REPRODUCED - Warhlngttan D C 20320 TOPsECRET NODIS SENSITIVE ' -- October 7 1970 Mr I r w i n J - Mr Johnson TO U FROM SUBJECT Luncheon ConversationOctober - Seymour Weiss on SALT 2 w i t hP a u l Nitze SALT On Substance Paulstarted by sayinghethoughtthat had gone aboutas w e l l as i t could a l l things considered It soon became c l e a r however thatfromastrategicpoinr o f view Paul has considerable misgivings concerning the e f f e c t of t h e c u r r e n t SALT agreement The explanation i s that as currently projected the agreement would permit the S o v i e t s to develop a f i r s t s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y a g a i n s t US land'- ased m i s s i l e s and bombers and moreover t o do so without yiolating the agreement This could come about i f as kxpected theSoviets MIRV eventhe 250 SS-9s a l l o t t e d t o them by the agreement and i n a d d i t i o n i f they were t o o f theapproximately 1000 S S - l l s I n improvetheaccuracy t h e meanti- the agreement would preclude the US from deploying an ABM defense o f US ICBMs and bombers o f making the land-based missiles mobile or o f hardening to withstand a f i r s t strike attack ' i inthePentagonsuggest t h a t t h e MINUTEMAN I 1 1 MIRV i s turning' o u tt ob ea ne v e nm r ea c c u r a t e warhead t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d and i' t h a ta c c u r a c y down t o 1 mileappearstobeentirelyfeasible ' ' Withsuchaccuracythepresent MINUTEM4N I 1 1 warhead 175 kt would have a 90% k i l l p r o b a b i l i t y a g a i n s t a hardenedSoviet m j$s i l e O b v i o u s l yN i t z ef e e l s that goingthe f i r s t s t r i k e rout i s a dangerousoptionfor us t of o l l o w However he feels ' t h a t t h i s i s somewhat less dangerous than a second alternatiGe r 2 We mightchangeourdoctrinetooneof launchon warning '' Thishasalwaysbeencontraryto US strategic doctrine butheacknowledges we c o u l d b e f o r c e d i n t o adoptio ' o f such a p o l i c y i f o u rl a n df o r c e becomes as v u l n e r a b l et o a f i r s t s t r i k e as seems a t l e a s tt h e o r e t i c a l l yp o s s i b l e Both '- t h i s d o c t r i n e and t h e development o f a US f i r s t s t r i k e capa-' b i l i t y are o f c o u r s e e x t r e m e l y u n s t a b l e a n d i n t i m e o f i n t e n s e c r i s i s could inexcusably be dangerous y ' ' 3 ' 3 We c o u l d abandon a l l land-basedforces and'move -' e n t i r e l yt os e a T h i s would presumablybeNitze'spreferred ' o p t i o n Though he acknowledges heprobablyheavilydiscount $' t h e arguments a g a i n s tt h i sa p p r o a c h namely t h a tt h i s would resultinputting a l l oureggs i n onebasketwhere a techno- i ' l o g i c a lb r e a k t h r o u g h s u c h as i n ASW could make us h i g h l y v u l n e r a b l eT h i os p t i o n a l s oo cf o u r s ep r e s e n t s e r i o u s _ c o s t problems d i n c e it presumablyinvolvesbuildingadditi0na d Poseidonsubmarines o r U W I I indicatedthattherewere ofcourse some i n Washington who were d i s t u r b e d by t h i s ' prospective v u l n e r a b i l i t y of o u r forcqs ' b u t t h a t we hadbeen s u r p r i s e d ' t h a t we hadhad l i t t l e o r no i n d i c a t i o n o f concern on t h i s fromour SALT D e l e g a t i o n PauL'd r e s p o n s e t o t h i s was t h a t h e f e l t t h a t ACDA had l a r g e l y writte$ o f ft h e MINUTEMAN a n da c c o r d i n g l y f e l t t h a t sdme o t h e r that some i nt h e government arearguingthatthe 250 SS-9 ' limit isnotimportantsinceassuggestedaboveevenwith 250 theSoviets could develop a f i r s t s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y The l a r g e rt h ea b s o l u t e number of s t r a t e g i cv e h i c l e s t h e g r e a t e rt h ef i r s ts t r i k ep o t e n t i a l M o r e o v e r P a u l would argue that the Soviet a b i l i t y t o g a i n p o l i t i c a l advantage ' by persuadingothersthatthe US was i n h i b i t e d from taking - ' effective action because of Soviet absolute superiority and f i r s t s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y might w e l l be enhanced by t h e g r e a t e r d i s p a r i t y i n numbers between ourselves and the Sovie 1 -I I 4 1 i On Procedure While I n e v e r r e c e i v e d an entirely satisfactogy 1 answer t ot h eq u e s t i o no f why i t was thatneitherPaulnor General Allison the JCS Representative did not point up the inherentstrategicdangerinthecurrent SALT proposal the ' answer seemed to implythatthereason was t o befound i n theproceduralarrangementswithinthe'Delegation Paul went to some p a i n s t o make i t c l e a r t h a t h e f e l t his relatiorik very good and t h a t on a very large ' ships with Gerry Smith were p a r t of the proposals formulated by the Delegation he was i n complete agreement with Gerry At the same time he was f equally candid in stating that on those few occasions where ' I hesharplydiverged Gerry appeared t o t u r n the'issueinto a vote o f confidence Paul f e l t t h a t it was obviously impossible f o r the President to support him against the head o f the Delegation nor did he want to p l a c e e i t h e r G e r r y o r m r e importantlythePresident inthat awkward p o s i t i o n As a r e s u l t h e s a i d t h a t h e had a t t e m p t e d t h e r e a f t e r to I I ' ' work out the b e s t compromise possible on issueswherehe ti disagreed He impliedthat he was g e n e r a l l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h ' theresultingarrangements but I d i dn o tp r e s s himon the ' point He d i d s a y t h a t when on a couple o f occasionshe hadcommunicated d i r e c t l y w i t h DOD i n d i c a t i n g some personal ' ' divergence o f view thatGerrytookseriousissuewith him I was o f c o u r s e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e exchange on t h i s subject which you may r e c a l l t e r m i n a t e d i n a meeting between Gerry Smith and L a i r d i n B r u s s e l s w h i c h r e s u l t e d i n a c a b l e from L a i r d i n d i c a t i n g t h a t a l l problemshadbeenresolved ' $ c Comment It i s e x t r e m e l yd i f f i c u l t from t h i sd i s t a n c e and on the basis of t h i s one discussion t o t e l l how serious a 'Y substantive and proceduralproblemexists We have o f ' I I 4 r 'V 4 a ' TOP SECRFP NODIS SENSITWE a ' 3 f 1 W size mm as - f RsPaoouceo ATTHE 5 TOP 1- 4 a 5 5 course been aware to some extent that both did exist 'Yet l it is clear that insofar as they do the points have tended 3 to be submerged under the pressure for a SALT agreement 0n the substantive side even if one accepts the strategic EH instability inherent in the pending SALT proposalmeans self-apparent that in the absence of a SALT ment we would be any better off In fact a case can be made that while a SALT agreement of the sort currently projected carries with it the danger of the development of af' first strike capability by the Soviets it may place some i restraints on Soviet capabilities which would otherwise noti i exist in the absence of an agreement General Vogt Directs 'i of the Joint Staff and a keen observer of US grams essentially takes this position The other side i the coin is that it is unwise to enter-into an agreement 33$ i inherently unsound and that with an agreement enormous $3 political pressures will be generated not to break it even if the Soviets begin to develop the first strike capability which some fear In short Paul seems resigned to the facthg' ign that SALE is about as good as we can get and is prepared await future deveIOpments before deciding whether j the US will be faced with the necessity of having to protect g against a first strike capability by the Soviets and i fc g it is deciding at that time what are the available options g $3 0n the procedural side Paul appears to accept present arrangements Yet surely everything does not seem as it ft should be Surely the fact that we have never once receivedgq an analysis from our Delegation pointing up the obvious danger of the agreement embodying the potential for developf 3 aep ment of a Soviet first strike capability is disturbing So too is the implication and I should underline this is ii my interpretation and I may be wrong that a senior member pg of the Delegation feels constrained from explicitly stating i a non-concurrence in specific and important features of thefg 6 a negotiations ax _s 5 as For obvious reasons this memorandum must be held in strictest 5 11' confidence15345 5- a 0 33 P- - ii riff - a @121 I f i 913 is z-Jsewn'gh5 34 its 1 I - amt n-l This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu