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a turn can Queue win-u nun oar-an - on nonnuuou an 35b 0 noun 5 Fauna banana an on an 3553 5 Egan - 5 gang an an 9 ouo'nuoouwouo Raw E9 035 In 335 91 3 ago on an ou w xngg sa nuns-nun Swuq 5% 5 82 ENE 95 2 8 weapon xx runwo w no on aw wrung wanna nau- can a numanandnc ungunun nn on a Fo Gavan unchu up n nn00 333 -Iu- nu uwnnwa n P wanonavuo vhnunn ME 40 muggy I an on u vum us #30 qu CHE no E mm an 55 guano-PE as nnwn can L28 - w a 59 as nine paragr- avuor uuhoh Eng 0E rrdvounnu manning - run 9 unwnu z uuon 3-an Eu n2 an 2 r nnm nacho a hum nounnuu a hummer mu rap buunnhru u 93342 8 manna u non 19 12 magnum onb- muhur Rhonmbouwob no on an no fawn-n 06 Lorwum lab hm rw Hung dunk - Wok-Fa rub ugh wabw 32 goo 3 and ung-nu saw at unnb w uu unawa- an dig gnom- u manning In nut on on 950 299 Early in March SAC and SAMSO met to develop a concept for a Trans-attack Environmental Probe SAC proposed to deploy ten to 20 hardened TEP missiles in each wing They would be launched in small groups and transmit UHF signals to all control centers in their wing if powered flight third stage thrust termination was successfully completed SAMSO indicated that the job could be done by a considerably smaller number of missiles But the problem was much more complex than merely transmitting a signal after powered flight In its consideration of the cost of the new UHF equipment and the question of signal reception probability SAMSO again looked at the old Trajectory Accuracy Prediction System TAPS concept which had been rejected as too expensive For Minuteman III completion of third stage thrust termination did not mean much The post boost vehicle would then have to continue on and deploy the reentry system To provide a signal of successful post boost vehicle flight a system like TAPS would be required Late in May SAC asked SAMSO to include TEP in the next program change request so that the program could be officially approved and funded Force Application TS-NF On 1 January 1968 the control time launch CTL concept became effective with Revision C to STOP-4 In addition to the pindown threat and suppression of Soviet ABM defenses fratricide in the target area and the reduction of vulnerability to the Soviet offensive weapons in the launch area dictated the need for precise launch timing for the whole ICBM force These threats now made the salvo tactic unwise For the preemptive option a doctrine for more rapid sequential firing was introduced In the normal retaliatory option a slower rate of firing was used If a pindown resulted in a launch delay the force would later resume firing over an extended period All sorties would be timed from a master reference time according to their tasks and to meet the fratricide restraints If a hold was encountered the proper timing would be accomplished by transferring the delayed sorties to their proper position in another wave block 300 A simple wave block scheme was used for Minuteman I and Titan II since their firing could be stopped at any time Until Minuteman F launches could be cancelled while in progress CLIP that force was divided into increment related to tasks Minuteman F sorties delayed by a pindown would resume launching in their own increments in other wave blocks or they could be moved to other increments by changing targets and or tasks Thus if a defense suppression sortie was lost to a pindown a backup sortie assigned to a later increment could be switched into an earlier increment in the next wave block TS-NF To insure the penetration of the ICBM force the Soviet ABM system would be attacked first Minuteman B and P and Polaris missiles would first hit the Hen House early warning radars and their Tallinn system defenses Then the Dog House radar and the Triad System around Moscow would be attacked More than 100 Minutemen would be involved in ABM suppression During the first three months of 1968 three suppression sorties were spread throughout the force On 1 April WS-133B sorties were deleted from this role because of the relatively slow reaction time of these sorties if the medium frequency MF radio system had to be used for a launch For this and other reasons 188 sorties were to be retargeted and 278 retired TS-NF More doctrinal refinements were planned for 1 July 1968 Revision B Crew documents would be consolidated and reduced The two-hour programmed launch delay for urban industrial targeted sorties Task C was eliminated to reduce prelaunch vulnerability To preserve the assured destruction capability Task C sorties were distributed throughout the wave block and reprogramming from Task A threat to Task C targets was made easier The ripple would be used through six wave blocks After that there would be so few missiles left that the remainder could be salvoed The length of TS-NF illeg TS-NF With MK 11C R V and MK 1 penetration aids when available 301 the basic wave block was extended by a few minutes The increase in the Minuteman B MK I1 A CEP relegated those sorties to soft targets only The Titan IIs were targeted against soft missiles command and control facilities and urban industrial areas For Revision D another 427 Minutemen would have to be retargeted during May and June TS During the first half of 1968 SAC operations planners showed renewed interest in the use of nuclear bursts to black out enemy radar and enhance penetration of his defenses This could be done by putting a high-altitude fuse on some Minutemen missiles and bursting them in the exoatmosphere Radar blackout might also occur as a result of Soviet ABM bursts Development of a high-altitude fuse for the MK 11 B C had been directed in December 1967 but by June 1968 it was more likely that it would be developed for MK l2 Although the development of such radar blackout technique would be expensive SAC favored development of the fuse and further study of radar blackout as a penetration tactic S Although fire on warning doctrine was the best military answer to the pindown threat it was politically unacceptable However this might not always be so With credible warning from new systems currently under development streamlined national command authority procedures and a minimal reaction posture MRP for ICBMs a fire on warning tactic could be feasible An MRP concept was studied in 1967 and was conditionally approved by General Compton for further development Most of what was recommended to save time would require changes to nuclear safety rules In March and April Ellsworth Grand Rapids and Little Rock were directed to test new crew checklists that would save time The results were still being studied by Headquarters at the end of June TS Over-the-horizon radar and satellite sensors This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu