ON 28227 LMORANDUM YCOUNCIL NATIONAL SECURIT TOP SECRET - ' M a y 10 1971 J MEMORANDUM FOR DR KISSINGER FROM K Wayne Smith S U B J E C T H a r o l dB r o w no nS A L T Harold Brown has sent you a l e t t e r T a b B which outlines his views on the next round of SALT The letter makes the following points -- B r o w n continues to be1iev e that an agreement on defensive and o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s i s p r e f e r a b l e i f w e c ait n gAlthough et we should r e m e m b e r that silo-based missiles will become increasingly m e r a b l e i n any agreement which now seems feasible -- The Soviets' principal tactical interest seems to be thelimitation of Safeguard and they have proposed an ABM-only agreement t o that end They would probably accept two Safeguard sites if we pushed the issue -- Brown continues to believe that an ABM-only agreementa t z e r o l e v e l f o r both sides would be advantageous to U S security although lkero now seems non-negotiable He believes that there may be other ABM-anly agreements which would be advantageous -- H i s p o s i t i o n o n A B M - o n l y i s p r e d i c a t eon d the view that the Soviets can already threaten Minuteman and the key to stability is to limit A B M i na w a y t o p r e s e r v eour penetration capability with other a launch-on warning capabilitv systems He notes that maintaining whether or not we have such a doctrine would decrease the likelihood that the Soviets would find an attack of Minuteman attractive -- Brown asserts that the important issue is to get controls over radars To that end we could concentrate on ABM-orily in the context o f z e r o - l e v e l f o r b o t h s i d e s or Moscow NCA four-site Safeguard In the latter case we should be prepared to go as low as one site to get TOP S E C R E T TOP SECRET 2 radar limits He would be willing to accept radar limits involving the specification o f numbers of phased-array faces a t a given number of locations Failure to control radars could result in the deployment of a l a r g e radar infrastructu re which could be augmented by missileand launchers to produce a heavy ABM defense over a 300-400 m i l e radius F o r t h o s e who w0rr y about SA M upgrade which Brown considers theoretically possible but not practical they should worry even m o r e about @re contri bution of large phased-array radars I n s u m m a r y B r o w n b e l i e v e s that a Soviet ABM capability without adequate controls i s f a r m o r e d a n g e r o u s m i l i t a r i l y than m o r e SS-9 m i s s i l e s a n d f a r more dangerous than Safeguard i s helpful While not totally new Harold Brown's arguments are persuasivbly put The major weaknesses are -- He dismisses the potential of SAM upgrade This isn't critical unless one postulates a major defensive capability in upgraded SAMs but s o m e a r g u e that a significant potential exists -- He disposes of the crisis stability argument by introducing launch-on-warning capabilitv with the inference it would deter the Soviets from an attackof Minuteman -- Finally he ignores whatever implkcations there may b e t o t h e potential for either Soviet numerical superiorityo p a continuation of the arms race in offensive systems These weaknes ses are not homver fatal to his basic argument p %ve drafted a brief note from you to Brown thanking him for his letter RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letter at Tab A TOP SECRET C A L I F O R N I A I N S T I T U T E OF TECHNOLOGY Dr Henry A Kissinger The White House Washington D C Henry Dear 90606 Since I ' m not sure I will g e t t o ' s e e you before this month's decisions are reached about the next steps i n the SALT talks I am writing down my thoughts about some current questions I probably wil1 be able t o discuss them with Gerry Smith by secure telephone and I am sending him a c o p y o f t h i s l e t t e r as well Please use these ideas as you think fit including if appropriate their transmfssion to the President I 1 I continue to believe that an agseementon offensive and defensive forces i s preferable if we can g e t it for the usual reasons-of stability minimization of resources expended on strategic arms etc It should be remembered however that there are some things that w i l l not be achieved by any of the comprehensive agreements that now seem feasible oneexample is that silo-based missiles are going to become'increasingly vulnerable in any event 2 The S o v i e t s ' p r i n c i p a l t a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e negotiations continues t o appear t o me t o be the limitation of Safeguard because t h e y r a t e i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s e s p e c i a l l y as the infrastructure of a thick ABM system much more highly than I do The question i s what will t h e y g i v e i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n such limitations At the moment it i s c l e a r t h a t t h e y a r e w i l l i n g t o g o f o r anABM-only agreement a t t h e l e v e l of NCA on both sides Indeed they have submitted a treaty to this effect but with some provisions which I f i n d very troublesome no control on quality or numbers o f radars no control on ABM c a p a b i l i t i e s of EW radars no control o f SAM-upgrade 100 Probably they would accept a MoscowNCA missiles and launchers and a two Safeguard s i t e agreement they keep saying that four i s unacceptable and three i s unacceptable and f i v e i s unacceptable leaving a pretty clear conclusion I t i s not clear however whether they would acceptother ABM-only agreements Indeed there remains a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e y a r e t r y i n g t o manipulate the SALT talks so as t o limit Safeguard to two-sites without limiting - Dr Henry A Kissinger May 3 1971 -2- themselves a t all however I believe they understand the U S domestic p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n w e l l enough to recognize that two Safeguard s i t e s have essentially-already been funded by the Congress 3 I have not changed my own view that an agreement involving only A B M but at t h e z e r o l e v e l on both sides would be advantageous t o the biilitary s e c u r i t y o f t h e U S and o f t h e S o v i e t Union But the negotiating situation haschanged since I made the suggestion in January that we respond to the Soviet N-only suggestion by accepting on condition that it be f o r a zero We probably will now There are have t o go a t the negotiating situation dizferently probably other ABM-only agreements which would help-U S m i l i t a r y security but there are also somesuch agreements which would not ABM My judgments o f anABM-only agreement are based on the view that limiting the Soviet ABM i s the most important objective i n terms o f m i l i t a r y s t a b i l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c arms limitation I b e l i e v e t h a t it i s more importanteventhan the limitation of Soviet modern'large missiles because they now have enough payload if they MIRV t h e i r m i s s i l e s t o be able to threaten our Minuteman very heavily But I would note that Minuteman surv'iva1 i s not I believe in the identical with U S supreme national interest three-fold deterrent but t h e ' t h r e e l e g s o f t h i s t r i p o d need not be identical i n their operation A U S c a p a b i l i t y t o be able t o launch Minuteman at Soviet milztary targets on'an unambiguous warning a doctrine of doing so can r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y be achieved during the mid-70's It would present the Soviets with a s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t should they att ck Minuteman the r e s u l t w i l l be not that they destroy it but that instead they lose their bomber bases if the U S does react by launching b e f o r e t h e i r m i s s i l e s Xand This is by nomeans a sure t a c t i c f o r us but having the capability t o do so makes Soviet preemption o f Minuteman a r e l a t i v e l y r i s k y and unattractive choice for them t o f o l l o w It could result in a situation for them involving an unequal degradation o f s t r a t e g i c forces of the sort that you and the President have noted would be most uncomfortable f o r us -In this particular case they mighthave l o s t most of t h e i r bombers and used upmuch o f t h e i r land-based missile force in attacking m i s s i l e s i t e s which were emptywhen their missiles arrived e 4 But t o achieve the stability which I b e l i e v e can ABM requires real limitation ' A limit o f one hundred missiles and launchers by i t s e l f does not mean very much because particularly with the Soviet ABM systems it i s easy t o move into place launchers and missiles previously built and stockpiled The geographical limit f o r t h e s i t i n g of radars i s some additional u t i f they can have as many radars as they want assurance t o us B and o f whatever kind they want they could build enough radars within two hundred miles o f Moscow t o be able t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o c r e a t e quickly a very heavy defense by moving i n i n t e r c e p t o r s and launchers be gained from limiting Dr Henry A Kissinger May 3 1971 -3- They could prpduce a heavy defense over a three or four hundred mile radius if the miss il es have several hundred mile interception range 5 Therefore I b e l i e v et h a t an appropriate response t o the current Sovi e$ posture i s t o be w i l l i n g t o concent r a t e on $talking abput ABMlimitation f o r a while leaving open the p o s s i b i l i t y of insisting on some sort of side agreement on offensive weapons depending upon how the dZscussions on ABM turn out We could start thoseydiscussions in terms e i t h e r o f a zero-ABMon both sides or with a Moscow NCAplus four-site Safeguard Perhaps t h e l a t t e r i s preferable We could then o f f e r t o go t o a two-site or even aones i t e Safeguard i f they w i l l accept t i g h t l i m i t s on the radars In this respect w e should i n s i s t o n l i t p i t a t i o n o f the number o f radars and s t a r t w i t h our present insistence on being able to name the numbers locations and types o f radars--target tracking and m i s s i l e guidance acquisition and track and with supplementary limitations onHenhouse types We may have t o back o f f on'allowing modernization within types This may be a l l r i g h t p r o v i d i n g w e can i n s i s t t h a t t h e number o f 1ocations be limited along the lines of alternative two among the six radar limitations considered somemonths ago perhaps backing o f f t o a l t e r n a t i v e four If they continue t o o b j e c t t h a t such l i m i t a t i o n s a r e t o o complex and unacceptable then we should proceed t o argue that zero ABM i s clearer-and more easily definable and that we insist onunambiguous qualitative limitations which if their objection islborrect can bemet by only zero ABM ' 6 I would add thatthose i n the U S who worry about ABM upgrade which I consider theoretically possiblebut p r a c t i c a l l y not possible should be' p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the l a c k o f q u a l i t a t i v e l i m i t s on Soviet NCA A B M which might be internetted with their surface-to-air missile systems t o c r e a t e some ABM capability outside o f the geographically limited ABM radar c i r c l e ' ' 7 I am concerned that there may be willingness which I have seen exhibited both by the JCS and i n t h e S t a t e Department for various reasons t o l e t the Soviets off the hook o f qualitative and numerical limitations on ABM radars Somemay hope that this could in return allow more Safeguard sites either now i n the negotiations or l a t e r as a result of gaining public support f o r such aprogram if the Soviets were t o b u i l d 50 radars within the geographical limitations as allowed by such an agreement I believe that approach i s poor p o l i t i c s and worse security policy The Soviets are more l i k e l y t o delude themselves than we are -that the c a p a b i l i t y o f a qualitatively unlimited system i s enough t o a l l o w them t o throw their weight around i n peacetime or take chances i n a c r i s i s This asymmetry even in the unlikely event that a qualitat i v e l y u n l i q i t e d agreement and achange i n U S public opinion allows more extensive ABM on both sides i s l i k e l y t o be both Dr Henry A Kissinger -4- May 3 1971 destabilizing and unfavorable to the U S It will encourage Soviet adventurism much more than American willingness to situations involving less than strategic nuclear war act 8 I should like to repeat in conclusion my main point A Soviet ABM capability inadequately circumscribed is far more dangerous to us militarily than more SS-Qlike missiles and far more dangerous to us militarily than Safeguard is helpful Our policy decisions and negotiating tactics at this point re-should fleet that situation Sincerely cc Ambassador Gerard Smith in 28227 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 15 1 971 Dear Harold Thank you for your interesting and thoughtful l e t t e r o f M a y 3 1971 concerning an ABM-only a g r e e m e n t in the S A L T negotiations You have raised some important issues particularly with regard to radar deployment limitation We are continuing to explore all the relevant aspects of feasible SALT options in our- quest for a viable agreement with the w i l l receive the careful Soviets and your thoughts attention they merit Your contribution to our understanding of these v i t a l i s s u e s i s greatly appreciated L Warm regards --7 Henry Dr Harold Brown California Institute of Technology Pasadena California 91109 A Kissinger i This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu