ar UNCLASSIFIED United States Department of State Washington D C 20520 April 16 1999 CONFIDENTIAL DECL 1 6X1 INFORMATION MEMORANDUM RELEASED IN FULL SIS TO The Secretary FROM INR - Phyll SUBJECT East Timor-Momentum Shift Oakley The momentum in East Timor appears to have shifted to the pro-Indonesia forces after an early rush of pro-independence sentiment Prospects are high that a cycle of intimidation and terror will intensify requiring a neutral UN or 'other presence to maintain security and facilitate assistance C t Intimidation by-local militias with the support of Indonesia's regular forces is the driving force behind public demonstrations of pro-Jakarta sentiment this week in Dili and elsewhere but other factors contribute to the new dynamics C o There is a ripe environment for militias Like much of Indonesia a significant portion of East Timor's population is young and without prospects for good jobs Even without intimidation youths see monetary and psychological advantage in joining a militia unit Once involved-in a violent incident the incentive is even stronger to remain a 'revenge' momentum builds and a snow-ball effect begins attracting more participants o C After President Habibie's announcement that independence for East Timor could be an option it appeared that the civilian government in Jakarta was preparing for a Timorese rejection of an autonomy plan and that the military would accept independence for East Timor with proper provisions for a facesaving withdrawal Recently however there are signals that the leadership thinks a 'win on the issue of autonomy is possible There is no evidence that this sentiment has translated into orders for the military to suppress the pro independence movement but Jakarta has certainly given incentive to the pro-autonomy activists Some local military CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFIED BY Phyllis E Oakley INR A S REASON 1 S c d UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN DATEXASE ID 31 MAR 2006 200300722 UNCLASSIFIED F_ U9WP E FIED 2commanders are aiding the effort but the extent or exact C nature of their orders is unclear o Pro-Jakarta Timorese have few options other than to fight for the status quo Those Timorese who threw in their lot'with Jakarta cannot easily leave the province like the non-Timorese teachers -'doctbxs and-bureaucrats Who have beer-reassigned-by the central government Some of these Timorese have been targeted by radical independence forces and many believe they are on hit lists that would be a priority of-a new independent government o C On the other side of the equation pro-independence rebels were ill-equipped to become political players and strains emerged between leaders on the ground and Xanana Gusmao Their early parades and demands for independence frightened Timorese with vested interests in the status quo As Indonesian authorities moved to defend pro-Jakarta sympathizers including arming local gangs violence increased and the rebels stepped up attacks on Indonesian troops and civilian officials A vicious cycle of gang warfare has erupted in many towns with pro-Jakarta Tailitias clearly having the edge o C Pro-independence political activists were similarly ill prepared They had difficulty forming coalitions as new political organizations and NGOs bloomed in the heady days after President Aabibie raised the independence option Competing parochial interests of Timorese abroad and incountry undermined their effectiveness C Prospects Without strong civilian leadership the radical activists have filled the vacuum Putting the armed militias back in the bottle may be extremely difficult unless their leaders regional war lords in some cases are assured that their interests will be maintained-and that there is no retribution - No one in authority can provide those assurances at present 'It is very likely that the cycle of violence and intimidation will intensify and spread making it extremely difficult for the UN to proceed A neutral' presence on the ground appears essential to the restoration of stability and to facilitate aid but Jakarta may be increasingly resistant to such an outside presence if it interprets the current momentum as part of its winning strategy C CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu