I THE ''LAUNCH ON WARNING QUESTION FIRST PHASEOF SALT I N THE At the plenary SALT meeting o f A p r i l 27 1 9 7 0 Deputy F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Semenov argued f o r a ban on MRV p r o d u c t i o n and d e n i e d t h a t MRVs would i n s u r e more e f f e c t i v e deterrence Such arguments can be uttered only i n a further race by those interested They r e a s o n a s i f land-based f i x e d launchers with precisely established c o o r d i n a t e s were t h e o n l y s y s t e m s in B u t a f t e r a l l t h e r e are a l s o existence m i s s i l e - c a r r y i n gs u b m a r i n e s Also i n e x i s t e n c e and c o n t i n u o u s l y b e i n g i m p r o v e d areearly-warningsystems owing t o which t h e s i l o s c o n t a i n i n g ICBMsmay b e empty a t t h e momentwhen t h e enemy attempts t o s t r i k e a b l o w a g a i n s t them w h i l e t h e ICBMs thems e l v e s t h a t hadbeen i n t h e s e s i l o s would can a i r c r a f t a l r e a d yb e i n f l i g h t N e i t h e r be discounted I n a p l e n a r y s t a t e m e n t o f May 1 2 ACDA Director Smith n o t e d t h i s p a s s a g e andasked no we u n d e r s t a n d t h i s s t a t e m e n t t o s u g g e s t t h a t a government should plan to launch i t s ICBM force s o l e l y on t h e p o s s i b l y f a l l i b l e r e a d i n g o f s i g n a l s from i t s early-warning systems and b e f o r e it had any f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e t h a t an a t t a c k had i n f a c t been started lFrom U S D e l S a l t t e l 36 Apr 2 7 1 9 7 2 Secret Limdis T h i s would seem i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h any r e a l c o n c e r n f o r t h e problem o f a c c i d e n t a l or unauthorizedlaunch One o f t h e reasons f o r t h e U S emphasis on s u r v i v a b i l i t y was p r e c i s e l y t o a v o i d h a v i n g t o resort t o such a launch-on-warning p o l i c y which would be very dangerous and w o u l d i n c r e a s e t h e r i s k s o f unwanted war between our two c o u n t r i e s 'I1 The A m e r i c a n d e l e g a t i o n n o t i c e d t h a t G e n e r a l O g a r k o v a d v i s e d Semenov n o t t o r e p l y i m m e d i a t e l y t o Smith's statement b u t t o a w a i tt h en e x tm e e t i n g L a t e r G e n e r a lO g a r k o v privately expressed resentment to Allison that the United S t a t e s had r a i s e d t h i s q u e s t i o n A s a m i l i t a r y man he s a i d G e n e r a lA l l i s o ns h o u l d know t h e answer When General Allison denied this General Ogarkov claimed that the from S o v i e t s had b e e n a p p l y i n g o p e r a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g d o c t r i n e American manuals The A m e r i c a n d e l e g a t i o n b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e Soviets m i g h t mistakenly believe that the United States had a launch on w a r n i n g p o l i c y It c o n s i d e r e dt h a t Soviet misapprehensions should be corrected I f i n f a c t Soviet d e l e g a t i o n andgovernment has been under misapprehension that launch on warning represented U S d o c t r i n e c o u l d e x p l a i n some a s p e c t s of S o v i e t SALT d e l e g a t i o n of readiness accept at stance includinglack f u l l v a l u e U S statements o f concern over growing v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f land-based missile force There may o f course b e some d e t e r r e n t v a l u e i n Soviet u n c e r t a i n t y over U S p o l i c y i n t h i s r e g a r d but there also could be risk and danger i n such mistaken view There may b e some b a r g a i n i n g unconstrained or l e v e r a g e i n n o t i n g t h a t yn7 _ i n e f f e c t u a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d s t r a t e g i c arms competit o turn t o a tion there might be incentive 'Statement by Ambassador Smith May 1 2 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis from U S D e l S a l t t e l 6 3 May 1 2 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis The d r a f t s t a t e m e n t was r e v i s e d on i n s t r u c t i o n i n o r d e r t o a v o i d any i m p l i c a t i o n of p o s s i b l e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f j o i n t systems on a c c i d e n t a l o r unauthorizedlaunch from U S D e l S a l t t e l 6 0 May 8 1 9 7 0 Secret Exdis t o U S D e l S a l t t e l 71111 May 11 1 9 7 0 Secret Exdis On b a l a n c e we assume launch on warning p o l i c y i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e a f f i r m t h a t Fhe U n i t e d S t a t e s-7 a c o n s i d e r s i t h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e t o - a v o i d situation in which either side would f e e l compelled tf r e l y on a launch on warning doctrine At the plenary meeting o f May 15 Mr Semenov s a i d t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t was u n r e l a t e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f a c c i d e n t a l unauthorized or p r o v o c a t i v el a u n c h e s The Soviets were thinking o f various American statements in the context of MIRVs and ABMs and t h e y n o t e d t h a t S e c r e t a r y o f Defense L a i r d had i n d i c a t e d o n May 1 2 t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n had considered a launch on warning policy in the previous year Speaking t o theJacksonsubcommittee o f theSenate Armed S e r v i c e s Committee on May 1 2 S e c r e t a r y o f Defense L a i r d had said The s u g g e s t i o n s made l a s t y e a r t h a t we e i t h e r i n c r e a s e our o f f e n s i v e forces or are assume a p o s t u r e o f launch-on-warning examples i n t h e f i r s t c a s e o f t h e h a r d and difficult decisions the fiscal year 1971 program i s d e s i g n e d t o postpone and i n the second case o f a s i t u a t i o n whichno President would want t o face a s t h e o n l y course o f a c t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n an impending crisis 3 o f Play 1 9 M r Smith e x p l a i n e d In the plenary meeting t h a t t h e r e had b e e n s u g g e s t i o n s a l o n g t h i s l i n e b y p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s and members o f C o n g r e s s b u t t h a t t h e y had n o t b e e nc o n s i d e r e d b yt h eA d m i n i s t r a t i c n I nr e s p o n s e to q u e s t i o n s from t h e Jacksonsubcommittee SecretaryLaird had s p e c i f i c a l l y s a i d lFrom U S D e l S a l t t e l 65 May 1 2 1 9 7 0 Secret Exdis 2Semenov Statement May 1 5 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis from U S D e l S a l t t e l 73 May 1 5 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis 3Documents on Disarmament 1970 p 209 2 - 4 - T h i s s t r a t e g y t h a t has been advocated by some t o launch our missiles on warning I b e l i e v e i s a v e r y dangerous strategy and should not b e f o l l o w e d b y our country I would hope that that kind of strategy would never b e a d o p t e d b y any A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r b y any Congress M r Smith s a i d t h a t t h i s made t h e U S p o s i t i o n c l e a r and t h a t h e w o u l d welcome a s i m i l a r Soviet statement 1 Mr Semenov thankedhim f o r c l a r i f y i n g t h e q u e s t i o n and s a i d t h a t t h i s was o f v a l u e i n understanding the American p o s i t i o n 2L a t e r M r Grinevsky USSR t o l dG a r t h o f f and Akalovsky o f t h e A m e r i c a n d e l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e Soviets considered the question closed lStatement by AmbassadorSmith May 1 9 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis from U S D e l S a l t t e l 7 6 May 19 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis 2US USSR S a l t M e e t i n g 9 May 1 9 1 9 7 0 Secret 3From U S D e l S a l t t e l 105 May 28 1 9 7 0 Secret Limdis This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu