SECRET ' ' MEMORANDUM TO THROUGH FROM SUBJECT The Secretary s s TheUnder Secretary - ' DPRC Meeting of Survivability March 1 7 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 'j 1 I f ' ' # ' i ' I I ' - ' 1 _ ' 1 I The DPRC meton Wednesday March 17 todiscussissues with respect to the future survivability of our strategic forces Henry Kissinger explatned that he did not feel We ' had a chance toaddresstheseissqesin deptli duringthe recentVerificationPanel meetings on SALT It was obvious that there were differences on the matter and he suggested '1 the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g more' c l e a r l y what these differences were and what measures i f any should be taken to reduce strategic -force vulnerabilify i ' I I ' l i I ' ' t I ' '3 - ' i a 2 ' 4 $3 1 1 A ' ' $ Themain points to emerge a t the meeting were r i 2 ii a Minuteman Vulnerability There a r e two questions withrespect t o Minuteman vulnerability First how soon ' ' y w i l l i t occur and second what are the implications It i s I worthnotingthatthere is general agreement to the f a c t _ that i t is clearlywithin the Sovietcapabilitytodeploy ' ' ' ' - ' s ' i I I '8 I 8 I I forces which could make Minuteman vulnerable However the various agencies make diffeyent estimates of the future Soviet 3 X MIRV threat and the tiine i n which this w i l l develop As a $ ' I result there are d i f f e r e n t estimates as to when Minuteman' I OSD concerns i t s e l f might become vulnerable Ingeneral I ' ' i with worse case assumptions and thus concludes that I - -2 a ' _ ' %f ' ' 3 fl -' _ Ai I I - A i Minuteman could become v u l n e r a b l e by themid-1970s The i n t e l l i g e n c e commmityusing more l i k e l y threatsconcludes ' 1 6 t h a t t h i s i s n o tl i k e l yt oo c c u ru n t i lt h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 so r ' ' ' 1 i @ e a r l y1 9 8 0 s The k e yi s s u e s re when can the S o v i e t sp u t s i x o r more MIRVs on an SS-9 and when can t h e ya c h i e v e b _ a c c u r a c i e s o f one-quarter of a mile o r b e t t e r - mere $ remaiq d i f f e r e n c e s o f v i e w on these q u e s t i o n s $ x I I ' I' -9 ' V' VV k ' ' it - c ' x %S $' b Bombers There are also two q u e s t i o n s here 1 ' '' y $F ' c how many bombers would s u r v i v e an' attack and 2 how many ofthose t h a t d i d s u r v i v ec o u l dp e n e t r a t eS o v i e td e f e n s e s ' i ' 3 The main s u r v i v a b i l i t y t h r e a t comes from S o v i e t SLBMs TO ' I ' 1 - a c h i e v e a major threat they would have t o adopt t a c t i c s ' ' _ ' e i e depressed t r a j e c t o r yf i r i n g s which they have n o t ' y e t demonstrated W e can take counter-measures such as' % % i$ dispersal o f bombers and probablyaccomplish t h i s well -spej b e f o r e the threat emerges As t op e n e t r a t i o n the S o v i e t s % I haveextensive a i r defenses' and might improve them i n t h e _ ' -1 ' ' - f u t u r e they are not precluded from doing so i n SALT - ' 5 a ' g- Again we have counter-measures such as a i r launched I ' missiles low a l t i t u d ep e n e t r a t i o n sa n d ' e l e c t r o n i cc o u n t e r ' V $ y measures Dave Packard seemed c o n f i d e n tt h a tf o r the ti K t ' y 6 foreseeable f u t u r e s u f f i c i e n t bombers cansurvive and penetrate to targets to destroy 25% o f the Soviet population i $ ' I ' I ' I ' 1 Submarines There is a t p r e s e n t no s e r i o u s threat t o the' US P o l a r i sf o r c e T h e r e are p o t e n t i a lt h r e a t si n the ' l a t t e r part o f t h i s decade which would be s e r i o u s ' b u t D e f e n s eb e l i e v e s that f o r a l l the threats we can now p o s t u l a t e t h e US can devise counter-measures Nevertheless there remainsconsiderableuncertaintyabout the d i r e c t i o n o f ASW t e c h n o l o g yi n the l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s decade and ' p r e c i s e l y what threats we might have t o meet C 8 ' c I ' I If t $J i $ti i_ ' $ i y i J 'I ' I ' I I ' e3 $ ' j i ' $ ' j L i ' ' I I d Implicationsof Strategic Force'Vulnerability ' The i m p l i c a t i o n so f the s i t u a t i o n d e s c r i b e d above depend t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent on what we want our s t r a t e g i c f o r c e st o do If their s o l eo rp r i n c i p a lo b j e c t i v e is AssuredDestruction growingSovietcapabilities pose l i t t l e t h r e a t even i f they emerge sooner rather than l a t e r i e US f o r c e sr e m a i n i n ga f t e r a Soviet f i r s t s t r i k e could s t i l l d e s t r o y many S o v i e t c i t i e s If t h e o b j e c t i v e s o f o u r strategic forcesextend beyond Assured are l e s s D e s t r u c t i o nt h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fv u l n e r a b i l i t y clear F o r example thediscussiontouched on such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y i e how would US p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p r e a c t ' i n a c r i s i s if a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n o f US f o r c e was c o n s i d e r e d v u l n e r a b l e and e x t e n s i o no fd e t e r r e n c et oo u r allies Differences the v u l n e r a b i l i t y remain as to the implicationsof problem for meeting these objectives and indeed the role o f strategic f o r c e s i n meeting them I- e i ' ' ' 1 A $ F u t u r e Work Henry K i s s i n g e r asked t h e DPRC Working Group t o develop a tabularpresentationcomparing the v a r i o u s threat assessments ' the counter-measures that ' j ' we might take and thetiming o f t h et h r e a t i n r e l a t i o n t o $l i iJ2t o u ra b i l i t y t o respond t o it He a l s os u g g e s t e dc h a t the ' a J group meet a g a i no n c et h i sa n a l y s i s was completedto I PI' ii s address' the followingconceptualquestions ' l I '' ' ' -'-W - I 1 Do -we needanindependentcapability for Assured Destruction i n eachelement o f t h e s t r a t e g i c foyces i e SLBMs ICBMs and bombers I ' ' L 2 What i s t h er e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e' o b j e c t i v e s ' o f s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s as s e t f o r t h i n the c u r r e n tP r e s i d e n t i a l l y ' approved s u f f i c i e n c y criteria and o u r p r o j e c t e d c a p a b i l i t i e s ' - ' ii 'i ' What criteria should we apply to c r i s i s s t a b i l i t y and ' relative damage What capabiliki'es do we need to extend' ' ' -''b's Lv ' d e t e r r e n c e to our a l l i e s ' x 1 if # I ' j A j 0 # e I I I I i SECRET ' j' I 3 t $ ' flxcd 3 To W I K I t improvements I 'i i PM ISP LSloss i jg 3 18 71 Ext 20610 SECRET This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu