June 11 1959 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD - Dr Killian and Dr Wiesner saw the President on June 3rd They summarized conclusions reached in three related one reviews by panels of the Science Advisory Committee on ballistic missile warning systems a second on the national response to warning and a third on defense against ballistic missile attack The memo which was the basis for the informal report tothe P r e s i d e n t i s attached - Brigadier General USA ' - _ I ECLASSIFIED LO 11652 SCC 11 - J B Wiesnerlb-3-59 - - t Warning and Defense in the Missile Age The anticipated inclusion of long-range missiles in the will greatly alterthe warning and active defense requirements of the United States The P S A C has carried out comprehensive stu es of the National needs in these areasand also attempted t o judge the potentiality of the various existing programs for satisfying requirements We have recently completed three related reviews one on Ballistic M i s s i l e warning systems one on the National response to warning and one on the defense against ballistic missile attack I would like to anticipate a more complete discussion of the active defense systems with a few remarks which will establish a setting the for discussion of missile warning systems and of associated problem of response t o warning W e do not believe that an active anti-ballistic missile systemcan be made effective enough a'gainst a determined attack to provide significant - - - -- - - v u - protection for the civilian population later We believe I w i l l discuss the basis of our position that the most significant contribution of active anti-missile defense will be the additional protectionit might provide to hardened sites such as missile or bomber bases thispurpose willbecomeavailablebefore It i s unlikely that active defenses even for 1964-65 sometimeafterSoviet intercontinental missiles will have become a verv serious threat i -2Because of the uncertainty regarding the ultimate capability of active defense systems and their late availability we must take other measures to insure our security A number of things m u s t be done to insure the survival of our deterrent 6 forces or as a minimum to permit them to belaunched prior to an attack so that they a r e not destroyed on the ground o e A number of methods may be employed to protect the retaliatory forc 1 ' Among the choices available to us a r e hardening dispersal mobility and rapid response to warning We believe that these are more certainly effective than active defenses for protection of the retaliatory force These passive tactics are now available can be implemented to an effective degree relatively soon andcan unless precluded - by - redundant'operational requirements c _ more inexpensively effective than active defenses The Panel believes these passive tactics be that should be considered as the basic anti-missile defenses f o r both the a i r c r a f t and the missiles of the U S retaliatory force We urge in the strongest terms that they be exploited more fullyand more rapidly than called for in present plans __ - _ defending the retaliato ry force One of themeasuresforpassively hardening -- progressively - - - - decreases in effectiveness as the aimingaccuracy of the attacking ICBM i s improved Therefore in the long run active defense if possible will become more effective relative to hardening although not in an absolute sense I - - - - -1 _ r I- I u i i- d - -3Though our studies have shown the importance of hardening of the retaliatory forces we will not give attention t o the details of this subject in the present report response to warning Our purpose i s t o r e v i e wthe problems of warning and Our recent review has covered both tactical and strategic warning of missile attack We also examined the response mechanisms t o warning and will have some remarks to makeabout this subject F i r s t on tactical warning of an actual ballistic missile attack We believe that reliable detection of a missile attack can be obtained b y a radar system a properly designed electronicwarning system can W e a r e confident that detect any significant attack with sufficiently low probability of f a l s e a l a r m t o be a most important component of our deterrent force The BMEW System when implemented will provide this capability Unfortunately the BMEW's system was overly elaborate as firstplanned and was not going to have any capability until late 1960 or early 1961 some time after its need appears to become critical The Air F o r c e i s now re-examining their schedules We fi believe that a limited but useful capability could exist early in1960 if the system were simplified and furthermore that the necessary simplifications sy_stem --wormation would not impair thexff e ctiy2n e-s s - ftke _from BMEX not integrated into warning system An alternate type of m i s s i l e warning system using airborne heat detectors appears quite promising and should if practicable be used toaugment the radar warning system This system would observe Soviet missiles during their launch phase ani3 consequently will provide a longer warning time than I I -4- will the radar system which observes the mid-course of a missile trajectory It should also be notedthat it is practically impossible tospoof this system because it observes the energy radiated during the launch phase of a missile flight and this will be very difficult to imitate The usefulness of such warning i s often questioned f o r it i s s o short ranging f r o m 10 to 15 minutes to slightly more than half an hour We believe such warning i s vital and when backed with a bomb-alarm system i s adequate if proper procedures exist to insure prompt reaction A bomb-alarm system which instantaneously and certainly passes the word that a nuclear detonation has occurred is an essential part of any deterrent system which i s to have a quick response by SAG Such a system i s now being studied We believe that the implementation of an effective bomb-alarm system p 4 i s deserving of high priority The bomb-alarm system willfunction for it is very unlikelythat a x - $1 majhps' attack employing missiles can be launched i n such a manner that most of the targets are hit simultaneously In fact it i s our judgment that a spread in arrival times of a half-an-hour or more is to be expected The electronic early warning will provide the information to alert our forces get SAC a l e r t aircraft into the a i r r e a d y m i s s i l e s wake up government officials who must authorize a response etc The bomb-alarm system reporting the occurrence of the f i r s t explosion will provide the information upon which the decision to respond will have to be based We shall have more to say about the problems of response to warning later on -5The warning system discussed above will have a different role as time passes In the immediate future it will provide the warning necessary to get the SAC a l e r t f o r c e o f f of the ground without warning the 15 minute a l e r t concept has little meaning At a later date it will provide the time necessary t o ready our m i s s i l e s so that they can be fired before they aredestroyed Later when we have hardened or mobile quick response missiles of the P o l a r i s or Minuteman type it will only provide some decision time if that i s in fact needed T o summarize 1 Electronic warning can be obtained 2 It is necessary 3 Bomb-Alarm System is alsoneeded 4 Both should be speeded up A s I inferred earlier the PSAC does not believe that the warning response mechanisms have properly evolved to meet the needs of the missile age We have recently reviewedthe organization and functioning of the National Air F o r c e Indicators Center and examined those plans which exist within the for the use of the warningllformation __ discussed earlier and we believethat I the present system and future plans a r e inadequate in several ways The National Indicators Center has the taskof watching strategic indicators f o r information which would a l e r t us of an impending attack prior to an actual penetration of the tactical warning system The indicators which provide most useful information at the present time are associated withthe Soviet 7y - 5 p %-- Tq %a p- the -6strategic forces and their air defense system A s time goes on such information will become harderto get and have less meaning There are many other kinds of information now not exploited which w e b e l i e v e could be obtained Other comments regarding the NIC include the following points 1 The center does not enjoy adequate priority in the intelligence community to always obtain information it desires or even to insure i t s prompt transmission home in competition with administrative communications traffic Many times information obtained by a particular service or agency is processedand evaluated before it i s made available to the NIC 2 The Center does not have adequate data processing facilities to insure getting full value from information now collected The system seems to depend primarily upon the memories of men having area responsibilities 3 The functioning of the Center and doctrine f o r the use of information generated a r e n o t adequate to insure any response to a missile attack We believe that it i s necessary to study this problem in detail and to formulate a response doctrine adequate for the missile age and providing alternate procedures for the various conditions which might be encountered This need exists t o insure the effectiveness of both strategic and tactical warning -7Recommendations in R e g a r d to Warning and Response 1 Improvements should be made in the handling of strategic indicators including improved communications and data handling The possibility of getting useful information f r o m a wider range of indicators should be explored 2 Steps should be taken to insure that information f r o m the BMEWS i s made available to users as fast as electrical communications permit CA In particular direct circuits from the BMEWS installations to SAC strategic government centers should b e provided 5 7 E Q 3 A bomb-alarm system should be installed as Tapidly as possible This should be regarded as a matter of highestnational urgency 4 National policy must be established to insure the prompt and effective utilization of warning information in the missile era 5 A primer on warning and response should be prepared to interrelate types of warning and types of response Special attention should be given to developing a response doctrine to include various levels and types of response to various kinds of warning information Y The Nike-Zeus system as are all AICBM systems i s appallingly complex in concept and in required performance criteria No system which can approach such performance requirements has yet been demonstrated in test or practice Nevertheless the Nike Zeus system i s founded on sound technological concepts and the Panel has a high regard forthe competence of the technical staff developing the Nike-Zeus equipment The system appears to have been well designed f r o m a data processing point of view and the discrimination radar has a very good range resolution capability It appears that the presently conceived Nike-Zeus systemcan be made to function satisfactorily in a technical sense against simple attacks involving no more c th v e r y elementary tactics of confusion by an enemy 3 3 r Ch d Unfortunately sophisticated decoys appear to be quite easy to make and should b e anticipated in any estirnate of AICBM performance projected for 1964-65 the earliest time when the Nike-Zeus system can be available Our o w n ICBM offensive plans presently include the use of much m o r e sophisticated measures of confusion multiple warheads and decoy than the N i e - Z e u s can cope with in its present concept We must reasonably expect that the Soviets will employ similar offensive tactics In fact the defense against ICBM's with high yield multiple warheads employing tactics of confusion and decoy i s a problem which must be faced continuously f r o m now on -9Recent research work appears to offer some hope of providing means f o r the development of more effective decoy discrimination It appears possible by radar and optical means to examine the characteristics of the ionization cloud produced when the objects enter the atmosphereand distinguish the lighter ones from those that are heavier This may make it possible to distinguish realwarheads f r o m decoys but obviously will not p c help against multiple warheads The discussions concerning decoy discrimination highlighted the - - urgency and importance of a well-planned programto examine Soviet nose cones during the re-entry phase Adequate knowledge of the characteristics of Soviet nose cones and of any Soviet decoys which might be developed may be a decisive factor in our ability to confront the enemy with a potentially effective system The Panel believes that an observation program care- fully planned to obtain as much useful data as possible is deserving of a major effort While conventional radar observations and infra-red photo- graphs a r e useful they a r e insufficient for this purpose Special instrumentation i s required to get much of the information believedto be available during --- a_ _ - - - - - re-entry however it appears that such instrumentation can be assembled __i- 3 f r o m components which a r e now available -10High Altitude Effects The problems of attenuation and refraction which may result from high altitude nuclear detonations including those of the Nike-Zeu s warhead itself was considered a serious problem prior to the Hardtack tests It now appears that the principal effect will be a temporary reduction inthe range capability of the 500 m c acquisition radar in the direction of the detonation The Panel believes that the problems associated with beam refraction and radar clutter resulting f r o m high altitude nuclear detonation should receive further study in terms of their effect on the overall system capability It i s apparent that the effects of l a r g e nuclear explosions 1 M T a t v e r y high altitudes 100-1000 km have not received sufficient study There is serious concern that the effects of such an explosion might persist for rather long times and could adversely affect the ZEUS system performance over an extensive regionof space This problem should receive further theoretic $F i ' c study The Panel believes that present efforts to provide a higher frequency transmitter and antenna f o r the acquisition radar are totally inadequate - Furthermore we feel that it i s within the present state of the a r t to provide the components for higher frequency operation and that their development should be carried out in parallel with the present 500 m c development This work should receive sufficient support to permit incorporationof the new high-frequency components into the initial Zeus deployment rather than p e r m i t the less desirable low-frequency equipment to go into large-scale production Hardening Although one of the publicized advantages of the Nike-Zeus system is the protection of population centers as I have already said the Panel feels that any protection which can be achieved in this waywill remain far from adequate t o influence in any serious way the military policy of a potential attacker We believe that the effective contribution of Nike-Zeus is to be looked for in the problem of protection of the retaliatory force Whatever c the merit of other possible applications the presently conceived Nike-Zeus system i sdf doubtful value forthe protection of hardened missile bases D e This results largely fromthe vulnerability of major system components to the effects of near-miss nuclear detonations It 5 6 'd i s now estimated that the present Nike-Zeus system can only withstand overpressures-of the order of 2 psi By using multiple antenna installations this weakness can be over- come to some extent and at considerably additional expense however this is glaring a weakness in the--system -There is a t the present- time no - known way to obtain a really hard antenna system but this problem i s one of sufficient importance to warrant much m o r e attention than it i s now receiving These comments apply to a l l of the antennae of the Nike-Zeus and not to the lens alone The Panel therefore believes it highly desirable to explore all possibilities which may permit the hardening of-qa Jike-Zeus - Sarszwm system components - E ' -1k - We have a somewhat uneasy feeling that there i s not enough planning for the future needs in this system The Panel feels quite strongly that the research programs should b e continued and that every effort should be continued t o get an experimental system into operation at the earliest possible date 'This system should be sufficiently flexible to permit perfection without substantial replacement At the same time we urge the initiation of a parallel R D effort to perfect measures for system hardening a higher frequency capability for the acquisition radars and an effective capability in the presence of advanced confusion techniques We often hear criticismof the Zeus system concept and the proposal that some other arrangement of components would be better So far there has been no proposal that wouldnot require the development of the v e r y l a r g e radars though possibly in other forms or the large high-speed maneuverable missiles planned for Zeus nor has there appeared a proposal for a system capable of r e a l l y adequate decoy discrimination With the high degree of pessimism the panel shares about he possibility of a highly effective AICBM system based upon the present concepts it i s necessary To explain-whywe'%elievethatthedevelopmentwork-shouldbecontinued at the present high ateof expenditure and in fact allowed toincrease as planned Among the most important reasons which taken together convince us that the Nike-Zeus development must be carried forward are 1 The system will be capable of providing some additional protection for hardened sites F o r t h i s use it i s obviously necessary to provide antennas and other components much harder than those presently planned 2 Active defenses appear to be the only means of achieving some protection for cities against attack by missiles Without challenging the over-riding importance of protection for the retaliatory force the Panel notes two circumstances in which protection for cities has value a The condition in which the Soviets have a superiority in missiles great enough that they can direct up to a few hundred but not as many as a thousand missiles at cities in addition to those cz f directed at our retaliatory forces In this case active defenses s e7 I would not contribute to preventing attack but could nonetheless save many lives b A situation in which offensive forces were limited byan agreement which i s politically and technically enforceable In this case it i s possible to consider bullding even an active defense system which could not be overwhelmed within the limits of agreedforces None of the above circumstaKce2 caribe %led out as possibilities for the future 3 The components being developed for the Nike-Zeus system could provide the radar intelligence required for a quite different intercept system if new ideas should occur Furthermore the only hope of solving the extremely difficult problems of ballistic missile interception i s to c ' I I -14work at them I n spite of our pessirnism we must admit the possibility of a new idea which could change our viewpoint completely This has certainly happened in the past I y n 3 r -r w a i l -1 SPECLFIC RECOMMENDATIONS A s a result of our study of the current status of the U S capability the Panel feels obligated to set anti-ICBM I down the following General I Recommendations 1 The pursuit of an aggressive program to exploit the tactics of dispersal hardening concealment through mobility and quick reaction I upon early warning as the basic anti-missile defense of the U S e I 8 ' C retaliatory force 2 The early initiation of well-designed program to observe Soviet re-entry bodies I Based upon our examination of the Nike-Zeus program we recommend I the following 1 Continuation of the present research and development program in an effort to get an experimental system into operation at the earliest possible date This experimental system should be sufficiently flexible to permit perfectionwithout substantial replacement 2 The expenditure of a modest s u m 150-200 million dollars if this sum is in f a c t r e q u i r e d f o r developmental production to retain the presently p r o g r a m e d development schedules 3 The initiation of a vigorous parallel research and development effort to achieve a a higher frequency capability f o r the acquisition radars b an effective means for system hardening and c an I -1 6effective system capability in the presence of advanced confusion techniques 4 Further theoretical investigation of the effects of the very-high- altitude detonation 100-1000 k m of high-yield greater than 1 MT ' nuclear devices on the Nike-Zeus system This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu