E s Iloi in Approved For Release MEMORANDUM '9 it THE WHITE HOUSE ours-Ins magma WASHINGTON - INFORMATION 93 January 23 1973 MEMORANDUM FOR FROM WILLIAM E onontg SUBJECT Soviet Launch-'On-Warning Capability An item in the INR Analysis yesterday appeared on this subject See Tab A To prevent misunderstandingS'that it might create round I 1 This upgrading of our estimate actually occurred last ng I asked CIA to tell us about Soviet alert 1eVe1s I believe you forwarded the essence of that report to the President The INR item reflects wider dissemination of this analysis As you know ICBMs are the easiest strategic weapon to control the most responsive and the cheapest to maintain at the highest readiness level The implications are interesting -- The large Soviet buildup in landnbased missiles is obviously the easiest way for the Soviets to gain a rapid response or launch-on warning capability -- The lack of emphasis on SSBN readiness is easier to understand in this overall context The same is true for Soviet long-range aviation -- INR's conclusion that Long Range Aviation make up the Soviet reserve force is cogent at first glance Thelbast comforting implication is the readiness warn- ing time we might have I did not emphasize'that in the report last spring Perhaps it is worth calling to the President's attention on an appropriate occasion in the'future There are implications here for SALT which I won't try to spell out but which spring from the major asymmetries between our Triad and the Soviet strategic posture EA State Dept reviews completed TOP Approved For Release 2005 01 31 Approved For Release 2005l01 31 NLC-6-79-4-20 45 TOP BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH ANALYSIS January 22 1978 1 SOVIET LAUNCH-ON-WARNING CAPABILITY This fast reaction ICBM capability has apparently led the Soviets to consider their ICBMs as their prime retaliatory force This may explain in part the Soviet drive for such a large number'of land-based ICBMs This emphasis will continue into the 19805 the intelligence community projects that over two thirds of the warheads available to the USSR at that time will be deployed on ICBMB 9 That Soviet bombers and serve as a reserve secondestrike'force is suggested by their low level of day- to-day readiness Strategic bombers are not dispersed or placed on their airfields do not have high-speed taxiways It would take the Soviets many hours to prepare these aircraft for combat As or the no more than 15 percent normally are on patrol at any one timew two usually in the Atlantic two in the Pacific two in the Norwegian Sea and one in the North Pacific Approved For Release 2005 01 31 NLC-6-79-4-20-3 TOP Approved For Release 2005101 31 NLC-6-79-4-20-3 TOP 2 MILITARY BUILDUP By 1982 if present trends continue Iraq's armed forces surpass those of Syria and possibly those of Egypt in size and quality In a new conflict with Israel Iraq woul then be capable of sending an expeditionary force three times as large as the one it sent in 1973 Iraq's mil tary buildup began in earnest after the October 1973 war when Iraq had increased oil revenues in hand Its leader ip probably felt an increased urgency as the Iraqi expediti ary ferce to the Golan Heights had made a very disappointing showing The collapse of the Kurdish - rebellion in 1973 ena led Baghdad to focus more attention to the expansion and i provement of its military forces Iraq perceives Iran and Israel as the potential adversaries that warrant its building up of its forces Iran is probably seen as greater threat over the long run Relations between Ira and Iraq have improved since 1975 but the Iraqis fear th latent border problems the_ unsolved Kurdish issues and ompetition for influence in the Persian Gulf may eventuall lead the two countries into -confrontation And the Iraqis a aware of course of the tremendous expansion of Iran' 3 ar ed forces in the past few years In the 1973 war Iraq sent two a_ ored divisions and about 50 aircraft to the Golan Heights It could now dis patch four armored divisions and around 50 aircraft By 1982 these figures will rise to six divi ions and about 150e200 aircraft These projected expedit onary forces amount to less than half of the' Iraqi force and their absence would not seriously denude Iraqi for as in Kurdish areas or along the Iranian border nun-re- Approved For Release 2005 01 31 NLC-6-79-4-20-3 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu