Indonesia East Timor Roads Not Taken C 09 08 1999 UNCLASSIFtfp 'Wstate ic govaA99 m990908a htm CONFIDENTIAL RELEASED IN PART B l 1 4 D US Department of State Bureau ofIntelligence and Research Intelligence Assessment 0910811999 Indonesia East Timor Roads Not Taken C The Indonesian Government had at least three operational plans under consideration for East Timor although security forces now appear intent on the third option using a show of force to retain the province Common denominators underlay each approach C 1 The original public plan As enunciated by the Foreign Ministry and senior civilian and military leaders Indonesia would evacuate non- East Timorese and those Timorese loyal to the Indonesian regime reduce the military in a phased withdrawal maintain security for the ever-growing foreign presence continue aid until March 2000 and cooperate in a peaceful transition U 2 Cut and run Evacuate non-East Timorese and those loyal to the Indonesian regime and expeditiously remove security forces and infrastructure belonging to Jakarta Subplan A was a relatively orderly withdrawal that left a primitive but operational infrastructure in the hands of the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor UNAMET Subplan B had the Indonesians trashing East Timor as they left but still with the intent of handing things over to the UN C UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY MURRAY D ZINOMAN I of 3 ATE CASE ID 31 MAR 2006 200300722 UNCLASSIFIED 7 25 2005 3 20 PM 1ndonesia East Timor Roads Not Taken C 09 08 1999UNCLAS SIFIfBjp www state ic gov U99 m990908a htm 3 Discredit the vote and retain the province Engage in various measures to undermine the credibility of the vote and retain control working from a pro-Jakarta beachhead in the western part of the province or in Timor Barat western Timor if necessa B1 Common denominators All three approaches have common underlying traits o resentment of foreign i e Western interference and a feeling of victimization by the media o a belief that the UN and foreign observers were biased and that the election was not fair o hostility toward the ungrateful Timorese o a military that can operate outside of civilian leadership B1 o the absence of effective civilian leadership in Jakarta in the executive or legislative branches o the absence of a critical mass of civilians willing to defy the government and demand Timorese independence C What's viable Even if Option #2 were restored elements in the security forces would remain committed to retaining East Timor and seek to sabotage the transition and eventual independent government Security forces continue to see the danger of a slippery slope for other regions in Indonesia demonstrating the costs of breaking with Jakarta is a consistent theme Despite international opprobrium Indonesia appears UNCLASSIFIED 2 of 3 7 25 2005 3 20 Ply hdonesia East Timor Roads Not Taken C 09 08 1999 UNCLASSIF www state ic gov IA90 M990908a htm unlikely to reinvite a UN presence until the authorities are comfortable that a second vote would support integration It is unclear what level of economic and political pressure would bring about the sea change necessary for- Jakarta to take Option 2 seriously C f19P not rs rno-%r 77nAArct%TiA u r ii vade nt n1 llo1tP T'1't' 1 1f1T1 1 TaYY1111C tln'I'1C of p irsiying ration 3 but some are impotent -and others see the interests of national unity and their p nrrat' survivaunny s overriding None of the current or BI would be leaders have solid backing with suspicions fractured institutions and competing agendas complicating the political scene and making it difficult for outsiders to identify the power center much less to change behavior C CONFIDENTIAL INR Horne Page I Briefs I Intel Assessments I Viewpoints I Products by date Products by country I of l UNCLASSIFIED' 7 25 2005 3 20 PIS This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu