UNCLASSIFIED ' - k United States Department of State Washington D C 20520 February 9 1999 CONFIDENTIAL DECL 1 6X1 RELEASED IN FULL illy N A'ARD1 11YI yIQm IYICIVIVI ANDUM S S TO The Secretar FROM INR - Phyllis E Oakley SUBJECT East Timor - More Questions than Answers r Indonesia's January 27 announcement that independence for East Timor could be considered by the new parliament after the June 7 election if the Timorese reject an autonomy proposal initiated a political process with little coordination Indonesian officials and the Australian prime minister have reiterated that autonomy is the preferred outcome but the Key questions involve who momentum is toward full independence to engage on the Timorese side and the timing and precise nature of the process By default the UN may be best suited to transition but only if Jakarta has a face-saving orchestrate the way to protect its interests and supporters C x On the diplomatic front Who speaks for the East Timorese need worked out among the Timorese themselves and with will to be UN Canberra will take a prime interest Jakarta Lisbon and the East because Timorese such as Ramos Horta 'reside in Australia Timorese who have found unity in confronting a common enemy in Jakarta can be expected to voice differences over process For example some Timorese were timing and personalities critical of Xanana Gusmao's call for a lengthy transition C Under UN auspices delegations from Portugal and Indonesia have discussed the basic framework for autonomy but have not agreed on a mechanism to poll the Timorese Even though this autonomy proposal is likely to be rejected engaging the Timorese as soon as possible in this process could help establish guidelines for a transition to independence C Jakarta maintains some 20 000 troops in East On the ground Timor and has organized armed civilian cadre ostensibly to Disarming protect the people who are opposed to independence genuine sides difficult there is a ceasefire both will be unless to and guarantee of protection for residents opposed CONt IDENTIAL CLASSIFIED BY rhrllis E Oakley 1 5 c d SpN UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN DATEXASE ID 31 MAR 2006 200300722 INR A S UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED O CONFIDEN7 AL -2- independence Arranging an exit strategy for Jakarta's forces The armed forces want to avoid reopening the invasion issue and may balk at a scenario that appears to also will be delicate return East Timor to Portugal thus calling into question the sacrifice of several thousand Indonesian soldiers Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao's suggestion of a joint Indonesian-Timorese force for an in t erim- per io u iua y s ound na_ v e -bu t C ould provide security for the transition if supported by all the key players I C The exodus of non-Timorese has already begun more are likely to depart Managing resettlement will fall largely on the Indonesians who already have said the UN must accept some responsibility East Timor will lose a significant number of Indonesian -supplied teachers healthcare workers and civil servants making Catholic Church and NGO support anoessential part of the mix C Timing President Habibie speaks of independence of the year other Indonesians and some Timorese refer transition ranging from months to years There are no deadlines but Indonesian assembly elections on_June 7 by the end to a arbitrary present an awkward obstacle -Whether to seek a Timorese determination on autonomy before as part of or after June 7 has not been decided each timetable presents unique challenges particularly for consideration of an acceptable UN role Jakarta argues that only the full parliament scheduled to meet in the fall can terminate East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia C CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu