MORI DocID- 1054667 ret G Intel j'e ce O b O O O Q C Q otn CI C7 o1 epor Office ofAsian Pacific and Latin American Analysis 10 May 1999 Indonesia Challenges Facing East Timor b 1 b 3 Summary The government's commitment to President Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated pledge to offer East Timor a choice between greater autonomy and quick independence has become less certain since the announcement in late January Reporting indicates a lack of consensus on the issue among key senior officials Lack offirm leadership from Jakarta has encouraged civilian militias and their prointegration supporters to continue attacking independence advocates throughout the province o Armed Forces Commander Wiranto's vow to enforce a recent ceasefire agreement has not stopped prointegration militias from continuing their campaign of violence and intimidation against independence supporters many of whom remain in hiding o The disarming ofall warring factions is crucial to ensuring a free andfair ballot but until genuine attempts at reconciliation commence and the military ends its tacit support of the militias East Timor's security situation will remain volatile Indonesian and Portuguese negotiators have agreed that the province will vote on its future on 8 August but if violence continues we cannot be confident that the polling process will take place or how orderly it will be o Sustained unrest could lead UN officials to preempt the ballot in August o A free andfair ballot will still require approval from Indonesia's newly formed national legislature which may not approve a close vote for independence APPROVED FOR DATE MAR 2 0 0 MORI DocID 1054667 Top eere Jakarta Sending Mixed Signals The Indonesian Government lacks a consensus on how to proceed with President Habibie's public pledge in late January to allow East Timor to become independent by yearend if the troubled province rejects autonomy o Some government ministers who previously supported independence now privately argue in favor of the autonomy option because they fear granting independence would trigger separatist outbreaks in other provinces wi n e ruling o ar p the issue o was complicating opposition a i ie's handling of Foreign Minister Alatas has had -severai Ire arguments wii presidential foreign affairs adviserDewi Fortuna Anwar-who helped formulate Habibie's autonomy proposal--over her involvement in East Timor policy In early April Alatas told her that she was damaging the Foreign Ministry's credibility because he and his Ministry repeatedly had to deal with repercussions from her unsanctioned statements to the media about the future of East Timor I Support for Habibie's East Timor initiative also appears tenuous among senior military officers including Armed Forces Commander Wiranto who has taken no action against the prointegration civilian militias or discipline against local military units that if not abetting have at the least tolerated these groups o Wiranto has repeatedly promised that the military is a neutral force but local commanders would have required at least tacit approval from headquarters in Jakarta to allow the militias the blatant free hand they have enjoyed- E ecurity authorities knew in advance abou a p anne rru i a rally on 17 April in the provincial capital of Dili permitted it to occur and were ineffective in curbing the violence that led to some 20 deaths military may be fhe s$exmg to-irnmT ng process in avor of the autonomy option by allowing the militias to create disturbances The military's z MORI DocID 1054667 Speculating on Habibie's Ulterior Motives Habibie's sudden and uncoordinated decision to offer independence to the East imorese is at a minimum characteristic of his mercurial leadership style his Tim conti nued neglect at keeping key players within the Indonesian Government in the loop on East Timor is exacerbating differences Habibie's initiative to allow the Time rese to determine their own future may have been designed only to improve his Timo own short-term political prospects Presidential foreign affairs adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar advocated autonomy in early 1999 According to Anwar independence was proposed to demonstrate I11ndonesia's donesia's democratic credentials and would be taken only if unspecified e efforts to sway proindependence East Timorese failed Csince iabibie has repeatedly told US and foreign officials s announcement inanuary J that Indonesia has no strategic economic p olitical or cultural interest in retaining East Timor The director of Indonesia's P ci civilian intelligence agency-who has close ties to Habibie-stated in midN arch however that Jakarta's offer of independence was for foreign M cConsumption only and did not reflect the government's true intentions which w ere to ensure the rovince remained part of Indonesia Fon f imor as a political p oy e President viewed his initiative esigne to improve his party's prospects in h the legislative elections in June by stifling international criticism that might beenefit opponents however Habibie would withdraw Jakarta's acquiescence to b an independence option upon securing the presidency later in the fall C MORI DocID strategy I into silence in epen ence ac vi s to kill drive out or intimidate and to cow the general population into acceptance of an East Timor under Jakarta's control That Cultivates Culture of Violence Jakarta's mixed signals coupled with local military support have encouraged the prointegration civilian militias to carry on a violent campaign against the independence movement in the last few months o The armed forces has trained and provided logistic support to manv of the militia units enabling these coordination As a result prointegrationist forces have been able to easily target independence supporters especially in the western districts of the province o The militias' leaders fear retribution by the majority proindependence population and are strongly motivated b desires to protect their wealth For their part many local military units have vested interests with and emotional ties to the militias The violence has not been entirely one sided but proindependence guerrilla attacks against the military and prointegrationists have been relatively restrained and rebels for the most part did not heed jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao's public call in early April for his supporters to take up arms in defense most of East Timor's proindependence maaerstrlg are ILI any guarantee from the police for their protection-and the failure of rebel forces to respond to militia aggression is partly due to the fact that they are now disorganized and on the defensive despite his call to arms Xanana remains commt e o a pat o peaceful dialogue His Jakarta-based advisers have subsequently directed his followers in East Timor to make 3 1054667 MORI DocID Security Arrangements for Ballot Remain Vague Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May signed an agreement setting 8 August as the date for the autonomy ballot and paving the way for the deployment of a small UN civilian monitoring force to oversee the polls These latest efforts however have side-stepped security arrangements for the ballot at the behest of Indonesia ortuguese officials allege that a miscommunication between their negotiating team and jailed rebel leader Xanana Gusmao led the Portuguese delegation to the UN talks to pay insufficient attention to the document on security The two sides failed to agree on joint disarmament by the rival factions-a crucial precondition to stopping the cycle of violence in the runup to the ballot Disarmament is only mentioned as something the recently established but not yet operational peace and stability commission should endeavor to achieve' o It is unclear who has responsibility to maintain security The draft initially required the Indonesian military to substantially reduce its presence in the province by July and the local police to take sole responsibility for maintaining law and order during the ballot process The arrangement now refers responsibility for security to the appropriate Indonesian security authorities Habibie has agreed publicly to include an international police force as part of the UN presence but insists they will act in an advisory role not as peacekeepers and be allowed only to carry handguns resident Habibie and Armed Forces Commander irano initially o us ian rime Minister Howard they could accept an international force of between 200 and 300 police but retreated from this number and allowed only that they would permit an adequate number 1054667 MORI DocID 1054667 Up c et whatever temporary accommodations necessary to stay alive until an international force establishes a more secure environment Radical elements within the insurgency however are likely to react if civilian militias continue their attacks despite the cease-fire signed on 21 April between proindependence and prointegrationist leaders and witnessed by Wiranto One Xanana adviser insists that rebel forces will not take action a ainst the militias without the approval of the jailed guerrilla leader Independence Not a Sure Bet most East Timorese would reject Indonesia's autonomy pac age m favor o indence if a free and fair ballot were held Independence supporters make frequent public assertions that the vast majority of East Timorese want independence most senior Indonesian officials in East Timor concede i is unlikely a a of will result in Jakarta's favor Proindependence Timorese could try to stage a boycott locally of the legislative elections in June to signal the province's opposition to integration with Indonesia The uncertainty of Indonesia's commitment to allowing East Timor to determine its future and the province's volatile security situation are key determinants of whether a free and fair ballot under UN auspices can take place in the province later this summer 'Several scenarios could develop that would derail the process toward independence Ballot is Postponed Continued violence could indefinitely autonomy proposal current conditions i ince cou prevent a po an in ourjlu gmen e ballot scheduled for 8 August could be pushed back even further if Jakarta cannot guarantee the security of UN personnel deployed to the province to oversee the polls o Continued attacks by rointe ration militias threaten to degenerate into' a protracted conflict ili has remained tense since the cease- ire tvi militias making house-to-house searches for independence supporters under cover of night The eports of prointegration violence outside oz t e prime ovinci capital u details remain vague as militia roadblocks prevent easy access to all parts of the province 4 MORI DocID Indonesia Critical Steps Toward an Independent East Timor - Indonesian military withdraws support from prointegration civilian militias to establish public faith in its neutrality End to Serious Viollence - Reconciliation talks involving proindependence and prointegration leaders resume - Rebel forces and -bivilian militias maintain ceasefire and disarm UN-Led Ba60ot oar Autonomy - UN and Indonesia agree to terms on security arrangements I - The ballot is widely perceived as free and fair - The ballot outcome is decisive in rejecting Jakarta's autonomy plan Legislative Decision I i - The legislative election on 7 June results in new Peoples' Consultative Assembly that is willing to rescind the annexation of East Timor 36919OPM4 99 1054667 MORI DocID __UpSemtr- Ballot Not Viewed As Free and Fair Expecting to win by a wide margin proindependence leaders are likely to view an outcome favoring autonomy as evidence of manipulation by prointegrationists Conversely prointegrationists could escalate violent attacks as a last-ditch response if the vote re'ects autonomy and East Timor apleared poised to be granted independence he UN will insist on a completely secret ballot so at neither individuals nor vi ages can be targeted for retribution on the basis of their voting pattern_ Legislature Rejects Ballot Results Even if East Timorese reject autonomy the newly formed Peoples' Consultative Assembly MPR still needs to revoke the nation's 1975 decree that integrated East Timor into Indonesia-an action that will revert the province to a UN-administered non-self-governing territory with Portugal as the administering power until which time it is declared independent The assembly would find it difficult to reject a ballot that indicated an overwhelming majority of East Timorese opposed the autonomy proposal but a close vote could provide enough cause for the assembly to abort the process and retain the province without risking international condemnation Opposition leader Megawati-who has criticized Habibie's East Timor policy--could emerge from the legislative elections in June as the leader of a coalition government and not feel bound by a ballot initiated by Habibie Partition of East Timor A less likely option for the MPR would be to partition the province with the western districts-where a majority of prointegrationist militias are located-remaining with Jakarta and the eastern portion becoming independent- Proindependence leaders however are unlikely to accept such a compromise and UN officials refused to consider a similar proposal made by prointegrationists in February 1054667 MORI DOCID 1054667 - - 7- 4 -- Mn 5' MORI DocID - _-_- r 's' i _ at u Ss - ' - o- 1 ' SUBJECT Indonesia Challenges Facing East Timor Pub Num 9840507 _ fz 'rt 4 - ET Distribution 1 TO T _ nx uCjC' y 1054667 MORI DocID TOP 'sfeRL ' SUBJECT Indonesia Challenges Facing East Timor Pub Num 98-40507 Distribution 2 - 1054667 MORI DocID _ '_ __ sv % o i Y _ _' -u' rort' ' y ty yt' TOP SUBJECT Indonesia Challenges Facing East Timor Pub Num 9940507 Distribution 3 TOPJECRET _ _ 2s G __W o o si' 1054667 _ _ _ _ _ This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu