Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 - • · t I Research Study Whz tber Argentina New ·Politiail Systeni or lvfori of tl1e Satne PR 76-10012 February 1976 Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ' -- - I NT E l L I G E NC E CENT RA L ' - AGENCY DI RECTORA1'E _C F I NTfLL IGENCE _ _ OFFICE OF POLITICAL RESEARCH February__1976 WHITHER ARGENTINA NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM OR MORE QF__THE SAME - by - '- '' •• -- NOTE This study was prepared by the Office of Polltlcal Research Other agencl s and CIA offices -re consulted but the study has not been formally coordinated and does not represent an offlclal CIA position The Issuing off lee Is awar-e that the complex matters discussed lend themselves to other Interpretations C_omme_nts _o_n LIHLwele_om_ed b_y tl'le_aythor who may be r e a c h e d -------- ---- - - - PR 76 10012 Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 CONTENTS • • • THE DISCUSSION SUMMARY • I• 11 INTROOUCTlON • -· The Military • • • • • • B The Peronlsts· -- - • •• c Other Pol ltlcal Forces • • • • • D The Traditional Polltlcal Culture THE FORCES Of CHANGE -· • THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM • ' 111 • A B C IV New Pol ltlcal Forc rs - • • • • • • • Effect on Establ I shed Pol ltlcal Forces The Changing Political Culture • • • • THE FUTURE Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 5 5 5 6 8 9 9 12 12 13 14 18 1 -Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322--------- I - SUMMARY WHITHER ARGENTINA _ NEW POLITICAL SYS'TEM OR MJRE OF THE SAME Argentina seems on the verge of repeating a familiar pol t tlcal eye le an electe cl vii I an government Is fall Ing Into lower ond lower repute s It Is progressively overwhelmed by protilem s of Its own making and by pol ltlcal and eco1lomlc di lemmas that h·ave remalr ed unsolved for the last forty years In the wings a 'divided and reluctant armed forces ls 0 belng propel IP d to take over the government again Locked in an lmmobl I Ism of their own makln Argentine pol ltlcal forces have been unabi'e to break this polltlcal cycle In which the ml 11 tary Intervenes to take power from an I neffectua c I vi 11 an g0vernment 1 on y to give It back when they cannot govern effectively either The immob llzatlon of the Argentine system has two undeilylng dimensions Pol ltlcal ly the basic deficiency Is a lao k of respected Institutions through which confl lets among groups can le mediated Thus the efforts of any one group to stimulate major political change are quickly cancelled out by the opposition of competing groups On the economic side no group has had sufficient strength to take the me sures necessary to revltal lze a stagnant eeonomy -For decades two or three-years of slight or moderat g-owth have been followed by one or moredisastrous-years-ln wl'llch the prev I ous Increment of Qi owth Is wI ped out • This time however Argentine polltfcs·may ot repeat Itself The argument of this paper Is that there are r1ew forces loose In the Argentine society which have so-undermined the traditional Institutions and processes that a basic change in the polltlcal system i likely to occur In the next one to three yeqrs These new forces are both pol ltlcal and economic and their effect Is to erode the consensus that al lowed the tradltlonal system to function This consensus rested on_respectfoctwo implicit rules of Argentine politics vlolenee was permf ssable-to express grievances and show strength but on I y If carefu II y llml ted _ _ · Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A p p r o v e d for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322---------- • No pol ltlcal group sought the total el lmlnatlon of any other I e any defeat was perceived as only a temporary setback These rules prevalled because no group was afraid hungry enough to challenge them None had as muctt pol ltlcal power or economic wealth as ft wanted but each was comfortable enough to avoid taking the chance of losing permanently what ·It did have or angry Since about i970 this common understanding of how politics should be played has been_threatened·by the rfse Qf guerrilla • terrorist groups which disregard the rules of I lmltlng vlo- lence and of not seeking to-ellmlnate-other-power contenders Violence has changed In kind and Intensity ·where once strikes and demonstr atlons were the common occurrence these have now been supplanted by kidnappings as asslnatfons bombings and armed attocks loss of II fe from pol ltfcal violence has risen dramatically from an average· of 40 deaths per year durlng 1967-72 to over 1 000 f n 1975 ·· ·· ·· · · · The br•akdown In polltleaLrules fs now being exacerbated by the most virulent lnflatfon Arg·entlna ha·s ever ·experienced Pr I ces rose 335 percent In 197' c0mpared wI th -an aver age year I y rise of 30 percent durlng __19 6l -_H • __ IM_eJfe ct _has been to Intensify the pursuit of narrow sectoral Interests by Argentine pol ltlcal and economic groups Pe1r'tfculady_fn the labor sector fear Is growing t at the old methods wlll-not suffice to'protect the working class' share of the Argentine economic pie · Miiitancy Is rapidly Ir creasing as unemployment grows and real wages decline And the Army and secur I ty forces ace be Ing brought ·In to break up strikes declared I I legal and - sub •erslve'' by the government What Is the probable outcome of the sharp upward spfral In pol ltlcal violence and-Increasing· perceptlons·ot economic disaster One possibility Is fo _the old system of political lmmoblllsm to continue Another Is for clvil war Neither of these alternatives seems very likely Preservation of the old system for more than another year or so depends on the re-establ lshment of the old pol ltlcal rules and the minimum consensus that used to exist But the llkellhood of this seems Increasingly oubtful As violence by both the left and right Increases the previously respected norms on expected treatment of polltlcal opponents seem llkely to - 2 - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 -- ------ 'lpproved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 erode further Moreover there Is 11 tt Ie prospect that the old c onsensus can be revived unless the economy can be stab I lz ed This eannot be done however without a s11ve e austerity program which would be almost certain to hurt organized h bor's ee nomlc position and further undermine Its faith In the old system The odds for clvl I war are greater than for the Indefinite cpntlnuatlon of polltlcal lnvnobll Ism More turmoll Is likely since the strength of the guerrilla terrorists Is growing end greater labor ml lltancy Is develop Ing especr ally at the local union level · But sustained Internal war Is not likely unless the Armed Forces stand aside or spllt Into warrlng·factlons -neither of which seems In the car ls at this point Indeed the most probable-course of events Is for the spiral of Increasing polltlcal vlolence and economic breakdown to lead to an Indefinite takeover of the government by the Army This time the rule of the Army would llkely be much harsher and · more authorftarlan than any time In the past becau$e The Argentine society wlll be nuch closer to eir arc hy than on any previous occasion of Anny lnt rventlon and hence the measures-to restore order and stimulate eeonomlc re overy will have to be much more severe In order to succeed The· llmlts on using ylolence wlll hjve l lrgely dlsar peared so-that the Army wl 11 be les Inhibited by cultural constraints from forcibly suppressing any pot ltleal opposlHon Up to now the Army has _I acked _the unJiy_O f wJ 11 and purpose_ to use force to restructure the Argentina pol ltlcal system __ It has always been a loose_assemblagecoLhlghJy_ politicized factions whl ch formed shoct _1 lved_coalltlon s_tQ _rernove Ineffectual elvl I Ian leaders but which generally began to fa I apart after hklng' over direction of tha government Past factional Ism In the' Army may be about to give way to a new unity however ·rhe evidence Is uncertain b1Jt there-are Indications that new hard I lne mental lty Is growing among many ml 1ltary officers partlcularly those who have foug t the guerrillas - -' '· - - - - · Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ---- --------- t ' pproved for Release 2018 09 17 C 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - - • These officers are r ported to feel that the guerrillas and the soclat and econcmfc conditions that spawn them can only be el lmlnated by a total change In the existing pol ltleal a11d economic system Whl le this mental lty may be spreading as off leers who have fought guerrillas are rotated outside the combat zone It apparent I y has not yet r6ached the ht gh command I eve I lhe top Army leadership stl 11 remains reluctant to take power directly because of the Immensity of the problems they would face and the Jr memories of the frustrations of past ml 1ltary rule They are hoping that If they must take power again they can do so on a wave of popu I ar support that « 11 en ab Ie -them to govern without major opposition This time however -a seems Increasingly unllkely that fhe Generals could rule benlgnlyfor long The most likely scenario Is that they wf 11 take power again with the superficial backing of a wide spectrum of pol ltlcal forces but that ·· pol ltlcal an4 economic problems have assumed such· proportions that partial and patchwork solutions slmpt·y wl I I not hold Thus either they will eventually be forced to respond by Imposing severe authoritarian-rule-themselves or a rising generation of Are ntine·Army-off lcers Increasingly unfettered by the constraints and dlvfslons of the past wlll Impose It In their place In short basic and far•reachlng changes sbem likely In Argentina To monitor th se and their i'Tlplicatlons for US Interests will require Increased scrutiny of the attitudes·· of Argentine mllltary offlc rs at the middle as well as the top ranks - 4 -·· Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 THE DISCUSSION I INTRODUCTION for twenty years ever since the overthrow of Juan Peron In ·· - 1955 Argentina has stagnated both pol ltlcal ly and economically Whe'i her ruled by civilians or the military It has knownonly bf let per lods of pol ltlcal calm or economic growth ·Elected c Iv 111 an regfmes have a I tel 'nated In off fee wf f· 1 coup- I nsta I I ed 111illtary governments and both have ruled with equal Ineffectiveness Argent Ina seems on· the-verge-of the- same- ·chanrde that has been played out twice since 1955 - a-n erecfed-clvlllan government Is falllng Into lower and lower repute as ft Is progressfvely overwhelmed by problems of-Its own making and by political and economic dilemmas that have remained unsolved for the last forty years In the wings Is a divided Armed Forces1 being propel led - by events to again take over the government yet unwillfng to be pulled Into another no-win situation I e because It has neither the strength nor the wi 11 to govern decisively It wl 11 reign but not rule This time however Argentinepolltlcs may n ff repeat It-self The argument of this paper Is that there are new forces at loose in the Argentine society that have so under1T1ined the traditional Institutions and processes which have set the boundaries for past politics that a basic change In the ll rgentine pol ltlcal system Is 1lkely to occur In the ne t one to three years This paper will l describe the polltlcal forces and rules-of-behavior which characterized the crumbling old system 2 outline the evidence which suggests that change-fs underway and 3 speculate about what new political system may rise out of the debris of the old 11 THE TRAOITIONAL SYSTEM On the urtace the Argentine pol ltlcal system a pears to change each time an elected clvl I Ian government fs rM oved In favor of an authorltarfan mllltary regime In actuality until very recently the politfcal forces the rules that govern their behavior an the Issues over which they have struggled have changed ard Iy at al I - 5 -- - t ' · Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 Argentina has been the epitome of Samuel Huntington's praetorian society In such a society al I major soclol forces are hlghly polftlclzed Groups oppose each other directly on a wide range ot basic Issues since there are no respected pol it lI lnstltutlon s through which their conflicts can l e mediated Furthermore · there are no generally acceptad means for resolving di fferenees each group tends to use the coin which makes maximum use of tne resources most aval I able to It The wealthy bribe students riot workers strike lllObs demonstrate and the riiflitary coup ea In the rge tlne setting the two most powerful forces and the only ones capable of taking signlficant polit•i al Initiatives have long been the military and the Peronlst movement They have been the crucial actors for several decades and their relationship Is the pivot around which most of Argentina's polltlcs have turned since 1955 '· A heMilltary Argentina's Army the primary ml 1 ltary pol ttftal actor was mode I ed de I I berate I Y- after the Pruss I an -Army-with-its strong emphas Is that the military sho ld_functlon as a professional apolitical guardian of society's Institutions _ Yet almost simultaneously with the professfonallzatlon of the Argentine Army it also became one ot the most pol ltlclzed armies in Latin America- - These two processes are opposites One tends to orient the loyalties of the officer corps towards the mllltarv_as an Independent institu• tlon The other pulls loyalties towards_lndlvldual oolltlcians or pol it I cal partles-and-invol v-es- th-e-off I c-er corps- In factional pol I tics Ttte effect of these--co-onterval I ingpre fsures has been to create tensfons In lndlviduaLoff fcers and the corps as a whole fn These tensions have been present wlthlr the Army throughout the 20th century and under II e much of the amb i va' ence that the Army high command has demonstrated as to whether It should or should not be directly Involved in running the coJntry The polltfcal pattern that has consequently developed has been fairly consistent · The pattern begins· with n alreadf factlonalized Samuel P H1 ntlngton Pol ltlcal Order In Changrng Societies New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1958 p 196 - 6 - __ ' _ · - -li I --------------------- ---· Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 -·- I Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 n ' 1 Army In which some off leers have close personal and party tle s with various middle or upper class party leaders Most of the others are generally apolitical but are quite susceptible to being led by officers who feel strongly about professional or polltlcal Issues On numerous occasions over the last several decades this existing disunity has been exacerbated by the de1lberate efforts of elected clvt I Ian Presidents to develop a secure politlcal base In the military by manlpulatlng mllltary pr-omotlons anc' assignments In order to reward followers and punish critics In almost every case a counter-reaction has then set In and a movement to re-establish mllltciry professional Ism and to rerr ove the-Army from pol It I cs burgeons Eventually an ad hoc coal ltlon Is formed between-tho5'e·wantlng the Army toreturn to the barracks and thosewhose careers have been adverseiy affected by the pol ltlcal maneuvers of the President and the President Is removed from office by a _ temporori ly united Army A ml I ltary government Is next ln stal led Direct Involvement In rul Ing the country rather than uni tying the Army results -In even greater deterioration of professlonal norms - Eventual ly --a groui idswel I develops within the ml 1ltary to return the government to elected clvl I fan rule In the vain hope that the military can once again get out of politics and find a unifying professional Identity i I i I Th Is was the pattern that-occurred when the -m11 1t ary took power In 1955 from Juan Peron and fhen gave way to elected civilian President Arturo Frondlzl-ln 1958 --SJmllarly F ondizl was overthrown In 1962 bu the Army after briefly ruling through his constitutional successor_ as-a puppet President permitted -the election Of Arturo lflla In 1963 Next It forced I Ilia from off fee In 1966 but after-seven years of Indecisive ml I ltary rule al lowed elections and the return to the Presidency of Peron In 1973 · The dilemma-of the Argentine professlonal soldier Is best c ptured In a communique Issued by the Army Secretary of War In April 966 when the legallsts In the Army were struggf Ing wl th seH doubts over whether to remove 1111 a and subject the mi I ltary to the divisive pressures of governing The Army ••• makes known t P pub lie opinion ••• that It does not brJHeve In 'ml I ftary government' as a solution for Argentfne problems ••• that experience has demonstrated that the-Army- -1n-thefunctlon of - government ls converted Into a def I ber at Ive body and d f sc f p I I ne Is corrupted · which leads to anarchy destroying what so much vigilance and sacrifice have cost the Institution 7 - ___ - c ----- --- ------ - _ -- - - - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 · ' i v r · ·· ' -- ---_ ---Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C 0 0 0 1 1 3 2 2 • • • • • • • • • • • Since 1955 the tension between pol ltfcf zatlon and profes· $fonal izatfon has been comp I lcated by another basic division within the mi I ltary about what to do with the Peroni st movement Although the Army has been generally anti-Peron throughout this per lod two l'l ajor faetfons have cont I nued to dtspute the Issue One group has bet leved that Peronlsm must be eradicated entirely for the country to regain rts pol ftlcal health This group hes tended to coincide with those officers who belleve that the ml JI• 1'ary should take over he government lndetf nftely and Impose harsh rule The other more broadly-based and Inf luentlal group has a I so baen aga Inst Peron Ism as a -movement but has supported· the r lntegratlon of Individual Peronlsts Into the pol ltlcal pro·· cess In order to defuse them as a unlfled popullStt·politlcal force It has also generally supported the return of the government to civilian hands after a period of- ''cleansing Most recently - this group cane to bel leve that the only salvatlon of the Argentine society nd especially the mllftary as an lnst tutlon would be to remove- lfsel f frcxn power and let a ·chastened and aged Juan Peron take office hopfng that the responsibilities and pressures power might cause the Peronlst movement'elther to destroy or reform Itself This feeling led to the Army's withdrawal from politics and the return to power of Peroh In 1973 of In summary the Army as a political actor Is most ai curately seen as a roose assemb I age of Interest groups wh I ch come together In short-1 lved coal ltlons on occasion to overthrow Ir effectual national leader ship but which almost always begins to fal I apart ·as soon as It takes over the government • 8 The Peron I sts-- most Important of the other pol lt Cal forces In Is the Peronfst movement -llke every other group in Argentina It has always been faction-ridden The move- The Agentlna ment itself can only be defined very Imprecisely as an aggregate 'Ith I ch after Peron's overthrow-in· 19ss ·w-as-tinl fled primarily by the demand that he or those purportedly associated with him be returned to polltlcal power total strength - Its adherents have numbered from about one-fifth to one-half of adult Argentines with the exact number depending on the Issue In dispute The one Issue that has best served to unite Peronlsts has been their determination to keep the advances In economic well-being and· status they made under Peron and to resist-being made the sacrl flclaf lambs of any government program whether clvlllan or mllltary - n 8 - ' ' · Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ------- ---Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322--------- j-1 1 di j·· ·· to elnvlgorate the stagnant economy Their power lies In their control of the labor movement Over the last ho decades the trade union sector based on the General Confeder 1tlon of Labor CCGT with a total afff I latlon of over three ml I I Ion workers developed a reasonably efficient and wall financed bureaucratic structure As befits a pow$rful wel 1 ntrencll d movetaent It has not been revolutlonary or radical In orientation but rather has usually pursued bread-and-butter union Issues And although the e eonomy has stagnated for twenty yaars union leaders have generally succeeded in keeping wages up and the prices down of Items most crlttcal to workers' welfare Csuch as wheat nd beef c Other Pol ltleal Forces o - for the purposes of this essay the other major tradltlonal political forc es can be mentioned very_brlefly • _ One set of these forces c oo es from a far r I y h I gh i y deve Ioped mI dd I e e I as s and co slsts of commercial Interests assocf·ated with the export· ·economy native lr1dustrlal lsts professional pol ltlcians and government clvl I servants • Some are more cirganized thal'l others but the Interests of these groups are often diverse and In conf llct In most cases the Influence of these for es on the polltlcal system has been narrowly directed to the defense of the f nterests of their own partlcular_group and they have demonstrated little ablllty unlike the military and Peronlsts to affect the system as a whole The conservative rural ollgarchy_ls the final sector worth It has llttle organized national pol itlcal expression but has when defending Its own lnter s'ts consl'derable political power Its Influence comes from it5--control-over the-production of Argentina's h·o major exports graln-'and beet -and through personal ties with Important government -and· mf 1ltary-leaders noting D -The Tradltlonal Polltlcal Culture Despite appearances to the contrary the Argentine pol ltlcal system at the level of basic Institutions pol ltlcal force s and the rules by which pol I tics Is played has DEfen-remarkat ly consistent and stable · at least until recently It can essentially be d scrlbed as a veto system Ir which all poiitlcal actors or forces follow these bas'c rc 1 es - 9 - • • • • f • • Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 · ·i • J -•1111111 ' 11111_ ____________Approved for Release 2018 09 17 - I _ • 1 - - ••• C00011322-- - ---- ' · ' No single pol ltlcal force Is $trong enough to Impose Its wlll permanently on the others 2 Each Is strong enough to block the major pol It I_ cal Initiatives of the other end l There Is no commonly accepted basis for -the formation of governing coalltlons although temporary coal l'tlo-ns to overthrow the government-of-the-moment ean be formed These rules work Cit only to prevent efficient government because they are lmbedded In a commonly shared polltlcal culture ln wh I ch each of the actors subscr I bes to bas Ica 11 'f the same va Iues _ and expectations of behavior The most Important elements of this common culture are the fol low Ing 1 Pol ltlcal Institutions· have not modernized as rapidly as economic-Institutions so that ttie - t•fio systems are Increasingly Incongruent The econOll'llc system demands that the citizen respond In a highly rational and-functlonal manner In contr st In the polltlcal sphere the citizen responds In a much more-partlcularlstlc way and natlonal Interest Is def lned In a very narrow manner usually encompassing the welfare of only the specific group making the definition Each group tends to be 11 eve that- Improvements In ·economic and political benefits cannot te mutual what other groups gain it must lose 2 Limited violence has become lnsHtutlonal I zed as a legltlmate method-of-expresslng rievances or bringing about pol ltlcal change - Because of the weakness of political Institutions for managing change 11 • • • the component elements of the power elite In Argentina -- such-as-off leers off lclals 1 and party leaders -- are-prepared to press their disagreements to a pol nt that ca 11 s for a show of force or even a llmlted use of force Instead of relying on mutual consent that Is achieved after peaceful parsuaslon •Jeane Klrkp_atrlck Leader and-Vanguar-dTn--Miss -Society A Study of Peronlst Argentina Cambridge Mass The MIT Press 1971 p 93 - 10 - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 I ' ' - - f ' The amount of violence that ts permitted under the rules of the game has generally had very definite limits however• It has also been highly stylized particularly on the part of the military and has ·1ed to little bloodshed These llmlts are cle rly evident In the recent abortive rebelllon of a portion of the Argclntlne Air force and the way In which It was put down threats to bomb each side Into submission were uttered but actual bombing and straf Ing runs were made only on run ays -_and other unoccup Ied areas -· -- '· A final point Is that for most of moder-n Argentine history a common understanding has existed that no polltfcal force wl LI seek permanently - to ellm nate any other polltlcal force Peronlst ' ml lltary oligarchy or middle class each group· has bel leved that a culture In which pol ltlcal defeat Is perceived as only temporary best serv es Its own Interests since It can never be sure of being on the winning side of the resolution of any particular Issue Nor has any group because of factionalism In Its ranks and the power of other groups ever been confident It could wln In a termlo31 struggle Finally even whl le the Argentine economy-has stumbledalong lt has been beneficent enough to glte every Important group at I east a good part--of what· it wants In essence then untl I very recently no group has been-afraid hungry or angry enough to take the chance of losing permane tly what lt already has · This Is commonly the rule In traaltlonaFL-atln-Amedcan polltlcal systems Charles W Anderson Politjcs and Economic Change In l atln America _ Princeton New Jersey -0 -Van Nostrand Co Inc 1967r-i ·P --10 r ro6 -- - - --• II - ___Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ r--- -- - --------- Approved I II• for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322------------- THE FORCES OF CHANGE A New Pol ltlcal Forces Since about 1970 new po ltlcal forces have developed on the left which pose a serious threat to the continued functioning - of the old polltlcal system These f0rces exist mainly as rural guerrl I las urban terrorists but they also have some expression Jn organized pol ltleal party groupings - In the student movement and most recently at the local level In organized l bC f' • The 'first signs of Argentine participation-In guerrl I la _terrorist activities appeared In the late 1950's 4 and especially lri the early 1960 1 s when two Marxist groups sent members to Cuba for training Then In 1966 a Trotskylte-party -the R volut onary--- Workers Par ty CPRT began to sponsor bank_ r_o _berles and kldnapplngs ----------pr lmarf ly to secure financing By 1970 the PRT spawned a faction call Ing Itself the People's Revolutlon'ary Army CERF» which launched a sustained guerrll la campaign especl l Iv In Tucuman ·rrovlnce Whl le ERP fortunes- have-fluctuated considerably since 1970 H has remained steadfastly dedicated to the violent overthrow qf the government and the Imposition of a Marxist revolutionary political system It held to this position even when the supposed worker's hero Juan Peron -returned to power In 1973 The other major current of guerrilla terrorist activity has been spons9red by radical Per onlsts As previously noted the Peronlst movement has always had feetlons of varying colorations ·but the poJarl atlon Into moderate and radical camps accelerated greatly with the return of Juan Peron to power In 1973 After his return as Pres I dent Peron_tools geoecatt y Qnser_vat Ive posit Ions on most Important political and economic Issues Most old-line labor-oriented Peroni st leaders responded favorably to this conservatl sm ' but many of the younger leaders who were associated with the y9uth and student sector were-severely dlslllusloned They react'd In traditional Peroni st fashion by assassinating selected conservative Peronlst-leaders but they-did not directly attack the government This changed-In September 1974 after Mrs Peron took office fol lowlng her husband's death and showed herself to be even more conservative than he The radlcal Peronlsts broke with her went underground as the Montoneros terrorist movement and began a violent campaign against the pol ltlcal establishment and especially against the pol Ice - 12 - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ' ' ------------- Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ----- · -1 · jl i i Ii 6 Effect on Established Political Forces r The •xlstence of active and often successful forces engaged In political terrorism has had a heavy Impact on most other Argentine pol ltlcal forces The effect on the ml 1ltary has been at least three-fold First It has created some degree of unity In the off leer corps The Army which has not fought a w r n over 100 years ls now engaged In combat against an enemy which the Armed Forces high command has declared must be exterminated Secondly combattlng the guerrillas In the countryside and the terror sts In the c lty has I nexor ably _dr_agged__j'_h mLLI tary deeper Into politics Extraordinary powers were given to the Armed Forces by Anti-Subversion laws an expanded National Oefens e· law and a State of Siege al I declared by the congress In 1914 and 1975 And In Tucuman Province the Army has taken some clvll as well as ml 1ltary powers as It attemp s to destroy the ERA A I I this ha s · served to heighten the ever present tension between professlonal1zatlon and pol ltlclzatlon a growing number of mll ltary men belleve Mrs Peron must be replaced by an administration If necessary mllltary controlled capable of giving Argentina law and order Other off Ice rs part lcu Iar I y those 'In the h I gh command who have the fresl' est memories of the frustrations of past ml I ftary rule are desperate to keep the Army at least one step removed from direct control of government A thir l military reaction to the existence of new guerrilla terrorist poll lcal forces-has be nthe growth of a 11 hardllne 11-polltlcal men ta 11 ty amon s_ome officers -- are beg nn ng to fee I tha both the guerr 111 as and the social and economic conditions that spawn them can only be eliminated by a total change in the pol ltlcal and economic system -Tiley --- have grown to despise the clvlllan polltlclans and even some of the millta y leaders associated with them who run the corrupt old system Thls ot cour se Is parallel to the-attltudlnal change which any Brazilian Peruvian-and Chi lean-officers underwent decl lng that only the ml 1ltary can govern effectively and that national defense and national development are Inextricably prior to I inked The Peronlst movement has also been deeply Influenced by the emergence of the new rad Ical left pol I ti cal forces In part the I - ' ' __ -- - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ' -illlll a _ _ _ _lliiliiiiiii Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ' effect has been even more direct than on the ml I ltary since the Montoneros terrorists are formerly loyal Peronlsts who are now In vlolent opposition to a Peronlst administration The existence of this alternate pole of ettractlon for Peronlsts seems to be contributing to the breakup ofthe movement as an even vaguely unltled polltleal force The spllt appears to be three-way · One ever dl lnlshlng faction remofns loyal to Mrs Peron It no longer controls a majority In the congress and It Is rapidly ·1ostng control over the all-Important base of the Peronlst movement the trade union structure A second faction also poll- tlcal ly con ervatlve wants Mrs Peron to step down In order to - ave Peronlsm It has strength at the national l vBI In both the labor union movement_and Justlclal lsta Peroni st Party The third grouping Is composed of radicalized workers who formerly supported tt' e Peronrst movement but now seem Increasingly at tracted to the Montoneros cause Their Influence Is showing at the local urilon le· el where wlde·spread strikes are breaking out that the once-dominant natlonal labor leadership seems unable to control · C The Changing Pol ltlCal Culture One f the major consequences_of_the emergence of the guerr 111 a terror I sts and the IL assoc I ated pol It Ical al 11 es as Important actors on the Argentine polltlcal stage Is that the values that underlay the behavior of the traditional polltlcal forces and the stab I I lty of-the--establ I shed system- are under- going serious challenge Tf'leCharlenge threatens to undermine the o Id system and cause_ Lts breakdown -This change In values and - the erosion of the former Implicit agreement onacceptable polltlcal behavior are·most cl ear Iy demo nstrated_l two areas -f-' rst the prev lous ly accepted I Imitations on political violence seeTI to have been permanently breached Secondly the unspoken agreement that defeat ts only temporary and that no polltlcal group should seek the final· el lmlnatlon of_ any other group a_ppears to have broken down Polltlcal violence In Argentina has changed In the last few Where once strikes and demonstrathese have ow been sup lanted bv kldna pin s assasslnatlon_h__ omhl ri and ar m at-racks years f n both kind and Intensity tions were the common occurrence - 14 - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 ' l I 1 II I I I •••••••-------- pproved for Release 2018 09 17 ' f cooo 11322_ _ __ q _ The change along the seco11 Ldlll enslon _ that aetors seek to dominate but not elhnlnate other actors -- ls-most 1early seen In the att I tudes of_ the guerr 111 a terrorl sts and n the _feell11gs that seem to be evolving tn a large part ofdhe Army and security services The ERf arid the Montoneros-are11both dedicated to the violent overthrow of the current fft ourgools deinocratlc system and Its replaceiMntby a radical authoritarian form of government At the moment In pursuit of this goal --the ERP Is concentr at Ing cm assass I natloll- 2-LntJl_ltery off I cer s and the disruption of the Army as an-Institution whTlecfhe MOritoneros are directing a large part 9f their terrorist activity at the pol Ice and other security offlclals • ' € ' · Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 The Army Is responding to this threat with corresponding brutality A5 one head I lne expressed ft Guerrl I las In Argentina eattle Army In a War Without Prisoners Torture battlefield justice a fuzzing of the distinction between active guerd I la -and clvl I Ian supporter the use of arbitrary arrest and Imprisonment and the support of rlght-wlng- death 11 squads have all been noted as Increasingly common Army and police tactics As more and more mi 1ltary a 'ld pol Ice are exposed to the notion _that_all means are justified In order to ellmlnate subversion and the thr eat to the state posed by the guerrl 11 a terror I sts the previous Iy obeyed norms on expected treatment of p 11 t lea I opponents seem l lkely· to erode further ·•·· l I A change fo attitude-and-values less obvious than that oceurrl ng because of the con fl Iet between· the guerrl 11 a terror I sts and the Arrry may also be taking place In the labor sector The once-hlerarehlcal trade union movement seems-to be breaking apart primarily because of Increasing-doubts on the part of many workers that In the face of the worst-Inflation In-Argentina's history their natl nal leadershlp can adequately pr'otec t their economic Interests Unauthorized locaLstrlkes are_taklng place with Increasing 'frequency which protest both economic grievances and what local union members perceive as-a-lack-of responsiveness to labor's needs on the part of art unrepresentative aid self-perpetuating cl I que of national union· leaders -------- --t Labor's problems wl 11 probably worsen for at least the next year I nffatlon soared to 335 percent__ l_n_J915_JJ_tie highest In the world from an average of about 30 percent yearly during 1967-74 Meanwhile In 1975 wages rose 150-175 percent at the most and unemployme t climbed steeply from·neglfglble levels to o er sfx percent Massive wage Increases the tool tradltlonally used by Argentlne labor to keep real wages up wlll only accelerate the deterioration of the economy by feeding Inflation Moreover severe pol itlcal Infighting Is occurring among national trade union lead•rs some want Mrs Peron to step down some do not wh l ch w111 weaken the ab LI lty _ot_the_J abor_movement to act as a coherent pressure group In making both economic and political demands The probable result of these trends Is that the fragmentation of the labor movement wl 11 grow and some workers particularly those exposed to reported penetration of local· unions by the Montoneros wlll resort to Increasingly desperate and violent measures to attempt to protect their Interests - 16 - --- - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Labor strife and the spectre of uncontrollable agitation Is hardening of attitudes towards unionized workers ewnong the ml I ltary and security services oth of which have recently been Involved In breaking strikes declared Illegal and ttsubverslve by the government Generally opposed to Peroolsm as a pol ltlcal movement a growing number of officers are beginning to perceive workers and even their normal economic demands as a threat to national security which must be suppres sed One Argentine general Is quoted as having said that In order to save 20 ml I I Ion Argentines from social Ism It may be nece ssar·y to sacrifice 50 000 I Ives causing a Confrontation between labor and the mllltary has occurred Jn the past most notably In 1969 70-dirrlng the ml I ltary regime of General Onganla In order to bring Argentina's pol ltlcal and economic roblems under contro1 -0nganla when he took office fn 1966 attempted to establish authoritarian controls on the polltlcal system by closing congress and suspending all pol ltlcal parties He also tried wHh_ consfderab_l_e Inf tlal success to Impose an austerity program on the economy by among other things a temporary wage freeze 1 n late 1967 and 1968 the economy began to recover and although re al wages decl lned through this period strikes and demonstrations were few and only partially successful because the labor movement w s divided abQut to what extent It should cooperate with government In May 1969 however serious disorders broke out There was a general trike on 30tl May-wfl1Ch- led to a violent confrontation with the pollce-1 which 0-30 people were kl I led Onganla responded to the labor agitation by suspending some unions Intervening and reorganizing-the CGT to place It un4er government control and declaring a state of emergency At this critical juncture however l e faced a united labor movement under Peronlst control but had at his back a divided Army which would not support his authoritarian policies If that meant vlolently suppressing organized labor and other po 11 t lea I oppos It Ion - By October 1969 the Ongan I a government began to grant massive-wage Increases and a general strike called In November by a supposedly government_ controtled CGT was 75 percent successful Erosion of the stabilization program contln ed through 1970 an by early 1971control over the country's conomlc problems h·ad been lost • The old veto system continued to function under Onganla and prevented him from holding to effective potfcy Initiatives In major part because the consensus on how to play - 17 - - i · '- - -t · · · _ - '- iii 0 '· · t ' • o · - l 5l i t $j '4i_t fl'l _ c • 1' - f ' j d-f $ J · _ - fft'io'- -0 ' - · · _ - -l t · 111- f -i - - 1$ - · l-- ' _t i t - - ' t ¥ 1 1 1 4·v'f l S · · - ·- · t • 'l ·- • - - - - - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 -- '• • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A p p r o v e d for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322------ --- ' I pol ltlcs preval led That consensu s was mlnlmal In that ft prescribed what behavior to avoid -- unllmfhd vfolence and the total elfmlnatlon of one's opponent·- rather than general agreement on •hat procedures and Institutions to use to resolve cont I let Now however under the -Impact of the emergence of new pol ltlcal forces uncommltted_to past pol ltlcal values and whose grievances are directed at the tradltlonal pofltlcal system and not just the way It functions even that negatlvett commitment appears to be df ssolvlng Thus there Is a strong posslbl I lty that the o Id veto system I tse If may soon breakdown - IY THE FUTURE The fact that a polltlcal ctifti lre ts prC t ably changing and that new polltlcal forces are-entering the scene does ot lead Immediately to concluslons-about when a change In the polltlcal system may oc ur or what form the new system may take Certalnly the overt polltlcal emphasis Jn Argentina today Is to make the old system last one day longer by_ finding some constitutional way of persuading Mrs Peron step down In favor of a legal successor The top Army leadershfp stl 11 remains extremely reluctant to teke power directly If economic and polltleal conditions deteriorate further and the mllltary_ls forced to step In the top command hopes that Mrs Peron and her-cronies In government wfll have so dlscredlhd themselves that the ml I ftery wl 11 be able_to take over on a wave of ___ _ broad publlc lncludlng Jabvr support In short there are no Indications the current top mllltary-leadershlp has plans to radically restructure the pol ltlcal system In-order to end -the-pol ltlcal and economic lmmobf I Ism to which the old veto ·system had led -- How long can the-old system persist with or without the mllltarv rn p Wer Its continued functioning for-mote than another year or so depends on the re-est ab 11 shment of the o Id pol It I ca I rules and the minimum consensus that ·osed to exlst The I lkel I hood of this seems lncreaslngly doubtful As violence by both the left and the right grows the-prevlous1y-res·pected-norms on expected treatment of polltlcal opponents seem likely to erode· further In addition th economic and pol ltlcaLlssues now demanding resolution are beconilng so Intensely felt that they cannot be temporized for long Important soclal and pol ltlcal forces -- wotkers businessmen the military and security services •-are being injured to a degree never experienced before -------------- ---- The di liemma for the old pol I ti cal system f s that deal Ing effectively with these Issues -- ranging from hyper-Inflation to the ------ 18 - - - - - 71 • - • 't ' _ - iii • 4 • • • 11 l i 3l i _ _ _ f i J · J t · 't1' P - r•r • i ' 1 l '- ' 'l '11- ' O I' _ 'O • ' l _• S • • _ _ • _ - 'c'I __ •• -· - J• ' - - '• _J f '4 -T '- -or· •-tt - '·r• i' •£' '· • --- - 'If - ' t t f if - - Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 •• # • • ' I -1-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A p p r o v e d for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 -------- - threat of anarchy from the guerrl I la terrorists -- wl I I take severe measures which wl 11 also hurt powerfut groups No government clvl I Ian or ml i ltary functioning within the present system has either the pot ftlcal muscle or lr stltutlonal strength to overcome the veto of those polltlcal forces who would have to m ke the sacri f Ices necessar ' to resolve Argsntlna's pro_blems Nor Is thert much hope that the partlcularl lstlc pol ltlcal culture •I It dlsoppear overnight so 'that labor business government worker s professional pol lticl ans agricultural f ntere ts end oth r Important groups can be persuaded voluntarlly to make the essenttal sacrifices In the name of some higher national Interest One possible outcome of the spiral of lncre s Jng po1 ltlca1 violence and economic breakdown Is civil war The odds for this are greater than for tKe indefinite continuation of polttlcal lmmobl llsm but _Internal war Is still not th e most likely outcome of the current situation The guerrlllafterrorlsts have probably not reached the peak of their potent I al to wreak havoc especl ally If they continue to lnfl ltrate and gain sympatl lzers In the labor ··m0vement Thi$ Increases the llkellhood of higher levels of turmoil as work stoppages and demonstrations spread at the local union level Slmultaneously however greater ml lltancy·at the local level Is con tr Ibut Ing to the sp II nter Ing _Qf _thEr_Peron I st movement and It ts losing whatever tenuous unity It had as a national ool rt I cal force It Is doubtful the guerrilla terrorists could spark a clvll war unless I thev draw widespread support from moderate as well as radical Peronlsts and the Army stands as_lde or 2 the ml lltary Itself splits Into warring factions Neither of•these developments seems likely at this point Rather than continuation of the status quo gr_ c lvl I war It seems more llkiely that the sense of desperation developing among ArgentJne pol i ttcal forces wl 11 propel one of them to overcome Its past factlonallsm and to seize-power In order to attempt to Impose Its wl 11 on the society There are three groups that theoretically have the capablJlty to seize power and suppress opposition the Peron I sts the guerrl I I a terror f st and the At··my Of these three the Army Is the only group now or In the foreseeable future with sufficient national power and organization to be able to undertake successfully the forclble restructuring of the polltl al system What the Army still la ks to play this role Is unity of wlll and purpose There are Indications that this unity ls developlng as cited earlier but the biggest Imponderable today Is how extensive Is the bellef wlt1'lfn the - 19 - ' Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 I Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322 - Army that It must take over and char ge the pol it I cal system to save the country and how fast-that mentality Is growing For this reason It may be a mistake to see the sudden by the mltltary In Brazl t Peru and Ch_ile and almost Immediate Implantation-of far reaching authoritarian rule as the model-for-the probable course of events In Argentina It Is likely to happen more slowly ln Argentina In two ot more stages rather than In a single move Thus one poss i b I e scenario Is for Mrs Peron to be removed In favor of a seizures of power their subsequent ci vi Ii an successor who wf 11 also· be unable to control events · for a still divided military subnquently to take over In an ostensibly temporary capacity to attempt to restore calm ano • f lnal ly when traditional techniques have worked neither for the civi I ians nor the military and as violence and economic disorder continue to escalate -for a hardlinementalfty 11 ·to rise_to dominate the Army At that point either the current Army leadership would be forced to Impose harsh authoritarian rule or-· a new generation of Army officers Increasingly unfettered by the · constraints and divisions of the psst would probably remove them an J impose it in their place ___ _ Whatever the exact scenarl o the conditions seem ripe for permanent changes In the Argentine political system New political foi-ces have emerged and are having a heavy impact on the traditional political forces potltical and economic prot lems have assumed proportions that wfll not long admit to temporizing or inaction and the basic value consensus-that made the old•system possible has probably broken down To monitor the likelihood of basic and far-reaching changes in Argentina and their imp I ications for US interests continued scrutiny of the attitudes of military officers at the middle'as well as top ranks will be required - 20 - -Approved for Release 2018 09 17 C00011322lili - a i r rt11111ms11111m-llllill•iiitiiiiiiiiii 5 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu