I I o i ' f No Objection To Declassific t o 009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 o 'Vl t L wh - 1 ASSIST ANi SECRE TARV OF Dt FF tJ iE It WMUINOlON D C 20301 I l MEMORANDUM l 'OR SUl3 1 F C'f SECID TI RY Qli' r- v _ l -- GBP t u r ----1 o ' - ' k -- DEFENSE Recycle of' m on Cltrateg ic Offensive o nd Defensive Forces u '1 ' 1 1is yeo r 1 s ccaruJICll'bs to the Dl M on Strategic l i'orces raised a n unusually large munber of issues on strategy calculations Md posture pla nnin in addition to tl e reclamas of parbicu lar tent at l vc force decird on o A On Deterrence The ll i r l 'orcc e t gues that J Dete1 reuce de1 ends on the dj ffe ence between U S and Sov Lct losses in an exchange not just on Soviet losses The dH'fcrunce bct -leen U S and Soviet decdihs is l ruportant The measure of deterrence could also depend on l he survlv tng military forces on both sides after an cxc ba nec no b just on c tvilia n loss es We should pay more a Ltention to d' 'lierring strategic nuclen r aga inst NA'J 'O Europe in casen wlH rc the U S h not at Lackcd sitnult Lucously A caps bil i ty to a litae k the Sovie l IH MRBM sitea i s co lJ eel f'o r wh i J c we cont nuc to d Jtcr a VLa cks a ga l nst CONUS Presvmabl y a l 'tn ope-bnr ed st t'ike force is also calletl t'or but Dr H rown does not l'o isc th l s suggestion 2 a l ucks 3 Act i vc dct'en ' CS im Provc our dete r rcnli by mak i ng Sov i eli to rgct tng GBPtnd tact i cs mo n diff' lcul t by reduc lnp the d i ffercncc bct cen U S ancl Soviet fa tali U cs Ace- po Lnt 1 above and by int roduc i Jl6 a l 5na of symmetry for i nrrbuncc if the USSH ove r-c t i mF J tes i li mm clcfcm Je c3pabil i ty Uwy would proha bJy ov r- e Jti mato U S d ofenec performance o leo thur lmlanc i ng Lheir ltkeli hood to pl'C- Clllpt l Strong 11 S Da mo gC r im i tinz procrams 1-10uld protect our A1u n cd Destruction ca X tbil t y und CO ild fo ccotnll uot fuel an a rms race J3y m n 1dng the Sovi d s work hard fm an An mrud Dest s uction ca Hl b i lity bhcy could not tt ffol'd to Btrivc i'or a Doo11e ge L ndting ca r a b i l i Ly s i mu l't aneously o t j rt' l _ t 1 1 1 i i No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 i U J- o I 1l ' 1 r h i t 2 5 Deterrence dc pends on performance undc t o wu r-f'ighting SlOP-l i ke scena rios not j ust on tat i c cxchane e models In fa ct Dr Brown suggel'rLo that ou1 losRcs must be no grea Lcr tha n Sov l ct losses under all scena rio J to havo a good deterrent 6 Withou b a U S Damage L tm tting program ancl wl th a f i xed standa rcl of Ass u-ed Destruction U s progr llils i muld be driven by SoviP t initiatives and could fall a pho sE bchh1d The JCS also raise po i nts lt and 5 and point l Ls iml 11 c L t in many of their collllncnts One valid point not raised in the Service contncm t s i s tl at our Nr 1 L tonaJ command a ud control system is vulnerable I believe that the Soviets' best chance to avoid retaliation would come from attack tne the President his cha tn of commo ncl Wld h ts commw1ica liion to the major conunanders responslbla i 'o r execut Lng the SIOP our analyses show that attacks on ow strateg ic fo t c es arc much le-ss likflly to v10rJq f'l rt'thcrmore al most a lJ of our c rro'rt-goes to protcctine our fo t ces Di scussion The o reument s on df ltcrrenl e fa l l i nto two s ctn That the deterrent is inadequat e agaiJtst very large Soviet attacks if they are severely enough presoed or That the deterrent is inadequat e o ga nd a llrnited Soviet nucleur attack such as a stra begic attack J tmited to Western 1'urope or an attack a g l-iJtst U S mi litary i'orcca that apa red U s c i t Lcs I f i nd unc onv tnci lg the arguments about the inadequacy of our de l c c t cnt to very large a t1 a cks Firat 1 hc Soviets have a gr cu L dco l to worry about fc r which we take lit'Llc credit in our Assurerl De Etiruc tion caJ cu la tiono our large bombt r fore e launch-on-warning tac t ice 1 nei'fici -ncien in thc ir turgct tng due to imperfdc l l ntcLlicc l r e corrunand and conlirol o r tim i ng U S theater Rt - o Lke forces Sovlet f ata J lt i cr due to long- Lerm fall-out ep i dC'm i cs or secondary ei'fects e g starvation because of bottle-necks in 'l ltc i r ccortomy Second d iffcr cntial fato lit i cs i o pool' Cl'i ter ton for detc r rcncc Ansurcd Destruction is the lowur end of a range of i'atalitlcs -- 2ryj fatalities J I O rnl l li on lu Afiim cd Destruction cor reF-ponds to a range of l 0-100 m i llion fa tal i t i es in l i'h ely cases J I' we an ld ll l 0-- 1 00 million Russj e ns lfO mLU i on is the be t they could hope f'o r v1hy ould the-y be temp ted t o a unch a ma ssiverl dke a aa inst the U S that C'OUld kill J50 mi li ion fi ' Cl'iC anB c Oll if they COUlU replace their lnduntrial cnpnc ii y by invarli ng vTestern Euro1Ja 'l'hil u 1 here is no reo sc l i'or tJ c SoV Lc'Ls to be licvr the U S would 1 c- La Jiate to a str i kc on our ci t Lcs by a ttack i ng Sovlet m Ulta ry targets at tbc C - 'IJCnoc of om Asr m d De st T'uction capabj l i ty If they htt oux c i tlcs i J 1 n lllll Ssivc s li t' i kc they woul cl have to c 1 eet a vengeful U S stri ' e back to lti ll af many J lJS Ed ans o por dblo P rha p the SIOJ l should have two d ii'fe r ent OI titms against Sov let c i tias _ _ r J 1 No Objection To Dec 1assification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 i i J _ lo J -- No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 l 1 I 10 1 I i l I j ' 3 a Only onough countcr-C'ity strikes -withheld for rent if they do not hit our cH i es and b Mo s ive l l1 intra1 1ar deter- punitive strjkf'l l if they de However L do feel that better protel t ton of our National Command and Control system our 11Assurcd F xecution capa bil lt-y ta an impor liant part of improving our Assured Destruction ca pab i lity Mlwlng the Spartan bn t-tcry of the Chinese o r tented AllM from l'lcw York to Wa ahington wou ld improve out' deterrent by reducing the chance of u Sov tet attack against the coJTilland and control sys liem needed to launch out' reta l iatory strike I reconuncnc1 that the bn ttcry be sh i fted to Washlngton Approved I I J j 1 'I l j I I l o l I I iI J l i i Il l - r J ina plJrOVCd __ _ _7 '-t f The arguments on ow inabili by to de tcr small a tta ck f l arc rnorr disturbing The impotence of all Assured Destruction capability in deterring conventional wars etc is a l t'endy wall recogni ed and the gaps in out' ovcr- all posture from the days of maas l ve r eta liation have largely been f i lled w lth convenliional forces and tact i ca l nucleo r forces But a sizable theo t e cicaJ go p st i ll rc mo i Iw bel weun tactical nuclear weapons for battlef leld use and strategic forces used in an Assured Destruction task The ma ln cxf Wl Jl c raJ sed is a large Sov tet strjke a ga i nst mi li ta ry taraets ln Western l 'urope followed by an invasion 1'he question is of course what can the U S do to deter r uch an attack' 'J'hc A i r 'orce and JCS woul l argue tha b sur viva blc aclcli b i onal Europe-based s brikc f'orces capable of reacM ne the USSR would be ncec1c d to mn Lntain n credible deterrent to th i s sort of attack Unforttma te ly additiona l non- f nrrv i vable l-7eapons such as Q RA a l rcraf'li p r oba'bl y inv i te x athcr bban deter thls type of strike I Ud nlt we have enough strike forces i n Western Europe to deter fmch a strike when backed up by bhe external forces SAC and Pola t'is to deter a really masRivc strike lJut if we a r c to continue to talk of C'XternaJ forcee in dotex r-j DC then te r ' -ID r We had better obtain the opC't'O t lonal plans to use them ap a in d the Sov-let thrco t Lo I 'urope w i thout automatically tr i fmerirtB the stratcg i c U S -USSH exchanGe Lhat 'e all 1oceoen t w as mutuA Gu tc i d ' l'lttw I l el i cva ou r ma ln r 1quircmcnt fo r kl e ping crod tble our eua cn ntces to p t otect our allies ia a better operational plan not additionaL fo rccs bought an J just i fied Cor this task A secondary quest j m is out' de Lerl'rmt of a large st1 ike o guinst our Rtratcgic rn Ui lio ry fore en but not c l L'i es in the U B J n cold logj c a U S response that stl ikcs thei r cttics is not rational e nd hl 11ce credible CSJ Ccially when we annoooce that our action 'o ould inevita bly lead to a Soviet a Lta ck on our ci tics We ho vc a very strrmg i ncc nt l ve for bc l tcr O Jcrationa l plamd ng to increase ou r own cuunterforce aff er t1 vctW G in order to keep a ''onf l dent dei crrcnt of a Soviet attack conr tra i ned Lo our mil i tm -y fm ccs No Objection To Decla sificati n 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 I I I' I' No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 J ' o oo r o'- I o l 1 J o ' - o 4 In ammer to the specific points oh deterrence j 1 I have alreo dy explained vlby I do not think the difference in U S e ud Soviets deaths is very t elev ml t o the measurement of our cletcrrent However a favorable surviving balance of mil tto ry forces on both sldes in an exchange that spares cit i es m i ght serve to deter such an cxchn ngc Wo should tnwrove our opera t i onal plans S OP to gaJ n as a voru ble counterforce results as we ca n i i j 1 i l 1 j I l l lj I J i l l 1 i I 1 j l I I l 1 l l l 2 I agree that we should pay more attention to deter r tng u tl acks on Western Europe but improved opcra l tonal planning would aLlow us to obta in a muc h better deterrent to these a Lta t ks tha n we now have w th- ou t additional forces 3 Defenses add to dctcrrl ncc mo tly by protcctinB our strnteg Lc forces Argu i ng that Sov i et unccr l a i ntics enhanc c ou r dc'l eiTcnt is counter to the j dea o f Aatmred Destruction -we vmnt them to be sure that they cannot destroy our forces 'J hc Air J 'orce also argues that l fcnscs cuhance our d terrent by rcllu c ing U S fatalili tus if you reject the difference between Soviet and u s fata litlcs as a measure o C deterx ence point 1 above then you reject th i s po l nt also There ls some mcr tt in the Air Force argument that defenses on'both sidns Introduce a kind o t' symmet ry if the Soviets over-estimate their ovm defense effe LiVfmess they wiJJ also over-cs t i matc ours Ihrt s i nce r think the Soviets might be tempted to go to wnr to strike our mil l tary forces but no l just to st r i kc ou t' citi s only act i ve defense of our mil tary forceR is needed to acquire thi r kind of' synnnetry Jo'ino lly dci'cnne nrsa Lnst an accidental attack f9recloses another 1ay thai wa r might start In sum a ct l vc defenses might improve O LU deterrent some11hn t but no heavler a defc n sc than t he present light JU ll-1 deployment is n eded to attai n these ndvs nta ges 1 Accuracy in U S offens i vc missile p r ogro ms tndi rectl y he S ou-r Assu t'cd Des t ruction capability by ereatl inc1 en sing the coflt to the SovJ ctr of huying survivnbJ e oi'fcmnive mi ss i lcn a nd thus reducing thc lr t otal 1n i ssile payload But I do no t see much mc r Jt i n prn ct iC e to the areumcn l that stJoong defenses d iv0rt Sov i ct rc ou1 ccs i'l om DaT Ulge I l miti programs to the lr own Assured Den Lructj on p rob emr In theory the Sov i et rt'sponsc to a heavy U S dcfcnsj vc prog ram coupled v1l th our strong offc mt-dve missile forces should be to buy a l m a lJ number ot big protected or ln lbilc ruiosilcs with penet rat i on alds cmall RVs and 1nany other measures tho t give them n goou penetration capabili ty but nccrl not add a bonus first td he cHp lb ll U y In fac 'L however they would fcc l forced Lo cont i r mc procluc t i on of f i xcd missiles thai 1ould cive them a large firnt s cr i kP f'orc c and furthe r nrore their respomw t0 a la I'fie U S ADM would very li kely although illoc ically i nclude n Jm gc Sov Lcl AJ3M ' rhis would greatly c ompli cate our ArwuTcd Destruction task 1 l I ' t I' ' No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 Pf i o 1 l L 'lo d J 't o -' i o ' ' l''tl 5 5 Present operational plans such as SIOP chuuld not form the basis for analyses of future rcqlli renLents Operational plans a toe presently uo L 'ev tcv1ed in OS and they provide for m ssions that aJthough desirabl e n ay not lle wo rth spending lart smns on T i fls i s eapec la Uy true i n strategic forces where the plan is basically i'or limiting damage against a weLl-defined tlu eat whe r eas forces are bought to protect our detC rrent against a potentia J threat fo 1' i n the future However i L seems lU ely that tl1 SIOP vlill cont i nue to be quoted t o us in the f'uturc in support of r cqueato for additional forces In this case I feel we must eet into the SIOP as the paper at Tab n discusseo not only to understand what is there but to car ry out 1Jnprc vementa so Lha t past inefficiencies not propagate into future requirements I reconunend you eign Tab B Concerning the suggesU on 'Lhat for a good deterrent our los9es must be no greu'Ler tho n Sov et J o ses undc n alJ sceno 'ios this would lead to an absoJ utely open-ended requ1 rcmcnt for etratetrlc forces and would eradicate Lhc di U nction bet Jcen a de l errent and a c01npJ etc WEI I'i'ighting capabili ty 6 It ts inaccurate to lJn lJ y tha L U S programs arc driven by Soviet initiatives while the Soviets have a free hand As your San Francisco speech illustrated Soviet progrB IM are also very strongly driven by what we do B D ma c TGBPi n ting 1 The JCS believe we should buy Dwuae c r 'Lnri L tr g J lrograms designed to kecJ l JlS supc r i or in any war should deterrenC'c f d 1 Thc i r stronr cr t objection to 'Lhe st ra'Lcgy of the m M is the lack of a Damage L'i mit l ng progru m again L the Soviet Union r crLh er i han to Lhe inadequa cy of 0 U' forces for dete1 rcncc Irupl lcitly the JCS seem to th ink that nuclea1 i'lar is more 1 i lwly Um n we think However I see no reason to chn ne e cu r pnsition on the infeas LbD i Ly of Damage Linli'Line aga i nst the USSR as o basis fm plo nn ing ou c forces I I I l l 2 Dr J3r mm arcrucs thai t he cc i s room fo r Lhe Sov i ets to keep a n adequate deterrent and yet for 1 hc U S to reducl da Jn - e e s i Bnifl ca ntl 'lhe Army Air lo'orcc and JCS all fl grce tlmt the Soviets would try Lo rega i u their dctcrrGBP-nt i C Lh U S deployed heavy de fens cr but th y need not succeed and in 't 1y event would uot return all tite wey to th 'lr present very high lcvcJ o f 1 nsurcd Destruction I a e ree that the Soviets Jould most likely not compJ etcJ y r ga in the second s t rU e capo b i Hty they have 'Loclu y i f the U S r- i a rted a major Damage TA1ni tinc proe rnm Uni'oi tuna l eJ y even a part la1 -r -N prmse to N'ike-X would take awD-y mont of its lJenci'i t j 1' the Sov1 ctn struck f i rst o sho1m in the foJ J O dng to bJ e ' ' ' No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 I 't i No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 l i 6 I 1 I 1 USSR Strikes No U S ARM Posture A Limited Soviet Response li'uJ 1 Soviet J esponse 100 120 60 100 110 120 Fire l'he matn point of this table is that ev ' n if Posture A cut U S deaths in half if we pre-erupted i Ls effects if the Soviets went first would be ne glig tblc Since we 1wrry mos tly about a Soviet first st1o 1 kc even o small Sovlet response would negate Posture A i n the more important case 3 l'he JCS and the Navy argue that fOl cen prucur ed i'or Assured Dcntruction should b evaluated in ' ar-f Lghtil16 Lr-term l na ting scena ' i os nut they nrc not aped fie in nuggcstj ng ho 7 to do thio We do try to evaluate U S strategic f'orcen ill lor-fighting sccna t'ios as shown in Table 13 of the Strategic Force and Effcc tive ness 'a blcs and pages 1'7-19 of the Dl'M We have rcpco tedly told the Joinl staff tha t we would be happy to inc udc a du L tion t l tables showing 11 more realistic scenarios but they have been unable to produce them S i m ilarl y we would usc war-tcrm inat i ng scenarios if Wf or Uwy could design them 0 li ' 111 'fuc Arm v al es that 'vc can affo rd to re duce a l r defenf es somewhat if we do not chooP c a llamage Idm l t'lnc objec Live against the USSR We have no d i Dae reemcnt over HercuJ cs lL You deleted the folJ owJ ng paragraph on air defense i'rOJn the JJJPM Without thls paragraph no rat i onalc 1s g l v en fo r the JnPM air defense recmmnenda tlons Unless you dec i de to buy the F-1 I recommend you rcinstat c this paragraph ContinE ntal Ai r Defense An improved air defense r yEJt cm consj st tng of F-l s with AHACS is not jul' tifi d with a light AJlM In v Sov lC'L f'i 1 st strike we ' olould still suffc c over 100 million fat alit i cs from Ll dr missiles no m tte r what 1c do about air defenr e Um lcvcr e mode Jt a i r d e fense system one which j s J ess costly than the present system and sigui ficantly less corrLly' than the l '-12 is just ificd to pll t t'ol our o i r sp ce to di c ou rs gc poaaiblc Nth coun ry th ccu t und to contlnut to discon rngt Soviet bomber ar p Lration We C'an a chlcvc the e objective No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 l l j' co I 1 r r T o I 7 by gradually phasing down the present system and by continuine research md developmerr o t AWACS If the AY lACS p cogram is successful we may ' ' ant to deploy it w t th a limi l ed numlJcor of modified F-106s Ouch a system could aJ so accomplish the above objectives It could also b part of a mobile air defense system which could be used in CONUS and overseas It could b used to defend M i nutr ma n mifiBi les from bomber attack if we decirle to withhoJ d some of these m lss J les for more than three o Ihours after the st rt of a war 11 - - o - 1 l --t-1 A l Re t nstu te____ -' ' t - A _ 1 1 I _ _ II - I 1 - ' '' 'I t 't J J - J cave out_ _ ______ c CalculD tions S '- t ' 'l __ f l r i ---1 1 I t 'f ' o' t' o - _ ' r' ' ' 'I ' 4 - t fi - _ 1 1 r'' r _ ' rJ 1 AJ J thro reelamas note an apparent drop in the statccl requirement for Assured Destruction he 1961 Dl'M did not define the required level of Assm ed D st ructlon but di d discur s alternative forces for a t tacki ne 150 d t l es or 2 of' the population 'fhe '1965 DPM said that 3 Sov te i'atal i l ica would be a completely aclequn t c deterrent but did not ea y that this 'Wf UJ the min i nn un r equired l a s year' a Dl'M said that 20-3Ci Assured Destruction fatalities will deter a deliberate Soviet a ttaclt 'his was r mndcd to one-fifth to one-fourth of the Sov i et population i n the post ure sto tctncnt and then to 0- 5 iu thi s y ar' H DPM But the drop i n Ansured Destruci ion requircmc ts is mu 'C appm en tho n real since we hEtve in fact bccu cns i tivt to missile-only Assured Destruc ion o f cY a for yea rs o The Navy would not inc lude bombers i n Assured Jlestructi on calcu lntions at all but I i hink this conservat Ls1n i too extreme We to kc stC 'J S to k cep mi ns le-only Armured Dcstr lction fai alitics at or above 2fY' a a nd would no L count on bombc -rs as a Rolut1on to o long-term clec line in ou rcapabili1 y However if he missile - onl t Assured Destructi on dl ps b 'low 2 fo for one or t 1o ye a t s we clo r ely on l he bombex- to moo'Lh out the dip un t tl n missile solution becomes avail nb l c 3 1'he Air Force nncl the TCS would have calculations hO 'Iing sensitivit i es to a variety of factors p1 n-dmm taci ics frac i ona l orbit ballist i c sys tcms Ji'OBG fn ilu r of pcnP b C tion aids other tcchrd cnl riRks Althour h 'w are careful in on r a rQ uncnts to cover a r ca s of technical ri '' we should be more explJ c i t in our calculations on the effect of va d ouo types of tc 'lm1 cal f lfl ures We O 'e prcparinrz e tablE of rwno i t i vitir s to vndouB t 'chnicnl fo llu t'cs for t he strategic Force and EffcC tiven ss tables j - ' - No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 c No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 4 i J I C ' B 4 Our Damage I Jm tting culculations assume hat bombers are withhclcl f'or a significant part of the Assn 'ed Destruction to sk freeing many mise i les for o t tackir g military targets The Ai r Force notes that present opcratine procern r cs l avc the bombers too vulnerabJe to be safely withheld and thC J 'cfore we should buy the AM3A whi ch is casi r to with11old Inotead the A tr Force should fol low-up wi Lh the step needed to give the present bombers an enduring survival capabiU ty Bolltbers arc presently kept at about l o tome bases at a very high level of readiness to be flushed and go to ta rgc t on 15 minutes of -ra rning of an ICBM attack Against l Ol3S SLBMB or other measures des i gned to deny warning a concept of operations calling f'or widespread dispersal a nd cycling of aircraft to unattacked bases is an a lternat lve to t hc be'Lter warn i ng systeii IF a nd shorter warning t tmes that the Ail Force proposes Widely dispersed bomber operation in a cris i s iR particuJ arly well-suited to the nationwide area defense of the China-oriented AHM 'l lle enclosed paper l'ab B discusses bomber operations more fu U y 5 All the comments missed the difference bet to1cen fa taUt i es in Aaau rcd Destruction acena r l os where we are very conse rvativc and fatalities on both sides in war-f5 gh ing SC'enarios where we UfJe more likely cases 6 'he JCS comments continue to concentrate very nn tch on lnputs for ins liauce they measure offensive forces tn terms of targets covered not destroyed or i n relation to Soviet offensive forcca not i n terms ofd unage potential or U S dama g avoided they measure defenses in tcrm t of aircraft intercepted o r RVs der troyed not in terms of fata Ht les incurred with and without defenses I 7 The Army notes that they a nd my off'ice now get similar refmlts ht similar calculat lons thanks o the cx tens1ve olork tlmt we did last i linter i n getting their concurrence on the Strate lc Force and F i'fect i veneas 1'ables J o Q_Il_ GBP ' - - lllU E J J CS und A ir 'orcc both thi nk we WLY be cutting lead times too close or rely i ne too much on intcl lj gcnee in ow policy of buying op lons ruther t ha n extra forces against unexpected th r ea ts l O -iever I bel-Leva the value of' buy tncr op b ions and hedcrtng our i'orc s for Assured Destruction has been well demonstrated i n Lhc last t 'To yeru s 2 The JCS and Ai r li'orce take too 1 i e rally our great interest i n AsGurcd Destructic nl vlhere we use the cone cpt only to test the adequacy oi' the forc-e they seem to be gett i ng a message tha b we arc interes-ted No Objection To Declassificatton 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 I 1 No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 r l 11 ' lI l t 1 J l l r u i r- I ' ' 4 9 j in no ilrrprovcmGBP mi fl or OJ lCrationa l capa b i l i tiies for other 'Lha n sccoml strike attuckR on urbnn targets Thif l 1 El in sp1 te of the dec i a1 on to improve Pozc l don accuracy by buy i ng Startro ckcr Dr B1 own ho s scvcrn l t tmcs stated that we EJhould not i mmedio tcly a tta ck c i tiel3 flhmld deterrence fail as if he thinks os n attack cities iJmled iately j ' 1 -l f I Ii I j I It ip under ltandable from the tone of the DPI- 1 that the J'CS nn l the Air l'orcc Jn i anndcrstnnd our interact in accurate syEJtcru and in a e radun ted nuclear' attack policy -- ra tlwt than just attacldng Sov i et cities -- in any war short of a general strategic at t nck on our cit i es Thi problem would be solved by some mention i n the Dl M of what we 1-10uJ d do lf deterrence failed f'oJ_low d up by the operations memorandum ' rab n The Collow tng 't ro parneraph8 which you deleted f r om the IDPM eo far towards meet i ng the demand for gu tda uce on 1hat we Clo if dcLerrence fa i lG witbout buy-lng very heavy cle f'ensc 11 Another objective of' our strategic forces is to reduce to the U S a ncl its 1 ll i es if a war does bee in vTe cll ll do th iD moot effectively by deterring attacks on our cities For cxa mple by not a ttack ing Sov i ct d ties if they avoid ours we can reduce Soviet i nc entives for attacld ng U S c t tieo da ma e j i We might try to tal away the USSR 1 s ability to destroy our c i t tcs A lopt Lne thi s goal would requ i J a-maJor Rpcnd tug about $1 0 bill i on ovc Jr a tct -yea r pc1 iod for defenrdve systenm such as a henvy anti-be J li rl 1 m Lss i lc ABM system and cxt9nsivc anti-bomber defense in addition to the la cgc costs of our offensive fo r t on Ev n this much money would be wasted '1-Ihcn the Soviets reacted to Joe det'ens i vc systems 11 o 1 Reinotatc - - - - -- - - - v _ ' _ I o ' ' r o l r ea ve out t - --- ' - - _ L - ' - I r ' - o The i'oJ lowing pru aaraph part of wh i rh you delded from t he PM shows some tntei est in a ur-f tghtixm cv Jab l l ti y uith i n the fram work of the force sh cd for Assured Destruction 11 cr we could be sure that Soviet forces would follm-1 the ni l inb rs -- '-Jc should ste Tt considC'ring Slil J l tcr si rateg i c i 'orces Since we have tno ce than enough forces for Ar ntr c l est r uct l on o ga i n t the expected range of' 'Lhreo i s we fJhould ta kc stepf l to iHiprovc the af'fecl i venc s of that par 1 of Lh ' fo1 ce avv i ln b le t o o tta 'k Sov-let nri J i t a ry tarr ets Ny reeonunemlat i on on an imp1 ovcd guidance f lysi em fo r Pm r iclon is su ch a step u low ro nge of the NIE -- both in qual i ty and l l Reinstatn --- 1 co vc out 1 o - No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 - ' No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 TOP - o f CP --r ' ' o r o JO F On the Tlu ea t All the connnents notecl l hn t this year's Nat i onal Irrbelliecnce Estimates o f Sovlct ICllMs and SIJlt in v UJ be cons tdernbJ y hit ' ber t ha n lnst yua r' s estimates Tab A summar tz n the estimates and discusses tJ w evidence In a ny event the USSR J s almost cert a in to have more than 1 000 ICBMs by J 9r12 and could pa sa this mnnber by 19 0 Th cho nge in the throat docs not change our major postul'c reconnnendations so long as we o rc driven primarily by Assur ed Destruct i on conaidcra Llons since these a rc i n turn driven by the Greatcr-Than-Ex Pec bed Threat which -s 1nuch s Lronger than arJy NJE The incroascd threat makP B Da mnge L i miting and a c ountcri'orce policy a ppeo r yet less fcas i blc I -would ho ndle changing intell ieenC'c estimates by 1 Bring Lng the Lntr- JJ i gcncc narro ti i vc JO ge 8 of the ruPM up to date 2 In calcu1a bions involving NIE forces use numbers as of Maxch 13 19 6 but ind lcatc in the t1v Lty of t hc re 'su l l s to the chang Lng 'l lu eat 1'hc to different postm e rccornmenda Lions I l 1 I I 3 'lhen the new agreed est Lmates a re available mid-Novcltlber Lssue a new vel's ion of' the DPl-1 redoing the co lculat i ons on the ncwcCJ L cstirrlGBPl tcs Approved ______ __ _ _ JJ i sa 1wrovcd - - - - - -- - 11 to doC'S s b LLl leave the qucGtion of' -whether numbers of launchcro arc jJnpm ta nt enough i'or pol i b ical l' 'D Rons to push us i nto buying more ICBMs ll l Lhough numbers of wcc- pons provide a more mcrudngful 1nea m u c o f ' U S USSH capabilit Les thtm docs the m unber of ICBM launcherf-1 i he nmnb ll' of 'l a pons 'lll l not become a commonly a t ccpted measure because it i s i JTrPOSIJ lb l e to obaCl'VC and vc t'if' r I b l i ovc t hc numbers of laum he r s w i ll rctai n an i ntuitivt importance i f only 'because it is so uo sy to cotmt 11' you fcc tho l the U S should not r t ay a t 1 000 ICBM ' rhile the arises about '' hat missile we should be r r opo red to dc pl oy USSR dcplojos more than th i s munlJcr -Llle question I I o No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 _l o o No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 i J I f r ' ' ij c-d 0 r_ ' f I L r 'I 11 '-wfl j 1 i j l I j A number of studi es over the po st yeru have addl c of lccl the question If we need o ddi t i onal land-bused m i ssilc po yl on d what should the rnj ssiJ e look like and how ahol lld it be based The major study on this question was S'J HA'l'-X S'l'HAT-X assumed that we would develop a new Advanced ICBM with 7 500 lb payload a ud studied its basing and concluded that if a aienifica nt incrc ase in J and bMed payload i needed the missiles should be defended and deployed w t h one rnicsj e for four 3 000 psi silos 'l'he remainlhg three fti los are fiD cd with dummy missiles j f I I I One 1 dvanccd ICBM and three d lllllllY mif si lcs cost at least a J mtch as four Minuteman IIIs and have the srune payJ oo a becaUJ' Ie of the $ 2 5 bj Ll i on ll D needed to develop the Advnnccd ICBM It is cheaper to de-ploy add i tiona l Mi nutcmo n IJ Cs i n 3 000 ps l s llos than to develop ann deploy o n Advanced ICBM and th i s deployment would have the pol l 'l ical value of providing many more m i mdJ es Minuteman III in 3 000 psi silos cost a'bou b $1 t- million pc r silo or lCJ1 more than Minuteman II C in the presen t 300 psi s Llo 1 Because the ca lcu Ja liions of Assured Desi ruct i on are so theoretical and the Dl M i s so l mporta n l a veh lcle to such a large audience concepts of Jn mn ge Lim i ti ng and gro duatcd nucl ear response are not receiving enough attention in detailed weo pon Sj' s'licm design or tn the p c cpar ation of war plans 2 rhc NATO-n pprovC'c1 concept of flex1 b lc rer ponse should be cxtendl d to provi r e a credible nuclear deberrcnt to nuc t ea l ' war that fo ll CJhm of aU-ou t U S Sovlct n ttackf ou each ot her 1 s c i t i l' r Th ts involves iUiproved operational plans rat her thn n acld lt tonal forces 4' l 3 Nove threats a nd send -Livit i s -Lo technical r i sks should be treated mo rc explicitly in the Strategic Io'oi'ce and Hf' Ccctiv ness T t bleA lUld in nex t ycru 1 a DPM 1 lbmllc't's cannot now be wJ thhcld to thrca t l1 c tt i c in Dama c e Lim lti 11r calculations ann sceno rios By 19' - the Sovj d s w U 1 most likely ha vc mon ICB -is than we have programmed 'i-Tc should re-examine whethrr we would accept s s i tuo tion uhcre uc have a good Assured Det tl ueti nn capability but whe1 e we hu ve only J ooo J C l1'4s whilt the USSR ho s l oo oz 2 000 'he speeiJ' i c fo cce ir sur -1 rr d E cll j n the rcclW Ir' s are presented i n the r -nclosurc for you r c1ccis ton F xca PI where noted spec Lfico Jly DDR l concurs odt'h my recommendecl aJ Lc nat i vt1 r wlJ J ll 'ellarc a I'f u e reen version of the DP M based on yo'ltC' dcc i don No Objection To Declassification 2009 08 24 NLJ-061-005-1-5-6 To'rH 1 r 'Hr o This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu