UNCLASSIFIED United States Department of State Alas Won D C 20520 April 30 -1999 CONFIDENTIAL DELL 1 6X1 RELEASED IN FULL TO S WCI - Ambassador Scheffer FROM INR - Phylli SUBJECT Bast Timor-The-Worst Case Oakley You asked for a worst case scenario on East Timor and comments on a UN or Friends group response A worse case is for the Indonesian military to decide with or without Jakarta's political acquiescence to keep the province at all costs and undertake a massive-sweep against pro-independence activists and sympathizers This could result in significant deaths or disappearances Another bloody scenario is for pro-independence forces to expand guerrilla activity to include hit-and-run attacks or bombings directed at pro-Indonesian sympathizers and institutions C We cannot rule out either development but a more likely pattern is continuation of Indonesian intimidation and isolated attacks that cause pro-independence activists to go into hiding or appear to capitulate at least for the near term -A key determinant will be the size and credibility of 'neutral monitors or security forces on the ground Diplomatic actions against a weak central government more concerned with the national provincial parliamentary election in June and selection of a president in November will be of questionable value Even more problematic would be trying to get the government in Jakarta to stop the actions of an uncooperative military C The current tense atmosphere and uncertainty surrounding the autonomy vote will continue to breed violence between prointegration and pro- independence forces Those who have been displaced in the latest round of fighting number in the thousands The ICRC fears a recurrence of the tragedy experienced during military operations in 1975-79 when many deaths resulted from the absence of shelter food and medicine according to Embassy Jakarta Possible triggers that could set CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFIED BY Phyllis E Oakley REASON 1 5 c d UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN DATE CASE ID 31 MAR 2006 200300722 UNCLASSIFIED INR A S 2off even more widespread fighting include but are-riot limited to o Failure to finalize the autonomy plan at the upcoming May 5 UN-sponsored tripartite talks A bre_ai% dvvrn f the tripartite process over implementation of the direct ballot and modalities of a UN security presence which produces a further delay if not cancellation of the autonomy vote o A sudden announcement by President Habibie to withdraw military forces whether or not a UN security presence is on the ground o A UN security presence becomes the target of pro-integration militia attacks particularly if UN personnel suffer casualties and are forced to withdraw o The assassination of pro-independence activist Xanana Gusmao or one or both of the bishops in East Timor C The country-most able to intervene is Australia because it is proximate and has the military capacity to mobilize quickly However pro-East Timor independence domestic sentiment in Australia could constrain Canberra's ability to be perceived as a neutral peacemaker Moreover although the UN is-recognized by Indonesia as having a political role Jakarta's view on a security presence prior to the autonomy vote is still evolving The worst case scenario posits the Indonesian military resisting such a presence or seeking to restrict its activities on the ground In such a scenario the btoadest possible grouping of UN members and 'Friends' would be desirable C t CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu