A’s response times to FOIA requests for fiscal year 2013 FY 2014 and FY 2015 October 2014 through August 2015 I A has not consistently met the timeliness requirements New and unresolved FOIA requests have been carried over from year to year Figure 2 shows trend lines for I A’s FOIA workload from FY 2013 FY 2014 and FY 2015 11 months www oig dhs gov 9 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security • The first chart in figure 2 shows an increase in the combined number of new requests since FY 2013 including unresolved requests carried over from prior fiscal years i e Requests Received Carryover Carryover of Requests includes new requests received and those requests that I A was unable to process or that remained unresolved from the prior fiscal year s • The second chart in figure 2 shows an increase in resolving requests in FY 2014 i e Requests Processed Total Requests Processed refers to those requests that I A resolved during the fiscal year • The third chart in figure 2 shows an increase in workload i e Backlog since FY 2014 Unresolved requests accumulate over fiscal years as part of I A’s total backlog The Annual Workload is the combination of new processed and unresolved requests during each fiscal year Figure 2 Trends in I A’s FOIA Workload Requests Processed Requests Received Carryover Backlog 150 300 300 200 200 100 100 50 0 0 0 100 Source DHS FOIA Reports from I A FY 2013-FY 2014 and I A Monthly FOIA reports for FY 2015 October 2014 through August 2015 Table 2 shows I A FOIA Office Productivity Metrics for FY 2013 FY 2014 and FY 2015 October 2014 through August 2015 The table illustrates how the total number of new requests and carry-over of old or unresolved requests i e backlog increased from 112 in FY 2013 to 278 in FY 2014 and then decreased to 247 by August 2015 constituting a net increase of 121 percent Over this same period of time the backlog of all FOIA requests increased by 203 percent I A’s continued delays in addressing the FOIA workload could result in litigation and forfeiture of fees www oig dhs gov 10 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Table 2 I A FOIA Office Productivity Metrics FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 October 2014 through August 2015 I A FOIA Workload New Requests and Backlog Requests from Prior Year s Total Requests Processed Backlog of All Requests FY 2015 through August Percentage Change for this period of time FY 2013 FY 2014 112 278 247 121% increase 78 34 255 23 144 103 85% increase 203% increase Staffing Levels full-time to 3 2 7 2 4 -20% Manage FOIA Workload Source DHS FOIA Reports from I A FY 2013 and FY 2014 and I A Monthly FOIA reports for FY2015 October 2014 through August 2015 Inadequate Staffing Hindered I A’s Efficiency in Resolving FOIA Requests This backlog of unaddressed FOIA requests continued growing because I A did not have the resources necessary to address them Processing complex FOIA requests entailed identifying tracking and providing pertinent information as well as maintaining communications with requesters to keep them updated on the status of their requests However I A’s FOIA Office had inadequate staffing to manage the workload Table 2 above shows how I A FOIA Office staffing decreased from 3 in FY 2013 to 2 4 in FY 2015 from October 2014 through of August 2015 representing a change of negative 20 percent Compared to some DHS components I A was understaffed in relation to the number of FOIA requests received in FY 2014 Table 3 compares the total number of full-time FOIA employees and the corresponding average workload at I A to two other DHS components—the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the OIG Table 3 FOIA Requests Received and Staffing Within I A and Two DHS Components Number of “Full Time FOIA Employees” Average Requests Received per FOIA Employee Office of Intelligence and Analysis 2 122 Federal Emergency Management Agency 13 59 Office of Inspector General 4 Source OIG Analysis of DHS FOIA Report for FY 2014 44 DHS Component www oig dhs gov 11 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security In actual numbers I A received 244 requests the Federal Emergency Management Agency had 772 requests and the OIG had 177 requests for FY 2014 Without adequate FOIA Office staff I A may not be able to resolve its backlog as new FOIA requests are being received In addition mistakes can occur in tracking and recording the status of requests which can hamper their resolution We reviewed FY 2014 FOIA requests and identified a number of recurring problems that would adversely affect the timeliness of responses These problems included electronic FOIA requests that were misfiled requests that had incorrect tracking numbers and requests that had not been entered into the master FOIA log If FOIA requests cannot be found or require additional time to find and address I A is in jeopardy of legal action Inadequate Records Management to Address FOIA Responses I A was recognized for outstanding continued improvement in records management according to the 2014 DHS Records Management Maturity Model However at the time of our field work in September 2015 I A had not implemented sound records management principles such as an organizationwide program and procedures that would support operational staff members in locating pertinent information within the time allocated to address FOIA requests Records are the foundation of open government and their ready access promotes the principles of transparency participation and collaboration Well-managed and accessible records are important for operations to efficiently make decisions and carry out missions such as addressing FOIA requests I A had not placed priority on the implementation of an effective records management function Instead FOIA personnel Division contacts and operational staff had to search through different layouts content formats and locations of I A records to identify pertinent information The lack of records management contributed to delays in locating pertinent records and meeting FOIA timeliness requirements For example based on our review of the starting and closing dates in the I A FOIA Office’s tracking system extensive time was expended waiting for information from operational staff For five requests in FY 2014 the processing time ranged from 144 to 517 days To resolve the 517-day-old request I A had to provide all processing notes including search slips and the documentation pertinent to the original FY 2013 FOIA request—a difficult task given the lapsed time Following are the primary deficiencies we identified in I A’s www oig dhs gov 12 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security records management program which posed difficulties in responding to FOIA requests • Insufficient number of records management staff and knowledgeable liaisons and custodians I A has not appropriately staffed its records management function I A had one records officer and one contractor to meet records management requirements Also I A has not identified records liaisons or custodians to assist in records management functions • Lack of I A records management guidance DHS Directive 141-01 Records and Information Management requires the appointment of records liaisons or custodians as well as the implementation of records management policies and procedures Although I A’s Records Officer drafted policies and procedures I A management had not approved them at the time of our audit in September 2015 • Lack of suitable training OMB Memorandum M-12-18 required that by December 31 2014 agencies establish a method to inform all employees of their records management responsibilities and develop suitable records management training I A recognized the need for records management training in its FOIA report to the DHS Privacy Office in 2014 however it did not provide training suitable to I A’s intelligence mission Such training would enable FOIA staff to more accurately communicate to Division contacts the type and nature of information needed to respond to requests The training would also instruct liaisons records custodians or operational personnel on how to search for or maintain pertinent information and FOIA-applicable records When questioned regarding the lack of suitable training I A explained that all I A staff were required to take mandatory records training through the DHS online learning system However this training related to records management in general Based on the FOIA delays this training was insufficient to support I A in making timely FOIA responses • Duplicative tracking systems I A maintained two systems for managing FOIA requests Specifically I A used an executive secretariat system to issue task orders This system was also used to task and track the status of FOIA requests and report that status to upper management Concurrently I A’s FOIA Office entered this information into its own commercially available web application solution to task and track search requirements within I A Rekeying some of the same information into two separate systems was time consuming inefficient and risked input mistakes and inconsistent information For example for FY 2014 there were requests that had not been entered into the FOIA Office system www oig dhs gov 13 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Employing new approaches and systems to locate pertinent records could expedite the retrieval of requested information To further mature its records management system I A along with counterparts require programmatic guidance and additional resources from the Department Also I A officials explained they intend to improve their records management capabilities as part of a DHS enterprise-wide effort to implement an Electronic Records Management System ERMS to meet requirements of OMB M-12-18 Although the memorandum required that by December 31 2013 agencies develop and begin implementing plans to transition all permanent records to electronic format DHS has not instituted a plan for all components I A has been waiting for further instructions from DHS headquarters on requirements for implementing a complete electronic records management program Lacking instructions the proliferation of records may require additional space and expose I A’s sensitive information to unnecessary risks of loss and misuse Recommendations We recommend that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Recommendation 1 Prepare a plan of action and milestones for providing the FOIA Office appropriate staffing and capabilities to reduce its backlog of unresolved requests Recommendation 2 Provide specialized training for FOIA staff Division contacts and operational staff to improve I A’s responsiveness to FOIA requests Recommendation 3 Prepare a plan of action and milestones for instituting an organization-wide records management structure and processes to improve timeliness in identifying and locating pertinent records to address FOIA requests Management Comments and OIG Analysis We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Management concurred with our recommendations We have included a copy of the comments in their entirety in appendix B The planned corrective actions and milestones satisfy the intent of these recommendations We look forward to receiving updates on the implementation progress www oig dhs gov 14 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Continuity Capability For Safeguarding Essential Records and Intelligence Information Through the National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan dated August 2007 the President directed Federal executive branch agencies to achieve a national continuity capability Federal Continuity Directive-1 FCD-1 Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security and published in October 2012 provides direction for DHS’ development of continuity plans and programs FCD-1 directed that a viable continuity of operations program COOP should include 10 elements • • • • • • • • • • Essential functions Orders of succession Delegations of authority Continuity facilities Continuity communications Essential records management Human resources Tests training and exercises Devolution of control and direction and Reconstitution I A had made progress in this regard through issuance of Policy Instruction IA-802 Continuity Framework approved September 19 2014 by I A leadership As implemented the Continuity Framework laid the foundation for implementing continuity plans and continuity-related activities I A also addressed baseline requirements such as defining which records were essential to its operations Specifically its June 2012 Continuity Plan established a classification of essential records relating to rights and interests Records in this classification included official personnel records contracting and acquisition files payroll and other records containing sensitive PII Each I A Division must identify specific essential records and Emergency Operating Records needed to continue essential functions The Continuity Plan recognized essential records as a “critical element ” defined as follows the identification protection and ready availability of electronic and hardcopy documents references records information systems and data management software and equipment including classified and other sensitive data needed to support essential functions during a continuity situation www oig dhs gov 15 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Further at the time of our field work in September 2015 the Continuity Framework established a Continuity and Exercise Working Group CEWG a Continuity Coordinator and a Reconstitution Manager as responsible for continuity planning COOP plans support Federal agencies in responding to and recovering from business interruptions emergencies terrorism or natural events rapidly and effectively However the Continuity Framework neither adequately structured nor sufficiently provided authority for the CEWG to accomplish its assigned responsibilities These responsibilities included ensuring • all I A employees understand their continuity responsibilities • all I A employees have the necessary equipment records and databases and • rosters of Division personnel assigned to the Emergency Relocation Group are current As of fall 2015 primary and alternate representatives from all I A Divisions comprised the CEWG to implement the Continuity Framework However this group had limited success because its members were operations-level staff who lacked authority to task other employees or specialists needed to support continuity planning within I A The CEWG could have better fulfilled its responsibilities if a structure i e a Charter had required senior officials such as Division Executive Officers to comprise the CEWG For example Executive Officers have the authority to task out management assistance and support for records management training communications acquisitions human resources and administrative assistance to address challenges in implementing continuity plans Further at the time of our field work in September 2015 I A did not address the FCD-1 requirement to designate an Essential Records Manager with responsibility for safeguarding its essential records and intelligence information Without an Essential Records Manager I A had no means of meeting the requirement that its Divisions take a consistent approach to identifying protecting and ensuring the currency of essential and emergency records at I A headquarters relocation sites or devolution sites in case of emergencies An Essential Records Manager working with the I A Continuity Program Manager and CEWG could help ensure proper implementation and administration of an essential records management program An Essential Records Manager could oversee I A’s transfer and handling of essential records during tests training and exercises to resume operations after an interruption In addition an Essential Records Manager could perform the following essential records management requirements included in FCD-1 www oig dhs gov 16 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security • provide appropriate policies authorities and procedures • maintain a complete inventory of essential records locations of and instructions on accessing those records • review the essential records program annually and document the date and names of personnel conducting the review 6 • maintain a current essential records plan packet with a copy of the packet at the continuity facilities 7 • annually review rotate or cycle essential records so that the latest versions are available and • include instructions in the continuity plan on moving essential records those that have not been prepositioned from the primary operating facility to the alternate site Recommendations We recommend that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Recommendation 4 Develop a Charter outlining the authorities of the Continuity and Exercise Working Group to carry out the full range of responsibilities for planning and instituting a continuity capability Recommendation 5 Provide a plan and timeline to fully implement an Essential Records Management Program that meets FCD-1 requirements for identifying protecting and ensuring the currency of essential and emergency records at I A headquarters relocation sites and devolution sites in case of emergencies Management Comments and OIG Analysis Management concurred with our recommendations The planned corrective actions and milestones satisfy the intent of these recommendations We look forward to receiving updates on the implementation progress 6 Essential records program annual review is necessary to address new security issues identify problem areas update information and incorporate any additional essential records generated by new organizational programs or functions or by organizational changes to existing programs or functions 7 An essential records plan packet is an electronic or hard copy compilation of key information instructions and supporting documentation needed to access essential records in an emergency situation www oig dhs gov 17 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Securing Sensitive Information in Acquisitions A collection of Federal guidance calls for improved security of sensitive information in acquisitions Specifically • OMB Memorandum Follow-Up to President’s Management Council Cybersecurity Meeting September 5 2014 dated September 16 2014 requires each agency’s Chief Information Officer and Chief Acquisition Officer to initiate a process for identifying the functional areas of expertise needed to ensure compliance with Federal requirements and guidelines for continuously reviewing functional areas such as contracting solicitations and security • National Institute for Science Technology NIST Special Publication SP 800-161 Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations dated April 2015 calls for agencies to identify assess respond to and mitigate supply chain risks at all levels of their organizations • Class Deviation 15-01 from the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation HSAR Safeguarding of Sensitive Information dated March 2015 provides special contract clauses that require strengthening the security of contractor IT systems that have high risk of unauthorized access to or disclosure of sensitive information The Regulations require DHS components to provide IT security and privacy training amendments to existing contracts as needed and requirements traceability matrixes as a means of assessing high-risk solicitations and contracts involving sensitive information High-risk contracts are those that include PII and any other data the agency deems sensitive based on risk or mission 8 In early 2015 OMB tasked the Federal Chief Information Officer Council and the Chief Acquisition Officer Council to review current acquisition and IT policies and practices involving contractors and subcontractors to ensure they adequately secure Federal information consistent with the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 OMB planned to issue a memorandum Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions to provide guidance on strengthening cybersecurity protections in Federal acquisitions for products or services that generate collect maintain disseminate store or provide access to Controlled Unclassified Information on behalf of the Federal Government This memorandum still in draft as of November 2015 will require that an agency’s Chief Information Officer Chief Acquisition Officer Chief Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy and other 8 Such-high risk data include but are not limited to sensitive PII for official use only sensitive but unclassified information protected health information law enforcement sensitive information business confidential information trade secrets procurement sensitive information and proprietary information www oig dhs gov 18 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security key stakeholders work together to review continuously high-risk solicitations and contracts This collaborative review and oversight process should begin at contract solicitation and continue over the period that each contract is active to ensure the OMB requirements listed in figure 3 will be met Figure 3 Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions Upcoming OMB Requirements for Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions Draft 1 Contractor systems that contain Controlled Unclassified Information meet National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53 Rev 4 privacy and security controls 2 Contractors report security incidents 3 Contractor systems that contain Controlled Unclassified Information undergo information system security assessments 4 Contractor systems have information security continuous monitoring 5 Agency officials perform business due diligence to identify and prioritize planned acquisitions and contracts Source OMB draft memorandum Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions Draft I A made progress in addressing the collective Federal guidance calling for improved security of access to or disclosure of sensitive information by providing mandatory training and posting “HSAR Safeguarding IT Determination” and “Safeguarding of Sensitive Information Checklist ” Although the OMB memorandum was not yet published by the end of our field work in November 2015 I A had begun implementing the requirements under the HSAR for identifying high-risk contracts In addition I A’s Chief Financial Officer continues to improve due diligence in processing and safeguarding PII in contracting Further in line with requirements of the HSAR I A had already established in October 2014 an oversight team representing mission-support financial privacy IT security and acquisition functions from across I A to develop a template for reviewing all contracts I A had initiated a process for its Contract Officer Representatives to review its 72 existing contracts to determine whether they required amendments At the conclusion of this review in March 2015 I A determined that two contracts related to physical security and front desk services were high-risk and required additional clauses This was a one-time activity although I A continued to identify new high-risk contracts and also had pertinent contract language available for new and existing contracts Since the conclusion of this collaborative exercise in March 2015 I A has been waiting for further instructions from OMB and DHS headquarters on how to move forward to address upcoming requirements for improving cybersecurity protections in acquisitions www oig dhs gov 19 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Going forward I A could further enhance its cybersecurity protections by increasing business due diligence in acquisitions For example continuous risk assessment and end-to-end monitoring of high-risk acquisitions would provide better understanding and visibility into how contractors develop integrate and deploy products services and solutions to support government operations Such enhancements would also help ensure security integrity resilience and quality in contracted operations Recommendation We recommend that the Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Recommendation 6 Prepare a plan and milestones to improve I A’s risk assessment and end-to-end monitoring of high-impact acquisitions involving intelligence information privacy and security Management Comments and OIG Analysis Management concurred with our recommendation The planned corrective actions measures and milestones satisfy the intent of this recommendation We look forward to receiving updates on the implementation progress www oig dhs gov 20 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix A Objective Scope and Methodology The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Public Law 107−296 by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978 Our objective was to determine whether I A ensures compliance with Federal privacy regulation and policies We examined internal controls for managing all I A information but did not look at classified content as part of this audit As background we reviewed I A’s responsibilities for privacy protection and I A guidance related to operations testimonies compliance documentation training and intelligence oversight management As part of our field work we interviewed I A’s Information Compliance Branch Chief and 22 managers and employees We evaluated I A’s implementation of the Freedom of Information Act to promote agency transparency continuity planning and capability for essential records management and monitoring of solicitations and contracts We confirmed that I A offers mandatory training on privacy and civil liberties conducts intelligence oversight activities and is working to ensure compliance with the requirements of pertinent legislation regulations directives and guidance We conducted this performance audit between July and October 2015 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended and according to generally accepted government auditing standards Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives www oig dhs gov 21 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix B I A Comments to the Draft Report www oig dhs gov 22 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Recommendation 3 Prepare a plan oi action and milestones for instituting an organization wide records management structure and processes to improve timeliness in identifying and locating pertinent records to address FOIA requests tam Resnonse Concur 1 A s plan of action rst milestone was obtaining the issuance of Policy Instruction titled Records and information Management and accompanying Records Disposition Form in response to the 016's preliminary ndings 1-2 The policy instruction codi es how will Follow the Records Management Program as required by the DHS Records Management Directive 141-01 1 A s second milestone includes the creation ot'a requirement for an additional government employee to serve as 1 A's Chief Records Officer GEE-030610 1-13 135A expects this addition to be in place by end ofAugust 2016 Lastly anticipates the identi cation and initial training of the designated individuals to be completed by June 2016 13m expects to complete all milestones by August 31 2016 Estimated Completion Date August 31 2016 Recommendation 4 Develop a Charter outlining the authorities ofthe Continuity and Exercise Working Group to carry out the full range of responsibilities for planning and instituting a continuity capability ISLA Response Concur ld er t developed a draft Continuity Exercise Working Group CEWG Charter TAB 3 that outlines the authorities and responsibilities ofthe CEWG to ensure 134A can meet its continuity capability requirements The CEWG Charter is expected to be signed within 30 days Estimated Completion Date May 22 2016 Recommendation 5 Pr0vidc a plan and timeline to fully implement an Essential Records Management Program that meets requirements for identifying protecting and ensuring the currency of essential and emergency records at 185A headquarters relocation sites and devolution sites in case of emergencies Resnonse Concur 1 A s plan includes the full implementation ol'an Essential Records Management Program Idea has already designated an ld cr t Records Of cer as the 13m Essential Records Manager The plan also includes having this manager work closely with o cA's Continuity Program Manager and the 185A CEWG representatives to train Emergency Relocation Group members on what essential records are work with them to identify essential records and then ensure they are stored and accessible at the Emergency Relocation Site also recently isSued Policy Instruction lat-102 Records and Information Management TAB which includes previsions addressing these internal coordination ett'orts and Essential Records These provisions will also be incorporated into records and information management training program Furthermore has already Essential Records training with Emergency Relocation Group members and they have started to identify their Essential Records 1 A's plan and efforts timeline concludes with testing and validation by mid May 2016 during 1 A's Eagle Horizon exercise Estimated Completion Date May 2016 23 16 93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL aw Department of Homeland Security a oat- 0 Recommendation 6 Prepare a plan and milestones to improve l A's risk assessment and end- to-cnd monitoring ol high-impact acquisitions involving intelligence information privacy and securitv Response Concur agrees that securing sensitive information at all classi cation levels is vital and as the Inspector General's report states and our partners have already undertaken several steps to cornva with the anticipated but not yet nalized Of ce of Management and Budget memorandum Improving Lit-'bersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions In addition to the steps identi ed in the report 185A and its partners have developed several measures to fully assess the risk of high-impact acquisitions and monitor with quarterly updates the activities undertaken under those contracts A comprehensive description ol thesc measures and their associated implementation results will be provided within thirty days of the release oi'the report Technical Comments to the Draft Report were previously previded under separate cover Should you require additional information please do not hesitate to contact me or have your staff contact Dr Tammy 'l ippie at 2 2-447-4394 Attachments 1 IA-IOE - Records and Information Management-signed 2 IA Form l02-A_Records Disposition 3 Draft CEWG Charter 24 16 93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix C Office of Information Technology Audits Major Contributors to This Report Marj Leaming Director Eun Suk Lee Privacy Audit Manager Kevin Mullinix Privacy Analyst Richard Elias Information Technology Specialist Shawn Ward Referencer www oig dhs gov 25 OIG-16-93 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security Appendix D Report Distribution Department of Homeland Security Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff General Counsel Executive Secretary Director Government Accountability Office OIG Liaison Office Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs DHS Chief Privacy Officer DHS Audit Liaison Officer Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis I A Audit Liaison Officer I A Chief Intelligence Oversight Officer Information Compliance Branch Office of Management and Budget Chief Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner Congress Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees Senator Al Franken Ranking Member Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy Technology and the Law Representative Bennie G Thompson Ranking Member House Committee on Homeland Security Representative Jason Chaffetz Chairman House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Chairman House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism Homeland Security and Investigations Congressman Michael T McCaul Chairman House Committee on Homeland Security www oig dhs gov 26 OIG-16-93 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES To view this and any of our other reports please visit our website at www oig dhs gov For further information or questions please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs at DHS-OIG OfficePublicAffairs@oig dhs gov Follow us on Twitter at @dhsoig OIG HOTLINE To report fraud waste or abuse visit our website at www oig dhs gov and click on the red Hotline tab If you cannot access our website call our hotline at 800 323-8603 fax our hotline at 202 254-4297 or write to us at Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Mail Stop 0305 Attention Hotline 245 Murray Drive SW Washington DC 20528-0305