CURRENT US STRATEGIC TARGETING DOCTRINE U ' - U Doctrine used here as statement'of principles for employmentof strategic nuclear resources -- U Based on President's initial guidance for strategic forces PRM-10 Jul 7 7 01 Maintenance of essential equivalence --_ -fTS L --- --- No strategically inferior position CUJ 0 No ' un ess x --Y --- --- ' Maintenance of secure reserve force Maintenance of forces and C3 capabilities to secure limited employment options $ Maintenance of adequate attack warning and assessment -- Aids in maximizing our weapon systems and reduce the probability of being overwhelmed by the systems' technology -- Provides the framework for policies ground rules for nuclear weapon employment and objectives specific qualitative and quantitative goals for targeting within capabilities plans -- - i US disarming first strike capability Soviets do s o first U U U Influences acquisition and deployment policies J -f4W Current doctrine result of evolutionary changes in strategic realities -- CUI 4-53 Achievement of a secure strategic retaliatory capability by Soviet Union in1 9 6 0 s __ HO SAC XOK XPS Col Kearl 2328 Lt Col Locke 4325 3 Dec 1 9 7 9 CLASSIFIED BY Multiple SourcesY March 1 9 9 9 i 2-301C I U Continuous uncertaintythatthethreatof large-scale nuclear retaliation provided the best deterrence U Erosion o f US a l l i e s 'c o n f i d e n c e i n strength and c r e d i b i l i t y of US nuclear deterrent Jj Decline in confidence of ui councarcorce attacks holding damage to theUS to a low level cul W Reductions i n US d e f e n s i v ec a p a b i l i t i e s Articulated via five X - 0 x -- U Formal p o l i c y documents NSDM 2 4 2 PD-18 U Elaboration documents NUWEP JSCP U Declaratorystatements U Capabilities plans SECDEF Report t o Congress SIOP U Forces related command c o n t r o l and i n t e l l i g e n c e which develop support and executethe plans Fundamental Objective Flexible Nuclear Response Deterrence of nuclear and conventional attacks and coercion by nuclear powers againstUS and allies --- U Concept --__ ____ -----_ U Discourages enemy from takingactions U Worksonenemy intentions U P r i m a r i l y a peacetime objective U F o rc r e d i b i l i t y d e t e r r e n c e must be e f f e c t i v e o v e r wide range o f p o s s i b l e contingencies --__ ---- 2 majorelements U Rests on many options U Requiresspectrum of c a p a b i l i t i e s --- k$ Requiresforcesdesignedto promote n u c l e a r s t a b i l i t y and reduce S o v i e t i n c e n t i v e t o use nuclear weapons ---- CD FA S u r v i v a b i l i t yc o n t r o l l e d able to retaliate J ---- Lb f4E2 --- c J --- I Flexibility I 3 Control escalation A should c o n f l i c t o c c u r Confine c o n f l i c tt ol o w e s tl e v e l Display restraint options U W terms r -- CLJ ---- Coerce c o n f l i c tt e r m i n a t i o n 0 on acceptable damage t o US PP64 US counterforcecapability wanning IUJ TTt4-I Lack of improved c i v i l defensemeasures Requires communication of US determinat i o n and a b i l i t y t o r e s i s t a g g r e s s i o n c o u p l e d w i t h i n t e n t and c a p a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e r e s t r a i n t U Maximize US power r e l a t i v e to the enemy i f e s c a l a t i o n cannot be controlled YEUR --- 3 by executing limited IU f 4 One of few means f o rl i m i t i n g X ---- --- c a n provide options 4W Communicated p r i m a r i l y through declaratory policy ---- --- and I --- uj fslsr CV J --- trsj t J x --- WS- --- ---- - U -- i@Sj uj L i m i t damage t o US M a i n t a i n a s t r a t e g i c force i n reserve I 3 --- Seeks t o a c h i e v e a f a v o r a b l er e l a t i v ep o s t war position --- $ I G u i d e st a r g e t i n g for g e n e r aw l ar C h r o n o l o g y o f c u r r e n td o c t r i n e VJ W --- cuj @S O r i g i n a l l yf o r m e db y Zt - Sec L a i r di n 1 9 7 0 o f US n u c l e a r d e t e r - --- TE3 Recommended i n t r o d u c t i o n of l i m i t e dn u c l e a r employment o p t i o n s t o e n h a n c e d e t e r r e n c e and limit damage b y c o n t r o l l i n g e s c a l a t i o n --- tTs - F i n d i n g s were b a s i s f o r NSDM 2 4 2 tu g NSDM 2 4 2 24 Jan 7 4 P o l i c y for P l a n n i n g t h e Employment o f Nuclear Weapons --- Expansion of NSSM 1 6 9 c o n c e p t s ----- % Primary source of c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e # Introduced --- I 4 and p o l i c i e s NSSM 1 6 9 1 3 Feb 7 3 US N u c l e a rP o l i c y to determineeffectiveness -- to e a r l yp o s t - D e s t r o yr e s o u r c e sc r i t i c a l warrecovery 1 L ---- -- 4 i IUJ ---- x c%UJ ---- I - - 1Regional Nuclear Options RNO Small-scale attacks designed to counter deployed attacking enemy-forces and their supporting resources to achieve specific military objectives Includes provision for ReserveForce Secure LO @W NUWEP 4 Apr 7 4 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy --- cu_ -@E%Translates NSDM 242 by SECDEF into policy guidance for employment of nuclear weapons iu ---- W Elaborates on national policy ---- I 3 -- W JSCP Annex C - Provides specific JCS guidance for developmentof the SIOP - revised annually -- PD 18 2 4 Aug 1977 --- UJ W Present administration's statement of overall nuclear policy J ---- @ -I Broad --- L J x ------- --- 01 W enough to encompass range of possible employment policies Not a radical policy change u f'W ReaEURfirms deterrence damage limitation and escalation control U Documents strategic posture of essential equivalence k2YG-j Continues the three-part interrelated objectives ---- x ------- -- - 6 % $ Deter nuclear attack against US and enhance deterrenceof nonnuclear aggression against NATO and Asian allies f- If deterrence fails provide options for limited retaliatory responses to control escalation and flexibly respond to aggression UJ % If control of escalation fails seek to limit damage to US and allies and inflict unacceptable levels of damage on Soviet Unionso conflict terminates on most favorable possible terms to US and -t fs allies NSDM 2 4 2 and NUWEP continue as elaboration to carry out above objectivesalthough PD 1 8 supersedes NSDM 2 4 2 --- -- 0 W 3 0 0 Directs review o f US nuclear targeting policy NTPR NTPR Nuclear Targeting Policy Review 0 --- Evaluates current employment p o l i c i e s and i d e n t i f i e s a l t e r n a t i v e s --- UJ XPS3 4S-l Major f i n d i n g s Lb - Deterrence systems targethighervalue - $%J Escalationcontrol developa broader range o f options w i t h more politicalinputs i Major issues u - - - - tps F l e x i b i l i t y Recommends b u i l d i n g blockapproach restructure and increase number o f SAOs 2 added t o SIOP 5D and 4 proposed foradditionto SIOP 5E u crs Endurance - Concentrate on C 3 1 Requirement f o r refinement of SRF and optionalwithholds - Counterforce Give equal p r i o r i t y compared t o recoveryresources attack r e u s a b l et a r g e t s modernize US forces SRF - Size and composition change J @S- Escalationcontrol - More f u l l y i n t e g r a t e p o l i t i c a l guidance and p a r t i c i p a tion 0 US-NATO i n t e r f a c e - Strengthen cooperation and i n t e g r a t i o no ff o r c e s and plans Rf 7 7 v ---- ---- k --- x LO for Minuteman ICBM implemented in SIOP 5 D ICBM only LUA against 10 collateral military and leadership subsets -@VSJ LUA i 3 LUA -- Maintains three planning assumptions AWD GWOD GWD 8 - Generated with damage added SIOp to sc Postulates fully generated forces which receive damage from Soviet first strike This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu