The Secretary requested my commentson the program change on MIDAS MY comments which I forwarded to the Secretary are attached 'R '' - H E A D Q U A R T E A I RF O R C ES Y S T E M SC O M M A N D R UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE WASHINGTON 25 D C REPLY ro 1 3 AUG Change 4 4 040 on MIDAS 239A To Honorable Eugene M Zuckert Secretary of the A i r Foqr e Washington 25 D C ix CLS -baa- -npta -- Dear Mr Secretary I Secretary McNamara's Program Change Guidance of 6 August 1962 on the MIDAS Program has been carefully analyzed I a m of course ' deeply concerned about the impact that this course o f action w i l l have on the MIDAS Program However I feel an even greater concern about the broad implications with regard to our defense philosophy ' Therefore I a m including my tboughts on both aspects in the hope that they will be of aseistanee In further direuseions with the Secretary ' 'i ' 2 Of major concern is thesentencethatstatesthatearly warning ' r becomes less and less important'as time g0e s by This approach ' seriously limits the flexibility with which national strategy can be established and militaryforces utilized It fails to recognizethe deterrent value associated with unequivocal warning which i s not attain-' able with radar type warning alone It alsogives no value to added - warning associated with protection of the civilianpopulace 6 I- i 3 I realize that the guidance goes on to say that the achievement of a technological capability for detection of missile and satellite launchings is desirable and suggests a research and development program to achieve this end However the objective of timely translation of this technology to a useful operational capability is lacking Unless this technological effort can be oriented with this objective in mind thetime when such technology could produce a useful capability w i l l always remain in the distant and indefinite future ' - 4 With these thoughts in mind I strongly believe that maximtfm warning i s still a valid national objective On t h i s basis the balance' ' I ' of this letter is specifically addressed to the place of MIDAS in achieving that objective 5 From its inception the MIDAS Development Program has been based on f i r s t demonstrating the feasibility o f detecting ballistic missiles by orbiting infrared sensors then demonstrating that a practical and usefulsystem c o d d be evolved Thebasicdesign parameters for the infrgred sensors were chosen with extreme care and conservatism after several years of experiment and study Since thattime measurements have shown conclusivelythatinfrared radiation from ATLAS and TITAN I LOX-RP propellants missiles' exceeds by at least a factor of ten the basic de'sign sensitivity of the MIDAS sensors Radiation from TITAN 11 missiles using storable fuelsexceeds MIDAS sensitivity by a factor of three or more ' 6 Much has been said and much written to the effect that high altitude sunlit clouds and some particular cloud formations could result in background clutter which could obscure o r simulate actual missile tracks Most judgments of this nature have been based on theoretical extrapolations of limited data gathered by U-2 aircraft Much actual data has now been gathered in orbit by DISCOVERER and MIDAS flights These data show that very little background clutter exists under r e a l conditions except perhaps for a very small area in the direct azimuth of the sun No background clutter whatsoever has been found in the data collected from the lastMIDAS flight 7 I believe that DOD is now in complete agreement with us that the MIDAS system is feasible'and that the simplified MIDAS approach proposed will result in an acceptable reliability Interest has now turned to the requirement for this systemwhich had previously not been questioned 8 The need for a MIDAS-type system is based upon unique capabilities which complement radar early warning systems adding a great measure of confidence and credence to the total early warning picture MIDAS yields additional warning time to that offered by radar defense nets It employs an a r e a of technology quite apart from radar techniques and functions from'a different location and in a different way thus significant cal complicating an enemy's means to achieve surprise Further WDAS uniquely reveal with surety the geographic loCation from which a raid is launched ' This feature is definitely valuable in deciding which potential' enemycountrycommitted the aggressive act o what specificenemy ' j - I I i _ i 2 ' 62-103041 A _ _ facility i s still a threat Finally MIDAS lends itself uniquely to specialized surveillance of fluid situations such as limited warfare not only to detect missileslaunched f r o m within the zone of hostilities but also missiles launched from without into such zones 9 I believe that it should be made eminently clear that radar i s not an alternative to MIDAS in either an operational or technical sense Regardless of the threat that i s postulated through the 1968 to 1970 period MIDAS clearly c5mplements any existing or proposed radar system that i s accepted as being technically feasible This i s true even ifthe deficiencies and limitations of the present BMEWS are eliminated A s you know these deficiencies include gaps against the detection of low angle ballistic missiles inability to detect extremely high angle ballistic missilesand inability to detect missiles arriving from other than a northerly direction because of fixed location and orientation TXe cost of various radar approaches to early warning against ICBM's SLBM's and ERBM's were included in my letter to General LeMay of 23 March 1962 which resulted from our analysis ' of a memorandum from Mr Gilpatric to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in February of 1962 on early warning requirements 10 The flexibility inherent in the coverage afforded by MIDAS is an important consideration here If the launch area of a potential enemy changes fixed radars such as BMEWS lose their effectiveness MIDAS will have the capability of detectinglaunches of liquid fuel missiles from any geographical area and with technical improvement could extendthat detection to solid fueled missiles launched f r o m subs ships or land ' 11 For these reasons I strongly recommend that Secretary McNamara be urged to reconsiderthe approach he has outlined and to withhold his decision until significant actionsnow underway can be considered These include the study of early warning requirements within the Air Staff which I understand i s scheduled f o r completion on 15 August and review later thismonth of the revised MIDAS development plans in response to the most recent guidance ' This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu