9 2 Wu MEMGRANDUM FOR SUBJECT 5ir Force Proposed Changes to the Tentative _F or6e Gu1dance - II 6 This memorandum refers to my June 18 1964 memOrand6m this subject General LeMay comm nts are attaChed The Air Forte proposal regarding the AMSA including studies and program change proposals will be handled Ithrough separate correspondence 33 There are three areas in yohr Tentative Force Guidance 1 which I believe deserve- Specific comment They concernitheI' Strateg1c Retaliatory F6rces the Continental Air De_fense Forces and the Airlift Forces g Although we believe that a larger force may be Just1f1ed in the Generai Purp6se Forces we areI not making a rec1ama at this t1me _ UndeIr the present program ther will be opportunity to 33 1 to_ the force _ should our additional studies- further indicate' the des1rab111ty of doing sbi We also are king studies which may r s6lt in recommendations for a ifferent x of tact1oa1 fighters 1 5 including the addition of less expensive ana less complex 51 I aircraft f6r missions s6ch as close sopport under Spec1a112ed circumstances 8 03 - -- With -respect to the Strategic Retaliatory Forces 1' believe that a 1200 M1nuteman force represents -a sen51b1e I minimum None the studies that I have rev1ewed have Iconvinced e that we- should reduce o6r position below thm- figure The prov181on of one on Iaunch reliable M1nuteman 4 missile for each time urgent target till seems to be 1 rational basis Ifor sizing the force from the standpoint 6f I bo th assured destruct1on and damage Iimitation I As shown ' jm in the attachment the current requi rement for known times Iurgent targ ets is 100Q M1nuteman missiles Any growth in the number of targets and the minimum addition forI contin- gencies wo61d -reqnire a greater n mber than 1200 Minuteman I miSsiles in 1970 We s6pport yo6r objective 6If a balanced 1 - 3 10me16 16' 3131111166661sz - 13166 '12 211mg hn 7n rand nn It damage however the clougy Euture Iof the _ 511 fallout shelter program a d the uncertainty regarding jNike X tend to e' has1ze the r61e of the Minuteman Until Tithese uneertainties can be resolved it would appear prudent t6 place morep not 1655 reliance 6n the damage limiting _ vvalue 6f the Hinu emanl- I doub t' that additional studies _ --haSed onI currently known fa6 ts wil1 give us better answers f 'for the requirements In my opinion We sh6uId add an -I I meat per attachment to our present 1000 m1531les there- fore 1200 Minuteman misalles woul1 become our currently -p1anned toItal This will permit us to review the intelli- gence next year_ andI make new decisions without loss 9 f continuity of Minuteman installation'With res_pect to the continenta1 Airr Defense Forces 1 thi k We Should continue with the program in the manner proposed in my memorandum of July 27 1963 At that time t'2 I agreed with You that it was premature to set any numerical level for a newI interceptor force but I was convinoed- that gwe shOuld preserve a real option to go_ 'into production shOu 1d there be indications that Ehe Russians were making serious 1 336 eonrts to deploy a manned bomber force with supersonic 1 I5- 3 fcapability or with advance air to-surface missiles While a the fact that the number oE Blinders in the Russian inventory I 'nar'is greater Ehan we had estimated is not in itself conclusive it does convinCe me of the need to continue affirmative efforts in Ithe direction of being able to deploy an interceptor force' capable of coping with an- improved and enlarged bomber threat ' il i - Since uw'specific prOposaI-s tO meet this need- -involve details yin the special projects area I am formarding them as aI sep ' 2 f arate memorandum from this paper Further even a bug 6f 6 limited number of 'heSe ew interce'tors will rov 7e a I a 'meaningful increment of operational capability for deploy- ment either here or abroad In addition we would sequire a capability to internept inspect and identify high altitude 5 _high performance aircraft such as high altitude reconnaissance aiIrcr aft and supersonic transports I also recommend that you revise your intenti6n to Jki phaSe down our present interceptor force as Sharply as you - nemesis-so 11' 3 YEAR Imprints DECLAS-SIFIHD miss 12-16135 non Inn 5299 I19 - propose Although the force I15 adm1ttedly far from an 2 EideaI one and is of d1m1n1sh1ng value nonetheless it does 1 offer Some degree o f effeot1veness in the 1ight of the i w zpresent Russ1an bomber threat - I Because of the relatlvely small cost as theeattaoh - A i 1ments sEow it Would Seem to me to leave the 1nterceptor force -at the present 1eveI pending dec131ons on the larger questlons Defense 1 With respect to the Air Transport Force I believe #studies adrrently in progress W111 Show clearly the advan 5tages Qf 1nc1ud1ng the which have2 already been indi 2cated by prel1m1narv stud1es Not only will this aircraft 1 - provide us the necessary outsize cargo capability _ -but 1 gequel or greater 1mportance it will provide us a h1gher 1 degree of cost-effectrveness than any other transport For these reasons I believe that your proposed Option is Ifg the that we should adopIt T Attachments of Defense 1 - gI up 5P9 emu-12 mas A-KZIJ- - -14 eg_ -Ir- 1 Some fundamental changes toI tIhe philosophy and Tohces contained Iin the4 I Tentative Force Guidance Iare considered essential for t-he continued' military effect1Veness of U3 strategic forces Determine Ii6n 6T the t6tal MlQUDeman T6rces must he _hased Ion a range 61 parameuers _where a change in any one will affect the and requirement one considers ion cited in the Tentaiive Force Guidance that I certainiy support is 'th-e needI for a balanced damage limiting program e oITTense 93 -air missil zde1ense and fallout shelters However as noted in Irecent studies 99 6 the eerctiveness of Ia terminal missale deiense_1s_dependent on the oTTehse 1 While the effectiveness of the offense isI much less dependent onrte terminal missile defense - Thus imQroving the Capability'of the Minuteman for eaneed not be delayo d -until decisions are made on the-terminal missile defensIe sQEteneill h Other major con51dernt16ns are damage empe6uancy criQeria size and Coonsition of the target system t6 be attacked'by missiles and the errational concth 'ge Tor reprogramm1ng m1851les for known failures - The operational concept ef reprogramming missiles Ikhown failures is critical to the total forces required - Considering the eight stIored targets caQaciQy of the Minuteman and survivability of communications it is not considered IQracti al or possible to reQrOgram throughoht the entire force I Assigning six targets to each' flight of lo miIssiles and assuming a reprogram I mahle reliability of 70 will provide a highI assurance thatI sufficient 3-- missiles will be available Tor each flight to c6ver its target In addition 21' it can be expected 12% of the force will be available TorI reServe or the 'assured destruction requirements This rationale provides Tor a reprogramm1ng Tactor of l 67 inventory'm1531les Tor each on-launch reliable missile assigned 1 j a war plan aiming point The median target list used in the OSD draTt memorandum 10r uhe President dated 6 December 1963 contained 80 bomber staging bases 130wtact16al haSes II th a nuclear capability 3S baseIs and #5 offensive controls When confirmed missile Sites Qlus reported starts are added to these I the known time urgent total is around 600 590 Uinng a reprogramming factor Wt of l 67 as developed in the Qreceding Qaragraphtand assigning one on launch reliable missile per aim point the current reouirement far known tim urgenV 7 '-targets is missiles Prudence requiresI that 60- 8O targets he added to thIe Ilist Tor- uhkno ns and pos-sible SIoviet missile deployments This iner ases the reouiremenQ to some 1100 Minuteman Based on BI% estimat es - the ngiets-Q' Will- -have 522 Missile Aiming points oy-_l9TO Adding the 6th r time urgent 1 3 targets increases tIhe list to some _900 which would now require around 1500 M ssiles 900 1 67 BIA Quolication Future Strategic Targets in Eurasian Communist C6untries F u AQril 196% projected to 1970Win In Mun-o no Degas r1g-M I - 123-3 Lil's I CC bhhn - upi'VA-l u u 1 1ole I or 'in 115 av' u IQermission 4 un- 4destruct 10a requ1rement A recent etudyw 1ndicaues that a 1orce or 1000 SISuteman is inadequaue to cover the projected I9704 S6v4iet- npc4leSr del1vepy capaoility and provide suific1ent Minuteman missileS t6 support She coMb_ned Mlnuteman Polarls aSSured The totaI Minuteman Iorce'requirementI1n t4his Study re ned 116m some 1200 miss1leS to neaxly 18003 dependent on the desire6 damagIe expectancy against SOViet har MiSsile sites The AMSA Study st also based en a IEOO M1huteman' -force in the TOI time period Ito asa1st 1n the damage l1miting taskAnother major consideration in determ1n1dg fu ure Ifo4rce reqplreme e s is the p_rojec ted qualitative characteristics of t e weapon syStem A $35 of 17 to L0 nautical miles we predicted in the 1970 time period it appears prudent to use a criterion of programming one oh Iaunch reliable mi ss1le against each Lime seneitive target 1his ta1Iors phe force reqp1rement to4 4meet the low side of the threat 0y numbers of miss1les 'f r the early time period and provides the option of missile capability fof the later time period by quaIita ive improvements to the- force Tak1ng fulI consideration of the force previouSly approved hy the Secretary of- Derense and reaffirmed by the Jblni Chiefs of Staif in the project-ed 1mpr6vemeh SI to the in the early 1330's Such as improved guideno4e and multiple independent re e4ntry vehicles MIRVS Sud in the interest of lessening the cost impact a revised pregram Tab A hSS'been developed for 1200 Minuteman erce by end FM 69 1 Ehture object1ve force proposals will include recommendat1ons Ior quaIitapive lnmrovemenus to the M1nutemah ferce - Based on These comeldevatione it is recommended that a 1200 MM force oe 4achieved repo rt on the 1nterrelamionsh1ps oetween strategic 30 June 196% USAF Blue4 4Dar ofzensive and defensive fercIes I This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu