SYSTEM II 'o o 90026' ' 7'-i7t3 ----1I lf THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON TGP SECRET SENSITIVE o DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL E O 13526 SECTION 5 3 b 3 ISCAP APPEAL NO 2013-104 document no 1 NA T1 NA L sEC u RTTY VE CIS 10 N LD_E_c_L_A_s_siF_Ic_A_TI_o_N_DA_T_E_ _M_a _y_01-'- _20_11_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ j DIRECTIVE NUMBER 13 NUCLEAR WEAPONS EHPLOYMENT POLICY l l5 The President has directed hat the following will be US policy governing the deployment and employment of our nuclear forces and their acquisition The most fundamental national security objective is to deter direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States and its Allies Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur the United States and its Allies must prevail Our nuclear forces are of crucial importance both in the prevention of nuclear attack and in protecting our national interests at any level of nuclear conflict Deterrence can best be achieved if 0 ur defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes under any contingency so uncertain and dangerous as to remove any incentive for initiating attack This requires that v1e be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets or other adversary would be denied their political and mili'tary objectives Stated otherwise we must be prepared to wage war successfully Our nuclear forces both the strategic Triad and theater forces in conjunction with general purpose forces must hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the United States and its Allies kB1 If deterrence fails the employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to the operations of our general purpose forces Our doctrine for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must ensure that we can pursue specific objectives selected by the National Command Authority NCA at any given time from general guidelines established in advance These imperatives constitute the basis for the development of our nuclear forces and plans for their employment We must effect substantial improvements in our forces and their supporting command control and intelligence systems C 3 I to ensure requisite flexibility endurance and effectiveness in a nuclear war of indefin te duration Our nuclear weapons employment policies and plans must evolve in parallel with the improvement of our force capabilities The principles and goals hereunder should guide efforts in both areas GBP1 J 2 Basic Employment Objec tives The United States must be able to deny the Soviet Union a military victory at any level of conflict and force it to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States To this end we must have the capability to attack the widest range o f targets in a way that serves our national interests even when retaliating to a massive strike received without strategic warning and if necessary to cripple the capability of the Soviet Union and its allies to conduct effective military operations Plans for the employment of strategic nuclear forces must be integrated with employment planning for theater nuclear and other general purpose forces ts Employment Planning To accomplish nuclear employment objectives pre-planned attack options against the Soviet union and its allies will be developed with the following general order of priorities for weapon allocation Strategic and theater nuclear forces and associated c3r National-level political and military leadership and the associated cont ol structure All other military forces stationary and mobile and associated c3r Industrial facilities which provide immediate su port to military operations and The industrial economic base of the Soviet Union and its allies Sub-options will be developed to permit selection of targets from among the foregoing categories Options for attacking 1 the national-level political and military leadership and 2 the Soviet industrial economic base and that of their allies as appropriate will be desig ed to be withheld for a protracted period to leave the Soviets with sufficient national control structure and industrial economic resources at risk following countermilitary attacks so that they have a strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets OP SECRE SENSITIVE 1'QP 5ECRE5 S t li SITIVE 3' o 0 Methods of attack on specific targets should be chosen to limit collater l damage consistent with effective accomplishment of the attack objective Where appropriate overall plans should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage While it will remain our policy not to rely on launching our nuclear forces in an irrevocable manner upon warning that a Soviet missile attack has begun we must leave Soviet planners with strong uncertainty as to how we might actually respond to such warning And we must be prepared to launch our recallable bomber forces upon warning that a Soviet nuclear attack has been initiated li81 In addition to pre-planned options we must be able to develop on short notice innediate options for employment of nuclear forces both strategic and theater against targets of significant value as for example ground formations that emerge in the course of the developing conflict situation This capability must encompass the rapid construction of plans that integrate the effective employment of strategic and theater nuclear forces with general purpose forces for achieving theater campaign objectives Flexibility US nuclear forces supporting c 3 r and plans for thefr use must allow selectivity of empioyment to ensure appropriate responses to any level of aggression Enhanced employment flexibility is a significant objective which will be pursued aggressively to increase current capabilities and take full advantage of emerging force and supporting c3r improvements while maintaining a responsive decision-making and force execution process Survivability and Endurance Nuclear forces and supporting c 3 r systems must be sufficiently survivable and enduring to support the targeting requirements of this directive to provide for effective control and direction of forces in a protracted conflict and to ensure the Secure Reserve Force is capable of being emp oyed after an extended withhold perio d --tsT The composition of the Secure Res erve Force shall be based heavily on the probability of survival and endurance of its components and supporting c3r and upon its capability to attack a broad range of targets including hard targets The Secure Reserve Force shall be increased as rapidly as improvements to both forces and related c 3 r permit greater roles for it and increased flexibility in its employment Ji0 ' 'OP SECRE'i' SENSITIVE o'rOI' SECF E'f' SENS ITIVE 4 o Non-Warsaw Pact Employment Objectives Preplanned attack options shall be developed as appropriate to prevent potential adversaries outside the Warsaw Pact from coercing the United States and its Allies and friends in the aftermath of a Soviet nuclear attack and US counterattack We should rely as much as possible upon theater nuclear and Secure Reserve Force weapons for this purpose Relationship of Acquisition Policy to Employment Policy Our riuclear force and c3r acquisitio programs must support the employment policy established by this directive The criteria used in evaluating acquisition of nuclear forces must recognize that each element of our force posture possesses inherent attributes that are better for some conflict situations but are of lesser importance for others Programs wiil be designed to achieve Greater survivability endurance a nd military effectiveness both in the forces and associated structure c3r A subset of forces and suppbrting c 3 r that have a high probabiJ ity of enduring-survival in a nuclear war More effective capability for targeting Soviet military forces and associated c3r in the context of a rapidly changing conflict situation The capacity to assess battle damage and the disposition of remaining forces and eapon systems -ffrT Greater emphasis will be placed on multiplicity of nuclear systems and basing modes to strengthen the overall warfighting capability of our nuclear forces This multiplicity of nuclear systems and basing modes complicates soviet defense and attack planning strengthens mutual reinforcement among the nuclear and conventional force elements in our own attack planning and execution and hedges against unforeseen degradation of individual elements of our nuclear forces Related Defense Activities Active and passive defenses can contribute significantly to a credible deterrent The damage-limiting capacity of an effective strategic defense reduces the likelihood of coercion and increased prospe cts for postwar recovery of the United States Specific guidance for defensive measures will be provided in separate documents ke1 - OF SECRE SENSITIVE 5 Implementation The policies described herein shall be implemented in accordance with a Maste r Plan developed by the Secretary of Defense In addition to ensuring compatibility of acquisition and employment policies i t will provide for consistency with the revitalized Continuity of Government and civil Defense programs The plan should also outline provisions for conducting frequent exercises including semi-annual participation by the National Command Authority to evaluate employment doctrine and force and planning capabilities The plan shall be completed and forwarded for the President's review by February 1 1982 k81 A report will be provided to the President at least annually on our employment plans including but not limited to the size and capability of the Secure Reserve Force the degree 9f employment flexibility available and the status of improvement programs 81 PD-59 is superseded by this directive OP GECRE SENSITIVE This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu