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333011 Lo r'ji Gr rtiel 323930 1 a ha 3m is 313 3333 m2 5313 533 9 331 333335115 5 23533 03 out theoretim Eugen Nativn Declrrao $33 w53s anJ t33 MP 3me a 33333 matv Shad no 33 3319 marina 3 means of a vtruution in our 33 toward ewmr5v Puma at all ihre- R31 3on Declaran germ ne interu ti e we ayatem of to change 93 135ml 3n the Since Lhat an effective prepav d $3 3333 HG 3314153 In 9 3631313 narefully TOP SECRET A A thorityUM 7 a 151- m SECRET cayefully an with goud will any proposals for an effec- tive an system for the international cantrol of atomic energy and to enter into arrangements which embody the essential safe uards approved by the United ations Gene al Assembly 9 will this cause any change in the dameatic atomic Energy program Although we shall naturally have be ruexamine the domestic Erogram in the light of this deve10 memt it is not prsbable that there will have to be any mateyial modification of it 10 what i the state of our defense againgt atemic attack gaithin the limitation imposed by the budgez priori ieS have been established for all our military tanks in $336 we are involved in war The efenaa of she nited States is our primary basic under- taking and 13 being made in meeting our defense requiranenta 8% eatablished by the Department of Defense Concomitant with this task of course 13 the offenaive task of retaliation It would nab be compatible with 3 3 matimmal interests an give Eartha informa cian 33 this mat r 11 Does this increase the danger of war The Ginger of war does not spring from the 39119193 of the guinea dba ae and tha ether damacraciea The Unit d States will cantinue 83 make every effort t0 avoid war by observing-faithfully the provisions of the Charter cf the Uni ed Katina both in letter aha in spirit Ever - 39 knows tha aha preparation for aggreaalve war is twaossiblc in a denocracy and even more so in a co 1itian a demccracies If there is danger cf war it atema from the actltudes and palicies of Mb have no means or kgavfng what 13 in the minds of the m n who con rol the of the dowiet nion We anemia rememb r that th n re fact that a cannery might have the ability to make a bomb wau d nut in itaelf be an assurance t0 that country 9f cve3 all military supar10 1ty The belief cf thi Governms t 13 that war 1S net inevitable and our policiex ccn inve to be directm BO its avoidance 12 In what way has this development been taken into account in cur basic policy Au stated in the President's anueunceman we have always known that efforts wauid be ma a t9 develop this wcapon and it has been no secret that such efforts were in progreas in the dovies Union IOP SECRET IDECLASSIFIED Authority j 7a 2 57 TOP SECRET 1 It hag been for this reaaon amang etherss that we hmv laid such great erphasis on the naceasity far a firm an durable syatem of peaceful relatiexauips betwena he na- tiuzs of the worlu a d that we hava made such effort and such Sacrifices to this end We have consisteauly rec ained Even basing 032 inn policies on a manogoly of the weapen and have endeavored to f ame them throughsuc with a le% ta their validity in a period whan that manogoly would n5 longer exlgt we hava tried to make our military posturn cue which uaml be an effective deterrent to aggression whether or not othera had the atomic weapon The atomic barb must always be ju ge not $3 an isolated weapon but in the general framewavk of the relative m111 tary capabilities 0 countries United 3tatea policies in helping the econom of Euvopean countrlea 1n articipating in the Atlantic Fact and in considering a program of miliaaxw'assietance to othe aationa have all tende to increase the strength_of this sountry 13 re the preSQns talks with the Eritiah and the Canadians an atomic energy ccnnectea with this developmant Obviously it has he be taken into accornt in aur delibeyau ticns ith the Cana ians an the British but the discuasicns were scheduled for anather purpase l 14 Boea this mean that g will change on atomic g evgy yolicy with re pect ta ne British and the ana ians efini ely not This develoyment the need fer the vational and economic utilizatimn of the resauroea available to the hvee countries in the field of atomic euevgy and we have this eonai eragion p ominently in mind in the resent di ausuiona 15 Did the Eritish and the Gana ivna knaw about this tea hey have a same lufarnation we have 16 Does hia affect the Atlantic Pact qr our rela- tisnahips with the Atlantic Fact countries iYea It driveg heme harder than ever the need for the closest collaboration an mutual confidence amang them It is in no sense a the Enited tates alone There coul be nothing which could demanstrate more forcefully the need for tyne international collaboration of which the Atlantic Pact is a living example h13 alga brings out a3 nothing else could the importance to the United States of strangthening these countries 3 Haw TOP SECRET DE CLASSIFIED MN TOP SECRET lg 11 Raw will this affect he It aff cts it onlv in 39 1a as it crease need for such a pragIam Our lcn 33- -zange m31 tarv objec 1ve3 will 1a ve been met only when al 1es sirerauncnhi through the military Assist anca new i wluvcd t0 the maximum extent possible their a 1icv go a aaist 1n maintaini peace and securit I a 13 ew can our allieu in western Europe con ribute to am 32 93uac mow th t he Russians nave 3 19 atomic lamb The a ca-- bomb 13 19 ana other weapen has to be used pru antly and ha beeke an by acequ te overoall militar strength in orde ta assure 1%11 1 superlority in war ax immun tv against disastrous cataliation But these things in tuzn depe nd 2z5kn over all rslative military potential of tile parties so a coufli et vehich is based on their aca- 250m c and pali ical zealth and weli being The stronger the membva of She Aslantiu act use individually and ccllecti'w 13 in uver a11 eco atm ic and militax-y pcte tial which inciuies many 1 actoxs besides the atomi ham 3 the 133 the lizelihocd tha thLa weapon will ever be used againdt an ham 19 2 gun 319w this develogment with alaII ENG not with a13rm We axe naturally conceyned that this Heapjn should $935 3138c sha hands of a nation whosz policlea have been in many a v t0 Jorld Stability while they 13 as yet n0 yubem of In ernutional cantroln He havr ratez- 330133 thaw is inevitable WI as not think th39 of thie weapon nesessarily make war mere Id ujee We nauat never fchei shat the weapon 1 11u19 aa iu is 13 cal one 21Iment in 110 9011 12631 and military realitiea I h ch 01 11n1ng the Bee of this countyy 1n 1t$t1f it n 13nex cunfera on its pugze 'or any guarantee of acni v 12 v csury nor prcv3 aca insurance against reialja tlon I we carry on figmlv and calmly with war or 9011- ciez iractzd an the II'Iatinn of 1 ar and to the deierring of aggrammiam 3h att 1mm iant risks whf ch are in any c 113 unuvcl able are to rzea er than those which a nation must ezyCus 3n 3 r 1 to Ixerciae leadership in the quest far peace aha prags s in the modern warld we muat remember that thera is no such thing aa security in th tn worl IBRJ never has b en Security is relativeq The fact we are u longer the sole passeasors of the atomic wesran zhau3 d be a source of renewed to make war may 01 itable and therefore unliicely ana to pr to the pIoplea 91 she world that there are better Solutions TOP SECRET 1311c LASSIFIED Authority IJ Hi I 7 Eglg'f TOP SECRET 30116101 to human than those of laa Jna1io1qg violenee 20 Do 301 expc 13 any changes in Soviet policy as a regult c r th 3 he e net knew Yen will Eacall that when we firat anxolc 23 this President Truman 1 his address be ne nation on 9 19%5 acknowl @5363 our tsp0n31b111uJ to ne res of the wovld for the use which might be 1 ae of this Unaron He described hia as an 1 ul 330u33b111ty which has came to ua and said that as 11-30 1eraairLta ourselves trustees cf zuzw foraew to pxe vent 113 misuse and t9 turn it into '53 channels of sgrvi e Eu We 1ait to see whe hLI thy ccnaciousness 3f possessing this terrible and de1truet 1 aw we apon W111 bring to tile oviet leaders somvthing of 111% game seuae of responsibilicy t0 the a 3213 and rhethnr they will now join with ua and owner natimna a a reneV seaveh for wavs of prou ta sing h1 aanlty agaid t si n den mbzwer Qi this TOP SECRET This document is from the holdings of The National Security Archive Suite 701 Gelman Library The George Washington University 2130 H Street NW Washington D C 20037 Phone 202 994-7000 Fax 202 994-7005 nsarchiv@gwu edu