Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401020003 TEMPO 0506585 15501567 FRR USSR DFSMI I 1 FRR STATE 25x1 I as 0709200 550 -RAGE 001 NC 0709280 TOR 0201502 MAY so STATE 137033 OD ZNY 20C STATE RLYOOI - OD RUEHC RUEHHE DE RUEHC #7633 1220135 A ZZH 0 0201302 MAY 56 SECSTATE MASHDC - TO USDEL SECRETA- EDIATE 5751 I 3 STATE 137633 TOSEC 000322 NOFORN E O 12350 DECL OADR TAGS OVIP GEORGE P SUBJECT ESTIMATE OF FATALITIES AT REACTOR ACCIDENT INFORMATION MEMO SIS 0013003 I TO THE SECRETARY FROM INR - MORTON I SUBJECT OF FATALITIES AT CHERNOOTL REACTOR 1 THE ENTIRE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BELIEVES A FIGURE OF THO IS FREFOSTEROUS 2 A NORMAL DAY SHIFT AT AN INDIVIDUAL SOVIET ROM-1000 I 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88601117R000401020003-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401020003-1 0 CD 0 1 SECRET 86 OTABEBO sso PAGE 002 NO 0749256 TOR oaoxsoz PAT 86 137633 q POWER REACTOR Is REPORTED TO BE AROUND 100 PEOPLE A NIGHT SHIFT WOULD BE 25-35 PEOPLE THIS WOULD MEAN BECAUSE UNIT 3 AND a ARE ADJACENT AS MANY AS 200 PEOPLE IN THE DAYTIME OR 50-70 PEOPLE AT NIGHT COULD HAVE BEEN WORKING IN THE VICINITY OF REACTOR ll WHEN THE ACCIDENT BEGAN WHILE WE WOULD EXPECT THAT AN IMPEDIATE EVACUATION WAS ORDERED WHEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ACCIDENT BECAME APPARENT STILL A FAIRLY LARGE CREW COMPARED TO US REACTOR OPERATIONS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN TO CARRY OUT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES IN AN ATTEMPT TO SHUT DOWN THE REACTOR AND TO SOLVE WHATEVER PROBLEM MAY HAVE CAUSED THE ACCIDENT THIS CREW WOULD BE A KEPT AT THE SITE IN ORDER TO RECTIFY THE BUT WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THEY WOULD BE LOST SHOULD THE PROBLEM WORSEN ORAMATICALLY THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO THIS WOULD BE TO ABANDON THE SITE IMMEDIATELY AT THE SIGN OF MAJOR PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD VIRTUALLY INSURE THE SORT OF DISASTER THAT ULTIMATELY OCCURED 3 IF THE ACCIDENT SITUATION FOR ANY ANOONT OF TIME WE WOULD EXPECT THE EMERGENCY CREW TO BE AUGPENTED As THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION KNOWN SHIFT SUPERVISORS AND FOREHEN FROM THE OTHER UNITS WOULD BE CALLED IN TO MAKE SURE TNAT APPROPRIATE ACTIONS WERE BEING TAKEN TO HEAD OFF ANY POTENTIAL CATASTROPHE IMAGERY SHOWING FIRE ENGINES AND EMERGENCY VEHICLES NEAR THE SUPPORTS THE SUPPOSITION THAT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WERE RESPONDING TO THE ACCIDENT THEY COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN BEFORE ANY EXPLOSION ON NUMBERS OF VEHICLES IN THE AREA ANO POBTULATTNO AN AUGHENTED EMERGENCY As MUCH AB 100 PEOPLE COULD HAVE BEEN IN THE INNEOTA A occu REO PPIN 4 BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF THE DANAGE OBSERVED ON IMAGERY OF THE WE FEEL THAT ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF THE UNIT A EXPLOSION WERE EITHER KILLED OR SUFFERED LETHAL RADIATION DOSES AT THE TIME OF THE THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIETS TO EVACUATE THE FIRE ENGINES FROM THE LETHAL RADIATION ZONE AROUND 2 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401020003-1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88GO1117R000401020003-1 3 3 SECRET STATE 86 0709286 580 PAGE 003 NC 0709286 TOR 0201502 FAY 86 STATE 137633 THE REACTOR BUILDING IS ANOTHER INDICATION 0F HHITEHEAD END OF MESSAGE SECRET I 3 I I 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011 12 29 CIA-RDP88601117R000401020003-1 This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu