FILE 30 30 Capy Gapies JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY A HISTORICAL STUD 7 OF STRA TEGIC CONNECTIVITY 1 1950- 1931 HISTORICAL JomT f JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF JULY 1932 mm 9531A ww w n BY QOLEQF 3mm DATE WAN gem - a INC pat 9W THE JOINT CHIEFS 6F STAFF 5H-183-83 eon mm mm ran m 31m SUhject JCS Histqrisal Study '1 Historical Study of Strategic 60mnectivity 1 Ehs subject study was produced at Inquest at the Director 38 It is intended for internal use only and may be released only ands provisions of JCS HOP 39 since the content of the study has not hy the Joint Chiefs of Start it in to be construed as de- scriptivs only and not as constituting otticia1 pasi- tion of the Joint Chiefs of Start 2 Request a can of this Isuorsndun hs sitissd to the inside front cover of each cqu of the study O SWERHBS colonel USAF acting JCS Eustace 31mm m l wm l au Fl am 4 -0 a meat am or me Mr 1350-1931 Historical Division Joint Snaritatiat Joint Clams of Stat July 1982 cmsxunn Multiple scum 1n footnotes DATE 1'03 mm IS 31 number 2002 A armament am or smrcommrr 1950-1981 So PREFACE 69 INTRODUCTION 1 1 THE OS PIECES 3 2 THE OF THE SYSTEM 5 The macs 5 The MEGS 3 Criticisms or the command and Control System 8 3 THE mar 197OIHWMATION 11 She Revised Directive 11 The Evaluation Program 14 4 THE Lark CSHINS IS The SISten 19 Studies 23 osn net Assessment 399reiael 23 Defense Science Board Study o C3 anagement 1 24 Derense Science Board Summer Study 25 Secure Reserve roroe Study 27 sec Strategic Connectivity Study 28 Her Connectivity Study 32 norenoe Science Board Study of Enduring c3 34 lootions to Strengthen Command Control end Communication - 36 The Command Control and Communications Systems Directorate _36 Review of Connectivity Studios 38 - The Joint Strategic connectivity Stef _40 rue Strategic Connectivity Engineering Office _ 41 Presidential decisions 43 The SORAD False Alerts - 44 The Lee Rayon 5 The JCS Smbrelld Study 46 The or enstern Initiative 9 Budget Increases for ca 51 Progress 1978a1980 '57 111 1'1 was 33am EMPEASIS I 61 5 The Strategic Connectivity Bric ing 61 The nd Study '62 The Launch Under Attack Papa 66 nuclear weapons Employmont Policy and c3 67 The President's Decision on Strategic c3 - 69- 1983 Budget 71 rogresa during 1981 - 74 TABLES Strategic Command scuttcl and Ccmmunicatictc' Programs to Which the Congress Money in the FY 1932 nudgut Beyond What the President Requested 55 2 Funding FY 1930-1933 56 AHHEXES - ll 4 q a luau a r in of the Strategic Air Command Strategic Connectivity Study 7 March 1919 a xiv Strategic Contactivity Study rebruary 1979 JCS on the Sac Strategic Cumulativitg Stacy 1 October 1979 3 3 Reccuncndationc on the navy Strategic Cannectivity Chatter C38 30 at 1979 warns of utterance Joint Stratcgic Staff 3 march i930- of the Odds Tactical warning Attack Assessment umbrella Study 6 February 1931 Recommendations c the Strategic Connectivity Review wade Study 5 August 1981 the 338 Launch under Attack Paper Jun 1981 ct Acronym i mm Balms This_ special hiatbrical study was prepared ai the request cf 'Licutanant General Hilmc Dickinson USA Director-'1 for Command Control and Commaaicaticns 'Systems Joint - s'tazt It tracaa the 'aa elopmen o the systems and praceaaraa that link and provide staatagic connection between the National Wand Authczities and the nuclear farces we study was planned and written by Mr Willard 3 'chb Chief Special Project Branch Historical Division Joint Secretariat Organisatian o the Joint Chieta of Start lira Barbara c rioting Editorial Assistant praparcd the nanuacripl for publication - Valuable was ccaivaa from the following mbars of the Command annual and comnnications say-tans - Directorate Ila Jcaaph 3 'rm 0 the 'nvcluaticn Diviaian MC Jessie in ow can it c Hobo Run and CD3 Robert ll - nun USE oi Joint Strategic Requirements and 'COnnactivity Di aicm Tm Mark 3 Smith 1151 3 and COR-David 31 Jonas U511 6 the ca Planning rzogxaming and Budgeting Division aa - L'nc 3amc1'n Harland am and we nanny Stevens USE the Space warning anii Surwillanca Diviaion can nichard- Ellis Ram tamar- CGnnandar of the Stratagic Air Command supplied helpful intonation nut available elsewhere Mormon Introduction 01' The term strategic connectivity has entered the lexicon of military usage only recently The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined it as the facilities systems and procedures that interconnect 'the National Comma Authorities mil national Hilitary Command System secs nuclear clues and nuclear executing commanders It encompasses the not Military Staff Offioo in the White House the White House Communications Agency Mica national Military Command Center Alternate National Military Command Center ANMCC Homo warning systems Rational Emergency Airborne Command Post mom GROWN Helicopter operations osnc helicopters used to- none the President and all links and nodes that interconnect these facilities with tho executing commanders of 3101 aircraft intercontinental Ballistic Missile rose Launch Control Cent-05s Leos and Ballistic issile Submarines 5551913 to Although the tern is recent the procedures and systems that ooupooe strategic connectivity are not Ever sins the deployment of nuclear weapons with 1158 military orets it has been essential to have assured control and connection between those forces and the proper comma authorities System and procedures to that- end hate evolved over the years in accordance with the constantly expending technology associated with nuclear weapons and the I In the docmnte used in this study the term national emu Authority end notional contend Authorities 1Intern usod indiscriminately Both JCS Pub 1 the Joint Dictionary of unitary and Associated terns and non Dir 5100 30 which also provides a definition use the plural form Rational Command Authorities For continent National Command Authorities is employed throughout th study except where the singular form is used in a direct quatetion and when the tern is used as an adjective - and the singular is more appropriate 2 This definition is from a monitor 5 stuoy by the Director Joint strategic Connectivity Staff cases contained in Encl to noon 255 80 to Dir JSCSmuseum axoaassxeznn meane for' their delivery From the - 19505 onwards these systems and procedures were included under the designation of strategic command and control c2 and later strategic camnd control and commit-aunts Only in 1978 however was the term strategic connectivity inttoduoodt At that titre General'nioherd E 51118 Commer- of the Strategic 'Ait Comma SAC expressed to General teem c Jones Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff his concern- over the Soviet threat to the attategio command and control and omunications links between the President and the seoretary of befenee and the US nuclear Hforoes and propooed a study of strategic connectivity Ltr to taco USeoDeftRaE and esotcar 23 Sep 78 3368 File 043 CIHCBAC Interview Willard J Robb with Richard H Ellis am 6 Kay 82 JILL-MU WMEIFIBD The Issuaqugenca of the rims U The Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear device in 1949 and the initial us deployment ct nuclear weapons to nilitary ' orcea followed two years later With those events the United States began to devise and 'i'npleuent procedures I and system to provide ccmuand and ccmunicetion between the President and the nuclear at well as to prcuide warning and assessment at impending Boviet attack These actions during the 1950 provided the initial piece of the strategic connectivity system U Phenomenal advances in technology occurred during the decade of tho 1950 For the delivery of nuclear weapons as stratenic force moved from sole reliance on propeller driven 15-29 to jet eircratt and then to a combine aticn ct 'jet bombers and land-based missiles nally missile launching submarines completed the strategic triad curing the years from 1950 to 1950 planned tine to arepare for war was reduced from 45 daye to 15 'ninuteu Command and control procedures were gradually changed to support developnents The Air Force eetablished a comend port in the dentagcn in 1949 and an alternate poet was authorized thereafter at rt Ritchie Maryland In 1959 the Joint Chiefs ct Staff let up their own command center the Joint War 06m aubeeguently rcdeaignated' the National unitary Command Center lled a the cane tine the Pt Ritchie facility was upgraded and eventually renamed the Alternate Rational Hilitary comm Center tanned to serve an an emergency relocation site for the national demand Authorities and the Joint Chitin of Staff Increasingly sophisticated con nnicaticna data processing and display techniques were introduced in these centers to- maintain control of strike torcea By the end of the decoder plans were advancing for altarnativee to fixed contend centers 3 martian Intro 3 the Navy browsing a national Morgana Command Post Afloat moon and the Air force a National Emergency Airborne Command Post my 11 Creation oi warning and assessment system also proceeded The United States decided in 1953 to build a Distant Early Warning Dam System as a precaution against aircraft attacks and the system was completed in 1960 in 1954 construction of tho Muir-Automatic Ground Environment SAGE computarited system for integrating the entire warning and-- defense network had begun and by the latter part of tho'decade' development of both the Ballistic Missile Early' Warning System my and- satellite reconnaissance system were undorway All of these systems of the 19565 developed without any overall coordination or plan The principal concern was to town this President couplete control over any to one nuclear toroee but little attention we paid to the need for the system to rmin operational throughout a strategic nuclear exotange 1 I For detailed consideration or amend and control developments during tho 1950 see Study 8-467 the Boolution of 0 3 Strategic Cos-land and Control and warning 1945-1912 113 Jun 75 06 Historical Office les mason-Inn mar-assmm The laser-359111111119 at the System The was The 19603 brought action to bring some overall system and coor ination to the are of strata-31 cpmand and Secretary of e ense Robert S McNamara- instituted the first step in October 1952 On the remindation' or th e Joint Chiefs of Start he approved the establishment or the' warlawide' Military Command and conga System macs The object was 'to bring togethrr all the military resource available to ssure the xational Command tuth ritins tutor-- nation an which to mice ctitious and to allow issuance of execute orders to both strategic and tactical forces in response to an attack tgtinlt the United States The new water was to gravid survivability exibility responsiveness stananrdiaatlon and autonomy Its primipnl component was the National-Military Comma Syntax comprising the Rational unitary Command center th- Alternate National 'Mlntary Omaha Center the national _Emergency ' Comma wort afloat the National Burr-gene Airborne Command Post and survivable communications among thore- facilitiu and with uni ed and upbei iad '1' li and senior Thu mes would be harder- mmgemnt and dirrcticn d the Joint 'Chietl of staff supervised by the Director tor Operations or the Joint Start rte qther computing or the was included the of the Savior magnate the Luui ie ' rm specified con-under and their conversant commands anther mo agencies and officer that 'supportgd the comm and control tmtion ma Directive 5100 30 16 act 62 Even thus the Worldwide Military comma and control System was being established advances in weaponry were raising additional threats to the new system In 1952 the United States conducted the 18m tests a final series of high altitude nuclear explosions The most significant was STAR FISH It clearly revealed the vulnerability of hot ground-bascd and airborne communications systems to electromagnetic Qulse EMF from high altitude nuclear bursts This in turnIt brought into question the survivability or communications systems in a nuclear war and the ability 'of tho- National Command Authorities to communicate with and control stratcgio forces 2 I Subsequently in 1963 the Joint Chiefs unseat drafted the National Military Command System Master Plan to define broad planning guidance for the functional organizational and opsntidnsl relationships among tho elements constituting and supporting the ational military Comand Systes as the principal of tire Worldwide Military Comma and control System The mission was to provide the Naticnal demand authority withl the means essential for accurate and timely decisions including tho communications required for national direction of us military forces under all conditions of peace and-nor Th0 Secretary of Defense approusd the in June-1964 3 to its next najor want was the initiation or planning 141 1965 for the masses Automatic Data Processing trogram to enable the different command centers of the system to transmit and exchange data fraparstion of speci cations i Interview Hillard J Webb with Hr Joseph Tons Systems Evaluation Dim C35 24 Kay 82 Lam acs ease 3 54 26 Jan 63 JCS sass 137 as liar 63 no 4930 15 Jul 62 secs 4 and 5 non Dir $5100 9 Jun 64 a for competitive Procurement began the following year and the contract for 35 computer systems was finally awarded in 1971 4 Tito MEECN simultaneously development 0 the Minimum Essential Emetgenoy communications Net was underway In June 1966 the Joint Chiefs o Staff provided the Secretary of Defense a consolidated concept plan to provide survivable communications network to execution of the single Integrated '09esatiOna1 Plan ogtione in the trans- ano poetettsok nuclear environment The Secsetesy gene his approval and the Joint Chisi's o Stef distributed the plan 'in October of the some you The Minimum Essential Emergency 'cwunicetions Net was designed as a last resort mniostions system to give the President control over nuclear forces Initially the aininun Essential Emergency Cmunications et comprised the Navy and his Force systems both fixed sits and airborne from the unified and specified commanders to their respeotive submarine bomber and missile nuclear forces combined with the Emergency Rocket communications System 5 Thereafter in July 1969 the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided that the various olemnts of the ninimnn Essential Emergency Communications Bet must be integrated into 's single reliable and etfeotive omunioetions o-network' and to that end directed the designation oi e 5 the Single Operational Plan 8109 is the JCS 911344 the strategic offensive in a nuclear war 3 to ace 2469 1334Background section DCS Plan for the melt Engineer 29 Jun 79 same tile sec 2 'system engineer to insure -orderly improvement and maintenance of the Network i'he Joint Chiefs of Ste f' favored assignment of this tunotion to the Navy but the- Deputy secretary of Defense overruled them and assigned it- to' the neienoe Communications Agency in Her 1970' Development of a men System Engineer Plan end on operational concept followed during the reminder of 1970 7 0 During the 19603 changes in as nuclear strategy had _ inportent impliostions for strategic command and control who idonedy and Johnson administrations rejected the nseeive retaliation opproeon of the 1950s in avor of a exible response policy that enqisioned iisited nuclear exchanges - instead of one spun ettadit Moreover by the late 19608 the Soviet Union bed achieved strategic psrity ee the United States could no longer count on its nuclear superiority as as defense against nuclear attack Both of - developments greatly increased the requirement for survivable oonneotivity between the national Gounod - Authorities and the nuclear 'ioroes c Cr oisiis oi the Command and Co o1 sisteo But es the requiresents increased growing criticisms and doubts area over the capability end attentiveness oi the existing system although there was no actual ex er ienoe with the- strategic oomsnd end oontroi- system - the' umrt' 9mm end lc-ilZl shootdoin incidents in 1961 31966 end '1969 respectively raised' serious - lieno bepBeoDet to Sean oi ilnepts coca and - airs Jul 59 'htt to nos 24551433 17 Jul 59 JOSH-63249 to ll Oct 69 JCS 2469 1834 C lie-o permeate to Seoye or Milnepts G168 and air nee - 14 Key To to 608 2469 4834 3-62 3 Item Dir nan to Beobei thru cats 29 Jun 10 to JCS 2459 4334 30 Jun 70 some tile sec 2 c-op 3 supwaa-vu to Service Chiefs Clues et a1 I 24 NOV JCS sens file see 3 3 questions 'abeut tactical command and control arrangements and the overall system in general Hanover a series of tests and studies challenged the adequacy or strategic command and W and system as In October 1967 the Joint Chiefs _of Staff conducted Exercise HIGH HEELS 67 to test the entire spectrum of command in as strategic 21 11 11 The results were not enooureging The exercise revealed a lent of uniformity with respect to submission of requests by the since to execution of the 81 13 and excessive delay in receipt of intelligence and situation reporting the letter caused delays in the decision on nuclear weapons end uncertainty about the US to respond in the event or a nuclear attack 3 U in 1970 high lure emittee studying organisation end operation or the nefense Department the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel found responsibility within the Department relating to amend oontrol and communications and strategic connectivity utter inaugurated This was true in both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiete o Stef the most ebvioue wetness of the orgenizetion street-urn the Panel oonelu e is the absence of unitary management et the top level to eesure attentiveness and et cieney tron en overall Department at De ense mission point or vice Just before the Panel report was issued the Secretary of Defense created the position of assistant to the Secretary for Telecommuni- cations and the Blue Ribbon Panel viewed that development es at major improvement 'rS-ep'i rue Report 3-131 '51 Analysis or operational Procedures nurinq Exercise area EELS 67 $131Blue gibbon Defense Pane Regert 1 Jul 70 PP 28 1 5 I Hip-J short tin later the Weapons systems Evaluation Group MEG reviewed command control and communications problems In the resulting report issued inrebruary 1971 the Group repeated the finding oi the Blue Ribbon Panel - The Worldwide unitary command and Control System it said oporated in an environment of divided roagonaibility and independent organizations within the Department of Defense and the overall national security oomuhity Kore herioualy the Weapons System Evaluation Group charged that the muons did not maintain an assured capability to alert the President to an attack and to receive and transmit a Presidential decision to execute the Single Integrated Operational 91am In a nuclear environment the report continued the mes in highly vulnerable and can be rendered inoperative by a mu portion of the soviet weapon inventory thus it cannot ensure the availability of inlorution or warning anoint attach anaesanent and status of forces 0 0 I5 1 W836 Report 159 'Comnd Control and Communications Problems mum 3 the Early 1970s--Reor1entation If The Revised macs emetic In the criticisms and doubts 'ot the late 1960 brought increased attention to the command and control system in the decade or the The 'end a redirection of effort During 1971 neputy Secretary at Detense David Phokerd end Maire Thomas a Hooter Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Start discussed possible-improvements in this area they set dash together in eerie 'ot meetihqe and redreited the teeth worldwide Military nomend end Controb ssreten directiire to give the systen a stronger orientation in support or the President and Secretary of Defense frhe new directive issued on 2 note-her 1971 clearly stated the primary mission at the system es support of the Nations comma Authorities The directive essighed the Chaim of the Joint chiefs of Staff responsibility to operate the Rational nilitery Command System define its scope and cosponehts develop end validate its requirements end mete reoomendetions to the secretary or ne ehse to insure the responsiveness tunotioheil interoperability ehd l standardisation of the orideide Military amend end control System In addition provision was included for mos Council cad-posed o the mouth Secretary ot Detense the Cheimn of the Joint chiefs or scare the assistant Secretary of Defense for intelligence and the hesistent to the Secretary of Defense tor feloomunioetions to give policy quidenoe' tor the development 'ehd 'operetioh of 'the system end to e eluate its pertornnoe d can on 5100 30 2 71 11 mm - hMmu-u u The new ciructive' eliminator the concept for operation' of the nystom cod the Joint Chiefs of Star prepared and issued in September 1973 separate oriduidc' ilitary Comma anti Control 5173th Objectives Plan it set' forth objectives based on operational requirements to guide develoyment of the system It also contained list of supporting objectives tor ace in preparing tho commend -- anc control portions of the joint strategic plowing documents and an annotation of issues for further study and improvement One broad area in the latter categorif was additional capability to insure positive control or nuclear rotate to include more survivable electronic for antellitc land submarine communications and procedures for procuring continuity o maxim U To guide suture development or the worldwide unitary Bound and Control System an architocture' plan an devcioped Cheimn of the Joint Chiefs or Start originally requested the Director De ance Cmunicntionc Agency in December 1973 to produce a target architecture for 1985 and a transition pin to achieve the desired objective aecause- or Servicc disagreements over funding for the project the meta Council turned to contractual arrangement The IBM Corporation was selected computitively in 1974 to develop the architecture for the Department ct Dar-nu The resulting Worldwide Military command and Control System Architectural Plan or neuter plan 5 814-43343 to Cinch 25 Sep 73 Shin-73 to servicc Chiefs 25 Sep 13 831-535-714 to Defense Agencies 25- 8ep '33 JCS 2308 5713 380 12 sop Three days later the Joint Chiefs or Staff also issued policy guidance and procedural instruction for management of the mos See Sit 44043 to Service Chiefs Cities and Defence Agencies 26 Sup 73 was 2308 5741 360 13 Sep 73 Both documents were subsequently combined an 3000 macs chant-tires and angenent Plan arcs Pub 19 reviewed by the macs Council in June 19% eunplied framework for long term system development through 1985 and beyond It was intended to anticipate future requirements for command control and oomuniontione from the viewpoint of the National Comand Authorities and to provide a decision-eupoorting structure attuned to realities of the late twentieth century To monitor the implementation of the architecturerthe moss Council chartered the worldwide Military Command and Control System Engineer 353 3 In January President Nixon issued a new policy directive NSDM 2 2 ror nuclear employment planning which reaffirmed and expanded the flexible response policy developed in the 19605 president Nixon directed that The united States will rely primarily on 13 8 and allied conventional forces to deter conventional aggrouion by both nuclear and noon-nuclear powers Nevertheless this does not preclude a 5 use of both nuclear a a non-noel ear weapons in response to conventional aggression Consequently the President wanted us planneref to prepare a wide range or limited nuclear employment notions that could be used in conjunction with supporting palitical and military measures to control escalation 91 To insure that nuclear romeo were responsive to the national Gomnd Authorities Resident Nixon directed that Fleming for command control mutilation not surveillance must nupport decision-making and force execution no a minimum he wanted such planning to provide annential support to decision-making end execution of retaliatory strike in the event of largentraok upon the United Staten as well as adequate support for deoision-making and flexible use of nuclear toroen ace Hist om one Worldwide emu commend ontnol Bsten A Hietor on - no on Wm any PP- Commend ana Control System An approach to Architectural Development 11 6 JCB Hint Div files 13 W2Ahv I I'L'duu - in attempts to conttoi escalation in local conflict who President's directive was more demanding in tom of comma 'and control capabilities than previous policies and- added now'comand control and communications requirments The Evaluation 9 ng tr eantime in accordance with the 1971 iroctive the macs Council approved in ammation of a performance evaluation program to give butter of the weakness and requizements oi the system Based on the racemen ation of the Joint suit the program was to consist of a action of annual JCS general nuclear was exercises under di femnt anon-omen The that exercise 31cm 235MB 1 oocurttd in may 1914 11 represent a total departure iron the motion JCS 3165 HEEL cmrciaoar which had ban in the natuu of training exorciscs and simulated a more Holistic anoint environment In NICKEL PLATE 14 damage or destruction of command control and cmunication system was ilpond on the players in order to ovaluate more accurately as ability to execute a response under Malta attack dill-r The evaluation program also included analytical studies' to supplement exorcise observations The final such evaluation ms Portormancl in a seven unclear Environment an conducted for tho Nuclear Agency by the Stanford Research Institute in August 1975 It was based on tho 13mm 74 otviromnt and provided the first comprehensive Inniysis 0 nuclear and elaotxonic warfare effect or a major Savior attack on the as com 3 TB-BX Extracts of Ram 2 2 Jan 74 mom 1974 REM 5 U Interview Hillard a Webb with Joseph Toma c3 Systems Evaluation Div 38 31 liar 82 J33-379-74 to Socstato Sec-Def service Chitin at 31 18 Feb 74 335 4 Jan and control oyster The Stanford Research Institute assessed massive soviet nuoleer attack on the United States under two conditionenm attack when both countries 1severe in at state or full elert and a surprise strike against the United States the results indicated that it would be possible for the United states to execute nuclear operations in either situation The eftecte of electromagnetic pulse houever were not included in the amigo is because of the lack of system response data The most precarious situation the Stanford Research Institute believed would be in the Pacific where it would be necessary to depend on the Emergency Rocket Medications Byetel for timely reqeipt or emergency action In Europe needs would he eerued by airborne command poets in the situation where both countries were sully alert but this was lees certein in the ease of surpriee attack 5 the evaluation program we strengthened in December At that time the Director for and Command end Control Syetm or the Office or the Secretary or Derense direoted Iooutiuuina evaluation or the Worldwide Minter demand eod Control Enter to include end testes by the _Joint Chiefs 03 Staff the aeration the unified and entitled commends and other egenoiee end in addition a reel-ennui report by the Cheirm or the Joint Chiefs of Stet to the We Council to appraise the th General George S Brown om Cheiruan or the Saint Chiefs of Stef Provided the Secretary of Defense the first venous evaluation report on 8 June 1976 It covered the Ii 5 3' mam Stanford Research Inetitute mots Periormenoe in 1 Severe nuclear Environment - Pert 2 Aug 15 238 files Evaluation Division 7 DOD I 5100 80 1 Dec 75 15 W 3 nontheenoing on 1 April 1976 3 Following a brie ng to the I moot Council of the Chairman's October 19% evaluation report Deputy Secretary of Heronse william Clement suggested that the presentation be given to the House med Services committee Hr Clemente saw an opportunity for added support to Detense budget requests for strategic command control and communications systems Genera Brown oonourre end the brie ng was and in a oresentation to the Congressional Committee in early 1977 This event method an initial step in mooring Congressional support for increased funding for strategic command control and Joe 0n December 1 975 two 11'8le after the of the formal instruction for evaluation of the Worldwide Military Comand and Control System General Brown directed a review of as strategic nuclear - force posture He wanted command and control coveted including ouch aspects as Iggtrategio warning linlnum alert force prolaunoh euroivebi-lity and ooinonioebility and trensattaol stability In response the Detenta nuclear agency at the requeetot the Joint Stet cl-33 assessed the effects of the Soviet nuclear attacks on the Worldwide Military Counted and Control system using the Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan 31 80 3-0 The study was completed in February 197 11 3 Bi to Semi 8 Jun 76 Evaluation apt for Period Ending to latex-view Webb with me 31 Mar 82 10 The Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan 3180 is the 368 estimate of an emu nuclear ottenoive against the United Staten based on the latest available intelligence 11 535-33 034417-JCS 2056 5564 14 Jan 76 C Kano bitJCS 2056 5564Oct 75- no 1 16 the Defense nuclear Agency study like the earlier one by the Stanford Research Institute assessed the Military command and Control System under two' pass ible situaticns e_ massive Soviet nuclear attack when both countries were fully alert and a surprise nuclear strike when the United States was in a state at normal readiness Under both conditions severe physical damage was inflicted on amend control and communications systems Mbst' fixed land-based primary and alternate command centers and communications systems were destroyed within 30 minutes distribution of emergency action messages to the nuclear forces decanted on airborne elements cf the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net and the Emergency Racket Communications System Moreover in either situation airborne elements of the nininua Essential Emergency Consultations Hat would be severely hindered by nuclear detonations and electronic warfare attacks against -connunicetions systems 13 as a result of the Defense Nuclear Agency assessment the Joint Chiers at sure on 11 January 1918 agreed that altered communications connectivity between the National amend Authorities and the nuclear of ena ive fences Has 'nandatory more specifically they saia that under both dayuto-dey and generated cen itions there must be sufficient mend control and emunicetions resources available either deployed at available tar deployment to insure that the capability to ttanenit 810 emergency action messages We to 8101' forces exists To that end the Joint Chiefs o staff issued new guidance requiring annual evaluation of the expected of an enemy attack on 810 conunications 13 II E's-Bx apt mos Performance Assessment for INDIA and 5mm Including Electronic warfare U Feb 77 an 339 7 Oct 75 sec 23 13 ts-Bx JCS 2056 5564 30 Nov 17 mite Ms m toning Mother The Brag By the latter years of the 19703 on extensive not of ryeteue and procedures was in place to provide the President and the Secretary of Defense control over em cmunioetione with as strategic toroes This not comprised three beeic elements warning systems commend oentero and systems to transmit orders and direction to at nuclear forces - The warning portion of the strategic cement and control net includeq the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System km with sites in Greenland Ainslie 'end the 'nnited Kingdom to provide earning 'end etteok assessment of ballistic missile attack over the northern polar cap and northern ocean areas the See-launched Ballistic missile Betection and warning sm- on System with sites in Heine north ceroIine marine cuirornie and Oregon to were against see 1eunohed ballistic missile attack' iron as coastal wet-ere and the erimeter Acquisition Bede Atteot Characterization System ms located in north Dakota to supply teetioel warning and attack easeumnt on rails Information from all three systems went to the North American Aerospace De enee amend Cheyenne oontein temple for end -then to the aetionei Inuit-Lory Mend System end emcee over the motile warning end Display System 'In addition there no the Defense Support Program 931 of in ated satellite sensors em ground processing station in Colorado and Australia to were of site launches one provide nuclear detonation information Date went to the north m ioen Aerospace Defense Con ned the Nationel Ililitary amend system we the Strategic his 19 - - then-gus W- Wt um- Command via the amend Control Processing Diaplay- Syntax Corns nally coma DANE a radar on an island in the Aleutian chain collected electronic intelligence on Soviet missile launches to Kamchatka and the Eacirio area and provided warning and assessment data on muse within its coverage This information also went to the atom Cheyenne Maintain Complex an then to the National Military Comm System and the Strategic Air Conand over the Missile warning and nieplay Systen Three major command centers provided the link that connected the Presioent and the secretary of Detenae with the strategic command and control network The National unitary Comand Center mecca in the Pentagon served as the primary mend post and had the capability o advising the President and Secretary 0 - Defense and of impienenting their decisions The racility we not hardened against hiast or other nuclear effects The Alternate national Military Command Center tmtioned or the priaary backup to the National military comma center It was a fixed underground center who third major center the national mergency Airborne Command Peat mom was the backup tor the previous two It supplied the Preeident the Secretary of Defense am the Joint Chiets of staff a survivable amend poet capable of oontinuoue execution of nuclear operations and direction or nuclear forces In 1918 the National Emergencyurborne amend Post aircraft the was not hardened against electromagnetic pulse The national Energetic Airborne Comma Poet's survivability was based on the ability to respond to nuclear attack warning with launch tron ground alert prior to 5m iapacta in tho Washingtonian mo area 40 Other mend paste that ruled out the strategic comma and control not inoludad strategic air amend SAC Underground Comand mat the primary means for direction of SAC forces the Strategic Air amend Airborne 20 H Commend Post 3 continuously airborne command post that functioned as the primary alternate center tor CINCSAC and the north American Aerospace oerence Command Cheyenne nountain Complex note 1 hardened fixed underground amend facility that served as correlating processing and disseminating point for tectioal warning attack and nuclear detonetion intonation There was also the Post Attack Command Control System races consisting of a fleet of 2 30-135 aircraft One was the Strategic Air Command airborne amend post and seven more were on ground alert ready tor launching in response to warning or nuclear attack The remainder would be generated' and placed on ground alert in once or emergency et cotton 3 the uni ed commanders eho had nuclear forces under their mm room and CIECPAC also had airborne counted poets These command poets together with the netionel Eeergency airborne eon-end Poet were known collectively as the Worldwide Airborne Post manor system The third major component a the strategic amend and control net was the mane for transaction of orders from the President and the secretary 'or nerenee to the nuclear rorcee Such orders took the toro or emergency action manages We the following system could emergency action messages 1 the JCS Alerting Network 3083 a voice eyeten for both of 18 903 end conferencing which need the Automatic Voice network We 3 the 168 Improved Emergency Menage nutmtic transmission System raters leased special-purpose alternately routed teletyyewriter network AMODI -beaed capable of secure record communications from both the Alternate end'uational Military Commend Centers 21 31 the Automatic Digital Notwork' mommy a-landline system and primary record system for dispatch of messages including emergency action messages 4 the raotical Satellite Communications System Imam APSMCOH a UHF satellite system that furnished talc-type connectivity tron the Rational Emergency airborne Comma Post to the other airborne command post aircraft and the new aircraft not protect against jamming 5 Airborne 'Lou Frequcncy Very Low Frequency 1 means or icw opced teletype oomunicationa iron the Alternate National military Command Center enci'the National Emergency Airborne Command Post to the nuclear uni ed and spuci cd commanders lino protected against jamming but resistant to nuclear a oat High Frequency at a system that provider voice end teletypc continuation iron the Alternate national Military Comand Center and tho national Emergency Airborne Comm -Post to the nuclear unified and speci ed contenders the Emergency Rocket Communications System m3 a system oi six WW micelles with monicat ions system rather than nuclear oarhuda' that could to launched on east west trajectories to relay emergency action messages the Fixed Submarine Broadcast System a system that furnished continouo secure and Br broadcasts trout tired shore locations to 138 submarines at sea - 9 the cm 13 Navy aircre that were airborna VLF relay platforms to provide survivable continuous communications to Elect ballistic missile suburban - - - I 511 information on the strategic command and control system in 1 978 115 from rs-uorom-am Study Study on Strategic Connectivity tine Report 7 lie 79 360 9 Mar 79 sec 11 and from navy 'Congectivity Study lab 79 Vol numb Net Assessment mreisel Despite this elaborate system for strategic commend end control growing doubta arose during the lest years of the 19703 about the adequacy of this system In the spring of 1917 the Director of not Assessment in the otfioe of the Seotetery of Defense prepared an appraisal of us end Soviet command control and communications systems It revealed that the Soviets had node eigniticent edvanoco in this era and presented a toruideble threat to the United States We assessment suggested that major esmetry' existed between the United States and the Soviet Union in systems endurance end reconstitution capabilities in the poet-attack phase of nuclear conflict Moreover the assessment indicated that as torcea were not adequately prepared to meet Soviet and Warsaw not directed against as command control and communication aystems and the result night be significant military edventege the soviets in both theater and strategic warfare mother eree oi concern was oomunicetione security when as might substantially enhance Soivet 'etrategic intelligence and taming capabilities The United States poauesed in conceding lead over the soviete in control and oomnioetione technology the aeseemnt continued but it had not need that advantage ettectively the United States did not have operationally deployed system that functioned at levels of petrormence reliability and interoperability permitted by its technology nally because oi the centralised astute oi the Soviet system the easeamnt said the Soviet and were not zeroes hid important advantages in integrated programs end interoperability of equipment tor contend control and communications eyetend 2 Wow Minest Office of et Assessment 081 to Steering 6 9 2 Key 77 C33 tiles 23 nu ll a martian Defense Science Board Stud of ca Hanagenent U Later in September 1977 the Director of Detensa Research and Engineering initiated a study of the nanagenent or amend central and emuniaaticns systems He asked the Defense Science Beard to examine the process by which the nepartment at Defense planned and nrbenred aucn systems 3 - I U A special teak force at the Science Board conducted thermal and reported in July 1978 'i'he teak Eeree stated It intent that the nation needs Command and systems which would proride snhatantially - better service to our national leaders and our military eman dere than the ones we have in place Our Opponents in many nircunsranaes are likely to have erce larger than ours over which we can prevail only with superior coordination and better management and the potential damage and rapid pace a likely tutnre war-tare mates amend - and control even more essential than ever before The basic reason for new and better' coma-and and control capability the teat force continued use the changing nature 'of' circumstances where 05 military power eight have to be apnlied American interests around the world were likely to require earernliy controlled use or farce with precise nnderatanding at all levels at demand an to what was and was not happening In addition the likelihaod or future constraints on Detenae spending put- a preniun' an securing the most effective or limited force's It was clear the teat area believed that command and central eyatena seal-d nnltiply the of 03 torcee in many possible confrontations - 'i'ne de enee Science Board task force criticisedtne organization and management arrangements within the Department of Detenae for wand and control Systems must a n1 ants tn Chm ass 29 Sep 11 an 356 29 sep 214 mum be in teroiaerablc the task force acid and commended a strong central organization to cut across Service - boundaries to manage design and acquisition and to assure compatibility of all systems The tank force proposed the oration or a separate Defense agency for that purpose to report to the Secretary of Intense and to have a relation- ship within the nepertnent similar to that of the Defence Comunicarione and the National Security Jigencnier I Defence Science Board Sumner Star 4 Just as the test erce completed its study the Detenoe Science Board held a 'enmer study et the Revel We College during the period 30 July through 11 August 1978 one subject examined tree the strategic nuclear balance the result or the study revealed that over the past deoeade the strategic balance had evolved from net as superiority 'in all relevant indicee or capability' to a situation currently termed equivalence In the period of US superiority the Science- Eoerd said no planners assumed that it deterrence tailed superior us force would be adequate to conduct of hostilities Consequently objectives bed been stated' as retaliatory goals ow the Soviets had closed the gap the Board continued and all types of weapons would he needed to tight prolonged nuclear war Horeover the soviet placed greet emphasis on enduring viability of their forces including omend control and communications throughout a con ict one Defence Science Board runner study assessed the cenebilltee or as strategic nuclear forces including domino and control and indicated several nejor problems communications from US warning systems rearward were considered very tragile and the correct capability to 4 U apt of Defense science Board Teal Force contend and Control Systems Hennaenent Jul 18 Encl to JCS 2308 8111 17 Oct 38dual-c-dme mbf react to an attach on there communications was inadequate - Hanover the Science Board believed that prcvisicna cr National Command authority survival were critically dericient Given a nuclear attack on the United States when the President was in Washington it would be pcesihle the' Science Board said for the President either to amend the forces until the attack hit and he was killed or to try to escape and survive but not both 5 The Science Board alsc identi ed other Problems in the area ct strategic conned central and communications transmission of emergency action messages depended upon the survival ci a very tee critical aircraft and assumed that those aircraft 1era-re connected with a proper authority idea- tiried and authorised to act and survival would be increasingly dcubttu l beginning in the early or mic-19803 when Soviet remit in capecitg ecc- accuracy Another weakness the Science Board said was the lack ct a thought-through plan with appropriate associated capabilu itiee tor a major continuing nuclear war requiring actions that were not preplanhed For eralple there was to secure mend control manic-tithe and intelligence system to support the secure reserve rcrcer It was apparent the Science Board concluded that US strategic cement and control system were designed for a spam reepcnae with minim capability to other ttrategiee In em the essential and reliance need to support a broader 'deterrence' required increased attention to the ear-righting capability at both our etrategic tort-es and the car system which support than To that end the Science Board recounted that first pricrity be given to tiring and improving existing systems particularly of survivability of command control and communications system the Board race the renewing specific recmeacaticns with regard to 26 6 command - control and communications ii the system so that it worked in peacetime and under attack strengthen the current fragile system from the warning sensors to 'the command authority and improve the probability of emceasrul emergency action message transmission auring the initial phase of war to assure that the aircratt the 3-433 and Teams needed for FICA connectivity survived end worked Other actions considered important were initiation of programs for enduring backup mmioations between authorities and forces and increased hardening against electromagnetic pulse 5 Secure Reserve Force Stung 31 While the Detense science Boerd studies were in preparation a review was also in progress within the Department of Detense on the secure reserve force which had implications for strategic connectivity The secure reserve torce consisted of nuclear forces that would be reserved during the initial stages of a major nuclear conflict for subsequent protective and coercive uses Soon otter entering orrioe President Carter has ordered a review of national strategy Posse-18 and as a roller on the Secretary or ostenss in coordination with the Director of central Intelligence was tasked to review the capability required for the secure reserve force a working group composed or representatives or the Deputy secretary of Defense tor Policy ' the Director of Central Intelligence the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Start the Under secretary of Intense for Research and lngineer ing and the Assistant Secretaries of netsnse for International Security Affairs and Program Analysis and avalnation ooncluctod 5 25- st Detours Science Board sins Report or 1918 Summer Study the Strategic nuclear Misses 03' ll mo 78 lm 31 Jul 75 sec in 27 the utudy' r which wee completed in catcher 1978 and foruuded to the national Security council-5 a The nature reserve force study revealed that the nation Command nuthuritlee 'dld nut have the munlcatlons ei'steme m the means to ebtein the interment- 1021 and -intell-' igence reunited to manage the fut-cu - Because of the vulnexebllity of and lack of endurance in command control connunidetione and intelligence system the study questioned the ability at the united States to use the secure reserve after an initial nuclear exchange 7 The 8m gtgateglc Connectivitg Study 939 In the meantleet General Richard a 81113 cm manner at the Strategic tel emand had teem concerned that the United States and net execute the Single Integrated Operational Plea 8 091 in case an melee attack becauee of weaknesses in the strategic amend control and municatlone system He was particularly worried about the Sou let 'Yantee submarines of the nest Guest and the reduction in warning the available - to the United Stetee in the event of a missile attack Inning time he said was reduced on an to 15 ninutel and a high altitude nuclear buret and pulse could even reduce warning time Eartha to 1 linutee E 155 46150 Udeenef ruling to cats et Secure Reserve rune target Acquieltien Study 18 Rev 17 us-ex Reno 099 tranche Policy ta nunBIuDef cats et 'PD-la Follow-an Studlee -Secure Reserve Force 19 Oct 78 3-5 use Mum lattice time 1333 am See net to usguef Policy Seuute Force 133' 28 Oct 78 em 14 7 The study is classi ed Silt- The gist of its ndings it contained in 155 Keno Semi to new trolley Secure Force an 25 Oct 78 14 N8 Affairs Office tiles Further indication of the eantent of the 1973 study is gleaned true a 3 982 Joint Strategic Connectivity Stan 83 study contained in es-3 x am Bl uses to ms 23 Feb 82 C33 les 23 nil-m e- '0 donate Ellis discussed this concern with General David c Jones USAF the new Chairmen of the Joint Chieie of Stetf in early September when the latter visited the Strategic Air Commend The current Soviet threat matured against strategic commend control and communications systems and procedures General Ellie believed could prevent successful transmission of Residential directive to the nuclear forces Be met the tem strategic connectivity to cover the warning and concern and control systems that provided the Resident and the Secretary of Defenee the capability to execute end manage strategic nuclear torceg lie intended the term to imply more than just munieetione systems end propane a study of this mtter - - at General Jones was persuaded and upon his return to washingtop proposed that General 81118 undetuke such a stodgy the Secretary of Detenee gave hie approval In a discussion of the matter in at meeting oi the operation Deputies 'on 6 October 1978- the New questioned whether a Strategic'ai commend study ueu1d give edequate attention to connectivity with the naval ettetegic tomes he a result thequQretions Deputies decidea that the' that of Havel Operatione'ehould conduct conganion study of that aspect Accordingly the Joint Chiefs o Stet directed both the engender of the Strategic Air command and the chief o Havel Operations to proceed with uttetecic connectivity studiu who whale of bath was to he on nee term tixee to identi ed - deiiciencee Longer term solutions and programmatic ectien - would be coneieeted in separate etoay by the Defence Science Boerd E emcee commend Hitter 1978 pp 5 Ltr trace 0 I 23 Sep 78 CJCS file 048 cm In Interview Willard J Webb with can Richard E Ellie USAF net 6 any 82 9 to ca s 6 Oct 78 cats File 048 cmcsec C 1139 JCS 5833 to CEO cn cmcsac 0726353 Oct 76 360 29 Nov 78 39 unenl '0 ill it special task grouy at the Strategic Air prepared the SAC strategic connectivity study and General 31113 emitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1919 The Strategic n1 Commend study group examined the raoilities systems and procedures that interconnected the national Comand Authorities the national Kilitarr Command system the Strategic Air conand and the North American Air Defense amend and accessed the capability of existing command control and communications systems to perform during all phases at nuclear con ict The - study gratis round that command control and communications system could not cope with the strategic threat because of architecture dericiencea and lack of the command control and communications system supporting the Notional contend Authorities the group said was characterized by a peacetine orientation The Strategic Air Command group arranged its findings under the three major functional arena-warning decision and impimentetionwneoeraary tor successful direction of the strategic torcee with record to earning the group reported that tactical 1warning and communications were available to alert the National amend Authorities but were tregilo' and susceptible to electronic counterneaeuree eiootronagnetic pulse and sabotage which could deny necessary warning and allotment to the National Comma Authorities lloreover current procedures to route earning information to the national command Authoritiee- were cuntereoner involving seven major omunicationa nodes Attack tron axon warning nyeteu who nonexistent and the study group doubted warning would survive longer than 33 minutes in a nuclear attack against the united States all the major chortraii in strategic connectivity the strategic Air Commend group round was in the decision function current ayetenr and procedures no not provide 30 endur inq connectivity among the national Command Authorities the National Military command System and the commanders of nuclear forces The study group said that the decision time available to the national Command Authorities was compressed by the close geographic proximity of ashington to the sine threat and if the Resident chore to delay a response decision execution of a nuclear resoonee could be jeopardized With current basing and nuclear ei'i'ectn vulnerability the study group predicted that the national Emer ncy airborne Comand Post as well an the oresidential emu helicopters would be destroyed precluding a viable mean or National Cohenand Authority survival nally information 815nm available to the Breaident and the Secretary oi oerenre were grenade-baud and lacked enduring Lang range communication links hardened to survive in a nuclear war Conaequently force management information would not be available tor national imam authority decisions subsequent to an initial decision to execute a nuclear attack noon the name situation the Strategic nix Conant study group said existed eith regard to the inplenentation inaction In the execution or termination oi operations by strategic nuclear toroea ground oonnunicatione system to disseminating emergency action messenger had been overlaid on connercinl ayetena and had united endurance The National military Command System facilities and least of all the national unitary Mend Center would not survive a nuclear attack even the Rational Emergency airborne Command root was vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse and did not provide an assured survivable neana tor emergency notion message transmission the strategic Air amend study presented a series of some 120 in all to remedy these 9 11 the recomendatione were limited to near term improvements and involved procedures or changes that- 31 a a Hunt I could be' accomplishec with off the-nhelf' resources curtently available The recommendations tranged from relatively simple actions to elatetete Fc'r steeple with regard to reducing the vulnerability of the Pjeeident at the White House to early destruction by Soviet 51 33 the recommendations equated spectrum iron relocation of Presidential CROWN helicopters closer to the White House to enhancement of the ptcbebility of escape by develepment of hardened helicoytere re a listing a the specific recommendations see Annex A In emitting the strategic connectivity report General Ellie remen ed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff implement the procedural remendeticnsp that the Services program and implement the nee term tetmendetione and that the lattice at the insistent Secretary of De ense for amend Control Commieaticne anti Intelligence should develop remandetiene for long-tern system improvements He also proposed the _ crnetion of a de iceted JCS egencyf to eonduet end-Weed analysis of the or facilities systems and pmeeduree to euppert the strategic warning decieien and execution processes The n Connectivit Stud 7 a Simultaneously with the Strategic Li Cement study the Navy had conducted its review at command control and communication eyeteme that gave the National amend huthoritiee the capability to Wild and execute new strategic town The study wee completed in rebtuety 1979 although the chief of lien Digeratim did nut toruetd it to General Jonee until 23 July 1979 the New reached the em IE immortal-at Study c3 Study on strategic Connectivity tine Retort general conclusion as had 'the Strategic Air Command-- existing strategic connectivity was inadequate It had become apparent during the study the Navy said that the oyster which would currently exist at the initiation of either a 'generated' or surprise enemy nuclear attack would degrade rapidly to 'a very snail residual ayatom Using the current JCS estimate of an enemy nuclear attack the Red Integrated Strategic Operation Elan arson 5d the navy study indicated that such an attack would daetroy approximately 90 percent or the ground based at tho Worldwide Military Comand and Control System within 15 minutes of the attack initiation Even satellite space segments could be lost to electromagnetic pulse or direct physical damage and the residual aircrew remaining utter the initial attache would he assets or the Worldwide airborne Omani Post WW - In the poet attack period the Navy estimated that connectivity to and CIHCPAC would rennin tenuoue ' urvival and continued availability of fully-capable 13mm relay aircraft in the Western iitientic would provide' connectivity to usemcrun and creams and improve the chances for delivery or national amend authority order-a to eet ballistic docile ran force at sea Should new capabilities be degraded or lost the Navy etudy continued connectivity to either 33311113303 or would be reduced to periodic communicationa delivered by aortiea of aircratt noraally part of the roar Attect Maud and control agatea races chain over the continental United States def bite the Strategic air Comma Study the navy restricted considerations tor improvement to immediate and near-tern tires to identi ed deficiencies Ra -15mm ationa were made in three major areas protection of the recent system iaprcceeante in the connectivity iron the nuclear contenders to airborne rm aircrart and nuclear aubuarinea 88min and improvements in the connectivity 3 3 between nuclear commanders tor a listing or specific recommendations see Annex 3 11 The two studies the Strategic hire-ccmand and Navy became known collectively as the JCS Strategic Connectivity Study It represented the rst time that strategic connectivity had been addressed in manageable terms with epacific reccmendeticne for improvements study recommendations such as those by the Defense Science Boer- i had been icbrced generalities Defence Science Board Stud of Enduring 33 The JCS directive t6 both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the strategic Air Commend had rectricted their strategic connectivity studies to ehcrt-term problems and improvements hcnqer tern issues were to be the subject of a cmpimntery by the Detenee Science Board accordingly the Under Secretary of Defence neutral and requested the Chairun of the Science heard to' form special teal torce that pur cee It was to use the earlier Summary Study on strategic nuclear beience13 es the Faint cf departure 1 r 'The his force emitted its study of 'Endurinc suitegic Communication Canned end control an 10 October 1979 It cede a distinction between end mum the former we the ability to withstand a nuclear attack the letter the ability to cperete for 16 143' time in the face at set attack The Defense' Science - hoerd tech erce wee primarily ery 'Ccnnectivity Study Vol 1 Yet 79 360 20 new 7 8 sec in 12 to Interview Winerd a Webb JCS Hiet Dim with LTC Jessie h user JSR 019 car Din 12 Eeb 82 130 See abOVe' PP 25 27e ii 405 am USecneumn to Chm 1133 Warn of Reference for Teak Ecrce on Enduring Strategic U 2 how 18 App to DEB Report 'Bncuring Strategic Cmunicetione Cement and Control 10 Oct 19 638 tiles gum concerned with endurance although 'it recognised that endurance included fourvivability as a special case the task force found serious weaknesses in the endurance of as strategic command control ' an communications systenu particularly in the posthattack phase It doubted that an enduring system mm result from the program as then unset was or proposed It believed a fundamentally approach was needed one that used large numbers or existing assets rather than building a few new ones 4131' The task force reached the following conclusions with regard to the tutors requirements for command control and communications system design must emphasise flexibility against a multitude of situations and not optimisation against some approved threat or scenario redundancy proliferation and diversity were preferable to specialisation emphasis should be on enduring capability to perform a runotiou rather on survivability or speci c facilities and realistic systems tests and exercises usre absolutely an The task force examined strategic amend control and communications in three time periods of con ict- r pro-attack trans-attack and post-attack--and node the roilowing remendationr pre sttsok--toughen communica- tions and establish explicit procedures tor raising alert status or strategic amend control and mutations system bases on warning information trans-attacknincreus the number of airborne mud posts proliferate oununications to reruns and clarify the role of the military in seeking and supporting the national Command Authorities and post attack--revisw and extend procedures for reorganiring military command structure from surviving senior military of cers develop procedures and facilities to reconstitute rapidly a narrow band nationwide communications network tron surviving assets and plan tor 35 and practice use of surviving sensor ccmuniceticna and commend poet assets under port-attack canditicns 15 Actions to 8 hen 11 control and Communicet n3 6 The various studies and reviews in the period 19 through early 1979 succeeded in bringing nbnn't an awareness of the fragile condition of atrntegic connectivity As a result the Jcint -chie n c Staff and the Secretary of Defense recognized the need to do more to guarantee the national amend Authorities enduring mend end at strategic erce in the event of a nuclear con ict Haw they began to give increased attention end emphasis to the systems and procedures that linked thin President with the strategic The Cortland Control and emulation a In irectnrete U the first such action we the amnion of a Joint Staff directorate to cverree and cmunicntinne matters The Deanne science study in the rumor of 19781-5 hed criticized the management ct amend and control systems and had BIOPOIQG 1 central organization within the Departmental Defiant for that purpose _ Specifically the Detense Science Board study had recon-ended a new Defense agency or it that alternative van not propitious expansion cf the Defence Communications A Agency In implementation of that recommendatiom the Deputy Undet- Secretary cf Defense tor Research and Engineering dirncted the Defense Communications Agency_ to plan an expansion of its charter to proud Defense-aide IS 391' 1333 'i enk Force Report ' nduring Strategic Cmuniceticnn cement and Central 1 0 Oct 78 638 files 16 See above 9 24 25 36 - of command 6071 3013 one communications systems 17- - U The Joint Chiei n ot Stair however dig not agree After reviewing a Intense Cmunioation s Agency plan tor amend control and communications management they told the Secretary of Defense on 3 April 1979 that the delineation soope and range at ot the proposal were based on a limited View of command and control system management problems The grain Chie or - Stet reomended the assignment or only a limited architectural rain- oi' joint command and control systems to the Defense Communication agency - and that broad responsibility for - planning and establishing command and control systems interoperability be assigned to than 13 In pursuit of that recommendation the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs of scar General David c Jones USAF proposed the establishment of a Comma Control and mutations _3ystena 633 Directorate within the Joint Stuff The Secretary of Jerome accepted the Chairm's proposal on Apr 11 1979 and the new directorate was on - 30 May It was with developing policies plots and programs to insure adequate common control and oomnuniontions' support to the unified and speo- itisd commands and the Rational Command Authorities tor - joint combined military Operations with conceptualizing rnturs mend control and mientionr systest design and with providing direction to intone amend and control tor the con-end control and Mnications Directorate charter see Annex nail-9 I7 Diem Principal nspUSsoDs nr- m to air not 9 Hov 73 to JCS 2308 14nl 16 Rev 73 360 29 Sep 73 1 81 to sooner 3 Apr 19 JCS 360 29 Sep 73 19 U JCS 1977 149 25 May 79 JCS 202 208 eentine the Secretary at netenee bed elreedy teten similar action to strengthen management of amend control and emanation matters in his errice In Heron 197 he had established an Assistant secretary for Communications amend Control and Intelligence C31 to serve as hie principal assistant in that era Rgview or Connectivigx Studies In a further effort to bolster strategic connectivity the neputy Secretary of Defense on 29 august 1979 asked the Joint Chiefs of Stef to review the recently - completed Strategic Air demand and Navy studio and reomend inprovements in strategic connectivity 'i'he Joint Chiete of 'Stetf provided their response on 1 October 1979 They viewed the Strategic Air Command study as a useful baseline tron which to pursue essential improvements they endorsed e11 120 reameedetione oi the study except tor one calling tor pleemnt of North American aerospace Defense Command representative on 'the National Emergency airborne amend Post Such an action they felt wee unwarranted terry-one or the Stretegie Air amend mentions the Joint Chiete or Start told the Secretery or Detense were currently being addressed by their organization the Services end the Defense enemies to implementation while 57 more required further exerinetien by than some organise- tions as well no the Censndere of the Strategic Air and herenee amends rot arcs content and tenemen- detione on each Strategic Air Canned recommendation nee 13 13 non Dir 5137 1 11 liar 71 this position' evolved iron an assistant to the secretary of Detenee telecommunications treated in 1970 chenged to the assistant Secretery a Defense Telecommunications in 1972 who subsequently the hirector telecommunications and Commend end Control systems in 1974 21 SH 8130 PP- 23-3 38 user-slus- n In Inuit-- annex the Joint Chiefs or staff asked the Secretary of notense to provide support for the following improvements deployment of survivable space-bereft sensor system capable of providing impact points 2 two additional PAVE was sites and power upgrade to provide assessment 3 deploymont of programmed Defense Support Program mobile ground terminals with survivable communications 4 deployment of a space-based senior system with onboerd processing and direct munioations to ground-baud end airborne users an Air Force tanker procurement program to include 1111 support for the airborne warning and Control System space-based euroeillenoe eyeten to counter the throat of low-altitude cruise missiles direct trenenissioo or no date to the Rational Military Command System end the Strategic Air Command final operational capability by 1985 for six eiroratt fleet or 3433 9 strategic satellite Iystm and adaptive High rrequenoy progrm 10 prooureunt of 190m low rreqoency vory low irequoncy trenuittere and complete implementation or the Air rorce Satellite Comunioetions sitcom program aboard peetettaok amend and control oyster Est-135 tirortit ill the lion mom Improvement Program to insure compatible low frequency Air roroe Satellite Communication System capability the alto wanted the Secretary to secure Residential authorization for the following actions JCS determination of national Morgana Airhorne amend Post basing subject to the Pruidential responu guidollneo support for gluing the Vice President on 'the National Emergency airborne Command Post at moon 2 and consideration or 'alternative basing tor the Presidential cm Joan-29149 to Setter 1 Oct 79 Joe 360 7 liar m 39 9 The Joint Chiefs oi Staff also endorsed the Navy strategic connectitity study Of the twenty-two rocomendetione contained therein the 'Joint Chiefs of staff had directed implementation of eleven by the Chiei at Naval Operations crow and CIEPAC nine more required further consideration by their organization or the Defense Communications Agency and action had already been initiated on the remaining two to a listing or the recommendations and the 105 recomendations on each see Annex D the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the secretary to supply funds to implement those recommendations that could not be accomplished nithin present program funding In the recommendations of the Strategic air Comand and navy connectivity studies were tor short-term improvement and their implementation in the following months began to strengthen the systems and procedures that linked the national comma nothorities with the strategic forces In addition several organizational developments occured that were doeigned to enhance strategic connectivity further 11 goint Strategig Motion Staff m At the urging of General Ellis the Strategic Air omender and General Jones the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Strategic connectivity seer cases in rebrnary 1989 In proposing such an entity General 81115 noisioned an organisation to monitor strategic connection at an operational level no distinct iron the Command control and Communications System Directorate of the Joint Staff which was responsible tor planning and coordinating all contend control and cmunicationa system including those that supplied strategic connectivity The Joint JCSM-290-79 to 8069915 1 Oct 79 -165 2303 8213 360 20 73 #0 Strategic reonnectivity Stat was an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Starr located at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters It wine to give operational and user focus to tactical warning iand attack oontarenoing emergency action montage dissemination and force status and 'The new Star would develop roitwnre and hardware and 'procedurai recommendations to insure interoyerahinty ' reliability survivability endurance soourity and' efficiency to those systems In addition it would coordinate and revise connectivity- and operational - proccdurcs among and between the national CW Authorities the national Military Command System and the nuclear commanders It would also recommend exercises to test procedures In the Joint Chiefs our nomad General 11 13 the Siren-tor of the Joint Strategic connectivity Staff in addition to his duties as Coriander of the Strategic Air Command So the new rcsyonaibility he reported directly to the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs or Start For the Term of Sererencc tor the Joint Strategic connectivity Staff see Annex In The Strata con ivit En i carin ice - 5 Following tho cotahlilhaent or the Joint Strategic tonnectivity Start the Comma control and Communications Systems Directorate or the Joint Sta - saw a need for a reporting--the systems that provided strategic connectivity complimentary nyltom engineering Hort to assure survival or minimum essential communications for strategic i4 U JCS 1917 4241 12 Feb 803 JOSH-SS-BO to CIECSAC 3 Ha 80 -368 1977 4243 030 $1803 12 Feb 80 ' ashin ton Star 2 Aug 80 on U Interview mung J WEE 55 Richard H 83 11 USAF notW14 connectivity Since the Director of the nerenee' Communications Agency served as the system engineer for the Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net custom the Director of the cmnd Control and' Comanioatione Directorate asked the Defense Communications Agency on 7 October 1980 to recommend the best way to achieve a men- iike focus on strategic connectivity Subsequently on 23 January 1981 the Director of the Defense Communications Agency submitted a plan calling for expansion of the men system engineering efforts at the camna and Control Tochni ai Center CCTC in his Agency to include essential cmuniceticnu support to all evict-gene action functions in order - to ate-mush a system engineering approach to enaentinl communications ctinnentinity 26 Thereafter on 16 February 1981 the Director Detenee Cmmunioctionc agency oreetec the Strategic - Connectitity Engineering Office sore w1thin the Emma and Control Technical Center for that purpose this of ice would town on the functional areas or tactical turning an attack assessment decision conterencing and force nanagement to determine initially-5- the minimum essential connectivity - requirements and then to take ma a-like notions to provide survivable end encur ing system tor thou reguirenentc tater the Mnimun Essential Emergency Communications - net responsibilities woul he inborporeted into the strategic connectivity Engineering Oitioe tpproprieto 37'l Warner s-so to t1 ten 7 Oct so files 2mm Memo 91 can to 31 C35 21 Jan 31 can files 21 Wsr memo Dir not to Distribution 'ncn Support to Strategic connectivity Upgrading '10 not 81 035 iea 1 2 Presidentiel Decisions m hile there organizational developments were in process President dimly Carter reached several policy decisions that gave added imoortence to and priority for strategic connectivity President Carter 3 dormer naval orricerr had served on a nuclear eutmrine and was more conscious of the problene- of strategic contend and control than any previoue truncation 28 After entering oitioe he personally participated in 'eeveral command and control exerciser In decision on 15 noveeher 1979 Presidential Directive 53 he set out the requirement for a survivable municatione ureter as coeponent or deterrence United stator - he- 3e15 must provide tor connectivity between the sea and strategic and other appropriate forces to support flexible execution or retaliatory etrikee during and after an eneny nuclear attack 29 Subsequently Presidential Directive 58 of 30 June 1980 on continuity or government recognized the need to insure the eurvival or the Residency under the most stranding conditional extended nuclear attack to provide connectivity-batons national amend Authorities and the -- 'Itretegici and --other forces appropriate for exible execution of retaliatory etrikee during and after an enemy nuclear attack and to give response eupport for Rational commend Authority operational control over the armed even during protracted nuclear conflict three who later 25 July 1980 nreeident Garter e- new nuclear 1 reagent employment policy Presidential Directive 59 Among other things the president stated that fgtrategic stability in an era of essential equivalence Interview mm a Webb with one annexe n 3111 0833 not 6 Hey 82 29 U Extracts oi romeo-53 15 Nov 79 001 or 79 30 Extracts of Pumas- 58 5 depends at much on rurvitability of C31 capabilities aa it does on the tire and character of strategic arsenals n who it to U In the same period as there Presidential directiveh false missile warnings at the north American neroepace Defense Command cheyenne Mountain Coupler brought adverse public attention to the strategic command control and communications system he a consequence however action were taken to improve tactical warning and assessment 0 0n 9 November 191 9 an exercise tape was mistakenly interted inc the operational computer system at the Cheyenne montain Complex this caused missile warning displays at the Strategic Air Command the national Military Comand Center and the National Emergency Airborne Command Poet and cs terror in north America were blaced on alert tor about ten sinntes before the error was con ire-d 1'0 preclude a occurrence the Commander of North American Aerospace nerenu established a review board to look into the incident and instituted stringent testing regulations In addition an of eite tecility was designed to that testing or both hardware and eottware er well as training could be done separately fro the operational mute system 33 a little over six nonthe later on 3 and 6 June 1980 false miseile warning indication reoccurred at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex and appeared on the Strategic Air conned and Rational liilitary amend center displays SI TB-BX romeo-59 25 Jul an 301 80 sec 3 32 U Harbin ton star 10 no 79 Al 11 Statement by we dance er nger USAF marrow emcee in Bearings reilnree of 1 1 Do an neroe- - - - Cmend8 88 pp 115-125 herearter cited an Hearings reilures or new agree Warnin Sarge ng rf 99' 1H I Ageing it wae quickly determined that the warnings were erroneous The North American Aerospace Defense Comand investigatea and determined that a computer chip was 'at fault The particular chip as well an other critical chips were replaced and circuit boards were redesigned to prevent eny repeat inoioents z t - 1'heLeafRe rt a Following the June incidents General Lew Chier of Star or the Air Force ordered a review of all aspects of the tactical warning and attack assessment nyeten The on Air Force Inspector General Lieutenant General Howard it near conducted the review assisted by a groan composed of representatives from the Strategic Air and Aerospace nerenee cmande and other appropriate Air toroe commas General Leaf submitted his report inf-early September 1980 His principal finding was that the as Air Force did not recognise or unease tactical warning and attack assessment elements as a coupleto system This condition caused divided approaches to acquisition interface and management or elements a lack of I'emi-ttw end direction tor operations concepts doc-tr ine and procedures and the absence or a reporting requirement for tactical warning and street assessment systems and subey'stems General Lee made a number or reeomendatiens the nose significant or which nailed tor a warning and assessment management organ setion that included e oireo'tive to recognise tactical esrning and assessment as e total system one an engineer organization to that system - 35 ertinge r statement hearings railuree or Attack Wernin 8 stem pp 115-425 a more on Jun 19 Recent raise Alerts tron the at on on attack warning Synta apt by senators Gary Hart and Barry Goldwater to 5 Con on Armed services 9 Oct 30 96th Dong 2d sees pp 5-9 34 45 13 391 16 near Special Hensgement Review of user Support to the tactical warning htteck Assessment System 3 Jul-2 Sep 80 C38 tiles - 115 n who Air Force Chief of Staff General Alien - -approved tho recommendation to establishment or a tactical warning and attack assessment managem nt organization on 8 October 1980 35 Se named the Common of tho Aerospace Defense coolant the executive manger for tho Air rare for the tactical warning and rttnok assessment system with overall tor management and control of the system end-to-ond and rm roving of all ohnngas- thereto Rico combusted a oat-ire 1 January 1931 at the keroopnon Defense Comma Headquarters was tho system Integration Office 310 It was charged with functional responsibility for the nrohitooture deodorant and interim and engineering tasting development and acquisition of tho tootioai warning and attack- auasslenr system 21 0 108 Quay Stud a month the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Stat had also dirooted a similar review -On is July 1980 he and the Command control and emulation Santana nircotoraro to conduct an 'unbroiin' study or the total tactical warning and attack unmat ant-n He not shot-trans indentitiea and improvements remanded The mm control and Communications not Diroctorato pubiirhe its report known on the Umbrella study on 6 February 1981 It twinned previous studies dealing with warning and assessment first the cotton Study placed a m 63 to cm elm eh intonation of summation in the 8min Magnum Rev on of om Support to tho Tactical Warning m6 Attack armament System 8 Got an 38 files 36 nal 3814 pm No 3-3 'i r rm Mann ment Directive for the Ballistic missile Tact col warn ng nttook Monument TH an Bataan 19 liar 81 U 810 Ballistic missile oer u Syntax 91m tor System Intogration 19 mar 82 pp 16 20-21 33 to Interview Hillard J Webb with Robert Kipp Gounod Biltorian ADC 29 Apr 82 115 all previous recommendations and tinting tron earlier reviews into six major substantive groupings sensors comun-icatione systems computers display cisterns procedures and personnel management Then it assigned each of these recommendations to one or four evaluation categories gaps -- where remendatione were not being addressed but where action was needed 2 shortfalls - than some action had been taken but where more was needed valid ano ongoing where progress was being made I remandationa not being done where no action had been undertaken and ehere the study concurred that nothing was required In addition the Umbrella study included new racemen ationa that identified deficiencies not addressed by previoul recommendations In all the Study presented 73 recommendations that needed attention and 71 that were ongoing There broke down as tollowa Sensors commie Computer Display Procedures Pera Iotal at ions Syetggar mt caps33 3 10 13 6 4 33 Ongoing For a listing or the recommendations see Annex G nite Unbrella Study reminder that the Chairman 0 the Joint of Stat would tut identified agencies to take appropriate action on racouendationa in the gap' and shortfall categories The Study also urged support or the not report racomendationa concerning management of tactical warning and attack aanunent In this 911 3 the Umbrella Study pointed out that the tactical warning and attack assesmnt systen included augments beyond the control of the Mr rorce specifically the tactical warning 147 e and - atte'ck communications interfaces and displays elements under the unified and speci ed amends and responsibilities assigned tc the Defense Cmuniceticne Agency the Study thet the Chief of Staff of the hit some be designated the JCB executive agent for overall system integration to include interface with the unified and speci ed counted and the Detenee Communication Agency U thereafter ch 5 Key 1981 the Chairman did direct the Jeint Strategic Connectivity Stet to monitor the improvements specified in the Umbrella Study and parent their resolution '39 Several months later on 17 Auguet 1981 the Joint Chiete ci Statf designated the Chiei at Stat of the Air Force at their executive agent to technical integration of the tactical teeming and attack eseeamnt system he a further result of the June 1981 wetting alerts the Assistant Secretary of Detenae can asked a team of expette from outside of the Department of Batman to look mietc the- technical teepecte cf the Hezth nautical Aeroepace neienee Command computer system the team headed by Hz 3 0 Event Vice President of the Corporation We a series of Jeannendetions for both hardware and software ieproveaente to enhance further the' reliability at the mom warning systems These eecmdaticne were carried out in the ensuing month and did bring improvementa 4 cas oats Tactical Warning attack rs ea Study Group Final Report wheelie Study 6 tab 81 635 files 38 8 Bi-91141 to air 1808 5 my 81 C38 tilee 39 U 8H-569-81 to can csu' et 11 aug 81 2308 9363 scan 30741 ta Secne r 1 7 neg JOB 2303 9353 36 29 Jul 81 40 Mitt 3 0 Events 13 to Dr ilerry Van Principal Dip LED 20 80 C33 1108 U Interview Hillard J 1Itehlav with we 3 3 Stevens Spece Warning and Sur 38 Die 3 My 82 1 8 U Despite the enhancement in warning and assessment brought about by action resulting from the November 1979 end June 1930 incidents not everyone wan convinced that the improvement was nutticient The acting Comptroller General of the Ofti p Hr Milton J accolar questioned the ability at the north Mexican Aerospace Defense Command to perform adequately its missile warning and space surveillance mission In Congressional testimony the following spring he attributed the problems experienced in the north American Aerospace Defense amend computer development program to poor planning and poor management and the attempt to erce-tit naer requirements to a particular type or 'equimnt He clained to have documented in over 100 report since 1955 the failure of the Department of Defence the Joint Chieta of Staff and the services to plan tor eitective autouatic date 'prcceecing procurenent and implementation to identity user needs to develop function apeoiticetione to yrovide centralised acquisition magmnt and to eatabliah adequate accountability The Morgenetern Initiative Iteantine in early 1 980 a panel convened by the Joint Chiefs of Stat ted concluded that the ottecta of high altitude electromagnetic pulses could 'eevetely jeopardize the capability to execute the Single Integtatcd Operational Plan A working group in the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the panel's work and concurred in the findings he a reeult Lieutenant General silicon Dickinson can Director of the recently catebliehed if Statement Hilton 13' Stealer Hearince tt lgrea of NORAD Attegg Warning System pp 3-5 H Report A to once to on perat one Hg 'e Missile gaming Sgaten What went Egongg-- Command control and Comunioatione Systems Directorate of the Joint Staff and Mr John Morgenstern or the affine o the Assistant Secretary of Detenne command control Communications and Intel igenoe briefed the worldwide Hilitary Comand and Control system mos council on this matter on 28 July 1 986 They proposed 'fixos' to harden essential components or strategic command control and contamination system against high altitude electromagnetic palm these components included airborne amend poet aircraft both the 3-411 and nth-135 rm relay eirerart mend centers dedicated landlines high altitude nuclear detection sensors and antenna Satellite Communication Breton DECS terninaln - Hr Horgenstern eubeequently addressed the hardening at each of these component individually with the concerned Service and actions were taken to include the required funding in the Service budgets Mother development that emphasized the need to enduring strategic connectivity was ooneideration or a building block approach to planning for employment or nuclear weapon In reviewing draft nuclear weapons guidance in late August 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to a proposal that called for development of a net of situation-responsive objective oriented' building block options for use of nuclear weapons The Joint Chiefs of Start believed the concept was poorly de ned and beyond the capability of current planning and systems including than for mend oontrol and mutational- v Cannot working Paper 'Strategio c3 survivability Executive Summary n d Jul 801 U Council agenda 28 Jul an C35 tiles Interview Hillard J webb with Mr Joseph aroma C3 System Evaluation 1Ve 035 2 my 82' 43 rs-nu JOSH-23140 to Sonnet 29 Aug 89 rms 2430 349-1 an 721 11 111 19 80 50 Win response to the ace objection the Secretary of Defense 'dia olote the building block concept from the guidance He considered it 'onsontial however to pursue the mutton En dirootoo the Joint 'Chiot'o of staff with assistance from his oftioo to prepare a building block concept to provide 'inoroaaed floxibility in planning and employment of nuclear weapons to provide the national Comma Authorities with a mosaic of viable alternative rather than the relatively large aggregated attack options or current axon planning He wanted a plan for implementation consistent with no force and commit control and communications capabilities 4 The Joint Chiefs of stat prepared a study tor this tank and steering and working group were appointed but proparntion of the actual plan has not been omitted Nonetheless consideration of the building block concept has included that additional comma control and contamination oapabilitos will be roguired gudg et Inoruaot 91 U The various studies on strategic comm ant control as troll as the North Minoan Mrospaoo Defense Maud also warnings and tho publicity minted with then brought inorouod attention to strategic oonnootivity both within the Department of antenna and in the This attention attended to the con nes on well where tum was growing antenna of the problon usooiutod with control of nuclear unaponl nogiming in 1977 intonation tron the Chaitm't Maia-annual evaluation at comma II m Sonnet to cansOct Stone to CJCS 23 Dec 80 51 1 to JCS 2430 3 9 5 2 Jan 813 721 11 8119 803 45 to Stones 29 hp 81 was 2430 3494 721 ll Aug 80 U Interview Willard 3 into with Loon R H sieve USN J53 C38 Bin 9 Apt 32 51 control nna oomunications systems wan incorporates into Congressional testimony by various de ant officials with that establishmont o the Command control and continuation Systems Directorato in the Joint staff its Direotor General Dickinson USA began to testify' befor committees mixing thosn 'he attested the need to action in the omna and control axon In his tirnt testimony baton the Senate hrm Services Committee in April 1980 ha pointed to the ostnbi'isnment of hin' ditoototnta no indication of the importance - accorood to amino control land communications One of his key observations to the - committee was that the comma oonttoi and vomunioations portion of the US righting rst was out of balance It was behind he said and We no dtdicntad to tootify' thnt- bonnet c ground this than in subsequent Corners ionni 1 if this in the Depart-moot of intense in tile ministnation and in the- Congress united in increased moan for ma annual Ind omicationn In the- early 1970 funding to this puma had nmined at increase between the 1970 Ind 191 4 budg tn 51500 million for a total of $6 0 billion and in View of the inflation amounted to littic inornu nt ail-J7 in tho FY 1980 budgct QPvand in comma and communications teonivnd $1 8 billion an inning of only in six yn'rl Thettafttx than a anked - increase to 1981 itaidnnt Cotton budgeted $9 70 13 U Toatimony Hm Dickinson Di G38 aux-toga Egg Author tion to A I ntions 1931 8 Cato on km on on ong up at 4 pp 3403-34114 41 KG Van c Doubleday The as Bulimia 5igna1 MagazineFigures are in than your doiinrnh-the amount at the tin of appropriation without aubotqutnt inflation 52 billion subsequently President Ronald Reagan raised that figure to $9 77 billion and the Congress emroprieted even more-me total of $10 02 billion of which $1 73 1muss for streteg in mm control and cmnnicstions 563 Just a few days before leaving office in January 1981 President Carter suheitted the r 1982 budget that included en increase of $1 5 billion over his previous budget for comend control and municetions raising the total amount to $11 2 billion Immediately upon entry into office Resident Reagan initiated a review of the 1982 budget and the new Administration submitted revised Detense budget that increased the comma control end communications tigers to $12 1l billion the congress thought even more funds were needed for contend control and con-unicstions Senetor dohn Inner held speciel hearings on this matter herore the Subcommittee on Strategic and theater nuclear Forces of the Senete nrsed Services emittee in lurch 1981 He was particularly interested in remndetions for in the strategic con-send control and municetions systees beyond those provided for in the revised budget Berry Van the Acting Assistant secretary or Deiense Col-sud control Cunnicetions and Intelligence 1 General Richard R Ellis Con-ender or the Strategic Air conend and Director of the Joint Strategic Connectivity Brett Lieutenant General Genes V netting nan Contender of north Ale icen Aerospace Detense end Lieutenant General Dickinson ell testi ed end supported further improvesents General ickinson stressed the E 39 Statisticel Tables to new Dir c3 Resources to Dr Bebcock et 11 6 lint 81 638 files Vimreph prepared by '63 Funding 1980-1983 n d Apr 8 38 files 50 Statistical tables Att to Hm Dir Resources 05 to hr Behcoct et el 5 tier 81 35 tiles 53 following 3 enacting 0 prioritias to realize a- viable oomn control and communications system rst he lint-0d the provision of unanbigioua warning 'of enemy attack to the National Command nuthori'tias 'and a survivable connectivity to pass national Comm Authority orders to the forces Current warning and communication system General Dickinson said were not protootad against the ottoota of higbualtitndo bursts including alaotronagnatic pulse scintillation ano blackout gaming or sabotage second he called for attack assessment information that identified for the National Command Authorities the nature oi attack by location and scope to allowr flexibility in response attatagioa Finally ht said intornation oi the status of surviving tort both friendly and enemy was nacouary for reconstitution and tollow on response a a commence at than the Subcomittaa remanded and tho Congrats appropr iatod additional undo for strategic mud oonttol and cmonicationa in the amount of 31354 million above what Pruidtnt Reagan had taunted tor a broakdoun by opacitic program on table 1 The Congress dolotad honour lands in other auto of the command control and emulation program and the total appropriato for command control and communications overall anountod to $11 33 billion for r 1982 or approximately $70 000 less than President Reagan bad naught-1n his revised Bu Table 3 for a comparison of apptopriationa for command control and continuation to - 1980 through 1933 Testimony of MG Dickinson Hearings 82 '0 itar Authorization Ra nest Strata in 3 gntroI anal lamination Bogota on EErat ana nger mac rot-oat g Eta on lanai Services 97th lat seat pp 26-37 Into F bit 033 Dickinson to Senator John ll Iarnar 16 pr 81 C38 filu 52 C38 Statistical table 'Raoomandcd Package with cmc's Priorities 11 6 35 files 13 Viowgrapb prepared by 138 Funding FY 1980-4983 nu Apr 82 some file 1 Strategic Command Control and Communications Programs for which the Congress Appropriated Money in the FY 1932 Budget 1 Beyood what the President Raquosted 4 Program Amount in millions mm was Expangtan 3 a Communication Propagation 1 through Saintillation E saota 5 2 a Electromagnntio Pulse Hardoning- Critical Facilities 2 paces Electromagnetic Pulse Hardening 3 2 0 Satellite Covenogc Continuity $65 0 i Mani-141591 swoon $56 2 Eleottioal Power Modernization Program - Survivable anduting Coununloations 3 5 total 55 - autism - - suxakha avozmavmxuamuanm vagufuunoxmosna Maui u't 3 p jtt - - 5 zo'or amen sou misses 11m wxm z 'of 3713' - am-im gm amidst mz ta t 55-1 Lift - amvauvn axnaumaaua 19's - - 0 2 - Isa anwasmam as - 3 mum-mania fS'i gs't St't at't 3 avatsauzluaznaa are err 09' I - 3 319mm manna - Fuonvmm u Buoxmtsadomhv 1mm 861 zaat 11061 0961 I a HEW iwgmunM-M we A progzensg'197a-1sao U The various reviews organizational developments and budgetary increases to strengthen strategic connectivity did bring progress a number of improvements had been accomplished by the end or 193$ One of the most significant was the upgrading of the National Emergency Airborne Command Post error aircraft Consolidated budget guidance in 1913 had celled for the conversion or the current 3-43 to 3-43 con guration in order to improve communications perrormence end survivability by increasing -renge hardening against electronegnetic pulse end strengthening resistance to jming and the Strategic Air amendiconnectivi-ty study had recomended acceleration of this program Necessary planning end programing proceeded end -- the first 3-43 _becene operational during 1930 Simultaneously two 15-41 were planned tor retrofit to 3-43 configuration In 'addition the H 1982 budget prepared during the end smitted to the Congress the tailoring rebruery included provision to retrofit or third and planning celled for acquisition or two may l-dBe in 19834116 1984 the result would be a eet of six 13-433 tor-shrines hergency Airborne conned Poet operatione 53 -- any Improvement else occurred in the earning srea 'i'h'e percentage or niseiie launch detections by tho nersnse Support Program 1 53 reders increased in the period 1978 through 1930 from 'spprorinteiy so to 96 percent In addition two- Phased Array Elder warning System PAVE mm 53 information on the progress in the period ion-roan unless otherwise stated is iron the 33 Beniennuai Report on ferromnce Evolution of amend Control and Communications System System Evolution Report for Oat 78' 79 79 AP 30 Oct 39 and Apr 81 our 360 22 Apr 10 Oct 78 line 79 14 my 80 endiu any 81 57 olonss- nm m rites became omretionel in 1980 greatly improving the ground-based detection end nothing against sea-launched ballistic missiles The two sites one in naesachuaetts and one in California each had range or 3 000 miles They operated in conjunction with the Deirdre suoport Brogram satellitee to oontire launch reports provide nioe ile impact predictione determine the number of missiles in an attack and pinpoint probable targets This new radar system wea- deticient homrer in two It did not provide complete morocco ell potential threat areas and had only - limited attack characteriretion capability ooainet sen launched missiles with multiple independently-tinned reentry vehicles Finally by the close of 1980 warning had been further strengthened by improvement in the Defense Support Progress deta survivability through provieion of mobile ground terminals the survivability of strategic connectivity oysters was increased as well during 1980 funds 'were requested to herded critical landlines and metro 3-411 and 36-135 eircrert - In addition progrees were underway to upgede' contend centers in the or European amend and the north Merioen Aerospace heron eon-end consolidated Operations Center 6800 end to develop ground mobile oomond ports nnother major notion to strengthen strategic connectivity in the poricd 1978-1980 we initiation or ei'iorts to provide a oyster tor nuclear detonation W surveillance information The Strategic Air Mend connectivity study had set torth a need for an enduring system to more or weapons detonations on enemy targets as well an to arrese enemy attacks on the United States and its sllies As result planning began for the Integrated Operational Nuclear Detection Systee ram which involved placing sensors on Global Positioning system ops setellitee Secretary of helmet harold Brown approved the system in Augu st 1979 and the as Air force issued the 58 I I necessary management irective for the system later in the 931 54 Jil- Other strategic connectivity devoloments in the some period were improvement in the airborne computer support program tor the Poet Attack Commons Control Systam PAWS already the most survivable element of the Us command control and communications system and increased Emergency Rocket Communications System BROS lorries and selection or 3110' launcher locations to increase launch survivability These latter actions were designed to enhance the probability of Energenoy Rocket Comnnicntion System 'flyour' through a hostile environment Finally in record with the Strategic Air amend connectivity study the Secretary of Defense directed in December 1 980 procurement or high ' requenoy radio to improve consummation tor presidential helicopters 51 1'15 Conant Hiltorzg 1979 pp 80 82 550 Ibidel PP I 56 Memo sooner to 3 1M 24 Dee 3 3 are to MS 23051909 2 Jan 81 360 24 Dec 30 59 - ikvll In I o-I-nwl A - The magma mic In On 20 January 1981 Ronald Reagan auccaedac Carter as cf the United States The 'new President - had made the adequacy of the us defame posture an issue in - __hisl campaign and he antarad cf ica ccmittcd to bolstering 'us military strength ha discussed in the previons section President Reagan undertook an immediate review of the 1982 De ance budget prepared by the outgoing Administration Many other things this review brought an 'increase in the funding requaat for comma control and commutation and this initial interact by President Reagan and his advisers in command and including strategic connectivity continued in tha succeeding months The Strategic Conner-tick Briefing in important actor in securing the new A cinistration's attantion to ltratcgic connectivity was a briefing on this matter prepared in the Mud Control and Commicaticna System of the Joint iitaff General nickinacn himself hogan this project He used _a systems approach placing comm control and communicaticna requiramanta in a matrix initially he employed 'dcta tar inaction-L1 area's auch as warning with cancer and radar Iyatm Thu color ihd icat'cd- capability of the system Gran was good yallow aarginalg arid rad deficiancy tater the matrix war translated 'intc a pictorial approach with sliced and ciewgrapha The bricting was kept currant with appropriate changea as improvements wart undul- I Interviau Willard J Walsh with mm Eillnan Dickinson 138A Dir -238 25 lab 82 In Inca-view Willard J Webb with UPC H825 E Smith USAF PPB Div 335 26 at 82 61 mam 46 General Dickinson gave the strategic connectivity briefing to the Operations Deputies on 1 April 1 981 2 Thereafter it we used widely in presentations to Reagan Malnutrition of icielo Recipients included the Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering and his staff including the Deputy Under Secretary for amend Control amonicetlcno and Intelligence the new Secretary of Defense Cooper Weinberger and his Deputy Freak c cerluccl our log the Becretery' a 21m JCS performance review in July 1981 and members of the White House and National Security Council staffs including the President s science adviser In addition General Dickinson uled portions or in testimony beior'e the Submit on Strategic and wheat nuclear heroes of the Armed Serriccs committee rhc result was an increased creme of the tragile condtr1on or strategic connectivity both in warning capability and energency action acreage transmission 3 The Reds smog - nan-11m on the Reagan Administration initiated 4 review of strategic connectivity The- issue ercre our consideration - ct the Extremely Low Frequency rm Con-unicetlone Syetu this system would one connotation with nuclear submarines at covert depths and speean Current-1y 'ln order to receive or creosote manger there euhnerioee hat to operate at or near the surfacemcd at reduced speeds in order to deploy en entom- Briefing man Dickinson to cosmos Strategic connectivity 1 Apr 81 Note to m 'Btrategic Connectivity 1131 Apr 81 0 Interview lehb with such 26 Feb 82 Interview Willard J Webb with Mr Joseph Tune C3 System Evolution 35 24 any 82 T8 Draft Brie ng on c3 CECE to Sechef Weinberg or 11 6 C38 files 3 cash-aoz-sz to was 29 Oct Bl Files 035 C3- 62 Trait of course greatly increased the chance of detection and the Extremely Low Frequency System would reduce this vulnerability The Carter ministration had approved a small extremely low frequency test transmitter in Wisconsin and plans called to a second tacility in when succeniy on 20 Hatch 1981 the Secretary at the navy questioned the necessity for the system because of the expense and the Incl of curvivebility of the system In reaction president Reagan asked about the matter He was testiculeriy concerned about the political reaction against the test facility in Wisconsin and wanted Deputy secretary at Detenee Cariucci to look into the Question Rather than just an assessment of the extmely low trequemy system the Deputy Secretary proposea to consider the system in the overall context of cttetegic connectivity The secretary of Defense and the Resident agreed and work began on the study on 24 April 1951 4 3 Resident Reagan hovevet am not await the results of this broad connectivity study to make a decision on the Extremely Low Frequency system In Apr 11 he elected to continue further testing at the isconein tecility prior to deciding on a second eite I c3 Systems Evaluation Report Oct 31 pp 55 360 11 my 31 U tact My Depaecnet to President Extras-1y Low Frequency emanation System ma late lie 81 me 11098ve to Secnav and cmunicetion System 28 Jul 81 8 butt Homo hots USecneltnm tc Secnef and Dopsecneh Presidential Deni-ion Required to An Extremely Low Frequency Continuation system - ACTION 11 6 late Ill 31 08 C31 files Interview Hillard a Hebb with our Robert Leaky user osctcar 26 tab 82 ta-EX Wade Retort strete 1c Connectivit View summer e rt 5 Aug 81 35 ti es 5 leg 2 ystens Evaluation Report Oct 81 PI 63 U deantine the strategic connectivity review eae' carried out by a special executive review board headed by Dr James b Wade 31 Drincipal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Research and Enginceting and with members iron the Services the Joint Chiefs of Staffs the Deyuty Secretary of Defence Policy the Deputy Under Secretary for Command Control Cmunioatione and Intelligence the Resistant Secretary of Defense Program Analysii and Evaluation the Defense uolear Agency the Defense Communications Agency and the Joint Stnategic Connectivity 'Stait A noticing group of representatives at the members did the actual work of the review 4031' Dr Wade submitted the completed report known thereafter as the 'Wade Study to the Sectetary of Defence on 5 August 1981 It confirmed the finding of the Strategic Air Command and Navy connectivity studies two years earlier that the United States could not carry out its national policy because of comma control and communications weaknesses The Rude Study van even more than the earlier studies however because it was none broad- based-' It had been prepared by and had the backing of not only the Joint chute of State but also the Services the Office of the secretary of Detenee and the concerned Defense Agencies - The Wade Study presented the following conclusions improvements in the Soviet Union e nuclear warfare capability over the peel decade seriously threatened on strategic command control and communications capability in both initial nuclear exchanges and in protracted nuclear war 2 current command oontrol and communications would not provide assented aumtt to an effective initial response to a nuclear attack on the United States 3 the 3 T e Joint Chiefs of Staff were epresented by new Dickinson use Directot C38 61 I curront or command control and communications oytoms were not endurable and would not support the prosecution of a protracted nuclear liar 4 planncd organization and coordination of surviving post-attack command control and oomunicotiono systems and weapono systems were inadequate 51 the Unit-m1 Statca could not assure survivability eodurahility or connectivity of the national command authority function These conclusions owed from major command control and communications- dcficioncies in tactical warning and attack assessment when existing systems were vulnerable to disruption and d struction from pulse other high altitude nuclear effects artaro sabotago or physical attack in dociriommakinc hero there was inability to cure national command authority survival and concoction with the nuclear forces cmciolly uhdor surprise conditions and in communications systems which were susceptible to thc um throat as above and which could not guarantte availability of even capability during a protracted war The Rude Study recognized tho imanibility o attaining per-tact strategic command control and communications at all times and under all conditions Ron-than it did believe it possible to upgrade tho US- ctratugic to assure a reasonable probability of cffcotivoncrr' and to give onion-mints the ability to dofand the United States aitcotivcly and action national objectives to that and to Study presented two packagto or Ocm'ndcd actions who rst contained proctdural changer to be soon or possible andIr in addition 'programtic actions to be loaded in the F 1983 budget The second mug included actions for the FY 1984-1988 budgets Both packages were separated into categories or tactical warning and attack assessment decision-making and comunicationa For the specific - 65 recommendations see Annex 3 Estimated 3 933 ionding for actions in the first package amounted to $1 9 billion Current programing allocated only billion for this purpose resulting in a billion shortfall the total cost of both recommended packages or the node Study was $14 7 billion while current programing provided only $10 4 billion for an overall estimated shortfall of $4 3 billion 7 gm Launch Under Attack Page Jani- While the trade Study' was a in preparation consideication or 'laonch under attack' was options also brought the adequacy of existing and planned systems tor - strategic connectivity to the attention of the Reagan Administration boring the spring or 1981 or Richard D Detector Under Secretary or netense Research Md Engineering asked the Joint chiefs or Start about the ability ct contend control and municstions system to survive and get emergency action messages to the strategic town in various launch under attack situations In response the amend control and Communications Systems Directorate prepsred an appropriate assessment under two situationeu when both sides were alert or 'tuily generated and when the United States was attacked under surprise conditions with its torces in routine alert posture to sassy attack scenarios the Command Control and connotations Britons Directorate relied on the current and Integrated Strategic Operations Plan 31869 recognising that actual soc-y attacks might be IInationality ditterent the Gounod Control and connotations Systems Directorate concluded that in a rally generated posture the probebility or comand control and comuniontiona systems 7 Earn wade Report 'Stretegic Connectivity Review Emery Report ' 5 Aug 81 38 tiles 66 supporting assurcd execution at launch onoor attack options was extremely szmr I The was that no combination of systolic and procoduroo not that enough to complete the grocer or turning accountant decision-making and action message dissemination in the time available 3 5 minutes between tho first tantrum-launched ballistic missile breakwater and attacks on comma control and communications systems With regaro to an attack undo surprise conditions the remand Control and Communications Systems Dircctoratc consider the chance of current system supporting launch under attack options as moderate to high for Intccontincntal Ballistic niacilu model-at for bombers and low' tor nuclear submarincs If initial or precuuor' attacks were optimized tor mood control and communications gradation honour the probability of such system supporting Monroe execution of launch undo attack option was 'er II tor all force elements The Conrad Control and Communiontions System Dirobtbrato listed a nonhu- oi inproromontc headed to bring the probability of 'ururod command control and communication support for launch unocr options to an acceptable lml Soc Am I control Dickinson mounted the launch under attack me to the notation Deputies as vol ac to Dr Dot-aural Nuclear mamas mlomnt Polio- 1 an cg 528 Review oi nuclear weapons amount policy ciao raised questions about strategic connectivity tor the Reagan Administration In July 1981 the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy submitted a draft of a our policy statement on this to the Soc-rotary o2 De ance Jun 81 C38 files l3 Interviur Willard J webb with no Jessie Crawford 88M 35 29 liar 67 Basically the proposed_ statement continued the nuclear weapons employment policy developed by the Nixon Administration9 and reettirmed by Prouide ts Ford and Carter Among the new teetures the craft statement plecec greater emphasis on the secure reserve torce subset of our strategic forces that could be ulthheld during 0 nuclear war and would be capable o enduring survival The draft included provision of an increase in the secure reserve force over the next two years to allow tor e greater role and flexibility in its employment 13 Jun The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the dreit nuclear weapons employment policy and among other things doubted the ability of commend control and communication system to support on expenelon or the secure reserve torce rho Secure Reserve roroe Study in 197811 had reached this use conclusion Consequently they questioned any plane to expand use or the force without requlelte improvements in coueend control and communications they recommended thet' the guidance be modi ed to state the Secure Reserve Force shall be increased over time es improvements to both forces and releted 63 permit greater role to it and increased exibility in its nutrient subsequently the Under Secretary of Defense revised the drelt statement to incorporate the JCS reconneudetlon regarding the secure reserve forceJ2 See above 9 13-14 10 mm to Sachaf 1e Jul 81 31 1 to JCS 2439 363 16 Jul 81 721 11 Jul 81 11 see above PP 27 26 12 0-32 Jase-28241 to Soon 24 Jul 81 2438 363-113 9331 1382-81 to 34 Jul 91 to 89 8 3 hug 81 emo 905ecneftp to Secnet 7 hug 81 Att to JCS 2430 363 4 13 Aug 81 721 14 Jul 31 6 8 Sharer The President's decision on strategic as f The results of the Wade Study together with the conclusions concerning the launch under attack options and the secure force convinced President Reagan that stronger action must be taken -to improve strategic connectivity On 1 October 1983 the President approved Strategic Forces Modernization Fragran ' It included five mutually parts 1 making strategic communications and command system more survivable to assure connectivity with the nuclear commanders modernizing the strategic bomber force by the addition or two new aircraft increasing the accuracy and payload of the submarinewleunched ballistic nieeilec and adding see-based cruise missiles seen 4 improving strategic 5 deploying a new larger and more eccurate lend-haeec palliatic missile The President gave the first item the highest priority' in the program the objective was to develop command and communications systems for the strategic torcee that could survive and endure before during rend ether a nuclear attack We do not he said have such system new Financial resources required for the entire ucderniretion program would be derived tron ourrently planned and approved De ance budget allocationl and any overrune would be absorbed by reproganming within the agreed budget ceiling 13 In the President's modernization program provided tor improvement in strategic command control and communications in three arena the survivability performance and coverage o warning system radars and eatellires the survivability and capabilities or- the command centers that would direct Us - orcee in a nuclear war and the communications eystene that linked the commend Tim-ex user 12 1 Oct 31 new Asst to Pree for N55 to V Pres et Strategic Forces underniration h - centers' with the legs of the strategic triad In the- warning area the program included deployment of mobile ground terminals to process deta from satellites and upgrading or the satellites themseires To enhance remand centers the President called for deploying 3-413 aircraft camera poets hardening or ecu-135 aircraft command poets against nuclear effects and equipping the git-135 commend posts with upgraded eeteliite and very iow frequenoy 1ow frequency communications The measures to improve comericetione systems were development and instaliation of vvery low frequency low trequency receiver on strategic 'boubers improvement in micetione to deployed submarines - and development of new satellite communication system to provide extremely high frequency Ear channels to insure two-way communication between Were end their forces tJ At a news conference the following day President Reagan announced his decision on strategic weepone uodernireticn The progren had three objectives he said to act or a deterrent egeinet any Soviet eotion e to provide the capability to respond to any further growth in the Soviet rare and to signal us reeolve rue President then listed the aspects of the progren In- the public listing improvement in communications and control system we fourth and the President geve no indication that 110 th assigned this area the higheet priority mono the programs In the- - questioning that o11oued -the reporters did 'not eel about- the command control end omnieetionc aspects of the modernization 15 - II 3 hite House News Release The Bergen Strategie- Progrem 2 Oct 1981 3 5 President Reagan 'United States Strategic weapons Progra Remark ende Question-end-hnmr Senior with Reporters 2 Oct 31 He t1 1 etion of Presidential Mule nte 5 Oct 81 pp 1 eoDe Brie ng'o Hewenen at white House Stretegic Weepone System 2 Oct 81 can Historical Office tiles 70 TB Two end half weeks later on 19 October 1981 President Reagan approved new nucleer coupons employment policy that reinforced the inportence of strategic connectivity the policy celled tor 'suhstantiel improvement in forces and the supporting command control and intelligence system to eerure'the required flexibility endurance and etfectiveneta in a nuclear we of indefinite duretion The new policy also provided for secure reserve force that could be employed after an extended withhold period the President implicitly recognized the JCB contention that such an erce could not be expended without improvement in counted control and municetiont systems and the approved policy statement contained the language recommended by the Joint Shinto of Staff that the secure reserve force should be increased only no repidlg ae inprocenentc to' both forces end related comma control counnicetione ' and intellignece permitted 17 who 1983 Budget - - Hhile the President and his advisers were considering the ntretegio weapon modernization program end a new nuclear weapon uployunt policy work had proceeded on the 1953 Defonle Budget In June 1981 Deputy secretary of Deanne eerluoci issued revised guidance to strengthen the planning phase or the Planning Programming and Budgeting PPS System for the mend control and communication tree he directed the Joint Chief or Steer to take the lead in planning system to support the uni ed end' specified roman Such plans he raid should highlight cross-Service cross-mud cross-program and internationel requirementt the Secretary oil nteft would provide guidance direction and IE See above 9 67-68 -- I ccordination to insure integration of systems rcquirmen tn to meet the Secretary s goals and work on tho 1983 budget was already well advanced- this now directive was received and although it had little effect on the It 1983 process it promises to be of much importance in preparation of future command control and comunications budget Guidance for the Five-Year Defense Program mm FY 1983-1981 for comma control and communications tot significant improvement in missile garningend in connectivity with the strategic totccs in't he early phate ct nuclear conflict Actions to accomplish these' goals included onhanoement o the survivability of the De ance Support Progran mgr eatellite system moccrnication c airborne command posts by buying has aircraft and hardening existing Biz-135 aircraft- - prcvieion of- sufficient cm aircraft to support the Pacific nuclear submarines acquisition oi super high frequency sari transponders develomnt and partial running 'for an Integrated Operational unclear Detonation System Icons and of the- Reconstitutcblo Enduring Satellite Comunicetlonc 335m Sntam a system to reconstitute an austere satellite comunicetione network following an enemy Eirct trike 19' - - I the Servicee prepared their 'Ptogran Objective noncrenda Pain for the r 1983 budget to neat 'thc rive-teat Program objectivee end the secretary of minute reviewed then For the strategic mono control and micationc area he thought aoditicnal 'tnnding wee oguired to acct the recommendations of the recently L5 In Home Moscow to Secys of ailments cats at 12 Jun 31 to sea 2522 101 22 Jun 31 555 2 Jun 81 19 01581 non Program Review 83-83 Final Drait t Homo Exec Sony DRE to Boonecent- completed crio Study Accordingly the Secretary's Program Decision Mammalian added approximately $ 64 billion to strategic command control and comunicationc system above the amount of the recommended Service programs to a total or $2 61 billion Thereafter the Services prepared budget revisions the Budget Estimate Submissions 335 to contotn with the Program Decision xenon-anon In the final Department of ncfenso budgct View that followed still more funds approximately 8 26 billion wort n'ddnd tor strategic command control and communications systems and the nal non Program audget Decision resulted in I- totnl 'of billion Thus the Secretary of Defense approved the' acdition oi almost a billion collars in strategic comma control and communications system in the 1983 Defense Budget beyond what the services had initially toqunted l This reflected the President's decision to give comma control one micationc tint priority in strategic weapon modernization U the $2 81 billion tigutc for strategic mod control and communication was incorporated into tho Ptalidcnt s FY 1983' budget submitted to the congrcu in early February lsaz without change It funding to viz-icon satellite stagnant which aupport strategic cannot-Id Manon to cats-e1 cl Program Decision Memorandum to bounce Asuncion cnd Defense-wide Ptogtm 2 Oct 81 to Sam Program Decision Honorandun for tho Dept of the Air Form 0 2 Oct 81 De ance to Mar 'Ptogtan nocision MIMI-II for the Dept of the Navy to 2 Oct 31 newscast to Boom-Ir 'Progtan Decision nonrandom for the Dept of the May 011' 2 Oct' 81 our 557 2 Oct 31 38 Paper PM Evaluation -- 63 Systems n d Oct 81 C35 files 21 0% osn Paper czz Interim Status Report 83 - Budget by Mission Area me Jan 82 to C33 Viowgtaph c3 Funding FY 1933-1983 n d Apt 82 CBS files 22 Pros ag to tho Congrats transmitting r 1983 budget 8 Rob 82 Mega Congilntion 'of ngcidcntin E'cb 82 pp - 73 control tn communications were a dud the total amount increasea even further to $3 74 billion 23 The total mend control and communications program in the President's FY 1983 budget amounted to $14 74 billion The figures are important but even more important is the them A comparison of funding for comma control and communications shows a significant increase over the past four years See table 2 p 56 above Binding to comm 'cantro1 'and communications overall increased by apptoiimately 47 percent to struttgic aspects of the Program the increase was on so percont f Francs During 1981 - The President s modernization program for strategic comma control and continuation system together with the funding increases in the 1983 budget to initiate that program promised major improvement in strategic connectivity _It would take veal years however to see the effects at than planned improvements Even so that Here stances in stutegic conmtivity in 1981 During the year mad posts were strangthened In the continuing program to inptovc the National antiques Airborne comma P631 Hawaii the tint 2-41 aircraft was input for hardening and to 3-43 configuration in October 1981 The second 3-43 mo to retro t in_ October 1932 Meantime tin Comm-nae ot the strategic Air Command indicated that - he intended to use upgta ei 36-135 tint-attic tiic continuously airborneccmana post uni had no teq itmnt- for 2-43 In a consequence the hit some deleted plans to buy two addi ticnai 3-43 from it n 1933 P ogran Objective Mound -' his action would 0811 Paper 'Stntegic can 21983 Budget Est-into Submissionf 25 How 81 C38 films 24 U 33 viewraph Funding 1960- 19835' the tip 32 cas files 25 See above 9 57 for earlier aspects of this pragran Jun 5m result- in 'a fleet or tour 3-43 aircraft to maintain ground alert posture for the National Emergency Airborne demand 1 031 33 Another action in the command post area in 3 931 was the equipping of the airborne command posts of the nuclear connandern with Harmon terminals thereby increasing the redundancy for single Integrated Oyerational 91ers SIOP communications In addition 70 percent or the strategic Air Command contort were equipped with mantras terminals further strengthening the survivability of communications with the nuclear forces Sf Elana tor enhancement of the Alternate Rational military amend Canter moved ahead ea well An eetinere for installation or secure oonrerencing had been completed a reqhirencnt for eecure video link betueen the Center and the Federal Emergency enactment Agency mm was developed mobile satellite terminals had been requested as had mode for- electromagnetic pulse protection for 'the center's power source and e required operational capability was being prepared tor high frequency upgrade of the tacility Jili- In the area or communications very low frequency tests during 1931 demonstrated the technical' interoperability of the Glen nit Force and the Navy ayetene no a result installation or 6163 modem beg'en on the airborne command f posts of the nuclear contenders Thin new equipment would n'ilow interoperability with the navy very low frequency systems and supply an anti-gaming capability The 61611 and the when fully operational would become part or the very low frequency couponent or the ninim Essential Emergency cmunicetiona Net men 13 11 information on strategic connectivity inprovenentn in 1981 in iron C38 Evaluation Reportand 038 -Bvaluation Report Apr 82 360 17 Jun 82 75 'Othot ooinuunioationo edovolownta were the President's approval in April 1981 as described above to continue the Exttanoly Low Ptaquonoy continuation System Itost facility in wisoonain and tha suhaoquont approval on 8 ootoba 1981 to a second alto 1n Ilianaoota In addition in July 1981 than installation - at tho II notuotk homo opotatlonal and a fourth installation was addad to ootoha 1981 this ayatoo de ned to improve tho tranmIoion of compute data but quoationa quickly atoao Purthor dovelopnont of tho onto 1a now in doubt I-IOII- In the naming and atoa tho tho_ cm control ond Communication ayatau altaotorota cottaua Study taro telng auon1totod by tho JIoiot- Isttatogio Iconnootiqlty Stat to down to auppIoIotI the IPtaaidant'o ottotogio ooapoos Iaodotniaatioo proton IvIatlouo taprovoaonta to tactical tannin-g Iano attack wan approved to laploIlontation though hono ti pat opatatlonal Thou included if to tha- pounce support Preston D821 -aata111to aohao Ionhariomnta nohno gtound atationa om upqtading Itho hound mutation hatuotk cell for tanI InaniI'IaItio anon tony warning apt-on my - nioa o and ItaIdar upgrading and pronoun of aloottoaio oountornoaI-utoa 'analytato' to tho Sta-Launched Ballistic IlioIolloI ayoton addition of too PM aiItaa I to tho_ Ioouthaaot and nouthooat Units-d Statoa and a pom upgrado too tho ousting PM rm altaa mo ahovo p 63 28 See abovo pp 46-48 6 gm I'veIraii - the four years 1973 through 1 981 great progress was node in strengthening atrotegie connectivity Ite tenuous nature had been brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of Defense and the President In response the President has approved a etrategio weapons modernization pregran that gave highest - priority to the area or communication and amend systems T6 out this program the President approved 1983 budget that represented an 90 percent increase oyer the level of our years earlier for atretegie commend and control Survivabie and enduring etretegio connectivity still remained to be eehieved but novenent toward that goal area real Z7 mum This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu