__1 MEMORANDUM THEWHITE HOUSE I I - SUBJECT ' Helmut 2 Sonnenfeldf s INFORMATION September 22 1969 ' MEMORANDUM FOR MR KISSINGER FROM I WASIXINGTON SECRET NODIS ' ' ' i ' i r ' ' I ' ' ltIhessageII to You om Arbatov 1 _ I ' I ' ' During the ISS co erence in The Hague Septkmber 18-21 Arbatov sought m e out several times to propose a p'ri-ate taik We eventually had one for about an'hour ' j ' I J I ' s i i He said he had a message for'yop along the following lines The I i situation in yos cowhad deterioratedsubstan$aallyin the last fewmonths A11'Zhe old suspici6ns of the President had retpned and the prospects for progress in our relations had distinctly yorsened He said the was a sham that general conclusion was that our talk of negot #ions words had not been followed by deeds on the contrary the deedshad all been in the oppo site direction He cited in the first instanceChina were convinced the US was seeking where most people in Moscow tactical advantage from Soviet problems Next was the Romanian trip which was seen as a bad sign Also fitting into this pattern was the decision to continue export controls as before At a later stage in the conversation he also mentioned our refusal to make constructive proposals on the Middle East To this catalogue he added the tone of the American press and of American Kremlinologists who were spreading fantastic stories about EUReader'ship crises in Moscowand about Soviet internal developments Arbatov displayed great bitterness about the ISS conference papers dealing with Soviet affairs Arbatov said he did not expect you or me to agree with all the forkgoing but he wanted us to know the mood in Mo'scow because it was at the basis of Soviet slowness in answering our SALT proposal even though the answer would shortly come and would be positive He said he was now pessimistic about S A L T and believed an opportunity had been missed i I took a little time to respond to his particular points But while I used our formal rationalefor the Romanian trip and f o r oux China policy and also assured himthat therehad been no'White House backgrounding about internal Soviet matters I thought it b'est however not to attempt a wholly c on ncing rebuttal ' -- i SECRET NODIS I then told him that I too felt that our relation s wpre in an unfortunate response to phase I said that we had failed to get a single encouraging our farreaching moves on Vietnam I pointe d' qut that the President had set out to bring the warto an end honorably q ven though the steps he had undertaken w e r e n o t without political risk - It'seemed to usthat Hanoi was banking on the Pre sidentbekg driven furtherand further down the road of unilateral concessionsb$ domestic pressures by every objective standard the Soviets w e r e abetting this North Vietnamese course Itold Conceskions _ must inevitably end him that this was'dangerous if they are not reciprocated and a new sitqation'wotild then b e created j L Moreover it seemed to m e quite uhlikely that US-S et relations could improve as 16ng a s t h eSoviet u$ was qot'oqi supporting a war against us on the bat'tjefield but also a war against the President's political position at home A s exp ected Arbatov rejected the validity of this whole agre e but I did expect line I simply told him that I did not expect h$x to him to take with the utmost seriousness the fr of our attitude business I I I I ' ' I I thea told him that relatipns were alsocompt$ catedby our growing uncertainty about Soviet strategic a rms programs He said we simply resented the fact that we were nolonger superior I said that maybe we did and maybe we did not the issue I was raising was not psychological or subjective but the very practical one of a Soviet weapons system the SS-9 that made sense only a s a threat to ouz land-based missiles H e said he had no technical competence a point he repeatedly made in the ISS sessions in response to questions about the SS-9 but he could not understand why we thought a weapon was inevitably a counterforce one when i f it could hit Minuteman it obviously could also hit cities I said that that was precisely what was worrisome about the SS-9 its range and other characteristics made it suitable uniquely as an anti-Minuteman weapon H e then said that even if that was the case he could not see why we should worry After all neither side would wait i f it received warning of an attack but instead it w k d empty out i t g silos bylaunching a counterstrike at once I told him that was pretty dangerous talk launch on warning doctrines are precisely what we shbuld do without if there is going cloubt that Arbatov was necesto be a semblance of strategic stability 1 sarily reflecting existing doctrine The conversation ended with Arbatov again saying he wanted you to know ' that things looked gloomy from Moscow I said it looked to methat without progress on Vietnam the'y would stay that way NOTE There is nothing unique in the content of this message 1 ' Pravda has been on the deeds not words'f kick for some timeand Arbatov made virtually the same ' Y SECRET NODIS - 3 - points he made t o m eto others with whom he talked I have no doubt we look recalcitrant from Moscow and this i s unquestionably one of those periods where each side believes itself to have ample reason to be resentful of the other I hope we'll have staying power enough to continue giving the Soviets reason for resentment because I see no other way to get them to move on Vietnam This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu