' TOP SECRET EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL COPY 'NO WASHINGTON 9 63 MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SUBmCT U S P o l i c y on Continental Defense REFERENCES A B C D E NSC Action No 1842-2 NSC 580211 NSC Action No 2151-f- 1 Memo f o r NSC fromEx m5iveSecretary _ subject Future NSC Agenda Items dated A p r i l 12 1960 NIE 11-8-m NIE 11-60 NIE11-7-60 g The enclosed Discussion Paper on the subject prepared by the NSC Planning Board is transmitted herewith for discussion by the National Security Council a t an e a r l y meeting JR JAMES 9 LAY Executive Secretary cc The Secretary o f theTreasury The Attorney General The Director Bureau o f the Budget TheChairman Atomic Energy Commission TheChairman Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence TheChairman Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference TheChairman Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security DISCUSSION PAPJ3R nn Table of Contents I Qwistions to Which the Paper is Addressed--------------- 1 B Defense Against BallisticMissiles------------------ 5 5 Early warning of ballistic missiles--------------- ' C Passivedefenseagainst Activedefenseagainst ballistic missiles-------ballistic missiles--------- Defense Against SatelliteSystems------------------- 6 7 7 DISCUSSION PAPER on CONTTEJENTALDEFENSE Note 1 I QUESTIONS TO WHICH THE PAPER I S ADDRESSED 1 The advent o f a b a l l i s t i c missile era and o f msjor Soviet capabilities t o attack the United States with b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s dictates areassessment o f our continental defense policy I n the face of the increasing Soviet ballistic missile threat and the absence systems of foreseeable effective anti-ballistic nlissile Question 1 Should U S policy giveincreased emphasis t o passive our as compared with active measures for the protection of retaliatory capability against ballistic missile attack Moreover if increased emphasis should be given t o passive measures what factors should be considered i n determining those passive reasures that would be most effective i n the over-all continental defense effort Question 2 Should o w air defense e f f o r t be reoriented so that following an i n i t i a l ballistic missile attack it would retain a capability to cope w i t h follow-on mannedbombersand nonballistic missiles Question 3 Should theUnited States revise i t s plans for survival o f the military decision-making capability and i t s doctrine on response t o a t t a c k andon response t o warning of attack i n the l i g h t o f decreased reaction time and i n view of increasing U s emphasis on r e t a l i a t o r y b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e forces Note 1 The scope o f this paper i s that o f NSC 5802 1 This staterrent on 'continentaldefense' does not encompass a l l elements o f U 5 or allied strength contributing to the defense o f North America but i s limitedas follows a only those U S policiesare included which are essentially defensyve i n nature i e which contribute directly to the defense o f the NorthAmerican Continent and t o the protection o f that element o f our retaliatory capability based on the North American Continent paragraph 1 -ICY - 1 - TOP Sl2CRW I Question 4 Should substantially increased emphasis now be given t o protecting our population against fallout Question 5 Are existing policies that provide for the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government i n need of review Question 6 Is there a clear need for vigorous research and development e f f o r t s t o achieve a c a p a b i l i t y t o destroy orbiting s a t e l l i t e s and space vehicles 11 SOVIET CAPAEZLITIES 2 The NIE notes that Soviet delivery systems for attack on the continental United States are changing importantly i n character and it impliesthefollowingperiods Note 1 a The period i s drawing t o anend when the primary element i s mannedbombers over one hundred unrefueled BEAR'S and refueled BISON'S possibly supplementedby refueled or one-waymedium BADGER'S and by sow shortrange submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s i n e threat to the United States -- b The period of the e a r l y 1960's will represent a gradual trangition from a l a r g e l y bomber t h r e a t t o one mainly composed of ICBM's By the end o f 1960 the estimated Soviet ICBM force will constitute a grave threat t o the principal U S metropolitan meas By 1961 it will present an extremely dangerous threat t o SAC bomber bases unhardened ICBM s i t e s and conrmand installations c I n a few years then the princ ipal element o f the threat t o tEe United States will be ICBM's supplemented by 100 BISON heavy bombers and possibly some refueled or one-waymedium bombers increased numbers of submarine-launched b a l l i s t i c missiles and possibly by cruise type missiles 3 C r i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the changing threat are - 2 - TOP SECRET TOP sEcm a A maxirmun t o t a l t r a v e l time o f about 30 minutes from launzh o f ICl N'scompared t o mny hours for mannedbombers the above time for an average 5500 n m range Also the i n a b i l i t y t o r e c a l l ICBM's once launched b An I C E 4 accuracy and yield presently adequate t o dest y unhardened installations with one or a very few missiles Thenumber of missiles required t o destroy hardened targets WiU be reduced substantially over the coming period as accuracy y i e l d and r e l i a b i l i t y are improved Note 1 c The development of improved ICBM's with a s o l i d or storgble liquid propellant and a l l - i n e r t i a l guidance by 1965 also during the 1965-1970 period there i s expected t o be refinement of guidancesystems improved warheadsanddecoys and possibly drastically reduced radar r e f l e c t i o n which might permit avoidance of detection even i n the Ballistic Missile Early WarningSystem BMEWS beam Note 2 4 There are additional technological possibilities S o v i e t s m y pursue including a High v e l o c i t y f l a t t r a j e c t o r y under the planned cover of EbEb7S which the ICBM's v i t h t r a j e c t o r i e s b Advanced supersonic and l a t e r hypersoniccruise or g l i d e vehi s manned or unnlanned for possible weapons delivery including air-to-surface missiles of increased range speed and accuracy as well asreconnaissance Note 3 c ICBM's launched from unexpected locations or following e g ICBM's t r a v e l l i n g from uneGected directions of flight the USSR around the South polar region thereby avoiding the three presently-planned BMEWS radars d S a t e l l i t e based weapons systems f o r use a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c missTles and other targets as well as for reconnaissance commUnications andjamming Note 4 Note 1 In the case ofthe best 1 January 1960 Sovietmissile MJ warhead 3 n m CEP and 75 percent r e l i a b i l i t y 33 missiles would required t o g i v e a 90 percent assurance of exceeding 100 p s i a t the target I n the case of the best mid-1963 Soviet missile WT warhead 1 5 n m CEP aqd 80 percent r e l i a b i l i t y 8 misailerwould be required I n the caseofa possible 1965-1970 missile with a warhead 1 0 n m CEP and 75 t o 85 t z r c e n t r e l i a b i l i t y only 4 m i s s i l e s would be required See M E 11-8-@ and NE 11-2-59 Data for the blanks are beingfurnished Note 2 by a separate vk morandum See paragraphs 28-29 NIE 11-60 12 A p r i l 1960 See paragraphs7 38-40 and 44 of NIE 11-60 Note 3 Note 4 See paragraphs 32-35 rmE U-60 - 3 - TOP SECRET A Defense Against MannedBombersand Aerodynamic Missiles 5 I n the era i n which the dominant threat was that of mass Soviet bomber attack s u f f i c i e n t warning of a mass bomber attack was considered achievable t o permit the launching o f a significant portion of our strategic bomber force before it could be Sestroyed on the ground The several hours available were sufficient for alerting the m i l i t a r y forces for the evaluation and decision-making process bykey o f f i c i a l s and f o r transmission of the necessary communications I n addition evacuation and relocation could reasonably provide continuity of governmentand contribute to protection o f the c i v i l population 6 Reasonably r e l i a b l e e a r l y warning combined w i t h limited bomber speeds made it possible to plan a continental defense i n depth on the assumption that greater attrition could be e f f e c t e d by employing a series of active defense elements i n succession against an i n i t i a l massbomber attack Predominantemphasis was placed on active defense measures Note 1 t o provide the protection of our counter-offense forces and ow c i v i l i a n population I n i t i a l e a r l y warning permitted preparations t o be made t o launch the counter-offense forces area coverage was provided by interceptor aircraft and a point defense of potential targets was achieved using shorter range su3face-to-air missiles 7 An integral part of protectionof the SAC retaliatoryforces i n this era has been the Positive Control Doctrine that permitted the launching o f ourbombers even on receipt of equivocal warning A t a l a t e r time the bombers either receive a go ahead signal or they must return t o base The a b i l i t y t o r e c a l l a r e t a l i a t o r y f o r c e t o i t s base is r e f e r r e d t o throughout t h i s paper as the recallable oharacteristic There i s every reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s t a c t i c can be employed i n such a way as t o provide a high l e v e l o f confidence that SOB portion o f the bomber force can avoid destruction on the ground 8 The t a c t i c a l warning system hasweaknesses particularly the lower detection probabilities at very low and very high altitudes and the p o s s i b i l i t y of end runs as for example by small numbers of a i r c r a f t on oneway missions Note 1 I n accordance with accepted practice t h e term active defense i s used in reference t o those measures that involve an attempt t o physically incapacitate or destroy a threatening objective e g interceptor aircraft surface-to-air missiles anti-missile missile systems The term passive defense embraces a l l other means of defense e @ warning and response t o warning including the launch of recallable aircraft dispersal mobility hardening - 9 The logical extension of the means of defense against manned bombers including long-range manned interceptors and interceptor missiles could extend the coverage beyond the continental limits of the United States However because of the changing nature of the threat the once-planned prograins t o provide for rrajor growth and extension of t h e defenses against this threat have been largely discontinued or Cut back These includedthelong-rangeinterceptor F-108 thereplacement AEW aircraft the Canadian CF-105 the full continental coverage of SAGE the Super Combat Center Program Bomarc-BandNIKE-HERCULES B Defense Against B a l l i s t i c M i s s i l e s 10 The three general aspects of defense against ballistic missiles namely e a r l y warning active and passive measures are somewhat ' analogous t o those of defenseagainst mannedbombers However the means of accomplishment and the projected performance are vastly different Early warning of b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s 11 It i s expected that the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System BMEWS will provide some warning c a p a b i l i t y i n September 1960 when S i t e No 1 i s scheduled t o become operational This capabiLity will be increased i n June 1961 when S i t e No 2 i s scheduled t o become operational This system i s planned for completion i n 19 963 and should then be capable of providing some 15 minutes of warning against a large-scale missile attack arriving over great circle trajectories from Soviet areas The portion of the SAC bomber force that is malntained on a 15-minute ground alert basis can because of inherent recallable characteristics be launched i n response t o BMEWS warning or such other warning as may become available 12 An additional means now i n the research and development stage showing promise of supplementing or extending BMEWS warning i s the satellite-borne infrared detection system MIDAS Other p o s s i b i l i t i e s include aircraft-borne infrared detectors and over-the-horizon radars Note 1 - hote 1 MIDAS i s expected t o sense the launching o f large boosters anywhere i n the world with an average warning time of about 25 minutes An 1963 To date there operational system might be achieved as early as has been no successful system f e a s i b i l i t y t r i a l Infrared detectors carried in very high altitude aircraft patrolling the Soviet perimeter could detect launches from a substaatial area of Russia and China with an i n i t i a l d e t e c t i o n of about 25 minutes before impact on U S targets A number of over-the-horiion radar techniques have beerr proposed or are under study One of these TEPEE w i l l Undergo f u l l - s c a l e f e a s i b i l i t y trials this year The concept is a t t r a c t i v e because of anticipated low cost ease of installations and possible early a v a i l a b i l i t y if the technique proves f e a s i b l e - 5 - TOP SECRET ____ TOPSECIaT 13 A Bomb Alarm system i s currently being installed to provide n o t i f i c a t i o n of actual nuclear explosions occurring i n the' v i c i n i t y of retaliatory force bases Successful operation o f t h i s systemwould make it possible t o launch alert forces from surviving bases if the dispersion interval between i n i t i a l impacting missiles and those for the other bases i s s u f f i c i e n t Passive defense against ballistic missiles 14 While elements of the SAC a l e r t bomber force could be airborne or could be launched on receipt of e a r l y warning because they are are irrecallable It i s questionable recallable ballistic missiles whether U S response doctrine will permit the launch of irrecallable b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s s o l e l y on the basis of information received from a warning system There are however a number of passive measures that can be employed t o p r o t e c t t h e U S retaliatory missile forces e dispersal mobility shelter or hardening and concealment 15 Dispersal By physicallydispersing our retaliatory weapons a t a large number of s i t e s each remote from the other it may be possible t o confront a potential attacker with a s i t u a t i o n i n which he does not possess a s u f f i c i e n t number of attacking weapons to permit him t o calculate with high confidence his a b i l i t y t o destroy a l l such installations before an unacceptably large number o f weapons are launched i n r e t a l i a t i o n The r e l a t i v e advantages of dispersal can be calculated on the basis of reasonable estinlates o f t h e enenly's strike capability 16 The present distribution of SAC bomber bases wasmade to achieve dispersal in the era of threat of mannedbomber attack The number i s so small as t o provide protection by dispersal alone only i n the very e a r l y p a r t o f the e r a o f b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e t h r e a t Current plans c a l l for dispersal of a significant portion of the fixed U S missile installations 17 Mobility This technique combines the acvantages of dispersal with those that result from either continual or intermittent motion of t h e r e t a l i a t o r y weapons By such means it i s possible t o deny a potential aggressor the a b i l i t y t o p r e d i c t the physical location of a l l r e t a l i a t o r y weapons For example a limited capability t o mount an airborne a l e r t i n periods of international tensions i s being provided Polaris i s a mobile system and current plans c a l l for part of the Minuteman force to be rail-mobile 18 Hardening This concept involvesprovidingtheretaliatory weapon with a p r o t e c t i v e s h e l l i n ortler t o decrease i t s physical vulnerability A portion of the U S r e t a l i a t o r y missile force will be located i n hardened s i t e s There i s no hardening program for manned bombers It should be noted that the true hardness of a missile system - TOPSECRET I TOP SiiClW' i s l i m i t e d by the extent t o which existing types of communications can Hardening can also be used t o protect the c i v i l and military population from d i r e c t weapons e f f e c t s a s w e l l a s from radioactive fallout The r e l a t i v e c o s t s and effectiveness ofsuch measures have been extensivelystudied Note 1 The case for increased emphasis on f a l l o u t s h e l t e r is considered i n Question No 4 be hardened 19 Concealment It i s possible as in the case of the POLARIS submarine t o couple mobility with concealment and thereby decrease weapon vulnerability overthat achieved by mobility alone I n the case of MINVPEMAN i t may be possible to couple mobility and hardening with concealment I n general however it i s e x t r e m l y d i f f i c u l t t o conceal fixed military installations on the North American Continent Active defense against ballistic missiles 20 Nike-Zeus i s the m j o r active defense system a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c missiles now under research and development It i s t o be a terminal area intercept system i n t h a t i t must be physically located i n the target area in order to intercept a b a l l i s t i c missile i n i t s terminal phase The Nike-Zeus system would be soft 2-3 psi and it could be saturated by feasible attacks The system probably could be decoyed by r e l a t i v e l y simpletechniques The maximum radius o f coverage would be about 75 miles and this radius might be reduced t o about 15 miles i n the presence 09 reasonebly e f f e c t i v e decoys 21 A system test i s scheduled i n the Pacific i n 1962 If product i o n were begun now the earliest date on which an initial operational deploymnt could be achieved would be approximately 4 years The cost of an operational 6eployment o f 70 b a t t e r i e s a t 27 defense complexes by the end of I T 1968 would be about $9 b i l l i o n Noprogramhas been approved for the production of an operational Nike-Zeus 22 I n addition t o Nike-Zeus advanced research into techniques and components f o r a c t i v e a n t i - b a l l i e t i c m i s s i i e defense i s underway a t about $100 million a year primarily under Project Defender A t this time no operational system based on t h i s program appears feasible within the next 10 years barring unforeseen technological breaR throughs C Defense Against Satellite Systems 23 Currently the United States has a limited capability t o d e t e c t By f u l l y e x p l o i t i n g OUT s a t e l l i t e s t h a t pass over the United States IJote 1 Report t o the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs 1 July 1957 Memo for NSC A Federal Shelter Program f o r C i v i l Defense datedJuly 2 1957 Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange prepared for the National Security Council by the Stanford Research Institute 1 July 1958 Memo f o r NSC June27 1958 TOP SECRET TOP SSCRET existing and planned high-power radars it would be possible t o determine o r b i t s a t a l t i t u d e s up t o about 400 miles i n a lour-density environment within a week or so a f t e r launch 24 It appears f e a s i b l e t o d e v e l o p a system which would detect and determine the orbit within 12 hours after launch of a l l s a t e l l i t e s that pass over the United States with altitudes up t o 3 000 miles This system should have a reasonable traffic-handling capacity 25 Studies are underwayon t h e f e a s i b i l i t y of satellite inspection and destruction systems Research and development t o achieve a c0o r b i t a l c a p a b i l i t y appearspromising It appears that w i t h our present knowledge of bomb fragmentation and k i l l mechanism the development of a destruction capability for such a system poses no c r i t i c a l t e c h n i c a l problems IV DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS Question 1 Should U S policy give increased emphasis to passive as compared with active measures for the protection of our retaliatory capability a g a i n s t b a l l i s t i c missile attack Moreover i f increased emphasis should be given t o passive masures what factors should he considered in determining those passive rreasures that would be most e f f e c t i v e i n the over-all continental defense effort 26 As previously indicated athe United States w i l l not have an active anti-ballistic missile capability within the next 5 years and i n the 1965-1970 period the best that could be achieved would consist of a Nike-Zeus type system with minorimprovements Therefore for the next 5-10 years protection o f the land-basecl retaliatory forces against Soviet missile attack must depend on early warning and an appropriate response thereto coupled with such passive measures as will increase t h e a b i l i t y o f those forces t o survive or will increase the Soviet force requirements for launching an attack It should be noted that for the will not have assurance of obtaining next few years the United States early warning against ballistic missile attack T6% 27 vulnerability of SAC bombers t o b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a t t a c k might he decreased by dispersing these aircraft t o a number of existing a i r f i e l d s However t h i s advantage ha8 t o be weighed against costs and possible degradation of operational readiness resulting fromthe adverse e f f e c t s oncommandand control ground support maintenance andmanning Provision i s a l s o b e i n g made for a c a p a b i l i t y t o mountan airborne alert of a porCion o f the SAC bomber force i n periods of international tension The extent of and the benefits accruing from suchan airborne alert should however be weighed against i t s cost and against the adverse e f f e c t s on ground support maintenance and manning - 8 - TOP SF CRET TOP SECKET 28 The dispersal of retaliatory weapons canimpose unacceptably large force requirements on a potential attacker However i n considering particular dispersal programs account needs to be taken of t h e i r possible effects i n increasing wartime hazards t o the c i v i l population Dispersal of m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t t o c i v i l i a n a i r f i e l d s s e r v i n g l a r g e c i t i e s could for example result i n an increased l e v e l OS damage t o t h e c i v i l population and the industrial base if an agpessor chose to attack all these targets Similarly dispersal of missile basescould either increase or decrease the danger to the c i v i l population depending Upon theirlocation Therefore dispersedretaliatoryinstallations should be located as far as possible from centers of population 29 Hardening adds t o our deterrent posture since t o produce a g i v e n l e v e l of damage a l a r g e r number o f weapons must be employed against a hard t a r g e t than woula be required against a soft target Although it i s conceivable that hardening could r e s u l t i n an increased hazard t o t h e c i v i l population i n t h e v i c i n i t y of a hardened target under attack anenemy could with the same t o t a l number o f weapons required t o destroy a hard s i t e target a larger number of s o f t i n s t a l l ations and c i t i e s and the over-all damage to the c i v i l population might be s t i l l greater 30 Mobility of the retaliatory force would greatly complicate the hazard Lo problems of the aggressor without necessarily increasing the t h e c i v i l i a n population Mobility a t seamight have the advantage O f drawing f i r e against retaliatory forces away from Continental United States 31 An extensive study has been conducted by the Weapons System Evaluation Group i n the Department of Defense to ascertain the cost the conclusions of effectiveness o f the Nilce- us system Basedon t h i s study it would appear to be less costly and f a r more e f f e c t i v e t o increase the probability of survival o f U S retaliatory forces by aeploying additionel retaliatory missiles i n hardened s i t e s than t o attempt the protection of a lesser number of missiles with a Nike-Zeus anti-1CBT i system According t o t h i s study t h i s conclusion appears t o be v a l i d even if it i s assumed that there exists some as y e t undiscovered adequate decoy discrimination techniques The study further indicates that the disparity in cost effectiveness would be s t i l l greater i f the comparison were made between Nike-Zeus and the deployment o f additional mobile missile forces 32 Sn view o f this situation there i s a clear need t o r e v i s e that portion of e x i s t i n g p o l i c y f o r Continental Defense which places predominante Uj hasiS upon measures to improve our active defenses as compared with--but not t o the exclusion of--passive defense measures Such revision should not prejudice continuation o f those active defense measures that can o i e i f i c a n t l y contribute t o the protection of our e f f e c t i v e nuclear r e t a l i a t o r y power e g active elements of the a i r dfense system Moreover a vigorous research and developmentprogram - 9 - TOP SECRElC I directed toward achieving an effective active defense against ballistic missiles continues t o be required However since it is questionable whether any adequate AICBM system could be developed and deployed within the next LO years it seems imperative t h a t recognition be given i n p o l i c y t o the necessity for increased emphasis on passive measures for the protection of our retaliatory capability 33 It should be noted that the measures t o provide for passive defense of the retaliatory forces are interrelated with the characteri s t i c s of the various retaliato y weapons systems themselves Accordingly the vulnerabilities and response characteristics of retaliatory weapons should be considered among the other factors i n determination O f the mix of the retaliatory forces Question 2 Should our a i r defense e f f o r t be reoriented so that following an i n i t i a l b a l l i s t i c missile attack it would retain a capability to cope with follow-on mannedbombers and nonballistic missiles 34 The present a i r defense system would be of questionable value following a missile attack This results primarily from the fact that the present active elements o f t h e system are almost t o t a l l y dependent on the existence of a highly centralized system of close control The hardenins' ' of v i t a l elements of this control system i e the Super Combat Center Promam urould not provide a solution t o the problem of vulnerability The system could not be made operational until the United States i s well i n t o the missile era a t a time when the Soviets could be expected t o possess a large number o f ICBM's Evenassuming that the centers could be hardened there are practical limitations on achievable hardness for v i t a l communication links The soft data inputs i e the radars and the s o f t a i r defense weapons currently i n usewould also be seriously'degraded by a missile attack Finally an a i r defense system designed primarily for defense i n depth against an i n i t i a l mss bomber attack i s not equally suited t o a period Then the i n i t i a l attack would be by b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s I n the latter situat i o n t h e a i r defense system needs t o be designed prinlarily t o cope with follow-on bomber attack 35 It would therefore seem desirable to considermodification o f the existing air defense system i n such a way that even a f t e r absorbing substantisll damage from a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e attack s u f f i c i e n t capability would rewain t o deny the enemy unopposed access t o continental U 6 airspace If practicable over-all system vulnerability could be decreased by relocating those SAGE Direction Centers and interceptor squadrons that ere now l o c a t e d a t SAG bases Some frastion of the manned interceptors could be provided with improved radars and f i r e control equipment so that they could f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y a f t e r ground control ceased Lo e x i s t If the existing manual control capability were TOP SECFOIT TOP SECRTCT retained in standby status instead of being eliminated as SAGE Sectors become ouerative other manned interceptors could be employed f o r a i r defense i f t e r S A centers were destroyed 36 This discussion suggests the need for a reexamination of present a i r defense concepts t o take into account the necessity for retaining a capability t o cope with follow-on attacks by 'mannedbombers and non-ballistic missiles following an i n i t i a l b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e attack Question 3 Should the United S t a t e s r e v i s e i t s plans for survival of the military decision-mking capability and i t s doctrine on response to attack andon response t o warning of attack i n the light o f decreased reaction time and i n view of increasing U S emphasison retaliatory ballistic missile forces $ 37 The U retaliatory capabillty depends on i t s a b i l i t y to I n order t o p r o t e c t f u l l y survive until the decision to counterattack our a b i l i t y t o use the retaliatory capability Continental Defense plans and programs must ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and the means of communication of the decision t o the surviving retaliatory forces i n addition t o providing for the survival of an adequate number of the delivery vehicles 38 The existing capability to provide early warning of mass Ibomber attack appears t o be adequate Even though the probability of i n i t i a l mass bomber attack i s decreasing with time the United States must maintain t h i s e a r l y warning capability in a high state of operational effectiveness so long as the Soviets possess a significant longrange bomber force This tends to inhibit Soviet employrent of these weapons It should be realized however that our early warning system canbe avoided by a bomber attack of small scale The d e s i r a b i l i t y o f expending resources for improvemnt of the present system t o provide early warning against a small number of a i r c r a f t must be weighed against the relative probability o f suchan attack and against the effect of suchan attack on the over-all retaliatory capability of the United States 39 Thus i n the era of threat of mannedbomber attack without the b a l l i s t i c missile threat the a v a i l a b l e t a c t i c a l early warning provides adequate t i r o e f o r decision-making and launch of retaliatory forces Equivocal early warning could serve as the basis for launching the recallable SAC a l e r t f o r c e and for the i n i t i a t i o n of the attack K Defense and JCS consider that this in the Departlllent o f Defense - 11 - matter i s constantly under study TOP SECFUC J TOP SECXW decisionprocess Decision-making o f f i c i a l s could be alerted and placed in contact with one another either by assembly or by pre-arranged communications so t h a t i n i t i a l warning information and subsequent developments could be evaluated and a decision made i n tin t o permit positive strike instructions t o 50 out t o the SAC bomber forcealready on i t s way and out o f danger of destruction on i t s home bases B e n under conditions of eneq avoidance o f the early warning lines the t a c t i c a l warning interval provided by the contiguouszone and the combatzone elements and the travel times o f enemy a i r c r a f t in getting t o deep interior SAC bases appears sufficient t o permitthe saving of adequate bomber retaliatory forces and the decision-making process 40 The United States doesnot today possess a capability to However a capaobtainearly warning of a ballistic missile attack b i l i t y i s being achieved by a high priority program BMEWS as indicated I n Section 111-B It is evident therefore that 80m capa b i l i t y t o provide15-minute warning o f mass ICBM attack w i l l soon be available and that t h i s may l a t e r be extended t o as much as 25 mlnutes -- -- 41 Thus with the advent o f b a l l i s t i c missile threat the achievable total warning interval becomsseverely limited This limited warning time i s adequa-be t o permitlaunch of the recallable SAC a l e r t bombers thereby preventing 'cheir destruction on the sound It i s inadequate t o permit the decision to release aircraft and missiles to targets prior to the impact o f enemy missiles on the United States Therefore thedecision-makingprocess and the means for the cornmication of the decision t o the strike forces m u s t survivethe i n i t i a l missile onslaught 42 'Until such time as BMEWS canbeexpected t o provide a 15-minute warning interval of missile attack the limited initial Soviet ICBM capability might destroy the seat of government end an increasing The only indication of attack Would fraction o f the retaliatory forces The number o f SAC be provided by the planned bomb alarmsystem bombers on ground a l e r t saved under such conditions depends c r i t i c a l l y on currently unknown factors including the dispersion i n the arrival time o f the Soviet missiles the number of missiles actually arriving and their accuracy i n h i t t i n g particular targets 43 As our U S -based retaliatory capability becomes predominantly ICBM's we tend t o l o s e the benefit of the recallable feature of mnned a i r c r a f t It is o f course essential that the United States avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i r r e c a l l a b l e launching of strike forces based on the erroneousconclusion that an attack I s under way It appears questionable that BMEWS or any other warning systemcan produce such high confidenceearly warning as t o r e s u l t i n a U S decision to launch irrecauableretaliatorymissiles before bombs have detonated Therefore a r e l i a b l e bomb alarmsystem i s essential t o provide early positive information o f actual missile h i t s 8 - REPRODUCED A 1 THE NATIONAL ARCMVES TOP SZCIET 44 Nonetheless t a c t i c a l warning of attack canbe extremely important during the period when our SAC retaliatory forces consist l a r g e l y o f bombersand of fixed vulnerable missiles that require a significant count-dm period Although the planned BMEWS can provide valuable time for launching SAC bombersand for bringing these missiles t o an adequate state of readiness f o r f i r i n g t h i s warning will be of l i t t l e value unless bomberscan be l a u c h e d and missiles canbe f i r e d before they are themselves destroyed Currently CinCNORAD i s charged with the responsibility for evaluating a l l warning information i n order t o determine whether an attack i s underwayand for transmitting this infornlation t o Washington D C t o i n i t i a t e the decision-making process It i s questionable whe-Lher 15-25 minutes of warning tire will be adequate to a apprise the necessary o f f i c i a l s of the situation b permit a decision that sufficient evidence i s received that an attack has ac-tually occurred and c communicate a decision to undertake retaliatory strikes There i s no assurance a t present that following the detonation of the missiles in the initial attack there will r e m i n a capability t o authorize the use o f andemploy e f f e c t i v e l y those retaliatory weapons that may have survived 45 It appears that an a p r i o r i response doc-trine would increase the probability t h a t our sw-ivinc missiles could be launched and our manned bombers released t o target even though the i n i t i a l a t t a c k destroyed the seat o f goverment and other v i t a l l i d s s of the planned system f o r commandand control An a p r i o r i response doctrine might be one that permitted the launch of The surviving missiles by subordinate commanders i n the event more than a given number of the missile andbomber bases actually received hostile missile hits Technically the information that this had occurred could be provided by a bomb alarm system 11-6 On the other hand we should not rely exclusively on an a p r i o r i response doctrine that would permit decentralized decisions t o -attack the Soviet Union The range of possible circumstances o f outbreak of a thermonuclear war i s so large and complex that a l l possible important eventualities carnot be foreseen and provided for by doctrine We should preserve for ourselves if a t a l l possible the option of more than one retaliatory response For example if there i s reason t o believe that the Soviets have not spent t h e i r e n t i r e f o r c e i n the i n i t i a l attack--and they may not i n order t o be able to blackmail us--it i s believed by some that we Ray wish to have the option of altering our retaliatory attack or we may f i n d it t o our advant age t o hold our forces i n reserve t o use them'as a threat t o conclude the a r or t o deter follow-up attacks 47 It hasbecome increasingly evident that wemust achieve a survivable system o f commnd It is also recognized that a6 missile y i e l d and accuracy improve hardness alone cannot provide the desired l e v e l of survivability for the command posts A combination of hardness and achievable active missile defense m y prove more effective I n - 13 - TOP SECI T - I R E P R W C E DAT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES -I 1 2 _ DECLASSIFIED c u l l l r u x TOP SJ CIE'J connection wlth the problem of how we can most e f f e c t i v e l y Obtain a decision time adequate for t h e missile age it would be desirable-depending on the outcome o f currently-planned f i e l d t e s t s of Nike-Zeus-to consider the p o s s i b i l i t y o f employing a limited number of ATCBM weapons for point defense of two or three v i t a l centers of comn Wld 8 I n sum there i s need for a thorough study of capabilities plans andprograms t o ensure the survival of the decision-making machinery and of r e l i a b l e means of communication of the decision t o the surviving retaliatory forces on land a t sea and i n the air within the time dimensions of a surprise ballistic missile attack As an essential part o f t h i s stuOy attention should be given to the preparation of a response doctrine that i s not dependent on the survival of the seat of government and o t h e r v i t a l l i n k s of the planned system for cormnd and control Defense and JCS consicier tliat these mattersareconstantly study i n the Department of Defense - 1 4 - under TOP SECRET I 1 TOP SECRET Question 4 mouldsubstantiallyincreased emphasis now 'be given to protecting our population against f a l l o u t 49 Existing policy for the protection of the population against radioactive fallout i s stated in NSC Action No 18424 'phis action approves the concept of fallout shelter on the basig that improvements in active defenses can give reasonable promise together with fallout shelters of limiting estimated civilian casualties i n the event o f nuclear attack on the United States t o a l e v e l which will permit the United States t o survive as a nation and will i n no case be greater then a similar casualty ratio i n the USSR Since it appears that an e f f e c t i v e a c t i v e defense against b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a t tack cannot be expected within the next ten years Note See paragraphs 20-22 it seems advisable t o re-examine t h i s p o l i c y t o determine whether substantially increased emphasis should be given to fallout shelters 50 The extreme vulnerability of papulations t o f a l l o u t has been shown in various studies Note 1 Fallout shelters appear t o be far more e f f e c t i v e than any foreseeable anti-ICLPI system for protecting the - Note 1 WSEG Report No 45 includes a study of the e f f e c t of various enemy targeting doctrines attack levels and fallout shelters on the total resulting casualties in the United States based on present population patterns casualties from i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s such as disease of starvation geneticeffects etc areexcluded conclusions t h i s study follow Iy TAL YIELD IN MC ULTONS - 2000 5000 Millions of deaths A B C Weepons delivered uniformly a t random over the entire U S the results of such an attack resemble those for an attack with major emphasis on r e t a l i atory bases Without shelters With shelters 58 7 99 14 162 Weapons delivered in proportion population Without shelters With shelters 97 27 130 160 45 to the Targeting t o maximize pbpulation fatalities Without shelters With shelters 106 41 49 86 TOP SEcm gvpulation against the effects of a nuclear attack Note 1 Even if NXKE-ZEUS were made operational it would have a k i l l altitude as low as b O O O f e e t and a range of effectiveness as low as 15 miles Kill at such low altitudes especially if the high-yield eneqy warhead were ala0 t o detonate would severely damsge the exposed population and structures and the active defenses themselves Note 2 Activeprotection from b l a s t and other direct effects of nuclear attack would be of l i t t l e Overa l l advantage i f the persons saved from death by blast and f i r e were subsequently to die from f a l l o u t 51 Present policy calls for a low-key approach to shelter promtion but in the absence of increased emphasis by the Federal Government it appears unlikely that a comprehensive shelter system w i l l be completed i n the near future A recent survey by the House Cornittee on Governtuent Operations indicated that only 1 565 shelters had been b u i l t in the United States during the l a s t two yeaye This count is probably incomplete but the implications of the survey are not seriously questioned 52 Additional factors involved in this situation are exceedingly complex and d i f f i c u l t t o grapple with objectively because most Of them are based on considerations of public psychology both here and abroad In 1958 when the present concept WBS adopted it was deemed i m w m t that the concept be carried out without a creating public over-confidence in shelters or a public passive defense psychology b causing Congressional and public reactions prejudicial to higher priority national 8CcUrity programs c losing the support o f our a l l i e s o r causing them t o adopt neutralism o r a presenting the posture o f the United States as that of a nation preoccupied with preparations f o r war Note 1 The following estimates of deaths from WSEO Report No 45 india t e the relative efficacy of a perfect 75 n m anti-ICBM system and 8 fallout shelter program in protecting the population against the effects of nuclear attack i n which weapons arc delivered uniformly over the United States the results resemble those for an attack with m J o r emphasis on U 5 retaliatory bases TOTAL YIELD IN MEGATONS Millions of deaths - 2 m 5ooo No shelters 75 n m perfect AICBM Bhelters no AICBM A Department of the Army study show that for Soviet attacks o f warheads with no un8iscrFminsted decoys a $10 b i l l i o n NIKE-ZEUS progrm WOUM limit direot dame ge to 54 matropalitsn are- t o betvecn 16%and 26% Note 2 MP SEcm 53 Some believe that there was no clear determination i n 1958 as t o whether a more vigorous approach t o shelter-building would have these deleterious effects and there appears t o be no evidence whichwould place thematter beyond debate a t thepresenttime It i s clear however that the matter o f the national and international psychology i s important t o a resolution of t h i s issue andan attempt will therefore be made i n the following paragraphs t o clarify the alternative ways of looking a t the problem 54 Proponents o f a substantiallyincreased emphasis on fallout shelters regardprovision o f such shelters for the civilian populatidn as necessary both t o ensure the continuance o f a positive support f o r other national security programs and to deter the enemyfrom actions which might lead t o war The importance o f t h i s argument goes f a r beyond thequestionoffhlloutshelters It i s a questioninvolvingthenational psychology and our a b i l i t y and willingness t o r e a c t in a positive Way t o the tensions of the coming decade The lack of an effective c i v i l defense has so far not been a handicap in the conduct offoreign affairs This lack has at l e a s t in part been compensated f o r by the general feeling t h a t our deterrent capability was overwhelming and by the prospect that an active system o f b a l l i s t i c missile defense might eliminate the need f o r shelters The b a s i so f both compensating e f f e c t s appears t o be fading 55 Proponents believe a determined e f f o r t t o provide falloutprotect i o n as ameaningful and positive response to the threat would be interpreted as an indication o f the national will to see it through whereas any l e s s e f f o r t would receivetheoppositeinterpretation There has been some indication from NA'SO sources t h a t our A l l i e s would f o r t h a t reason welcome a decision by the United States t o build shelters Proponents f e e l that t h i s could be doneon other than a crash basis as an a c t o f hysteria and point out that shelter-building i n Europe hasnot resulted i n panic 56 Proponentsargue that the effect on a potential enemy o f a U S decision to place a substantially increased emphasis on fallout shelters i s also uncertain Assurance of the survival of a larger part of the U S civilian population might have essentially no e f f e c t on an enemy's calculations but there i s reaoon to believe t h a t it woultl since Soviet military planning provides f o r the contingency o f a protracted war following the i n i t i a l nuclear exchange Shelter for t h e papulation would greaty l enhance our a b i l i t y t o support a limited military effort after absorbing a nuclear attack and the e n e q might well believe t h a t t h i s would prevent him from achieving world domination 57 Deterrence implies a hoped-for state-of-mind on the part of a potential aggressor that results from-his estimate of our a b i l i t y t o ret a l i a t e e f f e c t i v e l y and our willingness t o do so Proponents believe tbat in theabsence o f e f f e c t i v e means t o protect the papulation our will t o r e t a l i a t e may besuspect As we move into a period i n which nuclearblackmail becomes a t l e a s t implicitly an Increasingly important factor i n international diplomicy one may question whether public Support TOP SECRET for t a k i n g of necessary risks in foreign policy will continue t o be as strong and constant unless measures f o r population protection are taken 58 Opponents o f a substantiallyincreased emphasis place a d i f f e r They f e e l t h a t subentinterpretation on the same factualsituation stantially increased emphasis on a s h e l t e r programaboveandbeyond the present low-keyapproach would be viewed outside the Executive Branch of the Government as a crash program and as i n d i c a t i v e o f a dramatic reassessment of the likelihood o f nuclear war They also believe that giving new emphasis t o a shelter p r o m would be inconsistent with the e f f o r t s t o achieve agreements with the Soviet Unionon arms control and a nuclear t e s t ban 59 Opponents contend t h a t t h e growing doubts among some o f our NATO a l l i e s as t o U 9 intentions might be intensified if the United States were t o launch what appeared t o be a crash program for the crea t i o n o f a comprehensive shelter system and t h a t our problems would be aggravated i n maintaining a friendly attitude among neutral nations in less-developedareas in the face o f Soviet charges of war-mongering They also believe t h a t i n i t i a t i o n o f a crash shelter program by the United States could well create fears in t h e Soviet Union t h a t the United States intended t o attack when the program was complete and might cause the USSR t o i n i t i a t e g e n e r a l war beforethe shelters could be b u i l t 60 Opponents believe t h a t the U 9 determination t o respond t o a Soviet nuclear attack or threat of attack rather t h m t o submitto Sov i e t blackmail would not be materially affected by the degree o f f a l l outprotectionavailable They contend t h a t since many millions of casualties would be expected even if shelters were a v a i h b l e t h e U S decision i n any given circumstances would be the same regardless of whether a comprehensive s h e l t e r system existed 61 Opponents o f shelter-building are convinced that if substant i a l l y increased emphasis were t o be given t o shelters t h e Executive Branch would be compelled t o make major changes in other national security policies Although recognizing t h a t it i s d i f f i c u l t t o f o r e t e l l the pressures which might result from an alarmed public opinion t h i s group feels that Congress could well be forced t o c u r t a i l sharply foreign economic assistance andprograms f o r increased contact with the USSR while a t the same time there would be accentuated demnd f o r major increase in other military programs thus further emphasizing t h e posture of a nation preoccupied with preparations f o r war 62 Those who believe t h a t a low-key approach should be retained contend that so long as even with shelters the probable number o f casualties would be i n the range estimated by current studies preponderant e f f o r t s should continue t o beconcentrated on deterring war They contend that whatever resources are available are better used f o r such purposes includingstrengtheningthe retaliatory capability protecting the r e t a l i a t o r y capability strengthening a l l i e d military capabilities ' _r rnP SECRET increasing limited war capabilities and employing non-military security measures such as economic and technical assistance exchange and information programs 63 Regardless of the resolutionof this question it appears the % consideration should be given to protecting selected military personnel and installations as part of the over-all defense of retaliatory capability discussedin Ouestion 1 and of the air defense capability discussed in Guestion 2 64 In addition there is a third group who feel that considerable increase in emphasis is possible within the essential concepts of the 580712 They believe that it is too early to policy laid down in NSC say on the basis of experience that the present policy will not result in significant shelter building Those who hold this third view point out that the policy approved by the President in 1958 contemplated appropriations of the order of $100 million spread over the first three years Actually Congressional action has reduced appropriations in Fiscal Year 1959 to $2 075 000 in 1960 to $5 474 000 and it appears that less than $5 million willbe available in1961--atotal for three years of only $12 million In addition Federal leadership has been lagging in many So has important areas--construction of shelters in new public buildings far been limited to a laboratory building of Bureau the of Standards in Boulder Colorado and thisms not specificallyapproved by Congress No start has yet been made on installation of fallout shelterin existing Federal buildings and the military has not installed fallout shelters in either base construction or Military Dependents' Housing I 65 Those who support the third position calling for more vigorous prosecution of present policy note that editorial and public reaction has been generally favorable A recent Gallup poll indicated that 38 percent of the population be would willing to build fallout shelters costing up to many letters $500 at their own expense This and the being receivedby OCDM and state and local civil defense offices indicate the possibility that the program may be catching on A concerted effort to obtain Congressional backing for appropriationsof support the order originally contemplated is needed before the conclusion can be reached that the policy currently in effect is inadequate There is room for much more Federal example and much more public information effort before there is any slight danger of violating the injunction of low key current policy guidance TOP SECmT Westion 5 Are existing policies that provide for the continuity of essential wartime functions of the Federal Government i n need of review 66 Present concepts t o assure the operational capability of the Federal Government i n the event of attack involve three essential elements a Hardened dispersedcontrolcenterswith communications O f t h z 17 emergency control centers in t h e relocation arc only t h r e e o f f e r any special protection against blast or radioactive f a l l o u t As a consequence nearly a l l c i v i l i a n agenciesplan t o concentrate selected staffs at the OCDM relocation site which i n net e f f e c t c r e a t e s a lucrative target near Washington D C Even i f a l l o f the f a c i l i t i e s were fully protected and operational as planned it would s t i l l be possible for a large part o f the existing Federal Government t o be destroyed in an i n i t i a l m i s s i l e a t t a c k b Relocation of senior o f f i c i a l s Planning f o r therelocation o f c i % l and m i l i t a w - elements of the Federal Government continues t o assume a degree o f warning time more appropriate t o the manned-bomber Under the Joint Emergency Evacuation era than t o the missile age Plan about 50 of t h e t o p c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s c o u l d be a i r l i f t e d t o emergency sites within 40 minutes a f t e r a l e r t But several hours c f e f f e c t i v e warning would be required for evacuation o f thousands o f subordinate o f f i c i a l s with emergency assignments There i s a l s o the assumption t h a t c i v i l i a n employees will leave their families upon warning o f enemy attack and r e p a i r t o t h e i r designated relocation sites c The cadreconcept The i n a b i l i t y o f s e n i o r o f f i c i a l s to surviye an attack on the Seat o f Government might place the Federal problems f o r the conduct o f the war and post-attack survival i n the hands o f a small number of employees of limited high-level executive or appointive authority and unknown experience lacking in electoral t o the public-at-large 67 There i s now a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a situation could arise in which the responsibility for making decisions would be i n doubt f o r an indefin i t e time While t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s it should by nomeans be regarded as a certainty which renders useless present arrangements There i s always t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of strategic warning But evenwithout strat e g i c warning a large part of b o t h t h e ' c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s would be capable o f r e a c t i n g i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n a deteriorating sitUatiOn under pre-arranged succession plans within limited fields of competence 68 It i s noted that there i s no clear agreement as t o the decisions that would be required o f p o l i c y - m k i n g o f f i c i a l s of the Federal Government during the attack and survival period 69 Presentplanning for the continuity of theessentialfunctions of the Government should be restudied i n r e l a t i o n t o a the reduced time available for the implementation of such plans b theunlikelihood of the survival o f many key Government o f f i c i a l s and c thedisruption o f communications and the widespread destruction immediately following the attack I n t h i s connection among the possibilities that would need t o be studied are Strengtheningthecadre t o include more high-level officials increaaing the number of haraened dispersal sites beyond the number planned use o f airborne and seaborne command posts greater prearrangement f o r emergency delegation of authority greater decentralixation o f Government functions greater dispersal of high-level officials and t h e i r s t a f f s an enlarged Presidential succession roster better shelter protection in Washington for the President and Vice President providing hardened facilities w i t h i n present headquarters buildingb and a concept o f in-place operations and greater emphasis on the alternate headquartersconcept Westion 6 Is there a c l e a r need for vigorousresearch and develorpnent e f f o r t s t o achieve a capability to destroy orbiting s a t e l l i t e s and spice vehicles 70 Present policy provides f o r a vigorous research and developent program i n supwrt o f continental defense and specifies a number of areas of particular imprtance including defense a g a i n s t s a t e n i t e s and space vehicles NSC 5802 1 psragraph 12 71 Since satellite-based bombing eystems would probably be less accurate less reliable and more costly and vulnerable thanland-based ballistic missiles it i S questionable ether the current threat of spacebased military systems warrants U S emphasis on aefensive measures This seems clear even though a possible advantage t o t h e USSR would accrue from the psychological effects and the resulting blackmail potential a specs-basedthreat might have on the Unite6 States and i t s allies Moreover it i s questionable whether U 5 a c t i v i t y i n this field especially of demonstration of a k i l l capability would be consistent with U S policy and proposals for the peaceful uses of outer space 72 On theother hand we must anticipte a marked increase i n the exploitation of space f o r m i l i t a r y purposes The United States for example i s alreadyproceeding with plans t o o r b i t s a t e l l i t e s for reconnaisaancc navigation early warning and communications While U S S ' e f f o r t s t o achieve spice-based systems will probably dependmoreupon t h e i r view of Soviet requirements than on limitation of capability theSoviets have a technical capability t o implement similar plans In the very near future merefore it appears desirable t h a t the United States continueresearch and developnent e f f o r t s i n order t o achieve a thorough technical backgroundand a defensive capebillty in the event the USSR achieves an offensivecapability explore 73 A t the presenttime research snd d e v e l o p e n t i s underway t o the feasibility o f obtaining a co-orbital capability i e placing a satellite i n close proximity to and i n the same o r b i t with an e x i s t i n g s a t e l l i t e Such a capability would permit the passive inspection e g close-up visual observation and survey with special detectors of suspicious s a t e l l i t e s Such a capability would a l s o permit the destruction or disabling of errant U S s a t e l l i t e s as f o r example one which i s inadvertently jamming important radio frequency bands 'be developent o f a co-orbital capability appears promising and desirable With present knowledge o f fragmentation ana k i l l mechanism techniques it appears that the developent of a destruction capability for such a system poses no c r i t i c a l t e c h n i c a l problems 74 Therefore while it amears desirable to pursue research and d e v e l o p e n t e f f o r t s i n t h i s area it i s agreed that it wouldbeunwise t o undertake a t e s t o f such a system without s p e c i f i c P r e s i d e n t i a l a p proval Ire 'Y EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION FOPJ@XLY RESTRICTED DATA WASHINGTON MENORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SU TECT U S Policy on Continental Defense REFERENCE Memo for NSC frem ExecutiveSecretary same subject dated July 14 1960 The following Note 1 t o paragraph 3-b on p g e 3 o f the Discussion Paper transmitted by the reference mem andum with the blanks f i l l e d in i s transmitted for use i n connection w i t h Council consideration of the Discussion Paper Note 1 In the case o f the best 1 January1960 Soviet missile 8 MT warhead 3 n m CEP and 75 p e r c e n t r e l i a b i l i t y 33 missiles would be required t o give a 90 percent assurance of exceeding 100 p s i a t the target In the case of t h e best mid-1963 Soviet missile 10 MT warhead 1 5 n m CEP and 80 p e r c e n t r e l i a b i l i t y 8 missiles would be required I n t h e case of a possible 1965-1970 missile with a 10 MT warhead 1 0 n m CEP and 75 t o 85 percent reliability only 4 missiles would be required See NIE 11-8- 9and NIE 11-2-59 l c cc The Secretary of the Treasury The Attorney General The Director Bureau o f the Budget The Chairman Atomic Energy Commission TheChairman Joint Chiefs of S t a f f The Director of Central Intelligence TheChairman Interdepartmental 1 - 1 _ 7 n_ _m _I_-__ This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu