Indonesia acid East Timor--Struggle for Control L 09 0--TJNCLASSIliW-Dvww state ic gov IA99 M990902a htm RELEASED DMIART SECRET B1 1 1 4 D INRAW of US_Deparbnent State Bureau ofIntelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment 09102 1999 Indonesia and East Timor--Struggle for Control U East Timor remains volatile with militia active in several locations attacking homes offices foreign and domestic journalists and other individuals seen as associated with the independence movement If there was political will the security forces on the ground would be able to restrain the militias Military forces to date have largely stayed out of the action giving the police full responsibility for law and order Additional police and armed forces arrived today However there continue to be mixed signals on how Jakarta intends to handle the militias and given the expectation of an overwhelming vote for independence the transition and withdrawal C Reining in the militias It is unclear whether Jakarta is now committed to restraining the militias it created Also unclear is whether the current rampages are part of a campaign to derail the 13rocess or reflect a last as by g- angs who fear the military will abandon them and the nature of the forces on the ground further B1 complicate the picture The police who have the primary responsibility for crowd control and protecting The UN Assistance Mission for East Timor UNAMET are afraid that the militias enjoy high-level military support from elements such as the' special forces Local battalions of East Timorese troops are suspected of being trying to undermine the independence sympathizers independence movement are working throughout the province S UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN 1 of 13ATE CASE ID 31 MAR 2006 200300722 UNCLASSIFIED 131 7 25 2005 3 05 PM Indonesia and East Timor--Struggle for Control U 09 OUNCLASSIFIWwww state-ic gov IA99 M990902a htm Moreover Indonesia's military is suffering significant morale problems Officers are questioning the current civilian leadership and pressures are mounting to resolve the more significant threat than East Timor--the growing rebellion in Aceh Even if the leadership issues clear orders implementing them on the ground may still be problematic In addition the potential for former pro-independence guerrillas to take -to theos reets should be fantorPni iritn tn 1anc fnr eS alnliA ntv crmur w e Political steps ahead Reporting suggests that Jakarta is resigned to a clear vote for independence But that does not guarantee smooth sailing through the political process The new assembly MPR which is scheduled to open October I and is charged with accepting or rejecting the vote may contain many who are highly more nationalistic including the large Megawati bloc Consideration of the Timor issue could be put off because it has no clearly defined place on the MPR agenda The delegates may decide they have higher priorities including choosing the next president C argue that Indonesians will be eager to put East Timor behind them an move smartly to bless the vote even designating January 1 as the transition date President Habibie could call a special MPR session for that purpose no evidence of planning for that Habibie is not very effective at only but swaying public opinion and no groundwork has been laid in Jakarta for losing Timor B1 B1 with honor C Pulling out Bl senior officers international image to refrain from an are sufficiently concerned about Indonesia's abrupt departure that would leave a security vacuum Although some Indonesian officials now talk about an eventual peacekeeping operation they remain opposed to the deployment of armed peacekeepers as long as East Timor remains in their view a sovereign part of the nation S Once the political formalities are worked out however and a peacekeeping operation authorized a rather rapid removal of Indonesian forces is Iikely favors an early and complete withdrawal probably because he is wary o leaving troops unprotected in a potentially hostile environment His more 2 of 3 UNCLASSIFIED B1 7 25 2005 3 05 PIN Indonesia and East Timor--Struggle for Control LTMCLASSIFIED http www state ic gov IA99 M990902a htm pressing concerns are Aceh Ambon and security for the MPR session in Jakarta Some of the ethnic East Timorese in the two native battalions may opt--or be allowed--to remain as part of a fledgling East Timorese defense force but they would be suspected of being a fifth column working for Indonesia's return S SECRET INR Home Page I Briefs I Intel Assessments I Viewpoints 1 Products by date Products by country 3 of3 UNCLASSIFIED 7 25 2005 3 05 PIV This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu